

## I. Introduction

The capture of the capital of Ethiopia by Eritrean separatists and other groups may lead to an unprecedented event in Africa: a successful secession. A similar event may be occurring in Somalia as rebels have taken control of the northern part of the country, declaring independence as the new sovereign state of Somaliland. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia's breakdown seems imminent as Hungary provides small arms to Croatian separatists. Finally, though the Gulf War ended, the Kurdish struggle for autonomy has continued. These events demonstrate the tenacity of ethnic conflict and the nature of such conflicts to draw in other states. In the post-Cold War era, the international consequences of ethnic conflict need to be studied.

In this study, the foreign policy of secession--how states relate to separatist movements in other countries--will be examined. A puzzle needs to be explained: why have some states chosen to violate one of the most fundamental norms of international relations, that of territorial integrity, by aiding secessionist movements? Conversely, some states have upheld this norm by restraining aid to such groups rather than follow material or strategic interests. This project will analyze exactly why the policies towards secessionists have varied over time and across states.

Since the boundaries of African states rarely coincide closely with ethnic, tribal, religious, and linguistic divisions, theorists have sought to understand why these borders have been maintained since the decolonization and why no secessionist movement has yet succeeded. There have been few significant changes in these "arbitrary" boundaries, drawn by the colonial powers, since decolonization. The norm of territorial integrity and the prohibition of support for separatism has been recognized by the Organization of African Unity [OAU] and many African states, though some separatist movements have received support. The question of boundary maintenance in Africa, therefore, is an interesting one, but can only provide a limited understanding of the international relations of boundaries and secession.

The focus of most studies has been on the maintenance of boundaries in Africa, so theorists have not analyzed violations of territorial integrity, not even those occurring in Africa itself.<sup>1</sup> In South Asia, for instance, there has been less respect for the existing boundaries. Not only have there been three Indo-Pakistani wars and a Sino-Indian war over boundary disputes, but support for secessionist movements has been the norm rather than restraint. In order to understand why most African states have not given aid to separatists, one must analyze states that have aided secessionists. A theory or model can not be considered very helpful if it accounts for only one of many possible outcomes. Since policy towards such movements does vary both in and outside of Africa, an analysis of the international politics of secession must consider both support for and restraint of aid to separatists.

In this proposal, I will address two sets of theoretical issues: regime formation and strength in the issue-area of boundaries and the foreign policy consequences of internal conflict. By examining the literature concerning these two topics, I plan to show how an analysis focused on the domestic incentives and constraints politicians face may either supplement or supplant existing arguments.

After reviewing the literature, I will develop my own model of the interaction between political institutions and ethnic cleavages within developing states and the impact this interaction has on policies towards secessionists in other countries since decolonization.<sup>2</sup> I will then discuss how international institutions may or may not influence the policy-making of states. Finally, I will discuss the methods that I will use to analyze this puzzle.

## **II. The Relevant Literature**

Several studies have focused on the constraining influence of international organizations on the policies of African states towards separatist movements. This body of literature is

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<sup>1</sup> Violations of territorial integrity are not the same as changes in boundaries. Violations can be considered to be efforts to change boundaries, such as invasions or aid to secessionists.

<sup>2</sup> By ethnic constituencies, I am referring to political groups organized along societal divides such as race, religion, language, kinship, et al. I will be using "communal" and "ethnic" synonymously in this project.

important for my study as it represents the conventional wisdom concerning these issues: common vulnerability to secessionism and ethnic conflict has led to cooperation in preventing aid from reaching separatist movements. The resulting regional and international institutions have prevented the boundaries from being changed and secessionists from being supported. If I intend to challenge these accepted beliefs, I must address such analyses.

Other theorists have sought to understand the foreign policy consequences of conflicts internal to states. Their studies have examined whether internal conflict leads to external aggression: do leaders use aggressive foreign policy to unify domestic support? This literature is equally critical for my study as my model will suggest that, under certain conditions, politicians will choose to support secession abroad as part of a strategy of enhancing their own political positions at home.

Both the international cooperation and the quantitative comparative foreign policy literature tend to ignore the incentives and opportunities elites face as a result of political institutions and/or societal structures. Such approaches may explain why the policies of states conform and converge, but not why they differ.<sup>3</sup> I argue that only by considering the incentives leaders face in each state will we be able to understand why policies towards secessionists have varied. The key, that I present, is that the domestic politics of some states provide incentives to develop international institutions to contain secessionists while leaders in other states have a political interest in aiding separatist movements outside their own polities.

### **A. Theories of International Cooperation**

An analysis of the international relations of secession may have broader implications for international relations theory by addressing the origins as well as the relevance of international organizations for the maintenance of boundaries. Not only is there considerable variation in the forms of international organization across regions, but the influence of such organizations may

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<sup>3</sup> See Waltz 1979, 74, for a discussion of systemic theory and its ability to explain similarities and variations.

vary as well. How and why do those institutions influence the policy-making of elites within states? By considering the domestic political interests of leaders, I will seek to understand why international cooperative efforts are desired as well as how such efforts influence the decision-making processes within states.

This analysis will shed new light on the issue of international cooperation because the method I plan to apply in this study will be different from those used in the past. Most studies of cooperation have focused on multiple issue areas and have contrasted the levels of cooperation across issue areas.<sup>4</sup> My method will be innovative in that I will hold the issue area constant, i.e. policies towards secessionists and boundary maintenance, while varying the regions that will be studied. By doing so, I hope to understand why cooperation differs across regions, which, in turn, should say something about what kinds of domestic conditions or international environments are more or less conducive to cooperation among states.

This literature review will first examine the debate concerning the role and nature of international regimes and their influence on the politics and policies of states. I will then discuss the works that actually address the maintenance of boundaries.

### *1. International Regimes and Foreign Policy*

During the past fifteen years, theorists of international relations have examined the impact of regimes on cooperation and conflict among states.

Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice (Krasner 1983a, 2).

Regimes are said to facilitate cooperation by reducing transaction and information costs, by defining common expectations around which behavior converges, and/or by regulating the behavior of states. However, the independent impact of regimes is in question. Haggard and

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 1989.

Simmons (1987) "... ask how and whether regimes 'matter.' So far, little research addresses this problem. Testing for the significance of regimes--even to verify international systemic theories--demands careful tracing of *national* level processes, structures, and values." (Original italics, 492)

How do international regimes influence the domestic politics and foreign policies of states, and how do the domestic politics of states affect the development of international regimes? Previous studies have focused on the relative power of states, the rational interests of states, and the influence of ideas and knowledge on cooperation, but have generally treated the state only as a unified, rational actor.<sup>5</sup>

Krasner (1983b) does present several ways in which regimes affect the policies of states: regimes can change the calculations of interests, alter the interests themselves, act as a source of power, and/or change the power capabilities of states. Regimes can influence the decisions of leaders of states by altering the costs and benefits they face, as the result of the existence of the regime. The development of a regime can make defection and/or building a new one more expensive, thus constraining policy-makers.

Regimes can alter the interests of states as "the regime promotes the interests of some groups and damages the interests of others (Krasner 1983b, 363)." The activities and policies of a regime may provide benefits to certain groups within states that not only create a greater demand for the regime, but also strengthen such groups vis-a-vis others within the polity.

Regimes can also serve as a power resource by increasing the influence of weaker states and constraining the influence of more powerful states (Krasner 1983b, 364). The existence of rules and institutions enable weaker states to have a voice, and, sometimes, a vote.

For my work, it is interesting to consider how regimes can serve as a source of power for leaders within their states, as opposed to relative power among and between states. Activity and influence within international organizations may serve to strengthen the political positions of

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<sup>5</sup> See Haggard and Simmons (1987) for a review of the structural, game-theoretic, functional and cognitive approaches to regimes. Also see Krasner, ed. *International Regimes*.

elites at home. Being a powerful leader in a regional organization may increase a politician's own popularity domestically. Further, participation in such institutions may increase national identity at the expense of more fragmentary identities, such as language or kinship. On the other hand, activity in particular institutions may highlight a certain cleavage upon which the leader's support is based, such as the Arab League and Pan-Arab unity.

"Current theories of international regimes have ignored domestic political processes.... This neglect has extended to the issue of how regimes actually influence national policy choices, a question closely related to the issue of compliance and regime strength (Haggard and Simmons 1987, 513)." In this dissertation, the relationship between domestic politics, particularly the interaction between ethnic politics and political institutions, and international organizations will be analyzed to determine whether regimes matter, and if so, how they influence domestic politics and foreign policy.

## *2. Juridical Statehood and Boundary Maintenance*

Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg argue that one can explain the continued existence of African states that lack the empirical requisites of statehood by analyzing the role played by juridical statehood and the norms of international society.<sup>6</sup> Empirical statehood, as defined by Weber and others, requires centralized control of the means of force and an ability to exercise control of a territory. Jackson asserts that most sub-Saharan states have lacked these attributes at one time or another without ceasing to exist.

Instead, the juridical nature of statehood explains why such states have continued to exist and remained intact. "According to Brownlie, the juridical attributes of statehood are 'territory' and 'independence' (as recognized by the international community)." (Jackson and Rosberg 1982a, 13). The important aspect of this understanding of statehood is the role played by the international society, which supports the rights of states, including the right to non-interference and territorial integrity--i.e. the maintenance of existing boundaries.

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<sup>6</sup> See especially Jackson and Rosberg 1982a, and Jackson 1990.

Why has the international society been able to play such a role in decolonized Africa?

The most important conditions that have contributed to this phenomenon appear to be: the ideology of Pan-Africanism; the vulnerability of all states in the region and the insecurity of statesmen; the support of the larger international society, including its particular institutions and associations; and the reluctance, to date, of non-African powers to intervene in the affairs of African states without being invited to do so by their governments. (Jackson and Rosberg 1982a, 17)

Separatist movements have generally been unable to get support from other African states as well as from outside powers, because of international society's prohibition on changing existing boundaries, it is argued.

Jackson's and Rosberg's argument is a very interesting application of Neo-Grotian theory to the actual practice of states and the international community.<sup>7</sup> Their discussion of the dual nature of statehood, empirical and juridical, contains keen insights into the nature of sovereignty. However, their main argument is flawed. Not only do they beg some crucial questions, but, more importantly, the analysis of the conditions strengthening the international community's role in Africa is problematic at best. This analysis, therefore, cannot explain the behavior of states in other regions, as well as why some states violate the norms inside Africa itself.

Jackson and Rosberg argue that "Almost without exception, the Pan-Africanists came to realize that freedom could in practice only be achieved within the existing framework of the colonial territories that the Europeans established (1982a, 18)." They assert that Pan-African ideology played a crucial role in maintaining the borders of the newly decolonized states.

The problem here is that Pan-Africanism was both a source of conflict between the leaders of independence movements and the new states and a motivating force against colonial institutions. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, there was a deep divide between radical and conservative African leaders, with the radicals advocating various schemes of union and federation while the conservatives pushed for a recognition of existing boundaries.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, efforts at Pan-Arab unity have shown that such ideologies can be a threat to the

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<sup>7</sup> For the Neo-Grotian approach, see Bull 1977 and Wight 1977.

<sup>8</sup> For an excellent account, see Touval 1972, esp. chap. 3.

territorial integrity of states. Although the formation of the OAU and the subsequent declarations of territorial integrity recognized the existing boundaries and was a victory for the conservative leaders, it was not an inevitable outcome of Pan-African ideology, and, therefore, still needs to be explained.

Jackson and Rosberg assert that "there is a common interest in the support of international rules and institutions and state jurisdictions in the African region that derives from the common vulnerability of states and the insecurity of statesmen (1982a, 18)." This argument makes two very questionable and very important assumptions: that African states are similarly fragile and that vulnerability presents African leaders with similar opportunities and constraints.

All African states are not similarly vulnerable to internal ethnic conflict. Though most are subject to such strife, the nature and intensity of such conflict vary from state to state and over time. While Nigeria, for instance, fought a bloody civil war to prevent a communal group from seceding in the late 1960s, the biggest threat in the late 1970s was corruption rather than ethnicity.

As the discussion below of the foreign policy consequences of internal conflicts will suggest, vulnerability by itself says little about the policies leaders choose to deal with their fragile positions and states. Leaders may opt for external aggression in order to unify a divided society, or they may opt to acquiesce, depending on the nature of the internal conflict they face and their own political interests. Neo-Grotian theory, like many others, ignores the possibility that states have more than one choice, that there are many different strategies a state might follow when seeking to ensure its own security and that there are many choices available to politicians seeking to remain in power.

The Neo-Grotian approach also assumes that common interests will lead to cooperative outcomes.

The new statesmen are understandably united and determined to bar ethnonationalities from the club because if they were admitted it would involve loss of jurisdiction over the territories in question and remaking of international frontiers which, in turn, would threaten international order. (Jackson 1990, 42)

This argument suggests that unity among African leaders developed due to a common threat, understating the existence of real conflict among African leaders. The formation of the OAU was certainly not inevitable, and the attempts at formation of similar organizations elsewhere have generally failed despite the existence of common threats and mutual interests. As the game theory and collective action literature have shown, states may share interests, but still compete for the greater portion of benefits or they may refuse to bear the costs of cooperation, hoping to free-ride on the efforts of others.

Jackson and Rosberg also argue that African decolonization occurred when international society was highly organized and integrated. "Membership in such associations [as the UN, the Lome Convention, the British Commonwealth, et al.] is an acknowledgment of the existence of the member states and of their international rights and duties...(1982a, 20)." Unfortunately, they fail to discuss how international recognition fits into the decision-making calculations of states.

Crucial questions about the functioning of international society are ignored. How does international society influence the decisions of states? Some states violate the norms of international society, including that of territorial integrity by supporting secessionist movements, but Neo-Grotian theory does not adequately explain why these states would do so. Though they can explain the South Africa's violations as the transgressions of an anti-social (or sociopathic) state (1982a, 21), it hardly explains the behavior of Somalia and Tanzania, not to mention Pakistan and India. This argument also ignores the interesting question of why some states are anti-social in the first place (though South Africa is an easy example to explain).

What happens to the violators of norms--are they sanctioned by the international community? If so, how? Was Tanzania punished for recognizing Biafra? Was India sanctioned for aiding the Bengalis? If so, this would provide stronger evidence for the Neo-Grotian argument, but Jackson and Rosberg fail to ask these questions. If violators are not punished, then how do international norms and the society of states actually influence the behavior of states? The resulting fundamental flaw in Neo-Grotian theory is that it claims that states have certain

obligations and duties within international society, but does not explain why or how states "feel" obligated or why states have different levels of attachment to international norms.

### *3. Specific Reciprocity and International Regimes*

Jeffrey Herbst (1989) compares the formation of African boundaries by the colonial powers in the 1885 with the recognition of those boundaries by newly independent African states.<sup>9</sup> He argues that politicians in both situations faced similar interests and obstacles: the motivation to avoid war, and the problems of defining boundaries in a continent without clear dividing demographic, ethnographic or topographic formations. Herbst argues that both the Berlin Conference of 1885 and the OAU designed simple decision rules to overcome the problems of administration and weak institutionalization.

Rather than having either to extend administrative control over broad territories or to go to war to define boundaries, the colonial powers decided on control of coastal regions as being sufficient for delineating large sections of Africa. After decolonization, African leaders found control over the capital city of a territory, surrounded by colonial boundaries, to be sufficient (1989, 687).

I find his argument to be an excellent explanation of why particular rules and institutions were chosen. However, his analysis of the desires of African leaders to cooperate is problematic. He argues that African states were too weak institutionally to exert control over territory within their own boundaries, not to mention administering territories beyond the existing borders. In addition, the costs and uncertainties of war were too great, especially the possible "echo effects" of other states also forcing changes in their boundaries.

While I agree that African leaders sought to avoid war, this did not mean that they could not support secessionist movements. Herbst, however, seems to consider only Somali-like irredentist invasions, rather than support for secessionist movements, as boundary changing behavior or violations of territorial integrity. He asserts that: "African leaders were also

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<sup>9</sup> This article also has a very intriguing discussion on the impact of boundaries upon identity formation, see p.680.

unwilling to resort to war as a way of determining boundaries because leaders recognized at the onset, as the OAU charter indicates, that the violent redrawing of boundaries would threaten their own positions."(Herbst 1989, 685) Yet aiding secessionist movements in other states does not require the material or institutional resources need for war nor does it imply the grave costs that war may entail.

Herbst, though he discusses war as a means of strengthening domestic institutions,<sup>10</sup> does not consider any other means of mobilizing one's supporters domestically through foreign policy. He does consider the influence of the domestic pursuit for power on boundary maintenance, but he does not view support for secession as a tool of communal mobilization.

Herbst uses Robert Keohane's notion of specific reciprocity to strengthen his argument.<sup>11</sup> "The reciprocal agreement followed by the independent African states is the same as that followed by the European colonialists: one nation will not attack or be attacked as long as minimal domestic administrative presence is demonstrated (1989, 689)." The behavior of each African state is contingent on the behavior of the other states: each will cooperate as long as the others cooperate.

However, "specific reciprocity is not a sure-fire recipe for promoting cooperation (Keohane 1986, 27)." Specific reciprocity can lead to either mutual cooperation or mutual recrimination. The interesting question is why cooperation, as in Africa, rather than a feud, as in South Asia, develops, and specific reciprocity cannot predict which outcome will occur nor explain why.

Another problem lies in one of the key assumptions of specific reciprocity (and neo-functionalism in general): one of the conditions is "the extent to which the players have interests in common (Keohane 1986, 24)." Assuming common interests begs the most important and interesting question: why do particular states have common interests and are willing to cooperate?

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<sup>10</sup> See Herbst 1990 as well as the conclusion of Herbst 1989.

<sup>11</sup> See Keohane 1986.

Herbst, like Jackson and Rosberg, argues that all African leaders face a similar threat, causing them to develop a common incentive to cooperate. As I have argued, this dissertation will examine how leaders facing a generally similar threat respond differently, contingent on the varying incentives and constraints that the threat poses to individual politicians. All, or most, African leaders face the problems of divided societies and weak polities, but that does not indicate that they have common interests since many possible strategies are available to them, including support of secessionists in other states.

### **B. The Foreign Policy Consequences of Internal Conflict**

This dissertation will address another important debate in the international relations literature: what are the foreign policy consequences of internal conflict?<sup>12</sup> Some theorists have argued that divided states will be more willing to cooperate internationally because they are vulnerable while others have argued that such states may attempt to be aggressive externally as "... elites may attempt to divert domestic discontent ... toward external targets (Russett 1990, 123)."

While most of these studies are severely flawed,<sup>13</sup> they do begin with an intriguing question: do states facing internal conflict behave more aggressively internationally than other states? Several of the studies start with a similar social psychological premise: "Conflict with out-groups increases internal cohesion (Coser 1956, 87)." These studies then go on to argue that politicians may understand this phenomenon, and will act aggressively abroad in order to create menacing "out-groups", resulting in stronger domestic cohesiveness. The findings of these

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<sup>12</sup> The quantitative comparative foreign policy school focused on this debate in the 1970's, and these issues still contested today. For various examples, see Wilkenfeld 1973, 1980; Hanrieder 1971; Stohl 1980; and Geller 1985.

<sup>13</sup> See Rummel 1973, for a classic study in this field that has been the model, rightly or wrongly, for many later works.

For an excellent review and critique of "diversionary" theories of war, see Levy 1989, and for a critique of the literature on domestic politics and war, see Levy 1988. Also see Scolnick 1974; Hazelwood 1975; Mack 1975; and Stein 1976.

studies are mixed, with some theorists finding positive correlations, others finding negative correlations, and many finding no relationship at all between internal and external conflict.

The most interesting aspect of these studies for my purposes is how they address internal conflicts. Specifically, they do not differentiate states by levels or kinds of domestic conflicts. "Little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kinds of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to the security of political elites (Levy 1989, 283)." These studies merely start with states that are suffering from internal conflict.

Why should all leaders react to internal conflict in the same way? Elites have more than one option when making policies, and since internal conflict comes in many forms, providing politicians with different opportunities and varying constraints, the results of the statistical analyses in these studies rarely provide meaningful insights.

My analysis will differ from these previous studies by examining those interests politicians face as a result of the communal composition of the politically relevant constituencies in states, i.e. the racial, religious, etc. makeup of the crucial groups supporting the politician, and the relationship of these constituencies to the government, through political institutions such as electoral mechanisms and bureaucratic organizations.

Another crucial problem in this literature is the specification of "aggressive" foreign policies. Including in their dependent variable are foreign policy actions including: numbers of antforeign demonstrators, of negative sanctions, of protests, of countries with which diplomatic relations are severed, of ambassadors expelled or recalled, of threats, of wars, and of people killed in all forms of foreign conflict behavior (Rummel 1973). In order to get meaningful findings, the dependent variable must be defined clearly and linked logically to the rest of the argument.

In my dissertation, the dependent variable will be clearly specified as support for secessionist movements, only one form of foreign policy. Support for secessionists will defined as the provision of bases, military aid, and/or diplomatic recognition (*de jure*). Direct

intervention, i.e. invasions, will be considered if they are in support of existing secessionist or irredentist movements in the target state. Thus, India's intervention in East Pakistan to aid the Bengals does count as supporting secession while Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia does not.

Unilateral attempts to stop aid from reaching secessionists in other countries or attempts to develop either bilateral or multilateral agreements to prohibit support for secessionists will then be seen as not aggressive since the target states of the secessionists will view such behavior favorably.

These definitions reveal a problem: terms like peaceful and aggressive tend to be normative--they often depend crucially on where one stands on the issue. Although substituting the words cooperate and defect for peaceful and aggressive may seem like semantics, they are more useful for consistent analysis. Supporting secession can then be seen as defecting from the preferences of the target state of the separatists while not aiding such movements or acting against them can be interpreted as cooperation.

My dissertation will, therefore, be much narrower than previous studies of the foreign policy of internal conflict. I will be addressing a distinct issue area, territorial integrity, rather than foreign policy in general. This should provide more determinate results and insights than the literature on internal/external conflict because my independent variables will be theoretically linked to my dependent variable, which will be clearly defined, as I isolate a distinct realm of issues.

Some might argue that such a study will not provide much insight into the broader issues of war and peace. I believe this an incorrect assumption for several reasons. First, the support given to secessionist movements does have a major impact on how successful such groups will be. Understanding how such assistance is given or blocked will aid in comprehending the dynamics of civil wars.

Secondly, civil wars can expand beyond the boundaries of individual states, especially if other states provide bases for the secessionists, or if other states intervene more directly, as India did in the case of the secession of Bangladesh. By analyzing the international relations of

secession, I may be able to say something about the causes and the likelihood of certain interstate wars, though not all wars. By undertaking a more limited examination of internal divisions and external behavior, I should, in fact, be able to offer more interesting predictions and explanations than those who have concentrated on a more general analysis of the foreign policy of the internal conflict.

### **III. The Interaction of Communal Organization and Political Institutions**

My model, by focusing on the domestic incentives and constraints determined by the relationship between communal divides and political institutions, offers a better understanding of behavior towards boundary changing efforts, specifically support given to or containment of secessionists. I shall focus on how the interaction between ethnic identity and domestic political structures influences the nature of political competition and the strategies and resources elites use to maintain and enhance their own political positions. Specifically, the communal composition, or ethnic makeup, of particularly important political structures will shape a politician's interest in stressing or in de-emphasizing certain ethnic identities, which, in turn, affects policies towards secessionist movements in other states.

#### **A. Communal Organization**

To understand why some states support secessionists while others do not, one must look at the communal politics within each state. "*Ethnic diversity exists historically and can be mobilized to and for the purposes of political competition* (Ronen 1987, 101, original italics)." By analyzing the strategies politicians follow in the course of competing for office and influence and how ethnic cleavages serve as both resource and constraint, this dissertation will be able to explain why certain elites seek to emphasize communal identity through ethnically-oriented policies at home and abroad, while others attempt to de-mobilize ethnicity as a force in their polities.

In particular situations, politicians will have a political incentive to engage in communal outbidding<sup>14</sup>, competing to be a better defender of the ethnic group than others, in order to mobilize certain communal groups. Given a certain set of political and social structures, politicians may gain followers and influence if they emphasize communal conflicts in general or specific ethnic divides in the society.

On the other hand, these political and social formations can act as constraints on political behavior as well. Politicians may seek to avoid issues of communal identity, as raising those issues may undermine their positions by dividing their followers and their supporting coalitions. Therefore, the strategies politicians follow towards communal issues are influenced by the incentives and constraints they face, which, in turn, are shaped by the political and societal contexts within which they act (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Laitin 1986).

My dissertation will, therefore, focus on communal groups, political institutions, and the interplay between them as the important factors influencing the policies of leaders towards secessionist movements as they seek to maintain and enhance their own positions domestically.

### *1. Constituency*

By constituency, I am referring to the group(s) or organization(s) that provides the politician with the most critical support for remaining and/or gaining power. Elites will be most concerned with maintaining the support of members within that group or organization, and will follow policies that bind that constituency to themselves. Determining which constituencies are most important in a political system is the first step in analyzing how communal politics influence politicians as they seek to maintain their positions and gain power. Therefore, this study will examine the political structures of states as they determine which constituencies are crucial for the continued support of the leaders.

### *2. Composition*

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<sup>14</sup> See Horowitz (1985) and Rothschild (1981) for excellent discussions of the dynamics of ethnic-outbidding.

The communal composition or ethnic makeup of the vital constituencies must then be examined in order to understand the resulting interests of the politicians. A leader will face very different incentives and constraints depending on whether his constituency consists of only a part of one communal group, of an entire group, or of members of several different groups.

In general, a politician will be choose to follow a strategy of communal out-bidding if his constituency consists of a single ethnic group, but does not encompass that group completely. Politicians will become extreme in their communally-oriented policies in such a situation, since they will have to gain the support of more members of that group to enlarge their constituencies at the expense of other politicians. They will try to appear as fiercer defenders of the interests of that group than the other politicians. Attempting to court members of other groups is a risky strategy as this may give an advantage to other politicians who can then accuse the compromising politician as weak and a traitor to one's group. This competition, i.e. ethnic out-bidding, will lead to an escalating emphasis of communal identity and interests.

Similarly, politicians will seek to de-emphasize ethnicity if their constituencies include members of different communal groups. If communal identity becomes mobilized in such a situation, those politicians would lose support as their supporters begin to conflict with each other.

If communal group and constituency coincide relatively closely, i.e. each group is represented by a single party or institution, then predictions are more difficult to make. Other variables must be considered, particularly the structure of communal divides in the larger society and the institutions through which communal groups press their demands.

### *3. Structure of Societal Divides*

When considering the nature of the communal divides in a society, there are two important factors to analyze. First, there is the relative size of each communal group. It should make a difference to the leadership of the state if their support rests on a communal group whose members are a majority of the population or not. How much of a difference depends on the political institutions in the society--electoral mechanisms, in a democracy, for instance, may alter

the incentives relative size presents to politicians, depending on whether such devices exaggerate or minimize the number of seats the largest groups may gain relative to the number of votes they get.

Second, individuals may have more than one communal identity (Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1986; Young 1976). A person may be a Hindu, but speak Tamil, or may be Muslim and either Bengali or Punjabi. When individuals have multiple identities, politicians not only have the option of emphasizing communal identity, but may also be interested in mobilizing certain identities at the expense of others (Laitin 1986). For instance, the Pakistani military may seek to mobilize Muslim identity in an attempt to unify their supporters rather than linguistic or racial identities which may divide their constituency, the military itself.

The importance of the multiple nature of communal identity for this project is that it suggests that politicians may be willing to support particular secessionists if they share an identity similar to those of the politicians' constituency, or if the separatists are fighting an enemy of one's own constituency.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, a politician is unlikely to support secessionists elsewhere if they are either of similar identity to one's opposition or of an alternative communal divide in one's own society. One would probably not support a religiously-based secessionist movement if one's own supporters consist of a single linguistic group, but multiple religions.

## **B. Political Institutions**

Institutions need to be considered as they mediate the demands of communal groups and provide politicians with varying incentives. As I have discussed earlier, political institutions determine which constituencies are most politically relevant as well as defining the nature of competition and advancement within these constituencies.

The type of political regime is important for it establishes which units are the most politically relevant, to which politicians must appeal in order maintain and increase their influence. In a democratic polity, elites will be most concerned with their party and their voters.

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<sup>15</sup> For instance, the Pakistanis might support Sikhs in India as long as they are fighting a predominantly Hindu regime, which is perceived to be the enemy of both Islam and of Pakistan.

In an institutionalized authoritarian regime, the bureaucrats of the state, the officer corps of the military, and the security establishment will be the most important groups for the leaderships' maintenance of power. In a personalist authoritarian regime, the leader will be most concerned with the support of a few key clients and individuals who exert influence in the state, rather than with the interests of larger institutions.

As the relevant constituency changes depending on the type of political system, so do the relevant institutions that influence competition and promotion. In a democracy, the most important institutions for a politician are the electoral mechanisms and party systems as these will shape what kinds of strategies they can follow in order to gain position and power.

For instance, does an electoral system, such as first-past-the-post, exaggerate the strength of the larger parties? If so, coalitions with parties representing other communal groups may be unnecessary as majorities in seats may result despite a lack of majority in votes, thus freeing politicians to engage in communal out-bidding. However, if an electoral system such as proportional representation strengthens the smaller parties, then minority parties may not be able to rule alone. Getting into the government may require compromises and coalitions with other groups, thus constraining the politician's ability to engage in ethnic politics. In such a system, extremist politicians may be excluded from power as potential coalition partners refuse to ally with them.

Party systems are important for the political dynamics of a democracy as they influence party competition. One would expect to see politicians in a one-party democracy to behave differently in the face of incentives and opportunities unavailable to politicians in a two party system or multi-party systems. In a one-party system, the mechanism of promotion within the party may be the crucial political dynamic, rather than competition between parties for votes.

In an authoritarian regime, it is important to consider the nature of the political system itself, which will indicate which institutions, if any, are critical. For this study, it will be most useful to consider the personalist/institutional dimension of such regimes. Is the regime one of patron-client relations or are the political dynamics defined by bureaucratic procedures and

interests? Authoritarian regimes will vary all along this spectrum, so the dynamics of communal politics may vary according to how personalist or how institutionalized the government is.<sup>16</sup>

In a personalist authoritarian regime, the leaders are concerned with maintaining the support of their clients and other crucial individuals, who reside in weakly developed institutions. "Personal rule is a system linking rulers not with the 'public' or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters and rivals, who constitute the system (Jackson and Rosberg 1982b, 18)." In such a political system, it is more important to consider whose support is crucial for regime maintenance, and what kinds of tools are available to the personalist leader either to buy off or repress competitors.

In a bureaucratic or institutionalized authoritarian regime, the politicians will be concerned about the interests of members of particular institutions, such as the military, the secret police, the party (if there is one), and/or the state bureaucracy. Obviously, in a bureaucratic authoritarian regime, the existing institutions play a greater role as they shape the requirements for political advancement. Actors in a bureaucratic regime will maximize the interests and integrity of their institution, as this will lead to advancement, and minimize opposition within the society to the regime, as this will protect their own influence and institutions. Such actors will be more concerned with public opinion as it affects the opposition one's institution faces in the society.

### **C. The Relationship between Political System and Ethnicity**

Analyzing regime type or communal divides by themselves is not sufficient for understanding which policies leaders will pursue. By themselves, each factor provides clues as to how politicians will behave, but only by considering how communal identity is represented in the regime--the ethnic composition of the elites--can general predictions be made about the strategies politicians choose take towards communally-oriented issues.

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<sup>16</sup> For discussions of the personalist/institutional distinction, see Jackson and Rosberg 1982b and Perlmutter 1981.

How many different communal fragments exist within the constituencies of the competing politicians? This is the crucial factor in understanding why communally-oriented policies are pursued or not. This relationship between communal identity and political institutions should determine what incentives and constraints politicians face.

I have generated a matrix, representing predictions made on the basis of the interests politicians have in particular political-societal structures.

**Composition of Most Relevant Units  
and Support for Communally-Oriented Policies**

<b>Regime Type</b>	<b>Representation of Communal Groups in Polity</b>		
	<b>Multicommunal <math>0 &lt; U/CG &lt; 1</math></b>	<b><math>U/CG = 1</math></b>	<b>Multiparty <math>U/CG &gt; 1</math></b>
<b>Democratic</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>NS/S*</b>	<b>S</b>
<b>Authoritarian</b>			
<b>Institutional</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>NS/S**</b>	<b>NS/S***</b>
<b>Personalist</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>S</b>	<b>S</b>

**U/CG** == Number of Politically Relevant Units Per Communal Group

**S** == Support for communally-oriented policies

**NS** == No support for communally-oriented policies

**U** == Politically Relevant Unit

\* **NS** if the party system and electoral mechanisms favor the formation of coalitions, and a weak prediction of **S** if the party system and electoral mechanisms allow the party to gain majorities in seats without the support of other parties/communal groups.

\*\* **NS** if there are multiple constituencies, each of a different group. If only one important constituency, then **NS** if it consists of a communal identity different from the majority of the society, and **S** if it consists of an identity that is the same as most of the population.

\*\*\* **NS** if the important institutions of the regime consist of a communal identity different from the majority of the society, and **S** if they consist of an identity that is the same as a majority of the population.

The ratio between politically relevant unit [U], i.e. constituency, and communal group [CG] is an approximation of what I am seeking to depict--how communal groups are represented in the political system of the state. I shall now go through each square in the matrix to explain my predictions.

*1. Column 1--Multicommunal Support*

The entire first column represents polities where the most politically important constituencies--i.e. parties, branches of the military, the state bureaucracy, the clients of a personalist leader--consist of more than one ethnic group; if the politicians seek to maintain their positions, one should **not** see policies based on communal identity. They would seek to de-

emphasize communal identity as mobilization would cause a breakdown in their constituency and a loss of influence.

## 2. *Column 2--Cohesion between Group and Unit--Communal Units*

When each party represents a single communal group in a democratic system, support again depends on the position of the party within the political system. I expect to see less support for communally-oriented policies if each party needs the support of other parties to gain control of the government, which, in turn, depends on the relative size of communal groups, the character of the electoral mechanisms, and the structure of the party system.

If no single communal party can gain a majority, and each ethnic group is represented by a single party, communally-oriented policies will probably not be chosen since communal parties will need to build coalitions in order to gain power.<sup>17</sup> A party in such a situation but chooses to support communally-oriented policies will only alienate potential coalition partners and never gain office. Moreover, a party in this kind of system will not fear losing its voters if it compromises with other communal groups as their supporters have no place else to go--it is unlikely that they will support the parties of other ethnic groups.<sup>18</sup>

If it is possible for communal parties to gain majorities in seats, then politicians within it will not need to engage in coalitions with other communal parties. Such parties are free to mobilize ethnicity to gain sufficient support to overcome the other parties.

Having said this, I must make the caveat that such a communal party's support for ethnically-oriented policies will be weaker than those of a party which must compete with other parties of the same communal identity (column 3). Moderate policies may be followed because extreme communally-oriented policies might force the other groups to opt out of the polity or at least undermine the legitimacy of the political system. While this is a concern for all

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<sup>17</sup> Of course, if the electoral system gives minority parties majorities in seats, then communally-based policies are still possible and perhaps desirable.

<sup>18</sup> This point is similar to that Lijphart makes when considering consociational democracies (1977, 1979, 1985, 1990).

democracies, a party that is the sole representative of a communal group has somewhat more room to maneuver and to compromise, with the option available to follow non-ethnically-based policies. In a polity where multiple parties represent a single group, no such opportunity is available to politicians--moderation is punished.

In a personalist authoritarian regime, the leaders will seek to mobilize communal identity if their constituency, their clients, are of the same identity. Since ethnicity is one of the few resources personalist rulers have to unify their supporters, they will use it to keep them together. Communal favoritism is one method of buying off one's allies and isolating one's enemies.

In an institutionalized authoritarian regime, constituency and communal identity can cohere in two very different ways. First, there can be multiple constituencies, each of a different ethnic group--the military is Muslim, the state bureaucracy is Christian. One would not expect leaders to emphasize religion as this would divide the supporters of the regime.

Second, there may be only one important constituency; for instance, the military itself may be the only important institution. If so, then leaders will face incentives and opportunities similar to a multiparty authoritarian regime. That is, if the military is the only important constituency, and it consists of only one ethnic group, then the key variable is the relative size of that group in the population. If that group is in the minority, one would not expect to see support for communally-oriented policies. If the military, in such a situation, is of the same ethnicity as a majority of the population, it will engage in communally-directed policies.

### *3. Column 3--Multiple Units Consisting of Same Group*

In democracies where one communal group is represented by more than one unit, i.e. multiparty or multi-faction, competition will exist between the units, leading to communal out-bidding.

The same logic holds true for personalist authoritarian regimes; each politician will attempt to be a better defender of the communal group than the other as they attempt to garner more support.

A prediction of support in an institutionalized authoritarian regime depends on the communal composition of the society at large as that will shape the incentives members within the crucial constituencies have towards mobilizing ethnicity. If both the army and the state bureaucracy are of the same communal group, competition may or may not develop between them, depending on whether most of the society is of the same identity.

If the most important political units have a communal identity that is in the minority within the society, then the military and other important units will not support ethnically-oriented policies as this may increase the opposition they face in the society.

However, in a society where the majority of the population shares the same communal identity as the important state institutions, then one would see more support for communal policies by those units. However, this is a weaker prediction as competition between institutions in an institutionalized authoritarian regime may not require ethnic appeals, depending on existing mechanisms of advancement.

#### *4. Adding the Role of Multiple Ethnic Identities to the Problem*

The predictions above leave out the important dynamic of multi-communal identity in individuals (Laitin 1986). A thorough analysis will have to focus on not merely the emphasis or de-emphasis of ethnicity, but on the varying intensification of particular identities. While this may seem confusing at first, including this dynamic will provide more accurate and more revealing findings than a broad focus on ethnicity that ignore crucial political interests and strategies available to politicians in such cases.

#### **D. Linking Communal Policies to Secession**

The relevance of the above discussion is that politicians face similar incentives and constraints when making foreign policy, particularly policies towards secessionist movements. "Foreign policy in contemporary Africa also tends to be associated strongly with the interests and concerns of the ruler (Jackson and Rosberg 1982b, 30)." A leader can use foreign policy for domestic political reasons, and, foreign policy can be constrained by one's domestic interests.

If a politician's strategy involves de-emphasizing religion as a divide in the society, for instance, then that politician will probably not support religiously-based secessionist movements.

On the other hand, one can mobilize communal support at home by supporting similar groups abroad. For instance, various Islamic states have supported Islamic secessionist movements as part of their general policy of emphasizing religion as the central identity around which these polities are organized. It is hard to understand the support Qaddafi has given to the Islamic secessionist movement in the Philippines, the Moros, if the role of religion in his own political system is ignored.

One might argue that my model really does not predict support for secessionist movements because politicians can emphasize particular cleavages without supporting secessionists. I argue that this may be true in states where communal outbidding does not occur (thus I have weaker predictions for such states), but in those states where ethnic competition is prevalent, it is difficult to avoid supporting secessionists. If the political-societal environment is conducive to outbidding, then the competing units will be pushed to the extremes, to supporting secessionists elsewhere. If a party or faction fails to do so, other parties or factions within the same ethnic group may accuse them of being token nationalists, of not really supporting that group--moderate policies are criticized and defeated.

However, if the ethnic identity of the seceding group is completely unrelated to the divides within another state, then that group will probably not gain support from that state, even if state's politicians are seeking to emphasize ethnicity. By completely unrelated, I mean that the identities of the state and of the movement share no common characteristic. That is, the leaders of the state may be emphasizing religion but the separatists are organized along kinship lines. Identities are related if they are of similar nature--racial, linguistic, religious, etc. Emphasizing race in one's own society does not require supporting movements of that race, but may also lead to supporting movements of other races, but not linguistically-based movements.

For example, if a separatist movement's crucial ethnic characteristic is language, then a state with religious out-bidding will probably not support such a movement, unless, as mentioned

above, that movement is attempting to secede from a state representing a competing religion. On the other hand, a state seeking to emphasize a particular linguistic divide in its own state will support a movement in another state if that movement is linguistically based, even if it is not the same language. Emphasizing identity does not imply one only aids groups of the same identity, but may also suggest aiding groups of similar identities. Thus, it is important to consider not only the communal composition of the politically relevant units within the state, but also the ethnic character of the seceding group in order to predict the policies of that state towards the particular secessionist movement.

One additional distinction must be made. Supporting secessionists in other states may or may not be irredentist. That is, aiding separatists elsewhere may or may not be part of movement to include that group and the territory they inhabit into one's own state. Somalia's support of groups in Ethiopia is clearly irredentist: Somali elites want the contested territory to be included in a Greater Somalia. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Qaddafi actually seeks to include the Moros of the Philippines in the Libyan polity. Emphasizing a certain linguistic or religious identity in one's own society may lead to supporting a group with a similar identity in another society, without intending or desiring inclusion of that group into one's own society.

One might argue that leaders who do not follow communally-oriented policies need not support international efforts to contain secessionists. That is also incorrect for several reasons. Leaders in such an environment prefer to restrict aid to secessionists elsewhere because any potential ethnic conflict is a threat to the influence and position of those policymakers. Containing secession abroad aids in de-emphasizing ethnicity in one's own polity. Moreover, by containing communal conflict in neighboring states, politicians limit the chances of getting drawn into such conflicts due to spillover, removing a possible source of destabilizing mobilizations.

Though this point may seem similar to Jackson's and Rosberg's, they are not, in that I treat the incentives individual politicians face seriously; internal divisions and political weakness do not have the same implications everywhere. Jackson argues that a similar attribute--vulnerability

to ethnic conflict--leads to similar interests, and therefore, to acts of cooperation. I argue that a similar attribute--susceptibility to communal strife--has various consequences depending on the particular form of ethnic cleavages in the society and the relationship of those cleavages to the specific political structures. Politicians in divided societies will follow different policies, depending on how the specific form of internal conflict affects their own political positions.

States with very different domestic situations may still face similar incentives to cooperate, or to support secessionists. For instance, a democratic regime with a single ethnic group represented by two parties will support secessionists as will an institutionalized authoritarian regime whose armed forces consist of a single ethnic group that includes a majority of the population. Likewise, a personalist regime which is supported by more than one communal group will seek to contain and restrain secessionism elsewhere as will a democracy, whose political institutions requires coalitions among communal parties in order to gain for positions in office.

#### **IV. The Role of International Organizations**

As many of the studies concerning this problem of boundary maintenance and secession have focused on the role of international organizations, so will I. However, I will focus on how elites use them as a resource for their own political interests rather than the importance of norms and rules for defining appropriate behavior.

Herbst (1989) and Jackson and Rosberg (1982a) both argue that the Organization of African Unity played a crucial role in the boundary maintenance and the prevention of support for secessionists. Herbst argues that the OAU defined the colonial boundaries as legitimate and de-legitimized efforts to change them. Jackson and Rosberg assert that the OAU embodied a set of norms that states adhere to as obligations and duties they have (1982a, 19). Both of these studies reflect two problems in theories of international organization: a) they fail to consider how regional (and international) institutions emerge from the political interests of leaders, and, therefore, may not have an independent impact on the policies of states; and b) they do not

consider how such organizations actually affect the decision-making of elites. Since they fail to consider seriously how the OAU emerged out of the individual political interests of elites in African states, they cannot really explain why the OAU was really that important or necessary.<sup>19</sup>

Herbst is correct in arguing that the OAU's declaration of the territorial integrity of existing boundaries was important. It made clear to all what most African leaders considered to be the legitimate boundaries, thereby solving the problem of defining new borders. However, if this is all that the OAU did, then why wasn't a single international conference sufficient? What role has the OAU actually played since the 1964 Declaration? Herbst's analysis does not adequately account for the actions and influence the OAU has had outside of defining which boundaries were to be accepted.

Jackson and Rosberg argue that the OAU embodied norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention, defining the duties and obligations of states. How do norms affect the decision-making of elites? Why does one obey the dictates of international society? Are violators punished or excluded from international society? By leaving these questions unasked, Jackson does not really demonstrate the impact of the society of states might have on the behavior of African states.

Since organizations like the OAU emerge from the interests of leaders, it is hard to separate their independent impact from the influence of the incentives of politicians. Does the OAU actually have an influence on events? In my model, the OAU and similar organizations can influence outcomes as a political resource previously unavailable to politicians.

The existence and policies of international organizations can serve the domestic interests of politicians in several ways. First, the politician can plead that a policy was pursued because the international organization was coercive. For instance, tough policies of economic adjustment have been justified by leaders of indebted developing states as the price of further credit. Thus, politicians can divert blame and responsibility to international organizations.

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<sup>19</sup> This is an issue that both Krasner (1983) and Haggard and Simmons (1987) raise: how do we know that the regimes have an independent influence on the behavior of states?

Second, through playing a leading role in international organizations, a politician's own political strength may be enhanced at home. By being a leader of the Pan-Africanist movement and of the OAU, Nyerere enhanced his position in Tanzania.

Third, and most important for my study, activity in international organizations can serve to define and accentuate the nation-state as a political unit domestically. This is not Jackson's argument about the juridical nature of sovereignty and the recognition of statehood by other powers. Rather, the role a state plays in international organizations may serve to emphasize a particular identity domestically, such as religion or nation that may unite the state and increase the support given to a particular leader or regime, at the expense of other ethnic cleavages.

By taking part in various pan-Arab and pan-Islamic organizations, Arab states are emphasizing either Arab-ness or Islam as a unifying force in their societies at the expense of others cleavages. The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, helped to found the OAU as part of his policies to define Ethiopia as a genuine, traditional African state, in order to ensure domestic support for his own position and to de-emphasize domestic divides by stressing traditional African nationalism. Indian leaders, in their efforts to lead the non-aligned movement, have sought to increase Indian nationalism--India as a leader and a great power--to overcome religious and linguistic divisions within their society.

It is my contention, as I start this project, that international institutions can serve as a resource for politicians as they attempt to maintain and enhance their own domestic political positions through the mobilization and intensification of particular divides and bonds at the expense of others.

## **V. Summary of Hypotheses**

In this section, I shall discuss the various hypotheses that I have developed, concerning both the domestic and the international aspects of my argument. I will then discuss how each hypothesis can be verified or falsified.

## **A. Communal Organization and Political Institutions**

Since my model is based on the decision making of politicians whose primary interest is gaining and maintaining influence, my model is most clearly falsified if the leaders of states consciously choose policies that will undercut their own support; that is, if they support policies that divide their followers. I am not arguing that politicians are always smart--I am merely asserting that contradictions between a politician's short-term political interests and the state's long-term security needs will be resolved in favor of the former rather than the latter. If a politician follows policies that stress a particular ethnic cleavage for security reasons--undermining one's enemy--while breaking up his/her multiethnic coalition, then domestic political concerns are not the most important variable.

This approach will also be undermined if leaders who support secession do so secretly. If support for secessionists is seriously covert, i.e. there are no intentional "leaks", then it is hard to argue that the policy is followed for domestic political reasons. This may be the most troublesome aspect of my approach--how do politicians support secessionists in order to gain more support at home while keeping such a policy secret? Of course, the question to ask is: who really knows? As long as the constituency of the elites know, then my model still holds. In an institutional authoritarian regime, as long as the military as an institution is "in the loop," then secession as a tool for ethnic mobilization still matters.

If the dependent variable, policy towards secessionists, does not change while a state's political and societal structures are altered, then those institutions may not determine the state's policies, unless the transformations of those institutions still provide the leaders with similar incentives. If the political incentives change, and the policy remains the same, then some other variables are clearly more determinant. Likewise, if political interests remain the same, but the policy changes, then political interests are not the crucial variable to be considered.

## **B. The Role of International Organizations**

My contention is that regional and international organizations will serve as an additional political resource available to politicians as they attempt to de-emphasize particular divides and intensify others.

If aid to secessionists is restrained without the existence or influence of international organizations, then such institutions may not be necessary for cooperation or for the restraint of secessionism. Therefore, this study will focus on three different regions, with varying levels of international institutionalization so that the independent impact of such institutions on the policies of states can be analyzed. If international organizations do not influence the interests of politicians nor the behavior of states, then an examination of the domestic politics of secession is even more necessary.

## **VI. Methodology**

In this section, I discuss how I research this study. My study will be both quantitative and qualitative, focusing on patterns of behavior within regions and policies chosen by states. I will also outline what resources I intend on using, and what cases will probably be studied.

Before going further, I must define some aspects of the project. A secessionist movement is a group seeking to separate a distinct territory from an existing state. Demands for federalism or for increased autonomy are not sufficient as these will not change boundaries or affect the territorial integrity of states. In this study, as I am interested in international conflict, I will be studying armed struggles. Rarely have groups attempted to secede without violence since almost all states refuse to allow pieces of their territory to be removed peacefully.<sup>20</sup>

Providing arms, sanctuary and bases, diplomatic recognition, and military intervention on the side of secessionists constitute support for a secessionist movement. Restricting aid to secession refers to the refusal to give support to secessionist movements. Restraint does not

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<sup>20</sup> The only case that I can think of in this century is the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905, besides the breakups of relatively short-lived federations formed during decolonization.

require aid to states defending themselves from secessionists though I shall examine such aid in the course of this study.

### **A. Quantitative Study**

I shall undertake two quantitative analyses. The first will test the significance and the accuracy of my predictions, and the second will evaluate the impacts of different variables on support for secessionist movements. First, I will put together contingency tables of my predictions and the actual policies of states. An examination of the significance of my predictions, relative to the null hypothesis, via chi-squares, will test whether my hypotheses provide good predictions.

Second, a cross-sectional probit analysis will be run to evaluate the relative importance of several possible independent variables including: regime type, to test the independent influence of political systems and institutions; vulnerability as determined by the number of different salient divides that exist in a polity, the size of the largest communal group (perhaps relative to the other groups), and the existence of secessionist movements within each state; and the ratio of communal group to politically relevant units, to test the predictions of my model. This analysis should not only test my own model, but by including measures of vulnerability and of regime type, it will be able to test more conventional arguments as well.

The dependent variable can be constructed in two different ways: it can be dichotomous, either yes or no for supporting secessionists, or it can be a total of the number of secessionist movements supported by a particular state.<sup>21</sup> I will run the analysis both ways. As I mentioned above, military aid, the willing provision of sanctuary and bases, and diplomatic recognition constitute support for secessionists.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> At this point, since the concern is for the violation of territorial integrity rather than depth of commitment, all kinds of support will be weighted the same. However, if I decide to evaluate how strong the support has been for secessionists, then direct intervention may be weighted more heavily than transfers of small arms.

<sup>22</sup> Jeffrey Herbst, in a private discussion, has considered support for territorial integrity of states to mean support for states that are being attacked by secessionists. While I shall consider such support in my case studies, my focus is on support given to secessionist movements since such aid is more obviously a "violation" of the norm of territorial integrity and is also more clearly a tool of communal mobilization.

The statistical technique that will be used is probit as my dependent variable is not continuous, and may be dichotomous, as are most of independent variables. I will be attempting to see how significant each variable is, and my preliminary expectations are that regime type and vulnerability, by themselves, may give mixed results, but that the ethnic composition of elites should provide more determinate results. I will also compare results across regions to determine whether the presence or absence of regional organizations matters.

The quantitative analysis should illustrate both the broad patterns of behavior that occur and what anomalies exist. The most important findings from the quantitative analysis may be which countries and/or regions are anomalous. Anomalies often are the most interesting cases to be studied, as exceptions can either "prove the rule" or they can show why the hypotheses are wrong, mis-guided or mis-specified.

In my study, I am focusing on the politics and policies of developing states in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Though I believe my model may be able to predict the policies chosen by the United States, the Soviet Union, and others, my primary interest is to determine the policies of states within these regions, as they shape the potential emergence of cooperation or conflict.

I shall include in the statistical analysis all states in Africa, South Asia,<sup>23</sup> and Southeast Asia.<sup>24</sup> These regions share many common attributes, including time of decolonization, the former colonizers, and the role of ethnicity in politics. Since these states decolonized at approximately the same time, many international variables--such as level of institutionalization, global norms, and relative power configurations--are held constant.

By holding the original colonizers relatively constant, I may be able to deal with a comparable set of political institutions. For instance, the British installed similar parliamentary

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Further, it may be difficult to separate aid given to states because they have been given aid for other reasons from aid given to states to defend their territorial integrity. Aid given to secessionists is more clearly addressing the issues of communal conflict and territorial integrity.

<sup>23</sup> South Asia consists of Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, India, and Bangladesh and Myanmar (formerly named Burma).

<sup>24</sup> Southeast Asia includes Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines.

systems in Nigeria, India and Sri Lanka. This should enable me to test the independent impact of such institutions versus the role of societal structures as well as the influence of differing ethnic compositions of similar institutions.

The nature of ethnic politics is similar in these regions, where boundaries do not coincide with communal divides. States in these regions usually consist of many competing ethnic groups with several levels of communal divides--religion, race, language, and/or kinship.

These three regions have also been chosen as they represent significant variation in both adherence to the territorial integrity of states and the level of regional institutionalization. As I will want to include case studies of states within each region I analyze, the inclusion of other regions will only serve to complicate this study, without necessarily providing anymore insight. In later works, I hope to compare my findings in these regions, with patterns of behavior elsewhere.

## **B. Qualitative Analysis--Comparative Case Study**

The comparative case studies will analyze the processes and the policies taken by individual states. I will seek to use states that are anomalies, that are not apparently explainable from my framework. If these hard cases can be explained within my framework, then my argument is more convincing than if I used relatively easy or obvious cases to "test" my hypotheses.

In this spirit, I will examine cases where my predictions, at first, do not appear to stand up. That is, I will choose cases where either a) the independent variables derived from my approach change and the dependent variable holds constant, b) the independent variables remain constant while the dependent variable changes, or c) where both independent and dependent variables change, but not at the same time. These kinds of cases will not only be more

convincing, but it will also maximize the number of different combinations of variables.<sup>25</sup> While I have not decided which cases to study, I shall list the most probable ones.

a) Pakistan, Nigeria and the Philippines. In these cases, there have been changes in the independent variables: political institutions, social structure (in one case), and in the ethnic composition of the elites and their constituencies.

Since independence, Pakistan has had both democratic and military regimes, and it is one of the few states where there have been dramatic changes in the structure of societal cleavages, due to the departure of an entire race as a result of the secession of the Bengalis; however, Pakistan has had a relatively consistent policy of support for secessionists. Nigeria may also provide interesting insights as it has been a democracy twice (and is in the process of democratization again), and has been ruled by military regimes that have varied along the institutionalized/personalist spectrum. Nigeria will also provide an interesting comparison with India, as both are dominant powers in their regions, their democratic institutions during Nigeria's First Republic were basically identical--British-style parliamentary systems, and their societal divides are very similar--multiple cleavages fragmenting large populations, yet Nigeria has been a consistent supporter of the territorial integrity of states while India's policies have varied.

Likewise, the Philippines have had democratic and authoritarian regimes, but have been a consistent supporter of territorial integrity.

b) India, Tanzania, and Indonesia may prove to be hard cases as well since their policies have changed while their political and societal structures have apparently remained relatively constant.

India, with the exception of Indira Gandhi's suspension of democratic institutions and practices in the late 1970's, has been a democracy with fairly stable rules and institutions since independence (though not necessarily peaceful campaigns). However, India's policies towards

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<sup>25</sup> While my statistical analysis will have a large "n" or number of cases, my qualitative analysis will only be focused on a handful of countries. By looking at states where political interests and policies change over time, I will be increasing the number of different configurations of variables to be studied. See Lijphart's articles on the Comparative Method, 1971, 1975.

secession and boundaries have varied over time. Not only did India intervene on the side of the Bengals as they seceded from Pakistan, but India also annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa and have given sanctuary and aid to the Tamil separatists of Sri Lanka. However, their policies have changed as of late, even attempting to restrict the flow of aid to the Tamils. This policy change may prove to be most interesting and could either be very damning for my model or provide great support for my study.<sup>26</sup>

Tanzania will also be an interesting state to study as its policies completely changed over a four-year period. Julius Nyerere, the leader of Tanzania for most of its history, was one of the founders of the OAU, but, only a few years later, he gave diplomatic recognition to Biafra, a territory attempting to secede from Nigeria. This turnabout needs to be explained as it is most puzzling.

Indonesia is an interesting case as it has generally disregarded the colonial boundaries in its own expansion, coming into conflict with its neighbors, but it has not apparently supported the Moro secessionist movements in the Philippines even though both the Moros and Indonesia identify themselves as Muslim entities.

c) Ethiopia and Somalia fit into a third category: their policies and their political-societal structures have changed, but not simultaneously. Both states have undergone revolutions, and their policies towards secession and territorial integrity has varied.

Ethiopia, while under a traditional monarchy, was one of the most ardent supporters of the OAU at its founding, but gave aid to movements attempting to secede from Sudan a few years later. The very recently overthrown Dergue, a Marxist military regime, overthrew the Emperor of Ethiopia in 1975, and have also had varying policies towards secessionists.

Somalia must be studied as they were an original founder of the OAU, but have consistently aided ethnically Somali separatists in Ethiopia ever since. This support included an invasion of Ethiopia in 1977-78. However, Somalia's support for separatists in Kenya has not

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<sup>26</sup> Examining India's policies is also important because, as the dominant power in the region, India, to a large extent, determines the chances of cooperation and conflict in South Asia.

been as strong. Thus, Somalia's policies have varied, not only over time, but also changing depending on the target of the secessionists.

All of these states, with the possible exception of Tanzania, have faced secessionist movements within their own states, yet several have given aid to such movements elsewhere. An examination of the policies and the politics of these states should be very interesting and illuminating.

### **C. Research Resources**

The actual research will consist mostly of examining documents of governments and international organizations, studies of the various countries by experts, newspaper accounts, biographies and the like.

Both UCLA and UC Berkeley have good collections of African documents, journals and books, and Berkeley also has an impressive collection of South Asian materials so I will not have to travel outside of California to gather such materials.

Interviews are probably unnecessary because there is actually a wealth of materials on these issues, although no one has attempted to compare the politics of secession across states and regions. If the new (as of this week) regimes in Ethiopia and Somaliland remain in power and Eritrea successfully succeeds, then a trip to that part of Africa may be necessary as these new governments may be able to provide me with more detailed information concerning aid given to them in the course of their secessionist wars.

The ethnic politics of each of the potential cases has been studied by experts, so that work has already been done. Rather than replicate such works, my task will be to compare the experiences of various states to determine the political dynamics behind the decisions to aid or restrain secession.

### **D. Research Schedule and Support**

After finishing this proposal and advancing to candidacy this spring, I shall spend the summer and the first part of the fall of this year gathering the data on each state for the statistical

analyses, re-learning the statistical tools required, and performing these analyses. I will then examine my findings, adjusting my hypotheses and selecting cases as indicated.

Starting in late fall and continuing through the 1992, I will perform the case studies. As I examine each country, I will write drafts of chapters. By the fall of 1992, I hope to have completed most, if not all, of the case studies, and will be focusing on comparing the cases, and completing the study.

While this schedule is ambitious, it is feasible as I will be able to concentrate my time and attention on the dissertation since I have received a Dissertation Fellowship from the Institute of Global Cooperation and Conflict. This will enable me to devote all of my efforts to the dissertation, rather than having to grade to support myself. This fellowship will also fund research trips to Berkeley and Washington, D.C.

## **VII. Conclusion**

This study will examine an often ignored area: the international consequences of ethnic conflict. By examining the support for or the restraint of secessionism, I hope to understand how and why ethnic conflict can expand beyond borders or can be contained within states.

This dissertation should also provide some insight into how politicians use foreign policy for domestic political purposes. This, in turn, should aid in understanding of the emergence of cooperation and conflict among states.

These issues will become of increasing importance as the new democracies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere begin to face the problem of communal conflict in their own and in other societies. As the states in Eastern Europe begin to experiment with their new independence and as their fragile political regimes develop, ethnic conflict and its international consequences, including attempts to change existing boundaries, could again spark war as it did in 1914.<sup>27</sup> An analysis of the varying success of efforts to contain the international consequences of ethnic

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<sup>27</sup> For example, see Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," both in most recent issue of *International Security*, 15, 3, 1990.

conflict in Africa and Asia may provide important insights into how to avoid war in those regions and elsewhere.

**Dissertation Proposal**

**Maintaining Boundaries or Supporting Secession:  
The International Consequences of Ethnic Politics**

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Suggestions and comments are most welcome.