

Issue Rivalries

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Abstract: In this paper, we expand upon the traditional interstate rivalry concept by focusing on two conceptual dimensions of interstate rivalry: issues and militarization. The first dimension captures the number of distinct issues that characterize a dyadic interstate relationship, such as repeated clashes between states over border disputes, maritime zones, or cross-border rivers. The second dimension is very similar to the dispute density approach to rivalry, and captures the number of militarized incidents over specific contentious issues. The first dimension of issue rivalry is coded by identifying pairs of states with two or more (simultaneous) contentious issues. The second dimension of militarized rivalry is coded for single issues (such as a border dispute), capturing the presence of two or more militarized incidents over that issue in the past. Empirical analyses of these two new rivalry measures in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe show some important variation in these rivalry dimensions. Issue rivals and militarized rivals are significantly more likely to employ militarized force and peaceful negotiation techniques to resolve geo-political issues in comparison with dyads that experience contentious issues in non-rivalry settings. On the other hand, dyads characterized by issue rivalry do not experience disputes that escalate to high levels of violence, such as fatalities or wars. It is only prior militarization of a specific contentious issue that leads states down the path to war.

This paper was prepared for the University of Alabama Conference on Territory and Rivalry, October 3, 2009. We are grateful to our colleagues at the University of Iowa for their useful comments and feedback at the Political Science Workshop Series.

Interstate rivalries have garnered a great deal of attention in the interstate conflict literature, which is understandable given the large number of militarized disputes and wars that take place in the context of rivalry. Conceptualizations of rivalry typically focus on competitiveness, threats, spatial consistency, time, and hostility. Some scholars point to the importance of contested issues in rivalry relationships, such as border disputes, although empirical measures of rivalry rarely capture this issue dimension of rivalry. In this paper, we develop two new measures of interstate rivalry that take into account more directly the contested issues at stake in an interstate relationship. We argue that rivalry can be conceptualized along two dimensions: 1) an *issue* dimension, which can be captured by the number of distinct diplomatic issues that characterizes a dyadic interaction, and 2) a *militarized* dimension, which can be coded based on the number of prior militarized attempts to settle a particular contentious issue. The first dimension allows us to measure rivalry independently of militarization, while the second dimension makes it possible to link a series of militarized disputes to a specific issue.

We test the effects of these new issue rivalry and militarized rivalry measures using data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe in the past two centuries (Hensel et al 2008). We find that pairs of states are more likely to use militarized force over contentious issues when the territorial, maritime, or river issue at stake is part of a broader issue rivalry or militarized rivalry. However, we find that only the militarized rivalry dimension significantly predicts to escalation of disputes to high levels of violence, such as fatalities and wars. This suggests that issue rivalries are competitive, but can be managed in peaceful ways, while militarization of issues, especially early in the dyadic relationship, sets the stage for further disputes with higher levels of escalation. This confirms patterns observed in the rivalry and crisis bargaining literatures showing that disputes are indeed

related over time, and that the choice of a militarized foreign policy tool leads states more often down the steps to war.

Our paper is organized as follows. First, we describe existing conceptualizations and empirical measures of rivalry in the international relations literature. Our review focuses on the two predominant approaches to rivalry: the enduring rivalry approach associated with the work of Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz and the strategic rivalry approach developed by William Thompson. We also review Scott Bennett's approach, which more self-consciously considers issues than either of the other two active research programs. This is followed by the development of our own conceptualization of rivalry, focused on the two dimensions described above (issues, militarization). The third section of the paper describes the operational measures of these new rivalry concepts. We then evaluate the empirical effects of issue rivalry and militarized rivalry on states' peaceful and militarized conflict management strategies. We conclude with a discussion of other ways in which these new rivalry measures give us new purchase for measuring rivalry duration, for linking conflict management strategies dynamically over time, and for thinking about how states link negotiations across different issues as well.

Conceptualizing and Measuring Interstate Rivalry

The idea of incorporating issues into the identification of rivalries is as old as the rivalry literature itself. The concept of rivalry requires that something provides the impetus for the initiation, duration, and termination of such a relationship. Contentious issues are an excellent candidate to fulfill all three roles. As we demonstrate below, most conceptualizations of rivalry accept that underlying issues are the foundation for rivalry relationships. However, most operational definitions do not explicitly account for issues, or issues are only used to identify one

aspect of the rivalry, such as termination. We briefly review these various conceptual and operational definitions before introducing the justification for our own issue-based approach to rivalries. We argue that an issue-based approach to rivalry helps to resolve the mismatch between conceptual and operational definitions inherent in the current literature, as well as resolving many of the outstanding critiques of this literature.

Enduring Rivalries

Goertz and Diehl (1992: 153) initially conceptualize enduring rivalries based on three components: competitiveness, time, and spatial consistency. States in enduring rivalries are thought to be in competition over some tangible or intangible good, which is framed in terms of issues (e.g., natural resources, territory). While issues would seem to provide the linkage between the conflicts in rivalries, Goertz and Diehl (1992: 153) also note that “one must conceptualize rivalry as more than a continuing conflict over one issue or set of issues.” The connection also requires temporal proximity or some other “thread” that links the competitions, such as regional hegemony or an intangible good like influence. Contentious issues, therefore, are not enough to identify an enduring rivalry. This stance probably reflects the authors’ focus on militarized competitions that becomes more apparent in their operational definition. In terms of the other two conceptual components, Goertz and Diehl require that enduring rivalries last an extended period of time and that two states will compose the spatial domain of such relationships.

Operationally, enduring rivalries are “conflicts between the same two states that involve at least five militarized disputes in a period lasting at least ten years” (Goertz and Diehl, 1992: 155). The enduring rivalry ends if ten years passes without another militarized dispute. As this operational definition makes clear, enduring rivalries are identified simply on the basis of dispute

and time density between pairs of states using the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data. Issues, or any other “thread” that links the disputes in the conceptual definition, are assumed but not measured in the operational definition. This operational definition produced a list of 59 enduring rivalries between 1816 and 1976. Goertz and Diehl (1992: 155) also operationally define proto-rivalries as “two to four militarized disputes, with no more than a ten year break between disputes” and isolated conflict as “all militarized disputes not followed by another dispute in the next ten years.”

Goertz and Diehl (1993) subsequently delve more carefully into the conceptual basis of enduring rivalries by considering alternative explanations for such relationships. They suggest that explanations for enduring rivalries could include issues, system structure, their possible irrelevance, or preference formation. An issue based explanation would argue that enduring rivalries emerge when some contentious issue like territory remains unresolved. A structural perspective would argue that enduring rivalries reflect the system structure (i.e., distribution of power) and remain in place until structural change occurs. Enduring rivalries may be irrelevant from a rational choice perspective, as states engage in repeated conflict only when it is rational to do so. The preference formation argument is that enduring rivalries may result from preferences changing or remaining the same based on the outcomes of previous conflict. This discussion of the theoretical basis of enduring rivalries did not affect the conceptual definition developed in their previous article, as it still revolves around competitiveness, time, and spatial consistency. Goertz and Diehl (1993: 154) are more conceptually explicit in this article that the competition must be militarized, which more closely matches their operational definition.

On an operational level, they recognize that coding the beginning and ending dates of a rivalry (or even an interrupted rivalry) is difficult using the dispute and time density approach.

The conditions that give rise to rivalry logically must begin before the first dispute and even a peace treaty between two states may not signal the end of a rivalry. After comparing a number of competing approaches to identifying rivalries based on the MID data (Wayman, 1990; Diehl, 1985; Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Jones, 1989), they note how the operational definitions produce dramatically different lists of rivalries. Goertz and Diehl (1993: 163) observe that most of the definitions rely on temporal proximity to imply a connection between the disputes, and only a few require issues to link the disputes (which are often trumped by temporal proximity even if the issues change). The competition standard is the main distinction between these MID-based approaches as the big break in the number of rivalries they identify seems to be between six and seven disputes.

Goertz and Diehl (1995) explore some of the explanations for rivalry that they raise in the previous article by examining how political shocks at the system and state level affect the initiation and termination of rivalries. While their conceptual definition remains largely the same, their operational definition has changed as a result of their previous work. An enduring rivalry is “a competition between states that involves six or more militarized disputes between the same two states over a period of 20 years” (Goertz and Diehl, 1995: 33). An enduring rivalry ends when 15 years passes without a dispute. Proto-rivalries are defined as “three to five disputes in a 15-year period.” Isolated conflicts are the residual category that contains one or two disputes. Although not framed in terms of issues, the political shocks they investigate, such as world wars, dramatic territorial changes, and changes in the distribution of power, as well as domestic shocks, such as new states and civil wars, often have issues at their base—such shocks may arise from issue-based competitions and may ultimately lead to the onset of new issues.

Goertz and Diehl (1996) attempt to deemphasize the time dimension by dropping the “enduring” from enduring rivalry to focus on the “rivalry approach to war and peace.” The militarized aspect of their rivalry approach is now very clear in their new conceptual definition—“a rivalry relationship is a militarized competition between the same pair of states over a given period of time” (p. 292). They again return to theoretical issues in this piece by puzzling over why rivalries begin and end, suggesting that many of the existing explanations for war may be suitable for rivalry as well. Goertz and Diehl (1996: 297) suggest that by taking “enduring” out of enduring rivalry and considering rivalry more broadly, we will “[reduce] the importance of definitional issues to their proper (that is minor) level.” The role that issues might play in rivalries is not discussed in this article; instead, linkages between disputes are framed in terms of rationalist expectations of future conflict, learning, and endogenous preference change.

Strategic Rivalry

Thompson (1995) criticized the Goertz and Diehl approach on three fronts. First, he objected to identifying rivalries based on the number of disputes that any two random states might engage in over the course of their history. As he noted, a number of the enduring rivalries identified by this approach seemed to lack face validity. In particular, the huge capability asymmetries between some of the pairs of states cast doubt on whether they viewed each other as true rivals. This would include cases like fishing rights disputes between the U.S. and Ecuador, identified as enduring rivals between 1952 and 1972, and the multiple militarized incidents between the U.S. and Haiti. Also, some of the enduring rivalries contain periods where the states were not principally concerned with each other—what Goertz and Diehl (1993) originally identified as “interrupted” rivalries. Many historically relevant great power rivalries also fail to be classified as rivals because of the reliance on dispute thresholds, such Great Britain and

France in the 19th Century (Thompson, 1999). Even minor power rivalries, such as inter-Arab rivalries are omitted.

Thompson (1995: 200) suggests dropping the reliance on arbitrary indicators of time and disputes to focus on the level of identification and recognition that distinguishes a rivalry from lesser types of competition. The key here is non-anonymity—rivals must recognize each other as such. Thompson (1995: 200) grounds this mutual recognition in issues as well, following Vasquez's (1993: 76) contention "that issues are approached and ultimately defined not in terms of one's own value satisfaction, but in terms of what the gaining or loss of a stake will mean to one's competitor." This is measured by looking at the "key decision makers' own observations about who they thought their principal enemies and opponents were" (Thompson, 1995: 201). Only "principal" opponents can be considered rivals, and we must recognize that this identification may change over time as the issues at stake change.

A second broad conceptual critique focuses on the distinction between positional and spatial rivalries. Only more powerful states are concerned with positional gains and losses, including great powers at the level of the international system and regional powers at the regional level. Positional rivalries require rough symmetry in capabilities and tend to have more deadly consequences. Spatial rivalries concerning the control of territory are much more common and less deadly. They also do not require capability symmetry between the participants. It is worth point out that the distinction between positional and spatial rivalries could easily be cast in terms of the different types of issues under contention (Vasquez, 1996; Thies, 2001a: 695-697; Thies, 2001b: 401-405). For example, Thies (2001b) argued that territorial issues formed the basis for a form of territorial nationalism that linked the series of conflicts comprising the Argentine-Chilean spatial rivalry. Positional and spatial rivalries are

also thought to have different causes and effects, thus the need for a conceptual distinction between them that is ignored in the dispute density approach (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008). For example, Thies (2001a) has argued that different social psychological mechanisms are likely to be driving competition and socialization between states with different levels of capabilities.

Thompson's (1995) principal rivalries approach morphed into his strategic rivalry approach. Conceptually, strategic rivals must view each other as "(a) competitors, (b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and (c) enemies" (Thompson, 2001: 560). The competitor dimension subsumes the aforementioned spatial and positional rivalry distinction, since just who it is that is viewed as a competitor is largely determined by capabilities and location. The enemy condition ensures the non-anonymity of states in a rivalry. As Thompson (2001: 561) states, "actors categorize other actors in their environments. Some are friends, others are enemies. Threatening enemies who are also adjudged to be competitors in some sense, as opposed to irritants or simply problems, are branded as rivals." The source of actual and latent threats could certainly involve issues, such as territory or status in the system. Operationally, strategic rivals are identified by examining the foreign policy histories of states to identify when key decision makers viewed each other as meeting the aforementioned conceptual criteria, in much the same way as proposed for principal rivalries. Even so, identifying precise beginning and ending dates is acknowledged as a difficult process. Thompson's approach generates 174 strategic rivalries, which is quite different than Diehl and Goertz's (or Bennett's) list of enduring rivalries. Thompson suggests that this is a good indication that his critique of the more inductively-derived, MID-based approaches is on target.

Issues and Rivalry

Thompson is not alone in criticizing the MID-based rivalry literature. Gartzke and Simon (1999) focus on the assumption that disputes within rivalries are indeed related. They suggest that researchers have assumed that previous disputes within a dyad are “the primary explanation of subsequent disputes within conflict dyads” (p. 785). What is required to make this argument is the identification of a cause for the initial dispute, which is omitted in the enduring rivalry approach. They argue that other theories of war or conflict are left to explain the initiation of enduring rivalries, since this literature lacks an endogenous explanation for the first dispute. Without an endogenous explanation, any explanation that can account for an initial dispute is as good as enduring rivalry in accounting for subsequent disputes. Enduring rivalries are therefore neither a necessary or sufficient condition to explain recurrent conflict. In order to avoid the “hot hand” phenomenon, one must show that a series of events are linked causally—or in their empirical estimation, that these events occur significantly differently from a series of unrelated events. Gartzke and Simon (1999) find that the number of dispute series classified as enduring rivalries is consistent with the number of dispute series generated by a stochastic process. In essence, the international system is generating “high-frequency series of low-probability dispute events,” or what appears to be the hot hand of enduring rivalries.

Bennett’s work on rivalry termination comes closest to dealing with this criticism, as he tried to incorporate issues into his conceptual and operational definitions of rivalry. Bennett (1996: 160) conceptualized “interstate rivalry” as “a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources (military, economic, or diplomatic) toward opposing each other, and in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states.” The issues at stake can include territory, external political policies

(e.g., promotion of religion or ideology), or internal political policies (e.g., treatment of ethnic minorities or presence of a particular leader in power). Bennett also recognizes that the issues at stake may change over the course of the rivalry. He acknowledges that issue disagreements can occur even among relatively friendly states, but it is only when such disagreements are characterized by the lack of willingness to compromise and the willingness to use military force to resolve the disagreement that we see rivalries form. The end of a rivalry occurs when formal agreements are signed or public renunciations of claims are issued by the rivals.

Operationally, Bennett (1996) modifies Wayman and Jones's (1991) MID-based approach to rivalry, which requires five MIDs, spanning a period of 25 years with no more than a 10 year gap between MIDs unless the primary issue at stake is unresolved. The major modification is the requirement that the issues at stake in the dyad are connected over the life of the rivalry. Rivalries end once that issue is formally resolved (Bennett 1996: 173-174). The beginning of the rivalry is coded based on the date of the first MID. This operational indicator produces a list of 34 interstate rivalries. Bennett (1996: 177; 1997: 251) finds that highly salient issues (border or homeland territory) increases the duration of a rivalry. This analysis is updated in Bennett's (1998) article, with a new operational definition of interstate rivalry based on a modified version of Goertz and Diehl (1995). An interstate rivalry must have six MIDs over a 20-year period, yet the relationship is not considered a rivalry until after both of these conditions are met. Thus, the beginning of a rivalry is at least 20 years after the initial dispute. Bennett maintains the same issue requirements and focus on termination as the formal resolution of the issues at stake. The analysis confirms the previous finding that highly salient issues lead to longer rivalries.

Bennett (1997) makes the strongest argument for the incorporation of issues into our understanding of rivalry in the literature. He is particularly critical of Diehl and Goertz's early work for failing to account for the issues at stake in a rivalry, despite scholarship that argues that issues are central to international conflict (Diehl, 1992; Vasquez, 1993; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981). Bennett (1997: 230) suggests that issues are "intuitively anything about which two states may seriously disagree." He further argues that issues may actually be more important in enduring rivalries than in normal competitions, since issues serve as the connection between the series of conflicts. Issues are what make a rivalry, as opposed to a dyad with many conflicts. Territorial issues may be an exceptionally important source of rivalry (Vasquez, 1993).

Diehl and Goertz (2000) also move in this direction of an issue-based approach to rivalry more recently. While they still emphasize spatial consistency, time, and militarized conflict as the key dimensions of interstate rivalry, they also make clear that an alternative approach would focus on issues:

What characterizes a rivalry relationship is not military force, but conflict over one issue or set of issues. Issue constancy over time thus permits one to say that all the competition in the rivalry belongs to the 'same' relationship. The advantage of issue conceptions is that they make one more certain that the various incidents in a rivalry belong together as part of the same relationship. Because the issue or issues remain constant, one can link the various disputes of a rivalry. In addition, this approach makes it easier to code the beginning and end of rivalries. Once the issue or issues have been resolved, the rivalry is over" (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 23-24).

While Diehl and Goertz (2000) provide an opening for the idea of incorporating issues into operational definitions of rivalry, this occurs more systematically in the next iteration of their dataset in 2006.

Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) provide updated conceptual and operational definitions of rivalry that attempt to deal with many of the aforementioned criticisms. The rivalry concept in

this version now has four components: spatial consistency, duration, militarized competition, and linked conflict. Rivalries are still primarily considered dyadic relationships, despite the fact that some rivalries may be linked to other rivalries. The duration component has been modified to consider only two categories: rivalry or isolated conflict. Isolated conflict is no longer considered a type of rivalry in this updated version of their work. Militarized competition continues to be an explicit part of the conceptual definition. States in a rivalry are still considered to be in competition over scarce goods, which must be cast in militarized terms. There are two conceptual linkages considered between disputes in a rivalry: the “pull of the past” that can involve “lock-in” policies based on previous interactions and learning, and “expectations of future conflict.” Operationally, they begin with all possible dyadic disputes in the MID data then eliminate instances where there was no direct interaction or intention to interact between states.

The biggest operational change comes in the duration, militarized competition, and linked conflict components. Cases of one or two disputes over the entire 1816-2001 period are labeled isolated conflict, while all others became potential rivalries. They have dropped the explicit requirements on the passage of time for an “enduring” or “proto-rivalries” to be identified as such. Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006: 337) contend that “the interrelation of issues primarily determines whether disputes belong to the same rivalry.” Issues become the linkage between disputes, and temporal proximity is less of an indicator of linkage than in previous versions. Issues may stay the same through the course of a rivalry, or they may change yet still be part of the same rivalry. As an example, Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006: 338) suggest that a purely issue-based approach to rivalry might miss that the 1971 Bangladesh War was indeed part of the India-Pakistan rivalry even though it was not fought over Kashmir.

Yet, the beginning and ending dates of a rivalry are still tied to the disputes or the “behavioral manifestation” of rivalry. They plan to rectify this in future work looking at issue resolution and treaties. The current dataset marks the beginning of a rivalry at the first MID and the ending 10-15 years after the last MID. In contrasting their work with Thompson’s (2001), they note that their approach does not require that states be “enemies,” but allows for a lower severity threshold over issues like fishing rights (p. 339). This new conceptual and operational definition produces 915 cases of isolated conflicts and 290 cases of rivalry between 1816 and 2001. 115 of these rivalries would be classified as “enduring” and 175 as “proto” rivalries under their old definition.

We believe that the move toward incorporating issues into the dispute density approaches to rivalry is a step in the right direction. Rather than start with disputes and add issues, as in Bennett (1996; 1997; 1998) or Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006), we start with issues. Just as issues proved useful in documenting the linkage between disputes (Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2006) or the termination of rivalry (Bennett, 1996; 1997; 1998), so can they be useful to document the initiation of a rivalry. As Gartzke and Simon (1999) argued, any causally meaningful definition of rivalry must account for the initial dispute. Issues can be documented as existing prior to militarized conflict. Our approach also allows for some rivalries to exist without militarized conflict. Issues can then form the linkage across a rivalry with or without militarized disputes. Finally, the resolution of the underlying issue(s) allows us to date the termination of a rivalry more accurately. In general, we believe that our issue-based approach to rivalry provides a much closer connection between conceptual and operational definitions of rivalry than currently found in the literature.

Issue Rivalry

The issue-based approach to world politics challenges the realist notion that states' foreign policies are guided only by broad strategic goals, such as the pursuit of power (Rosenau 1971; O'Leary 1976; Potter 1980; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; Randle 1987; Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1993; Hensel 2001; Hensel et al 2008). In this viewpoint, states contend over specific issues, which can be defined as "a disputed point or question, the subject of a conflict or controversy" (Randle, 1987: 1). Examples of contested issues include border disputes, the use or ownership of rivers or maritime areas, regime survival, the treatment of individuals abroad, and economic interests for firms and industries. Issues have tangible values to states, such as security, survival, and wealth, and intangible values, such as identity, justice, independence, and status. Issues that are salient along both dimensions, such as territorial disputes, are more likely to result in militarized attempts to settle the issue at stake. Cooperation is also more frequent when highly salient issues are involved, as disputing states will seek out peaceful negotiations more frequently (Hensel et al 2008).

The issue-based approach tends to focus on the variation across issues by capturing the salience of the contested issue. For example, Huth and Allee (2002) code several variables related to the salience of territorial claims, such as strategic importance and ethnic kinsmen living in the area. Hensel et al (2008) create a twelve point scale to capture the salience of three issues: territorial claims, maritime claims, and river claims. Maritime areas are delineated based on the presence of resources, such as oil and migratory fishing stocks, as well as strategic choke points. River salience is coded based on factors like navigational importance, hydroelectric power, and pollution. As noted above, most of the action in issue empirical models stems from variation in foreign policy strategies for highly salient issues relative to less important ones.

While the issue approach has given us great purchase for understanding the management of contentious issues, we have not fully explored the broader rivalry context of issue management. Some pairs of states contend primarily over a single issue while other dyads have a variety of distinct issues ongoing at any given point in time. While some of the conceptual work on rivalry notes the importance of issues, it is unclear how exactly issues matter. Some discussions imply a focal issue, such as a border dispute, that results in repeated militarized disputes over time. Others note that the issues at stake could evolve over the course of the rivalry, which is why the conceptual emphasis often shifts to the relevance of leaders' threat perceptions about their rivals.

We believe these two processes are distinct when conceptualizing interstate rivalry. As shown in Table 1, an issue-based rivalry can be delineated along two dimensions. The first dimension, *issue rivalry*, captures the number of contested issues in a dyadic relationship. States with multiple issues at stake are more likely to experience militarized disputes and more frequent peaceful negotiations to resolve contested issues. This occurs for two reasons. First, some issues are multi-dimensional, which raises the stakes of winning the issue. Many territorial disputes involve contestation over the resources in offshore waters in addition to the issue of who owns the piece of land. For example, the Falklands Island dispute between Great Britain and Argentina involves a disagreement about who owns the island, as well as who has exclusive rights to extract the offshore oil and fishing resources. Nigeria and Cameroon faced a similar situation in their contestation of the Bakassi Peninsula, which was valuable for both territorial and maritime reasons (Mitchell and Hensel 2007). The Rio de la Plata area between Argentina and Uruguay has been the source of contestation over territorial, maritime, and river rights. Our

basic assumption is that multi-dimensional issues are likely to involve more salient stakes in general, which will increase the risk of militarization in issue rivalry contexts.

The second reason that multiple issues may promote militarized interaction is that the handling of one issue may lead to further challenges of the status quo on the same issue or other issues. Iceland, for example, claimed a four mile territorial sea limit in 1952, which was challenged by the British government. The two states reached an agreement in 1956 through bilateral negotiations, which was challenged in 1958 when Iceland claimed an even further territorial sea limit of 12 miles. As fishing resources became increasingly scarce in the area, Iceland continued to push its maritime rights, claiming a 50 mile limit in 1972 and a 200 mile limit in 1976. These expanding claims to Iceland's maritime space resulted in increasingly hostile interaction between Britain, West Germany, and Iceland, culminating in the "Cod Wars" in the mid-1970s and intervention by the International Court of Justice to resolve the issue. The United States and Canada have also experienced over two dozen distinct issues in their interstate history. Some of these issues, such as maritime claims in the Beaufort Sea, are further challenges to sovereign rights left over from earlier boundary disputes (e.g. Alaska). Thus while one contentious issue might be resolved at a given point in time, the same issue can be challenged in the future as the situation changes, or the issue might give rise to new problems due to the multidimensional character of many geopolitical issues.

The second primary dimension is what we call *militarized rivalry*, which captures the way in which specific issues are handled. Pairs of states engaged in contentious issues will not necessarily become rivals in the militarized sense. In fact, less than half of all territorial, maritime, and river claims in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and Middle East have resulted in one or more militarized disputes over the contested issue (Hensel et al 2008). Many

dyads are able to resolve issues peacefully, which could stem from cross-cutting cooperative interactions and dense friendship networks that allow for more successful peaceful negotiations. This could also relate to the characteristics of the claimant states in an issue claim, as jointly democratic and asymmetrically matched adversaries are better able to strike agreements with peaceful foreign policy tools.

As issues become militarized, however, this increases the likelihood that future strategies for resolving the issue will also be militarized. Leng's (1983) classic study on crisis bargaining demonstrated that states often resorted to more coercive strategies when losing military contests, which created an increasing pattern of escalation over time, with war often reached by the third crisis in a rival dyad. This observation that the probability of dispute onset and escalation changes across the course of a rivalry is shown in other studies as well (e.g. Hensel 1994; Diehl and Goertz 2000). Colaresi and Thompson's (2002) analysis of crisis behavior in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset suggests that states are ten times more likely to experience another crisis after they have experienced three crises in the past. After only two crises, the next crisis is 17 times more likely to escalate to war. A similar pattern is observed in the issue-based literature as well. Hensel et al (2008) find that issues that have been previously militarized are significantly more likely to result in future militarized disputes. Leaders may find coercive tools easier to employ against rival states (Mitchell and Prins 2004) and may even be punished for extending olive branches to rival states (Colaresi 2004).

Table 1 presents examples of issue rivalries and militarized rivalries.¹ Dyads with multiple issues and low levels of militarization include Great Britain and Ireland (e.g. Northern Ireland territorial and maritime claims and maritime delimitation issues in the Irish Sea and

¹ We describe the operational rules for these measures in more detail in the next section. The data is coded based on territorial, maritime, and river claims as coded by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project (Hensel et al 2008).

northeast Atlantic) and Guyana and the Netherlands (Corentyn territorial and maritime claims). Dyads with a single issue as their point of contention, yet with high levels of militarization, include the United States and Ecuador (tuna fishing rights) and Guatemala and Honduras (border dispute involving R'õ Motagua). Some dyads are both issue rivals and militarized rivals, including Ecuador and Peru (border disputes over Oriente-Mainas and Amazonas-Caquet and a river dispute involving an oil spill) and France and Germany (border disputes over Alsace-Lorraine and Bavarian Palatinate).

In terms of theoretical expectations, we anticipate that both forms of rivalry will increase the risks for militarized engagement and the pressure for peaceful settlement. On the other hand, we expect that militarized rivalry will be more dangerous than issue rivalry in the long run, as repeated engagements in a militarized manner have clearly been shown to risk the chances for dispute escalation (e.g. fatalities or wars). The hypotheses that we evaluate in this paper empirically are summarized below.

H1: Issue and militarized rivalry dyads are more likely to experience militarized disputes over contentious issues than issue non-rivalry dyads.

H2: Issue and militarized rivalry dyads are more likely to employ peaceful techniques for resolving contentious issues than issue non-rivalry dyads.

H3: Issue rivalry dyads are less likely than militarized rivalry dyads to experience militarized disputes with high levels of violence (e.g. fatalities, wars).

Measuring Issue Rivalry and Militarized Rivalry

To fully capture the issues at stake in an interstate rivalry, we need a dataset that codes contentious issues between states. Most initial issue datasets focused on territorial claims (Huth 1996; Hensel 2001; Huth and Allee 2002), which is reasonable given the highly salient and escalatory nature of border disputes. Yet to capture multidimensionality in issue relationships, we need information on more than one type of contentious issue. To this end, we employ

version 1.1 of the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project's data on contentious issue claims (Hensel 2001; Mitchell 2002; Hensel et al. 2008). The ICOW project identifies contentious issue claims based on explicit evidence of diplomatic contention involving official representatives of two or more states over a particular issue. What is unique about this dataset is that it does not require militarization of the issue in order for an issue claim to be identified. This creates ample variation in the issue and militarized dimensions of rivalry that we discussed earlier.

The ICOW project codes three types of contentious issues: 1) territorial claims, where one state challenges sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state, 2) maritime claims, which involve explicit contention between two or more states over the ownership, access to, or usage of a maritime area, and 3) river claims, which involve explicit contention over the usage or ownership of an international river. All three issues are geopolitical in nature, and thus most likely to capture spatial rivalries, given that many territorial, maritime, and river disputes occur between contiguous neighbors. On the other hand, major powers do contend over these issues in colonial and former colonial areas, which allows us to capture some positional rivalries as well.

To date, ICOW has coded territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe (1816-2001), maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere and Europe (1900-2001), and river claims in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East (1900-2001) (Hensel et al. 2008).² This places a geographical limit on the creation of our new measures for issue rivalries and militarized rivalries. We focus on the two regions where all three issues are fully coded by ICOW: Western Hemisphere and Western Europe.³ For comparison purposes, we

² See the ICOW website at www.icow.org for updates on coverage by issue and region.

³ The ICOW Project is currently in the process of coding issue claims in other regions, thus we will be able to update our measures as additional regional data becomes available.

also create a list of enduring and strategic rivalries for these two regions based on the data compilations in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) and Thompson (2001).

Our first measure, *issue rivalry*, is coded one if the dyad has two or more unresolved contentious issues ongoing in the same time period, and zero otherwise. For dating purposes, the rivalry begins when the first issue claim begins and ends when the last issue claim ends. If the resolution of one issue occurs more than twenty years before the beginning of the next issue, we do not consider the issues to be linked. For example, Guatemala and Honduras have two distinct territorial claims over R'o Motagua (1899-1933) and Ranguana and Sapodilla (1981-), but they are separated by close to fifty years. An example of an issue rivalry is the one that occurs between the United States and Mexico. The first dyadic issue emerges in 1831 over the ownership of Texas. A series of other border disputes in the 19th century over California and other Baja peninsula areas maintained the issue rivalry. Competition over the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers emerged around the beginning of the 20th century. These water disputes, along with competing claims to tuna fishing rights, have sustained the issue rivalry to the present day.

Table 2 provides a detailed listing of all rivalries in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. Pairs of states that qualify as issue rivalries are listed in the first column. As we can see, the start date for many issue rivalries precedes the start date of enduring rivalries identified by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006), which is due to their coding rule of the start date as the first militarized dispute in the relationship. Our dating scheme more accurately reflects when the two states first began diplomatically disagreeing over specific issues. Thompson's dating scheme for strategic rivals is closer to our dating scheme, although there are significant disagreements

between our datasets as well. There are a total of 66 issue rivalries in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe from 1816-2001.⁴

Our second measure, *militarized rivalry*, examines the militarization of specific issues. We code this rivalry measure as one if the two states have experienced two or more militarized disputes over the specific issue at stake, and zero otherwise. The ICOW project does additional research on each militarized dispute that occurred between the issue claimants during the course of an issue claim to determine if each MID was related to the territorial, maritime, or river issue under contention. This helps to answer prior criticisms of empirical rivalry measures that do not provide a mechanism for causally relating militarized disputes. Our dating schemes for militarized rivalries employ the issue claim start and end dates from the ICOW project. There are a total of 57 militarized rivalries in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. Over 30 dyads are characterized by both issue rivalry and militarized rivalry. In these same two regions, Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) identify 92 rivalries, while Thompson (2001) records 53 rivalries.

Table 3 provides simple difference of means comparisons between the rivalry and non-rivalry groups.⁵ Table 3A examines issue rivalries, showing higher salience levels in the issue rivalry group compared to the issue non-rivalry group. This supports our argument about multidimensional issues being more salient overall. We also see that issue rivalries experience more bilateral negotiations and non-binding third party settlement attempts, more militarized disputes, and more wars. Issue rivalries tend to arise in situations of power parity and they tend

⁴ We should note that the maritime and river claim data are not coded by the ICOW project until 1900. This implies that any pre-1900 issue rivalries are those that experience multiple territorial claims.

⁵ The unit of analysis is the ICOW claim dyad-year. For each year of an ongoing issue claim, a case is created for each opposing pair of states involved in the claim. There are a total of 10,041 claim dyad years in version 1.1 of the ICOW dataset (Hensel et al 2008), although we lose some cases by exclusion of Eastern European and Middle Eastern regions.

to be initiated more often by non-democratic states. Table 3B presents similar data for militarized rivalries. The peaceful and militarized negotiation patterns are even more distinctive in this group, with militarized rivalry pushing states more frequently into militarized disputes, wars, and peaceful negotiations. We see a similar pattern of parity more often in the rivalry dyads and the presence of autocratic challengers. These descriptive statistics provide initial support to hypotheses 1 and 2; pairs of states in issue rivalries or militarized rivalries are more likely to employ militarized and peaceful foreign policy tools to resolve the issues under contention. The context of rivalry produces a distinct environment of interstate interaction.

Multivariate Empirical Analyses

To compare our measures of issue rivalry and militarized rivalry to pre-existing measures of interstate rivalry, we replicate an empirical model of contentious issues estimated by Hensel et al (2008), which employ the ICOW dataset for all available regions in the 1816-2001 period. The unit of analysis is the dyad claim year, which as noted above, produces over 10,000 total cases. Our sample sizes are reduced slightly due to the omission of some regions with incomplete coding across all three ICOW issues (Eastern Europe and the Middle East). We use the same measures as employed by Hensel et al (2008) for the independent variables.⁶ One important difference is the omission of the issue salience variable, which is strongly correlated with our measure of issue rivalry.⁷ Four dependent variables are employed: 1) militarized dispute onset

⁶ We include dummy variables for maritime and river issues with territorial issues as the omitted category. Recent claim activity in the past ten years is captured with two measures that weight previous MID's and peaceful settlement attempts. Attempts in the prior year are weighted 1.0, with a 10% decline in each year moving backward in time. Democratic dyad equals one if both states score six or higher on the Polity IV democracy scale. Parity is measured using the Correlates of War (COW) project's Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score for each state, taking the proportion of the dyad's total capabilities held by the strongest side.

⁷ When we include issue salience, the issue rivalry measure becomes insignificant in the MID onset model. The inclusion of issue salience does not alter the reported results for militarized rivalry. This correlation makes sense

(Table 4), 2) fatal militarized dispute onset (Table 5), 3) war onset (Table 6), and 4) the use of one or more peaceful settlement techniques in a given year (Table 7).

Hypothesis 1 is evaluated in Table 4. In Model 1, issue rivalry is positive and statistically significant ($p < .05$), indicating that dyads with multiple issues in contention are more likely to experience militarization of any single issue. Model 2 shows that militarized rivalry also has a positive and significant ($p < .01$) effect on dispute onset. Both of these findings show that rivalries in the issue context are more dangerous than issues in the non-rivalry context. The Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (Model 3) and Thompson (Model 4) rivalry measures also have a positive and statistically significant effect on dispute onset. In Table 8, we compare the substantive effects of these different types of rivalry. The Klein, Goertz, and Diehl measure captures the entirety of the dyadic militarized relationship, thus it is not too surprising that this has the largest substantive effect (648% increase in MID probability for rivals). The militarized rivalry variable also has a sizable effect on MID onset. If the issue at stake is characterized by two or more MIDs, the probability of another MID rises by 337% for the rival dyad.

Hypothesis 2 is evaluated in Table 7. All four rivalry measures have a positive and statistically significant effect on the use of peaceful negotiation techniques, such as bilateral negotiations, mediation, and arbitration. This concurs with previous findings in the conflict management literature, showing that more activity takes place in the conflict hot spots. Table 8 shows the substantive effects of each rivalry measure on peaceful settlements attempts, with no significant differences in the size of the effects across the four measures.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that militarized rivalries would be more at risk for escalation to high levels of violence than issue rivalries. Issue rivalries have more opportunities for conflict,

given that many issue rivalries arise due to multidimensional issues that often involve important territories and resources.

but because they are measured independently of militarized conflict, we include many cases of rivalry that are settled peacefully. Militarized rivals, on the other hand, are more likely to follow the dangerous path articulated by crisis bargaining and rivalry scholars, as recurrent conflict breeds further conflict and raises the likelihood of conflict escalation. We can evaluate this hypothesis by looking at the effect on rivalry on the onset of MIDs with fatalities or the onset of interstate war. In Tables 5 and 6, we can see that issue rivalry (Model 1) has no significant effect on the onset of either type of dispute. Militarized rivalry (Model 2), however, significantly raises the risk for militarized disputes with fatalities (increase of 219%) and escalation to war (increase of 224%). The Klein, Goertz, and Diehl and Thompson rivalry measures also increase the risk of violent disputes, which is to be expected given prior findings in the rivalry literature.

These findings are important because they help address a debate in the rivalry literature about the importance of militarization for defining a rivalry relationship. Some authors, such as Diehl and Goertz, have focused on militarized disputes because they see the use of coercive foreign policy strategies as essential for the conceptualization of what constitutes rivalry. Thompson's measure of strategic rivalry also tends to identify dyads with militarized histories, especially in the spatial rivalry context. The crossing of the militarized threshold is significant when states are managing issues such as territorial, maritime, and river claims. In our dataset, when pairs of states are both issue rivals and militarized rivals, we find that they militarize the first contentious issue in the relationship 74% of the time. The remaining 26% of disputes have occurred by the second contested issue. This suggests that the resort to force early in an interstate relationship pushes each side to adopt a rival or enemy image of the other side, which in turn makes further justification of the use of force easier to sell to the domestic audience. Losing states in early militarized confrontations also learn the lessons of increasing coercive

tactics, which can result in a pattern of increasing hostility and escalation over time. This pattern of behavior, especially as it is driven by territorial disputes, supports the steps to war model's assertion that the manner in which salient issues are managed is important for understanding how issue relationships evolve over time (Vasquez 1993; Senese and Vasquez 2003, 2008).

Conclusion

In this paper, we sought to demonstrate the importance of issues in conceptualizing and operationalizing rivalry. On the conceptual level, we have built on the prevailing view that states engage in rivalry over some underlying contentious issue. This led us to develop a new conceptualization of rivalry that contains two dimensions: the number of issues and the level of militarization. This conceptual approach resulted in two new operational measures of rivalry: issue rivalry and militarized rivalry. These new measures of rivalry help us to resolve many of the existing critiques of the literature. First, we are able to more accurately date the initiation of a rivalry by examining the onset of a contentious issue. Second, contentious issues provide the "glue" that holds a rivalry together. Together, the initiation and linkage functions of issues help to resolve the "hot hand" critique by providing an endogenous explanation for rivalry formation and duration. In militarized rivalries, this means that we can date a rivalry to the formation of a contentious issue before the onset of the first MID. Third, we can more accurately date the termination of a rivalry by looking at when and how contentious issues are resolved. As a result, our new conceptual and operational measures provide a complete account of the initiation, duration, and termination of rivalries. Finally, we can compare differences between rivalries that become militarized and those that do not, rather than assume militarization constitutes a rivalry.

If, as we argue, our operational measures provide a more accurate dating schema for rivalries, then future research should look at rivalry duration models more carefully. For

example, we can reexamine Bennett's (1996: 177; 1997: 251) findings that highly salient issues (border or homeland territory) increase the duration of a rivalry. We might also reexamine Goertz and Diehl's (1995) analyses of the effects of political shocks on rivalry duration, as well as initiation and termination. The dynamics of rivalries more generally, including whether they fit a "volcano model" or lock in to a "basic rivalry level" early in the relationship can also be examined (Diehl, 1998).

We can also look at linkages across time and issues to see how the overall rivalry context influences the way in which particular issues are settled. As we have demonstrated in this paper, the way in which the first issue is handled in a militarized rivalry is particularly crucial to this process. While our findings are currently limited to the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe, ICOW is in the process of coding data for other regions, which will eventually help us to overcome our regional data limitations.

This additional data would allow a comparison of the effects of issue rivals versus militarized rivals on state building (e.g., Thies, 2005; Thies, 2007). It might also provide a useful distinction between rivals that could form the basis for a zone of negative peace and those that would form the basis of a zone of war (Thies, 2008). We should also investigate the reasons why some issue rivals become militarized rivals in the first place. The conceptual distinction and operational measures we provide are really the only approach that allows an investigation of the militarization of rivalries.

In sum, we believe the new conceptual and operational definitions of rivalry outlined in this paper offer a new way to think about and observe rivalries. They open the door to reexamination of many existing findings in the literature, as well as prompt new questions for future research.

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Table 1: Rivalry Dimensions

	Number of Militarized Disputes	
Number of Issues	Low	High
Low	No Rivalry	Militarized Rivalry Ex: US-Ecuador; Guatemala-Honduras
High	Issue Rivalry Ex: UK-Ireland; Guyana-Netherlands	Issue & Militarized Rivalry Ex: Ecuador-Peru; France-Germany

Table 2: List of Issue and Militarized Rivalries
Western Hemisphere and Western Europe

Rivalries ⁸	Issue ⁹	Militarized ¹⁰	KGD ¹¹	Thompson ¹²
<i>Western Hemisphere</i>				
United States-Canada	1914-	1914-1999	1974-1997	
United States-Cuba			<i>1912-1934</i> <i>1959-1996</i>	<i>1959-</i>
United States-Haiti	1859-		1869-1915	
United States-Dominican Republic			<i>1900-1917</i>	
United States-Mexico	1831-2001	1831-1848 1835-1848	1836-1893 1911-1920	1821-1848
United States-Honduras	1899-1972			
United States-Nicaragua	1900-1928		1909-1926	
	1965-		1982-1988	
United States-Panama	1923-1995			
United States-Colombia	1890-1972			
United States-Ecuador		1952-	1952-1981	
United States-Peru		1947-	1955-1992	
United States-Chile				<i>1884-1891</i>
United States-United Kingdom	1816-1935	1872-1903	1837-1861 1902-1903	1816-1904
United States-France				1830-1871
United States-Spain	1816-1821		1816-1825 1850-1898	1816-1819

⁸ Rivalries in bold are those that experience one or more militarized disputes over the contested issues.

⁹ An issue rivalry exists if the dyad experienced two or more territorial, maritime, or river claims simultaneously. The rivalry starts when the first issue claim begins and ends when the last issue claim is resolved.

¹⁰ A militarized rivalry exists if the dyad experienced two or more MIDs over a specific issue. The rivalry begins when the issue claim begins and ends when the issue claim is resolved.

¹¹ KGD indicates the years of rivalry coded by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). Years in italics indicate that an ICOW issue claim is coded for this dyad, but it does not meet the criteria for two or more ongoing issue claims or two or more MIDS over a single issue.

¹² The years listed are those Thompson (2001) identifies as strategic rivals. Years in italics indicate that an ICOW issue claim is coded for this dyad, but it does not meet the criteria for two or more ongoing issue claims or two or more MIDS over a single issue.

<u>Rivalries</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Militarized</u>	<u>KGD</u>	<u>Thompson</u>
United States-Germany			1915-1918 1939-1945	1889-1918 1939-1945
United States-Russia	1900-	1900-	1918-1920 1946-2000	1945-1989
Canada-France		1971-		
Canada-Denmark	1971-			
Canada-Russia			1999-2000	
Haiti-Dominican Republic	1894-1935		1986-1994	1845-1893
Haiti-United Kingdom			1883-1887	
Haiti-Germany			1872-1911	
Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela		1962-	1996-1999	
Mexico-Guatemala				<i>1840-1882</i>
Belize-Guatemala	1981-	1981-	1993-2001	1981-1993
Belize-Honduras	1981-			
Guatemala-Honduras		1899-1933		1840-1930
Guatemala-El Salvador			<i>1876-1906</i>	<i>1840-1930</i>
Guatemala-Nicaragua				1840-1907
Guatemala-United Kingdom	1868-1981	1868-1981	1972-1977	
Honduras-El Salvador	1899-	1899-1992	1969-1993	1840-1992
Honduras-Nicaragua	1900-	1912-1961 1912- 1999-	1907-1929 1957-2001	1895-1962 1980-1987
Honduras-Colombia	1982-1986			
Honduras-United Kingdom	1981-1981			
El Salvador-Nicaragua			1907-1909	
Nicaragua-Costa Rica			<i>1948-1957</i> <i>1977-1998</i>	<i>1840-1858</i> <i>1948-1992</i>
Nicaragua-Colombia	1900-1930 1979-	1979-	1994-2001	1979-1992
Costa Rica-Panama				<i>1921-1944</i>
Colombia-Venezuela	1951-	1951- 1955-	1982-2001	1831-

<u>Rivalries</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Militarized</u>	<u>KGD</u>	<u>Thompson</u>
Colombia-Ecuador			<i>1857-1863</i>	<i>1831-1919</i>
Colombia-Peru	1839-1935	1839-1922 1932-1935	1899-1934	1824-1935
Colombia-United Kingdom			<i>1836-1857</i>	
Colombia-Italy			1885-1898	
Venezuela-Guyana	1966-	1966-	1966-1999	1966-
Venezuela-United Kingdom	1841-1966	1841-1899	1881-1903	
Venezuela-Netherlands	1850-1866	1854-1866	1849-1869	
Guyana-Suriname	1975-	1975-	1976-2000	
Guyana-Netherlands	1966-1975			
Ecuador-Peru	1854-1998	1854-1945 1947-1998	1891-1955 1977-1998	1830-1998
Ecuador-Brazil	1854-1922			
Peru-Bolivia	1848-1936	1848-1912		1825-1932
Peru-Chile	1879-1929	1879-1884 1884-1929	1852-1921 1976-1977	1832-1929
Peru-Spain		1864-1866	1859-1866	
Brazil-Paraguay	1846-1929	1846-1874	1850-1870	1862-1870
Brazil-Argentina	1972-1998		1872-1875	1817-1985
Brazil-United Kingdom	1826-1926	1838-1926	1838-1863	
Brazil-France		1826-1900		
Bolivia-Paraguay		1878-1938	1886-1938	1887-1938
Bolivia-Chile	1848-	1848-1884 1884-	1857-1884	1836-
Paraguay-Argentina	1941-1983			1862-1870
Chile-Argentina	1841-1998	1841-1903 1904-1985 1900-1985	1873-1909 1952-1984	1843-1991
Chile-United Kingdom		1940-		
Chile-Spain			1862-1866	
Argentina-Uruguay	1882-1973	1882-1973 1900-1973		

<u>Rivalries</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Militarized</u>	<u>KGD</u>	<u>Thompson</u>
Argentina-United Kingdom	1841-	1841- 1940- 1966-	1842-1846 1976-1983	1965-
Argentina-France			1842-1846	
Argentina-Bosnia			2000-2000	
Argentina-Russia		1967-1986		
<i>Western Europe</i>				
United Kingdom-Ireland	1922-1998			
United Kingdom-Netherlands	1816-1966			
United Kingdom-France			<i>1888-1898</i>	<i>1816-1904</i>
United Kingdom-Spain		1816-		
United Kingdom-Germany			<i>1887-1921</i> 1938-1945	<i>1896-1918</i> 1934-1945
United Kingdom-Italy			1927-1943	1934-1943
United Kingdom-Russia			1849-1861 <i>1876-1923</i> 1939-1999	<i>1816-1956</i>
United Kingdom-Norway	1911-1975			
United Kingdom-Denmark	1958-1984			
United Kingdom-Iceland	1952-1976	1958-1961		
Ireland-Spain		1984-		
Netherlands-Belgium	1830-1839 1918-1959	1918-1920		
Netherlands-West Germany	1955-1971			
Belgium-Germany	1841-1940		1914-1940	
France-Switzerland	1816-1862			
France-Spain	1917-			
France-Germany	1849-1935	1870-1871	1830-1940	1816-1955
France-Austria Hungary			1840-1859 1925-1940	

<u>Rivalries</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Militarized</u>	<u>KGD</u>	<u>Thompson</u>
France-Italy	1927-1986		1860-1866	1881-1940
France-Russia			1833-1856	1816-1894
			1918-1920	
			1948-1961	
France-Iceland	1953-1961			
Spain-Portugal	1928-			
Spain-Italy			1927-1940	
Bavaria-Baden	1816-1840			
Germany-Saxony			<i>1864-1866</i>	
West Germany-East Germany	1955-1972	1958-1972	1961-1971	1949-1973
West Germany-Russia			1961-1980	
West Germany-Denmark	1966-1982			
West Germany-Iceland	1958-1975			
Germany-Poland				1918-1939
Germany-Russia			<i>1914-1920</i>	<i>1890-1945</i>
			1936-1945	
			1911-1918	
Germany-Norway			1919-1920	1918-1939
Poland-Russia	1991-2001	1992-1995	1938-1939	
			1993-1997	
Austria Hungary-France				1816-1918
Austria-Prussia				<i>1816-1870</i>
Austria Hungary-Italy	1848-1919	1848-1866	1848-1877	1848-1918
			1904-1918	
Austria Hungary-Papal States			1847-1849	
Austria-Russia				1816-1918
Italy-Russia			1918-1920	1936-1943
Russia-Finland	1918-1947	1941-1944		
Russia-Sweden	1851-1856		1952-1964	
			1981-1992	

<u>Rivalries</u>	<u>Issue</u>	<u>Militarized</u>	<u>KGD</u>	<u>Thompson</u>
Russia-Norway			1956-2001	
Norway-Denmark		1958-1997		
Norway-Iceland	1979-			
Denmark-Iceland	1958-1997			

Table 3: Comparison of Rivalry and Non-Rivalry Groups

A. Issue Rivalry, 2 or more Ongoing Contentious Issues

	No Rivalry	Issue Rivalry (2 or more issues)	t-statistic
Average issue salience (0-12)	6.184	6.475	-5.660 (p<.001)**
# of bilateral negotiations (0-5)	0.104	0.123	-2.275 (p<.05)*
# of non-binding 3 rd party (0-5)	0.039	0.048	-1.713 (p<.05)*
# of binding 3 rd party (0-2)	0.007	0.007	.155 (p=0.562)
# of peaceful attempts (0-7)	0.150	0.177	-2.670 (p<.05)*
# of MIDs (0-2)	0.026	0.034	-2.091 (p<.05)*
# of wars (0-1)	0.002	0.003	-0.846 (p=.199)
Challenger/Target CINC (0-7602)	58.90	23.05	6.621 (p<.001)**
% in parity (< 3/1 ratio)	24%	30%	
Challenger's Democ-Autoc (-10 to 10)	2.233	1.211	7.673 (p<.001)**
Target's Democ-Autoc (-10 to 10)	1.528	4.253	-20.10 (p<.001)**
MTOP treaties (0-11)	2.469	2.893	-6.466 (p<.001)**

B. Militarized Rivalry, 2 or more MIDs over a Specific Issue

	No Rivalry	Militarized Rivalry (2 or more MIDs)	t-statistic
Average issue salience (0-12)	5.905	7.444	-29.58 (p<.001)**
# of bilateral negotiations (0-5)	0.099	0.15	-6.315 (p<.001)**
# of non-binding 3 rd party (0-5)	0.033	0.072	-6.631 (p<.001)**
# of binding 3 rd party (0-2)	0.006	0.008	-1.217 (p=0.112)
# of peaceful attempts (0-7)	0.139	0.233	-8.695 (p<.001)**
# of MIDs (0-2)	0.010	0.080	-17.652 (p<.001)**
# of wars (0-1)	0.001	0.006	-3.938 (p<.001)**
Challenger/Target CINC (0-7602)	47.54	10.48	6.501 (p<.001)**
% in parity (< 3/1 ratio)	23%	39%	
Challenger's Democ-Autoc (-10 to 10)	1.963	0.511	9.483 (p<.001)**
Target's Democ-Autoc (-10 to 10)	3.173	3.405	-1.605 (p=.054)
MTOP treaties (0-11)	2.819	2.541	4.039 (p<.001)**

Table 4: Effect of Issue Rivalry and Militarized Rivalry on Militarized Dispute Onset

Dependent Variable: MID Onset in Issue Claim Dyad Year

Variable	Model 1: Issue Rivalry	Model 2: Militarized Rivalry	Model 3: KGD Rivalry	Model 4: Thompson Rivalry
Rivalry	0.30 (0.15)**	1.52 (0.15)***	2.08 (0.15)***	0.62 (0.16)***
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Maritime Issue	0.08 (0.15)	0.23 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.15)	0.16 (0.15)
River Issue	-0.75 (0.47)	-0.35 (0.46)	-0.42 (0.47)	-0.59 (0.47)
Recent MIDs	0.89 (0.08)***	0.72 (0.08)***	0.55 (0.08)***	0.87 (0.09)***
Recent Peaceful Attempts	0.25 (0.05)***	0.17 (0.05)***	0.25 (0.05)***	0.22 (0.05)***
Democratic Dyad	-0.36 (0.18)**	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.18)
Parity	0.56 (0.14)***	0.33 (0.13)**	0.23 (0.14)*	0.29 (0.16)*
Constant	-4.28 (0.14)***	-4.75 (0.13)***	-4.86 (0.15)***	-4.26 (0.11)***
Sample Size	9361	9619	9361	9361

Entries are coefficients followed by robust standard errors; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 5: Effect of Issue Rivalry and Militarized Rivalry on Fatal Militarized Dispute Onset

Dependent Variable: MID Onset with Fatalities in Issue Claim Dyad Year

Variable	Model 1: Issue Rivalry	Model 2: Militarized Rivalry	Model 3: KGD Rivalry	Model 4: Thompson Rivalry
Rivalry	0.18 (0.32)	1.15 (0.34)***	1.86 (0.36)***	1.56 (0.39)***
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Maritime Issue	-1.22 (0.57)**	-0.79 (0.43)*	-1.32 (0.56)**	-1.00 (0.56)*
River Issue	---	---	---	---
Recent MIDs	0.67 (0.14)***	0.60 (0.15)***	0.41 (0.15)***	0.60 (0.14)***
Recent Peaceful Attempts	0.19 (0.12)	0.10 (0.11)	0.14 (0.12)	0.14 (0.12)
Democratic Dyad	-1.18 (0.68)*	-0.74 (0.54)	-1.06 (0.65)*	-1.04 (0.71)
Parity	0.54 (0.32)*	0.30 (0.31)	0.23 (0.32)	-0.19 (0.33)
Constant	-5.49 (0.30)***	-5.85 (0.26)***	-6.02 (0.30)***	-5.93 (0.29)***
Sample Size	8920	9178	8920	8920

Entries are coefficients followed by robust standard errors; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 6: Effect of Issue Rivalry and Militarized Rivalry on War Onset

Dependent Variable: War Onset in Issue Claim Dyad Year

Variable	Model 1: Issue Rivalry	Model 2: Militarized Rivalry	Model 3: KGD Rivalry	Model 4: Thompson Rivalry
Rivalry	0.27 (0.47)	1.14 (0.46)**	2.02 (0.51)***	1.60 (0.51)***
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Maritime Issue	-1.90 (1.08)*	-1.97 (1.08)*	-2.01 (1.06)*	-1.71 (1.09)
River Issue	---	---	---	---
Recent MIDs	0.32 (0.26)	0.13 (0.28)	-0.01 (0.31)	0.22 (0.27)
Recent Peaceful Attempts	0.35 (0.14)**	0.32 (0.14)**	0.31 (0.15)**	0.30 (0.15)**
Democratic Dyad	-1.70 (1.14)	-1.66 (1.14)	-1.53 (1.06)	-1.63 (1.18)
Parity	0.07 (0.50)	0.00 (0.50)	-0.25 (0.47)	-0.65 (0.48)
Constant	-5.97 (0.42)***	-6.27 (0.35)***	-6.50 (0.38)***	-6.35 (0.39)***
Sample Size	8920	9178	8920	8920

Entries are coefficients followed by robust standard errors; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 7: Effect of Issue Rivalry and Militarized Rivalry on Peaceful Settlement Attempts

Dependent Variable: One or More Peaceful Settlement Attempts in Issue Claim Dyad Year

Variable	Model 1: Issue Rivalry	Model 2: Militarized Rivalry	Model 3: KGD Rivalry	Model 4: Thompson Rivalry
Rivalry	0.20 (0.07)***	0.13 (0.07)*	0.35 (0.08)***	0.38 (0.09)***
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Maritime Issue	-0.40 (0.08)***	-0.21 (0.08)***	-0.42 (0.08)***	-0.37 (0.08)***
River Issue	0.61 (0.13)***	0.69 (0.13)***	0.68 (0.13)***	0.71 (0.13)***
Recent MIDs	0.42 (0.07)***	0.34 (0.06)***	0.33 (0.07)***	0.39 (0.07)***
Recent Peaceful Attempts	0.50 (0.03)***	0.51 (0.03)***	0.50 (0.03)***	0.49 (0.04)***
Democratic Dyad	0.33 (0.08)***	0.24 (0.08)***	0.35 (0.08)***	0.40 (0.08)***
Parity	0.36 (0.07)***	0.36 (0.07)***	0.32 (0.07)***	0.19 (0.08)**
Constant	-2.58 (0.07)***	-2.46 (0.05)***	-2.51 (0.06)***	-2.54 (0.06)***
Sample Size	9361	9619	9361	9361

Entries are coefficients followed by robust standard errors; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 8: Substantive Effects of Rivalry

	Predicted Probabilities (generated with Clarify)			
	<u>MID Onset</u>	<u>Fatal MID Onset</u>	<u>War Onset</u>	<u>Peaceful Settlement Attempt(s)</u>
<u>Issue Rivalry</u>				
No	0.0169	0.0049	0.0033	0.0897
Yes	0.0228	0.0054	0.0038	0.1074
<u>Militarized Rivalry</u>				
No	0.0103	0.0031	0.0021	0.0998
Yes	0.0450	0.0099	0.0068	0.1118
<u>KGD Rivalry</u>				
No	0.0091	0.0027	0.0017	0.0943
Yes	0.0681	0.0175	0.0128	0.1285
<u>Thompson Rivalry</u>				
No	0.0171	0.0029	0.0020	0.0924
Yes	0.0315	0.0140	0.0098	0.1290