

## DECEPTION AND EVIDENCE<sup>1</sup>

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### Introduction

Suppose that, whenever Gary has an experience as of two bananas in a bowl, Barry does too, and suppose that, whenever Gary believes that there are two bananas in the bowl, reasoning that there will be a banana left if he takes one, Barry does too. In general, whenever Gary or Barry has some non-factive attitude to a proposition—an attitude one can bear to a proposition even if it is false—the other does too. They are what can be called “internal twins”.

Suppose that Gary and Barry still differ in a dramatic way. Although Gary is now and then mistaken about some matter of fact, Barry is a radically deceived brain in a vat, as deceived as can be given that he has the same non-factive mental states as Gary.

Gary is in the good case; Barry is in the bad case—do they have the same evidence nevertheless? That is the question I will address in this paper.

According to proponents of what I'll call *Evidential Internalism* (such as Bonjour 1999 or Audi 2001), the answer to my question is “yes”. According to proponents of *Evidential Externalism* (such as McDowell 1982, 1995 or Williamson 2000), the answer to my question is “no”.

My main aim is to evaluate the case for Evidential Internalism. Although I have some sympathy for the externalist view, I want to understand why one might find the opposing view attractive. Evidential internalists should not take their view for granted, and evidential externalists should be aware of what else they might have to deny when they deny the claim. Since arguments for Evidential Internalism have been challenged, it is especially important to understand why one might endorse the view, since one might otherwise mistakenly conclude that it is unmotivated.

There is a further reason to evaluate the case for Evidential Internalism: the view plays a key role in skeptical arguments. Thus, the denial of Evidential Internalism provides a reply to some skeptical arguments, and the acceptance of

Evidential Internalism will commit one to skeptical conclusions, if no further response to the arguments can be devised.

The plan of the paper is as follows. I will start by formulating and clarifying the respective views (section 1). I will then state and evaluate two lines of argument for Evidential Internalism. The first line of argument appeals to considerations about one's access to one's evidence (section 2), the second appeals to a supervenience thesis about the equal justification of internal twins (section 3).<sup>2</sup> My conclusion will be that the second line of argument, once thoroughly pursued, is the best line of defense for the view. The main problem for Evidential Externalism will turn out to be that, if the view is true, then one's beliefs are sometimes *less* justified in the *good* case than in the bad case. I will close by discussing whether, as one might suspect, the evidential externalist has some advantage in responding to skepticism (section 4). Here I will conclude that she does not.

A further task is to evaluate the overall case against Evidential Internalism. Although I will address some objections to the view in what follows, I do not have the space to take on that task here.

## I. Formulations

The specific thesis I will evaluate is this:

(Evidential Internalism): Necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A and B have the same evidence.

I will start by clarifying what Evidential Internalism says, and will then make some points about what it does not say.

Evidential Internalism is a particular version of internalism in epistemology. It is an internalist thesis because it entails that, once the contents of one's internal states are fixed, what evidence one has does not depend in any further way on how one's environment is. Provided that two subjects are internal twins, their evidence will be the same, regardless of how different their environments may otherwise be.<sup>3</sup>

One might wonder what is meant here by "evidence". An initial suggestion would be "whatever plays a role in explaining why a subject has justification to hold a belief". This suggestion may be too generous. That Myla lacks a certain defeater may well help to explain why she is justified in holding a certain belief, without itself standing as evidence for what she believes. The intuitive notion I have in mind is that of a reason which provides one with justification to hold a belief, rather than merely explaining a belief. I leave open the question of whether only reasons can provide one with justification to hold a belief, and will not hazard any further explication of "evidence" here.<sup>4</sup>

On the use of "internal" I follow, two people are internal twins just in case they have the same non-factive mental states to the same degree—the same

beliefs, apparent experiences, apparent memories, and so on (cf. Wedgwood 2002).<sup>5</sup> What is crucial on this reading is that internal twins be the same in all representational respects. It is not crucial on this reading that internal twins have the same intrinsic properties—presumably two subjects can be the same in all representational respects without being the same in all intrinsic respects.

It's worth clarifying what sorts of mental states can count as "internal" on the use I follow. Evidential Internalism is compatible with the claim that there are "broad" mental states, mental states such that being in them does not supervene on one's intrinsic properties, but instead can depend on one's relations to other speakers or the environment. Evidential Internalism is compatible with the claim that there are object-dependent mental states, states such that one is in them only if objects represented by the states exist. In particular, being an internal twin of a person can require sharing broad mental states or object-dependent states with that person, if those states are themselves non-factive. For example, if Gary has a broad belief that bananas are yellow, someone will be an internal twin of Gary only if he shares that broad belief. I take it that, since beliefs are a primary object of epistemic appraisal, we should count two people as internal twins only if they at least have the same beliefs.<sup>6</sup>

Others might use different readings of "internal", and propose narrower supervenience bases for two thinkers to have the same evidence. For example, an internalist might say that "internal" mental states are just those non-factive mental states which are consciously accessible, or an internalist might say that "internal" mental states are just narrow mental states, states such that being in them does supervene on the intrinsic properties of a thinker.<sup>7</sup> However, these philosophers will not reject the version of Evidential Internalism I address: the mental states they count as "internal" are still not factive. Also, one might accept the version of Evidential Internalism I consider, and reject versions of Evidential Internalism in terms of a narrower supervenience base. Thus, by focusing on the version of Evidential Internalism in terms of non-factive mental states, we may address our attention to the most general version of the view.<sup>8</sup>

Evidential Internalism says that internal twins have the same evidence; it does not say what their evidence consists of. The thesis does not address detailed questions about the content and the ontology of evidence. One might think that the claim at least entails some particular view about what evidence we have; I will return to the issue later in the paper.

Evidential Internalism is not what we may call an *access thesis* in epistemology. Access theses place epistemic constraints on what it takes for something to be in one's evidence, or more generally on what it takes for something to justify one in believing this or that. The epistemic constraints can themselves be stated in terms of knowledge, justified belief, or other terms. According to the access theorist, something provides one with justification to hold a belief only if some further constraint is satisfied about one's access to the justifier, or to one's possession of the justifier.<sup>9</sup>

Evidential Internalism also does not concern the property of being justified, as opposed to the possession of evidence. It leaves open the question of whether,

if a person's belief has the property of being justified, then the belief stands in some suitable relation to evidence the person has. The thesis is compatible with the possibility of non-evidential justification. It also leaves open the question of whether, if two people are the same with respect to their evidence, then they are the same with respect to how justified their beliefs are.

What Evidential Internalism tells us is that internal twins have the same evidence, whatever their evidence may exactly be, and whatever the relation between evidence and justification may exactly be.

According to the opponent of Evidential Internalism, the following claim is instead true:

(Evidential Externalism): It's possible that: A and B are internal twins and A and B do not have the same evidence.

Evidential Externalism, like Evidential Internalism, is not itself a view about what evidence one has. An externalist might accept the thesis, defended in Williamson (2000: ch. 9), that one's (propositional) evidence is what one knows.<sup>10</sup> On this line of thought, assuming that propositions are what one knows, one's evidence includes a proposition P if and only if one knows P. But the thesis that one's propositional evidence is what one knows is a strong one, and there is room for versions of Evidential Externalism which are weaker than it. For example, an evidential externalist might accept the weaker thesis that one's propositional evidence is what one justifiedly and truly believes. Or she might accept the foundationalist thesis that one's evidence includes a proposition P if and only if one perceives P. And so on. According to the most straightforward versions of Evidential Externalism—those I will focus on in this paper—one's body of evidence includes P just in case one has some privileged factive attitude to P. Since here it can be easy for one to be in possession of evidence which obviously entails contingent propositions about the environment, we can think of this variant of Evidential Externalism as Entailing Evidence Externalism.<sup>11</sup>

Evidential Externalism is a version of externalism in epistemology. On this view, even when we have fixed the representational contents of one's non-factive states, what evidence one has is still sensitive to the environment one is in. Indeed, Evidential Externalism is arguably the best version of externalism in epistemology. An advantage of the claim is that it does not entail reliabilist views, which I take to be the most familiar versions of externalism in epistemology. According to the reliabilist views I have in mind, a belief is justified if some salient process (or perhaps method) whereby the belief is formed or maintained is reliable. Someone can meet the sufficient condition proposed, yet fail to appreciate the reliability of the salient source of her belief. So one common objection is that something unrecognized by the thinker cannot make a positive contribution to the justification of a belief (Bonjour 1980). According to another common objection, such views face a "generality problem" in properly

specifying the salient processes by which one's belief is formed or maintained (Conee and Feldman 1998).

There are versions of Evidential Externalism which are not vulnerable to the above complaints about reliabilism. Even if one's evidence is sensitive to what environment one is in, it does not follow that unrecognized factors make a positive contribution to the justification of one's beliefs. For example, an evidential externalist such as Williamson (2000) says both that one's evidence is what one knows, and that only one's evidence justifies belief. This view fares well with the demand that one must have access to what justifies one's beliefs, since on this view *only* what is known justifies belief.<sup>12</sup> Also, the evidential externalist need not face any problem in specifying what one's evidence is: one's evidence will be what one knows, or justifiedly and truly believes, etc. The upshot is that versions of Evidential Externalism escape some standard objections to reliabilism, making those versions of Evidential Externalism promising theses for an externalist in epistemology to accept.

We now have clarified the positions of the evidential internalist and of her rival. It is time to consider how one might argue for the internalist view.

## **II. Access Arguments**

According to the first line of argument I will consider, Evidential Internalism is entailed by some true access thesis in epistemology, even though the view is not itself an access thesis. Before we look at the strategy in more detail, we should bear in mind that some access theses are compatible with Evidential Externalism. For example, as we just saw, it might be that only known propositions justify beliefs. On this sort of view, Evidential Internalism is false, but some access thesis is nevertheless correct. To argue for Evidential Internalism from access theses in epistemology, then, one will have to be very clear about which access thesis one invokes, and why that thesis should rule out the externalist view.

The kind of access thesis I will consider concerns one's knowing whether one has such-and-such a piece of evidence. For example, if one's evidence includes the proposition that the wall looks white, the relevant access thesis will concern one's knowledge that one's evidence includes the proposition that the wall looks white, as opposed to one's knowledge simply that the wall looks white.

I will consider two access arguments. The first is not novel, and I will pass over it quickly. The second argument is novel, and I will set it out in much more detail, finally explaining why I think it is flawed.<sup>13</sup>

The first access argument is stated and critiqued in Williamson (2000: ch. 8). It uses the following thesis:

(Transparency): For any proposition P, if one is suitably alert and conceptually sophisticated, then one is in a position to know whether or not one's evidence includes P.

If Transparency is true, and Evidential Internalism is false, some reflective subject in the bad case should be able to work out that she is not in the good case. Since she will know that she is in the good case only if she has a certain piece of evidence, and she will know that she does not have the piece of evidence, she will be in a position to know that she is not in the good case. Since no subject in the bad case can figure out that she is not in the good case, the proponent of the Transparency argument concludes that Evidential Internalism is true.

We can all agree that Transparency is a very strong claim about one's access to one's evidence. Williamson (2000) sets out an extended argument to show that the Transparency thesis is false. Further, according to Williamson, Evidential Internalism is unmotivated once we have shown Transparency to be false:

If something like this argument [from Transparency] is not the reason for which skeptics and others think that one has the same evidence in the two cases, it is not at all clear what is (2000: 173).

On this line of thought, the Transparency argument is unsound, and there is no other argument in sight for Evidential Internalism. The upshot is presumably supposed to be that Evidential Internalism is unmotivated.

I set aside the question of how Williamson argues against the Transparency thesis, and whether his argument succeeds.<sup>14</sup> I also set aside the question of whether there is a true weakening of Transparency which can do the work of the stronger claim.<sup>15</sup> What I want to emphasize is that there is a novel access argument which uses a very different thesis, one which is not touched by Williamson's argument against Transparency. Since there is a good deal of discussion in the literature of Williamson's line of argument against Transparency, and no discussion of the new argument, it is worth taking the trouble to set it out.

The Transparency argument focuses on the bad case, using a claim about *when* one is in a position to know what one's evidence is. One can set up a different access argument, focusing on the good case, with a claim about *how* one can know what one's evidence is. According to the new argument, Evidential Externalism is false because it has unacceptable consequences about what one can know from the armchair.

To set out the argument, we will need a grip on what "armchair knowledge" means. One has armchair knowledge of a proposition when one knows it, and one's justification for believing the proposition does not *constitutively* depend on one's having had any particular sense experience or type of sense experience. Thus, one can have armchair knowledge of a proposition, even if a background

condition for having that knowledge is that one has had a certain experience or type of experience. For example, one might have armchair knowledge that redness is a color, even if one knows that proposition only if one has had experiences of redness (Kitcher 1980: 5; Burge 1993: 459–60).

The key access thesis for the new argument is the following one:

(Armchair Access): It is sometimes the case that: one's evidence includes some proposition E, and one knows from the armchair that one's evidence includes E.

According to Armchair Access, one sometimes knows by reflection that one has a certain piece of evidence. The claim should be plausible. Although I may be fallible about what evidence I have, it still seems that I sometimes know what evidence I have simply by reflecting on my situation, rather than by relying on sense experience. Of course, it might be that I have the piece of evidence only if I have had some particular experience—the evidence might itself consist of some sense experience. But my justification for believing that I have the evidence need not constitutively depend on my having had the experience. The source of my knowledge remains reflection rather than sense experience. Analogously, I know that I am having a certain sense experience only if I am having the sense experience, but that does not show that I lack armchair knowledge that I am having the experience. The source of my knowledge is arguably still reflection instead of experience.

To set out the problem for the evidential externalist, we can focus on an example of a thoughtful subject in the good case. Suppose Gary sees that the dial reads 0.4, and considers what evidence he has and what his having certain evidence entails. If Evidential Externalism is true, then in the good case he has as a piece of evidence that the dial reads 0.4, and in the bad case he at best has the evidence that it seems that the dial reads 0.4. That's just the sort of asymmetry between the cases we should expect if the view is true.<sup>16</sup>

In particular, if Evidential Externalism is true, we should expect that Gary knows from the armchair that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4. It would be ad hoc for the externalist to accept that we sometimes have armchair access to our evidence, yet insist that we never have armchair access to our environmentally sensitive evidence. After all, it would be ad hoc for a content externalist to say, we have privileged access to some of our mental states, just not to any of our environmentally sensitive mental states. No such restrictions are built into the plausible thoughts about how we can access our evidence or our mental states.

We should also expect that, if Evidential Externalism is true, then one's evidence includes any proposition P only if P is true. After all, if the view is true, then what evidence one has depends on how the environment is—the most straightforward way for this to happen is for attributions of propositional evidence to be factive. Given that Gary is thinking about the matter, he knows this from the armchair if we do.

So far Gary knows two things from the armchair if Evidential Externalism is true: that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4, and that, if his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4, then the dial reads 0.4.

We should also expect that, if Gary puts the two pieces of armchair knowledge together, and infers what they entail, he will also have armchair knowledge of what follows from the two pieces of armchair knowledge. Granted a suitable closure principle for armchair knowledge, Gary is in a position to know, still from the armchair, that the dial reads 0.4!

According to the proponent of the access argument, although Gary can know what the dial reads, he cannot know such a proposition through armchair reflection. In general, if a proposition concerns how the world is, and is not guaranteed to be true by the concepts which figure in it, one's justification for believing the proposition must constitutively depend on one's experience. The problem is not restricted to contingent propositions—it is also not possible to have armchair knowledge of a necessary proposition such as the proposition that water is H<sub>2</sub>O.

According to the proponent of the argument, Evidential Externalism is itself false, since it has false consequences about how one can have knowledge of the world.

We can sum up the problem for the evidential externalist by sketching the following argument:

- (1) Gary has armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4.
  - (2) Gary has armchair knowledge that, if his evidence includes the proposition that the dial reads 0.4, then the dial reads 0.4.
- So,
- (3) Gary is in a position to have armchair knowledge that the dial reads 0.4.

The evidential externalist must either identify the flaw with the argument, or explain away the implausibility of its conclusion. In particular, the challenge is either to reconcile the externalist view about evidence with our having special access to our evidence, or else to show we don't have the special access to our evidence after all.<sup>17</sup>

On one line of externalist response, the argument's conclusion is unobjectionable, given that the source of Gary's evidence is itself his experience. Here Gary at most has an armchair route to a claim he already empirically knows—no new knowledge is supplied. But we can raise a special problem for the externalist thesis that one's evidence includes P only if one knows P. Consider the following argument:

- (4) Gary has armchair knowledge that his evidence includes the proposition that there is a dial in the room.



- (5) Gary has armchair knowledge that, if his evidence includes the proposition that there is a dial in the room, then there are no fake dials around. So,
- (6) Gary is in a position to have armchair knowledge that there are no fake dials around.

We can know from the armchair that, in order to know that there is a dial (or barn) around, it had better not be true that there are fake dials (or fake barns) around. It seems to be an *a priori* matter of epistemology that knowledge excludes such a possibility of error. But it still seems too demanding to ask that, in order to know that there is a dial around, one must *know* that there are no fake dials around. Someone could know that there is a dial around without even believing, and hence not knowing, that there are no fake dials around. Thus, if Gary is in a position to know from the armchair that there are no fake dials around, he is in a position to gain armchair knowledge of something he did not already know. The previous response to the armchair argument does not help with the current problem.

We can also make the current problem vivid without using the notion of armchair knowledge.<sup>18</sup> On the one hand, when one has a piece of evidence which supports some proposition Q, it's plausible that one could know Q by reflecting on one's possession of the piece of evidence. On the other hand, when one has a piece of evidence which does *not* support some proposition Q, it's implausible that one could know Q by reflecting on one's possession of the piece of evidence. The relevant piece of evidence in the current case—that there is a dial in the room—does not itself support the conclusion that there are no fake dials around. However, it seems that, if one's evidence includes P only if one knows P, then, by knowing that one's evidence includes that there is a dial in the room, one can know that there are no fake dials around. Here reflection on evidence which does not justify a proposition still can provide knowledge of that proposition. Whether the case is one of armchair knowledge or not, the externalist owes us some therapy.

We have now seen that the Transparency argument is not the only access argument against Evidential Externalism. There is another argument against the view which appeals to a different access thesis, focusing on the way in which we can know what our evidence is.

The new access argument raises a *prima facie* problem for the evidential externalist. I still take it that the internalist should seek an independent argument for her view. We can bring out the difficulty by comparing the second access argument with the much-discussed, and still unresolved, McKinsey problem (McKinsey 1991).<sup>19</sup> The problem concerns the compatibility of externalism regarding the contents of our mental states with our having privileged access to our mental states. If certain content externalist theses are true, then one's being in some mental states depends on the environment being a certain way. However, if we have privileged access to our mental states, we sometimes have

armchair knowledge of what mental states we are in. Thus there is a worry that, if content externalism is true (and armchair knowable), and we have privileged access to our mental states, then we can also have armchair knowledge of how the environment is.

The new access argument concerns the compatibility of externalism regarding our evidence with our having privileged access to our evidence. Given the close parallel between the new access argument and the McKinsey problem, we should expect a wide variety of the potential solutions to the McKinsey problem to be available to the evidential externalist. In particular, one might deny that closure holds for armchair knowledge, as does Schiffer (2005), or one might allow that one can have armchair knowledge of the world, as is discussed in Sawyer (1998), Hawthorne (2002), or Weatherson (2005). My own sympathies lie with the compatibilist line of response to both problems. At any rate, since the McKinsey problem has yet to supply a compelling objection against the content externalist, we should not expect the second access argument to supply a more compelling objection against the evidential externalist. Just as the McKinsey argument poses a puzzle for the content externalist, rather than a strong objection to the view, the new access argument poses a puzzle for the evidential externalist, rather than a strong objection to the view.<sup>20</sup>

Given the limitations of the new access argument, I now set the access strategy aside, and turn to what I take to be the most promising line of defense of Evidential Internalism. The further argument does not invoke any claim about access to evidence, and apparently does not otherwise rely on any such claim.

### III. Supervenience Arguments

We may start with a sketch of the overall strategy:

- (7) If Evidential Internalism is not true, then internal twins are not equally justified.
- (8) Internal twins are equally justified.
- So,
- (9) Evidential Internalism is true.

The evidential externalist may well be happy to deny that internal twins are equally justified. My aim is to show how problematic the commitment is for the view, by examining exactly why the view has the commitment. I will start by explaining and motivating the thesis that internal twins are equally justified. I will then discuss the best way to argue from that thesis to Evidential Internalism itself. My main point will be that, if Evidential Externalism is true, then there are violations of equal justification that even the externalist should find

implausible: the view implies that the radically deceived subject is sometimes more justified than her twin who is not deceived.<sup>21</sup>

We can formulate the equal justification thesis as follows:

(Equal Justification): Necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A is justified to degree  $n_1$  in believing P to degree  $n_2$  just in case B is justified to degree  $n_1$  in believing P to degree  $n_2$ .

Notice that we can consider the degree to which a given belief is justified, or whether the belief is justified simpliciter. Equal Justification concerns the degree of justification of internal twins' partial beliefs, and not just whether internal twins are outright justified in believing the same propositions. Further, Equal Justification is what we might call an *evaluative* thesis, rather than an *explanatory* thesis. It says that internal twins have the same degree of justification for their partial beliefs, but says nothing about what provides their partial beliefs with the degree of justification that they have. Of course, one might think that the fan of Equal Justification is committed to some specific view about what evidence we have. I will return to the issue later.<sup>22</sup>

There are at least two distinct readings of Equal Justification. One reading of the thesis is focused on what is commonly called "propositional justification." According to this reading, internal twins are, in terms of what they have justification to believe, equally well-positioned with respect to the same propositions. The twins might still fail to have any attitudes towards the propositions, or have attitudes towards them, though not on the basis of the justifications available to them. We can call this the *propositional reading* of the Equal Justification thesis, since it is silent about the status of the attitudes internal twins actually hold. Another reading of Equal Justification is focused on what is commonly called "doxastic justification". According to this reading, internal twins are equally justified in holding the degrees of confidence they actually hold. We can call this the *doxastic reading* of the Equal Justification thesis, since it is not silent about the epistemic status of the attitudes internal twins actually hold.

As far as I can tell, the doxastic and propositional readings entail each other, given that internal twins are the same with respect to the causal relations between their internal mental states. However, I take the doxastic reading to be the most natural reading of Equal Justification. In what follows, my emphasis will be on that reading of the claim.

I now turn to the motivation of the Equal Justification thesis, on its doxastic reading. I take it that Equal Justification is extremely plausible when we consider instances of the claim. Suppose that both Gary and Barry are confident to degree .9 that there is a dial in the room. Intuitively, they are justified to the same degree in being confident in that proposition to that degree, even though one person is radically deceived and the other is not. Even when the question of whether they are both outright justified in the belief is distinguished from the

question of whether they are both justified to the same degree, I take it that the plausible answer to both questions is “yes”. This consideration in favor of Equal Justification could of course be outweighed by other considerations, or otherwise undermined, but it is a consideration in favor of Equal Justification nonetheless.

It is important that Equal Justification is supported by intuitive judgments about cases. The upshot is that the motivation of the claim is not based on theoretical judgments about one’s access to one’s evidence, or indeed on any other premises. In order to motivate Equal Justification, then, one need not invoke Transparency or indeed any thesis concerning one’s access to one’s evidence.

I take us to be non-inferentially justified in believing instances of Equal Justification. One might claim that, even if the motivation for Equal Justification does not invoke a claim like Transparency as a premise, Equal Justification is plausible only if one accepts some such claim (Williamson 2004b: 315). Disputes about the underlying commitments of a thesis are of course difficult to adjudicate. Some evidence that the claims are independent is that there are philosophers who accept Equal Justification without yet accepting Transparency, such as Conee and Feldman (2001). I also find it plausible that, if one is a coherentist about justification, one will be committed to Equal Justification, while also being committed to rejecting claims like Transparency, since one might fail to be in a position to access subtle facts about the coherence of one’s overall belief set.

Taking it that Equal Justification can be motivated independently of considerations about access to evidence, I now turn to the incompatibility of the claim with Evidential Externalism.

As far as propositional justification is concerned, the evidential externalist should allow that internal twins can have different degrees of justification for their beliefs. Suppose an externalist said that, even though internal twins have different evidence, they are equally justified in their beliefs. Perhaps, given that one is not certain of what evidence one has in the good case, the differences between the evidence one has in each case end up washing out. On this sort of externalist position, however, evidential differences between internal twins are epistemically idle. Evidential differences here would not even explain differences in knowledge—it seems that one can have knowledge in the good case even if one has the same evidence in the bad case. However, I take it that evidential differences between internal twins are interesting and important only if those differences can generate differences in propositional justification between twins. So I take it that, if Evidential Externalism is true, then internal twins can fail to have the same degree of propositional justification.<sup>23</sup>

One might also be convinced that Evidential Externalism will conflict with Equal Justification on its doxastic reading. What is less clear is where exactly the conflicts will arise. By attending closely to the matter, we’ll best bring out just how surprising and implausible the consequences are of Evidential Externalism, as well as gain a sharper understanding of its relation to Equal Justification.

I will start with a cautionary observation about a consequence Evidential Externalism does not have. I will then show how, if Evidential Externalism is true,

one is sometimes more justified in the good case than in the bad case. I will finally illustrate what I take to be the worst consequence of Evidential Externalism: that one is sometimes more justified in the bad case than in the good case.

In the arguments I set out, I will need to use some assumptions about the relation between the evidence that one has and the degrees of confidence that one ought to have. For the sake of simplicity and vividness, I will use the following assumptions. The first is that, if the probability of *P* on one's evidence is *n*, then one's degree of confidence in *P* ought to be *n*. For example, if the probability on one's evidence that Jones committed the murder is .8, then one's degree of confidence that Jones committed the murder ought to be .8. The assumption is fairly plausible, since I take it that evidential probabilities should determine how confident one ought to be, and the most straightforward way for them to determine how confident one ought to be is if one's credence ought to match them.

The second assumption I will use is that, if one's degree of confidence ought to be *n*, and one's actual degree of confidence diverges from *n*, then one's actual degree of confidence is less than fully justified insofar as it diverges from what it ought to be. This is not to say that, if one's degree of confidence is not exactly what it ought to be, then one's degree of confidence is not outright doxastically justified. This is also not to say that, if one's degree of confidence is exactly what it ought to be, then it is outright doxastically justified: one might have the appropriate degree of confidence for the wrong reason. The key point is instead that, other things being equal, if A's degree of confidence in *P* is placed where it ought to be, and B's degree of confidence in *P* is not, then B's partial belief in *P* is less justified than A's.

One might reject the assumptions I use.<sup>24</sup> But my arguments should go through with weaker assumptions. In particular, they should go through as long as the externalist accepts that, if A has entailing evidence for *P*, and B does not, then A ought to be more confident in *P* than B. One of the most striking features of Evidential Externalism is that it allows one to have entailing evidence in the good case which one lacks in the bad case. This feature of the view is toothless if it does not imply that one should be more confident in some propositions in the good case. Nevertheless, I will use the stronger assumptions stated above to make the problems for the externalist as vivid as possible.

I will now look at some examples in more detail.

A natural thought one might start with is that any counterexample to Evidential Internalism is a counterexample to Equal Justification: if two internal twins do not have the same evidence for some proposition *P*, then it follows automatically that they are not equally doxastically justified in believing *P*. The thought turns out to be wrong.

We can illustrate the mistake with the following sort of example. If Evidential Internalism is false, it will transpire that Gary has entailing evidence for some proposition *P*, whereas his internal twin Barry only has good but non-entailing evidence for *P*. I take it that the probability of *P* on Gary's entailing evidence will be 1. The probability of *P* on Barry's evidence will itself be less than 1, let us say

.9. As far as their degrees of confidence are concerned, however, they may both be confident to degree .95 in *P*. Their situation will then be as follows:

	<i>Degree of Confidence in P</i>	<i>Probability of P on Total Evidence</i>
Gary	.95	1
Barry	.95	.9

We may now consider the degree of doxastic justification of their partial beliefs. It seems that Gary and Barry are not quite as confident in *C* as they should be, given their evidence. However, the difference between their actual degrees of confidence and the degrees of confidence they should have is the same—0.05. Even if Gary and Barry do not have the same evidence in this case, they remain doxastically justified to the same degree. The upshot is that counterexamples to Evidential Internalism are not automatically counterexamples to Equal Justification.

It is natural to expect that, if Evidential Internalism is false, one will sometimes be more doxastically justified in the good case, given that in the good case one will have evidence which one lacks in the bad case. I will now illustrate this consequence of the externalist view.

First, consider the claim that one does not have entailing evidence that one is not a brain in a vat or otherwise radically deceived. If Evidential Internalism is false, then the claim is mistaken. For example, sometimes one's evidence in the good case will include the proposition that a spider is black, and one's twin in the bad case will merely have the evidence that there seems to be a black spider. Now, the proposition that there is a black spider, as opposed to the proposition that there seems to be a black spider, entails the negation of *BIV*, the proposition that [one is a radically deceived brain in a vat and it merely seems to be the case that there is a black spider]. Thus, if Evidential Internalism is false, one will sometimes have evidence which entails that one is not in a skeptical scenario.

Second, suppose that Gary and Barry are confident in  $\sim$ *BIV* to degree .999. If Evidential Internalism is false, the probability of  $\sim$ *BIV* on Gary's evidence will be 1. The probability of  $\sim$ *BIV* on Barry's evidence will be less than 1, and will plausibly be less than .99. Thus,

	<i>Degree of Confidence in <math>\sim</math>BIV</i>	<i>Probability of <math>\sim</math>BIV on Total Evidence</i>
Gary	.999	1
Barry	.999	<.99

Even though Gary's confidence in the good case in  $\sim$ *BIV* may be slightly misplaced, Barry's confidence in the bad case in  $\sim$ *BIV* is more distant from where it ought to be. The upshot is that one can be more justified in the good case than the bad case, if Evidential Externalism is true.

We have now seen a specific case in which Evidential Externalism yields a counterexample to Equal Justification. Since there is reason to believe Equal Justification, there is already reason to believe that Evidential Externalism is false.

A complication for the objection is that, as far as the evidential externalist is concerned, it is no disadvantage that her view allows for greater doxastic justification in the good case. Indeed, she might think that an advantage of her view is that it allows for greater doxastic justification in the good case. I now want to explore an unexpected problem for her view. Although it is natural to think that, if Evidential Externalism is true, then one can be better off only in the good case, that natural thought is wrong.

The further difficulty arises given that, just as in the bad case one will sometimes overestimate one's evidence, in the good case one will sometimes underestimate one's evidence. For example, suppose that Gary remembers and knows B, that he had a banana with breakfast yesterday, but is not fully confident in B, given that he also knows that his memory is not entirely reliable about such matters. We thus may have it that in the good case he is confident to degree .9 in B, where the probability of the proposition on his evidence is in fact 1. In the bad case, however, Barry's evidence is something like the proposition that he seems to remember that he had a banana with breakfast yesterday. It seems fair to say that the probability of B on his evidence is .9. Thus,

	<i>Degree of Confidence in B</i>	<i>Probability of B on Total Evidence</i>
Gary	.9	1
Barry	.9	.9

If Evidential Externalism is true, it turns out that Gary's partial belief in B is misplaced by a wide margin, whereas Barry's partial belief in B is not misplaced at all. Indeed, Barry's confidence is causally based, in the right way, on the weaker evidence he has, whereas Gary's fails to be adequately adjusted to his stronger evidence. Since Gary underestimates his evidence, and Barry's partial belief is properly adjusted to his own evidence, the subject in the good case is less justified in believing B.

We arguably knew from the start that the externalist will have to deny Equal Justification, and the externalist may well be happy to do so. But here is another plausible thesis:

(The Bad Case is Never Better): Necessarily, if B is in the bad case and A is an internal twin of B in the good case, B is not more justified in believing P than A.

In having to deny this attractive claim, the externalist has a problem beyond denying Equal Justification—no one expected that one is sometimes more

justified in the bad case than the good case. Even if one is willing to accept the result that one is sometimes more justified in the good case, it is harder to live with the claim that one is sometimes more justified in the bad case. In particular, many reliabilists will be happy to deny Equal Justification, but I take it that no ordinary reliabilist will be happy to say that one is something better off in the bad case. The consequence that one is sometimes more justified in the bad case should be unwelcome to all.

The externalist might protest that, since the consequence arises because one has greater propositional justification in the good case, the consequence is in fact benign. After all, the issue is not that one has too little propositional justification in the good case, but instead that one has a great deal of propositional justification in the good case—what could be wrong with that?

We can sharpen the problem for the externalist by setting aside the comparison of cases, and considering the good case in its own right.

One strike against the externalist might be that, if the view is true, one has *too much* propositional justification in the good case, more than was expected or plausible. But I'll set that question aside. The point I want to emphasize is that, if Evidential Externalism is true, then counterintuitive assessments of beliefs in the good case turn out to be correct. Intuitively, our ordinary partial beliefs are just fine as they are: we are neither more nor less confident in our ordinary beliefs than we should be. If Evidential Externalism is true, however, we are sometimes less confident than we should be, given our evidence. Although the view does not have skeptical consequences, it implies that there are flaws in places where apparently there are none.

If the externalist view is true, it may even turn out that we are *typically* more cautious than we should be, given our evidence. If one's evidence includes anything one knows, presumably a subject will have an abundance of entailing evidence in the good case, while only rarely being as confident as she should be given her superb evidence. Here the externalist might have to conclude that most of our ordinary partial beliefs are somewhat at fault, despite the fact that our ordinary beliefs seem fine as they are.

As we saw, not every counterexample to Evidential Internalism is a counterexample to Equal Justification. Sometimes internal twins will have evidence of different strengths, but will proportion their confidence to their evidence equally well. As we also saw, Evidential Externalism does predict that one is sometimes more justified in the good case. Sometimes the confidence of someone in the good case will be better proportioned than the confidence of her twin in the bad case. Most importantly, we saw that Evidential Externalism predicts that one is sometimes more justified in the bad case. Sometimes one will have greater propositional justification in the good case, but greater doxastic justification in the bad case, since one's confidence will be better proportioned to one's evidence in the bad case. This last consequence of the externalist view is one that even the externalist should find wrong.

To make vivid the problems for Evidential Externalism, I used the strong assumption that, if the probability of P on one's evidence is  $n$ , then one's credence



in P ought to be n. It's worth repeating that the arguments can go through without the assumption. As long as one ought to be more confident in some propositions in the good case than in the bad case, one will sometimes underestimate one's evidence in the good case, and overestimate one's evidence in the bad case. In particular, cautious subjects will sometimes be more justified in the bad case, and aggressive subjects will sometimes be more justified in the good case.<sup>25</sup>

According to the proponent of the supervenience argument, the consequences of Evidential Externalism are false. We have reason to reject Evidential Externalism, both because it is incompatible with Equal Justification, and because of the particular kind of counterexamples it yields to Equal Justification.

I will now sketch some ways the externalist might respond to the overall argument, and address one line of response in detail.

According to the first line of response, Equal Justification is false and the supervenience argument is unsound. Since most of the arguments against Equal Justification I am aware of are themselves direct arguments for Evidential Externalism, I set this line of response aside. Surveying the case for the view is beyond the scope of the paper.<sup>26</sup>

According to the second line of response, the Equal Justification thesis expresses a truth in some contexts of utterance and a falsehood in others. This line of response can be developed either in terms of an ambiguity in the expression "justified" and its cognates, or in terms of some context-sensitivity of the expressions.<sup>27</sup> In either case, the supervenience argument shows that Evidential Internalism expresses a truth in some contexts of utterance, not that it expresses a truth in all contexts of utterance. The ambiguity and contextualist views in question deserve further explanation and attention. However, since they concede so much to the evidential internalist, I will not discuss them further here.

According to a third line of response, which I will consider in detail, Equal Justification is unmotivated and the supervenience argument is unconvincing. In particular, although we have reason to believe some claim weaker than Equal Justification, we do not have reason to believe Equal Justification itself. Thus, provided that Evidential Externalism is compatible with the weaker claim, that Evidential Externalism is incompatible with the stronger claim is no reason to believe that Evidential Externalism is false. On this line of thought there is some *surrogate* for Equal Justification which undermines the supervenience argument.

The challenge for this line of response is to identify a suitable surrogate for the claim. I will now consider some attempts to meet the challenge.

According to one proposal, we have good reason to believe only the following weaker thesis, which does not concern epistemic justification:

(Equal Blamelessness): Necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A is epistemically blameless in believing P just in case B is epistemically blameless in believing P.

According to the weaker thesis, it cannot be that a person is deserving of (epistemic) criticism for holding a particular belief when an internal twin of the person is not. This weaker thesis seems to be perfectly compatible with Evidential Externalism. According to the objector, it is confused to think that anything more than this claim is plausible upon the comparison of internal twins.<sup>28</sup>

The problem with this response is that we can argue for a supervenience thesis which is stronger than Equal Blamelessness. The stronger thesis concerns outright justification rather than degrees of justification. It says that internal twins are outright justified in believing the same propositions. Since the argument for the stronger thesis is, as far as I know, novel, it is especially useful to set the argument out.<sup>29</sup>

Just as one's belief or disbelief in a proposition can be epistemically evaluated, one's suspension of judgment regarding a proposition can also be epistemically evaluated. In particular, we can provide a simple sufficient condition for one to be justified in suspending judgment:

(Suspension): Necessarily, if one lacks justification to believe *P*, and one lacks justification to believe  $\sim P$ , then one has justification to suspend judgment in *P*.

We can use the Suspension principle to argue for a weakening of Equal Justification. First, it's never the case that one person has justification to believe *P*, and some internal twin of that person has justification to believe  $\sim P$ . Even one's radically deceived internal twins do not have justification to believe the negations of what one is justified in believing, since part of what it is to be radically deceived is to lack justification to suspect that one is. Given the Suspension principle, if Barry lacks justification to believe that there is a dial in front of him, or lacks justification to believe any other proposition that Gary is justified in believing, then Barry will have positive justification to suspend judgment in those propositions. But suppose Barry did suspend judgment in the proposition that there is a dial in front of him, despite the fact that there seems to be a dial in front of him, and despite the fact that no defeating evidence is available to him. I take it to be very implausible that Barry would be justified in suspending judgment in the matter. Thus, given that Barry also does not have justification to deny the proposition, and given the Suspension principle, it follows that he does have justification to believe the proposition.

We can sum up the argument as follows:

- (16) It's not possible that, A is justified in believing *P*, and B is justified in believing  $\sim P$ , where A is in the good case and B is A's internal twin in the bad case.
- (17) It's not possible that, A is justified in believing *P*, and B is justified in suspending judgment in *P*, where A is in the good case and B is A's internal twin in the bad case.

- (18) Necessarily, if one lacks justification to believe P, and one lacks justification to suspend judgment in P, then one has justification to believe P.  
So,  
(19) It's not possible that, A is justified in believing P, and B is not justified in believing P, where A is in the good case and B is A's internal twin in the bad case.

The new argument supports a weaker counterpart of Equal Justification:

(Outright Equal Justification): Necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A is justified simpliciter in having an outright belief in P just in case B is justified simpliciter in having an outright belief in P.

The weaker thesis is set out neither in terms of degrees of confidence nor in terms of degrees of justification. We are simply considering the outright justification of outright beliefs (while keeping the focus on doxastic justification rather than propositional justification). According to the minimal thesis, either internal twins are both justified in holding a given outright belief, or neither is. They are not merely equally blameless in their beliefs. The upshot is that the proposed surrogate for Equal Justification—the mere claim that internal twins are equally blameless—will not do.<sup>30</sup>

Outright Equal Justification, unlike Equal Justification itself, might be compatible with Evidential Externalism. The evidential externalist must deny that internal twins have the same evidence, but the evidential externalist might be able to allow that one's twin in the bad case has evidence, albeit weaker evidence, for her beliefs. In particular, the externalist might be able to say that, although internal twins are equally outright justified in their beliefs, they still are not justified to the same degree in their beliefs. In response to the supervenience argument, then, the externalist could insist that the weaker thesis is the plausible core of the stronger claim. After all, the Suspension argument does support Outright Equal Justification, but apparently does not support Equal Justification itself.

Let me now evaluate the retreat to Outright Equal Justification. One problem is that Evidential Externalism is not obviously compatible even with Outright Equal Justification. We have not yet seen any guarantee that the externalist will be able to hold on to the weaker claim. Another problem is that the response fails to appreciate the force of the intuitions which support Equal Justification. If Outright Equal Justification is the plausible core of the stronger claim, then the supervenience argument shouldn't have seemed to bring out any problem for the evidential externalist. But it did. So Equal Justification must itself be plausible after all. The fact that the supervenience argument requires a response reveals that the retreat to Outright Equal Justification does not work.

If we are shown how to explain away the intuitive appeal of Equal Justification, the supervenience argument is undermined. We have not yet been shown how to explain away the intuitive appeal of Equal Justification. So the supervenience argument provides us with some reason to believe that Evidential Internalism is itself true. Given that the argument also does not fall prey to worries about the access argument, I take it that we have spelt out the most promising line of argument for the view.

Now that we have seen how the supervenience argument is best set out, I want to conclude by clarifying what the argument does not show. So far we have simply considered whether internal twins have the same evidence, whatever exactly it may consist of. It is time to consider what Equal Justification might imply about what their evidence can be. I will argue that, if one endorses Equal Justification and Evidential Internalism, one is still relatively uncommitted regarding what evidence one has. The upshot is that the internalist is not yet vulnerable to the following sort of objection:

That one has the same evidence in the good and bad cases is a severe constraint on the nature of evidence ... [Evidential Internalism] drives evidence towards the purely phenomenal (Williamson 2000: 173).<sup>31</sup>

A tempting thought is that, if Equal Justification and Evidential Internalism are true, then some mentalist conception of evidence is correct. According to mentalist conceptions of evidence, one's evidence consists only of one's mental states or facts about one's mental states. On these views, if *P* does not concern one's mental state, then one's evidence does not include *P*. One might think that the internalist is committed to some such view, and one might find the view implausible for that reason.<sup>32</sup>

We can flesh out the line of thought as follows. The key step is that, if a person has a piece of non-mental evidence, then some internal twin of that person does not have that non-mental evidence. For instance, since Gary is in the good case, that a spider is black may well be evidence Gary has that an arthropod is black. However, since Barry is in the bad case, in which it is false that a spider is black, that a spider is black is not evidence Barry has that there is an arthropod is black. Thus, if one can have non-mental evidence, internal twins do not have the same evidence. But then, if one can have non-mental evidence, internal twins are not equally justified either.

Let's now evaluate the argument that Equal Justification entails some mentalist conception of evidence. The argument relies on the claim that, if someone has a piece of non-mental evidence, then some internal twin of the person lacks that evidence. There are at least two worries about the claim.

One potential problem is the assumption that one's evidence can consist only of true propositions or of states that one is in. This assumption might be mistaken. If it is wrong, then internal twins could be equally justified, yet have evidence which consists of false propositions which do not concern their mental state. For instance, it might be that one's (propositional) evidence consists of those propositions one is

justified in believing, whether or not they are true. This non-mentalist view is plainly compatible with Evidential Internalism and Equal Justification. Further, this view respects the datum that, when one forms a belief on the basis of reasoning, one does not take one's reason to be that one believes this or that, but instead to be what one believes. Given how we reason and think about our reasons, it is plausible to think of the evidence at least for our inferential beliefs as the contents of our beliefs, rather than as belief states themselves.<sup>33</sup>

One might protest that one's evidence can consist only of true propositions or of states that one is in. It would still not be true that a mentalist conception of evidence follows from the Equal Justification thesis. One way to bring this out is by considering necessary propositions. Although some contingent propositions will be true in the good case though false in the bad case, no such scenario can arise for any necessary proposition. Thus, internal twins can have non-mental evidence which consists of necessary propositions, concerning logic or mathematics or even their environment, as with a posteriori necessary truths. Another way to bring out the problem is by considering some contingent non-mental truths. Suppose it seems to Gary as though *that* spider is black, and he believes that *that* spider is black. Second, suppose that the contents of his mental states are object-dependent: if anyone has a mental state with those contents, it follows that the spider exists in their world. What follows is that, if Gary and Barry have exactly the same beliefs, then the spider exists in Barry's world as well. More generally, assuming that some non-factive mental states have object-dependent contents, the environments of people in those mental states must be alike in certain respects. Since the spider exists in both cases, and the twins have the same apparent experiences of the spider in both cases, there's no reason to deny that some facts about the spider can be evidence for their beliefs.

In sum, the Equal Justification thesis does not force us into any mentalist conception of evidence. We can bring this out either by considering that one's evidence might include false propositions, or by considering that the truth of many propositions, perhaps even of some contingent propositions, supervenes on the non-factive mental states of internal twins.

The points just made generalize to Evidential Internalism as well. Even if internal twins have the same evidence, it does not follow that they only have mental evidence. Evidential Internalism, like Equal Justification, leaves open the question of what evidence it is that internal twins share. The upshot is that, even if it is a mistake to endorse a mentalist conception of evidence, the view does not yet force us to make any such mistake.

#### IV. Skepticism and Evidence

Having discussed the motivation for Evidential Internalism in some detail, I now want to address a particular line of worry about the claim. According to this line of worry, one plays into the hands of the skeptic if one accepts Evidential Internalism. That is, there is a skeptical argument such that the

externalist can undermine it and the internalist can't. By addressing the best argument which is a candidate for an externalist response, I will show that the worry is unmotivated. Despite what one might think, the externalist does not have any advantage in responding to skepticism.

The skeptical argument I will address tries to show that one is not justified in disbelieving certain radical skeptical hypotheses. For concreteness, I will focus on the hypothesis that you are a brain in a vat such that, although you are in all the non-factive mental states you would be in if you were in the good case, your beliefs are wherever possible false rather than true. I will take it for granted that, if you are not justified in disbelieving the skeptical hypothesis, then you are not justified in believing any proposition obviously incompatible with it.

The argument runs as follows.<sup>34</sup>

First, if you are justified in believing that you are not a BIV, then either you are experientially justified in believing that you are not a BIV, or you are non-experientially justified in believing that you are not a BIV. That is, either some experience or experiences of yours are part of what makes you justified in disbelieving the hypothesis, or something which excludes your experiences makes you justified in disbelieving the hypothesis. Assuming that something makes you justified in disbelieving the hypothesis if you are justified in disbelieving it at all, this first claim is correct.

Second, you are not experientially justified in believing that you are not a BIV. To motivate this claim, the skeptic may stress that the hypothesis entails that you have the experiences you do. In particular, since the skeptical hypothesis predicts that you have an experience as of having hands, you should respond to your experience as of having hands by raising your confidence in the skeptical hypothesis, just as you should increase your confidence in any hypothesis when you discover that something it predicts is true. And given that you should raise your confidence that the skeptical hypothesis is true in response to your experience, your experience does not provide you with justification to believe that the skeptical hypothesis is false.

Third, you are not non-experientially justified in believing that you are not a BIV. To motivate this claim, the skeptic may insist that the proposition that you are not a BIV is a worldly proposition, not guaranteed to be true by the concepts which figure in it.<sup>35</sup> Here the skeptic may rely on the empiricist thought, already mentioned above, that for any worldly proposition, justification for believing such a proposition must rest on one's course of experience.

There is much more to be said about how to refine the argument I have sketched, and there is much more to be said about various lines of potential response. But we have said enough to clarify how the evidential externalist will respond to the argument, and it is the externalist way with the argument which is of interest here.

According to the externalist, the claim that one is not experientially justified in believing that one is not a BIV is unmotivated and false. The claim is supposed to be unmotivated because the argument for it relies on an internalist description of my evidence for the proposition that I have hands. The skeptical

hypothesis indeed does entail that I have an experience as of having hands. However, my strongest evidence (on the basis of which I believe) that I have hands is that I see my hands, or see that I have hands. My being in these perceptual states is not entailed by the skeptical hypothesis, but instead entails that the skeptical hypothesis is false. So it's false that my perceptual evidence is predicted by the skeptical hypothesis. Further, I am experientially justified in believing that I am not a BIV. Given that my perceptual evidence is incompatible with the skeptical hypothesis, it also provides me with justification to believe that I am not a BIV. The further details of exactly how I am justified in disbelieving the hypothesis remain to be worked out, but the thought is that there is no principled problem here for the externalist.

According to the evidential externalist, an advantage of their view is that it makes available a Moorean story about how one is justified in disbelieving radical skeptical hypotheses. On this line of thought, the evidential internalist is not in a position to provide a Moorean story of how one is justified in believing that one is not a BIV, or at least cannot provide as simple a Moorean story about how one is justified in believing that one is not a BIV. After all, the internalist would need to provide us with a principled reason to deny that, when one discovers that a prediction of a hypothesis obtains, one ought to increase one's confidence in the hypothesis. That seems hard to do.

I'll now discuss how Evidential Externalism fails to have the advantage it might seem to have. The problem I will explore is that the response envisaged by the externalist does not apply in the bad case. I set aside the question of whether the externalist response even works in the good case.

We can clarify and sharpen the problem as a dilemma. One option for the externalist is to deny that, in the bad case, one has outright justification to disbelieve the BIV hypothesis. Another option is to allow that, in the bad case, one has outright justification to disbelieve the hypothesis.

The externalist might say that the thinker in the bad case is not justified in disbelieving the skeptical hypothesis. Perhaps part of what is so bad about a scenario of radical deception is that, when one is in it, one is not justified in believing that one is not in it. This suggestion requires rejecting a claim already seen above:

(Outright Equal Justification): Necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A is justified simpliciter in having an outright belief in P just in case B is justified simpliciter in having an outright belief in P.

This minimal thesis allows that one might have a greater degree of justification in the good case or the bad case. Thus, even if the externalist provides a reason to deny the stronger Equal Justification thesis, and explains away the plausibility of the stronger claim, the externalist will still need to provide a special treatment of Outright Equal Justification. A further complication is that I set

out a further argument for Outright Equal Justification—the further argument will also have to be undermined.

The other option for the externalist is to grant that one is justified in the bad case in believing that one is not a BIV. Since their Moorean story is not applicable in the bad case, they will have to accept some story which is available to the internalist, which applies in the good case as well. Here the internalist is as well positioned as the externalist to hold that one is justified in believing that the skeptical hypothesis is false. The externalist will simply add that one enjoys an extra justification in the good case. However, it is no advantage for the externalist to grant us an extra anti-skeptical justification in the good case. The extra justification available in the good case is not required for one to be outright justified in disbelieving the hypothesis. The extra justification also is not required to explain how one knows that the skeptical hypothesis is false: one's belief in the good case is not inferred from a false premise, and it seems that one is not otherwise in danger of having justified true belief without knowledge.<sup>36</sup>

On the one option, the externalist has a burden the internalist lacks, namely of showing that Outright Equal Justification is false and explaining why it seemed true. This problem is an extra problem for the externalist position, on top of the problem of being incompatible with Equal Justification. On the other option, one need not endorse Evidential Externalism to explain how one is justified in disbelieving skeptical hypotheses, or even to explain how one knows they are false. Either way, the externalist has no special advantage in responding to the argument.

With respect to the skeptical argument we have considered—what I take to be the best skeptical argument one might give an externalist response—Evidential Externalism does not have the upper hand. Indeed, given the costs of some externalist responses to the argument, it might be that Evidential Internalism itself has the upper hand. In any case, the view cannot be fairly accused of playing into the hands of the skeptic.

## Conclusion

We have now surveyed two lines of argument for Evidential Internalism. One strategy appeals to considerations about one's access to one's evidence, focusing either on when one can know what one's evidence is, or on how one can know what one's evidence is. Another strategy appeals to considerations about the Equal Justification of internal twins. I hope to have shown that the second strategy has the best prospects, while remaining clear about how much the strategy leaves open about exactly what evidence internal twins share. I also hope to have shown that, as far as responding to skepticism is concerned, the evidential externalist is no better off than the internalist. The overall case for



Evidential Externalism might turn out to be stronger, but the case for Evidential Internalism is not weak.

## Notes

1. I'm grateful for helpful comments from Stewart Cohen, Adam Elga, Greg Epstein, Matt Kotzen, Anna-Sara Malmgren, Ram Neta, James Pryor, Stephen Schiffer, Declan Smithies, Ralph Wedgwood, Roger White, and Timothy Williamson, as well as participants in an NYU seminar.
2. A further line of argument for internalism appeals to considerations about the psychological explanation of internal twins' beliefs. I won't discuss that sort of argument here.
3. Evidential Internalism might be best understood as the claim that, if A and B are internal twins, then they have the same type of evidence. It might be that two internal twins have evidence which consists of their token experiences, and fail to share the same token experiences, although they do have experiences of the same type. A view which allows for this possibility need not conflict with the spirit of Evidential Internalism.
4. I also use the term "justification" broadly, so that I won't attend to distinctions that others might try to capture with terms such as "entitlement" or "warrant".
5. An evidential internalist should also require that the causal explanatory relations between their internal states are the same.
6. It may well be that, if I have a belief that I am F, someone is an internal twin of me only if he is identical with me. In that case Barry will just be Gary in another possible world.
7. The two suggestions seem to fail to be equivalent: broad mental states probably are consciously accessible, and narrow mental states probably are not consciously accessible.
8. One might insist that, if the version of Evidential Internalism formulated in terms of non-factive states is true, some version formulated in terms of a narrower supervenience base is true, and more basic. I won't be able to pursue the issue here.
9. Conee and Feldman (2001) helpfully distinguish between "accessibilism" and other forms of internalism. For useful discussion of distinctions between various access theses one might propose, see Pryor (2001: 105–8).
10. Similar theses can be found in early responses to the Gettier problem, as in Meyers and Stern (1973: 152) or Armstrong (1973: 152). For related claims formulated in terms of "reasons", see also Unger (1975) or Hyman (1999). Since Unger (1975) denies that one knows anything, he is not an evidential externalist in that work.
11. As James Pryor pointed out to me, someone might endorse Evidential Externalism while rejecting the claim that one can have evidence which obviously entails contingent propositions about the environment. For example, two internal twins might be in the same perceptual states, where being in those perceptual states fails to entail their propositional contents. Still, the internal

twins might have different evidence since their perceptual states differ with respect to how reliably they indicate the truth. We can think of this variant of Evidential Externalism as Indicator Evidence Externalism. (There may well be other versions of Evidential Externalism which diverge from Entailing Evidence Externalism, but I'm not aware of them).

Following Alston (1989: Essay 9), I find it natural to distinguish between the grounds of a subject's beliefs, and the adequacy of those grounds, or the evidence a subject possesses, and the strength of that evidence. As far as the above example of perceptual evidence is concerned, I take it that the evidence of the two twins is the same, even if the strength of their evidence is different. In general, I will take it that, if Evidential Externalism is true, then Entailing Evidence Externalism is true. Although it is important that one might turn out to be able to sever Evidential Externalism from Entailing Evidence Externalism, I won't provide any separate treatment of Indicator Evidence Externalism and related views in what follows.

12. This sort of point can also be found in Williamson (forthcoming, section 3).
13. For discussion of an access argument for an internalist claim which is stronger than Evidential Internalism, see Goldman (1999). For some responses to Goldman, see Bonjour (2001) or Feldman and Conee (2001).
14. For some relevant discussion, see Brueckner and Oreste Fiocco (2002) or Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004).
15. Relevant here is Fumerton (2000), Hawthorne (2004), and Williamson (2004a).
16. On any reasonable version of Evidential Externalism, there will be evidence one has in the good case but lacks in the bad case. On some, but not all, versions of the view, there will also be evidence one has in the bad case but lacks in the good case. For example, on some metaphysical views about experiences, there is no (visual) experiential state in common between someone who sees a parrot and anyone who hallucinates a parrot (Hinton 1973 or McDowell 1982). Here there may be experiential evidence that one has in the bad case but lacks in the good case, as well as experiential evidence that one has in the good case but lacks in the bad case. Since there is no experiential state in common between the cases there is no experiential evidence in common between the cases either. Discussions with Greg Epstein were helpful here.
17. According to one line of response, the evidential externalist need not allow that we can have evidence which obviously entails proposition about the environment. For some discussion of this line of response, see n. 11.
18. Discussions with Matt Kotzen were helpful here.
19. For a selection of approaches to the problem, see Ludlow and Martin (1998) or Nuccetelli (2003).
20. I explore the puzzle for Evidential Externalism in more detail in my dissertation, "Reasons and Armchair Knowledge."
21. A similar line of argument—often called the "new evil demon problem"—is used against proposals of necessary conditions for justification in terms of reliability. Such proposals seem to imply that one's internal twin in the bad case is not justified in her beliefs. See Cohen (1984: 280–4), Foley (1984: 113–4), or Luper-Foy (1985: 215–6). The problem for the externalist is importantly different from the problem for the reliabilist. It is open to the externalist to claim that one's

twin in the bad case does have evidence, albeit less evidence than oneself. The initial argument against Evidential Externalism will thus need to concern the degree of justification of internal twins' beliefs, whereas the argument against reliabilism can simply consider the outright justification of internal twins' beliefs. Also, Evidential Externalism will turn out to imply that one is sometimes epistemically better off when one is radically deceived, whereas reliabilism seems only to imply that one is sometimes better off in the good case.

22. The epistemology literature is often unclear about the distinction between evaluative and explanatory claims. For an exception, see Sidelle (2001: 170–2).
23. For a technical discussion of the relation between Evidential Internalism and the claim that the evidential probabilities in the good case and the bad case are the same, see Williamson (2004b: 313–4). The discussion is orthogonal to my own, since my emphasis is on doxastic justification.
24. For example, Williamson writes that “we should question the association between evidential probability 1 and absolute certainty (2000: 213).” Hawthorne also writes that “such an equation [on which it is rational to be confident in  $p$  to degree  $n$  iff the epistemic probability of  $p$  is  $n$ ] will not likely be palatable to a nonskeptic who thinks that knowledge entails epistemic probability of 1, assuming that rational confidence of degree 1 in  $p$  bring with it a rational disposition to be at any odds on  $p$  (2004: 29, n. 72).” The further details of Williamson's account of evidential probability are to be found in his (2000: ch. 10).
25. Notice that the argument is insensitive to the difference between evidential externalists who allow that one can have evidence which obviously entails propositions about the environment, and those who don't.
26. For some recent work which supplies considerations against Equal Justification, without arguing directly for Evidential Externalism, see Sutton (forthcoming). One should bear in mind, when assessing Equal Justification, that internal twins are in the same non-factive mental states throughout their careers. The proponent of Equal Justification thus can allow that two people are in the same non-factive mental states at a given time, yet fail to be equally justified at that time, since one may have forgotten evidence that the other never had (cf. Sosa 1999 or Greco 2005). Given the reading we are using of “internal twin”, such a case is not a counterexample to Equal Justification. The point can also be found in Feldman (2005).
27. For a contextualist treatment of ascriptions of evidence, see Neta (2003). For a view one might describe as an ambiguity view, see Sosa in BonJour and Sosa (2003: 153–5).
28. This sort of move is suggested in a different context by Byrne (2005: 246–7).
29. Another objection could be that, since being epistemically blameless just is being epistemically justified, Equal Blamelessness is not a substitute for any thesis in terms of epistemic justification. I follow other philosophers in denying that being justified is a matter of being blameless. See Pryor (2001: 114–5), Conee and Feldman (2001: 240), or Wedgwood (2002: 351). The simplest way to make the point is to stress that being justified is a matter of degree whereas being blameless is not. Notice that it is a separate question whether being epistemically *praiseworthy* entails being epistemically justified.

30. Strictly speaking, the conclusion of the Suspension argument is that, if one has sufficient propositional justification in the good case to have an outright belief in *P*, then one has sufficient propositional justification in the bad case to have an outright belief in *P*. That's because the Suspension principle is best understood in terms of propositional justification. I assume it to follow that, if one is doxastically justified in the good case in believing *P*, then one is doxastically justified in the bad case in believing *P*. I also assume that, if one is doxastically justified in the bad case, then one is doxastically justified in the good case. Finally, I assume that one's internal twins who are not radically deceived require no special treatment here.
31. Williamson's specific objection is that, if Evidential Internalism is true, then one's evidence can consist only of "those conditions, whatever they are, which rational subjects can know themselves to be in whenever they are in them (173)." By showing that one need not invoke a claim like Transparency to motivate the internalist view, I hope to have already addressed this particular objection. The more general question remains of whether the internalist is committed to a mentalist conception of evidence.
32. For useful discussion of mentalist views of reasons for action, and more discussion of what reasons might be, see Dancy (2000).
33. On the view that one's evidence is what one is justified in believing, we also have an abundance of entailing evidence if we have lots of justified beliefs. One might protest that, if it was supposed to be problematic for the externalist to allow us a wealth of entailing evidence, it should also be problematic for the internalist to allow us a wealth of entailing evidence. However, the internalist can allow that, even if the probability of *H* on entailing *E* is 1, we should discount how confident one should be by how confident one should be in *E* itself. The externalist is not allowed to make this move, since it presumably would undermine the claim that one should be more confident in the good case than the bad case. So the internalist might escape the objection to externalism.
34. Here I draw on Pollock (1974), Pryor (2000), Schiffer (2004), and White (forthcoming).
35. The skeptical hypothesis in question is one in which one has the mental contents that one would in the good case. It thus is not open to the response to skepticism set out in Putnam (1981).
36. If one accepts the thesis that only knowledge justifies belief, it's not clear how to explain that a subject is justified in the bad case in believing that she is not in the bad case, since it seems possible for such a subject to fail to have knowledge which justifies that belief. She might for example merely hold the belief on the basis of an inference from the false premise that she has hands. Here the externalist might have to abandon the stronger thesis that only knowledge justifies belief—thereby allowing for non-evidential justification—and retreat to the weaker claim that only what one knows is evidence.

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