

## MPP-E1147: Political Economy of Elections

Prof. Mark Kayser

Revised December 2014

### 1. General Information

Class hours	Tuesday, 16-18h
Class room	R 2.32
Instructor	Prof. Mark Kayser
Email	kayser@hertie-school.org
Office	R 2.54
Assistant	Dayna Sadow ( <a href="mailto:sadow@hertie-school.org">sadow@hertie-school.org</a> )
Office Hours	By appointment, please contact Dayna Sadow

### 2. Course Contents

This course examines the determinants and consequences of voting, with an explicit emphasis on the economy. We cover the state of the art in the academic understanding of how voters respond to economic stimuli: How voters attribute responsibility, and hold political parties electorally accountable. Conversely, we also examine the consequences of voting: How regularities in voting behavior influence policy making, redistribution and specific policy making. The economy, more so than any other variable, ranks consistently among the most important issues in an election and as such, the economic vote is the strongest evidence that the governed actually hold those who govern them accountable in democracies. This course examines empirical regularities in the key relationships that determine who gains and who loses in democratic politics.

### 3. Course Requirements and Grading

Attendance and participation: Attendance, participation, and contribution to the discussions are an important part of the course requirements. You are expected to attend the session having done the reading and reflected upon them and to contribute to the discussion. Please let me know ahead of time if you have to miss a session.

Discussion leading: Different students will be responsible for presenting given topics each week. This implies giving a short presentation (15-20 minutes) based on two readings (one each from the required and supplemental lists) for the given week. You are free to choose the supplemental reading yourself. It is best to choose one that connects with and engages the required reading. Two students will present

each week and I will often open with a brief introductory lecture on the topic. The point of the presentations is to highlight and evaluate differing claims and evidence in the literature. This is not intended as a simple exposition of the material but as a critical engagement with it.

Evaluation: Students will be evaluated on their in-class participation (10%), their presentations (30%) and, most importantly, on a take-home final (60%) that will ask students to draw on the readings (core and extended) on the syllabus to answer questions that I will pose to you. This will resemble a limited research paper. The take-home final will have an eight (8) page maximum length and must be uploaded as a PDF to the dropbox folder on the course Moodle page twelve hours after you receive the exam question. We will coordinate an exam day in class that does not conflict with your other course exams. Please email a copy to Dayna Sadow (sadow@hertie-school.org) if you have a problem with the upload.

Examination Requirement: The weighted average grade of all course assignments must be 50% or above to pass this course.

Late assignments: For each day the assignment is turned in late, the grade will be reduced by 10% (e.g. 2 days after the deadline would result in 20% grade deduction)

#### **4. Readings**

This syllabus is subject to change, in discussion with the seminar participants. Readings for each week are divided into required and supplemental articles. The latter category enables students to choose one of the papers they cover for their presentation and supports student take-home finals. You can expect to read about 2 papers per week when not presenting a topic.

#### **5. Course Overview/Topics**

**Week 01: Voters: Information, Issue Voting, Party Identification**

**Week 02: Economic Voting: Sociotropic, Retrospective, Asymmetric**

**Week 03: Media and Campaign Effects**

**Week 04: Accountability in Context: Institutions, Coalitions & Clarity**

**Week 05: Democratic Development: Behavior & Party Systems**

**Week 06: Timing, the Economy and Elections**

**Week 07: Unjust Accountability?**

**Week 08: Globalization, Job Insecurity & Compensation**

**Week 09: Partisan Responses and Effects**

**Week 10: Economic Effects of Electoral Institutions**

**Week 11: Economic Determinants of Electoral Institutions – Replace with half of week 12 (redist)**

**Week 12: Inequality, Voting and Preferences for Redistribution**

## 6. Course Sessions & Readings

### Week 01: Voters – Information, Issue Voting, Party Identification

#### Required:

- a. Bartels, Larry M. 2008. "The Irrational Electorate." *Wilson Quarterly*: 44–50.

#### Supplemental:

##### Spatial models:

- a. Rabinowitz, G., & Macdonald, S. E. (1989). A directional theory of issue voting. *The American Political Science Review*, 93-121.
- b. Claasen, Ryan L. (2008). Directional Versus Proximity: Amassing Experimental Evidence. *American Politics Research*, 37(2), 227–253.
- c. Kedar, O. (2005). When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections. *American Political Science Review*, 99(02), 185-199.

##### Opinion formation:

- a. Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 755–769.
- b. Lau, Richard R., and David P. Redlawsk. 1997. "Voting Correctly." *American Political Science Review* 91: 585-98. (Info Levels)
- c. Lau, R. R., Patel, P., Fahmy, D. F., & Kaufman, R. R. (2013). Correct Voting Across Thirty-Three Democracies: A Preliminary Analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(02), 239–259. doi:10.1017/S0007123412000610

##### Informed voters?

- a. Bartels, Larry M. 1996. "Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 194-230. (Info Levels)
- b. Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew Daniel McCubbins. 1998. *282 The democratic dilemma: can citizens learn what they need to know?* Cambridge University Press.
- c. Healy, Andrew J., Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2010. "Irrelevant events affect voters' evaluations of government performance." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107(29): 12804-12809.
- d. Enns, Peter K. and Anderson, Christopher J., *The American Voter Goes Shopping: Presidential Elections and the Micro-Foundations of the Partisan Economy* (2009). Cornell University, Working Paper. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1451209](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451209)
- e. Paldam, M. (1999). WHAT DO VOTERS KNOW ABOUT THE ECONOMY ? A STUDY OF DANISH DATA , 1990-1993 Peter Nannestad, 1990–1993.
- f. Ashworth, Scott, & de Mesquita, Ethan B. (2014). Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance. *American Political Science Review* 108 (3): 565-587.

##### Issue ownership

- g. Budge, I., & Farlie, D. J. (1983). Budge and Farlie Chapter 3. In *Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies* (pp. 57–83).
- h. Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40, 825–850.

##### Strategic Voting:

- i. Meffert, M. F., & Gschwend, T. (2011). Polls, coalition signals and strategic voting: An experimental investigation of perceptions and effects. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(5), 636-667.
- j. Fisher, S. D. (2004). Definition and measurement of tactical voting: the role of rational choice. *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(01), 152-166.
- k. Bawn, K. (1999). Voter responses to electoral complexity: Ticket splitting, rational voters and representation in the Federal Republic of Germany. *British Journal of Political Science*, 29(03), 487-505.

## Week 02: Economic Voting: Sociotropic, Retrospective, Asymmetric

### Required:

- a. Cheibub, Jose A, and Adam Przeworski. 1999. "Democracy, elections, and accountability for economic outcomes." In *Democracy, accountability, and representation*, eds. Adam Przeworski, Susan C Stokes, and Bernard Manin. Cambridge University Press, p. 222-249.
- b. Becher, M., & Donnelly, M. (2013). Economic Performance, Individual Evaluations, and the Vote: Investigating the Causal Mechanism. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(04), 968-979.

### Supplemental:

- c. Malhotra, N., & Margalit, Y. (2014). Expectation Setting and Retrospective Voting. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(04), 1000–1016. doi:10.1017/S0022381614000577
- d. Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013). Retrospective Voting Reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16(1).
- e. Jennings, Will and Jane Green. 2014. Explaining Costs of Governing. Working paper. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2451878](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2451878)
- f. Kayser, Mark Andreas, and Christopher Wlezien. 2011. "Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote." *European Journal of Political Research* 50(3): 365-394.
- g. Huber, Gregory a., Seth J. Hill, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. "Sources of Bias in Retrospective Decision Making: Experimental Evidence on Voters' Limitations in Controlling Incumbents."
- h. Gomez, Brad T., and J. Matthew Wilson. 2001. "Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate: A Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 899-914.
- i. Godbout, J. F., & Bélanger, É. (2007). Economic Voting and Political Sophistication in the United States A Reassessment. *Political Research Quarterly*, 60(3), 541-554.
- j. Gomez, B. T., & Wilson, J. M. (2007). Economic Voting and Political Sophistication Defending Heterogeneous Attribution. *Political Research Quarterly*, 60(3), 555-558.
- k. Gomez, B. T., & Wilson, J. M. (2006). Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Comparative Analysis of Four Democratic Electorates. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(1), 127–145.
- l. Bloom, Howard S, and H Douglas Price. 1975. "Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: The Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession." *The American Political Science Review* 69(4): 1240-1254.
- m. Kappe, Roland. (2013). Cross National Evidence of Asymmetric Retrospective Voting. Working Paper. University College, London. [http://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/1080\\_601.pdf](http://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/1080_601.pdf)
- n. Feldman, Stanley. 1982. "Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior." *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (3): 446-466.
- o. MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1992. "Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy." *American Political Science Review* 86 (3): 597-611.
- p. Rudolph, Thomas J. 2003. "Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 698-713.
- q. Tilley, James and Sara B. Hobolt. 2011. Is the Government to Blame? An Experimental Test of How Partisanship Shapes Perceptions of Performance and Responsibility." *Journal of Politics*.
- r. Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M Bartels. 2004. "Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability."
- s. Wlezien, C., Franklin, M., & Twiggs, D. (1997). Economic perceptions and vote choice: Disentangling the endogeneity. *Political Behavior*, 19(1), 7-17.
- t. Evans, Geoffrey, and Robert Andersen. 2006. "The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions." *Journal of Politics* 68 (1): 194-207.
- u. Malhotra, N., & Margalit, Y. (2013). Do Expectations Condition Retrospective Voting? Working paper. Stanford Business School and Columbia University.

## Week 03: Media and Campaign Effects

### Required:

- a. Ladd, J. M., & Lenz, G. S. (2013). Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift to Document the Persuasive Power of the News Media. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2), 394–410.
- b. Soroka, Stuart. (2006). Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic Information. *Journal of Politics*, 68(2), 372–385.

### Recommended:

- a. Gelman, A., & King, G. (1993). Why are American presidential election campaign polls so variable when votes are so predictable?. *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(04), 409-451.
- b. Wlezien, C., & Erikson, R. S. (2002). The timeline of presidential election campaigns. *The Journal of Politics*, 64(04), 969-993.
- c. Snyder, J. M., & Strömberg, D. (2010). Press Coverage and Political Accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2), 355–408.
- d. Hetherington, M. J. (1996). The Media's Role in Forming Voters ' National Economic Evaluations in 1992. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(2), 372–395.
- e. Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2010). What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From U.S. Daily Newspapers. *Econometrica*, 78(1), 35–71. doi:10.3982/ECTA7195
- f. Larcinese, V., Puglisi, R., & Snyder, J. M. (2011). Partisan Bias in Economic News : Evidence on the Agenda-Setting Behavior of US Newspapers. *Journal of Public Economics*, 95(9).
- g. Ansolabehere, S., Meredith, M., & Snowberg, E. (2008). Sociotropic Voting and the Media. Typescript.
- h. Della Vigna, S., & Kaplan, E. (2006). The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting. NBER Working Paper.
- i. Arceneaux, K., Johnson, M., Lindstädt, R., & Vander Wielen, R. J. (2013). Democratic Representation and the Emergence of Partisan News Media: Investigating Dynamic Partisanship in Congress. Available at SSRN 2324786.
- j. Puglisi, R. (2011). Being the New York Times: The Political Behavior of a Newspaper. *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy* 11(1).
- k. Snyder, J. M., & Strömberg, D. (2010). Press Coverage and Political Accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2), 355–408.
- l. Brady, H. E., Johnston, R., & Sides, J. (2006). The study of political campaigns. In *Capturing campaign effects*, pp1-26. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- m. Jacobson, Gary. (2015). Do Campaigns Matter? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18(1). (first available in June 2015).
- n. Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. F. (2000). New perspectives and evidence on political communication and campaign effects. *Annual review of psychology*, 51(1), 149-169.
  - o. Larcinese, V. (2005). Information , Elections and Public Policy : *Working Paper, LSE*, 44(0).
- p. Nadeau, R., Niemi, R. G., Fan, D. P., & Amato, T. (1999). Elite Economic Forecasts , Economic News , Mass Economic Judgments , and Presidential Approval. *Journal of Politics*, 61(1), 109–135.
- q. Nadeau, R., Niemi, R. G., & Amato, T. (2000). Elite economic forecasts, economic news, mass economic expectations, and voting intentions in great britain. *European Journal of Political Research*, 38(1), 135–170. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00530
- r. Druckman, J. N. (2005). Media matter: How newspapers and television news cover campaigns and influence voters. *Political Communication*, 22(4), 463-481.
- s. Zaller, J. (1996). The Myth of Massive Media Impact Revived: New Support for a Discredited Idea. In D. Mutz, R. Brody, & P. Sniderman (Eds.), *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change* (pp. 17–78). University of Michigan Press.

- t. Sanders, D., Marsh, D., & Ward, H. (2009). The Electoral Impact of Press Coverage of the British Economy, 1979–87. *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(02), 175. doi:10.1017/S0007123400009728
- u. Mosley, P. (2009). “Popularity Functions” and the Role of the Media: A Pilot Study of the Popular Press. *British Journal of Political Science*, 14(01), 117. doi:10.1017/S000712340000346X
- v. Vavreck, Lynn. *The message matters: the economy and presidential campaigns*. Princeton University Press, 2009.
- w. Arceneaux, K. (2005). Do Campaigns Help Voters Learn? A Cross-National Analysis. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(01), 159. doi:10.1017/S0007123406000081
- x. Healy, A., & Lenz, G. S. (2014). Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(1), 31–47. doi:10.1111/ajps.12053
- y. Blood, D. J., & Phillips, P. C. B. (1995). Recession Headline News, Consumer Sentiment, the State of the Economy and Presidential Popularity: A Time Series Analysis 1989-1993. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 7(1), 2–22.
- z. Sheaffer, T. (2008). The Media and Economic Voting in Israel. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 20(1), 33–51.
- aa. Barbera, P., Boydston, A., Linn, S., & Nagler, J. (2014). Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Media Coverage of the United States Economy Motivation. Working Paper.
- bb. Goidel, K., Procopio, S., Terrell, D., & Wu, H. D. (2010). Sources of Economic News and Economic Expectations. *American Politics Research*, 38(4), 759–777. doi:10.1177/1532673X09355671
- cc. Eggers, A. C., & Fournaies, A. B. (2014). The Economic Impact of Economic News. Working Paper. Oxford.
- dd. Alt, J. E., Lassen, D. D., & Marshall, J. (2014). Information, Source Credibility and Political Sophistication: Experimental Evidence on Economic Voting.
- ee. David Dreyer Lassen, & James E Alt. (2013). Unemployment Expectations, Information, and Voting: Experimental and Administrative Micro-Evidence.
- ff. Kayser and Leininger. 2014. Vintage Errors: Does Real-Time Economic Data Improve Election Forecasts? Working paper.

#### **Week 04: Accountability in Context: Institutions, Coalitions & Clarity**

##### **Required:**

- a. Hellwig, Timothy, and David Samuels. 2008. “Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes.” *British Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 65.
- b. Duch, R., & Stevenson, R. (2013). Voter perceptions of agenda power and attribution of responsibility for economic performance. *Electoral Studies*, 32(3), 512-516.
- c.

##### **Supplemental:**

- d. Duch, Raymond, Wojtek Przepiorka & Randolph Stevenson. (Forthcoming 2014). Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers. *American Journal of Political Science*.
- e. Kayser, Mark A. 2014. The Elusive Economic Vote. Ch. 7 in *Comparing Democracies 4: Elections and Voting in a Changing World*. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris, eds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- f. Anderson, Christopher J. 2007. “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 10(1): 271-296.
- g. Kayser, Mark Andreas, and Michael Peress. 2012. “Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison.” *American Political Science Review* 106(03): 661-684.
- h. Debus, M., Stegmaier, M., & Tosun, J. (2014). Economic voting under coalition governments: Evidence from Germany. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 2(01), 49-67.
- i. Powell, G. Bingham, and Guy D Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting : Taking Account of the Political Context.” *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.

- j. Bischoff, C. S. (2013). Electorally unstable by supply or demand?—an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies. *Public Choice*, 156(3-4), 537–561. doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9910-z
- k. Anderson, Christopher J. 1995. "The Dynamics of Public Support for Coalition Governments." *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (3): 350-383.
- l. Whitten, Guy D, and Harvey D Palmer. 1999. "Cross-National Analyses of Economic Voting." *Electoral Studies* 18(1): 49-67.
- m. Nadeau, R., Niemi, R. G., & Yoshinaka, A. (2002). A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context across Time and Nations. *Electoral Studies*, 21, 403–423.
- n. Samuels, David. 2004. "Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 98 (3): 425-36.
- o. Duch, Raymond M., and Randy Stevenson. 2008. *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*. Cambridge University Press.
- p. Hellwig, T. 2011. "Constructing Accountability: Party Position Taking and Economic Voting." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(1): 91-118.
- q. Hellwig, Timothy. N.d. "Context, Information, and Performance Voting." In *Citizens, Context, and Choice*, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Christopher J. Anderson. New York: Oxford University Press.
- r. Dorussen, Han, and Michael Taylor. 2001. "The Political Context of Issue-Priority Voting: Coalitions and Economic Voting in the Netherlands, 1970-1999." *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 20, pp 399-426.
- s. Samuels, David, and Timothy Hellwig. 2010. "Elections and Accountability for the Economy: A Conceptual and Empirical Reassessment." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 20(4): 393–419.
- t. Pacek, Alexander, and Benjamin Radcliff. 1995. "Economic Voting and the Welfare State: A Cross-National Analysis." *Journal of Politics* 57 (1): 44-61.
- v. Anderson, C. J. (2000). Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective. *Electoral Studies*, 19(2), 151-170.
- w. Ashworth, S. (2012). Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15(1), 183–201. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823
- x. Healy, A., & Lenz, G. S. (2013). Presidential voting and the local economy. Working Paper.

## **Week 05: Democratic Development: Behavior and Party Systems**

### **Required:**

- a. Ziblatt, D. (2009). Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany. *American Political Science Review*, 103(01), 1-21.
- b. Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, 55(3), 399-422.

### **Supplemental:**

- c. Lupu, Noam. 2014. Brand Dilution and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America. *World Politics* 66 (4), 561-602
- d. Lupu, Noam. 2013. Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina. *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (1), 49-64
- e. Ezrow, L., Tavits, M., & Homola, J. (2013). Voter Polarization, Strength of Partisanship, and Support for Extremist Parties. *Comparative Political Studies*, 0010414013512605.
- f. Tavits, M. (2005). The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 283-298.

- g. Stokes, Susan C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 315
- h. Debs, Alexandre and Gretchen Helmke. "Inequality under Democracy: Explaining the Left Decade in Latin America." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5.3 (2010): 209-241.
- i. Roberts, Kenneth M. and Erik Wibbels. 1999. "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations." *American Political Science Review*. 93(3): 575-590.
- j. Duch, Ray. 2001. "A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies." *American Political Science Review* Vol. 95 (4): 895-910.
- k. Rohrschneider, R., Schmitt-Beck, R., & Jung, F. (2012). Short-term factors versus long-term values: Explaining the 2009 election results. *Electoral Studies*, 31(1), 20-34. (nice comparison of voting in E & W Germany).
- l. Roberts, Andrew. (2008). Hyperaccountability: economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe. *Electoral Studies*, 27(3), 533-546.
- m. Tucker, Joshua A. (2002). The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting: What Have We Studied, and How Have We Studied It?. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5(1), 271-304.
- n. Stokes, Susan C. (2001). *Mandates and democracy: Neoliberalism by surprise in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
- o. Tucker, J. A. (2006). *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- p. Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2008). The economic vote in transitional democracies. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 18(3).
- q. Tavits, M., & Annus, T. (2006). Learning to make votes count: The role of democratic experience. *Electoral Studies*, 25(1), 72-90.
- r. Zielinski, J., Slomczynski, K. M., & Shabad, G. (2005). Electoral control in new democracies: the perverse incentives of fluid party systems. *World Politics*, 57(3), 365-395.
- s. Pop-Eleches, C., & Pop-Eleches, G. (2012). Targeted Government Spending and Political Preferences. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 7(3), 285-320.
- t. Alcañiz, I., & Hellwig, T. (2011). Who's to Blame? The Distribution of Responsibility in Developing Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 41(02), 389-411.
- u. Singer, M. M. (2007). *The electoral politics of vulnerability and the incentives to cast an economic vote*. ProQuest. Book.
- v. Gandhi, J., & Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 403-422.
- w. Magaloni, B. (2008). Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5), 715-741.
- x. Dunning, T., & Harrison, L. (2010). Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), 1-19.
- y. Blaydes, L. (2006, August). Who votes in authoritarian elections and why? Determinants of voter turnout in contemporary Egypt. In *annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*.
- z. Manzetti, L., & Wilson, C. J. (2007). Why do corrupt governments maintain public support?. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(8), 949-970.
- aa. Manacorda, M., Miguel, E., & Vigorito, A. (2009). *Government transfers and political support* (No. w14702). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- bb. Gandhi, J., & Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 403-422.



## Week 06: Timing, the Economy and Elections

### Required:

- a. Schleiter, P., & Tavits, M. 2014. The Electoral Benefits of Opportunistic Election Timing. Working paper. [http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/Lists/Events/Attachments/397/Timing\\_Schleiter\\_Tavits\\_MPSA\\_2014.pdf](http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/Lists/Events/Attachments/397/Timing_Schleiter_Tavits_MPSA_2014.pdf)
- b. Shi, M., & Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? *Journal of Public Economics*, 90(8), 1367-1389.

### Supplemental:

- c. Franzese, R. J. (2002). Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and Outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5, 369–421.
- d. Canes-Wrone, B., & Park, J. K. (2012). Electoral business cycles in OECD countries. *American Political Science Review*, 106(1), 103-122.
- e. Huebscher, E., & Sattler, T. (2014). Fiscal Consolidation Under Electoral Risk. Available at SSRN 2470470.
- f. Saez, Lawrence and Aseema Sinha. 2010. Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public Expenditure in India, 1980-2000." *British Journal of Political Science*.
- g. Kayser, Mark A. 2005. "Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention." *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 17-28.
- h. OMahony, Angela. 2010. Engineering Good Times: Fiscal Manipulation in a Global Economy. *British Journal of Political Science*.
- i. Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2004). *Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies* (No. w10539). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- j. Blaydes, Lisa. (2008). Electoral budget cycles under authoritarianism: economic opportunism in Mubarak's Egypt. manuscript. Stanford University.
- k. Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The political business cycle. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 169-190.
- l. Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 55(1), 1-16.
- m. Rogoff, Kenneth (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. *The American Economic Review*, 80(1), 21-36.
- n. Schultz, K. A. (1995). The politics of the political business cycle. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(1), 79-100.
- o. Drazen, Allan, 2001, : The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years, in, Bernanke, B./Rogoff, K., NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, MIT Press.
- p. Schuknecht, L. (1996). Political business cycles and fiscal policies in developing countries. *kyklos*, 49(2), 155-170.
- q. Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. (2004). Do IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data. *Open Economies Review*, 15(1), 5-22.
- r. Troeger, Vera E., and Christina J. Schneider. "The politics of strategic budgeteering." (2012). Working Paper.
- s. Brender, A., & Drazen, A. (2004). Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies. NBER Paper.
- t.

## Week 07: Unjust Accountability?

### Required:

- a. Hellwig, Timothy T. 2001. "Interdependence, Government Constraints, and Economic Voting." *Journal of Politics* 63(4): 1141-1162.
- b. Healy, A. J., Malhotra, N., & Mo, C. H. (2010). Irrelevant events affect voters' evaluations of government performance. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 107(29), 12804–12809. doi:10.1073/pnas.1007420107

## Supplemental:

- c. Chubb, J. E. (2012). INSTITUTIONS , THE ECONOMY , AND THE DYNAMICS OF STATE ELECTIONS. *American Political Science Review*, 82(1), 133–154.
- d. Hansen, S. B. (1999). Life is not Fair: Governors' Performance Ratings and State Economies. *Political Research Quarterly*, 52(1), 167–188.
- e. Campello , Daniela and Cesar Zucco. 2012. It's the (World) Economy, Stupid! International Determinants of Presidential Success. 2012. Working Paper. Princeton and Rutgers. This version: November 18, 2012
- f. Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2004). Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought, Flu and Shark Attacks. In Juan March Institute, Estudio Working Paper. Retrieved from [http://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/2004\\_199.pdf](http://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/2004_199.pdf)
- g. Duch, Raymond M, and Randy Stevenson. 2008. *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- h. Duch, Ray, and Randy Stevenson. 2010. "The Global Economy, Competency and the Economic Vote." *Journal of Politics* 72: 105–123.
- i. Kayser, Mark A., and Michael Peress. 2012. "The Buck Stops over There? Benchmarking Elections in the Open Economy." *Working Paper, Hertie School of Governance and University of Rochester*.
- j. Hellwig, Timothy. 2010. "The World Economy, Political Control, and Responsibility for Economic Performance." Midwest, <http://mypage.iu.edu/~thellwig/research/HellwigMPSA2010.pdf>
- k. Hellwig, Timothy, and David Samuels. 2007. "Voting in Open Economies: The Electoral Consequences of Globalization." *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (3): 283-306.
- l. Vowles, Jack. 2008. "Does globalization affect public perceptions of 'Who in power can make a difference'? Evidence from 40 countries, 1996–2006." *Electoral Studies* 27(1): 63–76.
- m. Kayser, Mark Andreas. 2006. "Trade and the Timing of Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 36(3): 437–57.
- n. Kayser, Mark A. 2007. "How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 341–362.
- o. Caramani, Daniele. 2010. "Electoral Waves : An Analysis of Trends , Spread and Swings of Votes Across 20 West European Countries , 1970 – 2008." (43): 41–71.
- p. Leigh, Andrew. 2009. Does the World Economy Swing National Elections? *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 71 (2): 163-181.
- q. Healy, A., & Lenz, G. S. (2013). Presidential voting and the local economy. *Working Paper*.
- r. Gelineau, F., & Remmer, K. (2006). Political Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: The Argentine Experience, 1983-2001. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(1), 133–57.
- s. Wolfers, J. (2007). Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections. Working Paper.
- t. Meguid, Bonnie M. "Institutional change as strategy: The role of decentralization in party competition." APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. 2009.

## Week 08: Globalization, Job Insecurity & Compensation

### Required:

- a. Rehm, Philipp, Jacob S. Hacker, and Mark Schlesinger. 2012. "Insecure Alliances: Risk, Inequality, and Support for the Welfare State." *American Political Science Review* 106(02): 386–406.
- b. Marshal, John and Stephen D. Fisher. 2013. Compensation or Constraint? How different dimensions of economic globalization affect government spending and electoral turnout. Working paper. Oxford.

## Supplemental:

- c. Murphy, Justin. (2013). Mass Media and the Domestic Politics of Globalization. Available at SSRN. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2320218>
- d. Gingrich, Jane and Ben Ansell. 2012. Preferences in Context: Micro Preferences, Macro Contexts, and the Demand for Social Policy. *Comparative Political Studies* 45(12):1624-1654.
- e. Iversen, Torben, and Thomas Cusack. 2000. "The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?" *World Politics* 52: 313-49.
- f. Walter, S. (2010). Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2), 403-426.
- g. Rodrik, Dani. 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Larger Governments." *Journal of Political Economy* 106 (October): 997-1932
- h. Diego Fossati. 2013. Economic vulnerability and economic voting in 14 OECD countries. *European Journal of Political Research*. Article first published online: 14 MAR 2013. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12019
- i. Singer, Matthew M. (2013). What goes around comes around: Perceived vulnerable employment and economic voting in developing countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(2), 143-163. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02066.x
- j. Alesina, Alberto, and Romain Wacziarg. 1998. "Openness, Country Size, and Government." *Journal of Public Economics* 69(3): 305-321.
- k. Vowles, Jack. 2008. "Does globalization affect public perceptions of 'Who in power can make a difference'? Evidence from 40 countries, 1996-2006." *Electoral Studies* 27(1): 63-76. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2007.11.003> (February 10, 2012).
- l. Hellwig, Timothy. 2011. "Constrained Policymakers, Compensating Voters: The World Economy and Policy Preferences in Advanced Capitalist Democracies." Working Paper. Indiana University.
- m. Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and Philipp Rehm. 2006. "Risks At Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government Redistribution." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 22 (3): 365-389.
- n. Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2006. "Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1 (3): 255-286.
- o. Margalit, Yotam. 2011. "Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections." *American Political Science Review* 105(01): 166-188.
- p. Dominitz, Jeff, and Charles F. Manski. 1997. "Perceptions of Economic Insecurity: Evidence from the Survey of Economic Expectations." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61 (2): 261-87.
- q. Mughan, Anthony, and Dean Lacy. 2002. "Economic Performance, Job Insecurity, and Electoral Choice." *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (3): 513-33.
- r. Sverke, Magnus, and Johnny Hellgren. 2002. "The Nature of Job Insecurity: Understanding Employment Insecurity on the Brink of a New Millennium." *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 51(1): 23-42.
- s. Näswall, Katharina, and Hans De Witte. 2003. "Who Feels Insecure in Europe? Predicting Job Insecurity from Background Variables." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 24 (2): 189-216.
- t. Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew Slaughter. 2004. "Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 662-674.
- u. Anderson, Christopher J., and Jonas Pontusson. 2007. "Workers, Worries, and Welfare States: Social Protection and Employment Insecurity in 15 OECD Countries." *European Journal of Political Research* 64: 211-235.

## Week 09: Partisan Responses and Effects

### Required:

- a. Oswald, A. J., & Powdthavee, N. (2010). Daughters and left-wing voting. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 92(2), 213-227.
- b. Kayser, Mark and Cassandra Grafstrom. 2014. The Luxury Goods Vote. Working Paper.

## Supplemental:

- c. Döring, Holger, & Manow, Philip. 2013. Is PR more favourable to the left? Electoral rules and their impact on elections, parliaments and cabinet formation. Working Paper.
- d. Brooks, C., & Manza, J. (2013). A Broken Public? Americans' Responses to the Great Recession. *American Sociological Review*, 78(5), 727–748. doi:10.1177/0003122413498255
- e. Kitschelt, H. (1994). *The transformation of European social democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- f. Przeworski, A., & Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper stones: A history of electoral socialism* (ch 1 & 2). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- g. Gerber, Alan S., and Gregory A. Huber. 2009. "Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?" *American Political Science Review* 103 (3): 407–426.
- h. Douglas A. Hibbs. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71(4): 1467–1487.
- i. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1982. "On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Macroeconomic Performances and Mass Political Support in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany." *Journal of Politics* 44(2): 426–62.
- j. Cukierman, A., & Tommasi, M. (1998). When does it take a Nixon to go to China?. *American Economic Review*, 180–197.
- k. Peltzman, Sam. 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107(2): 327–361.
- l. Bartels, L. M. (2010). *Unequal democracy: The political economy of the new gilded age*. Princeton University Press. Ch. XXX. (Partisan effects chapters)
- m. Boix, Carles. 1998. *Political Parties, Growth and Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- n. Rueda, F. David. 2005. "Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties." *American Political Science Review* 99 (1): 61–74.
- o. Ha, Eunyoung. 2012. Globalization, Government Ideology, and Income Inequality in Developing Countries. *Journal of Politics*.
- p. Kayser, Mark A. 2009. "Partisan Waves: International Business Cycles and Electoral Choice." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 950–70. 2009.
- q. Adams, James, Andrea Haupt, and Heather Stoll. 2009. "What Moves Parties? The Role of Public Opinion and Global Economic Conditions in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(5): 611–639.
- r. Przeworski, A., & Sprague, J. (1986). *Paper stones: A history of electoral socialism* (pp. 45–6). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- s. Kalyvas, S. N. (1996). *The rise of Christian democracy in Europe*. Cornell University Press.
- t. Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Maskett, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3): 571–597.
- u. Leduc, Lawrence, and Jon H Pammett. 2012. "Electoral Impact of the Economic Crisis in Europe 1." *Working Paper*. University of Toronto.
- v. Durr, Robert H. 1993. "What Moves Policy Sentiment?" *American Political Science Review* 87(1): 158–72.
- w. Stevenson, Randolph T. 2001. "The Economy and Policy Mood: A Fundamental Dynamic of Democratic Politics?" *American Journal of Political Science* 45(3): 620–633.
- x. Markussen, Simen. 2008. "How the left prospers from prosperity." *European Journal of Political Economy* 24(2): 329–342.
- y. De Neve, Jan Emmanuel. 2009. "Ideological Change and the Economics of Voting Behavior in the US, 1920–2008." Working Paper. London School of Economics.

## Week 10: Other Economic Effects of Electoral Institutions

### Required:

- a. Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100(2).
- b. Hallerberg, M., & Marier, P. (2004). Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Caribbean countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(3), 571-587.

### Supplemental:

#### (Re)distribution

- c. Blaydes & Kayser. 2011. Counting Calories: Democracy and Distribution in the Developing World. *International Studies Quarterly*.
- d. Brown and Mobarak. 2009. The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity. *American Political Science Review*.
- e. Rickard, S. J. (2009). Strategic Targeting: The Effect of Institutions and Interests on Distributive Transfers. *Comparative political studies*, 42(5), 670-695.

#### Lobbying & Narrow Interests

- f. Naoi, Megumi, and Ellis Krauss. 2009. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 874–892.
- g. Rickard, Stephanie J. 2012. "Electoral Systems, Voters' Interests and Geographic Dispersion." *British Journal of Political Science* 117(2002): 1–23.
- h. Rogowski, Ronald, and Mark A Kayser. 2002. "Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 526–539.
- i. Stratmann, Thomas/Baur, Martin (2002): Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-barrel Differ across Electoral Systems, *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 506-514.

#### Trade & Protectionism

- j. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2005). A protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(4), 1239-1282.
- k. Evans, C. L. (2009). "A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation." *Economics & Politics* 21(2): 278-307.
- l. Rickard, S. J. (2010). Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements. *European journal of international relations*, 16(4), 711-729.
- m. Karol, David. 2007. "Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials' Trade Policy Preferences?" *Journal of Politics* 69(2): 483–494.
- n. Ehrlich, Sean D. 2007. "Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies." *International Organization* 61(03): 571–605.

#### Fiscal Outcomes

- o. Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., R. Perotti, et al. (2002). "Electoral systems and public spending." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(2): 609-657.
- p. Price Levels  
Cheibub, Jose Antonio. 2006. Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems. *American Political Science Review*.

#### Misc & Overviews

- q. Remmer, Karen. 1993. The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 1980-1991." *American Political Science Review* 1993.
- r. Persson, T. and G. E. Tabellini (2005). The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

- s. Schmidt, M 2002 "Political Performance and Types of Democracy: Findings from Comparative Studies", *European Journal of Political Research*, 41(1):147—63
- t. Kayser, Mark and Rene Lindstaedt. 2013. A Cross-National Measure of Electoral Risk. Working Paper. Hertie School & Essex.

#### Corruption

- u. Klasnja, Marko, and Joshua Tucker. 2012. "The Economy, Corruption, and the Vote: Evidence from Experiments in Sweden and Moldova." *Working Paper*.
- v. Adserà, Àlicia, Carles Boix, and Mark Payne. 2003. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 19: 445-90.
- w. Aaron Tornell and Philip R. Lane, "The Voracity Effect." *American Economic Review* 89 (1) (March 1999), 22-46.
- X. Charron, N., & Lapuente, V. (2010). Does democracy produce quality of government?. *European Journal of Political Research*, 49(4), 443-470.
- Y. Fearon, James D. 1999. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians", in Przeworski et al (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*.
- Z. Kurer, Oskar (2001), Ch 4 "Why do voters support corrupt politicians?", in Arvind K. Jain, *The political economy of corruption* Routledge: New York
- aa. Treisman, Daniel. 2007. "What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research?" *Annual Review of Political Science* vol10: 211-44
- bb. Brunetti, Aymo and Beatrice Weder, 2003, "A free press is bad news for corruption", *Journal of Public Economics* 87 (2003) 1801-1824.
- cc. Jana Kunicova & Susan Rose-Ackerman (2005) Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption, *British Journal of Political Science* 35, 573-606.
- dd. Chang, Eric, and Miriam Golden. 2007. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (1): 115 — 37.
- ee. Chang, Eric, Miriam Golden, and Seth J. Hill. 2010. "Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability." *World Politics* 62 (2): 177-220.
- ff. Margit Tavits. 2007. Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption. *AJPS* 51:1, 218-229

### **Week 11: Economic Determinants of Electoral Institutions --- Replace with half of week 12 (redist)**

#### **Required:**

- a. Boix, C. (1999). "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-624.
- b. Calvo, E. (2009). "The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation: Partisan Biases and Electoral Regime Change under Increasing Party Competition." *World Politics* 61(2): 254-.

#### **Supplemental:**

- c. Ahmed, A. (2010). Reading history forward: The origins of electoral systems in European democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*.
- d. Andrews, J. T., & Jackman, R. W. (2005). Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under extreme uncertainty. *Electoral Studies*, 24(1), 65-84.
- e. Economic Globalization and the Change of Electoral Rules Christian W. Martin1 /Nils D. Steiner. MPSA 2012.
- f. Vowles, Jack, 1995. *International Political Science Review*. Special Issue: The Politics of Electoral Reform, 16(1).
- g. Colomer, Josep M. , 2005. "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)." *Political Studies* 53: 1-21.

- h. Cox, Gary W., 1997. *Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- i. Cusack, T. R., T. Iversen, et al. (2007). "Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems." *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 373-391.
- j. Dunleavy, Patrick and Margetts, Helen (1995): ""Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform,"" *International Political Science Review*, 16: 9-29.
- k. Fernandez, Raquel/Rodrik, Dani, 1991, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual- Specific Uncertainty, *The American Economic Review*, 81(5), 1146-1155.
- l. Rogowski, Ronald, 1987, ""Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions"", *International Organization*, 41(2), 203-223. Hatfield, J. W. and W. R. Hauk (2010). *Electoral Regime and Trade Policy.* Working Paper.
- m. Renwick, Alan, 2010, *The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy*, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press.
- n. Sakamoto, Takayuki, 1999, ""Explaining electoral reform - Japan versus Italy and New Zealand"", *Party Politics*, 5, 419-438.
- o. Taagepera, R. and M. S. Shugart (1989). *Seats and Votes. The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems.* New Haven, Yale University Press.

## Week 12: Inequality, Voting and Preferences for Redistribution

### Required:

- a. Gilens, Martin. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69 (5): 778-796.
- b. Page, Benjamin I., Larry M. Bartels and Jason Seawright. 2013. Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans. *Perspectives on Politics* 11(1): 51-73.

### Supplemental:

- c. Lupu, N., & Pontusson, J. (2011). The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 105(02), 316-336.
- d. Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. *Perspectives on Politics*.
- e. Fowler, Anthony. 2014. Regular Voters, Marginal Voters and the Electoral Effects of Turnout. *Political Science Research and Methods*.
- f. Shayo, M. (2009). A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02), 147-174.
- g. Clark, Gregory. *The son also rises: surnames and the history of social mobility.* Princeton University Press, 2014.
- h. Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott. F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89: 914-27. [Read only first 3 pages].
- i. Acemoglu, Daron. (2001). Inefficient redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 95(03), 649-661.
- j. Brunori, P., Ferreira, F., & Peragine, V. (2013). Inequality of opportunity, income inequality and economic mobility: some international comparisons. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, (6304). (Great Gatsby Curve).
- k. Rueda, David and Stegmueller, Daniel. 2013. Equality or Crime? Redistribution Preferences and the Externalities of Inequality in Western Europe. Working Paper. Oxford and Essex.
- l. Moene, Karl Ove, and Michael Wallerstein. 2001. "Inequality, Social Insurance and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 859-74.
- m. Corak, M. (2006). Do poor children become poor adults? Lessons from a cross-country comparison of generational earnings mobility. *Research on Economic Inequality*, 13, 143-188.
- n. Corneo, Giacomo, and Hans-Peter Gruner. 2002. "Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution." *Journal of Public Economics* 83 (1): 83-107.
- o. Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David. 2001. "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences." *American Political Science*

- Review* 95 (4): 875-93.
- p. Emmenegger, Patrick. 2009. "Specificity Versus Replaceability: The Relationship Between Skills and Preferences For Job Security Regulations." *Socio-Economic Review* 7 (3): 407-430
  - q. Rehm, Philipp. 2009. "Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42 (7): 855-881.
  - r. Gelman, A. (2009). *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do (Expanded Edition)*. Princeton University Press.
  - s. Gelman, A., Shor, B., Bafumi, J., & Park, D. (2007). Rich state, poor state, red state, blue state: What's the matter with Connecticut. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 2(4), 345-367.
  - t. Raymond Duch & Philip Rehm. 2012. Democratic **Inequality** and the Economic Vote. Working Paper.
  - u. Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2006). *The evolution of top incomes: a historical and international perspective* (No. w11955). National Bureau of Economic Research.
  - v. Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 91: 1-14.
  - w. Citrin, Jack, Eric Schickler, and John Sides. 2003. "What if Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased Turnout in Senate Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 47: 75-90.
  - x. Anderson, Christopher J., and Pablo Beramendi. 2012. "Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral Participation in Advanced Industrial Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (6)
  - y. Osberg, Lars, and Timothy Smeeding. 2006. "'Fair' Inequality? Attitudes toward Pay Differentials: The United States in Comparative Perspective." *American Sociological Review* 71 (3): 450-473.
  - z. Bartels, L. M. (2005). Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Public Policy in the American Mind. *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(1), 15–31.
  - aa. Alesina, Alberto, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch. 2004. "Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?" *Journal of Public Economics* 88 (9–10): 2009–2042.
  - bb. Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch. 2005. "Partisan Social Happiness." *Review of Economic Studies* 72 (2): 367-393.
  - cc. Stutzer, Alois, and Bruno S. Frey. 2006. "Political Participation and Procedural Utility: An Empirical Study." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (3): 391-418. (**Think Nozick**)
  - dd. Radcliff, Benjamin. 2001. "Politics, Markets, and Life Satisfaction: The Political Economy of Human Happiness." *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 939-952.
  - ee. Lane Kenworth & Pontusson PoP
  - ff. Bradley, David, Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, François Nielsen, and John D. Stephens. 2003. "Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies." *World Politics* 55 (2): 193-228.
  - gg. Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Systems and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100 (2): 165- 81.
  - hh. Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. 2009. "Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run." *World Politics* 61 (2): 215-253.
  - ii. Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. N.d. "The Conscriptioin of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation." *International Organization* (forthcoming).
  - jj. Pontusson, Jonas, and David Rueda. 2008. "Inequality as a Source of Political Polarization: A Comparative Analysis of Twelve OECD Countries." In *Democracy, Inequality and Representation*, ed. Pablo Beramendi and Christopher J. Anderson. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
  - kk. Arend Lijphart, "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma," *American Political Science Review*, 91 (1997), pp. 1-14.
  - ll. Anderson, Christopher J., and Pablo Beramendi. 2012. "Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral Participation in Advanced Industrial Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (6)
  - mm. Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87 (9-10): 2129-2155.
  - nn. Mahler, Vincent. 2008. "Electoral Turnout And Income Redistribution By The State: A Cross- National Analysis Of The Developed Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 47 (2): 161-183.
  - oo. Larcinese, V., Snyder Jr, J. M., & Testa, C. (2011). Testing models of distributive politics using exit polls to measure voters' preferences and partisanship. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1(1), 1-31.