

Online Appendix

1 Additional Tables

Table A1: Summary Statistics

	Median	Mean	St. Dev.	St. Dev. w/in Countries	Min.	Max.
Democratization	0	.019	.137	.139	0	1
Authoritarian Breakd.	0	.078	.268	.26	0	1
Democratization after Breakd.	0	.249	.433	.343	0	1
% Dem. neigh. (spatial lag 1)	.167	.218	.257	.189	0	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 1)	0	.004	.076	.076	-1	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years (spatial lag 1)	0	.008	.106	.105	-1	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years (spatial lag 1)	0	.012	.129	.126	-1	1
% Dem. world	.321	.341	.119	.093	.132	.584
Ch. % dem. world last year	0	.004	.016	.016	-.035	.079
Ch. % dem. world last 2 years	.002	.008	.026	.025	-.057	.101
Ch. % dem. world last 3 years	.005	.011	.035	.037	-.062	.13
% Dem. neigh. (spatial lag 2)	.2	.248	.21	.155	0	1
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 2)	0	.004	.047	.047	-.455	.667
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years (spatial lag 2)	0	.008	.066	.065	-.5	.667
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years (spatial lag 2)	0	.012	.081	.079	-.5	.667
% Dem. region	.143	.192	.221	.147	0	.9
Ch. % dem. region last year	0	.003	.042	.042	-.333	.5
Ch. % dem. region last 2 years	0	.006	.058	.058	-.5	.5
Ch. % dem. region last 3 years	0	.008	.07	.069	-.5	.5
Ch. # dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 1)	0	.023	.358	.353	-6	3
Ch. # dem. neigh. last year (spatial lag 2)	0	.081	.772	.762	-13	16
Hegemonic power volatility	.411	.604	.518	.486	.057	3.203
Growth rate	1.025	1.63	5.417	5.161	-33.291	158.606
Growth crisis	0	.331	.471	.393	0	1
Bench. Growth	-.284	-.136	5.304	5.042	-34.306	155.251
Rain dev.	-.08	-.076	1.903	1.833	-12.623	14.508
RR crisis	1	.523	.5	.462	0	1
LV crisis	1	.564	.496	.416	0	1
RR/LV crisis	1	.557	.497	.445	0	1
GDP pc (logged)	7.507	7.609	.788	.407	5.093	10.758
Oil	0	440.786	3132.657	2050.923	0	78588.8
Muslim	1	24.136	37.353	0	0	99.7
Catholic	31	42.55	40.651	0	0	99
Protestant	2	9.42	17.104	0	0	90.6
Ethnic frac.	27	30.875	24.561	0	0	82
Rel. frac.	13	22.849	21.761	0	0	83.5
British Col.	0	.154	.361	0	0	1
# Past Break.	0	.221	.542	.353	0	4
Polarized Order	1	.578	.494	.429	0	1
Democratic Order	0	.192	.394	.367	0	1
Alliance with France	0	.012	.109	.103	0	1
Alliance with Germany	0	.012	.111	.095	0	1
Alliance with Japan	0	.003	.052	.05	0	1
Alliance with Russia/USSR	0	.054	.225	.18	0	1
Alliance with US	0	.134	.341	.274	0	1
Alliance with US (Cold War)	0	.113	.317	.262	0	1
Alliance with UK	0	.019	.135	.128	0	1
Pro-Democratic Hegemonic Shocks	0	.137	.344	.337	0	1

Table A2: Cases of Authoritarian Breakdown — Part I

Ecuador 1875	Iran 1896	Dominican Rep 1914	El Salvador 1931	Paraguay 1948
<i>Uruguay 1875</i>	Netherlands 1897	Haiti 1914	Panama 1931	Peru 1948
Bolivia 1876	Spain 1897	Mexico 1914	Peru 1931	Venezuela 1948
<i>Dominican Rep 1876</i>	Uruguay 1897	Peru 1914	Chile 1932	China 1949
Ecuador 1876	El Salvador 1898	Haiti 1915	Ecuador 1932	<i>Indonesia 1949</i>
El Salvador 1876	Guatemala 1898	Dominican Rep 1916	<i>Japan 1932</i>	Panama 1949
Haiti 1876	Venezuela 1898	<i>Ethiopia 1916</i>	<i>Afghanistan 1933</i>	Paraguay 1949
<i>Honduras 1876</i>	Bolivia 1899	China 1917	<i>Cuba 1933</i>	Syria 1949
Mexico 1876	Dominican Rep 1899	<i>Costa Rica 1917</i>	Ecuador 1933	Haiti 1950
Turkey 1876	Venezuela 1899	Greece 1917	Peru 1933	Pakistan 1950
<i>Uruguay 1876</i>	Colombia 1900	<i>Russia 1917</i>	Austria 1934	Panama 1950
Paraguay 1877	Denmark 1901	Germany 1918	Bolivia 1934	Taiwan 1950
<i>Dominican Rep 1878</i>	<i>Nepal 1901</i>	Turkey 1918	Chile 1934	Venezuela 1950
<i>Afghanistan 1879</i>	Dominican Rep 1902	<i>Afghanistan 1919</i>	<i>Cuba 1934</i>	Bolivia 1951
Bolivia 1879	Haiti 1902	<i>Costa Rica 1919</i>	Yugoslavia 1934	Iran 1951
<i>Dominican Rep 1879</i>	Paraguay 1902	Honduras 1919	Ecuador 1935	Jordan 1951
Haiti 1879	Dominican Rep 1903	Italy 1919	Bolivia 1936	Nepal 1951
Peru 1879	Honduras 1903	<i>Peru 1919</i>	Paraguay 1936	Bolivia 1952
Venezuela 1879	Paraguay 1904	Spain 1919	Bolivia 1937	Egypt 1952
<i>Afghanistan 1880</i>	Dominican Rep 1905	Uruguay 1919	China 1937	Japan 1952
Paraguay 1880	Paraguay 1905	Bolivia 1920	Colombia 1937	Panama 1952
Peru 1881	Cuba 1906	Guatemala 1920	Ecuador 1937	<i>Afghanistan 1953</i>
Russia 1881	Ecuador 1906	Mexico 1920	Paraguay 1937	Colombia 1953
Peru 1882	Paraguay 1906	Guatemala 1921	Bolivia 1939	Iran 1953
<i>Uruguay 1882</i>	Honduras 1907	Japan 1921	Spain 1939	Egypt 1954
Ecuador 1883	<i>Korea 1907</i>	Paraguay 1921	Cuba 1940	Paraguay 1954
<i>Honduras 1883</i>	Haiti 1908	Spain 1921	<i>Estonia 1940</i>	Syria 1954
<i>Dominican Rep 1885</i>	Morocco 1908	Greece 1922	<i>Latvia 1940</i>	Argentina 1955
El Salvador 1885	Paraguay 1908	Ireland 1922	<i>Lithuania 1940</i>	Indonesia 1955
Guatemala 1885	Portugal 1908	Spain 1922	Panama 1941	Haiti 1956
<i>Nepal 1885</i>	Venezuela 1908	China 1923	Uruguay 1942	Honduras 1956
Peru 1885	Chile 1909	Spain 1923	Argentina 1943	Hungary 1956
United Kingdom 1885	Nicaragua 1909	China 1924	Bolivia 1943	Nicaragua 1956
Uruguay 1886	Turkey 1909	Honduras 1924	Italy 1943	Peru 1956
Haiti 1888	<i>Korea 1910</i>	Ecuador 1925	Ecuador 1944	Colombia 1957
Brazil 1889	Nicaragua 1910	Greece 1925	El Salvador 1944	Guatemala 1957
<i>Costa Rica 1889</i>	Dominican Rep 1911	Honduras 1925	France 1944	Haiti 1957
<i>Ethiopia 1889</i>	Ecuador 1911	Mongolia 1925	Guatemala 1944	Honduras 1957
Haiti 1889	Haiti 1911	China 1926	Brazil 1945	Thailand 1957
El Salvador 1890	Honduras 1911	Greece 1926	Germany 1945	Argentina 1958
Brazil 1891	Mexico 1911	Nicaragua 1926	Guatemala 1945	Guatemala 1958
Chile 1891	Nicaragua 1911	Chile 1927	Venezuela 1945	<i>Iraq 1958</i>
Venezuela 1892	Paraguay 1911	China 1928	Bolivia 1946	Thailand 1958
<i>Honduras 1893</i>	Sweden 1911	<i>Afghanistan 1929</i>	Haiti 1946	Venezuela 1958
<i>Nicaragua 1893</i>	Argentina 1912	Bolivia 1930	Philippines 1946	<i>Cuba 1959</i>
Belgium 1894	Dominican Rep 1912	Brazil 1930	Ecuador 1947	El Salvador 1960
El Salvador 1894	Haiti 1912	Guatemala 1930	Nicaragua 1947	Korea South 1960
<i>Honduras 1894</i>	Paraguay 1912	<i>Japan 1930</i>	Costa Rica 1948	Laos 1960
Paraguay 1894	Spain 1912	Peru 1930	Ecuador 1948	<i>Myanmar 1960</i>
Peru 1894	El Salvador 1913	Romania 1930	El Salvador 1948	Turkey 1960
Ecuador 1895	Mexico 1913	Spain 1930	<i>Indonesia 1948</i>	Dominican Rep 1961
Peru 1895	Turkey 1913	Ecuador 1931	Panama 1948	El Salvador 1961

Note: Authoritarian breakdowns resulting in a transition to democracy are shown in **bold**. Authoritarian breakdowns shown in *italic* are omitted from our main regression (Model 1 of Table 5) due to missing data on explanatory variables.

Table A2: Cases of Authoritarian Breakdown — Part II

Syria 1961	<i>Oman 1970</i>	<i>Yemen South 1978</i>	Uruguay 1985	Central Afr. Rep 1993
Turkey 1961	Poland 1970	<i>Afghanistan 1979</i>	<i>Afghanistan 1986</i>	<i>Latvia 1993</i>
Dominican Rep 1962	Syria 1970	Bolivia 1979	Bangladesh 1986	Madagascar 1993
Syria 1962	Argentina 1971	Brazil 1979	Guatemala 1986	Niger 1993
<i>Yemen North 1962</i>	Bolivia 1971	Cambodia 1979	Haiti 1986	Nigeria 1993
Argentina 1963	Honduras 1971	Central Afr. Rep 1979	Lesotho 1986	Burundi 1994
Benin 1963	<i>Lebanon 1971</i>	Chad 1979	Philippines 1986	Guinea-Bissau 1994
Dominican Rep 1963	Sudan 1971	Congo Brazzaville 1979	Uganda 1986	Haiti 1994
<i>Iraq 1963</i>	Uganda 1971	Ecuador 1979	<i>Yemen South 1986</i>	Lesotho 1994
Nicaragua 1963	Benin 1972	El Salvador 1979	Burkina Faso 1987	Malawi 1994
Peru 1963	Ecuador 1972	Equatorial Guinea 1979	Burundi 1987	Mozambique 1994
Syria 1963	Gambia 1972	Ghana 1979	Tunisia 1987	Rwanda 1994
<i>Togo 1963</i>	<i>Madagascar 1972</i>	Iran 1979	Haiti 1988	South Africa 1994
<i>Vietnam South 1963</i>	Qatar 1972	Korea South 1979	Korea South 1988	Comoros 1995
Benin 1964	<i>Afghanistan 1973</i>	Mauritania 1979	<i>Myanmar 1988</i>	Qatar 1995
Bolivia 1964	Argentina 1973	Nicaragua 1979	Pakistan 1988	<i>Afghanistan 1996</i>
Gabon 1964	Greece 1973	Nigeria 1979	Comoros 1989	Burundi 1996
Laos 1964	Rwanda 1973	Uganda 1979	Paraguay 1989	Sierra Leone 1996
Sudan 1964	Thailand 1973	Burkina Faso 1980	Poland 1989	Taiwan 1996
<i>Vietnam South 1964</i>	Burkina Faso 1974	El Salvador 1980	Romania 1989	Albania 1997
Algeria 1965	Cyprus 1974	Guinea-Bissau 1980	Bulgaria 1990	Cambodia 1997
Benin 1965	Greece 1974	Liberia 1980	Chad 1990	Congo Brazzaville 1997
Congo Kinshasa 1965	Niger 1974	Mauritania 1980	Chile 1990	Congo Kinshasa 1997
Dominican Rep 1965	Portugal 1974	Peru 1980	Czechoslovakia 1990	Ghana 1997
<i>Vietnam South 1965</i>	<i>Yemen North 1974</i>	Uganda 1980	<i>Germany East 1990</i>	Sierra Leone 1997
Burkina Faso 1966	Bangladesh 1975	Argentina 1981	Haiti 1990	Sierra Leone 1998
Burundi 1966	Chad 1975	Bangladesh 1981	Hungary 1990	Comoros 1999
Central Afr. Rep 1966	Honduras 1975	Bolivia 1981	Kuwait 1990	Guinea-Bissau 1999
Ecuador 1966	Laos 1975	Central Afr. Rep 1981	Liberia 1990	Indonesia 1999
Ghana 1966	<i>Madagascar 1975</i>	Egypt 1981	Mongolia 1990	Ivory Coast 1999
Guatemala 1966	Nigeria 1975	Panama 1981	Panama 1990	Niger 1999
Indonesia 1966	Peru 1975	Uruguay 1981	Benin 1991	Croatia 2000
South Africa 1966	Saudi Arabia 1975	Argentina 1982	<i>Estonia 1991</i>	Fiji 2000
Syria 1966	Thailand 1975	Bangladesh 1982	Haiti 1991	Ivory Coast 2000
Benin 1967	<i>Vietnam South 1975</i>	Burkina Faso 1982	Lesotho 1991	Mexico 2000
Togo 1967	Burundi 1976	Chad 1982	Mali 1991	Senegal 2000
<i>Yemen North 1967</i>	Ecuador 1976	Honduras 1982	Nepal 1991	<i>Yugoslavia 2000</i>
Benin 1968	Nigeria 1976	Panama 1982	<i>Somalia 1991</i>	<i>Afghanistan 2001</i>
Congo Brazzaville 1968	Portugal 1976	Burkina Faso 1983	Sri Lanka 1991	Congo Kinshasa 2001
Czechoslovakia 1968	Uruguay 1976	Guatemala 1983	<i>Afghanistan 1992</i>	Peru 2001
<i>Iraq 1968</i>	Congo Brazzaville 1977	Panama 1983	Albania 1992	Kenya 2002
Mali 1968	Spain 1977	Swaziland 1983	Algeria 1992	Lesotho 2002
Sierra Leone 1968	Thailand 1977	Thailand 1983	<i>Azerbaijan 1992</i>	Sierra Leone 2002
Benin 1969	<i>Yemen North 1977</i>	Turkey 1983	<i>Georgia 1992</i>	Ecuador 2003
Bolivia 1969	<i>Afghanistan 1978</i>	El Salvador 1984	Guyana 1992	Georgia 2003
Brazil 1969	Bolivia 1978	Guinea 1984	<i>Lithuania 1992</i>	Guinea-Bissau 2003
<i>Libya 1969</i>	Comoros 1978	Mauritania 1984	Sierra Leone 1992	<i>Iraq 2003</i>
<i>Yemen South 1969</i>	Ghana 1978	Mongolia 1984	<i>Tajikistan 1992</i>	Paraguay 2003
Argentina 1970	Honduras 1978	Nicaragua 1984	Thailand 1992	Haiti 2004
Bolivia 1970	Mauritania 1978	Nigeria 1985	<i>Azerbaijan 1993</i>	
Ghana 1970	<i>Yemen North 1978</i>	Sudan 1985	Burundi 1993	

Note: Authoritarian breakdowns resulting in a transition to democracy are shown in **bold**. Authoritarian breakdowns shown in *italic* are omitted from our main regression (Model 1 of Table 5) due to missing data on explanatory variables.

Table A3: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1			Spatial Lag 2				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.532 (.147)***				.702 (.215)***			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.607 (.338)*	.359 (.251)			.810 (.579)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years							.778 (.456)*	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years				.161 (.220)				.643 (.424)
Hegemonic power volatility	.207 (.077)***	.190 (.078)**	.187 (.079)**	.198 (.079)**	.203 (.075)***	.185 (.077)**	.176 (.079)**	.184 (.079)**
Growth rate	-.028 (.010)***	-.028 (.010)***	-.026 (.010)***	-.029 (.010)***	-.027 (.010)***	-.028 (.010)***	-.026 (.010)***	-.028 (.010)***
GDP pc (logged)	.243 (.071)***	.315 (.067)***	.316 (.067)***	.317 (.067)***	.217 (.081)***	.316 (.067)***	.317 (.067)***	.315 (.067)***
Oil	-.0003 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0003 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.0009 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.0009 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-.0009 (.002)	-.0009 (.002)
Catholic	-.0004 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.0006 (.002)	-.0001 (.002)	-.00005 (.002)	-.00005 (.002)
Protestant	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.004 (.002)*	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.004 (.002)
Ethnic frac.	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*	.003 (.002)*
Religious frac.	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)
Brit. col.	.057 (.130)	.069 (.130)	.073 (.131)	.075 (.130)	.109 (.130)	.071 (.130)	.073 (.131)	.072 (.131)
# Past trans.	.265 (.046)***	.285 (.042)***	.273 (.041)***	.283 (.042)***	.252 (.045)***	.288 (.042)***	.275 (.041)***	.281 (.041)***
N	5621	5587	5526	5459	5621	5587	5526	5459
Pseudolog-lik.	-475.964	-477.259	-474.608	-476.088	-476.164	-477.63	-474.253	-475.321

Note: Redoes Table 4 without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A4: Effect of World Diffusion on Democratization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. world	1.622 (.397)***			
Ch. % dem. world last year		2.703 (2.551)		
Ch. % dem. world last 2 years			4.111 (1.827)**	
Ch. % dem. world last 3 years				1.809 (1.427)
Hegemonic power volatility	.14 (.066)**	.142 (.072)**	.083 (.077)	.124 (.08)
Growth rate	-.029 (.010)***	-.033 (.010)***	-.031 (.010)***	-.032 (.010)***
GDP pc (logged)	.277 (.070)***	.332 (.067)***	.324 (.067)***	.328 (.068)***
Oil	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.0009 (.002)	-.0002 (.002)	-.0003 (.002)	-.0002 (.002)
Catholic	.002 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Protestant	.003 (.003)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.003)
Ethnic frac.	.001 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Religion frac.	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)
Brit. col.	-.012 (.141)	.049 (.137)	.038 (.137)	.045 (.137)
# Past trans.	.269 (.044)***	.290 (.043)***	.288 (.043)***	.289 (.043)***
N	6477	6477	6477	6477
Pseudolog-lik.	-497.993	-505.622	-503.008	-505.099

Note: Redoes Table 4 using world diffusion. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A5: Effect of Regional Diffusion on Democratization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. region	.546 (.198)***			
Ch. % dem. region last year		2.015 (.686)***		
Ch. % dem. region last 2 years			.888 (.621)	
Ch. % dem. region last 3 years				.715 (.559)
% Dem. world	1.242 (.413)***	1.506 (.392)***	1.532 (.390)***	1.547 (.398)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.147 (.066)**	.126 (.067)*	.129 (.066)*	.131 (.067)**
Growth rate	-.030 (.010)***	-.029 (.010)***	-.030 (.010)***	-.030 (.010)***
GDP pc (logged)	.239 (.072)***	.279 (.069)***	.279 (.070)***	.280 (.070)***
Oil	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.0006 (.002)	-.0008 (.002)	-.0008 (.002)	-.0007 (.002)
Catholic	.0008 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Protestant	.002 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)
Ethnic frac.	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.001 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)
Brit. col.	-.018 (.145)	-.005 (.142)	-.008 (.143)	-.010 (.144)
# Past trans.	.229 (.050)***	.270 (.044)***	.270 (.044)***	.267 (.045)***
N	6470	6429	6381	6313
Pseudolog-lik.	-493.666	-494.317	-495.855	-495.123

Note: Note: Redoes Table 4 using regional diffusion. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A6: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. neigh.	.100 (.105)	.915 (.277)***	.071 (.148)	1.222 (.355)***				
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year								
Hegemonic power volatility	.153 (.048)***	.127 (.121)	.153 (.048)***	.126 (.118)				
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)***	-.035 (.020)*	-.019 (.006)***	-.030 (.020)				
GDP pc (logged)	-.079 (.053)	.603 (.201)***	-.074 (.051)	.587 (.201)***				
Oil	-6.88e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)***	-8.05e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)***				
Muslim	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)				
Catholic	.002 (.001)*	-.004 (.003)	.002 (.001)*	-.004 (.003)				
Protestant	-.0004 (.002)	.003 (.005)	-.0004 (.002)	.004 (.005)				
Ethnic frac.	.0007 (.001)	.007 (.003)**	.0006 (.001)	.007 (.003)**				
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	.002 (.004)	-.003 (.002)*	.002 (.004)				
Brit. col.	-.084 (.093)	.321 (.246)	-.078 (.093)	.371 (.257)				
# Past trans.	.157 (.049)***	.197 (.082)**	.158 (.049)***	.165 (.083)**				
N	5488	423	5488	423				
Pseudolog-lik.	-1590.302	-1567.283	-1589.545	-1569.415				

Note: Redoes Table 5 without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A7: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change in % Democratic Neighbors in the Last 2 and 3 Years)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years	.103 (.194)	.337 (.501)	.112 (.375)	-.013 (.853)	.244 (.342)	.374 (.236)	.151 (.050)***	.369 (.235)	3.342 (.826)***
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years									
% Dem. world	.390 (.235)*	3.239 (.811)***	.027 (.210)	-.174 (.372)					
Hegemonic power volatility	.154 (.049)***	.043 (.139)	.153 (.050)***	.050 (.139)				.149 (.051)***	.055 (.140)
Growth rate	-.020 (.006)***	-.018 (.022)	-.019 (.006)***	-.020 (.023)				-.019 (.006)***	-.019 (.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.080 (.052)	.832 (.222)***	-.082 (.052)	.849 (.221)***				-.082 (.052)	.849 (.220)***
Oil	-7.32e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-5.90e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***				-5.94e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0008 (.001)**	-.0008 (.004)	-.001 (.001)**	-.0004 (.004)				-.001 (.001)**	-.0004 (.004)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)				.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)
Protestant	-.0007 (.002)	.009 (.006)	-.0006 (.002)	.009 (.007)				-.0006 (.002)	.009 (.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0004 (.002)	.006 (.003)*	.0006 (.002)	.006 (.003)*				.0006 (.002)	.006 (.004)*
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)*	.0004 (.005)	-.004 (.002)*	.0003 (.005)				-.004 (.002)*	.0003 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.082 (.093)	.243 (.288)	-.069 (.092)	.235 (.289)				-.068 (.092)	.239 (.288)
# Past trans.	.152 (.049)***	.126 (.105)	.148 (.049)***	.133 (.109)				.148 (.048)***	.131 (.108)
N	5402	415	5339	411	5402	415	5339	5339	411
Pseudolog-lik.		-1550.763		-1534.901		-1550.988			-1534.568

Note: Redoes Table 5 using the change in % democracies in the last 2 and 3 years. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A8: Effect of Regional Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. region	.101 (.141)	.734 (.333)**						
Ch. % dem. region last year			.814 (.492)*	2.023 (1.473)				
Ch. % dem. region last 2 years					.360 (.494)	1.214 (.870)		
Ch. % dem. region last 3 years							.212 (.407)	1.193 (.954)
% Dem. world	.438 (.244)*	2.470 (.745)***	.471 (.224)**	2.976 (.727)***	.494 (.227)**	2.989 (.737)***	.514 (.230)**	3.004 (.736)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.094 (.043)**	.086 (.112)	.089 (.043)**	.059 (.116)	.093 (.044)**	.053 (.119)	.097 (.045)**	.051 (.121)
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)***	-.027 (.020)	-.019 (.006)***	-.024 (.020)	-.019 (.006)***	-.025 (.021)	-.021 (.006)***	-.024 (.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.066 (.051)	.645 (.189)***	-.058 (.050)	.725 (.187)***	-.062 (.050)	.749 (.190)***	-.059 (.051)	.762 (.191)***
Oil	-6.18e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-7.33e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-6.01e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-6.04e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0001 (.001)	-.0009 (.003)	-.0002 (.001)	-.0008 (.003)	-.0002 (.001)	-.0004 (.003)	-.0002 (.001)	-.0003 (.003)
Catholic	.004 (.001)***	-.003 (.003)	.004 (.001)***	-.001 (.003)	.004 (.001)***	-.001 (.003)	.004 (.001)***	-.001 (.003)
Protestant	-.002 (.002)	.002 (.005)	-.002 (.002)	.004 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	.005 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	.005 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	-.0003 (.002)	.004 (.003)	-.0004 (.001)	.004 (.003)	-.0003 (.001)	.005 (.003)	-.0003 (.002)	.005 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.002 (.002)	.001 (.004)	-.002 (.002)	.0003 (.004)	-.002 (.002)	.0005 (.004)	-.002 (.002)	.001 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.131 (.101)	.175 (.279)	-.124 (.101)	.190 (.281)	-.114 (.101)	.180 (.287)	-.108 (.102)	.171 (.291)
# Past trans.	.139 (.048)***	.148 (.087)*	.145 (.047)***	.175 (.091)*	.145 (.047)***	.175 (.098)*	.144 (.048)***	.170 (.098)*
N	6200	450	6166	450	6126	447	6064	443
Pseudolog-lik.		-1701.985		-1699.506		-1689.096		-1673.735

Note: Redoes Table 5 using regional diffusion. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A9: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change % World Democracies in the Last Year)

	Spatial Lag 1		Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
% Dem. neigh.	Auth. Break. .099 (.104)	Tr. to Dem. .924 (.283)***	Auth. Break. .071 (.147)	Tr. to Dem. 1.232 (.365)***	Auth. Break. -0.423 (.525)	Tr. to Dem. -0.091 (1.118)
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year						
Ch. % dem. world last year	1.220 (1.688)	3.339 (3.886)	1.241 (1.690)	3.224 (3.968)	2.027 (1.771)	2.712 (4.011)
Hegemonic power volatility	.140 (.053)***	.090 (.132)	.140 (.054)**	.090 (.130)	.146 (.053)***	.120 (.132)
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)***	-.034 (.021)	-.019 (.006)**	-.028 (.021)	-.019 (.006)***	-.029 (.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.080 (.053)	.612 (.202)***	-.070 (.051)	.594 (.203)***	-.070 (.051)	.843 (.218)***
Oil	-7.00e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)***	-8.14e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)***	-8.88e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0006 (.001)	-.0006 (.004)
Catholic	.002 (.001)*	-.004 (.003)	.002 (.001)*	-.004 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.004 (.003)
Protestant	-.0005 (.002)	.003 (.005)	-.0004 (.002)	.006 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	.006 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0006 (.001)	.007 (.003)**	.0006 (.002)	.007 (.003)**	.0006 (.002)	.007 (.003)**
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	.002 (.004)	-.003 (.002)*	.003 (.004)	-.003 (.002)*	.002 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.086 (.093)	.324 (.250)	-.081 (.093)	.374 (.260)	-.083 (.093)	.331 (.248)
# Past trans.	.156 (.049)***	.193 (.084)**	.157 (.049)***	.162 (.085)*	.162 (.049)***	.177 (.100)*
N	5488	423	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.		-1589.806		-1589.064		-1568.663

Note: Redoes Table 5 using *Change % World Democracies in the last year* rather than *% World Democracies*. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A10: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.
	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.054 (.114)	.950 (.350)***	.064 (.120)	.879 (.279)***
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		1.880 (.690)***		-114 (.242)
Hegemonic power volatility	.264 (.083)***	.515 (.233)**	.161 (.055)***	.175 (.055)***
Rain dev.	-.049 (.015)***	-.035 (.050)		
RR/LV crises			.226 (.056)***	.231 (.056)***
GDP pc (logged)	-.109 (.051)**	.512 (.242)**	-.071 (.060)	-.067 (.056)
Oil	-7.09e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)**	-.0002 (.0003)	-.0002 (.0003)
Muslim	.0005 (.002)	-.0004 (.003)	-.0009 (.002)	-.0009 (.002)
Catholic	.004 (.002)**	-.0008 (.004)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.001)
Protestant	-.002 (.003)	-.003 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Ethnic frac.	.00006 (.002)	.010 (.004)**	.0009 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.0001 (.002)	.004 (.005)	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.002)
Brit. col.	-.101 (.091)	.388 (.296)	-.070 (.100)	-.072 (.100)
# Past trans.	.173 (.057)***	.166 (.121)	.163 (.052)***	.166 (.052)***
N	3384	250	4685	4664
Pseudolog-lik.	-973.717	-959.065	-1409.389	-1394.649

Note: Redoes Table 6 without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A11: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (RR and LV Crises)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	-.087 (.150)	.458 (.366)			.022 (.152)	.750 (.433)*		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.279 (.279)	1.790 (.668)***			-.172 (.377)	2.807 (1.379)**
% Dem. world	.399 (.364)	2.882 (1.162)**	.406 (.381)	3.254 (1.187)***	-.302 (.507)	3.206 (1.311)**	-.335 (.493)	4.158 (1.311)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.125 (.066)*	-.160 (.170)	.134 (.068)*	-.177 (.162)	.233 (.115)**	.699 (.313)**	.252 (.116)**	.617 (.316)*
RR crises	.154 (.068)**	.054 (.214)	.153 (.069)**	.019 (.211)				
LV crises					.293 (.090)***	-.030 (.359)	.290 (.089)***	-.052 (.351)
GDP pc (logged)	.041 (.077)	.787 (.219)***	.025 (.075)	.931 (.227)***	-.137 (.067)**	.727 (.251)***	-.146 (.063)**	.882 (.231)***
Oil	-2.66e-06 (.0002)	-.0003 (.0002)*	1.00e-05 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)**	-.00002 (.00003)	-.0009 (.0005)*	-.00002 (.00003)	-.001 (.0005)*
Muslim	-.003 (.002)	-.005 (.006)	-.003 (.002)	-.005 (.006)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.005)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.005)
Catholic	.0003 (.002)	-.004 (.003)	.0002 (.002)	-.005 (.003)	.003 (.003)	-.002 (.005)	.003 (.003)	-.001 (.005)
Protestant	-.0006 (.003)	.016 (.008)*	-.001 (.003)	.026 (.008)***	-.006 (.003)*	-.012 (.011)	-.006 (.003)**	-.010 (.011)
Ethnic frac.	.004 (.002)*	.0007 (.005)	.004 (.002)**	-.0002 (.006)	-.002 (.002)	.013 (.005)**	-.002 (.002)	.011 (.006)**
Religious frac.	-.009 (.003)***	.0002 (.008)	-.009 (.003)***	-.002 (.009)	-.0005 (.003)	-.003 (.007)	-.0006 (.003)	-.002 (.007)
Brit. col.	-.185 (.169)	.549 (.453)	-.181 (.169)	.509 (.443)	-.061 (.105)	.553 (.385)	-.070 (.106)	.586 (.417)
# Past trans.	.171 (.056)***	-.012 (.155)	.172 (.057)***	-.084 (.145)	.231 (.067)***	.053 (.210)	.229 (.068)***	.053 (.204)
N	3241	284	3226	281	2326	166	2320	165
Pseudolog-lik.		-1023.812		-1010.81		-639.966		-633.811

Note: Redoes Table 6 with *RR crises* and *LV crises* on their own. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A12: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change % Democracies over 2 and 3 Years)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years	-.012 (.281)	.660 (.663)	.100 (.286)	-.152 (.522)	.056 (.199)	.229 (.521)	.141 (.223)	-.354 (.406)
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years								
% Dem. world	-.173 (.399)	4.273 (.967)***	-.141 (.405)	4.398 (1.004)***	.234 (.263)	3.203 (.866)***	.254 (.266)	3.281 (.849)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.276 (.081)***	.309 (.286)	.294 (.082)***	.278 (.284)	.169 (.055)***	.049 (.151)	.173 (.057)***	.050 (.152)
Rain dev.	-.050 (.015)***	.040 (.055)	-.055 (.015)***	.052 (.056)				
RR/LV crises								
GDP pc (logged)	-.117 (.049)**	.836 (.167)***	-.115 (.049)**	.847 (.164)***	-.074 (.057)	.854 (.223)***	-.075 (.057)	.877 (.219)***
Oil	-6.69e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-5.82e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-.00002 (.00003)	-.0006 (.0002)**	-.00002 (.00003)	-.0006 (.0002)**
Muslim	.0004 (.002)	-.0003 (.004)	.0003 (.002)	-.0005 (.004)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.004)	-.001 (.002)	-.0006 (.004)
Catholic	.005 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)	.005 (.002)***	-.003 (.004)	.002 (.001)	-.004 (.003)	.002 (.002)	-.004 (.003)
Protestant	-.004 (.003)	.0001 (.009)	-.004 (.003)	.001 (.009)	-.002 (.002)	.008 (.007)	-.002 (.002)	.008 (.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0005 (.002)	.008 (.005)	.0007 (.002)	.008 (.005)	.0008 (.002)	.007 (.004)*	.001 (.002)	.007 (.004)*
Religious	.0002 (.002)	-.0001 (.006)	.0003 (.002)	-.0003 (.006)	-.003 (.002)	.003 (.005)	-.003 (.002)	.003 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.080 (.088)	.401 (.338)	-.064 (.088)	.369 (.338)	-.078 (.099)	.185 (.309)	-.070 (.100)	.161 (.312)
# Past trans.	.164 (.056)***	.033 (.169)	.157 (.056)***	.047 (.167)	.156 (.051)***	.110 (.111)	.155 (.051)***	.115 (.118)
N	3311	244	3251	240	4630	371	4593	368
Pseudolog-lik.	-940.406	-923.869	-923.869	-1384.936	-1373.239			

Note: Redoes Table 6 with change % democracies over 2 and 3 Years. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A13: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Spatial Lag 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.
	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.056 (.192)	.576 (.542)	.065 (.183)	.874 (.388)**
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.540 (.588)		-.143 (.506)
% Dem. world	-.201 (.399)	3.605 (1.133)**	.173 (.273)	2.098 (.874)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.269 (.082)**	.265 (.080)**	.154 (.054)**	-.250 (.265)
Rain dev.	-.051 (.015)**	-.053 (.015)**		.166 (.055)**
RR/LV crises			.221 (.057)**	-.007 (.169)
GDP pc (logged)	-.108 (.053)**	.697 (.193)**	-.074 (.061)	-.074 (.057)
Oil	-7.75e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)**	-.00003 (1.00e-05)	-.00002 (.0002)**
Muslim	.0005 (.002)	-.0005 (.004)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)
Catholic	.004 (.002)**	-.001 (.004)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.001)
Protestant	-.002 (.003)	-.004 (.008)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Ethnic frac.	.00009 (.002)	.009 (.005)*	.008 (.002)	.0009 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.00006 (.002)	.001 (.006)	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.002)
Brit. col.	-.096 (.092)	.418 (.346)	-.071 (.101)	-.079 (.100)
# Past trans.	.174 (.056)**	.091 (.170)	.158 (.051)**	.161 (.051)**
N	3384	250	4685	4664
Pseudolog-lik.		-968.456	-1405.013	-1388.311

Note: Redoes Table 6 with spatial lag 2. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A14: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Regional Diffusion)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. region	.161 (.177)	.299 (.512)	.083 (.165)	.728 (.350)**
Ch. % dem. region last year				
% Dem. world	-.291 (.399)	3.948 (1.035)***	.452 (.647)	2.154 (1.772)
Hegemonic power volatility	.274 (.082)***	.412 (.274)	.172 (.274)	2.413 (.814)***
Rain dev.	-.049 (.015)***	.021 (.055)	.14 (.051)***	.131 (.051)***
RR/LV crises				
GDP pc (logged)	-.113 (.048)**	.727 (.186)***	.226 (.055)***	-.054 (.171)
Oil	-6.16e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-.073 (.059)	-.066 (.056)
Muslim	.0004 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.0007 (.001)	-.0006 (.001)
Catholic	.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)	.003 (.0009)***	.003 (.003)
Protestant	-.003 (.003)	-.006 (.008)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Ethnic frac.	-.00004 (.002)	.008 (.005)	.0005 (.002)	.0004 (.002)
Religious frac.	.0006 (.002)	-.0002 (.006)	-.002 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Brit. col.	-.124 (.089)	.387 (.343)	-.078 (.094)	-.068 (.092)
# Past trans.	.162 (.056)***	.091 (.167)	.149 (.050)***	.153 (.049)***
N	3476	255	4993	4974
Pseudolog-lik.		-988.2	-1485.904	-1481.834

Note: Redoes Table 6 with regional diffusion. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A15: Effect of Alternative Economic Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change % World Democracies in the Last Year)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.	Auth. Break.
	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.055 (.113)	1.016 (.356)***	.063 (.119)	.882 (.282)***
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.086 (.346)	1.759 (.676)***	-1.173 (.256)
Ch. % dem. world last year	.565 (2.310)	1.167 (2.362)	1.484 (1.794)	1.346 (4.140)
Hegemonic power volatility	.257 (.089)***	.252 (.087)***	.144 (.061)**	1.847 (4.353)
Rain dev.	-.048 (.015)***	-.050 (.016)***	-.015 (.049)	.154 (.061)**
RR/LV crises			.225 (.057)***	.230 (.057)***
GDP pc (logged)	-.110 (.051)**	-.119 (.049)**	-.072 (.059)	-.067 (.055)
Oil	-7.09e-06 (1.00e-05)	-6.55e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.00002 (.00003)	-.00002 (.00003)
Muslim	.0005 (.002)	-.001 (.004)	-.0009 (.002)	-.0009 (.004)
Catholic	.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.001)
Protestant	-.002 (.003)	-.004 (.007)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.002)
Ethnic frac.	.00004 (.002)	.010 (.004)**	.008 (.002)	.007 (.003)**
Religious frac.	-.0001 (.002)	.003 (.006)	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.002)
Brit. col.	-.101 (.091)	.416 (.301)	-.072 (.100)	-.074 (.100)
# Past trans.	.172 (.057)***	.136 (.139)	.161 (.052)***	.165 (.052)***
N	3384	250	4685	375
Pseudolog-lik.	-971.819	-957.933	-1409.039	-1394.11

Note: Redoes Table 5 using *Change % World Democracies in the last year* rather than *% World Democracies*. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Uses spatial lag 1. *Rain deviation* gives the difference, in percentage, between the total amount of rain a country received in a given year and the average yearly amount of rain that country has received between 1950 and 2006. The variable *RR/LV crises* indicates whether a country is experiencing a crisis as defined by either Rogoff and Reinhart (2010) or Laeven and Valencia (2013). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A16: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1900–2004)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.098 (.107)	.576 (.288)**			.054 (.168)	.763 (.398)*		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-239 (.249)	1.731 (.632)***			-149 (.497)	-233 (1.021)
% Dem. world	.073 (.322)	2.427 (.942)***	.141 (.318)	3.230 (1.005)***	.100 (.327)	2.249 (.976)**	.137 (.320)	3.234 (1.000)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.132 (.048)***	.054 (.129)	.136 (.050)***	.036 (.135)	.131 (.048)***	.060 (.126)	.136 (.050)***	.048 (.131)
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)***	-.022 (.020)	-.019 (.006)***	-.015 (.022)	-.019 (.006)***	-.020 (.020)	-.019 (.006)***	-.018 (.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.082 (.053)	.574 (.214)***	-.079 (.053)	.764 (.231)***	-.077 (.055)	.565 (.217)***	-.079 (.053)	.752 (.237)***
Oil	-7.21e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-8.39e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-8.55e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-8.33e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0009 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0009 (.001)	-.001 (.004)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0009 (.001)	-.0008 (.004)
Catholic	.002 (.001)	-.002 (.003)	.002 (.001)*	-.002 (.004)	-.002 (.001)	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.001)*	-.002 (.004)
Protestant	.0007 (.003)	.003 (.006)	.0002 (.003)	.007 (.007)	.0008 (.003)	.004 (.006)	2.19e-06 (.003)	.007 (.007)
Ethnic frac.	-.0002 (.001)	.005 (.003)	-.0003 (.002)	.005 (.004)	-.0003 (.002)	.005 (.003)	-.0003 (.002)	.005 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	-.0002 (.005)	-.004 (.002)**	.0004 (.005)	-.004 (.002)**	-.0001 (.005)	-.004 (.002)**	-.0004 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.107 (.094)	.237 (.279)	-.098 (.095)	.263 (.295)	-.103 (.095)	.266 (.286)	-.099 (.095)	.242 (.289)
# Past trans.	.148 (.049)***	.188 (.088)**	.152 (.049)***	.154 (.107)	.149 (.049)***	.171 (.087)**	.152 (.049)***	.162 (.104)
N	4769	378	4744	373	4769	378	4744	373
Pseudolog-lik.		-1419.533		-1397.89		-1419.611		-1399.788

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1900 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004). Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A17: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1900-2004; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. neigh.	.105 (.103)	.806 (.271)***			1.099 (.364)***			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			1.728 (.614)***					
Hegemonic power volatility	.133 (.049)***	.096 (.118)	.098 (.119)		.098 (.116)			
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)***	-.032 (.019)*	-.026 (.020)		-.027 (.019)			
GDP pc (logged)	-.081 (.053)	.512 (.201)**	.717 (.215)***		.502 (.200)**			
Oil	-7.28e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)**	-.0005 (.0002)***		-.0004 (.0002)**			
Muslim	-.0009 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0008 (.004)		-.001 (.003)			
Catholic	.002 (.001)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)		-.003 (.003)			
Protestant	.0007 (.003)	.002 (.005)	.005 (.006)		.003 (.005)			
Ethnic frac.	-.0002 (.001)	.006 (.003)*	.006 (.003)*		.006 (.003)*			
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	.002 (.004)	.003 (.005)		.002 (.004)			
Brit. col.	-.105 (.095)	.277 (.241)	.292 (.242)		.323 (.251)			
# Past trans.	.148 (.049)***	.201 (.076)***	.180 (.090)**		.173 (.076)**			
N	4769	378	373		378			
Pseudolog-lik.	-1423.469	-1404.862	-1422.78		-1407.018			

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1900 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004), and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A18: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1945-2004)

	Spatial Lag 1			Spatial Lag 2		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.077 (.114)	.507 (.350)	-.020 (.190)	.695 (.535)	-.136 (.517)	-.614 (1.438)
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year						
% Dem. world	-.077 (.399)	3.720 (1.010)***	-.018 (.397)	3.578 (1.094)***	-.013 (.397)	4.390 (.973)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.212 (.064)***	.130 (.187)	.212 (.064)***	.152 (.188)	.216 (.065)***	.122 (.196)
Growth rate	-.016 (.007)**	-.008 (.026)	-.016 (.007)**	-.006 (.026)	-.016 (.007)**	-.004 (.026)
GDP pc (logged)	-.099 (.050)**	.665 (.187)***	-.102 (.048)**	.661 (.193)***	-.103 (.048)**	.797 (.179)***
Oil	-5.19e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-6.85e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-5.19e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0007 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0001 (.002)	-.0008 (.004)	-.0002 (.002)	-.0007 (.004)	-.0002 (.002)	-.0006 (.004)
Catholic	.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)	.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)	.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)
Protestant	-.001 (.003)	-.004 (.008)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.008)	-.003 (.003)	.0007 (.009)
Ethnic frac.	-.0002 (.002)	.010 (.005)*	-.0003 (.002)	.010 (.005)*	-.0001 (.002)	.009 (.005)*
Religious frac.	-.001 (.002)	-.0006 (.006)	-.002 (.002)	-.0007 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.007)
Brit. col.	-.103 (.092)	.393 (.333)	-.104 (.093)	.420 (.346)	-.090 (.090)	.385 (.348)
# Past trans.	.153 (.052)***	.101 (.147)	.156 (.051)***	.091 (.147)	.152 (.052)***	.080 (.153)
N	3593	268	3593	268	3578	264
Pseudolog-lik.	-1029.872	-1012.155	-1030.045	-1013.52		

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1945 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004). Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A19: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (1945-2004; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. neigh.	.070 (.110)	.896 (.334)***			1.311 (.494)***			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year								
Hegemonic power volatility	.210 (.065)***	.237 (.163)		1.895 (.754)**				.360 (1.296)
Growth rate	-.016 (.007)**	-.031 (.024)		-.022 (.024)				.241 (.166)
GDP pc (logged)	-.099 (.050)**	.562 (.241)**		.671 (.240)***				-.026 (.024)
Oil	-5.26e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***		-.0006 (.0002)***				.667 (.246)***
Muslim	-.0002 (.002)	-.0006 (.004)		-.0006 (.004)				-.0006 (.0002)***
Catholic	.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)		-.0006 (.004)				-.0003 (.004)
Protestant	-.001 (.003)	-.004 (.007)		-.002 (.008)				-.002 (.008)
Ethnic frac.	-.0002 (.002)	.010 (.004)**		.009 (.004)**				.009 (.004)**
Religious frac.	-.002 (.002)	.003 (.006)		-.003 (.006)				.003 (.006)
Brit. col.	-.104 (.092)	.387 (.285)		.366 (.278)				.349 (.278)
# Past trans.	.153 (.053)***	.154 (.113)		.143 (.113)				.145 (.113)
N	3593	268		264				264
Pseudolog-lik.	-1035.965	-1020.919		-1035.208				-1022.484

Note: Redoes Table 5 while restricting the sample between 1945 and 2004 (rather than 1875 and 2004), and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A20: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region) — Part I

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Western Countries		Eastern Europe		Latin America	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.066 (.115)	.704 (.332)**	.064 (.112)	.626 (.284)**	-.082 (.159)	.566 (.384)
% Dem. world	.255 (.268)	3.427 (.926)***	.356 (.240)	1.886 (.797)**	.474 (.313)	1.839 (.772)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.132 (.049)***	.105 (.135)	.142 (.051)***	.068 (.129)	.196 (.060)***	.160 (.157)
Growth rate	-.018 (.006)***	-.020 (.025)	-.019 (.006)***	-.026 (.020)	-.020 (.007)***	-.005 (.020)
GDP pc (logged)	-.113 (.053)**	.633 (.221)***	-.100 (.055)*	.563 (.203)***	-.060 (.057)	.315 (.236)
Oil	-3.12e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-3.89e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-1.00e-05 (.00002)	-.002 (.0008)**
Muslim	-.0006 (.001)	-.0007 (.004)	.00002 (.001)	-.002 (.003)	-.0005 (.001)	.0002 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)	.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.003)	.0002 (.002)	.0004 (.003)
Protestant	-.001 (.003)	-.002 (.007)	-.002 (.002)	.005 (.006)	-.0005 (.002)	.004 (.005)
Ethnic frac.	-.0001 (.002)	.008 (.004)*	-.0004 (.002)	.006 (.003)**	.0004 (.002)	.005 (.004)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	.002 (.005)	.0008 (.002)	-.002 (.005)	-.002 (.002)	-.0002 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.092 (.096)	.281 (.335)	-.150 (.088)*	.243 (.263)	-.079 (.100)	.180 (.244)
# Past trans.	.169 (.052)***	.221 (.116)*	.153 (.051)***	.213 (.082)***	.156 (.074)**	.205 (.097)**
N	5030	394	4852	405	3853	210
Pseudolog-lik.		-1456.376		-1484.778		-879.846

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession. *Western Countries* are defined as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada as well as countries from Western Europe. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A20: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region) — Part II

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Middle East		Sub-Saharan Africa		Asia	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.033 (.116)	.604 (.260)**	.080 (.125)	.648 (.372)*	.113 (.119)	.383 (.302)
% Dem. world	.509 (.265)*	2.169 (.757)**	.470 (.321)	2.193 (1.274)*	.213 (.252)	2.786 (.877)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.126 (.051)**	.093 (.119)	.142 (.054)**	-.122 (.162)	.127 (.049)**	.040 (.140)
Growth rate	-.018 (.006)**	-.024 (.020)	-.017 (.008)**	-.048 (.026)*	-.017 (.006)**	-.028 (.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.045 (.059)	.600 (.182)**	-.058 (.075)	1.017 (.197)**	-.108 (.058)*	.701 (.237)**
Oil	-.0001 (.0001)	-.0002 (.0002)	-1.54e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)**	-5.02e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)**
Muslim	-.0006 (.001)	.002 (.004)	-.0008 (.002)	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.002 (.006)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.002)*	-.007 (.003)*	.0007 (.003)	-.001 (.005)
Protestant	-.0006 (.002)	.003 (.005)	.004 (.003)*	.008 (.008)	-.003 (.003)	.006 (.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0003 (.002)	.004 (.003)	.001 (.002)	.004 (.006)	.0004 (.002)	.006 (.004)
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	-.002 (.004)	-.006 (.002)**	.005 (.006)	-.005 (.002)**	.002 (.006)
Brit. col.	-.068 (.108)	.309 (.267)	-.250 (.140)*	.068 (.636)	-.027 (.097)	.277 (.296)
# Past trans.	.131 (.050)**	.139 (.075)*	.151 (.061)**	-.071 (.143)	.151 (.051)**	.157 (.101)
N	4775	396	4121	325	4844	386
Pseudolog-lik.		-1463.717		-1187.116		-1430.465

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A21: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World) — Part I

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Western Countries		Eastern Europe		Latin America	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.101 (.106)	1.161 (.315)***	.106 (.107)	.832 (.264)***	-.034 (.155)	.731 (.373)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.141 (.049)***	.194 (.120)	.157 (.051)***	.125 (.120)	.207 (.061)***	.207 (.150)
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)***	-.040 (.024)*	-.020 (.006)***	-.034 (.019)*	-.021 (.007)***	-.012 (.019)
GDP pc (logged)	-.107 (.052)**	.586 (.219)***	-.095 (.056)*	.524 (.199)***	-.053 (.058)	.296 (.216)
Oil	-3.35e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)**	-3.81e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)**	-1.00e-05 (.0002)	-.002 (.0007)**
Muslim	-.0006 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	.00002 (.001)	-.002 (.003)	-.0004 (.001)	.00008 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.004 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.003)	-.00004 (.002)	-.0005 (.003)
Protestant	-.0007 (.003)	-.0006 (.006)	-.002 (.002)	.004 (.005)	-.0007 (.002)	.002 (.004)
Ethnic frac.	.00002 (.001)	.009 (.004)**	-.002 (.002)	.007 (.003)**	.0009 (.001)	.006 (.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)	.004 (.005)	.0009 (.002)	-.001 (.004)	-.002 (.002)	.001 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.086 (.096)	.330 (.275)	-.136 (.088)	.300 (.240)	-.062 (.100)	.242 (.210)
# Past trans.	.173 (.052)***	.242 (.096)**	.160 (.051)***	.239 (.076)***	.164 (.074)**	.230 (.092)**
N	5030	394	4852	405	3853	210
Pseudolog-lik.		-1463.163		-1488.004		-883.349

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession, and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. *Western Countries* are defined as Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada as well as countries from Western Europe. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A21: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdown and Democratization (Excluding Each Region; Does Not Control for % Democracies in the World) — Part II

	EXCLUDED REGION					
	Middle East		Sub-Saharan Africa		Asia	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.095 (.111)	.852 (.241)***	.134 (.122)	.856 (.360)**	.143 (.113)	.794 (.289)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.146 (.051)***	.153 (.112)	.163 (.054)***	-.085 (.153)	.135 (.049)***	.118 (.131)
Growth rate	-.020 (.006)***	-.032 (.019)	-.017 (.009)**	-.050 (.028)*	-.017 (.006)***	-.038 (.022)*
GDP pc (logged)	-.041 (.060)	.566 (.177)***	-.037 (.071)	1.010 (.217)***	-.106 (.058)*	.620 (.229)***
Oil	-.00008 (.0001)	-.0001 (.0002)	-2.95e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)**	-4.94e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0004 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0004 (.001)	.002 (.003)	-.0009 (.002)	-.003 (.004)	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.005)
Catholic	.002 (.001)*	-.004 (.003)	.002 (.001)*	-.008 (.003)***	.0004 (.003)	-.004 (.005)
Protestant	-.0007 (.002)	.002 (.005)	.004 (.002)	.005 (.007)	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0006 (.002)	.005 (.003)*	.001 (.002)	.004 (.006)	.0005 (.002)	.006 (.003)*
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	-.001 (.004)	-.006 (.002)***	.006 (.006)	-.006 (.002)**	.003 (.006)
Brit. col.	-.047 (.108)	.399 (.235)*	-.235 (.141)*	.253 (.583)	-.019 (.098)	.360 (.256)
# Past trans.	.140 (.050)***	.161 (.069)**	.152 (.060)**	-.088 (.143)	.155 (.051)***	.192 (.091)**
N	4775	396	4121	325	4844	386
Pseudolog-lik.		-1468.73		-1189.564		-1435.894

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 of the main text while excluding each region in succession, and without controlling for the % of democracies in the world. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A22: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Benchmarked Growth Rates)

	Spatial Lag 1		Spatial Lag 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. neigh.	.051 (.109)	.603 (.290)**		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year				
% Dem. world	.327 (.242)	2.452 (.806)***	1.682 (.622)***	
Hegemonic power volatility	.147 (.048)***	.071 (.130)	.051 (.138)	
Bench. Growth rate	-.020 (.006)***	-.022 (.022)	-.018 (.023)	
GDP pc (logged)	-.085 (.053)	.619 (.203)***	.824 (.224)***	
Oil	-6.64e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-.0006 (.0002)***	
Muslim	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.004)	
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.004)	
Protestant	-.0003 (.002)	.004 (.005)	.009 (.007)	
Ethnic frac.	.0003 (.002)	.005 (.003)*	.006 (.004)	
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	.0005 (.004)	.0009 (.005)	
Brit. col.	-.098 (.092)	.221 (.274)	.242 (.288)	
# Past trans.	.150 (.049)***	.172 (.087)**	.134 (.105)	
N	5488	423	416	416
Pseudolog-lik.		-1584.814	-1557.662	-1559.458

Note: Redoes Table 5 with growth rates benchmarked against the world growth rate. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A23: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Excluding Outliers)

	Spatial Lag 1		Spatial Lag 2						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					
% Dem. neigh.	.059 (.109)	.626 (.295)**	1.701 (.625)***	-.002 (.160)	.810 (.396)**	Tr. to Dem.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year									
% Dem. world	.386 (.242)	2.463 (.804)***	3.266 (.828)***	.424 (.250)*	2.301 (.842)***			-.288 (.506)	-320 (1.041)
Hegemonic power volatility	.137 (.048)***	.059 (.129)	.040 (.136)	.137 (.048)***	.065 (.126)			.445 (.241)*	3.289 (.824)***
Growth rate	-.018 (.007)***	-.025 (.021)	-.017 (.022)	-.018 (.007)***	-.022 (.021)			.147 (.049)***	.052 (.132)
Oil	-5.98e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-.0006 (.0002)***	-6.64e-06 (1.00e-05)	-7.29e-06 (1.00e-05)			-.018 (.007)***	-.020 (.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.090 (.054)*	.637 (.205)***	-.836 (.224)***	-.083 (.056)	-.629 (.210)***			-6.59e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.004)	-.0006 (.001)	-.001 (.004)			-.086 (.052)*	.823 (.228)***
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.004)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)			-.0006 (.001)	-.0007 (.004)
Protestant	-.0001 (.002)	.004 (.005)	.009 (.006)	-.0005 (.002)	-.0002 (.005)			.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)
Ethnic frac.	.0004 (.002)	.006 (.003)*	.006 (.004)	.0005 (.002)	.006 (.003)*			-.0005 (.002)	.009 (.006)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	.0004 (.004)	.0009 (.005)	-.004 (.002)*	.0005 (.004)			-.0004 (.002)*	.006 (.003)*
Brit. col.	-.105 (.091)	.228 (.278)	.246 (.292)	-.101 (.092)	.260 (.285)			-.004 (.002)*	.001 (.005)
# Past trans.	.151 (.050)***	.169 (.089)*	.132 (.107)	.153 (.049)***	.151 (.089)*			-.102 (.092)	.225 (.286)
N	5453	423	416	5423	423			.154 (.050)***	.140 (.104)
Pseudolog-lik.		-1583.243	-1556.217		-1583.202			5423	416

Note: Redoes Table 5 without observations with growth rates below -20 percent or above 20 percent. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A24: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Growth Crisis)

	Spatial Lag 1		Spatial Lag 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Dem. neigh.	.049 (.108)	.592 (.283)**	.784 (.392)**	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year				
% Dem. world	.248 (.264)	2.459 (.846)***	2.307 (.879)***	-249 (.502)
Hegemonic power volatility	.151 (.048)***	.066 (.135)	.070 (.132)	.161 (.049)***
Growth crisis	.137 (.064)**	.080 (.159)	.059 (.160)	.147 (.064)**
GDP pc (logged)	-.102 (.053)*	.588 (.194)**	.583 (.198)**	-.100 (.052)*
Oil	-7.85e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-.0005 (.0002)***	-8.31e-06 (1.00e-05)
Muslim	-.0009 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.0008 (.001)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)**
Protestant	-.0005 (.002)	.004 (.005)	.005 (.005)	-.001 (.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0004 (.002)	.006 (.003)*	.006 (.003)*	.0004 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	.0001 (.004)	.0002 (.004)	-.004 (.002)**
Brit. col.	-.107 (.091)	.220 (.276)	.254 (.283)	-.103 (.091)
# Past trans.	.152 (.048)***	.174 (.085)**	.158 (.085)*	.155 (.048)***
N	5488	423	416	5458
Pseudolog-lik.		-1586.508	-1558.897	5458
			-1586.322	-1560.853

Note: Redoes Table 5 with a dummy variable for growth crises (defined as a growth rate below -2% in the last three years) rather than the continuous growth rate measure. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A25: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Country Fixed Effects)

	Spatial Lag 1			Spatial Lag 2				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.510 (.337)				1.263 (.587)**			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.405 (.405)				.241 (.809)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years			.106 (.295)				.137 (.691)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years				-.155 (.278)				-.114 (.564)
% Dem. world	5.582 (1.246)***	5.910 (1.161)***	5.868 (1.173)***	5.920 (1.169)***	5.000 (1.341)***	5.921 (1.164)***	5.868 (1.179)***	5.908 (1.176)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.056 (.123)	.041 (.126)	.055 (.125)	.055 (.125)	.057 (.123)	.041 (.126)	.053 (.128)	.055 (.126)
Growth rate	-.073 (.018)***	-.077 (.018)***	-.078 (.018)***	-.080 (.018)***	-.071 (.018)***	-.077 (.018)***	-.078 (.018)***	-.080 (.018)***
GDP pc (logged)	1.562 (.318)***	1.604 (.304)***	1.628 (.311)***	1.614 (.310)***	1.544 (.322)***	1.604 (.306)***	1.626 (.313)***	1.614 (.310)***
Oil	.002 (.0008)*	.001 (.0008)*	.002 (.0008)**	.002 (.0008)**	.002 (.0008)*	.002 (.0008)*	.002 (.0008)**	.002 (.0008)**
# Past trans.	-.657 (.192)***	-.623 (.198)***	-.629 (.200)***	-.621 (.204)***	-.736 (.177)***	-.619 (.199)***	-.627 (.200)***	-.624 (.204)***
N	3386	3359	3322	3289	3386	3359	3322	3289
Pseudolog-lik.	-359.033	-357.82	-355.115	-356.475	-356.173	-358.068	-355.13	-356.551

Note: Redoes Table 4 with country fixed effects. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A26: Effect of Alternative Political Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy

(2)

	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	-.014 (.119)	.572 (.304)*	-.122 (.121)	.503 (.316)
% Dem. world	1.212 (.525)**	3.214 (1.245)***	.471 (.258)*	2.168 (.904)**
Hegemonic Power Volatility	.134 (.050)***	.111 (.129)	.125 (.050)**	.072 (.127)
Growth rate	-.016 (.006)**	-.027 (.021)	-.018 (.006)***	-.029 (.021)
GDP pc (logged)	-.081 (.052)	.633 (.209)***	-.105 (.048)**	.578 (.210)***
Oil	-7.53e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-6.26e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0006 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0002 (.001)	-.0008 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.003)	.002 (.001)*	-.003 (.003)
Protestant	-.0002 (.002)	.004 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	.003 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0004 (.001)	.006 (.004)	.0002 (.001)	.005 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	.0002 (.005)	-.003 (.002)	.002 (.004)
Brit. col.	-.127 (.093)	.126 (.323)	-.103 (.093)	.133 (.317)
# Past trans.	.153 (.055)***	.187 (.093)**	.124 (.052)**	.148 (.092)
Polarized Order	-.074 (.124)	-.182 (.258)		
Democratic Order	-.251 (.196)	-.409 (.355)		
Alliance with France				5.662 (.886)***
Alliance with Germany				.889 (.824)
Alliance with Japan				-.241 (.930)
Alliance with Russia/USSR				-.542 (.654)
Alliance with US				.112 (.396)
Alliance with US (Cold War)				.246 (.394)
Alliance with UK				-4.500 (.952)***
N	5229	413	5229	413
Pseudolog-lik.		-1541.107		-1529.542

Note: Redoes model 1 of Table 5 with additional measures of political shocks. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. *Polarized Order* takes the value 1 in 1933-90, and *Democratic Order* takes the value 1 in 1919-32 and 1991-2000. These variables and the variables on alliances are taken from Boix (2011). Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A27: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (US Power Volatility)

	Spatial Lag 1			Spatial Lag 2		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.026 (.117)	.663 (.318)**	-288 (.255)	1.790 (.608)**	-.065 (.169)	-.820 (.420)*
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year						
% Dem. world	.411 (.238)*	1.796 (.851)**	.435 (.231)*	2.618 (.868)**	.472 (.250)*	1.702 (.872)*
US Power Volatility	2.202 (.740)**	3.523 (2.050)*	2.394 (.756)**	2.651 (2.108)	2.175 (.742)**	3.448 (2.026)*
Growth rate	-.016 (.006)**	-.029 (.022)	-.016 (.006)**	-.020 (.023)	-.016 (.006)**	-.025 (.022)
GDP pc (logged)	-.082 (.053)	.668 (.198)**	-.082 (.052)	.856 (.209)**	-.073 (.054)	.662 (.201)**
Oil	-7.12e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)**	-7.01e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)**	-8.64e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)**
Muslim	-.0007 (.001)	-.0009 (.003)	-.0006 (.001)	-.0007 (.004)	-.0006 (.001)	-.0008 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.004)	.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.003)
Protestant	-.0004 (.002)	.005 (.006)	-.001 (.002)	.009 (.007)	-.0004 (.002)	.005 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0003 (.001)	.006 (.003)	.0004 (.002)	.006 (.004)	.002 (.002)	.006 (.003)*
Religious frac.	-.004 (.002)**	-.00007 (.005)	-.004 (.002)**	.0005 (.005)	-.004 (.002)**	-1.00e-05 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.129 (.092)	.135 (.329)	-.126 (.093)	.152 (.342)	-.135 (.093)	.170 (.338)
# Past trans.	.150 (.050)**	.188 (.099)*	.153 (.050)**	.147 (.114)	.155 (.049)**	.169 (.100)*
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423
Pseudolog-lik.	-1547.687	-1521.646	-1547.632	-1523.317	-1547.632	-1523.317

Note: Redoes Table 5 but measures political shocks with the absolute value of the change in the US share of hegemonic power over the last three years, rather than the average of the absolute value of the change in the share of each hegemon over the last three years. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A28: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Interaction Between Diffusion and Economic Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1			Spatial Lag 2				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.381 (.152)**				.465 (.229)**			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.559 (.346)				.667 (.601)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years			.290 (.252)				.402 (.461)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years				.083 (.220)				.364 (.426)
% Dem. world	1.111 (.422)***	1.422 (.401)***	1.442 (.401)***	1.429 (.406)***	1.061 (.430)**	1.411 (.403)***	1.445 (.399)***	1.404 (.405)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.184 (.076)**	.155 (.078)**	.154 (.079)*	.167 (.079)**	.183 (.075)**	.154 (.077)**	.147 (.079)*	.157 (.079)**
Growth rate	-.034 (.014)**	-.023 (.009)**	-.021 (.009)**	-.023 (.009)**	-.034 (.016)**	-.023 (.009)**	-.025 (.010)***	-.027 (.010)***
% Dem. neigh.*Growth rate	.027 (.027)				.024 (.036)			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year*Growth rate		-.080 (.094)				-.077 (.157)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years*Growth rate			-.049 (.071)				.130 (.099)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years*Growth rate				-.043 (.060)				.061 (.093)
GDP pc (logged)	.231 (.072)***	.271 (.068)***	.274 (.068)***	.275 (.068)***	.218 (.078)***	.274 (.068)***	.275 (.069)***	.275 (.069)***
Oil	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)
Catholic	.0005 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.0004 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Protestant	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)*	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)*
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)
Brit. col.	.015 (.136)	.004 (.138)	.007 (.139)	.009 (.138)	.050 (.137)	.005 (.138)	.002 (.139)	.005 (.139)
# Past trans.	.255 (.046)***	.262 (.045)***	.250 (.044)***	.261 (.044)***	.249 (.045)***	.266 (.044)***	.255 (.043)***	.263 (.044)***
N	5621	5587	5526	5459	5621	5587	5526	5459
Pseudolog-lik.	-472.111	-471.016	-468.238	-469.806	-473.048	-471.586	-467.942	-469.535

Note: Redoes Table 4 with interaction terms between growth and diffusion. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A29: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Interaction Between Diffusion and Economic Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.0001 (.115)	.633 (.303)**			-.050 (.166)	.770 (.398)*		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.228 (.252)	1.789 (.647)***			-.412 (.508)	-.310 (1.085)
% Dem. world	.303 (.239)	2.440 (.821)***	.403 (.235)*	3.238 (.832)***	.355 (.252)	2.257 (.845)***	.414 (.238)*	3.270 (.826)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.142 (.047)***	.060 (.130)	.148 (.049)***	.042 (.136)	.143 (.048)***	.068 (.126)	.149 (.049)***	.054 (.131)
Growth rate	-.034 (.008)***	-.021 (.033)	-.018 (.006)***	-.018 (.022)	-.033 (.010)***	-.036 (.035)	-.019 (.006)***	-.021 (.021)
% Dem. neigh.*Growth rate	.063 (.025)**	-.008 (.076)			.051 (.031)	.045 (.096)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year*Growth rate			-.031 (.081)	-.077 (.154)			.095 (.129)	-.019 (.334)
GDP pc (logged)	-.087 (.053)*	.634 (.207)***	-.082 (.052)	.831 (.224)***	-.079 (.055)	.627 (.208)***	-.081 (.052)	.822 (.226)***
Oil	-4.85e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-7.33e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***	-7.16e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)***	-7.38e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)***
Muslim	-.0008 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0006 (.001)	-.001 (.004)	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0006 (.001)	-.0008 (.004)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)
Protestant	-.0006 (.002)	.004 (.006)	-.0008 (.002)	.009 (.007)	-.0004 (.002)	.005 (.005)	-.0008 (.002)	.009 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0003 (.001)	.006 (.003)*	.0005 (.001)	.006 (.004)	.0003 (.002)	.006 (.003)*	.0005 (.002)	.006 (.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	.0005 (.004)	-.003 (.002)*	.0008 (.005)	-.003 (.002)*	.0005 (.004)	-.003 (.002)*	.00006 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.096 (.091)	.246 (.282)	-.093 (.093)	.249 (.291)	-.096 (.093)	.258 (.287)	-.095 (.093)	.229 (.286)
# Past trans.	.156 (.048)***	.171 (.090)*	.156 (.050)***	.134 (.107)	.155 (.049)***	.152 (.087)*	.156 (.049)***	.141 (.103)
N	5488	423	5458	416	5488	423	5458	416
Pseudolog-lik.	-1581.479	-1558	-1558	-1558	-1583.617	-1559.65	-1559.65	-1559.65

Note: Redoes Table 5 with interaction terms between growth and diffusion. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A30: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Change in the Number of Democratic Neighbors)

	Spatial Lag 1 (1)		Spatial Lag 2 (2)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
Ch. # dem. neigh. last year	.054 (.065)	.304 (.095)**	.018 (.029)	-.084 (.080)
% Dem. world	.409 (.241)*	3.091 (.817)**	.408 (.243)*	3.197 (.817)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.153 (.048)**	.064 (.130)	.152 (.048)**	.093 (.127)
Growth rate	-.019 (.006)**	-.023 (.021)	-.019 (.006)**	-.025 (.020)
GDP pc (logged)	-.075 (.050)	.809 (.220)**	-.075 (.050)	.822 (.224)**
Oil	-7.96e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)**	-8.04e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)**
Muslim	-.0008 (.001)	-.002 (.004)	-.0008 (.001)	-.002 (.003)
Catholic	.003 (.001)*	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.001)*	-.003 (.003)
Protestant	-.0009 (.002)	.007 (.006)	-.0009 (.002)	.008 (.006)
Ethnic frac.	.0002 (.001)	.005 (.003)	.0002 (.001)	.005 (.003)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	-.0002 (.005)	-.003 (.002)*	-.0008 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.103 (.093)	.248 (.285)	-.103 (.093)	.213 (.281)
# Past trans.	.156 (.049)**	.155 (.100)	.157 (.049)**	.158 (.101)
N	5412	5412	5412	5412
Pseudolog-lik.		-1553.449		-1554.508

Note: Redoes models 2 and 4 of Table 5 with a variable indicating the change over the last year in the number (rather than proportion) of neighbors that are democratic. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A31: Instrumental Variable Estimations of the Effect of Growth on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy

	(1)		(2)	
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	-.021 (.125)	.509 (.389)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year			-.143 (.341)	1.516 (.862)*
% Dem. world	-2.497 (.871)***	5.980 (1.986)***	-2.394 (.882)***	6.265 (1.754)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.020 (.129)	.631 (.289)**	.043 (.129)	.525 (.270)*
Growth Rate	-.413 (.129)***	.449 (.401)	-.396 (.130)***	.448 (.355)
GDP pc (logged)	.330 (.155)**	.167 (.594)	.296 (.155)*	.271 (.583)
Oil	1.00e-05 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)*	.00002 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0003)**
Muslim	-.004 (.002)*	.004 (.006)	-.004 (.002)*	.004 (.005)
Catholic	-.0006 (.002)	.002 (.005)	-.0002 (.002)	.001 (.004)
Protestant	-.011 (.004)***	.006 (.013)	-.012 (.004)***	.011 (.012)
Ethnic frac.	-.008 (.003)***	.017 (.007)**	-.007 (.003)***	.016 (.006)**
Religious frac.	.002 (.002)	-.004 (.005)	.002 (.002)	-.003 (.005)
Brit. col.	.086 (.125)	.248 (.403)	.091 (.123)	.223 (.394)
# Past trans.	.248 (.060)***	-.096 (.218)	.241 (.060)***	-.125 (.188)
Growth as Dependent Variable				
Rain dev.		.177 (.054)***		.179 (.054)***
% Dem. neigh.		-.122 (.317)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year				-.488 (.909)
% Dem. world.		-5.711 (.753)***		-5.742 (.742)***
GDP pc (logged)		1.080 (.110)***		1.072 (.108)***
Oil		.00005 (.00002)**		.00005 (.00002)**
Muslim		-.011 (.003)***		-.011 (.003)***
Catholic		-.013 (.003)***		-.013 (.003)***
Protestant		-.021 (.006)***		-.021 (.006)***
Ethnic frac.		-.018 (.003)***		-.018 (.003)***
Religious frac.		.003 (.004)		.003 (.004)
Brit. col.		.536 (.188)***		.541 (.189)***
# Past trans.		.215 (.125)*		.211 (.125)*
F-stat. instr.		10.79***		10.97***
N	3244	241	3221	238
Pseudolog-lik.	-797.729	-920.749	-789.776	-910.324

Note: The first stage regressions use rainfall to instrument for growth. The second stage regressions use Heckman probit models. We run a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. We then run a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

2 Interaction Between Economic and Political Shocks

Conditional relationships also warrant consideration, particularly the possibility that economic shocks become more destabilizing when they occur concurrently with political shocks, and vice versa. In Tables A32 and A33 we redo Tables 4 and 5 with an interaction terms between *Growth rate* and *Hegemonic power volatility*. The interaction term is never statistically significant.

However, one must be cautious when interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003). We thus provide marginal effect plots based on model 1 of Table A33 in Figure A1. All variables are kept at their means. The key variable of interest – growth in the two left panels and *Hegemonic power volatility* in the two right panels – is also kept at its mean.¹

The bottom two panels of Figure A1 suggest that the effect of *Growth rate* and *Hegemonic power volatility* on the choice to democratize after an authoritarian breakdown is never statistically significant, regardless of the value of the conditioning variable. The top two panels, however, do provide some evidence suggesting that the effect of *Growth rate* (*Hegemonic power volatility*) on authoritarian breakdowns is conditional on *Hegemonic power volatility* (*Growth rate*). Specifically, the marginal effect of economic contractions on the probability of autocratic breakdown increases slightly at higher levels of *Hegemonic power volatility*. When there is no secure and dominant world power to bail out client states and preserve order, domestic economic performance matters a little bit more for the survival of autocracies. Similarly, political shocks are more likely to destabilize autocracies that are experiencing economic difficulties.

However, the evidence in favor of an interactive effect is weak. In particular, while the effect of economic contractions strengthens as *Hegemonic power volatility* increases, and

¹We use its mean value for an illustration. The marginal effect of, say, growth may vary at different growth levels in non-linear model interactions.

Table A32: Effect of Diffusion on Democratization (Interaction Between Economic and Political Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Dem. neigh.	.396 (.152)***				.472 (.228)**			
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year		.534 (.333)				.593 (.569)		
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 2 years			.277 (.245)				.509 (.435)	
Ch. % dem. neigh. last 3 years								
% Dem. world	1.136 (.418)***	1.424 (.400)***	1.449 (.401)***	.072 (.212)	1.083 (.428)**	1.419 (.401)***	1.422 (.396)***	1.393 (.401)***
Hegemonic power volatility	.188 (.077)**	.157 (.078)**	.151 (.080)*	.167 (.079)**	.186 (.076)**	.155 (.078)**	.145 (.079)*	.159 (.079)*
Growth rate	-.019 (.014)	-.024 (.014)*	-.025 (.014)*	-.024 (.014)*	-.019 (.014)	-.023 (.014)*	-.024 (.014)*	-.024 (.014)*
Growth rate*Hegemonic power volatility	-.010 (.016)	-.0009 (.015)	.005 (.014)	-.0008 (.015)	-.009 (.017)	-.001 (.016)	.004 (.015)	-.0008 (.015)
GDP pc (logged)	.226 (.072)***	.273 (.068)***	.275 (.069)***	.276 (.068)***	.218 (.078)***	.274 (.068)***	.276 (.069)***	.276 (.069)***
Oil	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0002 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*	-.0004 (.0002)*
Muslim	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)
Catholic	.0006 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.0005 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Protestant	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.005 (.003)*	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)
Ethnic frac.	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.003 (.003)
Brit. col.	.012 (.136)	.002 (.138)	.003 (.139)	.007 (.139)	.049 (.137)	.005 (.137)	.005 (.139)	.007 (.139)
# Past trans.	.252 (.047)***	.264 (.044)***	.253 (.043)***	.263 (.044)***	.246 (.046)***	.266 (.044)***	.255 (.043)***	.262 (.044)***
N	5621	5587	5526	5459	5621	5587	5526	5459
Pseudolog-lik.	-472.325	-471.239	-468.388	-470.003	-473.089	-471.668	-468.338	-469.691


Note: Redoes Table 4 with an interaction term between economic and political shocks. Dynamic probit estimations. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Table A33: Effect of Diffusion and Shocks on Authoritarian Breakdowns and Transitions to Democracy (Interaction Between Economic and Political Shocks)

	Spatial Lag 1				Spatial Lag 2			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.	Auth. Break.	Tr. to Dem.
% Dem. neigh.	.059 (.109)	.632 (.298)**	-263 (.252)	1.706 (.620)**	-.009 (.160)	.811 (.398)**	-.300 (.506)	-.308 (1.023)
Ch. % dem. neigh. last year								
% Dem. world	.346 (.239)	2.451 (.813)**	.405 (.234)*	3.255 (.841)**	.389 (.249)	2.289 (.848)**	.407 (.236)*	3.276 (.837)**
Hegemonic power volatility	.137 (.049)**	.074 (.129)	.145 (.051)**	.051 (.137)	.136 (.049)**	.078 (.128)	.147 (.051)**	.060 (.133)
Growth rate	-.019 (.010)**	-.019 (.028)	-.020 (.010)**	-.013 (.029)	-.019 (.010)**	-.017 (.028)	-.020 (.010)**	-.017 (.028)
Growth rate*Hegemonic power volatility	.003 (.014)	-.011 (.031)	.003 (.014)	-.008 (.033)	.003 (.014)	-.010 (.032)	.003 (.014)	-.006 (.031)
GDP pc (logged)	-.085 (.053)	.639 (.205)**	-.082 (.052)	.837 (.223)**	-.078 (.055)	.631 (.209)**	-.082 (.052)	.824 (.227)**
Oil	-6.68e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)**	-7.34e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)**	-8.12e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0005 (.0002)**	-7.29e-06 (1.00e-05)	-.0006 (.0002)**
Muslim	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0006 (.001)	-.001 (.004)	-.0007 (.001)	-.001 (.003)	-.0006 (.001)	-.0008 (.004)
Catholic	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.003)	.003 (.001)**	-.002 (.004)
Protestant	-.0003 (.002)	.004 (.006)	-.0008 (.002)	.009 (.007)	-.0003 (.002)	.005 (.005)	-.0008 (.002)	.009 (.007)
Ethnic frac.	.0004 (.002)	.006 (.003)*	.0005 (.002)	.006 (.004)	.0003 (.002)	.006 (.003)*	.0005 (.002)	.006 (.003)*
Religious frac.	-.003 (.002)*	.0004 (.004)	-.003 (.002)*	.0008 (.005)	-.003 (.002)*	.004 (.004)	-.003 (.002)*	.001 (.005)
Brit. col.	-.097 (.092)	.235 (.279)	-.093 (.093)	.251 (.293)	-.099 (.093)	.267 (.286)	-.094 (.093)	.230 (.287)
# Past trans.	.152 (.049)**	.167 (.090)*	.156 (.049)**	.131 (.108)	.155 (.049)**	.150 (.090)*	.155 (.049)**	.139 (.104)
N	5488	5488	5458	5458	5488	5488	5458	5458
Pseudolog-lik.	-1585.11	-1558.057	-1558.057	-1585.079	-1585.079	-1559.867	-1559.867	-1559.867

Note: Redoes Table 5 with an interaction term between economic and political shocks. Heckman probit estimations. The first stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy breaks down. The second stage runs a probit estimation of the likelihood that an autocracy that has just broken down transitions to democracy as opposed to another authoritarian regime. Models on authoritarian breakdown include the age of the regime, its square and its cube. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

Figure A1: Marginal Effects of Growth Rate and Hegemonic Power Volatility



Note: Dashed lines give 95 percent confidence intervals. Based on model 1 of Table A33.

vice versa, the confidence intervals also become much wider and they overlap highly, which suggests that these changes are not statistically significant. In fact, whether *Growth rate* (or *Hegemonic power volatility*) is statistically significant or not does not depend on *Hegemonic power volatility* (*Growth rate*). The effect of economic contractions on authoritarian breakdowns is significant at the five percent level at all values of *Hegemonic power volatility*. Similarly, with the exception of countries experiencing a growth rate above about 18 percent – which represents less than one percent of our sample – the effect of political shocks on authoritarian reversals is always significant at the five percent level.

We conduct two types of tests to show that adding the interaction term between economic and political shocks does not improve over the models presented in Table 4 and 5 of the main text. First, likelihood-ratio tests suggest that adding the interaction term does not improve the fit of the model. The test statistic (which follows a chi-squared distribution) comparing models 1 of Tables 5 and A33 is 0.148.²

Second, based on model 1 of Table A33, we calculate the marginal effect of *Growth rate* on authoritarian breakdowns when *Hegemonic power volatility* is set at its mean along with a 95 percent confidence interval. We also calculate the marginal effect of *Growth rate* when *Hegemonic power volatility* is one standard deviation above its mean. Again, we compute a 95 percent confidence interval. We find that the two confidence intervals overlap. In fact, 99 percent of the confidence interval computed when *Hegemonic power volatility* is at its mean is contained within the confidence interval calculated when *Hegemonic power volatility* is one standard deviation above its mean. Similarly, 90.8 percent of the latter confidence interval is contained within the former confidence interval. Therefore, the marginal effect of *Growth rate* on authoritarian breakdowns when *Hegemonic power volatility* is set at its mean is not statistically different than its marginal effect when *Hegemonic power volatility* is one standard deviation above its mean. This suggests that the effect of *Growth rate* is not

²To be statistically significant at the five percent level, the test statistic would need to be at least 5.991.

conditional on *Hegemonic power volatility*. This is also easy to see from the top left panel of Figure A1, since the confidence intervals are largely overlapped across different *Hegemonic power volatility* values.

We have conducted the same exercise to test whether the marginal effect of *Hegemonic power volatility* is conditional on *Growth rate*. Again, we find that the marginal effect of *Hegemonic power volatility* on authoritarian breakdowns when *Growth rate* is at its means is not statistically different than its marginal effect when *Growth rate* is one standard deviation above its mean. This time 85.2 percent of the confidence interval calculated when *Growth rate* is at its mean is contained within the confidence interval when *Growth rate* is one standard deviation above its mean. Likewise, 92.5 percent of the latter confidence interval is contained within the former confidence interval.

3 Spatial Probit Model

Some scholars recommend using a spatial econometric model to test diffusion of democratization (e.g., [Leeson and Dean 2009](#)). For example, in a spatial autoregressive model (i.e., $Y = \rho WY + X\beta + u$), a weighting matrix W is designed to capture a country's neighbors, and the model tests if a country's decision to democratize is influenced by its neighbors' level of democracy (i.e., if ρ is positive and statistically significant). Since we use a binary dependent variable, we employ a spatial autoregressive probit model to examine diffusion of democratization as a robustness test.³ That is, we test if ρ is positive and statistically significant in $Y^* = \rho WY^* + X\beta + u$, where Y^* is a latent variable.

We implement this spatial probit model using the `gmmprobit` command from the `McSpatial` package in R ([McMillen 2013](#)). Since we only include countries that begin the year as autocracies, our estimation captures whether democratization among neighbors within a given year induces democratization at home during that same year. Models of Table 4 in the main text are replicated,⁴ and the results are shown in column 1 of Table A34.⁵ As clearly demonstrated, the estimated ρ is $-.020$ and is statistically insignificant.⁶ Put differently, our spatial probit model suggests that contrary to the prediction of diffusion of democratization, autocracies are not more likely to democratize when their neighbors democratize during the same year. This finding echoes our findings in the main text. Column 2 redoes model 1

³For instance, see [LeSage and Pace \(2009\)](#) for a discussion of spatial autoregressive probit models.

⁴Since a spatial model does not need to include an independent variable to measure diffusion, it has less missing observations than the models in Table 4.

⁵When the oil income variable is employed, this spatial probit model fails to converge because this variable is highly skewed. Instead, we use a dichotomous oil variable taken from [Przeworski et al. 2000](#), which is equal to 1 if the average ratio of fuel exports to total exports in 1984-86 was greater than 50 percent, and 0 otherwise.

⁶This variable is labeled $WX\beta$ to denote WY^* .

without the control variable for the proportion of countries in the world that are democratic. Results are unchanged. In addition, the findings of other independent variables in Table A34 are consistent with our earlier results.

Table A34: Spatial Probit Estimation of Effect of Diffusion on Democratization

	(1)	(2)
$WX\beta$	-.020 (.069)	-.035 (.061)
% Dem. world	1.610 (.406)***	
Hegemonic power volatility	.149 (.067)**	.192 (.068)***
Growth rate	-.026 (.011)**	-.031 (.012)***
GDP pc (logged)	.260 (.066)***	.314 (.068)***
Oil	-.954 (.352)***	-.963 (.327)***
Muslim	-.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Catholic	.002 (.002)	.002 (.002)
Protestant	.003 (.003)	.003 (.003)
Ethnic frac.	.001 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Religious frac.	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.002)
Brit. col.	.012 (.138)	.089 (.135)
# Past trans.	.262 (.058)***	.286 (.059)***
N	6477	6477

Note: Spatial probit estimation ($Y^* = \rho WY^* + X\beta + u$). Standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables are lagged. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$ and * $p < .1$.

We did not use spatial probit models as our main estimation technique because we believe the effect of diffusion occurs with at least one period lag. Put differently, neighbors' lagged level of democracy is more appropriate for the test of diffusion. Theoretically, it is difficult to justify a concurrent effect because it takes time for a country to observe and learn from its neighbors. Empirically, the yearly data does not offer information on the order of democratization when two or more countries democratize in the same year. Due to this data limitation, it is likely a later democratization is mistakenly assumed to have an effect on an earlier transition. Because of the temporal lags, the TSCS spatial autoregressive probit model can be estimated by a probit model (Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006).⁷ The

⁷In addition, we assume the error terms are temporally independent in the spatial au-

implication for our test of the diffusion of democratization is that instead of using a spatial autoregressive probit model, one can simply introduce a variable, like ours, to measure diffusion.

autoregressive probit model.

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