

## FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS OF REASONABLENESS

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# FALLACIES AND JUDGMENTS OF REASONABLENESS

## Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules

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## Preface

*Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness* reports – as the subtitle of this volume indicates – on our empirical research concerning the pragma-dialectical discussion rules. It is, in fact, a final overview of this research and its results. We started the experiments described here almost 15 years ago as part of a comprehensive research project titled *Conceptions of Reasonableness*. This project was aimed at determining to what extent the norms for reasonableness incorporated in the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion are intersubjectively acceptable to ordinary arguers who do not have had any special training in analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse. To the extent that they indeed prove to be in accordance with ordinary arguers' judgments of reasonableness the pragma-dialectical discussion rules may not only lay claim to "problem-validity" but also to "conventional validity."

The report given in this volume is for a large part based on papers we published earlier in academic journals and book chapters. Journal articles by the three of us we made use of here appeared in *Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing* (1999, pp. 29–48, with Rob Grootendorst instead of Bart Garssen; 2000, pp. 22–40; 2001, pp. 106–131; 2002, pp. 120–145; 2003, pp. 158–180; 2004, pp. 291–302; 2007, pp. 251–274) and in *Language and Social Psychology* (2000, pp. 416–435, with Mariel Verburg instead of Bart Garssen). Book chapters we made use of here we published earlier in R. Neutelings, N. Ummelen, & A. Maes (Eds.) (2000). *Over de grenzen van de taalbeheersing* (pp. 129–140, 141–156). Den Haag: SDU; G. T. Goodnight (Ed.) (2002). *Arguing communication & culture* (pp. 343–350). Washington, DC: National Communication Association; F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.) (2002). *Advances in pragma-dialectics* (pp. 45–64). Amsterdam: Sic Sat; L. van Waes, P. Cuvelier, G. Jacobs, & I. de Ridder (Eds.) (2003). *Studies in Taalbeheersing 1* (pp. 118–123; pp. 124–133). Assen: Van Gorcum; F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.) (2003). *Proceedings of the fifth conference of the international society for the study of argumentation* (pp. 281–284). Amsterdam: Sic Sat; D. Hitchcock, & D. Farr (Eds.) (2005). *The uses of argument* (pp. 66–74). Hamilton, ON: Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation; F. H. van Eemeren, & P. Houtlosser (Eds.) (2005). *Argumentation in practice* (pp. 349–365). Amsterdam: John Benjamins; C. A. Willard (Ed.) (2005). *Critical problems in argumentation* (pp. 669–675). Washington, DC: National Communication Association; Willard; P. Riley (Ed.) (2006). *Engaging argument* (pp. 445–452).

Alta, UT: National Communication Association; F. H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C. A. Willard, & B. Garssen (Eds.) (2007). *Proceedings of the sixth conference of the international society for the study of argumentation* (pp. 367–373). Amsterdam: Sic Sat; F. H. van Eemeren, & B. J. Garssen (Eds.) (2008). *Controversy and confrontation* (pp. 181–195). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. We are grateful to the editors of these journals and books for giving us an opportunity to bring our empirical work to the attention of a broader readership and we thank the reviewers for their useful comments.

In preparing the manuscript for this volume we have been helped considerably by the assistance of our students Nanon Labrie and Renske Wierda. Their careful and skillful support has made it much easier for us to bring the project to completion. We thank them very much.

Frans H. van Eemeren  
Bart Garssen  
Bert Meuffels

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