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World Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Apr., 1959), pp. 430-441

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009202>

Accessed: 11/09/2013 19:54

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BRAINWASHING AND TOTALITARIANIZATION IN MODERN SOCIETY

By EDGAR H. SCHEIN

Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World Revisited*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1958, 147 pp. \$3.00.

Joost A. M. Meerloo, *The Rape of the Mind: The Psychology of Thought Control—Menticide and Brainwashing*, Cleveland, World Publishing Company, 1956, 320 pp. \$5.00.

ONE of the most interesting aftermaths of the Korean conflict in 1950-1953 has been the preoccupation of many Americans with "brainwashing." The word itself has become popular as a term for all sorts of persuasion and, within the appropriate context, as an explanation for any behavior which we do not understand. There are probably many reasons for this preoccupation. First, because our struggle with the Communist world is partially an ideological one, we need new terms for ideological weapons—e.g., "brainwashing." Second, because the Chinese Communists were successful in stalemating the Korean conflict and in eliciting germ-warfare confessions and other collaborative behavior from their American prisoners of war (POWs), we have had to find someone or something to blame. The conclusion that the collaborator and confessor were "brainwashed" is one convenient way of assigning such blame. Third, our own society has become increasingly concerned about the ethics and implications of techniques of overt and covert persuasion, such as the "soft sell," motivational research, subliminal stimulation, the use of drugs to influence psychological functioning, the use of hypnosis as an anaesthetic, and so on. This growing technology of influence has fed into the conception that society, or some of its agents, is becoming capable of overwhelming the human mind completely. Fourth, our changing international position has led us to an attitude of tense doubt about our supremacy and our capacity to cope with international problems. Given these and doubtless many other factors, it is no wonder that we have begun to question where the limits of the integrity of the human mind lie, and increasingly to entertain concepts like "brainwashing" which express graphically our loss of confidence in our capacity as individuals to master our world. When things go wrong, it is far less ego-deflating to say that we have been

"brainwashed" than to recognize our own inadequacy in coping with our problems.

A crucial question, however, is whether such changes in our society and such preoccupations represent weaknesses and signal the deterioration of some of our highly valued institutions, or whether they are merely the symptoms of a changing world. Are we becoming mentally apathetic and hence more prone to a totalitarian solution, or are we finding new ways in which to relate ourselves to our international and internal problems? Many observers of the contemporary scene, among them the novelist and philosopher, Aldous Huxley, and Joost Meerloo, a psychoanalyst, feel strongly that we are headed squarely in the *wrong* direction—that the combination of certain social forces and the weapons against the mind now available will inevitably lead to the destruction of the democratic way of life and the freedom of mind which goes with it, unless we recognize clearly what is happening and put counterforces into operation.

I

While these two observers approach their analysis from quite different perspectives, they arrive at similar conclusions. Huxley uses his *Brave New World*, written in 1932, as a frame of reference for his *Brave New World Revisited*¹ and reaches the inference that many of the crucial characteristics of his fantasy are already observable in the world today and that others are imminent. His basic theme can best be summarized by some of the chapter headings themselves: Over-Population; Over-Organization; Propaganda in a Democratic Society; Propaganda in a Dictatorship; The Art of Selling; Brainwashing; Chemical Persuasion; Subconscious Persuasion; and Hypnopaedia (sleep-teaching, particularly of children).

Huxley describes how the alarming growth of population in the world is creating economic and social conditions which will necessitate highly centralized forms of government, and how technological developments are making the means of production, distribution, and communication so complex and expensive that only large and powerful entrepreneurs or governments will be able to handle them. Thus we are moving toward more centralized forms of organization which will facilitate the usurping of power by a totalitarian leadership. At the same time, the complexity of work and urban life has tended to de-

¹ Huxley apparently was stimulated to write his analysis by *Newsday*, a Long Island daily paper, whose editors asked him "to take a look at the brave new world of 1958 and tell us if we are losing our freedom to think" (*Newsday* supplement, "Tyranny over the Mind," May 31, 1958, p. 2).

individualize man in a manner which makes him more susceptible to the totalitarian appeal. Huxley agrees with Fromm² that modern society undermines inner security, individual reason, and the capacity to form close personal relationships, leading the individual into that most dangerous of all conditions—the illusion of individuality and freedom, while in reality he is becoming more like everybody else.

In his discussion of the various forms of psychological influence and coercion which the chapter titles suggest, Huxley's interest converges almost completely with that of Meerloo, which is primarily "menticide"—the transformation of the mind into an automatically responding machine. Both authors emphasize that there are now available a variety of techniques for producing mental submission and that the conditions for their widespread use are rapidly approaching. Forces active within our own society are unobtrusively eroding man's desire and capacity to make decisions independently and rationally, and are thereby gradually turning him into an apathetic and willing tool of any demagogue who can capture the channels of communication. Among the examples of such forces or phenomena which Meerloo discusses are automation and the disproportionate worship of machines; the "cultish" preoccupation with relaxation and low-level passive entertainment; the increasing reliance on drugs for stimulation or tension reduction; the use of the mass media to give an outlet to low-level advertising; the utilization of motivation research for merchandising; the engineering of consent and public opinion; the undermining of our judicial process by permitting its proceedings to be too public and thus allowing public opinion or mass media to influence the jury; the use of loyalty investigations as an instrument of threat and coercion; and so on.

Many of the factors mentioned above, particularly the last one, are seen by Meerloo as tending to produce an atmosphere of fear and insecurity which stimulates irrational and "infantile" motives and mental processes. To the extent that the democratic process hinges on maturity, any force in society which tends to "infantilize" will undermine or make unworkable the democratic institutions, while at the same time creating a citizenry more vulnerable to the totalitarian appeal, which is specifically geared to fulfilling "infantile" emotions and desires. As key examples of such emotions and desires Meerloo cites unconscious wishes for complete dependency on some strong authority (like one's parents in infancy) and the feeling of omnipotence which derives from identifying with a powerful cause. Meerloo also presents an analysis of types of child-rearing methods which might be conducive

² E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, New York, 1955.

to producing persons prone to a totalitarian philosophy (e.g., the authoritarian personality which results from overauthoritarian, moralistic child-rearing).

Both Meerloo and Huxley feel that totalitarian societies like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union or Communist China were in the past, and continue to be, quite successful in their thought-control programs. They argue, however, that the more recently available techniques of influence and thought control are more securely based on scientific fact, more potent, and more subtle. Hence the danger to democratic society lies in the implication that even *some* degree of centralization of the means of influence and coercion can result in widespread thought control.

The argument is persuasive, but how do we establish the validity of the assertion that forces such as those toward overcentralization exist in the form cited, that such forces—if they do exist—will have the kinds of effects on the human mind which the authors claim, and that techniques of influence are either more scientific or more effective today than they were in the past? If these analyses were presented merely as the opinions of two people whose experience makes them valid observers of the contemporary scene, one could accept them on this basis, as one would any interesting social commentary. But, as I have stated above, there runs through both works a theme of “scientism” which should warn the reader to take a skeptical position, lest he begin to accept something as fact merely because it is stated as fact. Both authors repeatedly make points which they assert as facts, yet which are highly controversial: e.g., “There are unconscious sexual roots in hypnosis, related to the passive yielding to the attacker, which the quack uses to give vent to his own passions” (Meerloo, p. 61); “Ready-made opinions can be distributed day by day through press, radio, and so on, again and again, till they reach the nerve cell and implant a fixed pattern of thought in the brain” (Meerloo, p. 47); “For, ironically enough, the only people who can hold up indefinitely under the stress of modern war are psychotics” (Huxley, p. 74); “. . . fatigue increases suggestibility. (That is why, among other reasons, the commercial sponsors of television programs prefer the evening hours and are ready to back their preference with hard cash.)” (Huxley, p. 77). The generally dogmatic style and the reliance on secondary sources which themselves are not definitive³ make it especially difficult for the reader to evaluate such statements, particularly since they are presented with equal confidence

³ Fromm, *op.cit.*; W. Sargant, *Battle for the Mind*, New York, 1957; V. Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders*, New York, 1957.

in a wide range of fields (economics, political science, psychology, psychopharmacology, etc.).

II

The central concern of both books is weapons against the mind, and of these the prototype is, of course, Communist brainwashing. Brainwashing is presented as a novel, highly effective technique for producing mental submission and related by Meerloo and Huxley to other techniques, such as hypnosis and Pavlovian conditioning. Both aspects of this interpretation warrant comment.

If one reviews the published literature on Chinese Communist treatment of POWs and political prisoners,⁴ one finds considerable variation in the description of the actual events which occurred, in the relative significance attached to these events, and in the evaluation of how effective the Communist techniques were. For example, in reference to the description of events, there is sharp disagreement about the amount of physical brutality suffered by the prisoners, the degree of breakdown of individual character and morale in the prison camps, the amount of successful resistance or escape from captivity, the amount of collaboration and conversion to communism, and so on. In matters of evaluation, the waters are still muddier. At one extreme is the position that the physical brutality suffered by the prisoners was insignificant, that they simply collapsed both individually and as a group, that the rate of collaboration was appalling, and that we had best revamp our socializing institutions to produce a tougher future generation. At the other extreme is the position that the physical and psychological pressures on the prisoners were intense, and that, given this intensity, the novelty

⁴ E.g., A. D. Biderman, "Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War," *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine*, xxxiii (1957), pp. 616-25; *idem*, in *Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of American Military and Civilian Prisoners*, Hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 1956; I. E. Farber, H. F. Harlow, and L. J. West, "Brainwashing, Conditioning, and DDD (Debility, Dependency, and Dread)," *Sociometry*, xx (1957), pp. 271-85; L. E. Hinkle and H. G. Wolff, "Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of 'Enemies of the State,'" *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, lxxvi (1956), pp. 115-74; E. Kinkead, "The Study of Something New in History," *The New Yorker*, xxxiii, No. 36 (1957), pp. 102-53; R. J. Lifton, "Home by Ship: Reaction Patterns of American Prisoners of War Repatriated from North Korea," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, cx (1954), pp. 732-39; *idem*, "Thought Reform of Western Civilians in Chinese Communist Prisons," *Psychiatry*, xix (1956), pp. 173-96; W. E. Mayer, "Why Did Many GI Captives Cave in?" *U.S. News and World Report*, February 24, 1956, pp. 56-62; E. H. Schein, "The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War," *Psychiatry*, xix (1956), pp. 149-72; H. A. Segal, "Initial Psychiatric Findings of Recently Repatriated Prisoners of War," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, cxi (1954), pp. 358-63.

of the situation, and the lack of specific training and preparation, the amount of collaboration and collapse was surprisingly low and the amount of heroism and resistance commendably high. As might be expected, the definition of collaboration chosen and the figures quoted tend to confirm whichever position is taken.

To complicate the issue, there appears to have been some change *over time* in the evaluation of events in Korea. In a recent symposium,⁵ evidence was given that there has been a considerable change in reporting by the *New York Times*, from emphasis on Communist atrocities and brainwashing to emphasis on the moral "collapse" of the POW group and the weakness of our society implied thereby. From filing a formal report in the United Nations concerning the horrible treatment of American captives, which resulted in perhaps the highest death rate in POW history, we have moved to a position of all but discounting the role of fear, threat, and physical pressures in eliciting collaboration.⁶

In order to understand the discrepancies among the views of various "experts" on this subject, it is necessary to recall the circumstances under which data were initially gathered. By clever distribution of propaganda material obtained from POWs, the Communists succeeded in creating an image of large-scale collaboration and ideological defection which resulted in debriefing procedures geared more to the establishment of individual guilt than to the establishment of events during captivity. In the search for collaborators, too little attention was paid to the psychological atmosphere which had been created in the camps, the systematic destruction of groups by the Communists, and the difficulty which most men faced in this setting of defining an appropriate role for themselves. Certainly many actions which were defined as collaboration on the outside were not so defined by the men themselves—for example, signing a peace petition in order to communicate to the outside who had been captured (the Communists did not provide such lists).

For reasons such as these, the use of a raw rate of collaboration as an index of the effectiveness of Communist techniques on individual prisoners is highly tenuous. A criterion based on change of belief is equally tenuous because of the difficulty of measuring such a change in a puni-

⁵ A. D. Biderman and J. L. Monroe, "Reactions to the Korean POW Episode," paper read before the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., August 30, 1958.

⁶ Interestingly enough, the latter position mirrors the claims of the Chinese Communists about the treatment they accorded the POWs and has recently been quoted in their press as proving what they had been saying all along.

tive, hostile context. It was quite clear to the repatriate that his American debriefer would be shocked and appalled by any evidence of acceptance of communism. Furthermore, there is really no way to determine the latent effects of indoctrination—i.e., how likely the repatriate is to recall and accept Communist arguments if his experiences back home are largely dissatisfying. The opinion of the men themselves was that very few, if any, were seriously swayed by ideological considerations, except in the most general sense—e.g., finding appeal in a “peace campaign.”

If we look at the cases of Western businessmen, doctors, priests, etc., who remained on the mainland of China after the take-over and were imprisoned, we find similar problems of interpretation. Their dramatic public statements at the time of their release in Hong Kong to the effect that they were guilty of various crimes and that they deserved punishment were the result of many feelings and motives which were operating at that moment, not the least of which was the fear of reprisal by the Communists if they did not make such statements. What follow-up data are available, however, indicate that only a very few cases, even after from three to five years of so-called “thought reform,” have shown any lasting change, and in these cases one does not know how much of the change could have been predicted from the individual’s past history, whether other experiences would have produced similar changes, and whether the changes actually represent increasing loyalty to the Communist cause or merely a broad acceptance of ethical principles which that ideology shares with other ethical systems—e.g., that selfishness is an evil.

Those studies which have attempted to obtain firsthand information in a non-punitive research context⁷ tend to converge on a number of points: (1) Coercive persuasion (a term which I prefer to “menticide” or “brainwashing”) is a complex process involving an interaction among physical, psychological, and social forces which under some conditions, and in some men, produces changes in self-perception, beliefs, and attitudes toward certain social objects. (2) Given the amount of effort that was devoted to the production of such changes, it is not surprising that they occurred to some degree; but the small number of people influenced and the apparent instability of the changes argue against considering coercive persuasion a highly effective practical “weapon.” (3) The techniques used in coercive persuasion are not new, diabolical, or scientific. Insofar as one can trace their history, they are the result of

⁷ E.g., those of Biderman, Hinkle and Wolff, Lifton, and Schein, cited above.

trial and error within the hierarchy of the secret police and the Communist Party and have been developed empirically.

Given these considerations, it is difficult to see how Meerloo and Huxley can be so sure of the effectiveness of brainwashing and of their interpretation of it as a process based on hypnosis and Pavlovian psychology.⁸ The chief problem with the hypnotic interpretation is that the relationship between hypnotist and subject is to a large degree a voluntary one, whereas the coercive element in coercive persuasion is paramount (forcing the individual into a situation in which he must, in order to survive physically and psychologically, expose himself to persuasive attempts). A second problem is that as yet we do not have an adequate theoretical explanation for the effects seen under hypnosis, and hence there is little to be gained by using it as an explanatory concept. Third, and most important, all hypnotic situations that I know of involve the deliberate creation of a state resembling sleep or dissociation. The essence of coercive persuasion, on the other hand, is to produce ideological and behavioral changes in a fully conscious, mentally intact individual.

The assumption that coercive persuasion is an application of Pavlovian psychology is also of questionable value and probably incorrect. It rests on a chain of circumstantial evidence: Pavlov was a Soviet scientist; the Soviet government at one time or another supported his work; conditioning is a process of making someone do something involuntarily;⁹ Pavlov believed his theory to be applicable to humans and to the higher nervous functions like speech (the "second signal system"); Pavlov used fatigue and other stressors to produce experimental neuroses in dogs; experimental neuroses often involve a reversal of feeling—objects previously liked become disliked and vice versa—and

⁸ On p. 91 Meerloo states, "As soon as the brainwashee returns to a free democratic atmosphere, the hypnotic spell is broken." This statement would make one assume that Meerloo too doubts whether this process is very effective, but the bulk of his book puts emphasis on mental changes which are implied to be highly significant and lasting.

It is, of course, difficult to assess whether coercive persuasion, or Communist indoctrination generally, even has a lasting effect on the "private" beliefs of individuals who remain in a society in which public compliance is routinely enforced. Katkov, in an unpublished paper, suggests that the beliefs and attitudes inculcated in the Soviet citizen, for example, play a superficial role in his total personality, making possible changes which are as lasting as they need to be in terms of external pressures, without destroying the integrity of deeper layers of the personality. Implied in this point is the argument that statements like "I believe in communism," "I believe myself to have been guilty of crimes against the people," cannot be evaluated without knowing what function such beliefs play in the personality of the speaker.

⁹ It is, however, not often enough pointed out that it is usually responses which are involuntary in the first place, like salivation or eyelid blinking, which are the most conditionable by the Pavlovian method.

so on. From points like these is drawn the conclusion that a Soviet corps of scientists have collaborated to evolve an irresistible tool for mental destruction.

There is, however, no sound evidence for this position and there is considerable evidence to the contrary. The much-cited discovery that the Russians succeeded in conducting human-conditioning experiments overlooks completely that American psychology has for decades pursued the same lines with limited success on the higher psychological functions, and without thereby implying that man can now be "tamed." American psychologists coming into contact with Soviet psychologists in the last few years report that Pavlovian theory and experimentation have indeed developed, but not as much in the direction of the "second signal system" (language and speech) as toward the exploration of the conditionability of internal organ systems, with far greater relevance for medicine than for "political conditioning." At the same time, Soviet psychology has developed along lines very similar to our own, except that political pressures have often necessitated the clothing of non-Pavlovian experiments in Pavlovian terminology and format. Interestingly enough, one of the fields of psychology which is underdeveloped in Russia is social psychology, which would ordinarily include the study of social influence, attitude change, indoctrination, and so forth.¹⁰

Tucker has recently shown how the Pavlovian revival and the statements that Pavlovian techniques had wide applicability were a response within Soviet psychology to direct political pressures from Stalin.¹¹ Following the death of Stalin there was apparently a considerable waning of enthusiasm for Pavlov.

Statements by defectors who had intimate acquaintance with Soviet secret police methods are uniformly negative on any connection with psychology, psychiatry, or Pavlov.¹² Instead, they affirm that whatever rationalized methodology exists in the Soviet Union for indoctrination and the extraction of confession was derived from experience within the party and the police hierarchy itself. Bauer, too, who is closely acquainted with psychological developments in the Soviet Union and the manner in which they fit into the broader social context, has recently

¹⁰ A. Mintz, "Recent Developments in Psychology in the USSR," in *Annual Review of Psychology*, Palo Alto, Calif., 1958.

¹¹ R. C. Tucker, "Stalin and the Uses of Psychology," *World Politics*, VIII, No. 4 (July 1956), pp. 455-83.

¹² R. Beck and W. Godin, *Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession*, London, 1951; Hinkle and Wolff, *op.cit.*; Lifton, "Thought Reform' . . .," *op.cit.*

directed himself to the question of the Pavlovian origins of brainwashing and finds no evidence of any connection.¹³

In any case, it is difficult to see how the complex set of procedures involved in coercive persuasion could have been derived from or fitted to a Pavlovian model. It is true that the prisoner is fatigued and debilitated, and that political stimuli are hammered at him day and night, but these factors are by no means the core of the process. If such a core is to be found, I suspect that one would come closer in singling out the relationship which sometimes forms between the prisoner and his interrogator or the prisoner and his cell mates. In the context of this relationship, unconscious guilt may be stimulated or reinforced, as Meerloo himself points out. He shows very cogently how such guilt can eventually lead to a "confession compulsion,"¹⁴ and can then be transferred to a series of political crimes which come to be accepted in order to avoid facing the unacceptable impulses toward the parents which usually aroused the guilt in the first place.¹⁵ On the other hand, there is little in Pavlov which tells us how guilt and the human psychological defenses operate.

The first step in countering any alien force is to understand its nature clearly, and the dogmatic attribution of this complex social process to Pavlovian psychology does a disservice both to the understanding of the process and to those Pavlovian psychologists in the Soviet Union and in the United States who are attempting to work out carefully the implications of the model and methodology that Pavlov formulated.

III

Following their discussion of brainwashing and thought control in totalitarian society, both Huxley and Meerloo discuss the various "unobtrusive" devices for thought control which are emerging in our own society. Here again I think they strongly overstate the case. Certainly, good clean-cut evidence of the effectiveness of motivation research, subliminal stimulation, drugs, sleep-teaching, etc., is not yet available.

Particularly overstated is the role of the mass media. Both authors imply that our complex society can be represented as a mass of individuals, each tied to some central communicator by the mass media.

¹³ R. A. Bauer, "Brainwashing: Psychology or Demonology?" *Journal of Social Issues*, XIII (1957), pp. 41-47.

¹⁴ Cf. J. C. Moloney, "Psychic Self-Abandon and Extortion of Confession," *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, xxxvi (1955), pp. 53-60.

¹⁵ An excellent detailed description of this whole process can be found in Meerloo, pp. 75-90, and in Lifton, "Thought Reform' . . .," *op.cit.*

Neither author mentions the problems encountered by the mass communicator in defining his audience, identifying the opinion leaders, finding an appeal which will be meaningful to more than one kind of audience, and so on.

Meerloo justifies his fear that the citizen is in danger of becoming robotized by maintaining that each of us to a degree *wants* to become robotized, dependent, and irresponsible. Basing his points on a variety of clinical observations, he notes that treason and disloyalty ultimately have their roots in our ego-alien motives and impulses, which stem from childhood conflicts and make us ambivalent toward even our most cherished values, groups, and leaders. It is in the patterns of identification with, and integration into, various groups and parts of society that each of us finds the defenses with which to cope with such conflicts. When man fails to find an adequate level of personal and social integration, his inner impulses to betray that which he loves, to regress to a childhood level of expressing hostility toward his parents, are much more ready to express themselves. As Meerloo puts it, "Men yield primarily because at some point they are overwhelmed by their unconscious conflicts. . . . Men withstand pressure when these conflicts cannot be so easily aroused or have been inwardly overcome" (p. 279). From this statement flows what Meerloo regards as the essence of the capacity to resist menticide—psychological maturity and adequate social integration into a mature group. He acknowledges the importance of education and training—particularly, the provision of maximum information concerning the nature of menticide and those forces which have been used to produce it—but he deplors those educational methods which by their authoritarian and dogmatic approach fail to be consistent with the development of individual maturity. The man who has faith in himself and others, who understands what he is facing and has a strong sense of belonging, can resist brainwashing.

IV

What one misses most in these two social commentaries is a sense of balance or perspective. In their analysis of what is happening to modern society there is no ray of hope, no silver lining, no mention of constructive forces. In their discussion of weapons against the mind one finds only exaggeration—both of the potency of the weapon and of the weakness of the individual against whom it may be used. Yet it is clear that one could, if one adopted a positive frame of reference, discover a good many constructive trends in the very social forces or institutions that Meerloo and Huxley attack. For example, the increasingly technologi-

cal character of industry has forced centralization but has also forced a general upgrading of work, requiring higher levels of education and greater intellectual involvement of the worker with his job; the mass media, particularly television, have made available a large amount of valuable information and knowledge to audiences that never before have had access to it; studies of the effects of totalitarian indoctrination or of weapons of influence like drugs have revealed (far more clearly than they have revealed his vulnerabilities) the tremendous resistance of the individual to intrusion by beliefs and values not consistent with his own; and so on.

In their recommendations as to what is to be done about the deplorable state of affairs that they describe, Huxley and Meerloo are very general and programmatic. "Have better education," "Rear children to be more mature adults," "Pass legislation to prevent mental intrusion," "Improve birth control methods and methods of conservation," "Rehumanize urban life," and so forth. I am sure one can agree wholeheartedly with these suggestions, as one always could, but the authors do not tell us where in our society we are to seek the positive motivating force and the institutions to which to attach such programs.

The intention of Meerloo and Huxley was to delineate a range of phenomena which they felt needed attention and analysis. Unfortunately, too often the analysis becomes mere self-criticism. Self-criticism is an important revitalizing function in any individual, group, or society. But self-criticism based on exaggeration and overstatement in areas which are at best controversial can do as much to create the very conditions of fear and apathy which these authors deplore as those forces which they cite as causally significant. In the rash of books and articles which have been published in the last few years condemning American society and character lies perhaps the most interesting phenomenon of all. Many of these works have posed difficult problems for some of our educators—e.g., for the military training officer who is attempting to instill pride and group spirit in recruits who have been publicly condemned as being morally poor material to start with. It is perhaps time for the social scientist to shift his focus from the weaknesses in our society to the reasons why self-criticism is currently so popular in certain segments of our society.