Two Sword Lengths: Losers’ Consent and Violence in National Legislatures

Christopher Gandrud

Yonsei University

Paper







Paper available at SSRN

Outline

What is legislative violence?








Physical fights between legislators in national legislative chambers.

Examples of Legislative Violence (1)


Turkish Fighting
From The Guardian

Examples of Legislative Violence (2)


Ukrainian Fighting
From The Guardian

Examples of Legislative Violence (3)


South Korean Fighting
From The Guardian

Where Does Legislative Violence Occur?

Legislative Violence (1981-Winter 2011)


Data collected by author.

Widespread







Country-Years With & Without Violence


So . . .







Legislative violence is more common in:

Why should we care?



Violence & Losing

What might predict violence in legislatures?


Violence & Winner/Loser Gaps


Building on the losers’ consent and consensual institutions literatures, I argue that:



Legislative violence is more likely when the gaps between winners and losers are bigger.

Violence & Winner/Loser Gaps


Building on the losers’ consent and consensual institutions literatures, I argue that:



Legislative violence is more likely when the gaps between winners and losers are bigger.

Bigger gaps make losing more painful and winners’ decisions more difficult to consent to.

Winner/Loser Gaps (1)


Experience in the other position under the current rules of the game:

Winner/Loser Gaps (1)


Experience Gap

Experience Gap

Winner/Loser Gaps (2)


Representation

Winner/Loser Gaps (2)


Representation Gap

Representation Gap

Winner/Loser Gaps (3)

Preferences & Power

Winner/Loser Gaps (3)

Preferences & Power

Winner/Loser Gaps (2)


Representation Gap

Representation Gap





\(N = \mathrm{New\:Policy}\)
\(SQ = \mathrm{Status\:Quo\:Policy}\)

Framework



Predicted Probability of Legislative Violence

New Democracy Old Democracy
Majoritarian Likely Unlikely
South Korea United Kingdom
Consensual Unlikely Unlikely
South Africa Sweden

Empirical Model


Rare Logistic Regression (1)


Rare Logistic Regression (2)


Independent Variables


Variable Source
Age of Democracy Marshall and Jaggers (2009)
Disproportionality Gallagher (2012) &
Carey and Hix (2011)
Majority Beck et al. (2001)
Gov. Fractionalization Beck et al. (2001)
Trust World Values Survey
Association (2009)
Immunity Fish and Kroening (2009)



For the full list of variables included in the analysis see the Base Variable Summary table in the paper’s Appendix.

Main Results: Culture & Hard Rules




Main Results: Age of Democracy


Main Results: Disproportionality (1)


Main Results: Disproportionality (2)


Main Results: Government Majority


Conclusions: Framework Compared to Empirical Observations


Conclusions