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Fundamental Elements of Oriental Philosophy

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Introduction

This study book is primarily for students of the *Philosophy* programme taking the course "Fundamental Elements of Oriental Philosophy" and for students of the *East Asian Cultures and Languages* programme at Vytautas Magnus University. However, it can be useful for teachers of gymnasiums and higher education institutions, as well as for anyone willing to get acquainted with several major religious and philosophical traditions of the East. It is a general-purpose introductory teaching aid not claiming to be the in-depth philosophical analysis. It aims at awakening interest in Oriental traditions, getting acquainted with essential features and concepts of their history, and at encouraging further deepening into a selected specific tradition or school of Oriental philosophy. The main aspects of teaching and learning of Oriental philosophy are discussed in Chapter 1.

When getting acquainted with Oriental philosophical traditions, it should be remembered that in the East, unlike in Europe, philosophy has never been a purely theoretical discipline, separate from religion. As a matter of fact, what is said by philosophy is always directed towards a religious goal. In no way Oriental wisdom is based on intuition alone, though there is also no such rational prominence typical to the West. Since the ultimate goal of thinking is the relationship with the Supreme Being, it is impossible to dispense here with intuition, though the cognitive process is not based on intuition alone. Intellect deals with theory, and intuition confirms this theory in practice.

In Oriental traditions, philosophy, religion, and daily life dimensions are interwoven. For example, in Indian traditions, according to A. Beinorius, "the doctrinal level determines the direction of yoga psychotechnics, and transformation experience of yoga meditation provides material for philosophical reflection, though only specific individual practice gives both […] the value and addressee for the set of theoretical reflections and conclusions."[1]

1. Beinorius A. *Sąmonė klasikinėje Indijos filosofijoje* (Consciousness in Classical Indian Philosophy). – Vilnius: Kultūros, filosofijos ir meno institutas (Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute). 2002. P. 43.

The concept of the Orient in this book outlines main traditions coming from India and China – Confucianism, Daoism[2], Hinduism, and Buddhism, – with better reflection of the philosophical dimension than, for example, in Shintoism or Zoroastrianism, and which have had a great impact on the Western culture since ancient times. Another important and influential tradition – Islam – is left out deliberately, as it is worth individual broader studies beyond the scope and nature of this text. All traditions are discussed in brief with the most emphasis put on their origins and first teachers, and modern forms and schools of these traditions are discussed during lectures and seminars.

With regard to the sources of Oriental philosophy, many difficulties are caused by the diversity of translations of the main texts, and the language barrier prevents both students and teachers from reading texts in the original language. This book contains numerous quotations from ancient writings, e. g. *Dàodéjīng*, *Lún Yǔ*, Vedas or Sutras, allowing the reader to feel non-retold ancient wisdom, though subject to the translator's interpretation.

Chapters conclude with test questions pointing out the most important things, encouraging the reader to compare one tradition with another and a short list of recommended literature, specifying books and articles which are the most important and most easily accessible in Lithuania.

For each Westerner, Oriental philosophy is a more or less alien area, as no one can avoid the influence of his/her own culture and completely isolate himself/herself from it. When getting deeper into Oriental traditions, we, first of all, meet the Other – culture and mindset alien to us. Problems of the I-Other relationship in the con-

2. Nowadays two systems of transcription of Chinese hieroglifs are used. The older Wade-Giles system is more popular in the USA and Taiwan. According to this system, the following romanised concepts are used: *Tao, Taoism, Chuang Tzu*. The modern *Hanyu Pinyin* (or *Pinyin*) system, although created for the Chinese, is becoming more popular around the world. According to this system, the following romanised concepts are used: *Dao, Daoism, Zhuangzi*. The *Hanyu Pinyin* system will be used in this book, except for quotations and the article by Jesse Fleming presented in the annex. When using a name or a concept for the first time, the Wade-Giles transcription will be provided in the brackets.

text of East–West interaction is perfectly illustrated in the text "From Orientalism to Occidentalism" by Hassan Hanafi, a philosophy professor at Cairo University. The article "Comparative Philosophy: Its Aims and Methods" by Jesse Fleming, another professor of philosophy and comparative studies, shows that the comparative analysis is a necessary tool in studies of Oriental philosophy. It also often becomes the basis of studies. As seeking to understand the Other, we are constantly (sometimes unconsciously) looking for equivalents of concepts, features, and ideals in our environment, in already read texts and theories of Western philosophers. However, no matter how much deep we go into Oriental cultures, religions, and philosophical traditions, Oriental civilizations remain a mystery luring by their inexhaustible wealth, and their studies become a challenge for every critical mind.

1. Teaching and Learning Peculiarities of Oriental Philosophy

With the world becoming "smaller" through globalization, studies of Oriental philosophy in the West are gradually turning into an ordinary or even necessary element of university education. A question arises at the same time as to whether access to information, diversity of text translations, and general interest in Oriental cultures are actually contributing to the quality of studies of Oriental philosophy. Is the global cultural convergence not merely an illusion created by the media? It can also be questioned as to whether distinction between the East and the West is artificial; whether there is sufficient basis for assigning of generalizing Eastern and Western features to different cultures and thinking traditions. It can be argued that every country and every specific higher education institution has a distinctive educational vision and system, though it is difficult to deny that the distinction between the East and the West exists in people's minds and affects the study process as well. Furthermore, world-wide research shows the influence of a cultural tradition on specific fields of human life and activities, including teaching and learning.

Research performed by Hassan Aminuddin and his colleagues revealed that the fundamental difference in the Eastern and Western educational systems is not disciplines which are given the most emphasis, but rather concepts of the learning process[3]. According to Aminuddin, passive learning and memory are emphasized in the East (in the most general sense). This most likely comes from the traditional practice of studying religious texts – learning scriptures by heart and refraining from comments by students. By contrast, innovations are constantly sought and students are encouraged to interpret old ideas in most original ways and to experiment in the West. The

3. Aminuddin, H., Nur Syuhada, J., Tajularipin, S., Roselan B. Western and Eastern Educational Philosophies. [Paper presented at the conference "Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia" held at Murdoch University 2010] // http://upm.academia.edu/RoselanBaki/Papers/587165/Western_and_Eastern_Educational_Philosophies; accessed on 20-01-2012.

teacher–student relationship also differs correspondingly: in the East, a teacher is almost the absolute authority transferring knowledge; in the West, a teacher tries to be a friend helping to reveal student's abilities and encouraging his/her individual intellectual development[4].

When looking at philosophy studies in Lithuania, one can easily notice these Western features and problems arising from the prominence given to innovation and originality. Students often begin to think that anything new is better than anything old simply due to its novelty. Splashes of innovative ideas, with devaluation of the continuous learning process and lack of ability for the systematic and complete development of research, remain only on the level of initial unjustified hypotheses. Consistent work with texts and their commentaries and the broader cognition of the cultural and historical context are especially important when speaking about studies of philosophy formed on the basis of a culture alien to that of our own.

Subjective and objective aspects of teaching and learning of Oriental philosophy in the West can be noticed and it is worth recalling the division between the philosopher and the scholar of philosophy highlighted by Antanas Maceina. According to Maceina, the philosopher creates his/her own interpretation of existence and being, and the scholar of philosophy researches interpretations of philosophers, but he/she does not basically create anything[5]. It is not the matter of any assessment as to who is better or more important for studies of Oriental culture and philosophy. However, such a conceptual separation encourages every teacher or learner of Oriental philosophy to ask himself/herself what we seek for by researching one or another aspect of a tradition alien to us. Who do we consider ourselves to be and who do we want to be – scholars of philosophy or philosophers?

Wu Kuang-ming, a professor of comparative studies of culture and philosophy, criticizes modern Sinologists for the lack of self-reflection and self-criticism. According to him, today's Sinologists "speak Chinese using the Western syntax" or, in other words, use the Chinese language to create a Western slang. They use Chi-

4. Ibid.
5. Maceina, A. Filosofijos keliu (On the Way of Philosophy) // *Aidai*. 1978, No. 9. P. 391–396. // http://www.aidai.us; accessed on 05-02-2012.

nese philosophy as data for the development of their own Western philosophy and/or to respond to their Western questions. Thus, *Yijing* text is attributed the "mathematical structure", Laozi and Zhuang Zi become "metaphysicians", and the School of Names is told to have undertaken the "logical analysis"[6]. Thereby, the image of Chinese thinking tradition is totally distorted by convincing readers that ancient Chinese sages were concerned about abstract morality, logics, language theory, meta-level of wisdom, etc. According to Wu Kuang-ming, there is nothing wrong about creating such distinctive philosophy, though it should not be called "Chinese philosophy" as, in his opinion, objective research of the Chinese culture or philosophy is not possible at all.

In that case, what scientists, teachers and students of Western countries are engaged in? After all, when we turn towards Oriental philosophy in the academic environment, we are trying to look *objectively* in the first place. The objective aspect of any culture or thinking tradition is texts, history of personalities and countries, works of art, etc. This is what we research trying to understand one or another tradition by looking from the side – still from a very far distance. Furthermore – by looking from so far, we often have universalistic claims.

When I think I am *objective* towards, for example, Daoism, I already assume that this is not just *my* view. Objectivity in this case means that *anyone* looking will see what I see. Unfortunately, it is often forgotten that every person sees in his/her own way depending on his/her culture, education, and beliefs. The obviousness of a fact and a statement about the fact is not things consistently following one from another. Objectivity is possible only integrally with subjectivity as opposition to it. However, whereas attempts are made to become isolated from and to forget subjectivity and, therefore, to become scientifically objective, subjectivity does not disappear, it merely turns into unconscious fundamental beliefs concerning the perception of the person himself/herself, Oriental and Western culture and the world in general.

6. Wu, Kuang-ming. Let Chinese Thinking Be Chinese, not Western: Sine Qua Non to Globalization // *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy*. 2010. Vol. 9 (2). P. 195.

Kirkland Russell, one of the most prominent modern Sinologists, states in a quite categorical way that "our ability to understand other cultures – or even our own culture – is tied to our ability to recognize our own prejudices"[7]. We decide what is real and what is not, even what is worth our attention based on unconscious assumptions mostly. Therefore, according to Russell, we first have to realize them, so that intellectual and religious values of our own culture would not destroy our efforts to discern meaning in another culture[8].

It can be noticed that non-realization of own prejudices determines not only interpretations of specific aspects of one or another tradition, but generalizing statements as well. Some philosophers and scholars state that in the East, for example, in Daoism tradition, there is no "true *philosophy*", only religion[9]. But the question emerges as to what it means. After all, speaking and thinking take place within boundaries of the Western philosophical paradigm. On the one hand, such statements are true – the Chinese term "philosophy" (*zhé xué*) is relatively recent and artificial. However, even though conditionally, the same can be stated about the term "Daoism" or "Confucianism" as well as about the Western term "religion". All currently used terms are "new" in comparison with some texts interpreted using them.

By stating that there is no "true religion" in the East, only philosophy, some theologians also have in mind the Western concept of the systemic and organized religion. Therefore, an attempt to look "objectively" at Daoism or another thinking tradition alien to us becomes an attempt to transfer the own scientific paradigm to Oriental cultures. The name of "religious Daoism" (Hinduism, Islam, etc.) or "philosophical Daoism" (Hinduism, Islam, etc.) shows our own beliefs, intentions and interests, rather than reflects objectively existing dimensions of any Oriental tradition.

7. Russell, K. The Taoism of the Western Imagination and the Taoism of China: De-Colonializing the Exotic Teachings of the East // Paper presented at the University of Tennessee, 1997 20 October, Tennessee // http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/pres/TENN97.pdf; accessed on 15-10-2011.
8. Ibid.
9. Komjathy, L. *Cultivating Perfection: Mysticism and Self-transformation in Early Quanzhen Daoism*. – Leiden: Brill. 2007. P. 8–7.

Park O'Hyun, a professor of philosophy and religious studies from North Carolina, states that the so-called "objective" scientific approach and method is based on a biased preliminary assumption that the world itself is pure objectivity, therefore, the more objective our teaching will be, the closer to reality it will be. But, according to O'Hyun, we first have to ask ourselves the ontological question "Who am I?" All questions about the nature of *Dào* or Buddha without an answer to this question will remain abstract and unreal. Therefore, according to him, Buddhist or Daoist teaching or learning should begin with meditation to start with self-knowledge and what the essence and basis of these traditions are beyond any "isms"[10]. Another problematic topic is clearly revealed here – the relationship between theory and practice in studies of Oriental philosophy or, in other words, the significance of personal experience in understanding of any Oriental tradition.

In order to understand or at least to come closer to understanding of the main idea of a text on any Oriental philosophical tradition, we have not only to understand words in the text, but also to turn towards experience. Intentions of writing these texts are also worth remembering. Monks and ancient sages used to write texts not for the texts themselves, as an object of analytical studies for future generations. The texts had to lead people to experience in their everyday life. Therefore, in order to understand not only linguistic but also the profound meaningful text dimension, we must always remember what goes beyond text boundaries, i. e. experience.

The problem is that most modern people have no such experience. A person without similar experience, e. g. a student, has only texts. Furthermore, he/she can hardly expect to meet a teacher with such experience in the academic environment. However, this does not eliminate the importance of experience for understanding of ancient texts. A certain amount of experience can be reached by any student, as text reading can also become valuable experience (not only empirical or intellectual, but also spiritual). It depends more on the reader's attitude, and not on words which are read. Of course, the concept of "experi-

10. Park, O'Hyun. Moving Beyond the 'ism': A Critique of the Objective Approach to Teaching Buddhism // Victor Sogen Hori, Richard P. Hayes and J. Mark Shields (Eds.), *Teaching Buddhism in the West*. – New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 2002. P. 64.

ence" is one of those concepts which are differently understood in the East and the West, however, the belief that the reality can be cognized only by experiencing it is given much more emphasis in the East.

On the other hand, the one-sided emphasis on subjective experience would be the prominence given to another part of the subject – object division, which is also alien to Oriental philosophy and culture. In the West, subjectivity is most clearly shown in the *New Age* world outlook where personal experience is made absolute to the universal criterion of truth. The pursuit for pure experience ignoring or biasedly selecting practices, rites, text extracts of any tradition eliminates the possibility of the rightful assignment of such experience to that specific tradition. For example, experience of being engaged in *tài jí quán* or *yoga* practice, though without general knowledge about the Chinese or Indian culture and specific traditions, without compliance with general religious and philosophical principles and without an authoritative teacher, can hardly be called Daoist or Hindu experience. Correspondingly, drawing of generalizing conclusions based on such experience is unfounded.

What should we do? Should all Sinologists become Daoists, Confucians or Buddhists, and all investigators of Islam – Muslims? Should we speculatively rely on the concept of universal experience and look only for aspects connecting Oriental and Western traditions? Hardly. Bearing in mind what has already been said, we first should clearly understand our cultural and religious identity and reflect our fundamental beliefs. The second step would be the recognition of the Other otherness, without which the dialogue is impossible. The recognition of otherness would mean both the refusal of own imaginary superiority and listening, instead of categorical, though justified, statements. Cognition of Oriental traditions as well as teaching and learning of Oriental philosophy are possible by establishing contact with a culture alien to us, and not by trying to consume it or make use of it; as well as not by trying to merge by renouncing own cultural basis or imagining that it can be destroyed. Therefore, we remain, in a sense, in a closed though constantly revolving and evolving process: in order to cognize the other, we first have to cognize ourselves and establish a dialogue which changes both us and the other.

2. Confucianism

Confucianism is mostly distinguished by the direction towards this world; it does not look for salvation in eternity and puts the most emphasis on ethics and right, i. e. virtuous, life. Virtuous life per se implies activity, active formation of own features, therefore, learning and development are very important in Confucianism. The development, of course, requires guidelines which in the Confucian tradition are provided by history – glorious past events, wise tales, and ancient writings. Unlike any other tradition, Confucianism puts a lot of emphasis on political philosophy and ruling and obedience principles. Such main provisions make Confucianism essentially separated from other traditions discussed in this book. On the other hand, it must always be kept in mind that Confucianism from the very beginning was not formed and developed in isolation, but in "cohabitation" with Daoism and later – with Buddhism.

L. Po kaitė identifies three features of the Chinese culture which are important to consider in order to understand Confucianism and other traditions existing in China: 1) Holism. The entire world is the whole which remains despite changing parts. On the other hand, each part affects the whole. Holism is expressed by the concept *Dào* ("way") typical for the whole Chinese culture, *yīn* and *yáng* symbol and a phenomenon of different Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism traditions excellently existing in China along each other; 2) Practicality. This world's earthly life – long, healthy, giving birth to many offspring – is important in the Chinese culture. It is important not what happens after death, but what must be done now, how to behave to be happy; 3) Humanism. In Chinese cosmology, the universe consists of the Sky, the Earth and Man among them. It is Man who relates the Sky and the Earth, and the harmony of the universe mostly depends on him[11]. Of course, the concept of humanism is different in Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism.

11. Poškaitė L. Konfucianizmas (Confucianism) // *Religijų istorijos antologija*. III dalis. Konfucianizmas, daoizmas, šintoizmas (*Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 3. Confucianism, Daoism, Shintoism). – Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 12–19.

2. 1. Development of Confucianism

The name of Confucius (Kŏng Fūzĭ, K'ung Fu-tzu) stands for "the teacher Kong from the place Fu" (*Kong* – name, *Fu* – place, z*i* – teacher). It is believed that he was born around 552 BC in a noble family and died in 479 BC. After the early death of his father, the future philosopher led poor life, doing many different jobs. While being still very young, he became engaged in pedagogy and established the world's first private school of philosophy. Thus, Confucius, unlike many ancient philosophers, was the founder of a philosophical school (in the literal sense of the word). He later held senior government positions: he used to be a managing administrator of the capital, chief justice, and the first adviser to the ruler. He eventually refused all positions and spent 13 years travelling across China seeking practical implementation of ideals declared by him. Having returned to the homeland, until his death he devoted himself to the management of ancient writings.

Even though Confucius responded positively about worshiping gods only in terms of continuing traditions and was sceptical about faith in various spirits, after his death he was himself revered as a deity. After the teacher's death, his school was divided into eight directions and later underwent further division. Confucian philosophy was further formed by the followers of Confucius – Xunzi and Mengzi.

Mengzi (Meng tzu, Mencius; ~372–289 BC), a disciple of Confucius' grandson, faithfully continued ideas of Confucius. The most emphasis was put on ethics, aesthetics and public relations. According to him, a person is good, virtuous by nature.

Mengzi said, "… There is no human being lacking in the tendency to do good, just as there is no water lacking in the tendency to flow downward" (Mengzi 6A:2).[12]

All human beings have a mind that commiserates with others. […] one who lacks a mind that feels pity and compassion would not be human; […] The mind's feeling of pity and compassion is the beginning of humaneness (rén); the mind's feeling of shame and aversion is the beginning of rightness (yì); the mind's feeling of modesty and compli-

12. Bloom, Irene. Mencius // *Sources of East Asian Tradition* ed. by Theodore de Bary. New York: Columbia University Press. 2008. P. 87.

ance is the beginning of propriety; and the mind's sense of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom.

Human beings have these four beginnings just as they have four limbs. (*Mengzi* 2A: 6).[13]

According to Mengzi, any malice appears under external forces and due to the fact that a person forgets his/her nature. Thus, the path of both an ordinary person and a sage is to cherish his/her nature, and the highest knowledge is inborn, though forgotten by most people. Therefore, the path to harmony in the world starts with each person's look at himself/herself.

Mengzi said, "… When one has made one's own person correct, the rest of the world will follow" (*Mengzi* 4A: 4).[14]

Mengzi was the first in Chinese history to have opposed humane and despotic ruling in social and political philosophy. The most important role, according to him, must be given to people, and the ruler must only be its representative. This idea was also adopted by Xunzi. Mengzi was the first to have raised the issue of the problem relationship among human spirit, sensory nature and mind. Later, this issue became particularly relevant in Neo-Confucianism.

Xunzi (Hsun tzu; ~313–238 BC), considered to be an unorthodox follower of Confucius, held more liberal views. Xunzi's teaching was formed as criticism of Confucius' and Menzi's ideas; he was close to Daoism, as much emphasis was put on *Dào* laws valid in nature, rejected the concept of Heaven's will and stated that everything in the world happened with the spread of vital energy ***qì*** (*chi*)[15] through the

13. Ibid. P. 79–80.
14. Ibid. P. 84.
15. There is still not only no established commonly accepted translation of Confucian or Daoist concepts, but also no single transcription system, therefore, different writing of Chinese hieroglyphs using Latin characters can be found in different sources. In this book, writing of Confucian concepts relies on the transcription version provided in the book "Religijų istorijos antologijoje" (History of Religion in the Anthology) ("*Religijų istorijos antologija*. III dalis. Konfucianizmas, daoizmas, šintoizmas" [*Anthology of the History of Religion.* Part 3. Confucianism, Daoism, Shintoism], 2002), which is different from the one provided in earlier books (e. g. *"Konfucijus. Apmąstymai ir pašnekesiai" [Confucius. Reflections and Conversations]*, 1997). However, the latter transcription version is also included in the brackets to facilitate the identification of concepts and names in texts.

diversity of *yīn* and *yáng*. Unlike Mengzi, Xunzi believed that human nature is evil; therefore, the true path is not to cherish but to overcome nature. This belief was the main feature of Xunzi's unorthodoxy and alienated Xunzi's Confucianism from Daoism. Xunzi taught:

Human nature is evil; its goodness derives from conscious activity. […] therefore one must be transformed by the example of a teacher and guided by the way of ritual and rightness before one will attain modesty and yielding, accord with refinement and ritual, and return to order (*Xunzi*, 23).[16]

In the 2nd century BC, Confucius' teaching became the official ideology of China. Later, Confucianism was sometimes popular, sometimes unpopular, until receiving its Renaissance Neo-Confucianism form in the 10th century. Parts of Daoist and Buddhist doctrines were integrated into Confucian philosophy. This contributed to maintaining the religious and philosophical unity in China and also to making it easier to explain some philosophical and cosmological problems, e. g. the question of evil. Old concepts gained new meanings. According to A. Andrijauskas, the essential "difference between ideas of early Classical Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism (Li Ao, Han Yui, Chu Hsi, Kuo Hsi, Mi Fou, Su Chi, Wang Yan-Ming) is that ancient Confucians mostly commented on classic texts and emphasized the significance of "teaching directed towards oneself". […] Neo-Confucians forming the ideology of the Great Chinese Renaissance transform the introversive orientation of teaching by early Confucians into the new extroversive humane theory oriented to […] the society in general"[17].

Confucianism remained even after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), and the definition of ethics and loyalty, so important in early Confucianism, still has influence on the current Chinese society. Currently, there are 6 schools: Han Confucianism, Neo-

16. Bloom, Irene. Xunzi // *Sources of East Asian Tradition* ed. by Theodore de Bary. New York: Columbia University Press. 2008. P. 103.
17. Andrijauskas A. Konfucijus ir konfuanizmas (Confucius and Confucianism) // *Konfucijus. Apmąstymai ir pašnekesiai (Confucius. Reflections and Conversations)* [*Lún Yǔ*]. Translated by Z. Mažeikaitė. – Vilnius: Pradai. 1997. P. 50.

Confucianism, Modern Neo-Confucianism, Korean, Japanese and Singaporean schools.

2. 2. Most Important Texts

Wisdom of the past was extremely important for Confucius, therefore, the whole Confucianism is heavily influenced by ancient writings: *Yì Jīng* (*I ching*) – "The Great Book of Changes", *Shī jīng* (*Shih ching*) – "The Book of Songs" or "The Book of Odes", *Shū jīng* (*Shu ching*) – "The Book of History", *Lǐ jì* (*Li chi*) – "The Record of Rites". Confucius, like most ancient sages, did not leave any texts of his own. His ideas were written down by disciples in the 5th–3rd centuries. BC. The West got acquainted with Confucius' philosophy only in the 17th century when his texts were translated by Jesuit monks. The main treatise of Confucianism – *Lún Yǔ* – is usually translated as "The Analects of Confucius". These are ideas of Confucius and his disciples written down by followers. Along with *Lún Yǔ*, important treatises are *Mengzi* (*Meng tzu*) and *Xunzi* (*Hsun tzu*) – writings of two main disciples of Confucius. *Dà Xué* (*Ta-Hsueh*) – "The Great Learning" and *Zhōng Yōng* – "The Doctrine of the Mean", as well as numerous commentaries of ancient writings continued teaching of Confucius and his closest disciples and facilitated the formation of Neo-Confucianism.

2. 3. Key Concepts[18]

The main term is *Dào* (*Tao*) – "way", i. e. the right way, the way of virtue. This term is met in all religions of China. Man and the whole world are an integral part of *Dào*, as *Dào* is the world's first principle, the harmony of *yīn* (feminine nature, tenderness, permanence) and *yáng* (masculinity, hardness, dynamics). However, Confucius emphasized *Dào* as right behaviour in which virtue is the most important thing, i. e. human activity, observance of customs.

18. Most concepts changed during the development of Confucianism, though they were not rejected or replaced with new ones, but merely acquired new additional meanings. Since this book presents only a brief overview of several traditions, the main concepts of Confucianism are discussed on the basis of earliest texts.

The superior man bends his attention to what is radical. That being established, all practical courses naturally grow uP. Filial piety and fraternal submission! – are they not the root of all benevolent actions? (*Lún Yŭ*, 1. 2).[19]

The Master said, "Shen, my doctrine [Dào] is that of an all-pervading unity." The disciple Zeng replied, "Yes." The Master went out, and the other disciples asked, saying, "What do his words mean?" Zeng said, "The doctrine [Dào] of our master is to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others, this and nothing more." (*Lún Yŭ*, 4. 15).

Heaven in Confucian philosophy takes the place of the main deity. It is neither an impersonal principle of the universe as *Dào*, nor an anthropomorphized god. Heaven (concepts of the "Will of Heaven", the "Heavenly Order" and "Heavenly Destiny" are used more frequently) is the principle supporting morality and ethical order, the force controlling the whole universe – conscious, creative and determining earthly good or lack thereof. Therefore, rulers were associated with Heavenly functions for a long time: only the ruler can communicate with Heaven; Heaven blesses the ruler considering his virtues. According to Confucius, a noble man feels awe towards the Will of Heaven (*Lún Yŭ*, 16. 8). And Xunzi opposed the glorification of Heaven saying:

Are order and chaos determined by Heaven? I say, the sun and moon, the stars and constellations revolved in the same way in the time of Yu and in the time of Jie. Yu achieved order thereby; Jie brought disorder. Order and chaos are not determined by Heaven. […] if you set aside what belongs to the human and contemplate what belongs to Heaven, you miss the genuine realities of all things (*Xunzi*, 17).[20]

Despite such Xunzi's belief, the concept of Heaven in Confucianism continued to be associated with the highest power in the universe.

19. All *Lún Yŭ* quotes are from the translation of James Legge. Legge, James. The Analects // *Chinese Text Project*. Editor: Donald Sturgeon. Retrieved from: http://ctext.org
20. Bloom, Irene. Xunzi // *Sources of East Asian Tradition* ed. by Theodore de Bary. New York: Columbia University Press. 2008. P. 100–101.

Dé – virtue, an example of virtuous behaviour, moral grace, morality, and the power to behave properly. It is opposed by the force, compulsion. According to L. Poškaitė, "in Daoism, which is oriented more towards understanding of the ontological world, *dé* primarily stood for the materialistic spread of the power, self-concretization, implementation or emanation of *Dào* creating being, involving into the flow of changes and returning (to call again for being) into wombs of being (origins), and in Confucianism, elevating ethical and humanistic values, *dé* primarily becomes the spreader of most noble moral qualities, i. e. of good"[21].

Confucianism has five main virtues: *rén* (humaneness), *yì* (justice), *lǐ* (rites, their observance), *zhī* (knowledge), *xìn* (sincerity/integrity). Just like with *dé* concept, specific meanings of concepts indicating virtues and moral values are revealed only in a specific context, i. e. in practice. If a person cherishes virtues inside himself/herself, but does not reflect them in his/her actions and words, these are not true virtues.

Ji Zi Cheng said, "In a superior man it is only the substantial qualities which are wanted; why should we seek for ornamental accomplishments?" Zi Gong said, "Alas! […] Ornament is as substance; substance is as ornament. The hide of a tiger or a leopard stripped of its hair, is like the hide of a dog or a goat stripped of its hair." (*Lún Yǔ*, 12.8)

The essence is manifested only through the form; therefore, we would not be able to recognize the essence without the form, and we would not be able to recognize a noble man without words and deeds. Abstract reasoning did not seem as valuable for Confucius as the practical human activity; therefore, he mostly focused on the person and society, and not on issues of being. He believed that people who are constantly developing themselves will create a harmonious society and this will become an image of cosmic harmony.

Rén (*jen*) – humaneness, kindness, benevolence, and love of neighbour. It is the main virtue and the basis for all other virtues. The idea of humaneness is most precisely and succinctly expressed by Confucius' "golden rule":

21. Poškaitė L. Konfucianizmas (Confucianism) // *Religijų istorijos antologija*. III dalis. Konfucianizmas, daoizmas, šintoizmas (*Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 3. Confucianism, Daoism, Shintoism). – Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 58.

Zi Gong asked, saying, "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" The Master said, "Is not RECIPROCITY such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." (*Lún Yǔ*, 15. 24).

However, what was the specific meaning of virtuous behaviour for Confucius?

Zi Zhang asked Confucius about perfect virtue. Confucius said, "To be able to practice five things everywhere under heaven constitutes perfect virtue." He begged to ask what they were, and was told, "Gravity, generosity of soul, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness. If you are grave, you will not be treated with disrespect. If you are generous, you will win all. If you are sincere, people will repose trust in you. If you are earnest, you will accomplish much. If you are kind, this will enable you to employ the services of others." (*Lún Yǔ*, 17, 6).

Yan Yuan asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, "To subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him. Is the practice of perfect virtue from a man himself, or is it from others?" Yan Yuan said, "I beg to ask the steps of that process." The Master replied, "Look not at what is contrary to propriety; listen not to what is contrary to propriety; speak not what is contrary to propriety; make no movement which is contrary to propriety." (*Lún Yǔ*, 12. 1).

Such a concept of humaneness shows not only the status of this virtue as the basis for other virtues, but also emphasizes the already mentioned holism of Chinese thinking. Spiritual perfection achieved by one person can affect the entire humanity. Therefore, the development of virtues in oneself is not a selfish aspiration. On the contrary, the essence of morality is renunciation of selfishness, and this makes Confucianism closer to other Chinese traditions – Daoism and Buddhism. However, "decency", i. e. consistency with social values, customs, beliefs of people around, is given more emphasis in Confucianism.

Rén also stands both for humanity in the broad sense, which is the basis for all positive human features (*Lún Yǔ*, 3. 3), even the ability to like good and hate evil (*Lún Yǔ*, 4. 3), and for good relationships which are the most favourable soil for growing human wisdom (*Lún Yǔ*, 4. 1). Therefore, a sage is always filled with humaneness and kindness.

On the one hand, humaneness was always seen as the ideal feature possessed by the few only.

The Master said, "I have not seen a person who loved virtue, or one who hated what was not virtuous. He who loved virtue, would esteem nothing above it. He who hated what is not virtuous, would practice virtue in such a way that he would not allow anything that is not virtuous to approach his person. Is anyone able for one day to apply his strength to virtue? I have not seen the case in which his strength would be insufficient. Should there possibly be any such case, I have not seen it." (*Lún Yǔ, 4. 6*).

On the other hand, *rén* is not a superhuman virtue:

The Master said, "Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous, and lo! Virtue is at hand." (*Lún Yǔ, 7.* 30).

Xìn (*hsin*) – sincerity, integrity, being worth of trust, virtue, and honesty. In the Chinese mindset, the mind and rationality were never opposed to desires, emotions and feelings. This concept stood for the principle directing our actions towards the pursuit for true values, as well as towards the virtuous path and forming right relationships. Confucius and his followers can surely be considered rationalists, as they gave priority to the mind over feelings and passions. However, they did not rule out the importance of feelings, did not say that they are bad, and called for their control and guidance in the right direction. Harmony has to prevail everywhere between the mind and feelings. A person has to be harmonious from the inside, only then he/she will correspond to cosmic harmony.

Mengzi said, 'He who has exhausted all his mental constitution knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven. To preserve one's

mental constitution, and nourish one's nature, is the way to serve Heaven. When neither a premature death nor long life causes a man any double-mindedness, but he waits in the cultivation of his personal character for whatever issue; this is the way in which he establishes his Heaven-ordained being.' (*Mengzi,* 13. 1).[22]

Yì (*i*) – right behaviour, justice, morality, and duty to neighbour. Opposite to it is the concept of *lì*, whose hieroglyph stands for benefit, achievement, and advantage; this is not the proper motive of behaviour. As Confucius said, "*yì* is the principle of activity of a noble man (*jūnzǐ*). Meanwhile, the life of the mean man (*xiǎorén*) is based on *lì*" (*Lún Yǔ,* 4. 16). However, Confucius understood that most people aspire to welfare and power; therefore, he did not condemn them, but merely warned them about temptations hidden in them. Later, the aspiration for benefit received stricter evaluation from his followers.

Lǐ (a hieroglyph other than *lì* is written for benefit, achievements) – decency, dignity, and good manners. *Lǐ* also stands for the rite. Before Confucius, this word was used to refer to the religious rite, but Confucianism broadened the use of the term and it began to describe any rite. Ethical rites were more important for Confucius than religious ones. They had to help preserve the social stability and harmony, as Confucius believed that their basis is culture. This idea was adopted and developed by Confucius' disciples, especially by Xunzi, who emphasized that rites help to curb the vicious human nature.

The ancient kings hated chaos and therefore established rites and rightness in order to limit it, to nurture people's desires, and to give them a means of satisfaction. […] Rites have three roots. Heaven and Earth are the root of life, the ancestors are the root of the human species, and rulers and teachers are the root of order. […] Thus rites serve Heaven above and Earth below; they honor ancestors; they exalt rulers an teachers. (*Xunzi*, 19).[23]

22. *Mengzi*. Translated by James Legge // *Chinese Text Project*. Editor: Donald Sturgeon. Retrieved from: http://ctext.org
23. Bloom, Irene. Xunzi // *Sources of East Asian Tradition* ed. by Theodore de Bary. New York: Columbia University Press. 2008. P. 101.

Glorious past was the most important support for ethical Confucius' teaching. It was not historical facts that were important for Confucius, but ideas coming from the past and past achievements. Thus, he saw his goal not in the creation of a new theory, but in the transfer of best past traditions through the rite.

Zi Gong wished to do away with the offering of a sheep connected with the inauguration of the first day of each month. The Master said, "Ci, you love the sheep; I love the ceremony." (*Lún Yǔ,* 3. 17).

In the book by *Lún Yǔ*, the term *lǐ* has a much broader meaning than a mere rite. This term also refers to certain decent human behaviour in ordinary everyday situations. It is the proper language and proper behaviour corresponding to the age, sex and social status. Therefore, *lǐ* can stand for any *proper* behaviour.

The Master said, "Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of propriety, becomes rudeness." (*Lún Yǔ,* 8. 2).

In this sense, *lǐ* is directly related to *rén* – humanity. Humanity is the inner, essential human goodness, and virtuous behaviour, and observance of customs are the manifestation of humanity in the world.

Xiào – filial piety. One of the most valued virtues which had to be cherished in the whole society following the example of the ideal son–father relationshiP. Respect for parents and elders – both living and dead – was very important for Confucius, like respect for the past, most clearly reflected through rites. If a person does not respect his/her parents, does not obey them, departs from their path, such a person is unlikely to become honourable and noble.

Meng Yi asked what filial piety was. The Master said, "It is not being disobedient." […] Fan Chi said, "What did you mean?" The Master replied, "That parents, when alive, be served according to propriety; that, when

dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and that they should be sacrificed to according to propriety." (*Lún Yǔ*, 2. 5).

The Master said, "While a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years he does not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial." (*Lún Yǔ*, 1. 11).

Meng Wu asked what filial piety was. The Master said, "Parents are anxious lest their children should be sick." (*Lún Yǔ*, 2. 6; cf. *Lún Yǔ*, 4. 20).

Six versions of *xiào* are provided in Confucianism, which have to cover all areas of communication: father–son, husband–wife, elder brother–younger brother, ruler–subject, friend–friend, teacher–disciple. In the ruler–subjects relationship, *xiào* stood for what is now called loyalty. However, the concept of loyalty was equated with blind obedience during autocratic regimes in China. But *xiào* stood not for the one-sided obedience, but for the mutual relationship based on personal qualities. *Xiào* relationship is reflected, for example, in martial arts where there would be no teaching without obedience, and learning would be disastrous without caring.

Zhī – wisdom and knowledge. A peculiar hierarchy of knowledge levels remaining in Confucianism writings, which once again highlights the value of inborn knowledge.

Confucius said, "Those who are born with the possession of knowledge are the highest class of men. Those who learn, and so, readily, get possession of knowledge, are the next. Those who are dull and stupid, and yet compass the learning, are another class next to these. As to those who are dull and stupid and yet do not learn – they are the lowest of the people." (*Lún Yǔ*, 16. 9).

As in many other religions and philosophies, the true and supreme knowledge is not the simple acquisition or mastering of knowledge. This is why it is possible to achieve perfect wisdom, as it is impossible to know all things in life. Seeking the highest level of knowledge, a

person must first look at himself/herself and at his/her inborn knowledge rather than resort to wisdom of other people: "*When you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it – this is knowledge.*" (*Lún Yǔ,* 2. 17).

On the other hand, the true sage does not sink in his knowledge, does not think that this knowledge is enough for perfection, does not consider himself to be better than others and does not turn away from those with less knowledge:

"Gifted with ability, and yet putting questions to those who were not so; possessed of much, and yet putting questions to those possessed of little; having, as though he had not; full, and yet counting himself as empty" (*Lún Yǔ*, 8. 5).

It is believed that these words were said about Confucius; this is also confirmed by his own words: *"Am I indeed possessed of knowledge? I am not knowing"* (*Lún Yǔ*, 9. 8). Every person has something to learn from others. Learning in Confucian philosophy was the essence of any improvement, as without learning and development, even virtues can become wickedness or bring misfortune.

There is the love of being benevolent without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to a foolish simplicity. There is the love of knowing without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to dissipation of mind. There is the love of being sincere without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to an injurious disregard of consequences. There is the love of straightforwardness without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is the love of boldness without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to insubordination. There is the love of firmness without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to extravagant conduct. (*Lún Yǔ,* 17, 8).

Jūnzǐ *(chun-tzu*) – a noble man. The first meaning of the word *jūnzǐ* is "the son of the ruler", "prince", though in Confucianism *noble* does not necessarily stands for *highborn*. According to Confucius, nobility is determined not by the social status, origin and wealth, but by education and exceptional moral qualities. A noble man is the ideal

member of the society capable of honest performance of public duties, a civilized, humane, and spiritual aristocrat, as well as the ideal example for others.

An important feature of *jūnzǐ* is the correspondence between speaking and actions: *"He acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his actions."* (*Lún Yǔ,* 2. 13, cf. *Lún Yǔ,* 15. 18). This feature is peculiar not only to other spiritual ideals of the East, e. g. guru or bodhisattva, but also to the Western concept of a fair, honourable, and righteous person.

Although *jūnzǐ* certainly is a person who advanced far along the *Dào* path, he/she is, however, differentiated from ***shèngrén*** (*sheng-jen*) – a sage. A noble man is not yet a sage who the history speaks about, but he is on the path towards such being. *Shèngrén* is almost a divine being, an ancient ideal not available to modern people.

The Master said, "A sage it is not mine to see; could I see a man of real talent and virtue, that would satisfy me. […] A good man it is not mine to see; could I see a man possessed of constancy, that would satisfy me." (*Lún Yǔ,* 7. 26).

A noble man, in contrast to the ideal sage, is considered to be the real example to everyone here and now. He still makes mistakes, though he differs from other people by recognizing his mistakes and correcting them immediately (cf. *Lún Yǔ*, 1. 8).

Zi Gong said, "The faults of the superior man are like the eclipses of the sun and moon. He has his faults, and all men see them; he changes again, and all men look up to him." (*Lún Yǔ,* 19. 21).

A mean and poor man (***xiǎorén*** / *hsiao jen*) is indicated as the opposite to a noble man. This concept also does not indicate the social status, financial situation or physical properties. Poorness is generally understood as a moral category, and a mean person is discussed as the opposite to a noble one.

The Master said, "The superior man thinks of virtue; the small man thinks of comfort. The superior man thinks of the sanctions of law; the small man thinks of favors which he may receive." (*Lún Yǔ,* 4. 11).

The Master said, "The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain." (*Lún Yǔ,* 4. 16).

The Master said, "The superior man is satisfied and composed; the mean man is always full of distress." (*Lún Yǔ,* 7. 37).

Confucius said, "There are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven. He stands in awe of great men. He stands in awe of the words of sages. The mean man does not know the ordinances of Heaven, and consequently does not stand in awe of them. He is disrespectful to great men. He makes sport of the words of sages." (*Lún Yǔ,* 16. 8).

Therefore, a noble man behaves in the same way with everyone, similarly to the excellent yogi described in *Bahgavat-gīta* (cf. *Bahgavat-gītā*, 6. 9). However, a noble man is not everyone's humble servant (cf. *Lún Yǔ,* 2. 12). He is not a conformist, though not following the crowd, he remains harmonious and consistent with the whole (cf. *Lún Yǔ*, 13. 23). A noble man does not hide his dissatisfaction if moral norms are violated; *"He hates those who proclaim the evil of others. He hates the man who, being in a low station, slanders his superiors. He hates those who have valor merely, and are unobservant of propriety. He hates those who are forward and determined, and, at the same time, of contracted understanding."* (*Lún Yǔ,* 17. 24). Therefore, a noble man is the most suitable ruler and, on the contrary, it is noble men who have to rule.

Ji Kang asked Confucius about government, saying, "What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?" Confucius replied, "Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it." (*Lún Yǔ,* 12. 19).

According to Confucius, education and upbringing are the best tool of ruling. Therefore, the concept of *xiānrén* ("a talented man") is

sometimes used as a synonym for *jūnzǐ*. It is the talent – ability to develop and learn – make the ruler a personal example for subjects. State and public development must start with the human self-development. For him, politics was the same as ethics, therefore morality and personal responsibility had to be the main features of rulers. For harmony to prevail in politics and a society, everyone has to take their place and do their own business: *There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son*. (*Lún Yǔ*, 12. 11).

Test questions:

1. What are three features typical for the whole Chinese culture?
2. What is the relationship between *Dào* and *dé* in Confucianism?
3. Define the concept of virtuous behaviour in Confucianism.
4. What are the main differences between a noble man and a poor man?
5. How should each of the main virtues manifest itself in Confucius' concept of ideal ruling?

Recommended literature:

1. *The Analects*. Translated by James Legge // *Chinese Text Project*. Editor: Donald Sturgeon. Retrieved from: http://ctext.org
2. Bo Mou. *History of Chinese Philosophy*. Routledge, 2008.
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5. JeeLoo Liu. *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism*. Malden: Blackwell 2006.
6. Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee. *Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation*. State University of New York Press, 2007.
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3. Daoism

Daoism, along with Confucianism and Buddhism, is the most important tradition forming Chinese cultural, religious and philosophical life. One of the main features of Daoism is polymorphism, i. e. being made of many elements, fundamentals. Daoism is also attributed folk superstitions, ancient religious practices, various esoteric practices, psychophysical training practices, and the idea of the comprehensive and connecting Oneness. As a result, Daoism is often incorrectly interpreted when trying to discern its philosophical and religious parts, or – even worse – when trying to oppose those parts.

These traditions have existed since the very first Confucian and Daoist sages as the opposition, though not as struggling but as complementary forces. Confucianism put more emphasis on the social life, and Daoism accentuated the orientation of an individual to himself/herself; Confucianism valued ethics, Daoism – search for the deepest wisdom; it was important to have the ritualized and personal relationship with the highest being for Confucianism and Daoism, respectively; Confucianism makes the clear differentiation between good and bad, Daoism emphasizes the relation between positive and negative poles; Confucianism calls for changing yourself and the world, Daoism promotes inaction. However, Daoism, like Confucianism, was characterized by attention to a person, the spiritual self-development seeking the spiritual ideal, the orientation to a particular life, rather than to abstract reflections, and the overall perception of being.

3. 1. Development of Daoism

Traditionally, Laozi (Lǎozi, Lao Tzu, Lao Dze) and Zhuang Zi (Zhuāng Zǐ, Chuang Tzu, Zhuang Zhou) are considered to be the founders of Daoism, and treatises attributed to them – *Dàodéjīng* and *Zhuāngzǐ* – are considered to be the main sources of religious and philosophical ideas of Daoism. Even though there is no precise data, it is believed that Laozi lived in 585–500 BC. The origin of his name is subject to debates, it is usually translated as "Lao, the founder of the school"

correspondingly to Mengzi, Zhuangzi, Kongzi (i. e. Confucius). Laozi is known to have been a chronicler of the Zhou dynasty's library – "the guardian of the treasure house of books". Zhuang Zi probably lived later than Laozi – in 370–300 BC. Some researchers of Daoism (e. g. Sima Qian) believe that Laozi was a legendary person and only Zhuang Zi can be considered the historic founder of Daoism.

However, even though Laozi or Zhuang Zi can be considered founders of the Daoist tradition, they did not establish the philosophical school in the true sense of the word, as Confucius did. The word "school" here, as in case with many other ancient philosophical and religious traditions, should be understood as the succession in the conception of the world or the continuation of the main ideas, rather than the organized structure or the transfer of explicated theories. After all, both *Dàodéjīng* and *Zhuāngzǐ* call not for learning, but for listening, not for defining and explaining, but for feeling the unity and fullness of being.

Daoism did not have and does not have a religious system, doctrine or ecclesiastical institution. For a long time, the truths of Daoism have been passed on directly from the teacher to the disciple and have remained inaccessible to outsiders. Numerous sects (around 86) have been formed since the 2nd century, each following their own teacher. Daoism has perfectly integrated earlier folk superstitions and cults, and the pantheon of deities and immortals has never been clearly defined and has been constantly replenished with new objects of worshiP. Since the 2nd–3rd centuries, Laozi was seen as one of the main deities – the incarnation of *Dào* on earth. A belief of his constant incarnation into other teachers was formed later. However, there can be many such simultaneous incarnations in Daoism, unlike in Tibetan Buddhism with only one Dalai Lama at the same time.

The development of Daoism can be divided into two stages: 1) appearance, formation – until the 2nd century. Organized structured Daoist communities started to form only in the 2nd century. Therefore, Zhang Daoling (*Zhāng Líng*), the founder of the first such school *Tiān Shī Dào* or the "Way of the Celestial Masters", is officially considered to be the founder of Daoist religion; 2) development, maturity – from the 2nd century until now. Many smaller periods can be identified in the second stage, of which the most important one in the context of

this book is the 4th–6th centuries, when Buddhism came from India to China (according to the legend, Bodhidharma came to China in 526 and became the first patriarch of Chinese Buddhism).

Daoist teaching included not only philosophy and religious practice, but also martial arts, alchemy, various esoteric practices, and art, especially, landscape painting. Although very closed, Daoism has remained to this day as one of the most important Chinese ideologies, alongside with Confucianism and Buddhism. Currently, the largest school of Daoism is *Quán zhēn dào* (the "School of the Perfect Truth"), established as early as in the 12th–13th centuries. It is one of the schools which, under the influence of Buddhism, also started to promote the monastic way of life. Even though officially there is only around 1 per cent of Daoists in China as professors of this religion, Daoism had and still has a great influence on the formation of the "daily life" ideology, literature, and art, and sculptures of Laozi stand in temples next to Confucius and Buddha.

3. 2. Most Important Texts

The main treatise of Daoism is *Dàodéjīng* ("Book of Dao and Virtue" or "Book of the Way and Its Power"). It is traditionally attributed to Laozi, though in its current form it was written later, around the 4th–3rd centuries BC. The most emphasis here is put on cosmogony, i. e. the rise of everything from *Dào*. It constantly emphasizes emptiness and non-being – the "part" of the universe inseparable from being. Being and non-being are inseparable, and the whole is united and harmonious.

Another important treatise of Daoism is *Zhuāngzǐ*. The so-called "inner" chapters (Chapters 1–7) of this book, which are believed to be older than *Dàodéjīng,* are attributed to Zhuang Zi. Other, i. e. "outer" (8–22) and "miscellaneous" (23–33), chapters could be also influenced by other sources. The final version of the *Zhuāngzǐ* text was formed around 130 BC. *Zhuāngzǐ* emphasizes the ontological and gnoseological aspect of *Dào*. It especially criticizes speaking and discursive thinking as the way of conveying or achieving the truth. *Zhuāngzǐ* recommends to simply observe nature, the nature of yourself and the world, to accept in cold blood everything that happens, to reconcile yourself to the inevitability of death and to spontaneously enjoy rou-

tine. It is this treatise that strongly influenced Buddhism in China, especially, Chán (Zen in Japan) Buddhism direction.

All most important writings of Daoism were compiled into one set *Dào Zàng*, which was formed for almost 15 centuries and consists of more than 1,000 volumes (not texts!). Most texts are written in the esoteric language understood only by initiated disciples. Almost none of the texts have an author or date indicated; it is also not clear what was the procedure for writing canonical texts. Thus, the texts also reflect peculiarities of the tradition itself.

3. 3. Key Concepts

Daoist philosophy is distinguished by the nature other than that of the main ideologies of that time, including Confucianism. According to B. Watson, it is, as a matter of fact, mystical philosophy whose essence is not defined in any way. Other ideologies suggested to follow certain norms, to create a certain model of self or the world, and the main idea of Daoism was to get liberated from the world, first – from ideas which became clichés, what is good and what is bad, what is life and what is death (*Zhuāngzǐ*, 23)[24].

The key concept is ***Dào*** (the first meaning is "way"), which is common to the whole Chinese culture. However, only in Daoism this concept acquired a comprehensive nature and began to stand for eternal being, the basis of any being, and the eternal order of being. In Daoism, the concept of *Dào* was used in three ways. Two last meanings were used in Chinese philosophy for a long time. Only the first meaning was new and important and became the centre of the whole Daoist philosophy. Three forms of Daoism are distinguished in accordance with three meanings of *Dào*. However, these are not three separate schools, but the manifestation of Daoism in different environments. 1) Transcendent *Dào* as the source of everything

24. Watson B. Introduction // *Chuang Tzu. Basic Writings*. Transl. by Burton Watson. – New York: Columbia University Press. 1964. P. 4. *All Zhuāngzǐ* extracts included in this study book are the translation by B. Watson; the text includes the number of the chapter. Watson uses the *Wade-Giles* Latinization system for the Chinese language, though for the consistency and clarity of text in this study book, the *Wade-Giles* system has been changed to the *Hanyu pinyin* system for all *Zhuāngzǐ* quotations.

that exists in the Universe. This is the concept of *Dào* by Laozi and Zhuang Zi – the so-called "philosophical Daoism". 2) Immanent *Dào* as the law of nature and the world order. The so-called "life-supporting Daoism" aimed at releasing and increasing life energy *qì* (*chi*) by means of movement (exercises of martial arts, acupuncture and acupressure), matter (herbs, breathing) and consciousness (meditation on emptiness). 3) *Dào* as the human way of life in harmony with universe *Dào*; social norms, laws; sometimes this concept is translated according to its first meaning as "the way", but it also stands for the way of life and social order. In this field, Daoism is called "religious" as it is manifested in a more organized form through priests who have to help ordinary people to harmonize themselves and the environment and to understand principles of *Dào*.

Book *Dàodéjīng*, or *Laozi*, covering the main ideas of Laozi begins with the description of *Dào*, to be more precise, with the assurance that *Dào* is indescribable, imperceptible and unthinkable, and related to non-being in the same way as with being. *Dào* is described as the opposition to ordinary things which can be named or defined. And any description of *Dào i*s inexpressive.

The Dào that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Dào. The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name. (*Dàodéjīng*, 1)[25].

The Dào, considered as unchanging, has no name. Though in its primordial simplicity it may be small, the whole world dares not deal with (one embodying) it as a minister. […] As soon as it proceeds to action, it has a name. When it once has that name, (men) can know to rest in it. When they know to rest in it, they can be free from all risk of failure and error. (*Dàodéjīng*, 32)

Music and dainties will make the passing guest stop (for a time). But though the Dào as it comes from the mouth, seems insipid and has no

25. All *Dàodéjīng* quotations are from Legge, James. Dao De Jing // *Chinese Text Project*. Editor: Donald Sturgeon. Retrieved from: http://ctext.org. *Dàodéjīng* is one of the world's most frequently translated texts. For example, 112 different translations into the English language and numerous translations into other 25 languages are available at http://home.pages.at/onkellotus/TTK/_IndexTTK.html

flavour, though it seems not worth being looked at or listened to, the use of it is inexhaustible. (*Dàodéjīng*, 35).

Dào is the basis and source of everything, but not the spirit or deity. *Dào* precedes any deity. All are "great", though *Dào* is the first from which everything else appeared. On the other hand, *Dào* is not other-worldly, transcendent, related to the world only by the original creation. It is creative original energy – endless and inexhaustible. Therefore, *Dào* is usually described through negation by saying what it is not or by using various metaphors.

The Dào is (like) the emptiness of a vessel; and in our employment of it we must be on our guard against all fulness. How deep and unfathomable it is, as if it were the Honoured Ancestor of all things! […] How pure and still the Dào is, as if it would ever so continue! (*Dàodéjīng*, 4).

"It [Dào] is in the ant."
"As low a thing as that?"
"It is in the panic grass."
"But that's lower still!"
"It is in the tiles and shards."
"How can it be so low?"
"It is in the piss and shit!" (*Zhuāngzǐ,* 22).

Thus, *Dào* is understood as truly comprehensive; the equality of all things and phenomena is emphasized when looking from *Dào* perspective. On the other hand, *Dào* is not a polytheistically understandable deity, perceptible and fully manifested in every individual treatise. *Dào* is not the whole made of separate particles. It is solid harmonious, indivisible, self-sufficient original being (*Dàodéjīng*, 25). However, both opposites and multitude appear out of it ("a nugget decomposes into the uncountable multitude", *Dàodéjīng*, 28).

Dào is the basis for everything, including man, but this is why it cannot be cognized rationally or empirically. It cannot be understood as being separate from the world, but it cannot be found in manifestations of that being as well. An attempt to understand *Dào* is similar to shadow catching, as it is merely dust that hands can catch.

The Dào, when brightest seen, seems light to lack;
Who progress in it makes, seems drawing back;
Its even way is like a rugged track.
Loud is its sound, but never word it said;
A semblance great, the shadow of a shade.'
The Dào is hidden, and has no name; but it is the Dào which is skilful at imparting (to all things what they need) and making them complete (*Dàodéjīng,* 41).

The Way has its reality and its signs but is without action or form. You can hand it down but you cannot receive it; you can get it but you cannot see it. It is its own source, its own root. […] It was born before Heaven and Earth, and yet you cannot say it has been there for long; it is earlier than the earliest time, and yet you cannot call it old. (*Zhuāngzǐ,* 6).

Dé (*te*) – virtue, moral power. It is not a moral virtue, but rather similar to the healing power of herbs or certain practices concealed in their essence rather than in the outer form. It can be also interpreted as the power of goodness, though not as a separate human quality, but as the overall state of a person living in harmony with *Dào*. The term is the same as in Confucianism, however, as mentioned above, the Daoist *dé* is understood from a more ontological perspective. *Dào* is manifested through *dé*, i. e. through the power or virtue. Since *Dào* is the basis for the existence of all things and phenomena, every thing or phenomenon is also a form of its power.

Thus it is that the Dào produces (all things), nourishes them, brings them to their full growth, nurses them, completes them, matures them, maintains them, and overspreads them. It produces them and makes no claim to the possession of them; it carries them through their processes and does not vaunt its ability in doing so; it brings them to maturity and exercises no control over them; – this is called its mysterious operation (*Dàodéjīng,* 51).

Thus, virtue in Daoism stands not for volitional cherishing of certain qualities – *"The sage […] keeps his mind in a state of indifference to all"* (*Dàodéjīng,* 49), – but rather for the recognition of eternal *Dào* laws

in the environment and not disturbing them to spread. Laozi often compares a person filled with virtue with an infant – not detached from nature, ordinary and natural (cf. *Dàodéjīng*, 49, 55). Therefore, virtues of Confucianism – directed to the earthly life, good relationships, and proper ruling – are not valued in Daoism. On the contrary, such a concept of virtue is opposed to *Dào* and nature, as with *Dào* living among people and in people, there is no need to even talk about virtues – everyone already lives according to their principles.

When the Great Dào (Way or Method) ceased to be observed, benevolence and righteousness came into vogue. (Then) appeared wisdom and shrewdness, and there ensued great hypocrisy. When harmony no longer prevailed throughout the six kinships, filial sons found their manifestation; when the states and clans fell into disorder, loyal ministers appeared. (*Dàodéjīng*, 18).

If we could renounce our sageness and discard our wisdom, it would be better for the people a hundredfold. If we could renounce our benevolence and discard our righteousness, the people would again become filial and kindly. If we could renounce our artful contrivances and discard our (scheming for) gain, there would be no thieves nor robbers. (*Dàodéjīng*, 19).

Laozi believes that the apotheosis of virtue demonstrates its opposite – spoiling of people, therefore, the true virtue is the expression of inactivity rather than activity.

(Those who) possessed in highest degree the attributes (of the Dào) did not (seek) to show them, and therefore they possessed them (in fullest measure). […] Thus it was that when the Dào was lost, its attributes appeared; when its attributes were lost, benevolence appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness appeared; and when righteousness was lost, the proprieties appeared. (*Dàodéjīng*, 38).

It can be noticed that the main ethical principle of Confucianism, which is met in all times in all cultures and which reached the peak of its expression in the formula of categorical imperative by I. Kant, is not alien to Daoism as well: to behave not according to "merits" of another person, but in the same way you want to be treated.

However, bearing in mind one of the main statements of Daoism about the coexistence of opposites and the aspiration for looking at good and evil from the overall *Dào* perspective, a different interpretation is possible. Besides, the incarnation of *dé* is inactivity, not activity.

Wú wéi – inaction, inactivity, calmness. It is another important term of Daoism showing the path which, if followed by a person, can lead to the goal of life – merging with *Dào*. The essence of *Dào* is inaction (*wú wéi*), self-existence, and creative calmness: *The Dào in its regular course does nothing (for the sake of doing it), and so there is nothing which it does not do.* (*Dàodéjīng, 37*). Consequently, it must be sought by a person as well. There are only two possibilities: either a person lives in harmony with *Dào* according to its *dé* power naturally manifested in all forms of being without compulsion or a person is constantly restless, aspiring, seeking and constantly encountering his nature, and self-destructive from the inside. The human inaction does not mean passivity and doing nothing, it stands for non-interference with nature, not taking own advantage, observation of nature and learning from its eternal laws.

Therefore the sage manages affairs without doing anything, and conveys his instructions without the use of speech. All things spring up, and there is not one which declines to show itself; they grow, and there is no claim made for their ownership; they go through their processes, and there is no expectation (of a reward for the results). The work is accomplished, and there is no resting in it (as an achievement). The work is done, but how no one can see. (*Dàodéjīng,* 2).

The inaction of Heaven is its purity, the inaction of Earth is its peace. So the two inactions combine and all things are transformed and brought to birth. Wonderfully, mysteriously, there is no place they come out of. Mysteriously, wonderfully, they have no sign. Each thing minds its business and all grow up out of inaction. So I say, Heaven and Earth do nothing and there is nothing that is not done. Among men, who can get hold of this inaction? (*Zhuāngzǐ*, 18)

Without going outside his door, one understands (all that takes place) under the sky; without looking out from his window, one sees the Dào of Heaven. The farther that one goes out (from himself), the less he knows.

Therefore the sages got their knowledge without travelling; gave their (right) names to things without seeing them; and accomplished their ends without any purpose of doing so. (*Dàodéjīng*, 47).

At the first glance, inaction looks like complete passivity. Indeed, "inaction" means non-dissipation of forces for idle and short-term things. Inaction also means return to the primordial state of calmness, insight of emptiness in yourself, and openness to the whole world.

The *Zhuāngzǐ* book especially frequently calls for cherishing one's own inside, though it does not mean platonic turning away from one's own corporeality, but the aspiration for development of the spiritual view alongside with corporeal and seeing things as they are. Since the basis, source and purpose of every thing and phenomenon is *Dào*, the sage is able to rejoice in any small thing as being the most perfect and greatest, in addition to not getting attached to it (*Zhuāngzǐ*, 6). This idea was later adopted and particularly developed by Zen Buddhism. Of course, it is not the path of every person: *There are few in the world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising from non-action.* (*Dàodéjīng,* 43).

Inaction (*wú wéi*) is a more existential and social category, and the ontological category of Emptiness is closely related to it. It is as if explains from the other side why exactly inaction is most important. The emptiness and absence are one of the key concepts of Daoism also adopted by the school of Zen Buddhism.

People often see only one side – presence – and decide unilaterally, therefore, they get disappointed later. Therefore, in the opposition of positive-negative, fullness-lack, etc., Daoists emphasize Emptiness and non-being:

The thirty spokes unite in the one nave; but it is on the empty space (for the axle), that the use of the wheel depends. Clay is fashioned into vessels; but it is on their empty hollowness, that their use depends. The door and windows are cut out (from the walls) to form an apartment; but it is on the empty space (within), that its use depends. Therefore, what has a (positive) existence serves for profitable adaptation, and what has not that for (actual) usefulness. (*Dàodéjīng,* 11).

There is life, there is death, there is a coming out, there is a going back in – yet in the coming out and going back its form is never seen. This is called the Heavenly Gate. The Heavenly Gate is nonbeing. The ten thousand things come forth from nonbeing. Being cannot create being out of being; inevitably it must come forth from nonbeing. Nonbeing is absolute nonbeing, and it is here that the sage hides himself. (*Zhuāngzǐ*, 23)

Shèngrén (*sheng-jen*) – a "wise man", sometimes also translated as a "noble man". He is essentially different from the Confucian sage (*shèngrén*) or, especially, from a noble man (*jūnzǐ*) whose concepts put more emphasis on morality, activity, control of one's own nature and suppression of desires, observance of rites and performance of duties. In order to become a sage in Daoism, a person must become natural again and recognize (if cannot be rejected completely) treachery and greed. Therefore, another concept – *zhēnrén (*chen-jen*)* – "the true man" is often used when referring to the sage.

Confucianism quite clearly defines what is good and bad, and in Daoism good and evil, positive and negative always go together and are inseparable. The Confucian sage seeks to change and control himself and the world, and the Daoist sage does not interfere with nature and returns to the calm state (cf. *Dàodéjīng*, 2). Confucius believed that the reality can be understood, named, and controlled. The greatest objective for Daoists is to give up the habit to distinguish one from the other, to name, to define; they seek to return to yourself, close all chaos "holes" and experience harmony. The path of *Dào* is the path of impartial observation and sensing the Oneness.

He who knows (the Dào) does not (care to) speak (about it); he who is (ever ready to) speak about it does not know it. He (who knows it) will keep his mouth shut and close the portals (of his nostrils). He will blunt his sharp points and unravel the complications of things; he will attemper his brightness, and bring himself into agreement with the obscurity (of others). This is called 'the Mysterious Agreement.' (*Dàodéjīng,* 56).

The Daoist sage lives according to nature, despises dogmas and boundaries, and seeks calmness and emptiness. He does not feel neither love, nor hatred for others (this idea was also developed by Zen Buddhism),

therefore, it is said that "*there is nothing that could damage such a person*" *(Zhuāngzǐ, 1)*. The sage lives observing. He knows life well, knows its laws, and shrewdly sees people. However, he does not use it for his own purposes, he seeks natural simplicity. He is not trying to look better or wiser than he is, therefore, many people believe his is an "ignoramus" (cf. *Dàodéjīng*, 20). It is what makes him completely different from careerists, know-nothings and people sunk in their daily routine who are far from *Dào*. A wise man knows the world and himself, though recognizes that there also are incognizable things. He sees things as they really are, does not deceive himself, accepts everything his life brings, and does not try to keep anything his life takes.

The True Man of ancient times did not rebel against want, did not grow proud in plenty, and did not plan his affairs. A man like this could commit an error and not regret it, could meet with success and not make a show. […] The True Man of ancient times knew nothing of loving life, knew nothing of hating death. He emerged without delight; he went back in without a fuss. He came briskly, he went briskly, and that was all. (*Zhuāngzǐ,* 6).

The concept of a "noble man" is partially affined with Confucian *xiānrén* ("a talented man"), though in Daoism this term is criticized by Laozi. The concept of a talented man determines the idea of the ruler as a personal example, while Laozi believes that ordinary people must feel absolutely no ruling and not worry about what their ruler is. Political philosophy constitutes one more clear difference between Confucianism and Daoism. According to Daoists, such focus of Confucianism on the ruler means exceptionality, and exceptionality is unnatural. A wise man is naturally virtuous, which is directly and without any efforts passed on to the environment – family, society, and the world. Thus, ruling also starts with the spread of person's inside and grows into the self-formation of orderly society, and is not controlled by a wise ruler and his orders (cf. *Dàodéjīng*, 54).

Another important concept is **harmony** (*hé*), which implies a dialectical relationship between opposites, without which there would be no life. Every phenomenon exists as long as there is its opposite. More-

over, everything that turns into its opposite (happiness-misfortune, wealth-poverty). It is impossible to absolutely correctly decide what is what (*Dàodéjīng*, 20). *Dào* is the connection between opposites: *All things under heaven sprang from It as existing (and named); that existence sprang from It as non-existent (and not named).* (*Dàodéjīng,* 40). All things will eventually return to the calm state (*Dàodéjīng*, 14, 16), the Oneness (*Zhuāngzǐ*, 2). Here, the Oneness does not stand for limits between the extinction or ignoring of things, but for an insight of harmony and equality of one origin – *Dào* and all things and phenomena. Therefore, there is no good and bad for the sage – everything has its own place in the world and everything rises from *Dào*.

The dialectical nature of all things is usually expressed by the relationship between ***yīn*** and ***yáng***, harmony of the sky and the earth, a male and a female, darkness and light, right and left. *Yīn* and *yang* aspects exist in every thing and every person. If a person emphasizes and develops only some qualities, there is no more harmony and it destroys the person (these days, it is more often said by psychologists than philosophers).

Who knows his manhood's strength,
Yet still his female feebleness maintains;
As to one channel flow the many drains,
All come to him, yea, all beneath the sky.
Thus he the constant excellence retains;
The simple child again, free from all stains. (*Dàodéjīng,* 28).

Dào is one and formless, though, being decomposed into the visual world of multitude, it also acquires all qualities, though none of them is essential for it: *The Dào, when brightest seen, seems light to lack…* (*Dàodéjīng,* 41). Only having harmonized masculinity and femininity in himself/herself, a person can attain the fullness. Therefore, Daoism has many paradoxes and contradictory statements which can be understood only by looking at them as a part of the whole.

A state in which "this" and "that" no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a single endlessness and its wrong too is a single endlessness. (*Zhuāngzǐ,* 2)

Test questions:

1. What are the main features of *Dào* in Daoism?
2. What is the difference between the Daoist concept of *Dào* and the concept emphasized by Confucianism?
3. What is the relationship between *Dào* and *dé* in Daoism?
4. What are the attitude to life and the way of life proposed by Daoism?
5. What is the difference between the ideal sage in Confucianism and Daoism?
6. What ideas of Daoism affected Chán (Zen) Buddhism?

Recommended literature:

1. Chuang Tzu. *Basic Writings*. Vert. Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press. 1964.
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5. Kohn L. *Daoist Mystical Philosophy*. Three Pines Press, 2007.
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4. Hinduism

The tradition of Hinduism has no one or several founders. It dates back over 5,000 years. The Indian themselves call their faith eternal teaching or law – *dharma*. Hinduism unites many different religious beliefs and different philosophical schools. Buddhism is also considered one of unorthodox schools of Hinduism, though it has not developed into a completely independent religious and philosophical tradition spread around the world. According to Indologists, India has a very distinctive phenomenon of inclusivism, i. e. when other traditions, world outlooks are integrated into an already existing one and subjugated to it. For example, according to A. Beinorius, Buddhism "in India was overcome by incorporating and integrating this doctrine into the tree of Vedanta philosophy, and by declaring that Gautama Buddha is the ninth avatar of Hindu god Vishnu who came down to the world with heretic teaching in order to bring together all heretics and, thus, protect them from a karmic burden growing heavy"[26].

4. 1. Development of Hinduism

Even though Hinduism has no founder, several periods of the formation of this tradition can be distinguished: 1) pre-Vedic (3000–2000 BC); a part of rites and cults, yoga techniques were formed in the Indus Valley Civilization; 2) Vedic (2000–600 BC); the sacred Vedic language and Sanskrit, the complex pantheon of gods and the system of rites were formed, the society divided into estates at the time, which later became castes (*brāhmaṇa*, *kśatriya*, *vaiśya*, *śūdra*); 3) Brahmanic-Shramanic (600 BC); two different religious traditions were formed at the time: Brahmanic following the Vedic authority and Shramanic, unorthodox, uniting various sects, including Jainism and Buddhism; 4) Hinduism Consolidations (200 BC–400 AD); it is the period of formation of Shastras, Puranas, establishment and

26. Beinorius A. *Sąmonė klasikinėje Indijos filosofijoje (Consciousness in Classical Indian Philosophy)*. Vilnius: Kultūros, filosofijos ir meno institutas (Vilnius: Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute). 2002. P. 91.

definition of norms of religious, ethical, social, political and economic, sensual (family and artistic) life; 5) Classical Hinduism (300–1200), religious, social, ritual systems were fully formed, monasteries flourished, philosophical schools were formed; 6) Islamic Influence (1200–1757); the mystical movement of Sikhs emerged in India; on the one hand, the resistance to the Islamic world outlook was rising, on the other hand, new reformatory and synthetic religious and philosophical movements emerged; 7) Modern Hinduism (from 1757 to the present), British colonialism was influencing trends for adaptation to the Western culture as well as the emergence of resistance and national liberation movements; political and religious activities intensified outside India.

4. 2. Main Schools

In India, all philosophical systems are called *darshans* (*darśana* – "look", "insight" or "view"). Most controversial teachings are considered to be equivalent versions of the development of Hindu idea. Unorthodox schools (*nāstika*), which do not recognize the Vedic authority, casts, sacrality of the Sanskrit language, and importance of rites, mostly focus on austerity, yoga, and meditation: Buddhism, Jainism and Lokayata. Six orthodox schools (*āstika*), i. e. those recognizing the Vedic authority:

1) *Nyāya* – a school of logic, based on Nyāya Sūtras written in the 2nd century BC. The methodology of this school was adopted by most later schools – both orthodox and unorthodox. Here, the logic is not an end in itself, and knowledge must help to get liberated from suffering.

2) *Vaisheṣhika* school was formed in the 2nd–3rd centuries AD independently of the *Nyāya* school; both schools are very close in terms of teaching. In addition to logic, it developed the atomic theory stating that atoms are moved and directed by the will of the Eternal Being. After the 15th century, the school fell into decay.

3) *Sāṃkhya* (*Sankhya*) – the oldest school of Hindu philosophy. It is distinguished by strictly dualistic philosophy; it is based on belief in two eternal realities: *puruṣa* (spirit, consciousness) and *prakṛti* (matter which also covers what is called "mind" in the West). Ac-

cording to this school, false knowledge arises from the belief that the spirit is the single whole with the body. The spirit is released when it is understood that the spirit and the body are separate things.

4) *Yoga* school. Yoga, as the path to enlightenment, which appeared as early as during the pre-Vedic period, is one of the main practices of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. The word *yoga* (the Sanskrit root *yuj* – "to join", "to unite", "to attach") is usually translated as "unity", "tying into the whole". Joining is implied between the soul and the Absolute in *Vedānta* philosophy or between the soul and a specific deity in the theistic form of Hinduism and in some forms of Buddhism. Dualistic philosophy of the *Yoga* school is close to the *Sāṃkhya* school. The aim is to get separated from the matter, materiality (*prakṛti*), and to unite the spiritual origin (*puruṣa*) with the Supreme Consciousness. The classic text is *Yoga Sūtra* written around the 2nd–3rd centuries AD, in which sage Patanjali summarized and systemized yoga techniques known for a long time, therefore, yoga described by him is also called *rāja yoga* – "royal yoga".

5) *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* ("prior") – a rationalistic school; sought to maintain and strengthen the Vedic authority, to create rules for the interpretation of the Vedas. Liberation can be achieved only by living in accordance with Vedic instructions. It criticized the aspiration for personal liberation declared by other schools for being selfish and showing attachment to the idea.

6) *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* ("posterior"), better known as *Vedānta*. These are three schools relying on Upanishads: 1. *Advaita* ("not two"), often called *Advaita Vedānta*, formed according to teaching of Adi Shankara (788–820?). Here, the main idea is non-duality: Self (*Ātman*) and the Whole (*Brahman*) are the inseparable oneness. It mainly relies on Upanishads, *Brahma Sūtra* and *Bhagavat-gītā*. 2. *Visishta-advaita* ("qualified monism", "qualified non-dualism") emerged as a counterweight to the *advaita* doctrine of Shankara. It seeks the Middle Path between the oneness and dualism. The god is commonly known as Vishnu; therefore, the philosophical school is also called Vaishnavism, and its followers – Vaishnavas. The most important teacher is Ramanuja (1040–1137). 3. *Dvaita* ("two") – dualistic school. Teacher – Madhva (1238–1317). The god was also called Vishnu, though it strictly dualistically understood the difference between the Deity and the individual soul.

4. 3. Most Important Texts

A giant block of sacred texts, not including later commentaries and philosophical treatises, has been formed over millennia in the Hindu tradition like in no other.

Vedas (the root "vid-" – "to know") is a collection of religious texts written in Sanskrit which is believed to have been created by gods. Therefore, the recollection of texts was for a long time appreciated more than the interpretation or commentaries. The earliest texts were written around 1200 BC. The final form of Vedic hymns was established around 500 BC. The Vedas consist of 4 collections: *Rg Veda* ("Veda of Hymns"), *Yajur Veda* ("Veda of Instructions"), *Sāma Veda* ("Veda of Holy Songs") and *Atharva Veda* (after the name of mythical sage Atharvan; prayers, incantations, spells, blessings; the latest collection, strong influence of the pre-Vedic cult; later became the basis of the Tantric tradition; this Veda is not recognized by all Brahmanic schools).

Originally, there were two types of Vedic texts: *mantras* (worship hymns or verses) and *brāmanas* (commentaries of priests on how to use sacred texts for rites). Annexes were added over time, therefore, each Veda consisted of four parts: 1) *Samhitā* (various mantras), 2) *Brāmaṇas* (texts for sacrificial rites), 3) *Āraṇyakas* ("forest books", esoteric teachings) and 4) *Upanishads* (mystical texts, Revelation; according to ancient sages, these songs come from beginningless, unique *Adiveda*, they are eternal, not human-made, though obtained from the world of gods).

The Vedas are the basis for the caste system, worship of one divine Being and many gods, various rites, animal sacrifices. The Vedas are distinguished by universality and tolerance, i. e. there is no religious or national fundamentalism and aggression.

Upanishads (also called *Vedānta* – "end of the Vedas"; *Upaniṣad* – "to sit next to the teacher", *upāsanā* – "cohesion", "sitting near"). Upanishads differ from other religious texts. There are over 100 of them written in the form of dialogues, disputes. These are treatises of many centuries and various authors; there is no a consistent and coherent teaching system, though they are united by the common

subject matter and purpose. Upanishads are important for all Indian religions, especially significant are *saṃsāra*, *karma* and *mokṣa* doctrines formulated there. Discussion of rites prevails in older texts, and in Upanishads – it is the importance of inner harmony, self-awareness, and inner sacrifice.

Later collections of treatises are known as **shastras** (*śastra*). Three independent, though related parts of them were formed: 1) *Dharma shastras*, mainly for ritual, ethical and social philosophy; 2) *Artha shastras* (*artha* – "benefit") on political and economic areas; 3) *Kama shastras* (*kama* means sensual pleasures as well as art) – on family and sensual life. Sutras and karikas are a part of shastras (*sūtra* – summary of teaching; *kārikā* – rhymed summary). They include brief interpretations of the philosophical doctrine and reject opposite teachings. *Brahma Sūtra* is the most important of them, though best known in the West is *Kama Sūtra* written by sage Vatsyayana.

Puranas (*Purāṇas* – "ancient stories") – literature of historical legends. They are written in the form of a parabola. Puranas were meant not only for priests or monks, but also for ordinary people. They include not only numerous religious stories, but also examples of a social, political, and ethical life; they speak about arts, rhetoric, grammar, horse and elephant care, as well as places of pilgrimage. The main poetic epic texts are *Rāmāyaṇa* ("Rama's journey"), *Bhagavata Purāṇa* ("story of the Lord") and *Mahābhārata* ("great epic of the Bhārata dynasty"). One of the main books of this period is *Bhagavad-gītā* ("song of the Lord,"), which is a part of *Mahābhārata*. It tells the essence of teaching about spiritual and life duties and identifies three paths (*yoga*) to liberation. Therefore, *Bhagavad-gītā* is often compared with the Vedas and even called the fifth Veda.

4. 4. Key Concepts

God. Hinduism is distinguished by the variety of faiths and beliefs. Most Hindus believe in one or another god, the eternal origin, Being/Reality (*ekam sat*) or the Oneness (*tad ekam*). The god can be a personal or an impersonal being. Ways and rites of worshiping the same god can be different. Most Vedic hymns are dedicated to one

God/Being called by different names. Upanishads also tell about that. Here, Being is referred to using the neuter gender and mainly stands for the deity itself, rather than the divine person. Thus, in principle, belief in many gods and goddesses does not contradict Indian monotheism (henotheism), as all of them are mere manifestations of the infinite inexpressible God. The worship of those gods can also be the path to one perfect God.

Hindu texts intertwine concepts of the God as the primordial being, as the all-supporting creative principle and as the true human essence. The Absolute is called the Creator God, God, Oneness, Supreme Consciousness, though it is indescribable.

That which cannot be seen, nor seized, which has no family and no caste, no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet, the eternal, the omnipresent (all-pervading), infinitesimal, that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings. (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad,* 1. 1. 5)[27].

However, the Absolute is mainly referred to as Brahman, especially in Upanishads telling about the human–Absolute relationshiP. Referred to as "gods" are various deities filling the Hindu pantheon emphasizing that gods are mere lowest forms of the Absolute obeying Him – Brahman as well as the person who cognized Brahman.

Verily in the beginning this was Brahman, that Brahman knew (its) Self only, saying, 'I am Brahman.' From it all this sprang. […]Therefore now also he who thus knows that he is Brahman, becomes all this, and even the Devas cannot prevent it, for he himself is their Self. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 1. 4. 10).

Brahman is the one, unchanging, and eternal reality. Our visual reality arises from Brahman, though it is so only in respect to the world. Therefore, it is called *Māyā* – the cosmic Illusion, as from the standpoint of Brahman, there is no reality separate from it – it is the Oneness.

27. All quotations of Upanishads are from Max Müller. *The Upanishads* [1879] // http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/

That immortal Brahman is before, that Brahman is behind, that Brahman is right and left. It has gone forth below and above; Brahman alone is all this, it is the best. (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2. 2. 12).

This is the teaching of Brahman, with regard to the gods (mythological): It is that which now flashes forth in the lightning, and now vanishes again. And this is the teaching of Brahman, with regard to the body (psychological): It is that which seems to move as mind, and by it imagination remembers again and again (*Kena Upaniṣad*, 4, 4–5).

'That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

'That which does not think by mind, and by which, they say, mind is thought, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

'That which does not see by the eye, and by which one sees (the work of) the eyes, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

'That which does not hear by the ear, and by which the ear is heard, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.

'That which does not breathe by breath, and by which breath is drawn, that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' (*Kena Upaniṣad*, 1, 5–9).

According to ancient sages, a person must seek the cognition of Brahman, actively think about it. However, it is neither rational consideration or theorization, nor logical interpretation of scriptures or grouping of conceptions. It is rather a spiritual-intellectual movement (*jñāna*) opposite to dry rhetoric. Therefore, it is said:

I do not think I know it well, nor do I know that I do not know it. He among us who knows this, he knows it, nor does he know that he does not know it. He by whom it (Brahman) is not thought, by him it is thought; he by whom it is thought, knows it not. It is not understood by those who understand it, it is understood by those who do not understand it. It is thought to be known (as if) by awakening, and (then) we obtain immortality indeed. (*Kena Upaniṣad*, 2. 2–4)

The life principle of the Universe, the God, and Being are also called ***Ātman*** ("Self"). This concept is dual: it refers to both the Absolute, Oneness and its manifestation in limited, temporary beings.

This Self is the honey of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this Self Likewise this bright, immortal person in this Self, and that bright, immortal person, the Self (both are madhu). He indeed is the same as that Self, that Immortal, that Brahman, that All.

And verily this Self is the lord of all beings, the king of all beings. And as all spokes are contained in the axle and in the felly of a wheel, all beings, and all those selfs (of the earth, water, &c.) are contained in that Self. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 2. 5. 14–15).

Brahman can be cognized by going into the essence of any existence and understanding that that essence is the same everywhere.

But he who sees everywhere the Self in all existences and all existences in the Self, shrinks not thereafter from aught. (*Isha Upaniṣad,* 6).[28]

Only such cognition liberates from the human narrow-mindedness, transience and reincarnation. It is not Buddhist liberation from *ātman* illusion. In Hinduism, *Ātman* is liberation itself. As stated by Shankara (*Ādi Śaṅkara*) in commentaries to "Brahma Sūtra" by Badarayana, "there can be no talk of liberation [from *ātman*], as the ignorant removal of Atman's imaginary shackles of samsaric dependency will reveal eternally free Atman. […] Liberation is identical to inner Brahman […] Brahman is the eternal Presence for everyone" (*Brahmasūtra Shankara bhāśya*).[29] On the other hand, *Ātman* is not the personal core which is usually identified with the Ego, the soul separate and independent of the body or consciousness which is individual and barely dependent on the environment. As sage Gaudapada (8th c.) commenting *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* says:

28. *Isha Upaniṣad* quotations from Sri Aurobindo. Isha Upanishad // *The Complete Works of Sri Aurobindo*. Vol. 17. Sri Aurobindo Ashram Press, 2003.
29. *Religijų istorijos antologija.* II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas (*Anthology of the History of Religion.* Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism), 2002. P. 171.

As the rope, (with its nature) not definitely ascertained in the dark, is imagined to be (possessed of the nature of) entities like the serpent, (water-) line; so likewise (is) Atman imagined (to be all sons of things). When the rope is definitely ascertained (as the rope), the imagined attribute turns away, and the non-duality (emerges) in the form (iti): "(This is) the rope itself". So likewise, (takes place) the ascertaiment of Atman. (Atman) is imagined to be Prana (life) etc. and these innumerable entities. This (is) the Maya of that shining one (Atman) by which (he) himself has been deluded. (*Gauḍapāda Kārikā,* 2. 17–19).[30]

Such accentuation of illusionism of empirical selfhood as well as emphasis on non-duality is typical for *Gauḍapāda Kārikā*, closer to Mahāyāna Buddhism, and according to some interpreters, Gaudapada himself could be quite familiar with Buddhism and could combine its and Hindu ideas in his commentary[31]. However, it is clear that even in early Hinduism speaking about the identity of *Ātman* and *Brahman* does not have in mind the identity of any one human part or aspect and the God, leaving other parts or aspects aside.

That Self is indeed Brahman, consisting of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing, earth, water, wind, ether, light and no light, desire and no desire, anger and no anger, right or wrong, and all things. Now as a man is like this or like that, according as he acts and according as he behaves, so will he be: – a man of good acts will become good, a man of bad acts, bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4. 4. 5).

He (Brahman or the Self) entered thither, to the very tips of the finger-nails, as a razor might be fitted in a razor-case, or as fire in a fire-place.

30. *Gaudapada Karika* (*Gauḍapāda Kārikā*, also called *Māṇḍukya Kārikā* or *Āgama Śāstra*) extracts are quoted from *Gauḍapāda Kārikā*. Edited with a complete translation into English, Notes, Introduction and Appendices by Raghunath Damodar Karmarkar. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1953. Retrieved from http://archive.org/details/Gaudapada-Karika.English
31. Beinorius A. *Sąmonė klasikinėje Indijos filosofijoje (Consciousness in Classical Indian Philosophy).* Vilnius: Kultūros, filosofijos ir meno institutas (Vilnius: Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute). 2002. P. 402.

He cannot be seen, for, in part only, when breathing, he is breath by name; when speaking, speech by name; when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name. All these are but the names of his acts. And he who worships (regards) him as the one or the other, does not know him, for he is apart from this (when qualified) by the one or the other (predicate). Let men worship him as Self, for in the Self all these are one. This Self is the footstep of everything, for through it one knows everything. And as one can find again by footsteps what was lost, thus he who knows this finds glory and praise. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 1. 4. 7).

The main goal of Hindu practices is to understand the oneness of self and the Absolute. Phrases repeated during meditations: "I am Brahman" (*aham brahmāsmi*) and "That you are" (*tat tvam asi*) are supposed to encourage the essential insight – cognition of one's own true essence. Even though it is said that *Brahman* and *atman* are the same, it, however, does not mean that atman could replace *Brahman*, that a person (the way he/she is here on earth) could substitute the whole reality. *Brahman* does not depend on anything and is perfectly complete – it does not lack anything and it is not bound by the excess.

Dharma. Hindu representatives themselves call their faith *dharma* – "eternal law"; the term "Hinduism" was introduced by foreigners. Thus, the first meaning of this concept is the eternal divine law, the eternal principle of Being, the whole of Hindu faith, eternal consistency, and harmony of the universe.

In the *Mahābhārata*, Yudhistira asks Bhishma to explain the meaning and scope of Dharma. Bhishma replies:

It is most difficult to define Dharma. Dharma has been explained to be that which helps the upliftment of living beings. Therefore, that which ensures the welfare of living beings is surely Dharma. The learned rishis have declared that that which sustains is Dharma. (*Mahābhārata*, *Shanti Parva* 109. 9. 11).[32]

32. Mahabharata extracts are from *The Mahabharata*. Translated by Kisari Mohan Ganguli. Published between 1883 and 1896. Retrieved from http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/

According to the context, this polysemantic concept can mean not only cosmic, but also social order, justice, virtue, and duty.

Dharma sustains the society. Dharma maintains the social order. Dharma ensures well being and progress of humanity. Dharma is surely that which fulfills these objectives. (*Mahābhārata, Karna Parva*, 69. 58).

At first, *dharma* was understood as the absolute human duty to the God, i. e. only a personal thing, though typical for everyone. Later, *dharma* was related more not to the human person himself/herself, but to his/her status. Thus, the duty already became not only the personal duty, but also the matter of a caste. As castes were considered the unchangeable fact, duties were also specific, only within a caste. Therefore, two duties appeared: a general duty and a caste-predetermined duty.

Much attention is paid to the performance of duties in *Bhagavad-gītā*. Any action of daily routine has and can be bound by the duty. Therefore, everyone must perform various duties, as *Verily none can ever rest for even an instant, without performing action; for all are made to act* (*Bhagavad-gītā*, 3. 5)[33]. However, everyone must do what he/she is meant to do by nature and fate:

Better is one's own Dharma, (though) imperfect, than the Dharma of another well-performed. Better is death in one's own Dharma: the Dharma of another is fraught with fear. (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 3. 35).

Such statements remind the saying of Confucius that everyone must mind their own business and do their work (cf. *Lún Yǔ*, 12. 11). However, whereas the activity in Confucianism is directed to the development of virtues, creation of the perfect society and similar things in life, in Hinduism any expedience of the activity, even the slightest attachment to the outcome, is understood as the *karma*-creating action. Meaning of work appears not due to work itself or its influence on others, but due to the attitude which that work is carried out with.

33. *Bhagavad-gītā* texts are quoted from *Srimad-Bhagavad-Gita*. English Translation and Commentary by Swami Swarupananda. 1909. Retrieved from http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/

By non-performance of work none reaches worklessness; by merely giving up action no one attains to perfection.

He, who restraining the organs of action, sits revolving in the mind, thoughts regarding objects of senses, he, of deluded understanding, is called a hypocrite.

But the man who is devoted to the Self, and is satisfied with the Self, and content in the Self alone, he has no obligatory duty. (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 3. 4, 6, 17).

A duty in Hinduism is not just a rationally understood principle or externally or internally binding a mode of behaviour. *Dharma – karma – saṃsāra* make a block of concepts; their meanings are intertwined and interrelated. Performance of the duty is associated with the main objective of Hinduism – liberation from *saṃsāra* – and is more related not to will, but to wisdom (*jñāna*), as it should not create good *karma*, but to liberate from any *karma*. True wisdom, as insight of activity-inactivity connections, especially reminds the Daoist *wú wéi* doctrine.

Even sages are bewildered, as to what is action and what is inaction. I shall therefore tell you what action is, by knowing which you will be freed from evil. For verily, (the true nature) even of action (enjoined by the Shâstras) should be known, as also, (that) of forbidden action, and of inaction: the nature of Karma is impenetrable. He who sees inaction in action, and action in inaction, he is intelligent among men, he is a Yogi and a doer of all action. (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 4. 16–18).

Saṃsāra ("changeability", "continuous flow") – the cosmic cycle of life and death, i. e. the continuous change of lives. All life in the universe of Illusion (*Māyā*) is constantly renewed; the soul of a dead person travels to another body (reincarnates). Every life is temporary, everyone is full of impermanence, fragility and associated suffering (*duḥkha*); everyone is predetermined by previous lives.

And when (the body) grows weak through old age, or becomes weak through illness, at that time that person, after separating himself from his members, as an Amra (mango), or Udumbara (fig), or Pippala-fruit is separated

from the stalk, hastens back again as be came, to the place from which he started, to (new) life. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 4. 3. 36).

And as a caterpillar, after having reached the end of a blade of grass, and after having made another approach (to another blade), draws itself together towards it, thus does this Self, after having thrown off this body and dispelled all ignorance, and after making another approach (to another body), draw himself together towards it. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 4. 4. 3).

And as a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold, turns it into another, newer and more beautiful shape, so does this Self, after having thrown off this body and dispelled all ignorance, make unto himself another, newer and more beautiful shape, whether it be like the Fathers, or like the Gandharvas, or like the Devas, or like Pragâpati, or like Brahman, or like other beings. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 4. 4. 4).

In every life, consciousness is filled with new experience, knowledge, and inclinations determining the quality of new reincarnation. However, it is still possible to light up and get liberated in this life. Liberation (*mokṣa*, *nirvāṇa*) means that a person, regardless of what he/she does, will not create *karma* for himself/herself until his/her death and will not be reborn after death.

But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, his vital spirits do not depart elsewhere, – being Brahman, he goes to Brahman. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 4. 4. 6).

Karma. *Karma* literally means "action", "deed", though it can also mean "duties", "rites", "fate", "consequences". *Karma* is usually understood as human's deeds, thoughts, desires, preferences, and beliefs determining his/her presence in the rebirth cycle. An ordinary person does not know which deed or thought is more or less important, therefore, he/she must always behave himself/herself, perform his/her duty as it is the only way to get rid of *karma* (cf. *Isha Upaniṣad*, 2). However, this is not the way *to guarantee* good *karma*. The differ-

entiation between good and bad relies on four sources: ancient scriptures, other inspired writings, virtuous behaviour, and conscience. However, good and evil are moral categories, and liberation is ontological. Therefore, in order to escape from the cycle of *saṃsāra*, it is necessary to liberate yourself from both good and bad *karma*. Both good and bad desires attach, "stick" us to the *saṃsāra* cycle, as every desire is closely related to expected consequences.

A man of good acts will become good, a man of bad acts, bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds. 'And here they say that a person consists of desires. And as is his desire, so is his will; and as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deed he does, that he will reaP. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 4. 4. 5).

Good *karma* is a desirable thing, though the ultimate goal is *mokṣa*. Liberation is sought, therefore, one must not only do nothing bad, but also not attach himself/herself to good, understand the conditionality of both.

Mokṣa – "liberation", synonym of *nirvāṇa*. In Hinduism, liberation primarily means right knowledge, cognition. It is ignorance and desires that keep a person in the cycle of *saṃsāra*. When a person recognizes what is illusive and temporary, he/she liberates himself/herself and is no longer reborn.

When all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 4. 4. 7).

When the seer sees the brilliant maker and lord (of the world) as the Person who has his source in Brahman, then he is wise, and shaking off good and evil, he reaches the highest oneness, free from passions (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad,* 3. 1. 3).

Right cognition (*jñāna*) leading to enlightenment, as have been already mentioned, primarily means the cognition of Brahman, the cognition of the *Brahman* and *Ātman* unity. However, according to

commentaries of Shankara, it cannot be achieved by focusing on *Brahman* as an object. Liberation cannot also be achieved neither through good work, nor rites, nor sacraments, nor studying of scriptures. Liberation itself is neither acquisition of something new, nor transformation. Liberation is equal to the nature of Brahma, therefore, there is nothing to add or take – the nature of Brahma is whole and perfect (*Brahmasūtra Šankara bhāśya*).[34]

There are various ways to achieve liberation: meditation, yoga, austerity. All of these methods are "passive", a person tries not to attach himself/herself to life, to abandon desires, to control his/her physical, mental bodies so that they no longer hamper the spirit at all. On the one hand, these methods of seeking liberation can be practiced by any caste. On the other hand, they clearly indicate a certain way of life. However, liberation, enlightenment is not a thing predetermined by destiny, situation, caste or personal efforts. Brahmans were originally called the enlightened ones – those who cognized *Brahman*. According to Shankara, enlightenment cannot depend on a caste, as the cognition of *Brahman* "relies on itself, as when cognizing a specific thing through direct contact. It is impossible to imagine that Brahman or its cognition would be somehow related to the action" (*Brahmasūtra Šankara bhāśya*).[35]

However, there is also a path of action. It is the belief that everyone in this life has duties (*dharma*) to be performed. It is said in *Bhagavad-gītā* that the highest perfection can be achieved not only through repudiation of everything – one can liberate himself/herself from the action by not avoiding it.

Whose undertakings are all devoid of plan and desire for results, and whose actions are burnt by the fire of knowledge, him, the sages call wise. Forsaking the clinging to fruits of action, ever satisfied, depending on nothing, though engaged in action, he does not do anything. […] Devoid of attachment, liberated, with mind centred in knowledge, performing work for Yajna alone, his whole Karma dissolves away. (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 4. 19–20, 23).

34. *Religijų istorijos antologija*. II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas (*Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism), 2002. P. 171.
35. Ibid. P. 170.

Consequently, the path of action can also lead to enlightenment, and it is not a specific action or its absence that keeps one in the cycle of *saṃsāra*, but shackles of *karma*, attachment to own actions and their consequences. This once again confirms that there is no one right path or path guaranteeing enlightenment in Hinduism, and when seeking liberation, most important is the belief that:

On that path they say that there is white, or blue, or yellow, or green, or red; that path was found by Brahman, and on it goes whoever knows Brahman, and who has done good, and obtained splendour. (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* 4. 4. 9).

Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou offerest in sacrifice, whatever thou givest away, whatever austerity thou practisest, O son of Kunti, do that as an offering unto Me. Thus shalt thou be freed from the bondages of actions, bearing good and evil results: with the heart steadfast in the Yoga of renunciation, and liberated, thou shalt come unto Me. (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 9. 27–28).

Jñāna, ***vidyā*** ("recognition", "knowledge"). The path to the eternal truth discussed in Upanishads is intuition, insight of enlightenment (*jñāna*), and not the mind. Much attention is paid to cognition – of reality, comprehensive Oneness, immortality – though not to rational, but rather intuitive cognition. Therefore, sages are also worshiped not because of their knowledge, but because of insight (cf. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, 2. 2. 8). As it became clear when speaking about the relationship between the Absolute and an individual and about cognition of *Brahman*, a person can cognize most not by gaining new knowledge about the world of things and phenomena, but by going deep into their and, primarily, into his/her own essence. As said in *Kaṭha Upanishad*,

The Self-existent (Brahman) pierced the openings (of the senses) so that they turn forward: therefore man looks forward, not backward into himself. Some wise man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality, saw the Self behind. (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad,* 2. 1. 1).

Hinduism distinguishes two levels of cognition: 1) cognition of illusion and the world of multitude and 2) cognition of the Oneness which has no cause and effect, no karmic affinity, attachment to life and death. In Upanishads, even studying of the Vedas is assigned to the lowest level of cognition, as the essence of being and non-being lies not in scriptures or their ritual application, but in insight (*jñāna*).

"Sir, what is that through which, if it is known, everything else becomes known?"

He said to him: "Two kinds of knowledge must be known, this is what all who know Brahman tell us, the higher and the lower knowledge. The lower knowledge is the Rig-veda, Yagur-veda, Sâma-veda, Atharva-veda, Sikshâ (phonetics), Kalpa (ceremonial), Vyâkarana (grammar), Nirukta (etymology), Khandas (metre), Gyotisha (astronomy); but the higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible (Brahman) is apprehended." (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad,* 1. 1. 3–5).

Thus, true cognition is not cognition of separate things or separate qualities, but the extinction of the subject–object relationship in consciousness, experience of the identity with the Whole Oneness (*ātman – Brahman*). According to Shankara, "even though cognition is mental activity, however, it greatly differs [from carnal actions]. […] Such cognition arises from the direct perception (*pratyakṣa*); therefore, it is not an action, but simply – sensation".[36]

Ajñāna, avidyā – "ignorance", "delusion". Accordingly to the concept of *jñāna*, *ajñāna* is a delusion related to attachment to the temporary world, and especially to one's own mind, knowledge and desires, not seeing that this is a part of the great illusion (*Māyā*).

Considering sacrifice and good works as the best, these fools know no higher good, and having enjoyed (their reward) on the height of heaven, gained by good works, they enter again this world or a lower one (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad,* 1. 2. 10).

However, according to A. Beinorius, not only *avidyā*, but also *vidyā* are "two aspects of the cosmic Illusion (*Māyā*): consciousness of one,

36. Ibid. P. 173.

oneness called *vidyā*, cognition or overall knowledge, and the dissemination of multitude, majority in the dimension of names-forms (*nāma-rūpa*) – *avidyā*, ignorance or darkness"[37]. Thus, even the highest cognition is a part of *Māyā*. However, even though the same concept (*vidyā*) is used, knowledge is heterogeneous: one thing is knowledge through which a person "becomes immortal", another – leading to "even more sombre darkness" than ignorance (cf. *Isha Upaniṣad*, 9–11). However, those seeking enlightenment must understand that *jñāna* and *ajñāna*, *vidyā* and *avidyā* are not absolute ontological mutually exclusive opposites. They exist only in human consciousness; therefore, in order to liberate oneself, it is necessary to understand not only their opposition, but also the conditionality of this opposition:

He who knows That as both in one, the Knowledge and the Ignorance, by the Ignorance crosses beyond death and by the Knowledge enjoys Immortality (*Isha Upaniṣad,* 11).

Duḥkha ("dissatisfaction", "suffering") – the essential feature of life in the *saṃsāra* state. Suffering is caused by karmic dependency, constant rebirth, fragility, and transience of existence. However, it is not suffering in terms of a punishment deserved individually or collectively by a person. It is not suffering which one can be liberated from by someone's grace or good fortune. *Duḥkha* lies in being of all living beings, though not everyone understands that.

To him who possesses discernment, all personal life is misery, because it ever waxes and wanes, is ever afflicted with restlessness, makes ever new dynamic impresses in the mind; and because all its activities war with each other (*Yoga Sūtra,* 2. 15).

One can liberate himself/herself from suffering only through liberation from ignorance (*ajñāna, avidyā*). Therefore, suffering is defeated not by joy or happiness, but by the elevation of consciousness over joy and suffering sought through various practices.

37. Beinorius A. Hinduizmas // *Religijų istorijos antologija*. II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas (Hinduism // *Anthology of the History of Religion.* Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 118.

This pain is to be warded off, before it has come. The cause of what is to be warded off, is the absorption of the Seer in things seen. (*Yoga Sūtra*, 2. 16–17).

The bringing of this association to an end, by bringing the darkness of unwisdom to an end, is the great liberation; this is the Seer's attainment of his own pure being. A discerning which is carried on without wavering is the means of liberation. (*Yoga Sūtra,* 2. 25–26).

Yoga ("yoke", "connection") – 1) psychophysical practices to reach liberation from rebirths (*saṃsāra*); 2) an orthodox school of Hinduism. *Yoga* is given most attention in *Yoga Sūtra* and *Bhagavad-gītā*. *Yoga,* as a practice or, more exactly, a complex of practices, has been known since ancient times. In the 2nd–3rd centuries, sage Patanjali (*Pātaṅjali*) collected and systemized various *yoga* methods in *Yoga Sūtra*. Here, *yoga* is described as disciplined efforts to tame feelings and the mind, to control physical and mental human parts, to reveal the nature of deity lying in everyone.

OM: Here follows Instruction in Union (yoga). Union, spiritual consciousness, is gained through control of the versatile psychic nature. […] The control of these psychic activities comes through the right use of the will, and through ceasing from self-indulgence. The right use of the will is the steady, effort to stand in spiritual being. This becomes a firm resting-place, when followed long, persistently, with earnestness. (*Yoga Sūtra,* 1. 1–2, 12–14).

Patanjali described 8 steps of yoga: the first two are meant for ethics, i. e. for the essential mood of everyday life: 1) *yama* – five abstentions from: violence, injustice, theft, sex and greed; 2) *niyama* – five precepts to be observed: cleanliness, satisfaction (with life, current situation), austerity/simplicity, learning and obedience to God. The other three steps are related to the discipline of the body and senses required for meditation: 3) *āsana* – body positions, postures; 4) *prāṇayama* – control of breath; 5) *pratyāhāra* – withdrawal of senses from external objects. The remaining three steps are related to soothing of the mind and thoughts: 6) *dhāraṇā* – concentration

of thoughts on one object; 7) *dhyāna* – meditation of that object; 8) *samādhi* – complete oneness with the object of meditation in contemplation (cf. *Yoga Sūtra*, 2. 28–3. 7).

Yoga Sūtra tells more about the practice, and in *Bhagavad-gītā* the concept of *yoga* is used to indicate the orientation, belief which is the basis for any practice. In this text, *yoga* is more similar to the concept of *Dào* in Daoism indicating the right path, right understanding, and not to *hatha yoga* (the complex of physical exercises, mostly known in the West as "yoga").

Thy right is to work only; but never to the fruits thereof. Be thou not the producer of the fruits of (thy) actions; neither let thy attachment be towards inaction. Being steadfast in Yoga, Dhananjaya, perform actions, abandoning attachment, remaining unconcerned as regards success and failure. This evenness of mind (in regard to success and failure) is known as Yoga. (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 2. 47–48).

Bhagavad-gītā indicates three paths (*yoga*): 1) *karma yoga* – the path of action. It is the daily life with the fair performance of duties and work, though without getting attached to the results of work; 2) *jñāna yoga* – the path of cognition in which meditation, self-development, and self-awareness are important; 3) *bhakti yoga* – the path of love or self-sacrifice passing through self-denial, dedication to the deity.

In the beginning (of creation), O sinless one, the twofold path of devotion was given by Me to this world; – the path of knowledge for the meditative, the path of work for the active (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 3. 3).

Most discussions arise when considering which path – active, of action or cognition and self-denial – is better. However, there is no a better or worse path, as both are related, both are conditional, i. e. none of them guarantees enlightenment by itself.

The Blessed Lord said: Both renunciation and performance of action lead to freedom: of these, performance of action is superior to the renunciation of action. […] Children, not the wise, speak of knowledge and performance of action, as distinct. He who truly lives in one, gains the fruits of both. […] He who does actions forsaking attachment, re-

signing them to Brahman, is not soiled by evil, like unto a lotus-leaf by water. (*Bhagavad-gītā,* 5. 2, 4, 10).

Test questions

1. What are the Vedas, Upanishads, and Puranas distinguished by? How do accents of the Hindu doctrine change in them?
2. How are *karma*, *saṃsāra,* and *duḥkha* related?
3. What is the relationship between the Absolute and an individual in Hinduism?
4. Describe the concept of liberation and its relation to knowledge/cognition.
5. Compare Confucian and Hindu concepts of duty/dutifulness.

Recommended literature

1. Beinorius. A. *Imagining Otherness: Postcolonial Perspective to Indian Religious Culture.* Research Institute of Culture, Philosophy and Art. Vilnius: Kronta, 2006.
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5. Buddhism

The Buddhist tradition has been formed in the Hindu environment and has adopted many concepts (*karma*, *saṃsāra*), though it has rejected (*ātman*) or changed the meaning of some of them. It did not recognize the worship of castes, one or many gods, the Sanskrit language and sacrality of the Vedas, as well as importance of sacrificial rites. The main goal remained the same as in the Hindu tradition – to liberate oneself from the cycle of rebirth through cognition. On this path, the significance of the teacher decreased and personal "efforts" became more important.

Buddhism is considered to be founded by Siddhartha Gautama born around 560 BC in a noble family. The child was foretold to become either a ruler, or a wanderer, therefore, he was raised in a closed palace. Grown-up Siddhartha got married and had a son. Once he saw three forms of suffering (a feeble old man, a disabled person suffering from pain and the funeral procession), he left his house and travelled away. Together with teachers and followers he exercised austerity, yoga. However, he quickly realized that external austerity is not enough if a person still continues to cling to life. Having left his friends and followers, Siddhartha started meditating. It is said that after 35 years of mediation under a tree Siddhartha Gautama achieved enlightenment and became Buddha ("the awakened one", "the enlightened one"), i. e. achieved *nirvāṇa*[38]. Buddhists believe that there were many Buddhas before and after Gautama. Siddhartha could achieve complete *nirvāṇa*, though he refused it and began to teach people the *Four Noble Truths* which he realized during enlightenment. This is how the *Saṃgha* community was created. Numerous legends and stories were created about life and death of Buddha. Of course, having turned 80, he got sick and died.

38. Buddhist terms, except quotations, are consistent with books by Keown D. *A Dictionary of Buddhism*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004, and Beinorius A. *Sąmonė klasikinėje Indijos filosofijoje (Consciousness in Classical Indian Philosophy)*. Vilnius: Kultūros, filosofijos ir meno institutas (Vilnius: Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute). 2002.

5. 1. Development of Buddhism

Barely 100 years after Buddha's death, over 20 different schools of Buddhism were formed. Representatives of all of them saw themselves as real transferors of Buddha's ideas. In Ancient India, Buddhism (unlike Hinduism) was a religion concentrated in monasteries and distant from people. An alternative direction of Buddhism was gradually formed with the essentially new substantiation of the same Buddhist teaching and the new approach to traditional Buddhist issues. Thus, Buddhism split into the new system – Mahāyāna ("great vehicle") and Hīnayāna ("inferior vehicle") which all schools existing before the split merged into. Only Theravāda school of Hīnayāna direction remained to this day, therefore, these names are often used as synonyms. Even though the official date of the split is considered to be the 2nd century BC, the main ideas of Mahāyāna existed before it. The Mahāyāna direction covers a wide range of very different schools with some of them explaining the truths contrary to each other. However, all of them focus on *karuṇa* ("love", "compassion") and *prajña* ("wisdom", "insight"). The spiritual ideal *bodhisattva*, according to Mahāyāna Buddhists, better corresponds to Buddha's life and teaching than the Hīnayāna ideal *arhat,* seeking only personal enlightenment. A new type of texts – Tantras – appeared in India in the 7th century. These texts covered rites and meditation techniques. A new direction was formed – Tantric Buddhism or Vajrayāna ("diamond vehicle") which later widespread in Tibet.

From India, where Buddhism flourished, especially, from the 5th century BC until the 15th century AD, it spread to China in the 6th century BC. In China, Buddhism was modified and is now quite different from Indian Buddhism. Main factors for the differences were not only contact with Confucianism and Daoism, but also the translation and use of texts.

While known by people before, Buddhism started to spread officially in Japan by the middle of the 6th century. The spread of Buddhism coincided with the spread of Chinese culture, including writing, political ideas, and urban planning. Most people understood Buddhism as a modification of the local religion (*Shintō*). Later, they started making commentaries on ancient texts, adapting rites.

Originally the religion of aristocrats, Buddhism spread throughout the country in the 7th–12th centuries. Local deities were considered to be incarnations of Buddha and *bodhisattvas*. Most schools were founded as counterparts of Chinese schools (e. g. Zen – Chán).

Due to the geographical and economic situation in Tibet, Buddhism reached it relatively late (around the 7th century), though Tibet borders with both India and China. The Tibetan religion (*Bön*) profoundly affected the Buddhist tradition that came from India, which could be the reason for Vajrayāna's Buddhism taking root there. The largest and still most influential school of Tibetan Buddhism – Geluk – was founded in the 14th century and became especially strong in the 17th century. Dalai Lamas travelling around the world after the Tibetan occupation also belong to this school. Dalai Lama's title of honour was introduced in the 16th century, and has been known as the authority since the 17th century.

5. 2. Main Schools

Theravāda (in the Pali language – "the path of elders"). The only school left to this day of old schools of Buddhism which made up Hīnayāna. Today, Theravāda Buddhism prevails in Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Representatives of this school state that their doctrine is oldest and most authentic. They faithfully comply with the Pali canon – the oldest collection of Buddhist writings, the only one remained in the canonical Pali language. It is the most conservative school, though, these days, monks already start to adjust teaching and put up with requirements of the modern world.

Madhyamaka ("the Middle School"; *madhyama* – middle) – a school of philosophy formed on the basis of teaching by Nāgārjuna (150–250). The essence of teaching expounded in the main treatise *Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way* (*Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*) is the pursuit for the middle between austerity and hedonism, realism and illusionism, thesis and antithesis. Representatives of this school mostly criticized others and refrained themselves from their own statements, as they basically stated the conditionality of affirmation and negation. They developed the doctrine of *anātman* (not-Self) and *śūnyata* (Emptiness), and taught the identity of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*.

Madhyamaka philosophy spread from India to Tibet and East Asia. Both other schools of Buddhism, e. g. Yogācāra, and non-Buddhists criticized Madhyamaka philosophy for being nihilistic.

Yogācāra – the main school of Mahāyāna Buddhism which appeared in the 4th century partly as an opposition to Madhyamaka school. It is also called *Vijñānavāda* ("The Path of Consciousness"), as it mainly focuses on the activities of consciousness. The main practice is meditation, yoga. Major early teachers: Maitreyanatha, Asanga and Vasubandhu. The basis of Yogācāra teaching: *Sandhi-nirmocana Sūtra*, *Daśambhūmika Sūtra* and *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. Yogācāra Buddhism spread both to India and Tibet, though it was strongly affected by the Madhyamaka direction prevailing in the latter.

Vajrayāna ("diamond vehicle"; *vajra* – thunderbolt of god Indra mentioned in the Vedas, later stood for "diamond") – the school of Tantric Buddhism which, according to some Buddhologists, overstepped school boundaries and became a direction like Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna. It is believed to have formed around the 7th century with the appearance of the *Māha-vairokana-abhisambodhi* text relating all things typical for Tantric Buddhism, except sexual yoga. Teaching of Tantric Buddhism was oriented to ordinary laymen, and not to monks, though its techniques require no less concentration of attention and focus. Tantrists think, speak and behave as if they have already achieved enlightenment. Tantric Buddhism was considered an alternative movement inside Mahāyāna and was called the "mantra technique", unlike the "pāramitā technique" (the path of perfection).

Chán ("school of meditation", derived from the Chinese word *chán-na* trying to convey the sound of the word *dhyāna*) – the main school of Buddhism in China; **Zen –** its equivalent in Japan. According to the legend, in 526 Bodhidharma, a disciple of Buddha in the 28th generation, came to China and became the first patriarch of Chinese Buddhism. This school avoids studying of doctrines, texts, and ethics, and seeks direct experience of enlightenment (*satori*). The Chán / Zen tradition includes temples, teachers, scriptures, and various practices. Much attention is also paid to the visual art, tea ceremony. However,

all these things are assigned only the secondary role in the pursuit for enlightenment. An outdoor flower or boiling soup can be as valuable or useless as the statue of Buddha in a temple. The main practice is studying of koans and quiet meditation.

5. 3. Most Important Texts

Buddhism rejected the sacral Vedic authority, though it revered ancient Hindu writings as "custodians of wisdom". Buddhist texts began with descriptions of Buddha's sermons, which perfectly reflect differences between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna traditions. Even descriptions of Buddha's life are essentially different in Pali, Sanskrit and Chinese. Pali – the language of Hīnayāna texts – is simpler; Buddha is presented as the good teacher. Mahāyāna texts are more sophisticated, philosophical. Their Buddha is mysterious, more heavenly than earthy, surrounded by various extraterrestrial beings. Mahāyāna texts constitute a separate collection called *Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtras* ("The Perfection of Insight Sūtras") formed in India around the 2nd century BC–the 2nd century AD, which continued to grow for a couple of hundred years. Summaries and short statements were formed later in the form of short Sūtras, e. g. *the Heart Sūtra, the Diamond Sūtra* (300–500) which, even though not authentic words of Buddha, became no less important than ancient texts. In 600–1200, Buddhist texts were strongly affected by Tantric tradition.

According to Hajime Nakamura, language differences influenced differences between Indian and Chinese Buddhism. 1) The Chinese translated all texts into their language and did not use terms of sacred canonical languages Sanskrit and Pali. 2) Commentaries were added and the text itself was also often changed during translation. Texts were designed as traditional Chinese texts, with traditional drawings; therefore, they had no visual differences from other texts. 3) Later Chinese schools no longer knew canonical languages and could not understand original Indian texts and often even first translations. 4) Many new texts written independently of Indian schools and their doctrines appeared. 5) Techniques for the interpretation of texts were different[39].

39. Nakamura H. *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1971.

According to the nature, idiosyncratic are texts of *Chán*/Zen school – koans. The use of stories and dialogues when seeking enlightenment was first mentioned in 930. There are two main collections of koans supplemented with commentaries and introductions after the compilation: 1) "Blue Cliff Record" (Chinese *Pi-yen lu*, Japanese *Hekigan-roku*) since the 10th century; 2) "Entrance without Doors" or "Gateless Gate" (Chinese *Wu-men kuan*, Japanese *Mumonkan*). It is a collection of 48 stories compiled by monk Wu-men Hui-k'ai (1183–1260). The collection's title can also be associated with the monk's name. Later, there were other collections of koans, but these two remained the main ones.

Buddhist tradition has three canons of texts: Pali, Chinese and Tibetan. The Pali canon is the canon of Theravāda school. Other early schools also had their own canons, though Pali is the only remaining complete collection of ancient texts. The Pali language is a combination of various dialects used for the verbal transmission of Buddha's sermons. Therefore, "Pali" refers to canonical texts, rather than to a living language. Texts are divided into three sections, therefore, the Pali canon is also called *Tipitaka* ("Three Baskets"): 1) *Vinaya Pitaka* (laws of monks, story, and course of two first religious meetings); 2) *Sutta Pitaka* (Buddha's sermons; texts arranged according to the length); 3) *Abhidhamma Pitaka* (psychological analysis of ethics, analysis of various elements of the doctrine).

There were many versions of the Chinese canon. The first complete version of the canon was written in 983, and the modern standard (*Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo*) was printed in Tokyo in 1924–1929. It consists of 55 volumes, i. e. 2,184 texts and, in addition, 45 volumes of additional texts. The Chinese canon covers a part of the Pali canon, Mahāyāna texts, various commentaries, as well as non-Buddhist texts.

The Tibetan canon consists of two parts: 1) *Kanjur* – Buddha's sermons; 2) *Tenjur* – commentaries. The second part is not Buddha's words; therefore, it is semi-canonical texts. The first *Kanjur* collection appeared in 1411 in Beijing. The first Tibetan edition appeared in 1731. In total, *Kanjur* consists of 98 volumes: Sūtras – 30 volumes, 270 texts – approximately ¾ of Mahāyāna, ¼ of Hīnayāna texts; *Prajñā-pāramitā* texts – 21 volumes, Tantras – 22 volumes. The bigger part of the Tibetan canon (both Buddha's sermons and commentaries) was translated

from Sanskrit, and only a few texts – from the Chinese language. As a result, the Tibetan canon is especially valued, as it preserved partial originality of some texts which was lost in Indian Sanskrit texts.

5. 4. Key Concepts[40]

Karma ("activity", "destiny", "consequence", "duties"). Buddhism adopted from Hinduism the concept of *karma* as the principle of universe formation, as the universal cause-and-effect principle. Any being is formed due to various reasons and conditions, and at the same time affects the future as the active force. Of course, laws of *karma* apply only to the matter, though to absolutely all forms of it. *Dharma-kāya* – the Absolute, the principle of Oneness in which all differences and causalities disappear, it is above the law of *karma*, though, manifested in the phenomenal world, it cannot avoid it[41].

Two levels are also revealed in human consciousness: ignorance (*avidyā*), which is often referred to as a synonym for *karma* or at least as a phenomenon directly related to it, and enlightened consciousness (*bodhi*). We cannot change our current situation, as it is predetermined by our previous lives. For the same reason, we can change our future, as it is a mere continuation of the present. Thus, there is no fatalism, as it may appear at the first glance. Every action is "eternal" in our life, as its consequences remain. On the other hand, every action is temporary, impermanent (*anitya* – "impermanence" – is the first one of three essential features of all phenomena; the other two are *anātman* – "not-Self" – and *duḥkha* – "suffering"). Depending on the law of cause and effect, all things appear, disappear, and change, i. e. they are impermanent. It also applies to the human soul, well-being, and happiness in life.

40. Most concepts discussed in this book are common to all directions of Buddhism, though more emphasis is put on Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, it should be kept in mind that Mahāyāna Buddhism unites an infinite number of different schools; therefore, certain nuances regarding their interpretation of main concepts may vary.

41. Cf. Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 54. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 54.)

In the West, the law of *karma* is often seen as a mere individual law of cause and effect. However, such a concept would contradict doctrines of *anātman* and *dharma-kāya* and the concept of *bodhisattva* in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Buddhism compares the law of *karma* with ripples in the water caused by a pebble, with the influence of a hand or leg movement on the entire body, with the infinite echo in mountains. Every deed or thought of every person can both help and hinder all living beings on their path to enlightenment. Therefore, Buddhism believes in dual *karma*, which expresses the dual fundamental attitude to life. *Karma* to be sought is actions bringing joy and well-being to oneself and others, helping to achieve enlightenment; *karma* to be avoided is actions bringing suffering to oneself and others, holding away from enlightenment.

Duḥkha ("suffering"). *Duḥkha* is usually translated as "suffering", though it is a very superficial translation bringing up specific associations, especially in the context of the Christian culture. When translated as "suffering", it emphasizes pain, a negative aspect of life. Buddha did not deny happiness and joy, though he saw their transience. *Duḥkha* stands for impermanence, inability to satisfy *all* desires, existential insufficiency, and imperfection. *Duḥkha* lies everywhere; it is especially clearly manifested in the human illusory Self. For example, fire heats but burns; water refreshes but drowns; beloved ones make happy but hurt; the person himself/herself creates but destroys, develops but behaves inappropriately. Some researchers of Buddhism use the psychological term *frustration,* which fits to almost all positive and negative situations in life[42].

Duḥkha, in a sense, is the fundamental concept of Buddhism, as it prevails in the *Four Noble Truths*, whose understanding lead Buddha to enlightenment: 1) life is torment (*duḥkha*); 2) torment has a cause; it is attachment, ignorance (*avidyā*) and desire (*tṛṣna*); 3) torment has an end – it is *nirvāṇa*; 4) there is an eightfold path to overcome torment. The *Noble Eightfold Path* is: 1) right knowledge/view; 2) right attitude/intention; 3) righ speech; 4) right action; 5) righ livelihood;

42. Cf. Danielius A. Budizmo kelias // *Religijų istorijos antologija*. II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas. (The Path of Buddhism // *Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 272–273.

6) right goal/effort; 7) right thinking/mindfulness (*sammā sati*) and 8) righ meditation (*sammā samādhi*) (cf. *Dīgha Nikāya* II. 305–311; *Saṃyutta Nikāya* LVI. 2. 1; *Turning the Wheel of Dharma sutta*).

Duḥkha has three aspects: 1) daily *duḥkha* – all forms of torment (illness, death, separation, disappointment, etc.); 2) *duḥkha* of changes, which comes from the transience, impermanence of all objects and things; 3) *dhkkha* of conditional states, which indicates that what we consider to be an individual is a combination of constantly changing psychophysical forces – five *skandhas*. *Skandhas* themselves are also often identified with *duḥkha*, as torment comes from the belief that "Self" is self-reliant, independent. Thus, liberation from suffering is also understanding that there is neither a liberator, nor liberation, as a specific result of actions.

For there is suffering, but none who suffers;
Doing exists although there is no door.
Extinction is but no extinguished person;
Although there is a path, there is no goer. (*Buddhaghoṣa „Viśuddhimagga"* XVI. 90)[43].

Ātman ("Self"). Buddha's teaching states that there is no permanent self, immutable immortal Self (*ātman*). Unlike in Hinduism, the Buddhist doctrine has no individual soul seeking to connect with the world's soul. On the other hand, it is not stated that Self (*ātman*) does not exist at all, that there is no certain unity of consciousness – denied are only *ātman* absoluteness, independence and eternity. According to Buddhist philosophy and faith, there is no *such* soul which would be the *centre* of the whole psyche and spirit. In Buddhism, what is called "Self" is defined as the sum of psychophysical qualities. *Ātman* is made (i. e. its illusion is formed) of 5 *skandhas* (aggregates). These are: 1) form/materiality, 2) sensations, 3) understanding–imagination (psychological aspect of understanding when features of things are recognized, e. g. different colours); 4) actions,

43. Bhadantácariya Buddhaghosa. *The Path of Purification* (*Visuddhimagga*). Translated from the Pali by Bhikkhu Ñáóamoli. Buddhist Publication Society. 2010. P. 529. Retrieved from http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nanamoli/PathofPurification2011.pdf

deeds, 5) consciousness (*vijñāna*). Like other empirical things, "Self" is made up of parts forming the aggregate due to a variety of reasons and conditions. However, like other empirical things, "Self" is temporary and dependent. What is called "Self" (*ātman*) is considered to be an abstract concept without the real basis.

The assertion of philosophical views concerning the elements that make up personality and its environing world that are non-existent, assume the existence of an ego, a being, a soul, a living being, a "nourisher", or a spirit. This is an example of philosophical views that are not true. (*Lankavatara Sūtra*, 2).[44]

So too are feeling, cognition, formation, and consciousness. Shariputra, all dharmas are empty of characteristics. They are not produced, not destroyed, not defiled, not pure, and they neither increase nor decrease. Feeling, cognition, formations, and consciousness are also like emptiness and form (*The Heart Sutra*).

Buddhists compare "Self" with a snake hiding under many layers of skin. Just when it seems that one can grasp the essence of "Self", it appears that there is only yet another slough in hands, and the snake is gone. It is an attempt of rational understanding of "Self", turning it into an object and getting stuck even deeper in illusion (*Māyā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*).

However, Chögyam Trungpa (1939–1987), a representative of modern Tibetan Buddhism, says that we should not be ashamed of ourselves and not try to deny or belittle ourselves, but rather recognize and see the Ego for what it is: "Understanding of ego is the foundation of Buddhism"[45]. Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg (1870–1966), another researcher and representative of contemporary Buddhism, states in a similar way: "Because it is not enough just to state that there is no

44. All extracts from Sūtras, unless indicated otherwise, are quoted from http://buddhasutra.com/

45. Chögyam Trungpa. Ego raida // // *Religijų istorijos antologija*. II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas. (Ego Development // *Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Translated by E. Lapinskas. Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 382.

ātman if we wish really to reach the end of sorrow and to be thus at peace with ourselves and with the world at large. We must have something positive"[46]. That positive self is called "not-Self" (*anātman*).

Anātman ("not-Self"). It can be stated that the doctrine of *anātman* in Buddhism is universal, though it has many interpretations; various schools have different beliefs in the authenticity of conditional and unconditional "Self". Some state that *ātman* is made up of *skandhas*, others – that *ātman* is only a name. According to the 14th Dalai Lama, contradictions can be noticed even in Buddha's teaching about "Self" and "not-Self" which appear due to the different context, different audience, and different circumstances (Dalai Lama, 2003, 97). When it comes to the denial of existence of personality, person, and soul, it is the conditional "Self" (*ātman*). And when it comes to achieving *nirvāṇa*, it is the absolute "Self" (*anātman*). On the other hand, it is not the opposition of different aspects of "Self" (as an independent individual derivative). In order to emphasize illusionism of "Self" (*ātman*) and to encourage the real insight, "Self" is often belittled, though only in comparison with "not-Self". *Anātman* is the expression of *dharma-kāya* in the human spirit which, however, as long as a person is alive is manifested through will, images, imagination, desires, aspirations, etc., thus, through *ātman*.

Enlightenment is understanding of interaction between conditional and absolute "Self" (*ātman–anātman*), similar to understanding of an individual and the Absolute Oneness (*ātman–Brahman*) in Hinduism. Some schools (e. g. one of the earliest and later condemned schools – Vātsīputrīya) recognize that there is a certain self which is usually identified with Buddha's nature. However, Mahāyāna Buddhism states that human self is not eternal. Furthermore, all things are believed to be hollow – they do not have any grain of eternity inside.

This body is inert, like the earth; selfless, like water; lifeless, like fire; impersonal, like the wind; and non-substantial, like space. This body is unreal, being a collocation of the four main elements. It is void, not existing as self or as self-possessed (*Vimalakirti Sūtra*)

46. Suzuki D. T. *Mysticism Christian and Buddhist*. New York: Dover Publications. 2002. P. 39.

Empty and devoid of ego is the nature of all things. There is no individual being that in reality exists. Nor end nor beginning having, nor any middle course. All is a sham, there's no reality whaever; It is like unto a vision and a dream. […] Because of causes and conditions things are here: in them there is no self-nature (atman). […] All beings in the world, beyond words and expressions are they; their ultimate true nature, pure and true, is like unto vacuity of space (*Mahāyāna Abhisamaya Sūtra*).[47]

Hīnayāna Buddhism does not make such strict statements, though the idea of eternity of things or phenomena is also nurtured. *Anātman* is one of three essential signs of *all* phenomena (other two are *anitya* [impermanence] and *duḥkha* [suffering]). However, in the strict sense, there is no "Self" or "not-Self". The active denial of own "Self" would be the manifestation of dualistic thinking and extreme categoricalness, which is totally unacceptable to Buddhists. Therefore, understanding of the "Self" illusion is understanding that there is no one better or worse, no basis for comparison, no real differences, therefore, "there is nothing". Disappearance of the "Self" illusion is called awakening, as a person realizes the true nature of everything. However, if a person thinks of himself/herself as of the "Self" that achieved enlightenment, he/she has not yet enlightened.

The presumption of self is passion. The absence of self is the intrinsic nature of the mind. Reverend Upali, all things are without production, destruction, and duration, like magical illusions, clouds, and lightning; all things are evanescent, not remaining even for an instant; all things are like dreams, hallucinations, and unreal visions; all things are like the reflection of the moon in water and like a mirror-image; they are born of mental construction. (*Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra*).

– Does a holy one say within himself: I have obtained Perfective Enlightenment?

47. Quotations from Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 64. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 64).

– No, World-honored One. Wherefore? Because there is no such condition as that called "Perfective Enlightenment." World-honored one, if a holy one of Perfective Enlightenment said to himself "such am I," he would necessarily partake of the idea of an ego-entity, a personality, a being, or a separated individuality. (*Diamond Sūtra*, 9)

It can be noticed that Mahāyāna Buddhism also calls the "true" human state (*anātman*) the nature, like Daoism does. Since everything comes from the great Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), "there is nothing" relative to it, therefore, the Emptiness and non-existence of self are considered to be the true nature. Any belief in the "Self" reality is misleading ignorance (*avidyā*).

Avidyā – "ignorance", "delusion". It is the subjective aspect of *karma*, not knowing of the true meaning of our life causing new rebirths. Ignorance leads to attachment to worldly things and life, when phenomena are perceived as independent and separate from each other. According to Chögyam Trungpa, a representative of contemporary Tibetan Buddhism, "when we speak of "ignorance", we do not mean stupidity at all. In a sense, ignorance is very intelligent, but it is a completely two-way intelligence. That is to say, one purely reacts to one's projections rather than just seeing what it is"[48]. Such ignorance means the belief in existence of appositions (e. g. "Self"–the world, "Self"–you, good–bad). Attempts are made to assert own "Self" due to ignorance by devoting one's life to career, image creation, wealth accumulation or simply to self-nurturance.

Jñāna, vidyā ("recognition", "cognition", "knowledge") – general terms referring to knowledge, right cognition, understanding on the level of perception of daily life or doctrines; sometimes also called the manifestation of enlightened consciousness (*bodhi*). Mahāyāna Buddhism, like Hinduism, distinguishes two or three types of cognition. According to the Yogācāra school, there are three forms of

48. Chögyam Trungpa. Ego raida // *Religijų istorijos antologija*. II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas. (Ego Development // *Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Translated by E. Lapinskas. Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 384.

knowledge: illusion, conditional knowledge, and absolute knowledge. 1) Illusion (*parikalpita*) is knowledge based purely on subjective experiences and is inconsistent with common sense or objective reality (a mirage, reflection in the water, belief in the reality of "Self"). 2) Conditional cognition/knowledge (*paratantra*) comes from everyday experience abstracted by the mind. According to Buddhists, it is active not-seeing of what is obvious to our mind, i. e. of the highest level of being, spiritual life. 3) Absolute cognition/knowledge (*parinishpana*) – the synonym of *nirvāṇa*. Such absolute cognition/knowledge is present in all parts of the world and in all beings as the principle of creation, the principle of ethics and morality. Such knowledge is achieved by realizing all illusions, having refused own intellectual selfishness and having seen the connectivity between everything.

According to the Madhamaka school, there are two types of cognition/knowledge: conditional and transcendental truth: 1) conditional truth includes illusion and conditional knowledge according to the Yogācāra classification; 2) transcendental truth corresponds to the absolute knowledge. Described terms used are *aśūnya* and *śūnya* ("not empty" and "empty"). The absolute truth is empty, as it has nothing specific, real or individual, nothing that could become a concept. Absolute knowledge is not real, as empty as individual things are real. If the absolute truth is looked at not from the perspective of phenomena, but of the Absolute, Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), it would be neither empty, nor full, nor absolute, nor relative, nor real, nor unreal.

Therefore, in emptiness there is no form […] no ignorance or ending of ignorance […] no suffering, no accumulation, no cessation, no Way and no understanding and no attaining because nothing is attained (*The Heart Sūtra*).

Trikāya ("threefold/triple body", though here "body" stands not for the personality or definiteness, but for the systemic nature, fullness, harmony). In Hīnayāna Buddhism, the essence of Buddha was understood in a simple way: earthly, physical Buddha and Buddha's Consciousness – an aspect of Buddha's wisdom. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the image of Buddha is much more complicated, and faith is more philosophical. Therefore, the doctrine of *Trikāya* formed there

explaining the threefold manifestation of Buddha: *nirmāṇa-kāya, saṃbhoga-kāya,* and *dharma-kāya*.

Nirmāṇa-kāya is the emanation body or physical embodiment felt and seen by ordinary people. Buddha motivated by non-affectionate and compassionate love (*karuṇā*) is manifested in the human world to teach people and lead them to enlightenment. In Tantric Buddhism, it is the carnal aspect of Buddha.

Saṃbhoga-kāya is the body of enjoyment or bliss. Like *nirmāṇa-kāya*, it also comes directly from *dharma-kāya*. This concept means that Buddha participates in life of higher beings through their meditations and visions, and spreads his teaching for *bodhisattvas* spirits and divine beings. It is a very delicate body which ordinary people do not realize, feel, and see. In Tibetan Buddhism with the prevailing Tantric tradition, *saṃbhoga-kāya* is equated with the linguistic aspect of Buddha's activities.

Dharma-kāya is the Truth Body of Buddha which is the basis of other two bodies. Buddha himself said, "Whoever sees Buddha, sees *Dharma* (his teaching), and whoever sees *Dharma*, sees Buddha." In early schools of Buddhism, *dharma-kāya* was understood simply as the participation of Buddha in the present through his teaching *Dharma*. More meanings of *dharma-kāya* appeared later. *Saṃbhoga-kāya* and *nirmāṇa-kāya* are conditional and temporary bodies; *dharma-kāya* is the eternal body. This concept means that Buddha (and all Buddhas) is identical in their essence to the absolute truth, the absolute reality. *Dharma-kāya*, as the Truth Body of Buddha, does not appear and disappear; it was not born with him, but it existed for centuries and did not die with him. *Dharma-kāya* is even higher than *nirvāṇa*, therefore, it can be stated that Buddha did not achieve *nirvāṇa* and did not go to *parinirvāṇa* (i. e. to complete *nirvāṇa*). His Truth Body is beyond *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, beyond all opposites. It is an ineffable, intangible "body" – the principle of being and truth. In Tibetan Buddhism, *dharma-kāya* is equivalent to Buddha's Consciousness.

When all possible obstacles caused by [material, intellectual and emotional] mistakes have been overcome, when all possible blissful dharmas have been saved and there is nothing except Suchness [Bhūta-tathatā] and knowledge of Suchness – it is what dharma-kāya is. The first two

forms of Tathagata are conditional levels of being; the last one is the true reality, the source of the former two (*Suvarṇa-prabhāsottama Sūtra,* 3)[49].

Dharma-kāya. *Dharma* in Buddhist writings stands for both smallest elements of matter and things, phenomena, ideas, images, religious doctrines, Buddha's teaching, the path to enlightenment. The latter meanings, according to D. T. Suzuki, are very close to the Chinese term *Dào* ("way") used by Confucians more in its moral sense, and Daoists use it to express the concepts of "truth", "higher reality"[50]. Therefore, *dharma-kāya* also has many meanings in Mahāyāna Buddhism: the body of being, the body of teaching, the body of law, the principle of cosmic order. The main statement of the Upanishads: *tat tvam asi* ("That you are") standing for the complete identity of *ātmana* and *Brahmana* in Buddhism stands for the unity of all phenomena and all beings in *dharma-kāya*. It is the highest absolute being which is in the essence of all partial and conditional beings. In Buddhism, it is called *dharma-kāya* ("body of Dharma") in the religious aspect, *bhūta-tathatā* ("suchness") in the ontological aspect, and *bodhi* ("enlightened consciousness") in the psychological aspect.

Dharma-kāya is not a person as the Christian God, though it has aspects of will, intellect, and sensitivity. It is also not entirely impersonal as Hindu *Brahman*. *Bodhi* is the expression of *dharma-kāya* in the human mind; *karuṇā* is the reflection of *dharma-kāya* in human feelings and actions. The "personalism" is revealed through *karuṇa*, as it "seeks" welfare for all living beings, though *dharma-kāya* is not called a person.

It is also said that *dharma-kāya* has will which is radically different from the human will, which is always conditioned by both external and internal actions and contradictions. Will is manifested through the decision of *dharma-kāya* to lead the whole universe to good despite partial and temporary evil. *Dharma-kāya* is the religious aspect of the Absolute connecting consciousness, will, feeling, and action. It

49. Quotations from Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 258. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 258).

50. Cf. Suzuki D. T. *Mysticism Christian and Buddhist*. New York: Dover Publications. 2002. P. 18.

is important to remember that it is not human love, wisdom, and will. *Dharma-kāya* is the Oneness; therefore, these aspects can be distinguished only by looking from the human perspective.

Dharma-kāya, even though manifested in the three-dimensional world, is immaculate and free from passionate desires. It spreads here and there, echoing everywhere to the call of karma. It is not the individual reality, not false existence, but universal and pure being. Dharma-kāya does not come out of nowhere and does not go to nowhere; it does not prove itself and is undeniable and indestructible. It is always calm and permanent. Dharma-kāya is the Oneness without any definitions. This body of Dharma has no boundaries, no sides, though it is incarnated in all bodies. Freedom or spontaneity of Dharma-kāya is as unreachable as its presence in all corporeal things. It has all bodily forms, it can create anything. By incarnating in any specific material body by karmic nature and condition, dharma-kāya sanctifies all bodies. Being a treasury of consciousness, it is free of particularity. There is no place in the world where the body of Dharma would not rule. The world is suffering from the change, though this Body remains unchanged. It is free of all contradictions and opposites. It acts in all beings and leads them to enlightenment (*Avataṃsaka Sūtra, XXXIV*)[51].

Śūnyatā ("emptiness", "nothingness") – one of the most important concepts of Buddhism. It is typically used to indicate the inexpressibility, indefinability of the reality. Our consciousness is also a part of the reality, though it mostly tends to things/forms. Emptiness is in both things and our consciousness.

Form does not differ from emptiness; emptiness does not differ from form. Form itself is emptiness; emptiness itself is form. (*The Heart Sutra*).

Manjusri: What is "empty" about emptiness?
Vimalakirti: Constructions are empty, because of emptiness.
Manjusri: Can emptiness be conceptually constructed?

51. Quotations from Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 227–228. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 227–228).

Vimalakirti: Even that concept is itself empty, and emptiness cannot construct emptiness. (*Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra,* 309b).

D. T. Suzuki provides the following comparison of *śūnyata*. The hare or rabbit has no horns; the turtle has no hair growing on its back. This is one form of emptiness; however, *śūnyatā* does not mean absence. Fire has been burning until now and there is no more of it. This is another kind of emptiness; however, *śūnyatā* does not mean extinction. The wall screens the room: on this side there is a table, and on the other side there is nothing, space is unoccupied; however, *śūnyatā* does not mean vacancy. Emptiness is beyond the relationship and opposition, beyond quantity and lack, beyond time, space, becoming[52].

The fact that "things do not exist" (as it is often stated in Buddhist texts) does not mean that a person does not see them, does not feel or realize their physical presence. It means that nothing else matters to this person compared to Emptiness. Such a belief and the idea of *śūnyatā* are especially important in Zen Buddhism, which rejects any authority of writings, idea or person. It corresponds to the statement of 9th century of Chán monk Lin-chi I-hsüan that "If you meet Buddha, kill Buddha", which was supposed to encourage disciples to seek truth and enlightenment not outside, but inside. However, emptiness is not something which could be left in the "world" and whose opposite could be found having escaped "inside". Aspects of emptiness listed in *Lankavatara Sūtra*:

The Blessed One replied: What is emptiness, indeed! It is a term whose very self-nature is false-imagination, but because of one's attachment to false-imagination we are obliged to talk of emptiness, no-birth, and no self-nature. There are seven kinds of emptiness: emptiness of mutuality which is non-existence; emptiness of individual marks; emptiness of self-nature; emptiness of no-work, emptiness of work; emptiness of all things in the sense that they are unpredictable, and emptiness in its highest sense of Ultimate Reality. (*Lankavatara Sūtra*, 3).

52. Suzuki D. T. *Mysticism Christian and Buddhist*. New York: Dover Publications. 2002. P. 27–28.

Thus, *śūnyatā* is not nihilistic vacuum, "soulless emptiness" from which monks are constantly encouraged to turn their mind away, as from other forms, temporality, torment, evil, self-consciousness (cf. *Budhaghoṣa „Viśuddhimagga*" XVI. 90). *Śūnyatā* means that the reality perceived, felt by us is nothing relative to the absolute reality, though *śūnyatā* is also the equivalent of another term – *bhūta-tathatā* ("true suchness", "true nature"). However, according to the 14th Dalai Lama, even though the cognition of *śūnyatā* means essential liberation from attachment to "Self" and destruction of the latter when becoming *anātman*, it does not mean that we lose our identity or disappear after merging with Buddha. It stands for a whole new level, where one is like Buddha, a completely enlightened being[53].

Bodhi ("knowledge", "wisdom"; in Mahāyāna Buddhism – "awakening", "enlightenment", often the synonym of *nirvāṇa*) – insight of concentrated consciousness. According to Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg, *bodhi* in Hīnayāna Buddhism was understood simply as knowledge. Mahāyāna Buddhism believes that the essence of *bodhi* is *karuṇā* and *prajñā*, as it is the manifestation of *dharma-kāya* in us. Thus, *bodhi* can be compared to divine wisdom of the Christian terminology, though only taking into account essential religious differences[54]. According to Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg, in Mahāyāna Buddhism "the only difference between Buddha and many fallible people is that *bodhi* is not manifested in all its power in the latter"[55].

Bodhicitta is a closely related term meaning "enlightened mind" in both a cosmic and an individual sense. According to A. Beinorius, it is "the comprehensive self-determination, opening or constant

53. Dalai Lama. *Tyra širdis. Jėzaus mokymas budisto akimis (The Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective on the Teachings of Jesus*). Translated by Maceina S. Vilnius: Dialogo kultūros institutas. 2003. P. 95.
54. Cf. Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 96; 291. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 96; 291).
55. Ibid. P. 287–288.

existential turning back to the pure Buddha's nature in oneself"[56]. Thus, similarities with the Confucian concept *xin* (*sin*) standing for "heart-mind" can be found. However, it must be kept in mind that the main concepts of Confucianism are understood in a more rational way and express ethical beliefs and ideals, while in Buddhism, especially in Mahāyāna Buddhism, any rationality serves religious purposes. D. T. Suzuki offers to translate term *bodhicitta* as "enlightened heart", as it is more often used to emphasize a religious rather than a rational aspect. *Bodhicitta* is a form, expression of *dharma-kāyos*, though it must be remembered that *bodhicitta*, *dharma-kāya* and their relationship are merely different forms of the same Reality[57]. Then, it is easier to understand why, on the one hand, *bodhi*, *bodhicitta* refer to enlightenment, though, on the other hand, they are not a feature of the enlightened only. According to the Tibetan teacher Gampopa, "all living beings have Buddha's nature. […] as if you press a sesame seed, you will have oil, and whereas if you churn milk, butter will appear, so Buddha's nature can reveal itself in all beings"[58]. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, beings with almost perfectly revealed Buddha's nature are called *bodhisattvas*.

Bodhisattva (*bodhi* – "knowledge", "enlightenment"; *sat-tva* – "existence", "what is") – "enlightened being", "being seeking enlightenment", "being whose essence is enlightenment". This ideal is very important in addition to Buddha's ideal and peculiar only to Mahāyāna Buddhism. *Bodhisattvas* are on the path to Buddha's existence through wisdom and love. These are not some privileged people occupying a better social position or representatives of the people. D.

56. Beinorius A. *Sąmonė klasikinėje Indijos filosofijoje* (*Consciousness in Classical Indian Philosophy).* Vilnius: Kultūros, filosofijos ir meno institutas (Vilnius: Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute). 2002. P. 464.
57. Cf. Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 292. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 292).
58. Gampopa. Apie paskatą, dvasios draugus ir laikinumą // *Religijų istorijos antologija.* II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas (On Incentive, Spiritual Friends and Impermanence // *Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 359–360.

T. Suzuki states that we all are *bodhisattvas* when we believe that we all are rewarded with the highest consciousness for which we all can achieve enlightenment[59].

In Sūtras, *bodhisattvas* are described as a group separate from *pratyekabuddhas* ("a lone thinker") and *śrāvakas* ("hearer"), and *arhats* ("the worthy one", "the one who achieved [enlightenment]"). *Arhat* – the ideal of Hīnayāna – is not reborn after death. The main difference from Buddha is that *arhat* achieves enlightenment with the assistance of others (teachers, texts), and Buddha – by himself. On the other hand, Buddha is also *arhat* ("the one who achieved enlightenment"). The Tibetan teacher Gampopa (1079–1153) says about others seeking enlightenment:

"The Shravakas" are those who are afraid of samsara and seek nirvana, though have little compassion. […] The Pratyekabudhas are those who […] are very proud, do not speak about their teachers and like to live in solitude. […] The way of life of the Shravakas and the Pratyekabudhas is different. They reach their goals, though nirvana which they say to have experienced is not real. […] they generally remain in the body of mind acquired through pure actions (*Gampopa. On Incentive, Spiritual Friends and Impermanence*)[60].

Shravakas and *Pratyekabudhas* seek ultimate enlightenment through austerity and theoretical philosophy, far from the life of ordinary people. They do not care about universal prosperity and enlightenment. Early Hīnayāna Buddhism had no idea of universal enlightenment. Rescue of all beings was seen as Buddha's ability and goal only. Buddha's followers can and must seek enlightenment, though only personal, and they do not even have to share joy they achieve. *Shravakas* and *Pratyekabudhas* avoided being among ordinary people

59. Cf. Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 31; 78; 282. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 31; 78; 282).
60. Quotations from *Religijų istorijos antologija.* II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas (*Anthology of the History of Religion.* Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 356.

seeking to remain completely spiritually pure. Their faith in Buddha and his teaching was very accurate, orthodox, though passive. According to D. T. Suzuki, they did not trust their own powers and that others could be helped at all[61].

The ideal of Mahāyāna Buddhism – *bodhisattva* – seeks to act in the same way as Buddha, and, having achieved enlightenment, does not limit himself to it, does not enjoy its pleasures, but devotes his entire life to well-being of other people. He does not deny the principle of *karma*, but rather the opposite – he seeks to help others understand it. Even though *bodhisattva* himself stays in the cycle of *saṃsāra*, he remains perfectly pure as the lotus flower growing in a swamp, though spotless. As said in Sūtra, although "bodhisattvas die, they do not stop planting the roots of virtue. Their birth is also not related to the flow of wickedness (*Sūtra of Vimalakirti's Teaching*, 364a). In addition, Mahāyāna Buddhists believe that *karma* of every person met comes in contact with *bodhisattva's karma* as well. He directs the fruit of his good *karma* to the benefit of other beings. According to Vajrayāna sage Āryadeva (170–270):

Those of the Small Vehicle / fear death in every step they make. / And those with spirit liberated from internal fight, / [know that] their consciousness lives forever. / Those of the Great Vehicle / are recognized by compassion. / By "shooting" with a bow, / which has a string of wisdom, by taking care of beings, they, / greatly brave and skilled in methods, / dispel the eternal sleep of mind. / Thus, liberating their spirit from internal fight, / which is difficult to free from, they liberate others from it as well (*Āryadeva. Clarification of Consciousness* 52–54).[62]

All actions, thoughts, feelings of *bodhisattva* "flow" from *bodhicitta* making up his/her essence. Therefore, the action of *bodhisattva*,

61. Cf. Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 278–280. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 278–280).
62. Quotations from *Religijų istorijos antologija*. II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas (*Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 336.

calm, non-violent, self-affecting the environment, can be compared with the inaction of the Daoist sage (*wú wéi*).

Prājña ("insight", "wisdom"). In Hinduism, it stands for the blissful state, when the individual soul briefly merges with Brahman. Mahāyāna Buddhism emphasizes the connection between *prajñā* and *karuṇā* in both the *dharma-kāya* doctrine and the *bodhisattva* ideal. Insight (*prajñā*) helps to understand that all people suffer; therefore, everyone is worth compassion and love (*karuṇā*). Indeed, having realized the *Four Noble Truths*, compassion naturally arises for all living beings. It is intuitive knowledge possessed by all people, though most have this knowledge "blurred", therefore, one must always seek the perfection of wisdom. However, *prajñā* is also insight of Emptiness and Oneness, therefore, like other perfections, it cannot be "achieved" through some practice.

There is no suffering, no accumulation, no cessation, no Way and no understanding and no attaining. Because nothing is attained, the Bodhisattva, through reliance on Prajna paramita, is unimpeded in his mind. Because there is no impediment, he is not afraid, and he leaves distorted dream-thinking far behind (*The Heart Sūtra*).

Good men and good women seeking the Consummation of Incomparable Enlightenment must create this resolved attitude of mind: I must liberate all living beings, yet when all have been liberated, verily not any one is liberated. Wherefore? If a Bodhisattva cherishes the idea of an ego-entity, a personality, a being, or a separated individuality, he is consequently not a Bodhisattva, Subhuti. This is because in reality there is no formula which gives rise to the Consummation of Incomparable Enlightenment (*The Diamond Sūtra*, 17).

A. Kugevičius states that *prajñā pāramitā* "is not stagnant perfect wisdom, but a completely open insight space, not obscured by images. From [its] perspective, even holy Buddha's teaching [*Dharma*] is not real"[63]. An enlightened person harmoniously blends into the

63. Kugevičius A. Paaiškinimai // *Mažoji Tibeto budizmo antologija*, III dalis. Beribės įžvalgos sūtros (Explanations // *Small Anthology of Tibetan Buddhism,* Part 3. Sūtras of Boundless Insight), translated by A. Kugevičius and S. Maceina. Kaunas: R. Anankos leidykla (R. Ananka Publishing House). 2004. P. 162.

world, as he/she sees it and himself/herself as the whole. However, it should not be assumed that such a person completely fails to realize himself/herself as an object separate from the world or completely stops thinking. According to Buddhists, enlightenment means understanding of the unity between an action and an actor; such understanding is possible by looking not from the outside, but from the inside. According to D. T. Suzuki, it does not mean that "Self" goes beyond its limits to see itself. "Self" stays in itself and watches itself. But as soon as a split takes place between "Self" as an actor and "Self" as a seer or a spectator, the true insight (*prajñā*) is lost[64].

Karuṇā ("compassion", "love") – a multifaceted concept which has no exact equivalent in the Western culture. It is most close to the Christian idea of *caritas/agape*. The idea of *Karuṇa* is not the unique concept of Mahāyāna Buddhism as it might seem when discussing the ideal of *bodhisattva*. Theravāda texts also tell about it.

He [monk] spreads compassion-filled (karuṇā) consciousness in one, then second, third and fourth directions. Above, below and across, in all directions, widely, he fills the whole world with compassion-filled (karuṇā) consciousness – infinite, expanded, spread, liberated from hatred and offensiveness (*Dīgha Nikāya III.* 223).

A. Beinorius notes that *karuṇā* as well as other three features mentioned next to each other in the Theravāda text are also important in Hindu *Yoga Sūtra* (I. 33) as a means for *karma* brightening, consciousness clarification[65].

Mahāyāna Buddhism emphasizes the inseparability of *karuṇa* from *prajña* and *dharma-kāya*. *Karuṇā* is universal love, as it spreads to all beings through people from *dharma-kāya*. Bodhisattva transmits this love to others like a pure conductor.

If there is a great Bodhisattva who is replete with kindness and compassion (karuṇā), who recites this Sutra repeatedly before all animals,

64. Suzuki D. T. *Mysticism Christian and Buddhist*. New York: Dover Publications. 2002. P. 40.
65. Beinorius A. *Sąmonė klasikinėje Indijos filosofijoje (Consciousness in Classical Indian Philosophy)*. Vilnius: Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute. 2002. P. 286.

birds, wild lives, snakes, worms, rats, ant and others, so that they will hear this Sutra in their original consciousness, then these beings will each attain liberation from their group and kinds with the strength of Sutra and Mantra. (*Dhāraṇī Sūtra*).

When the mind is impartial towards all living beings, one can accomplish full and perfect great compassion. By using the mind of great compassion to accord with living beings, one perfects the offering of the Dharma to the Buddha's. In this way the Bodhisattva constantly accords with living beings. (*Avataṃsaka Sūtra*).

Karuṇā is completely free of any human desires or passions; it spreads by itself, without any conscious and purposeful efforts. On the other hand, *karuṇā* is not something occupying the place of all emotions, feelings and experiences, therefore, it is said that the source of passionate desire is *karuṇā* itself[66]. Erotic love can be called passion, though it can also be a part of *karuṇa*. *Karuṇā* is comprehensive love; therefore, it cannot be equated only with religious love, kindness, love of neighbour or compassion. *Karuṇā* is also inseparable from *śūnyata*, as self-denial, i. e. becoming *anātman*, is the basis and condition of this love – comprehensive and compassionate to all living beings. In this sense, *karuṇā* as well as *nirvāṇa* has two aspects – negative (Buddhist "indifference") and positive (active love).

Nirvāṇa ("extinguishing") – liberation from laws of *karma*, *saṃsāra*; the goal of the *Noble Eightfold Path*. Theoretically, *nirvāṇa* is the dissipation of ignorance, ethically – the destruction of selfishness and awakening of love, religiously – complete subjugation of own "Self" to *dharma-kāya*.

This term is often interpreted incorrectly. According to A. Beinorius, "even though the nature of nirvana cannot be cognized through rational reasoning, the Western culture has entrenched nihilistic, pessimistic understanding of nirvana "as the end of thinking and life" not corresponding to fundamental ideas of Buddhist psychol-

66. Suzuki D. T. *Mysticism Christian and Buddhist*. New York: Dover Publications. 2002. P. 73–74; 100.

ogy and soteriology"[67]. *Nirvāṇa* undoubtedly has two aspects – negative and positive. The negative aspect is the death of "Self", rejection of subjectivity, calming of all passions and desires, extinction of attachment. Early Buddhist schools limited themselves to this negative aspect. According to A. Beinorius, "Theravada Buddhists separated and opposed the ordinary human state (*saṃsāra*) and liberation (*nirvāṇa*) which was interpreted as the highest reality"[68]. Such teaching was closer to Hinduism. Yoga school taught to separate *puruṣa* from *prakṛti* through meditation; Vedānta schools taught to merge with Brahman. Early Buddhism also sought complete destruction of earthly life, as it believed that it was the only way to get liberated from torment and *saṃsāra*. The Mahāyāna tradition puts more emphasis on the fact that *saṃsāra* is not the permanent, real change, that it is merely an illusion, as everything else is.

No letting go, no attainment, no annihilation, no permanence, no cessation, no birth: that is spoken of as nirvana. Nirvana is not a thing. Then it would follow that it would have the characteristics of aging and death. There does not exist any thing that is without aging and death. (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,* 25. 3–4).[69]

The Mahāyāna tradition distinguished not only negative, but also another *nirvāṇa* dimension. The positive aspect is freedom, revelation of the true nature, fruition of being. According to D. T. Suzuki, Buddha himself most probably had no specific theory or concept of *nirvāṇa* and, like most great teachers, declared his ideas depending on a specific situation. Therefore, when looking superficially, some

67. Beinorius A. *Sąmonė klasikinėje Indijos filosofijoje (Consciousness in Classical Indian Philosophy)*. Vilnius: Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute. 2002. P. 479.
68. Beinorius A. Remarks to the text *Vidurio kelio posmai (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way)* in the book *Religijų istorijos antologija*. II dalis. Islamas. Budizmas. Hinduizmas (*Anthology of the History of Religion*. Part 2. Islam. Buddhism. Hinduism). Vilnius: Vaga. 2002. P. 306–307.
69. Nagarjuna. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. English translation by Stephen Batchelor. Sharpham College, 2000. Retrieved from http://www.stephenbatchelor.org/index.php/en/verses-from-the-center

descriptions of *nirvāṇa* might seem contradictory[70]. *Nirvāṇa* in the broadest metaphysical sense is a synonym of Suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) or *dharma-kāya*. When referred to Buddha's entry into complete *nirvāṇa*, it means the end, extinction, death and liberation of physical and material existence from rebirth. When referred to *nirvāṇa* comparing it with *saṃsāra* or what symbolizes it, i. e. passions, desires, dirty consciousness, *nirvāṇa* stands for eternal life, immortality, fullness of being, pure consciousness, which appears having realized the existence of *dharma-kāya* in all separate beings.

According to *Vijñānamātra śastra*[71], there are 4 forms of *nirvāṇa*:

1) *absolute nirvāṇa,* synonym of *dharma-kāya*. It is the unchanging reason and basis of the whole reality; 2) *sopādhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* ("*nirvāṇa* with residue") – enlightenment which can be achieved in this life, having liberated yourself from illusions, passions, and attachment, though remaining dependent on *saṃsāra*; 3) *nirupādhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* (elsewhere *anupādhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*; "*nirvāṇa* without residue") – a synonym of *parinirvāṇa*. It is achieved when the enlightened one gets liberated from birth–death, as well as from passions and attachment, and is no longer reborn; 4) *apratiṣṭa-nirvāṇa* ("without a place", "non-localized *nirvāṇa*") – the ideal state in Mahāyāna Buddhism. A person becomes Buddha – completely free of any attachment, birth and death, even free of *nirvāṇa* as the complete state of calmness. Driven by *karuṇa*, i. e. boundless love, such a person does not leave the birth–death cycle only to lead other beings to enlightenment. Thus, the following is said about such *nirvāṇa*:

Samsara does not have the slightest distinction from Nirvana. Nirvana does not have the slightest distinction from Samsara. Whatever is the end of Nirvana, that is the end of Samsara. There is not even a very subtle slight distinction between the two. (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,* 25. 3–4, 19–20).[72]

70. Cf. Судзуки Д. Т. *Основные принципы буддизма Махаяны*, пер. Пахомов С. В. Санкт-Петербург: НАУКА. 2002. С. 68. (Suzuki D. T. *The Main Principles of Mahayana Buddhism*, translated by Pakhomov S. V. St. Petersburg: SCIENCE: 2002. P. 68).
71. Ibid. P. 336-339.
72. Nagarjuna. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. English translation by Stephen Batchelor. Sharpham College, 2000. Retrieved from http://www.stephenbatchelor.org/index.php/en/verses-from-the-center

Test questions:

1. What are the main differences between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna directions?
2. What is the difference between the Buddhist doctrine of *ātman* and the Hindu doctrine of *ātman?*
3. What forms of knowledge/cognition are distinguished and how are they related to the concept of *anātman?*
4. What is the relationship between the *dharma-kāya* doctrine and the *bodhisattva* ideal?
5. What is the relationship between *śūnyata* and *karuṇā?*
6. Which level of *nirvāṇa* are *Shravakas* and *Pratyekabudhas* on?
7. What is the relationship between the law of *saṃsāra* and various forms of *nirvāṇa?*
8. Compare the Buddhist ideal of *bodhisattva* with the Daoist ideal of the sage; with the Confucian ideal; with aspiration in Hinduism.

Recommended literature:

1. *Buddhism between Tibet and China*. Edited by Matthew T. Kapstein. Boston: Wisdom, 2009.
2. *Buddhist Texts through the Ages*. Translated from Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Japanese and Apabhramsa. Edited by Edward Conze. New York: Harper & Row, 2004.
3. JeeLoo Liu. *An Introduction to Chinese philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism*. Malden: Blackwell 2006.
4. Keiji Nishitani. *On Buddhism*. Translated by Seisaku Yamamoto and Robert E. Albany (N.Y.): State University of New York Press, 2006.
5. Keown D. *A Dictionary of Buddhism*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004.
6. Nakamura H. *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India-China-Tibet-Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1971.
7. Prebish, Charles S. and Keown, D. *Introducing Buddhism*. London: Routledge, 2007.
8. Suzuki D. T. *Mysticism Christian and Buddhist*. New York: Dover Publications. 2002.
9. *Sutras* on-line. http://buddhasutra.com/

ANNEXES

Hassan Hanafi[73]

From Orientalism to Occidentalism

Orientalism as a field of research emerged in the West in modern times, since the renaissance. It appeared during the second cycle of the history of the West, after the classical period and the Patristics, the Medieval time and the Scholastics. It reached its peak in the 19th century, and paralleled the development of other Western schools of thought such as rationalism, historicism, and structuralism.

Orientalism has been the Victim of historicism from its formation, via meticulous and microscopic analysis, indifferent to meaning and significance. Orientalism expresses the searching subject more than it describes the object of research. It reveals Western mentality more than intuiting Oriental Soul. It is motivated by the anguish of gathering the maximum of useful information about countries, peoples and cultures of the Orient. The West, in its expansion outside its geographic borders, tried to understand better in order to dominate better. Knowledge is power. Classical Orientalism belongs for the most part to similar aspects of colonial culture in the West such as Imperialism, Racism, Nazism, Fascism a package of hegemonic Ideologies and European Supremacy. It is a Western activity, an expression of Western Elan Vital, determining the power relationship between the Self and the Other; between the West and the Non West; between Europe from one side and Asia, Africa and Latin America, from the other side; between the New Word and the classical world; between modern times and ancient times.

73. Dr. Hassan Hanafi (1935–) is a professor of Philosophy at Cairo University. Text retrieved from http://www.fortschritt-weltweit.de/dokumente/aegypten/fortschritt_aegypten_hanafi.pdf

This brutal judgement, without nuances, is undoubtedly a severe and painful one, but a real one on the level of historical unconsciousness of peoples, on the level of images even if it is inaccurate enough on the level of concepts. On the contrary, Occidentalism is a discipline constituted in Third World countries in order to complete the process of decolonization. Military, economic and political decolonization would be incomplete without scientific and cultural decolonization. Insofar as colonized countries before or after liberation are objects of study, decolonization will be incomplete. Decolonization will not be completed until the liberation of the object to become subject and the transformation of the observed to an observer. The object of study in Orientalism becomes the studying subject in Occidentalism, and the studying subject in Orientalism becomes an object of study in Occidentalism. There is no eternal studying subject and no eternal object of study. It depends on the power relationship between peoples and cultures. Roles change throughout history. Peoples in the Ancient World, China, India, Persia, Babylonia, Egypt, were studying subjects. Peoples and Islamic classical cultures were previously studying subjects and Europeans at the time were objects of study. The role changed in modern times when Europeans became the studying subject and the Muslim world became an object of study. The end of Orientalism and the beginning of Occidentalism means exchanging roles for a third time in the subject object relationship between the Self and the Other. The West ceases to be subject and becomes object, and the Orient ceases to be object and becomes subject. Subjective Idealism switches from Western colonial modem times to Third World post-colonial new times. Cogito ergo Sum, which declared the West as a knowing subject, becomes in the third world studio ergo summ.

Occidentalism is a counter-field of research which can be developed in the Orient in order to study the West from a non-Western World point of view. The Other in the self is always an image. An image is always a caricature which helps in shooting at the target. Orientalism drew many images for the Orient. These included Blacks, Yellows, Oriental Despotism, primitive mentality, savage thought, Semite mind, Arab mind, Violence, fanaticism, underdevelopment, dependence, sectarianism, traditionalism and conservatism. Once

the Other is caricatured, it is easy to deal with him, justifying any action of the Self. The image made the Other a target the Self shoots at. Besides, the Self promotes self-made image to sharpen itself, such as: whites, Western, democracy, logical mentality, civilization, Arianism, peace, tolerance, development and even over development, independence, secularism, modernism, progress. By the power of mass media and its control by the West, the perpetuation and the repetition of this double image was made by the self to disarm the Other and to arm the Self, to create a permanent relation of superiority-inferiority complex between the Occident and the Orient, and a relationship of inferiority-superiority complex between the Orient and the Occident.

If Orientalism was the creation of the center, occidentalism is the creation of the periphery. The center was also privileged in history of sciences, arts and cultures, while the periphery, was marginalized. The center creates and the periphery consumes, the center sees and conceptualizes. The center is the master and in the periphery lays the disciple. The center is the trainer and the periphery is the trainee. Occidentalism, as a new science, can exchange this type of relationship, with the fixed roles played by the two, for reverse relationships and roles. Orientalism is born in an ethno-racist culture. It expresses Euro-centerism, based on historical pride and organic superiority. This pits White against Black, knowledge against ignorance, logic against contradiction, reason against magic, rationalization against ethico-religious practice, dignity and human rights against dignity and rights of God or of the king, democracy versus despotism or in short, Life against death, Being against nothingness. Occidentalism corrects this type of relationship between the West as Self and the Orient as Other to the Orient as self and the West as Other. The relation between the self and the Other, either way, can be an equal relation, not a high-low relation, an even and sane inter-subjective relation instead of a superiority-inferiority complex. Constructive Occidentalism is the substitute for destructive Orientalism.

The history of the world was written as if the West was the very center of the Universe and the end of history. History of ancient civilizations was reduced to the minimum. History of modern times in the West is blown up to the maximum. Three thousand years of the

Orient are summarized in one chapter, while five hundred years of history of the modern West is expounded in several chapters. Orientalism was the victim of Western philosophies of history, which conceived Europe as the peak of all civilizations, the fruits in modern times after planting the seeds in ancient times, the accomplishment of a theological development, the perfection of things after the abrogation of all previous imperfections, the unique Christ after the prophets of Israel, repeated in history. Occidentalism aims at evening the balance of World historiography against this historical injustice in history of world civilization.

Neutrality and objectivity were claimed to be the conditions of Western science. However, Orientalism is neither neutral nor objective. It is an oriented and committed discipline, expressing the inclinations and the profound motivation in European consciousness. It reveals the passions of the subject, more than it describes the neutral object. It substitutes for the independent object the mental image of the subject. Neutrality and Objectivity appear to be a cover-up for partiality and subjectivism. Occidentalism is just the opposite. It is not motivated by rancor or the desire to dominate. It does not consciously or unconsciously deform the object by stereotyped images, or make value-judgements on it. It tries to be a vigourous science by its object, method and purpose. The desire to liberate one's self from the yoke of the image imposed on him by the Other is a creative power, unveiling the truth of power relationships between the subject and the object in Orientalism, controlling the Other by the image, or in Occidentalism, liberating one's self from the image imposed on him by the other. Occidentalism may produce counter-images for the Other, with its desire to dominate, and for the self, with a self-producing image of endogenous creativity, as a desire for self-liberation.

The object of Occidentalism is to counterbalance Westernization tendencies in the Third World. The West became a model of modernization outside itself, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Western Life style became very common in Non-Western countries, especially in the ruling classes. The imitation of the West became almost a national behavior. These Westernization tendencies have generated anti-Western attitudes as they appear in religious conservatism and

fundamentalism. Occidentalism is partly a defense of national character, national culture and national life-style against alienation and disloyalty; a popular option against Orientalism as a minority option; a mass culture against Orientalism as an elite culture; an ideology for the ruled against Orientalism as an ideology of the ruler; a liberating device like liberation theology against Orientalism as a dominating device, like church dogmatics.

National culture everywhere in the Third World is split between two antagonistic tendencies. Each is presenting itself as the true representative of the people, the first in the name of modernity, the second in the name of Tradition. In the case of the Arab World, the West is a model of modernization in the three major trends in modern Arabic Thought: Religious Reform founded by Al-Afghani, Secular Scientism initiated by Shebly Shmayyel, and political Liberalism conceived by Al-Tahtawi. In these three trends, the West is a model of knowledge, that is of power, industry, urbanism, democracy, multi-party system, constitution, freedom of press, human rights. This is the image of Europe during the enlightenment. The difference between the three trends is of degree, not of nature. Once national passion calms down, Westernization appears as loyalty to the West and a life style for the ruling class. Cultural dependence on the West generates a gradual loss of national independence. Occidentalism as a science gives the priority to the endogenous over the exogenous, to the interior over the exterior, to the Self over the Other, to autonomy over heteronomy.

Occidentalism as a cultural movement aims at transforming developing societies from transfer of knowledge to cultural creativity. Since the National liberation era, the construction of the Nation State is based on modern sciences coming from the West. The role of intellectuals and even of scientists was to transfer science, art, and literature from the Western to the non-Western World. The West produces and the non- Western World consumes. The West creates and the non-Western World transmits. National cultures became conveyers of foreign systems and ideologies. The Culture of the center radiates on the peripheries. The center profuses and the peripheries diffuse. Occidentalism can help the Third World in sharing the creation, not just the diffusion, of a common cultural homeland for all humanity.

Science emerges from reality, not from pre-formulated texts in the ancient tradition or in the modern West. Conceptualization is not the monopoly of European consciousness. It is a human effort, accessible to every human consciousness. The long and painful work of creativity is preferable to the laziness of consumption and imitation, to the transfer to one's self of concepts formulated elsewhere. Peoples in the Third World can then reach the age of maturity and get rid of Western cultural tutorship.

The scientific data of this new science, Occidentalism, can be drawn from two sources: First, the criticism of European culture by Third World intellectuals, based on simple intuitions and existential reactions or on scientific analysis and demonstrative arguments. Before and after national liberation, national intellectuals in Africa, Asia and Latin America tried to liberate their national cultures from the hegemony and supremacy of Western culture. The critic of the Other and the perception of his limits is the pre-requisite of self-liberation from the control of the Other. The mentality, the history and the culture of the Other are distinct from the soul, the history and the culture of the Self. Indiginismo, Liberation Theology in Latin America, Conscientism and Negritude in Africa, base and democratic movements in Asia. All are examples of national creativity.

The second source of critique of European Consciousness is made inside the West by the Europeans themselves, their thinkers and philosophers. Rousseau criticizes arts, sciences, literature and their negative influence on individual and social ethics. Spengler declares the "Decline of the West." Max Scheler speaks of the reversal of values. Nietzsche evokes general nihilism and announces the death of God. Husserl and Bergson deplore the loss of life, "Erlebnis," "vecu" in European Consciousness, which became bankrupt for Husserl, and machines creating gods for Bergson. Nietzsche declares "God is dead", Derridea and the post-modernists declare "Man is dead," and Barthes even declares "The Author is dead!" This double testimony, external and internal, constitutes the already-existing data of Occidentalism as science.

Besides, there is also primary data, the works produced by European consciousness itself as symptoms of European Lebenswelt, the barometer of Being and Nothingness, of life and death of cultures and

civilizations. This raw material consists of major Philosophical Works during the historical course of European consciousness. Philosophy is a whole Worldview including art and science. It is the mirror which reflects the development and the structure of European Consciousness. The object of Occidentalism is European Consciousness itself, as the soul of' Europe, the condition of its renaissance or decline, life and death. The concept is not an abstraction, a hypothesis or a moral one but it refers to "une prise de conscience," Besinnung. a self consciousness, a subjectivity, the basis of objectivity studied by most philosophers of history: Scheler, Spengler, Bergson, Husserl, Ortega, Toynbee, Hazard. European consciousness has its sources, its beginning and end. It has a structure coming out of its development. Its future is debated at this turning point from the 20th to the 21st century.

European Consciousness has three sources: Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian and the European milieu itself: mentality, temperament, popular culture, customs, traditions. The Roman source took over the Greek one, given the Romanist intensive of Imperial Rome, which was reiterated in modern European colonialism. The Jewish source took over the Christian one, with Paul and the Judaisation of Christianity. The European milieu, which was close to Romanism and Judaism than to Hellenism and Christianity, took over two other sources. Realism triumphed over Idealism. Materialism dominated over Spiritualism and Satan overwhelmed God. The first two sources, Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman, changed models from Plato during the Patristic period to Aristotle during Scholasticism; from Idealism to Realism; from mind to matter. The European milieu is the material substratum for Judaism, Romanism and Aristotelianism. Thus the carrier and the carried are of the same kind.

European consciousness began in modern times, with the Cartesian Cogito, "Cogito ergo Sum." The subject has an absolute priority over the object. The Word is a perceived world. Subjective idealism was the point of departure. Regarding ethics, temporary ethics were proposed, unsubjected to reason. The will is much wider than reason. Theoretical Truth is guaranteed by Divine veracity. From this subjectivism, two apparent opposite trends emerged:

Rationalism and Empiricism. Both are subjectivist, the first as an idea, *a priori* or deduction; the second as impression, sensation, a

posteriori and induction. The first trend begins from the subject upwards, while the second begins from the subject downwards. European consciousness became like an open mouth. This is the famous Western Dualism which European modern philosophy began with and suffered from. The Transcendental Idealism of Kant tried to unify the two trends as form and matter, category and intuition, a priori and a posteriori, induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, metaphysics and physics, philosophy and science. In this famous problematique: how an a priori synthetic judgment is possible? organic unity and dialectic movement were absent. The same dualism continued in ethics. Pure reason is incapable of knowing right and wrong. Only practical reason can. Pure reason deals with phenomena, while practical reason deals with noumena. Kant declares that through this dualism, determining the final purpose of Transcendental idealism and critical philosophy, he had to destroy knowledge in order to make room for belief. Later, when efforts were again made through the absolute Idealism of postkantians, to unify this juxtaposed dualism, it only became triadism, sensation, understanding, and raison; aesthetics, analytics and dialectics, in a dialectical process. Fichte conceived practical Idealism and the subjective dialectic between the Ego and the non-Ego to form the Absolute Ego. Hegel reiterated Fichte, transforming subjective dialectics to objective, and going from logic to Being. Schelling preferred a certain kind of philosophy of Identity between Geist and Natur, to begin with unity as an axiom, not Cartesian duality. Schopenhauer reiterated the same dualism in the World as representation and Will, trying to unify the two in the negative aspect of life. This was already a symptom of the end, in accord with Rousseau's critique of modern civilization. The criticism of the Hegelian left, regarding Hegelian absolute Idealism, is also the beginning of the end. In all efforts to close down the open mouth of European consciousness, the end appeared in three ways: first, with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Ortega and most existentialists, the critique of Western rationalism became abstraction and formalism, ending in a complete destruction of reason and the affirmation of the irrational, the absurd and the contradictory, in order to bring the upward ascendant line downwards. Second, with Scheler, Weber and all existentialist philosophers, the critique of Empiricism as ma-

terialism and naive objectivism, brought the downward descendant line upwards. The two lines meet in the middle in the new Cogito of Husserl and Bergson, in human existence according to all existentialist philosophers, and in life with all philosophers of life, thus putting the third way between the two opposing trends and thereby closing up the European mouth. The course of European consciousness has its beginnings and endings. It has a point of departure and a point of arrival, from the Cogito of Descartes to the Cogitatum of Husserl. The epopee ends.

Besides, European consciousness has a structure formed during its development. It has a trinitarian structure, expressing itself in a triadic vision which splits the phenomenon into three parts and reduces the whole to one of its parts. The question is whether the phenomenon is formal and can be understood by reason, or material and can be perceived through senses, or lived and can be felt through human experience. The three visions disputed among each other in order to have the monopoly of knowledge. Each vision became unilateral, one-sided and unilinear. European consciousness fell down into the dichotomy of either/or. European consciousness was not satisfied with the two alternatives and ended by neither/nor. The oscillation between all became the only truth. Change took over permanence. European consciousness lost its focus. It shoots outside the point, in all directions except in the center. It goes all the time off to the side in diversion. All alternatives became equally true and untrue, which led to total scepticism, at the very basis of contemporary Nihilism.

The question now is, what is the future of European consciousness? Has it accomplished its historical course in the cycle of World-History? Which world-consciousness will take the lead? If Europe in modem times has inherited historical Cultures of Africa, Asia and Latin America, can Third-World consciousness, the new energized by the upsurge of these historical societies, take the lead and inherit European consciousness in a new cycle of World-history? Evidence can prove such a historical possibility, given the symptoms of new existence and optimism in Third World consciousness. Most philosophers of history in the West declared the birth of world history in the East and its rebirth and decline in the West. History was ac-

complished and the final stage was reached in modem times in the German enlightenment (Herder, Lessing, Kant, Hegel), in the French enlightenment (Voltaire, Montesqieu, Turgot), in the Italian enlightenment (Vico), in the Russian enlightenment (The Slavophiles), or in the American Enlightenment (Thomas Paine). Only Condorect left one stage, the tenth, for the future. Rousseau had already declared the beginning of the end, while Hegel declared the accomplishment of history and the close of an European historical cycle. Contemporary European philosophers showed the different manifestations of Nihilism at the final stage of the development of European consciousness, integral Nihilism, the death of God (Nietzsche), *renversernent des Valeurs* (M. Scheler), *Lebeweltverloss* (Husserl), *Des machines pour créer des Dieux* (Bergson), the decline of the West (Spengler), civilization on trial (Toyenbee), *l' Occident n'est pas un accident* (Garaudy), *la crise de la conscience European* (Hazard). The same phenomenon appears in human and social sciences, launching the question of crisis in Western sociology. It appears also in the general malaise of daily life, the counter-culture, two World Wars in thirty years, the collapse of the Western project, maximum of production. for maximum of consumption for maximum of happiness, the high rate of suicide, organized crime, violence. The last hopeful signs of returning back to European classical Liberalism in Germany, Eastern Europe and Russia, the renewal of the capitalist system, the rejuvenation of socialism. All are temporary and ephemeral signs. On the contrary, other real hopeful signs began to appear in Third World consciousness: liberation movements, decolonization, development, mass mobilization, modernization, building-up modern State, endogenous creativity, a new world value-system expressing a new world ethical social and political order in International agencies, a new World consensus against apartheid in South-Africa and Zionism, a new decolonization regime in Palestine. Set-backs are temporary counter-revolutions, dictatorships, militarism, new classes. Westernization, dependence, underdevelopment, violation of human rights. Moral and material Potentialities in the Third World are. Experiences of trial and error are fruitful. Historical traditional experiences of the self from the past and modem European experiences of the other in the present time can be two signposts for a new world consciousness.

Does Occidentalism as a new science sacrifice the unity of world universal culture in favour of national particular culture? In fact, World Culture is a myth created by the Culture of the Center to dominate the periphery in the name of acculturation. It has been created thanks to the mass-media monopolized by the center. There is no One Culture in capital C. There are only multiple cultures, in small cs. Each culture has its own autonomous life, an expression of a people and its history. Cultural interaction throughout history does not mean acculturation, the absorption of small cultures in the periphery by the big Culture of the center, assimilation, imitation, or modelling. It means an equal exchange, a give and take, a two-way movement on the levels of language, concepts, horizons, methods, and values. Is Occidentalism a politicization of historical sciences? In fact, politicization of science is a common experience, shared among all peoples and cultures in all times. It appeared not only in classical Orientalism, but also in European Sciences, human, social and even natural. It is only when the balance of power changed from Europe to the Third world, from the center to the periphery, that politicization of science became an accusation. The master in the center was the champion of such endeavour. Science is Power. The passage from Orientalism to Occidentalism is in fact a shift in the balance of power.

Jesse Fleming[74]

Comparative Philosophy: Its Aims and Methods

Throughout many studies of Chinese and Asian philosophies, comparisons have often been made between the Chinese or Asian philosophy in question and other philosophies (both Eastern and Western), such as frequent comparisons between the *I Ching* and Whitehead, Kant and Confucianism, Taoism and American

Transcendentalism, Buddhism and Hume, and so forth. Hence, some defense of "comparative philosophy" and some discussion of its goals, methods, and *raison d'etre* are called for. Many scholars and philosophers would argue that comparative philosophy (especially a comparison of Eastern and Western philosophical ideas, theories, systems, traditions) is just another pointless comparison of apples and oranges – Eastern and Western philosophies are simply too different to bear fruitful comparison. This might seem especially true considering that philosophical texts and theories appear to be so embedded in historical context and tradition, that to compare a philosophical theory originating in the East with one originating in the West, ultimately and ideally calls for a comparison of the entire philosophical tradition of each.

I agree that a single statement or sentence in a philosophical text must be understood in the context of the text as a whole (or the philosophical theory set forth in the text as a whole), and that particular philosophical theories need to be understood in terms of the philo-

74. Fleming, Jesse. Comparative Philosophy: Its Aims and Methods // *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*. 2003. Vol. 30(2). P. 259–270.

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sophical tradition within which they exist, and yet just as scholars of comparative literature, comparative religion, comparative musicology, or comparative ethnology, etc. can provide valuable insights through their comparisons (without undertaking the monumental, not to say impossible, task of comparing entire literary, musical, religious, and cultural traditions), so likewise can one compare different philosophical theories without undertaking to compare entire philosophical traditions. The endeavor to see things in their full context must be seen as a limiting concept, an admirable if unachievable goal.

We can aim at a comprehensive understanding of the onto-hermeneutic environment of a particular philosophical theory (whether in simply trying to understand it, or when trying to understand its similarities and differences in relation to a philosophical theory from a very different philosophical tradition, with which it is being compared), while realizing that such a massively thorough comparison is not actually possible.

The simplest and most common question regarding comparative philosophy is, "Why bother?" In other words, what can one hope to gain from comparisons of say, Confucian and Kantian ethics, *I Ching* and Taoist philosophies of education, or psychoanalytic and *I Ching* aesthetics?

My first answer to all such objections to the enterprise of comparative philosophy is that it is almost inevitable that we understand, or interpret, the new and unfamiliar by comparing it with that with which we are already familiar. According to this phenomenological or hermeneutic principle, someone first encountering the *I Ching*, for example (or any other alien philosophical system), will always think about ways in which this unfamiliar philosophy is similar to the philosophical terrain that is our conceptual "home turf" so to speak. After first identifying what we take to be similarities between the two philosophical theories (or systems, concepts, or traditions), we naturally move on to identifying significant differences: similarities and differences in regard to logic and method of proof, in regard to values, assumptions, and aims. It is by identifying both similarities and differences that we can better understand the two (or more) things (here, theories) better. There is a natural, if logically and epistemologically unjustifiable, tendency to see similarity of dif-

ferent philosophical theories as somehow confirming each of them (insofar as they are similar), just as in science a theory or experiment gains credence if repeated elsewhere under similar but different circumstances. At the very least, such comparisons (of say, the "Tao" with "Nature") help shed light on how one concept or theory in comparison with others could have been proven differently from the way it was, or what its practical consequences might be, contrary to what one has usually assumed them to be. In fact, it seems obvious to me that highlighting similarities (and differences) between two philosophical theories or traditions helps us to notice assumptions we make without being aware of it – assumptions regarding how a theory can be proven to be true (or false), and what the theoretical and practical implications of a philosophical position are.

In the sense that we see different strategies of thinking, or philosophizing, and different paths we can take in accordance with our own familiar philosophical territory, we get philosophical "answers" from the comparison. Even our notion of "philosophy" will inevitably be stretched and altered to accommodate differing ways of thinking. Insofar as "comparative philosophy" engages in comparing widely divergent systems of philosophy, it challenges our usual assumptions about what "philosophy" itself is, and hence might even be considered to be (or entail) a kind of "meta-philosophy" – a philosophy of philosophy. By comparing the notions of "change" in Heraclitus, Whitehead, the *I Ching*, and Taoism, for example, we not only learn new theoretical and practical models of change, but our concept of "philosophy" itself is expanded and extended. We understand what "philosophy" is (or could be) not only by comparing particular philosophical concepts/theories/traditions with one another, but also by comparing "philosophy" with "psychology," "religion," "literature," etc. And, again, it is the differences as well as the similarities that clarify the nature of each of the differing domains of discourse. Likewise, with comparison of "comparative philosophy," "comparative literature," "comparative musicology," etc., such comparison of similar yet different disciplines each aimed at comparing things should shed light on the nature of "comparative philosophy" and the project of "comparison" in general (a "philosophy of comparison," as it were).

However, we not only harvest "answers" (to questions like, "What is 'philosophy'?"), we also acquire new problems, or problematics. It is a truism that the way a question is put dictates the kind of answer possible, and the better one understands (and the clearer one states) a question, the easier it will be to get the answer: the clearer the question, the clearer the answer. For example, a philosopher familiar only with the Chinese philosophical tradition might never stop to think that there may be an important philosophical question regarding the relationship of a person's "mind" and their "body," since the "mindbody problem" is not even (explicitly) raised or recognized in his own philosophical tradition. Similarly, a Western trained philosopher might reconsider the practical consequences of the idea that all "opposites are complementary" (rather than in mutual conflict and contradiction), after learning about the *yin/yang* paradigm of polarity in Chinese philosophy. Or, to take other random examples, a Chinese philosopher might begin to take philosophy of language more seriously after studying Hindu (Mimamsa) philosophy of grammar, and both might find mathematics, logic, and science philosophically problematic in ways not earlier perceived after comparing their own thoughts with Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, and so on. Comparative philosophy can thus not only expand our notion of what "philosophy" itself is, but even help to expand our notions of mathematics, logic, science, art, literature, etc.

Another line of reasoning that I think can be used to define and defend comparative philosophy is this: it is certainly very common to compare philosophers within a given tradition (say, Confucius with Mencius, or Plato with Aristotle) – why is it, then, unreasonable to compare Confucius with Kant, or Plato with Chu Hsi? The fact that Confucius and Kant are from radically different philosophical backgrounds, to my mind, only makes it more urgent that they be compared, in order that there be a fruitful exchange of "answers" and "questions," each acting as a stimulating catalyst on the other. Logic leads me to conclude that the more different two things are, the more fruitful a comparison of them will be if some similarity can be identified; a comparison of apples and oranges is not as interesting (philosophically) as a comparison of cabbages and kings. By the way, while "comparative philosophy" in modern times is more or less a Western

phenomenon and is generally understood in the West as a comparison of some Eastern philosophical theory with its Western counterpart, I see no reason why a comparison of two Eastern philosophers (such as Confucius and Mencius, or Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu) or a comparison of two Western philosophers (such as Plato and Aristotle) should not also be considered to be "comparative philosophy." This will expand the usual notion of "comparative philosophy" as employed both by its adherents and detractors, but I would argue that seeing the common element of "comparison" running throughout all traditions of philosophy helps us to understand "philosophy" better (i. e., to see it as inevitably "comparative").

If, as I have argued in recent papers and a book on the *I Ching*,[75] the *I Ching* operates according to a dialectical ("inclusive") logic, whereby all entities whatever (concepts, theories, things) contain, and are defined in terms of their "other," which appears to be the "opposite" of the thing being considered, then it follows that philosophical theories and traditions (and "cultures") contain within themselves something "other" than what they are, which defines what they are. So comparative philosophy, insofar as it may reveal this hidden "other" lying buried within the heart of any particular philosophical theory, tradition, or culture, uncovers the essential self-alienating, yet defining, kernel or core of each of the two (or more) philosophies being compared. While the *I Ching* is generally agreed to be quintessentially "Chinese" and possibly the most seminal and important of all the Chinese classics, one could argue that the antitheses to which its dialectical logic commits, it, and with which it is implicated, constitute a kind of "rupture," an opening that allows it to accommodate seemingly incompatible theses or philosophical positions. For example, in my comparison of *I Ching* logic with Hegel and Heidegger, I argue that the *I Ching* certainly commits itself to the view that each person is merely a focal point on a social nexus, intimately connected to all other persons and "things" (i. e. processes); on the other hand, the *I Ching* is different from itself, alienates itself from itself, distances itself from itself, insofar as it also commits itself to the complementary view that benevolent so-

75. I Ching Philosophy (Taipei: Yeong Dah Publishing Co., 1999).

cial interaction must be complemented by its "opposite" – silence, inaction, and solitude (or occasional isolation, in order to recover one's "authenticity"). Comparison of Hegel and Heidegger with the *I Ching* similarly reveals a "rupture" or antithetical "difference" lying within their philosophies: in the case of Hegel who insists that all thought is self-contradictory and is identical to its "other," we find that in fact Hegel's own dialectic leads him to postulate that they are somehow the same and yet different; Hegel argues not only for identity of "opposites," but for "identity-in-and-through-difference";[76] similarly, Heidegger seems to be arguing straightforwardly for the thesis that "authenticity" is the "opposite" of "inauthenticity," but in fact I would argue (as Steiner does) that Heidegger actually commits himself to the view that "authenticity" lies precisely in overcoming "inauthenticity" and "fallenness" – thus, far from being mutually exclusive "opposites," authenticity and inauthenticity while poles apart are nevertheless polarized complementary aspects of a single dialectical process that incorporates both the thesis of authenticity and the antithesis of inauthenticity.[77] While no doubt it is possible to uncover/discover such dialectical "contradictions" (or "ruptures") within the *I Ching* (or Hegel, Heidegger, or any philosopher, philosophical tradition, or culture) without engaging in comparative philosophy, one could still argue that such comparison of disparate, seemingly inconsonant, philosophies (and cultures) helps one gain insight into the inner "other" of any given philosophy (or culture). Such comparisons seem not only to put the compared philosophies in a new light, or help us to see them from another perspective, but may in the end reveal a common pattern running throughout all philosophies and cultures that constitutes their inner contradiction/rupture; in other words, comparison of various philosophies with one another (or various cultures with one another) may expose a similarity in how each is essentially different from itself: the nature of inner contradiction (which is defining) may turn out to be the same (and of

76. See Hegel's Logic, translated by William Wallace with a foreword by J. N. Findlay, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
77. See Heidegeer's Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1962); see also George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

course somewhat different) in the various philosophies (or cultures) compared – more specifically, we may discover that all philosophies (and cultures) are dialectical.

One curious complication in the theory of comparative philosophy is the fact that throughout history, and especially nowadays with the internet and "cyberspace" which erode or transcend all national and cultural boundaries or barriers, there has never been a purely "Eastern" philosophy or culture, nor has there been a purely "Western" philosophy or culture. Each has inseminated (or infected) the other; one thinks of historical examples such as the influence of the *I Ching* on Leibniz's binary system, or the influence of "Oriental" philosophy and culture on Hegel (in both his philosophy of history and history of philosophy). Even as far back as Plato, one can discern elements of non-"Western" thought (regarding the nature of the soul [*psyche*], and its reincarnation in human or non-human form). As for the "East" and its various philosophies and cultures, even if it is true that China, Japan, and India were for millennia so isolated from other philosophical traditions and cultures that they were pure and self-contained, this is now certainly no longer true. One has only to think not only of the highly permeable interface and interflow of information on the internet, but also of the large number of travelers and students who these days leave the "East" (or "West") and return to their home cultures inoculated or influenced with ideas and values from the "other" culture, which are thereby imported and incorporated into the home culture. It is becoming increasingly difficult to speak of the "East" and the "West"; such a distinction seems increasingly artificial and difficult to maintain. I do not mean that there are no differences between the "East" and the "West," but only that always and especially in the twenty-first century these differences are diminishing due to mutual intellectual and cultural influence. For the philosophy of comparative philosophy, this would seem to entail the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that "comparative philosophy" (defined as comparison of some "Eastern" philosophy with some "Western" philosophy) is no longer possible, because there is no longer any purely "Eastern" philosophy or purely "Western" philosophy. On the other hand, because of the increasing confluence and intercourse between these different yet increasingly

similar philosophical traditions or cultures, such comparisons are inevitable; for example, a young philosopher from China who gets his Ph.D. in America will in some cases return home to China and "Chinese philosophy" will be transformed by the influence of his training in "Western" philosophies, so that any future intra-cultural discourse on "Chinese philosophy" will in fact already involve or include some discussion of 'Western" philosophy that has surreptitiously influenced and changed "Chinese philosophy"; philosophical discourse within the national boundaries of China will, in other words, inevitably evolve into comparison of "Chinese philosophy" and "Western philosophy," because there will no longer be any such thing as pure "Chinese philosophy" (and of course the same is true for a philosopher studying, or otherwise influenced by, "Chinese philosophy"). It is becoming more and more common for "Western" philosophers to know something about and think in terms of "Eastern" philosophies such as Buddhism, Zen, Taoism, and so forth; and likewise with "Eastern" philosophers. Philosophy is becoming intercultural world philosophy, just as the process of globalization in the information age is creating a world culture whose hallmark is identification-through-differentiation; differences will always remain, but they are paradoxically the grounds for identity-in-and-through-difference. This historical tendency for "opposites" (here, "opposite" cultures – the "East" and "West") to evolve into one another is of course predictable according to *I Ching* dialectical logic.

By the way, a simple argument used as early as the first East/West Philosophers Conference at the University of Hawaii in 1939 (and later by Archie Bahm)[78] to justify the enterprise of comparative philosophy is that it will hopefully lead to different cultures understanding one another, and if not to cultural homogeneity at least to a "global village" characterized by peaceful co-existence, rather than conflict due to mutual misunderstanding and intolerance. There are, however, at least two problems with this seemingly reasonable program for world peace through comparative philosophy. First of all, what exactly is the philosophical "tradition" (or "culture") of, say, China (which is to be compared to the philosophical "tradition" of,

78. See Archie Bahm, Comparative Philosophy (Albuquerque, NM: World Books, 1977).

say,America)? Are not the mainstream traditions and cultures of each in fact composed of innumerable micro-traditions and micro-cultures (for example, the Confucian tradition, the Taoist tradition, the Pragmatist tradition, the Puritan tradition, etc.), and would not such a conglomerate "world culture" or "world tradition" (of philosophy) still be composed of smaller streams of thought, "sub-cultures"? This idea that perhaps no supervenient "world philosophy" is even in theory possible in fact accords with the holistic and dialectical view of the interrelationship of wholes and parts, as set forth in the *I Ching*, and does not mean that comparative philosophy is a waste of time, but only that such comparisons of very different philosophical cultures and communities cannot be expected (even in theory) to culminate in pure philosophical homogeneity; it is arguable that such philosophical (and cultural) homogeneity is not even a desirable goal, diversity being the spice of life and thought.

Another problem (raised by D. Krishna and R. Panikkar[79]) is that such philosophical (and cultural) homogeneity resulting from comparative philosophy may in fact be the dominance of one "tradition" (or culture) over all others; specifically, the danger is that while comparative philosophy claims to aim at being objective and neutral, what actually happens is that some Western philosopher takes ideas and arguments from Eastern philosophies and distorts them by forcing them Procrustean fashion into Western philosophical categories, so that they are not viewed objectively and neutrally at all but are rather merely incorporated into the dominant, parochial, Western philosophical "tradition."As Panikkar puts it (somewhat cynically, I think): "The West not being able any longer to dominate other peoples politically, it tries to maintain – most of the time unconsciously – a certain control by striving toward a global picture of the world by means of comparative studies."[80] While this view, that philosophers (in the "West") are conspiring in a post-colonial era to dominate other (philo-

79. See Daya Krisna, "Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be," and Raimundo Panikkar, "What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?" – both in Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

80. Ibid., Panikkar.

sophical) cultures may be considered "politically correct" in some quarters, to my mind it is an unlikely and unreasonable hypothesis. However, rephrased in the words of D. Krishna as "reporting of [philosophical] data in terms of a conceptual structure already formulated in the West,"[81] comparative philosophy (defined by Panikkar as, "the philosophical study of one or some problems in the light of more than one tradition," and as "a kind of formalized analysis of the common patterns present in the diverse philosophical systems")[82] sounds less sinister and conspiratorial, although still patronizing toward non-Western traditions and cultures (needless to say of all developing, third-world cultures such as the "philosophical traditions" of, say, Africa). At the very least there is the unwitting tendency to analyze non-Western philosophical traditions and systems according to the prevailing typology (i. e., in terms of Metaphysics, Logic, Epistemology, Ethics, Aesthetics, Political Philosophy, etc.). I fear, for example, that my own recently published book on the *I Ching* may have made just such an error, insofar as the *I Ching* itself and Chinese philosophy in general do not categorize philosophical concepts and theories according to such a typology of branches of philosophy, seeing different issues and answers as organically intertwining, rather than artificially differentiated according to a kind of division of philosophical labor.[83] The danger of one tradition or culture (the "West," in particular the English speaking world, more precisely America) overwhelming the rest of the world with an undesirably excessive influence on alternative philosophical traditions (and cultures) is especially salient when we come to the translation of philosophical texts into the current *lingua franca*, namely English. Perhaps

81. Ibid., Krishna.
82. Ibid., Panikkar.
83. In my book, I Ching Philosophy and in my Ph.D. dissertation on Chuang Tzu (Chuang Tzu and the Problem of Personal Identity, Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1988), I dissect the philosophies of the I Ching and Chuang Tzu along the lines of traditional divisions of philosophy in the West, for example, with chapters on "Aesthetics in the I Ching" and "Taoist Metaphysics." Whether I am offering an orderly and systematic exegesis of these two classics of Chinese philosophy or doing violence to their spirit and intent by such pigeonholing is not for me to say.

this is one pragmatic argument against comparative philosophy insofar as it inevitably requires translation of non-Western philosophical texts into Western languages (especially English), leading most philosophers in the word at this time to have to re-think their positions and problematics in terms of the English language and the categories, positions, and problematics of Western philosophers and the "Western philosophical tradition."

However, every enterprise carries some danger with it, and I would still maintain that comparative philosophy can offer a lot to the world's philosophical community, and to each participating tradition (or culture). There are not only the benefits mentioned above (such as clarifying the dialectical nature of all philosophies and cultures) but also, for example, the revelation or exposure of the myths and metaphors we live by in our diverse traditions and cultures without ever being fully cognizant of them and their influence on our ways of thinking and living.

There still remain other issues regarding the validity and worth of "comparative philosophy," which are worrisome and difficult to resolve, such as whether "comparative philosophy" can stand alongside other branches of philosophy as an independent discipline (in the way, or example, that "comparative literature" stands alongside "literature" and "literary criticism" or "comparative religion" stands alongside "religion" and "history or religion"). There is also the question as to whether studies of philosophical issues, ideas, arguments, and theories taken out of their larger context (i. e. tradition) is not like tearing a plant up by its roots. Both these questions were broached tangentially above. Regarding "comparative philosophy" as an independent discipline, I have already argued that all philosophy is intrinsically and unavoidably "comparative" (as indeed all thinking is) and that while someone might specialize in comparative philosophy narrowly conceived according to the widely received ostensive definition as a comparison of some Eastern philosophy with some Western philosophy, this cannot justify calling "comparative philosophy" an "independent discipline." But so what? I have argued that it is still a useful enterprise in many ways, even if not formally recognized as an independent branch of philosophy alongside other recognized branches of philosophy, such as philosophy of law, phi-

losophy of history, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, etc. In my view, it is better (more realistic and useful) to recognize that comparative philosophy is always a useful adjunct to all these branches of philosophy; in other words, they all inevitably at some point engage in comparing one philosophy (of law, history, science, etc.) with another, and thus contain comparative philosophy as one of their methodological components or strategies, and if they neglect to compare "Eastern" philosophies (of law, history, science, etc.) with their "Western" counterparts, it is to their detriment, since assumptions and alternative paradigms will go unnoticed. As for the issue of de-contextualization, I have above committed myself to the view that ideally (in the "best of all possible worlds") comparisons would be carried out on a grand scale with entire traditions being compared, rather than piece-meal and out of context. But since this is impossible, comparison of one theory (out of context) with another (also out of context) is better than no comparison at all; while there is definitely the disadvantage of likely distortion, there is always the advantage of seeing one's own view in a new light.

Concerning the topic of context, it is worth mentioning Wing-tsit Chan's view that in translation of a philosophical text from one language into another, care must be taken to translate a philosophical term (such as "Tao") in different ways, according to textual context, rather than to always translate it into the target language with the same word.[84] Another point regarding translation of philosophical texts, in connection with comparative philosophy, is that while I think Western (or Eastern for that matter) translators and interpreters of philosophical texts should avoid mindlessly accepting the received translation (of, say, chün-tzu as "gentleman"), I think it is going too far to proffer such extravagant and eccentric translations (based on far-fetched etymology of Western terms) such as "authoritative person," which may authentically convey in this case the notion of someone who maintains continuity of tradition while creatively "authoring" some new contribution. Such translations are I think misleading in their connotation and do little to advance either

84. See the Appendix, "On Translating Certain Chinese Philosophical Terms," in Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

genuine understanding of Chinese philosophy (in this case) or comparative philosophy in general.[85]

It may seem that I have so stretched (I would say expanded or enlarged) the notion of "comparative philosophy" that the concept of "comparative philosophy" is no longer recognizable or useful. Note, however, that anyone who attacks "comparative philosophy" is comparing it to "philosophy" as ordinarily understood and is thus engaging in (or indulging in) "comparative philosophy," at least as I understand it and have defined it. It would seem that any attack on "comparative philosophy" is self-defeating if and insofar as it compares "comparative philosophy" with philosophy in general, although perhaps here we ought to speak of meta-comparative philosophy, since the purpose would seem to be the clarification of "philosophy" itself (i. e., meta-philosophy, philosophy of philosophy). In any case, it is generally agreed that what "philosophy" is, is itself a philosophical question, and until this can be settled (probably never) it is difficult to see how any final consensus can be reached as to the definition or (in)validation of "comparative philosophy." What I have offered is a tentative, working definition and defense.

My final argument in defense of comparative philosophy comes as a response to one line of argument against it. It might seem that in order to compare two things (here two philosophies or two philosophical traditions), one must somehow stand outside both (philosophies or traditions) in order to view them objectively, but that somehow philosophy is unlike a literary tradition, for example, in that the comparative philosopher is so steeped in his tradition that he cannot escape it or "suspend" (*epoche*) it phenomenologically. But it seems to me that philosophy is a very "iffy" subject – one's conclusions are always tentative, contingent upon premises and presuppositions all of which can never be proven. Hence, it is incumbent upon the philosopher (here, philosopher concerned with the definition and validation/

85. For eccentric and misleading translations, such as "authoritative person" for chun-tzu, see Roger Ames and David Hall, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1987). For my own views regarding translation of Taoist philosophical works, see my "On Translation of Taoist Philosophical Texts: Preservation of Ambiguity and Contradiction," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25, no. 1 (March 1998).

invalidation of comparative philosophy) to keep an open mind and to try not to assume that the tradition in which he was trained to think is true beyond doubt. And one of the benefits of comparative philosophy would seem to be that it not only brings to light hidden assumptions, presuppositions, premises, paradigms, myths, metaphors, etc., but also exposes the pre-reflective conditions (Wittgensteinian "life-forms") that make philosophizing possible in any given culture at any given historical epoch. Thus, in a strange way, comparative philosophy seems to make itself possible (by discovering/uncovering the "possible conditions of its own philosophizing"). In the words of Panikkar[86] (who is generally critical of "comparative philosophy"): "We may even conjecture that psychology, geography, upbringing, or other factors have predisposed peoples or cultures to take one of the [philosophical] visions [being compared]…,"[87] and one of the aims of comparative philosophy is to reveal these pre-philosophical conditions and biases that make philosophizing possible (or even necessary).

As G. Larson says in the introduction to *Interpreting Across Boundaries*, it is no more difficult to cross the boundary from one culture or tradition to another than it is to cross the boundaries in ordinary conversation (where misunderstanding is always already rife but which we do with some success). Hence, it would seem that Kipling is wrong: East and West not only can, but will and must meet (in philosophical dialogue), and in their "mutual fecundation" and cultural impact, transform one another so that they become similar and different in new and interesting ways.[88]

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86. Op cit., Panikkar, P. 122.
87. Ibid., Panikkar, P. 126.
88. Or, as Ben-Ami Scharfstein states in his Philosophy East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) "… the effort we make to understand the others, who are so different from us, may help us to understand ourselves more clearly" (P. 47). Scharfstein also states that "contrast increases visibility" (P. 29), and "…whenever we perceive or think, we compare, that is, respond to similarities and differences" (P. 28); he makes the same point I do, but more concisely when he says: "…comparison is essential to perception and thought" (P. 29).