

Monitoring Peace Consolidation

United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking

United Nations

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Monitoring Peace Consolidation

United Nations Practitioners' Guide to Benchmarking

United Nations

In cooperation with the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (NOREF)

Preface

This handbook aims to provide basic principles, guidelines and resources that will enable United Nations field presences to measure progress towards or regress away from peace consolidation. It may be seen as a first step towards establishing more formalized benchmarking systems to be used by United Nations field presences, including more specific formats and procedures for benchmarking organization, data collection and aggregation, reporting, and templates of benchmarks and indicators. Indeed, a number of United Nations departments and agencies have begun to develop indicators and benchmarks on a range of issues related to peace consolidation, including on the protection of civilians and on women, peace and security. The handbook is thus very much of an evolving document, with this first edition to be revised to reflect subsequent developments in policy and practice as well as comments and reviews from users.

The handbook was developed by Svein Erik Stave, of the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (Fafo AIS), under the direction of a United Nations inter-agency Steering Committee whose membership includes the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO), and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The handbook's further evolution will involve the active participation of these and other United Nations departments and agencies.

Development of the handbook commenced with a desk review of United Nations benchmarking practice, existing peace consolidation monitoring frameworks, and relevant literature on peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The handbook further benefited from the following consultations with mission strategic planners and practitioners in the field: (1) a study on "Measuring Peace Consolidation and Supporting Transition", in March 2008; (2) a United Nations Peacebuilding Community of Practice e-discussion on peace consolidation metrics, in April and May 2008; (3) a United Nations Peace Consolidation Benchmarking Experts Workshop, in November 2008, and (4) four country-level research visits, from January to March 2009.

The study on "Measuring Peace Consolidation and Supporting Transition" yielded the following key conclusions:

- Efforts to devise effective United Nations system transitional strategies are hindered by a lack of clarity as to the elements of a consolidated peace, the absence of a system-wide country monitoring methodology, benchmarking problems, and limited planning capacity within the United Nations system to support sequencing and transition of peace operations.
- Reliable quantitative and qualitative indicators of how stable a peace is need to be developed. Data collection efforts for measuring peace consolidation trends are still in their infancy.
- A sound transitional strategy requires operational measures of effectiveness that can help the leadership

of a United Nations peace operation and its national counterparts determine when the support offered by the United Nations system should be altered or reduced. Benchmarks need to be concrete and measurable. Performance indicators need to be used consistently by the international actors engaged in peacebuilding, with baselines and targets tailored to specific national contexts. Assessment of progress needs to be 'owned' by national stakeholders to the maximum extent possible.

The e-discussion on peace consolidation metrics within the inter-agency United Nations Peacebuilding Community of Practice (now with members in over 80 countries) revealed a need for (1) existing planning frameworks to be simplified, harmonized, and applied more uniformly; (2) further guidance on minimum standards for a monitoring framework; and (3) a clear division of international and national responsibilities.

The United Nations Peace Consolidation Benchmarking Experts Workshop, held in New York, brought together a select group of strategic planners from across the United Nations system with leading international experts to (1) facilitate an exchange of field-based experiences, and (2) refine skills for peace consolidation benchmarking and integrated peace operation transition planning. Key messages for the design and scope of this handbook included the following:

- The handbook should serve as a technical (non-policy-oriented) resource tool intended primarily for use by field-based colleagues.
- The handbook should ensure sufficient flexibility and scope to enable it to add value to multiple assessment and strategic planning/coordination tools.
- The handbook should reflect a broadly shared conception of peace consolidation with sufficient room for users to interpret its core characteristics and requirements.

Finally, from January to March 2009, country-level research visits were conducted in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti. Findings from the country visits, as well as the desk review that preceded it, are summarized in Appendix B of this handbook.

The handbook responds to these findings and recommendations by clarifying key terms and providing guidance on establishing a benchmarking system, data handling and reporting. The structure of the handbook follows a step-by-step approach to peace consolidation benchmarking:

- Chapter 1 outlines fundamental terms and concepts and provides guidance on how to set up a monitoring mechanism.
- Chapter 2 provides guidelines and principles on how to establish peace consolidation benchmarks.
- Chapter 3 provides guidelines on how to measure progress towards the established benchmarks by attributing indicators and collecting and analyzing data.
- Chapter 4 provides principles of sound reporting and use of benchmarking results.
- The Appendices include case studies from seven countries and contain links to a wide range of resources for peace consolidation benchmarking.

Acknowledgements

The following members of the Steering Committee for this handbook played key roles in developing and editing the text: Adrian Morrice, DPA; Madalene O'Donnell and Paul Keating, DPKO; Chris O'Donnell, formerly with UNDP and presently with DPKO; Anja Bille Bahncke, DOCO; Marc Jacquand, formerly with DOCO and presently with UNSCO; Genevieve Boutin, formerly with PBSO and presently with UNICEF, Matti Lehtonen, formerly with PBSO and presently with UNEP; and Richard Ponzio, formerly with PBSO and presently at the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State. Kazuhide Kuroda of the World Bank participated in the Steering Committee as an observer and provided many helpful editorial comments and resource materials. Vikram Parekh of PBSO led the editing of this final version. The handbook also benefited greatly from the inputs of external experts, of whom the following deserve special mention: Michael Dziedzic, United States Institute of Peace; Susanna Campbell, Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding (CCDP), Tufts University; Kathleen Jennings, Fafo AIS; and Mariano Aguirre and Tone Faret, the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (Noref). UN and other colleagues in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Haiti deserve a special word of thanks for sharing their experience and lessons from early experiments in benchmarking with the researchers.

We would like to extend our gratitude to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for financing the production of this handbook and to the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre for co-hosting the experts workshop.

Handbook Abstract

A Step-by-Step Guide to Peace Consolidation Benchmarking

Step 1: Prepare for benchmarking

Guidelines

Prepare for benchmarking from the outset of a United Nations peace operation. Basic preparations for a future benchmarking exercise – including the identification of data sources and other resources – can be made while conducting comprehensive needs and capacity assessments, strategic assessments, and conflict analysis. In addition, staff that will be expected to support a benchmarking exercise should receive appropriate training.

Engage the host government and civil society. National authorities and civil society, including community organizations, journalists, business leaders, and religious representatives, should be involved in the benchmarking exercise. They can serve as reference groups for establishing benchmarks, indicators, and data sources, and can sometimes provide information for measuring progress.

Specify core tasks that will enable a host government and its international partners to meet their shared objectives. Just as objectives will need to be re-evaluated as conditions on the ground improve or deteriorate, so will the tasks associated with them.

Share resources where possible with other monitoring systems. A variety of monitoring exercises coexist in most developing and post-conflict countries. Large-scale monitoring systems may be in place, for example, to monitor a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or progress toward Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), or for the purposes of Results Based Management (RBM). Careful consideration should be given as to whether the particular needs of a peace consolidation benchmarking exercise could be integrated within such systems.

Step 2: Establish benchmarks

Guidelines

Identify sound contextual benchmarks and indicators. Sound benchmarks and indicators are based on a deep knowledge of the host country combined with knowledge of factors affecting peace consolidation across conflict settings. Specific benchmarks and indicators should therefore be identified with reference both to the host country context and generic conceptual frameworks for peace consolidation.

Be realistic when defining benchmarks. There should be a realistic relationship between the assumed or planned duration of a United Nations peace operation in a particular country and agreed peace consolidation benchmarks. Achieving fundamental social change and addressing root causes of conflict are normally long-term processes that cannot easily be measured during the time frame of most peace operations.

Keep the focus on the core intentions of the benchmark system. The chief purpose of a peace consolidation benchmarking exercise is to monitor the main factors influencing peace consolidation in a host country and, having analyzed this information, better inform national and international decision-making. Peace consolidation benchmarks should not reflect broader aspirations for development, poverty reduction, and human rights if these are not directly relevant to the aforementioned objective. It is normally advisable to establish a relatively small number of benchmarks for peace consolidation monitoring, typically between 4 and 12.

Key considerations

A peace consolidation benchmark should always be phrased as a point of reference that is assumed to reflect sustainable peace. It can be likened in this respect to a goal or target.

- Consider how accurately the point of reference should be defined with respect to realism and convenience.
- Consider each benchmark in relation to: 1) the entire set of benchmarks to be established, and 2) the data sources that are or will be available, and the possibilities of measurement.

Step 3: Establish a data collection system

Guidelines

Map existing data sources. New data collection surveys specifically designed for a benchmarking exercise should only be carried out when existing data cannot be used. The various sources of data available for benchmarking purposes should be mapped early, preferably in advance of establishing a benchmarking system. Sources might include databases such as DevInfo, United Nations agencies, bilateral development agencies, national statistics offices, and national and international NGOs and research institutions.

Combine the quantitative data with qualitative information. Benchmarking systems normally rely on quantitative data, which on its own may not always reveal the full picture. Quantitative data should therefore be combined with qualitative information, e.g. by establishing a reference group of stakeholders and informed people to compare quantitative measurements with their own knowledge and perceptions.

Key considerations

- Can the data required be collected through existing systems?
- What resources are needed to collect the required data?
- Can comparable data be collected over time?
- When can data be viewed as valid and reliable?

Step 4: Attribute indicators to the benchmarks

Guidelines

Identify indicators to measure progress toward or regression away from benchmarks. The selection and definition of indicators should be based on: (1) their ability to reflect changes of relevance for the benchmark, and (2) the availability of data. In contrast to the establishment of benchmarks, which has both methodological and political dimensions, the selection of indicators is primarily a methodological activity.

Attribute multiple indicators to each benchmark. The set of indicators attributed to each benchmark should be comprehensive, including those that measure risk factors and the emergence of phenomena that might erode the conditions necessary for building durable peace. Possible pairings might include:

- **Objective and subjective indicators.** E.g. "the number of police officers in the national police force" combined with "public opinion on the performance of the national police force."
- **Indicators representing two opposing forces in a process.** E.g. "the size of the national police force" combined with "the development of criminal networks and associated activities."
- **Combine indicators on the total contribution of national and international actors to deliver sustainable peace with indicators on the contributions of national actors alone**, in order to assess change in the national capacity to sustain peace. E.g. indicators reflecting the joint contribution of national and international military/police forces in ensuring security combined with indicators that reflect the contribution of national forces alone.

Key considerations

- How accurately and comprehensively do the indicators selected describe the benchmark?
- How can the indicators be measured, and what type of data do they require?
- How comparable are the selected indicators over time?
- What changes can one expect to identify using the selected indicators, and over what time period?
- What are the expected resources required to measure the selected indicators?
- What amount of data and frequency of data collection is required?

Step 5: Aggregate and analyze data

Guidelines

Aggregate data from successively lower to higher levels in a hierarchy of results. This can be done by applying either: (1) statistical methods, (2) classification techniques, or (3) qualitative assessments.

Statistical aggregation techniques require the availability of high quality data at each level of results, to be statistically compared to each other. Since such data are not commonly available for peace/conflict monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks, the more suitable aggregation methods are classification techniques, such as weighting and scaling, and pure qualitative assessments.

Assess the validity and reliability of the data employed throughout the benchmarking process. The focus of the assessment should be on improving the quality of the data, in particular that data considered most relevant and important, and determining whether it is possible to introduce more relevant (valid) indicators by investing in improved data collection.

Key consideration

- Consider early in the benchmarking process, ideally when benchmarks are being defined, how data should and may be aggregated.

Step 6: Establish a reporting system

Guidelines

Establish a standard format for reporting the results of the benchmarking process. Benchmarking results are usually presented in one of two main types of reports:

1. Reports where benchmarking results indirectly contribute to the contents by providing underlying information. In this case, the main results from the benchmarking process and the main methodological procedures would ideally be included as an annex in strategy and policy reports.

2. Reports that are specifically designed to present the results from a benchmarking process. These can take the form of reports with detailed descriptions of single benchmarks and indicators, using a variety of diagrams and tables, or "traffic light" reports. One of the main advantages of the traffic light format is that it promotes aggregate thinking.

Develop user-friendly reporting formats adapted to the end use of the benchmarking process (e.g. to better inform decision-making and strategic planning).

Ensure multidimensional and balanced reporting that includes detailed descriptions of setbacks, risks, and uncertainty of the data and results.

Document and share, in a transparent manner, the reported results and their methodological bases, including methods used, sources of data, and aggregation procedures.

Key consideration

- Consider how the reporting system can be optimized for use in decision-making.

Step 7: Evaluate the process and make adjustments if needed

Guidelines

Assess the total benchmarking process in order to optimize its quality and usefulness. This assessment should cover every step of the process: from the underlying premises for establishing benchmarks to the use of the results in decision-making, and ultimately the process' contribution to peace consolidation in the host country.

Document and share lessons learned. This will benefit not only subsequent benchmarking exercises within the same country context but also those undertaken by other United Nations field presences. Peace consolidation benchmarking is a new field, whose further development will be guided by experience across the United Nations system.

Key considerations

- Are the benchmarks that were initially established optimal? Should they be revised using new reference points (levels) or replaced by other benchmarks?
- How have the benchmarking results affected the peace operation?

Contents



1. Introduction

1.1. Objectives and Context

1.1.1. Handbook objectives

The goal of this handbook is to support United Nations system planners[1] in designing and monitoring the implementation of benchmarking frameworks in conflict-affected countries. The handbook focuses on technical aspects of benchmarking the external environment, showing how to define reference points for peace consolidation and establish mechanisms to measure progress toward, or regress away, from them. Since the use of benchmarks for national peace consolidation is still at a very early stage, the handbook aims to provide:

- A basic introduction to benchmarking methodology
- Clarification of terms and concepts related to peace consolidation benchmarking
- Guidelines and principles for sound benchmarking
- An overview of data sources and data collection methods that can be used in peace consolidation benchmarking
- Where possible, examples from recent practice

Benchmarking peace consolidation is distinct from assessing the efficiency, effectiveness, or even attributed impact of the United Nations presence. Considerable information exists already, in the context of Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) and Results-Based Management (RBM) strategies, on the use of benchmarking as a tool for mission or programme performance monitoring and planning.[2] While benchmarking for RBB or RBM lies outside the scope of this handbook, these efforts and peace consolidation benchmarking should ideally be linked.[3]

The handbook does not attempt to design a template of "ideal" or "preferred" benchmarks and indicators to be applied to peace consolidation monitoring in all countries. The field of peace consolidation is not yet at the point where any consensus exists regarding key measures across very different contexts.[4] Rather it seeks to provide basic, technical guidelines that can be used to identify sound benchmarks and indicators adapted to different country realities and needs. In addition, the annexes provide examples of possible benchmarks that may be useful to practitioners who need to select a limited number of benchmarks most appropriate to their operating environment.

[1] The handbook's primary users are anticipated to be United Nations system strategic planners operating in conflict-affected countries. Secondary users may include senior United Nations management and policy advisors both at headquarters and the country level, as well as monitoring and evaluation specialists. It is understood, however, that dedicated planning and policy capacities vary across missions and that the actual community of users is likely to be broader.

[2] See e.g. UNDP, *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results* (New York, UNDP, 2009), http://stone.undp.org/undpweb/eo/evalnet/Handbook2/documents/english/pme-handbook.pdf.

[3] Post-conflict employment programming, for example, can be tailored to different phases of peace consolidation. See *United Nations Policy on Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation, and Reintegration,* sub-sections 3.1-3.3 (Geneva, United Nations, 2009), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_117576.pdf.

[4] See Appendix A and Charles T. Call, *Knowing Peace When You See It,* (UNDP, 2007), http://www.undp.org/cpr/content/economic_recovery/Background_3.pdf.

1.1.2. The United Nations context

Appendix C of this handbook details United Nations experience in benchmarking and monitoring in various contexts, including:

- During the Consolidation, Drawdown, and Withdrawal (CDW) of a peacekeeping operation or during earlier stages of the operation at the request of the Security Council.
- When developing a broad planning framework, such as a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) or international compact, or an internal United Nations planning tool, such as an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was the first United Nations field mission to use benchmarking to guide its troop drawdown, starting in mid-2002. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) also has relatively long experience with developing and using benchmarks: during 2006, for the consolidation phase, and 2007, for the drawdown phase.

The Security Council has increasingly been requesting the Secretary-General to propose and report on critical benchmarks even prior to drawdown and as an input to its overall monitoring of the peace process, with the reporting requests often reaching beyond the mandated tasks of a peacekeeping operation or special political or peacebuilding mission. The Security Council has requested benchmarks for Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste. In most cases, these benchmarks are being prepared without an agreed process and with varying levels of engagement among the peacekeeping or political mission, the United Nations Country Team, and national authorities and stakeholders.

Benchmarking efforts may be initiated by United Nations entities on the ground, irrespective of a Security Council request. The United Nations has been involved, for example, in jointly defining benchmarks with national authorities and other international actors in the context of strategic frameworks for peace consolidation and international assistance; these frameworks have sought to foster mutual accountability by providing technical criteria for what constitutes progress.[5] Such benchmarks are normally embedded within or aligned with national budgets or development strategies or international strategies or compacts.

Benchmarking for an internal planning tool, such as an ISF, is used to monitor a country's progress toward peace consolidation in order to prioritize and sequence internal United Nations operations and/or assistance. Sierra Leone provides an example of nationally shared peace consolidation benchmarks: the United Nations Joint Vision of 2009 is aligned to the national peace and development priorities and defines benchmarks for its priority areas, including peace consolidation.[6]

Benchmarking of the external peace consolidation process should not be confused with internal performance monitoring for United Nations entities (i.e. the use of indicators and results frameworks to track progress of United Nations programmes and operations).

[5] E.g. PCNAs, and PRSPs, the Afghanistan and Iraq Compacts, and the DRC Programme d'Actions Prioritaires

[6] See Annex C1 for further details.

1.2. Key concepts and terminology[7]

Monitoring progress toward peace consolidation rests on two basic elements: (1) a robust yet uncomplicated measuring system with appropriate benchmarks and indicators; and (2) an effective monitoring mechanism capable of gathering inputs from multiple sources and having the necessary credibility and authority within the government and international community to propose course corrections.

1.2.1. Benchmarks, baselines and indicators

The meaning of the term "benchmark" can vary according to the context in which it is applied:

- In broad terms, and as commonly used in a United Nations context, benchmarking can be defined as a type of monitoring that uses a benchmark as a point of reference against which change and progress can be measured. A benchmark, from this perspective, can be seen as a target that has been defined by an existing standard, a minimum requirement for something to work, the performance of a leading actor in a field of competition (i.e. a best practice), etc.
- A benchmark can be defined more specifically as a concrete point of reference (in the form of a value, a state, or a characteristic) that has been verified by practice (in the form of empirical evidence, experience, or observation) to lead to fulfillment of more overall objectives or visions (in isolation or together with the fulfillment of other benchmarks).

Table 1.1. Examples of benchmarks used in different fields

Field/purpose	Benchmark	Intention/vision of benchmark
Poverty (lower poverty line)	*US $2/day/person*	The amount of money needed per capita in a particular area to purchase food containing the minimum requirements of energy (kilocalories) fulfilling the metabolic requirements of an adult human being to stay healthy
Business performance	*US $500/day/employee*	Minimum sales for a particular company to achieve economic balance
Cubism (form of painting art)	Picasso's painting *"Les Demoiselles d'Avignon"*, 1907 (Museum of Modern Art, New York)	The painting that defined a new form of expression in art and that serves as the core example of the art form against which all other cubist paintings are compared
Building design, pollution control, etc.	Various *standards* developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)	Minimum requirements for buildings to function according to their intentions (e.g. safety, environmental sustainability), ensure minimal emissions from industrial processes, etc.

[7] For a comprehensive glossary of M&E terms, see OECD, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management,* Paris, OECD Publications, 2002, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf

In practice, a benchmark cannot always be defined as a clear value or target, particularly when dealing with benchmarks for sustainable peace. This is because peace consolidation focuses on system-wide effects and it is rarely possible to apply a single indicator to measure system-wide or even sector-wide effects (see Sub-section 1.2.4.). In such cases benchmarks may be defined as a process (e.g. the level of corruption in government agencies is being reduced), or as a value with reference to a baseline situation (e.g. the level of corruption in government agencies has been reduced by 80 per cent). These and other challenges related to using benchmarks for peace consolidation are addressed in Chapter 2.

A benchmark should be distinguished from a baseline, which some monitoring methodologies use for the same purpose – as a historical point of reference to measure against. Figure 1.1., below, exemplifies the relationship between an indicator, a benchmark, and a baseline with reference to child mortality in a given country. The benchmark has been defined on the basis of the average child mortality rate in other (comparable) countries in the region where there is no conflict (rate: 92). If we use the benchmark as a point of reference, the measured mortality rates from 1995 to 2008 show that the rate has improved from 112 above the benchmark in 1995 to 25 above the benchmark in 2008. The first reliable measurement of child mortality in the given country was conducted in 1995, and if we use this rate as a point of reference (baseline) we can state that the child mortality rate has decreased by 57 per cent between 1995 and 2008.

Figure 1.1. The relationship between a benchmark, a baseline, and an indicator exemplified by a baseline and a benchmark measured by a single corresponding indicator for a given country



As the example shows, there is in principle no need for a baseline when we have a well defined benchmark, as we only need one reference point in order to measure change away from the reference point (a baseline) or towards it (a benchmark).

1.2.2. Hierarchy of results

Measuring the wider impacts of specific strategies and activities is a challenging task, particularly when the aim of the strategies and activities is to change the way complex societies perform. Figure 1.2 shows the hierarchy of results where lower level activities contribute to higher level outcomes and impacts.

Figure 1.2. Relationships between a goal and its inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts



The successive levels within this hierarchy may be defined as follows:

- **Goal:** The higher-end objective of a strategic vision, which is based on assumptions of causality or a theory of change and operationalized through inputs.
- **Inputs:** The provision of resources for certain activities that are assumed to initiate a chain of results leading ultimately to the desired end-goal.
- **Outputs:** The direct results of an input activity. Peace consolidation evaluations at the project, programme or sectoral levels assess whether anticipated outputs have been attained through the provision of inputs such as financial resources, technical assistance or training.
- **Outcome:** The wider short- and medium-term effect (positive and negative) of the input activity. At the strategic level, peace consolidation has to focus on outcomes that are directly linked to reducing certain risks (including through the development of conflict management mechanisms), addressing critical conflict drivers, and advancing toward desired goals through the implementation of mutual commitments.
- **Impact:** The long-term direct and indirect effect (positive and negative) produced by operationalization of the strategic vision. These should reflect the goal embedded in that vision. System-wide impacts are normally heavily affected (positively and negatively) by factors outside of strategic control, e.g. other social change actors and initiatives, interactions with neighboring countries, and various unforeseen social and environmental changes.

Using security sector reform as an example, the goal might be to strengthen the national capacity to provide security. An example of an input activity may be a programme to train local police, whose typical output would be the number of police that successfully completed the training programme. The sector-wide impact of the input can be defined as an outcome insofar as it aims to strengthen the security sector in a particular region. At a system-wide level the impact of the programme can be seen as its contribution in achieving the ultimate goal of a peace operation or a national strategy (e.g. ensuring sustainable peace), which must be analyzed in relation to all other activities carried out by the peace operation as well as external activities and uncontrollable factors.[8]

1.2.3. Measuring results

Outputs should be easy to measure and verify as a direct effect of the input. Verifying a direct cause-effect relationship between the outcome and the initial input, on the other hand, is difficult to achieve by measurement. There are three reasons for this: first, because achieving the end-goal is dependent on other input activities normally initiated as part of a strategy; second, because initiatives by other actors may interact positively or negatively with the strategic activities; and third, because the outcome is to some degree governed by factors outside strategic control.

If verifying a direct cause-effect relationship between an input and an outcome appears difficult, then measuring exact relationships between an input and a system-wide impact can be regarded as nearly impossible. For the purpose of peacebuilding, the main focus should therefore be to measure and reveal system-wide change without necessarily trying to prove the direct relationships to specific inputs. Such an approach would not reveal in detail a cause-effect relationship between certain activities and system-wide change but it could still reliably indicate whether a strategy is effective. Perhaps most importantly, it would provide vital strategic planning inputs for the changing situation on the ground, to which strategies should be constantly adapted. However, many analytical frameworks, such as Impact Assessment (IA) and Logical Framework Approaches (LFA) (see sub-section 2.2.4), may combine the need for assessing system-wide contextual changes and the need for attributing these changes to specific programmes or activities. This is generally done by reversing the classical cause-effect approach with an approach taking the system-wide contextual changes as starting points and then trying to assess the contribution of a specific programme or activity in comparison with other factors that might have contributed to the changes (an "effect-cause" approach).

1.2.4. Establishing a monitoring mechanism

Monitoring mechanisms are critical to the successful implementation of strategic frameworks for peace consolidation. Because efforts to consolidate peace, as advanced through a strategic framework, are reversible processes, they need to be monitored closely to: (1) assess progress toward agreed goals (and associated benchmarks); (2) alleviate risks when these arise through corrective actions; (3) enhance coherence of multi-dimensional efforts; and (4) ensure fulfillment of mutual commitments by national and international actors.

An effective monitoring mechanism will ensure context specificity, comprehensive risk assessment, and complementarities with other planning and monitoring frameworks.

[8] See Figure 1.2

- **Context specificity.** Since strategic frameworks for peace consolidation address diverse political contexts and countries at different phases in their transition from conflict to peace, there are no standardized tools or templates for monitoring progress. In countries facing continued threats of violence, the methodology for measuring progress must be particularly sensitive to security issues; it should encompass a range of security indicators, such as violations of a cease-fire agreement, numbers of disarmed ex-combatants, and weapons collected. In countries that are further along in their transition process and where risk factors might have socio-economic as well as political bases, the appropriate targets for consolidating peace are likely to include numbers of ex-combatants who have found gainful employment, decrease in youth unemployment and expansion of basic government services in health and education.

- **Correspondence between risk assessment and monitoring tools.** The methodology for monitoring progress is only as good as the risk assessment and the corresponding peace consolidation objectives built into the strategic framework. For example, if persistent local and regional drivers of conflict are not included explicitly within a strategic framework, the corresponding methodology for monitoring peace consolidation will be flawed.

- **Complementarities.** Due to the breadth of peace consolidation activities in countries where strategic frameworks exist, there is a growing trend toward creating links between these and other planning, programming and monitoring tools, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). This is critical to establish important linkages between peace consolidation and poverty reduction goals.

Below are some general guidelines for establishing and managing a United Nations monitoring mechanism, based on a review of United Nations practice and comparative experience from other monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks and with the foregoing objectives in view.

- **Establish M&E units and train relevant staff.** Proper benchmarking requires skilled personnel and specifically allocated resources, for which M&E units might be the main coordinating body. Other staff that will be called upon to support a benchmarking exercise should receive appropriate training, including familiarization with key concepts, methodologies, and best practices.

- **Establish reference groups.** An internal reference group, consisting of strategic planners from the mission and from the United Nations Country Team (UNCT),[9] should be created to ensure that: (1) the benchmarking process is linked to strategic planning; and (2) that existing competencies and resources, including data sources, within the United Nations system are fully exploited. Where possible, an external reference group - comprising representatives of the concerned national and international actors, including civil society - should be created to ensure linkages to other M&E systems, such as those set up to measure progress toward a PRSP or MDGs.

- **Establish joint monitoring mechanisms where the situation permits.** Joint monitoring mechanisms promote vertical coordination within national government ministries, horizontal coordination among donors, and an effective interface between the government, civil society, international community and other stakeholders.

- **Constructively engage sub-national institutions in the monitoring exercise.** In particular, steps should be undertaken to feed sub-national reports and data collection efforts into national peace consolidation monitoring efforts.

[9] Where applicable, this can be a sub-group of the Integrated Mission Planning Teams (IMPTs) to be established as part of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)



2. Establishing Benchmarks

This chapter provides guidance on how to establish benchmarks for peace consolidation monitoring regardless of whether such exercises are initiated internally or undertaken in response to a request from the Security Council.

2.1. Characteristics of peace consolidation benchmarks

2.1.1. Making peace consolidation operational analytically

Peace consolidation generally refers to a process leading towards a self-sustaining peace (see Annex A). A main characteristic of peace consolidation is that it requires changes in regional, national, and sub-national contexts that cut across a wide range of institutions and actors. It therefore requires multidimensional international interventions, from tasks focused purely on security or peacekeeping to support for peacebuilding priorities and more long-term development processes.

A peace consolidation benchmark could be formulated broadly as "a situation in which peace has been established and no external support is needed to sustain the peace". This benchmark, in order to be made more operational analytically, would have to be broken down into sub-units.[10] The sub-units should be defined with regard to the specific dynamics of the country and factors that could help to determine whether critical elements of transition are moving in a positive direction.

The most common way to do this is to define benchmarks at the level of sectors, such as security, governance, rule of law, and human and socio-economic development.[11] An alternative approach, applicable where a broadly legitimate and comprehensive peace agreement is in place, is to focus on the critical planks of that agreement. Yet another approach is to define benchmarks based on the society's and/or conflicting parties' priorities for peace consolidation. This would require, however, a more systematic process of surveys, polling, and focus groups than is often possible for field missions to carry out, particularly during the early post-conflict period. The handbook discusses later options to better consolidate analytical and survey work across the United Nations system. [12]

No matter how general or specific a benchmark for peace consolidation is, it should always be phrased as a point of reference (similar to a target or a goal) that can be defined and measured by indicators.[13] United Nations benchmarks have often been phrased incorrectly as categories, such as "national security strategy and architecture." A proper benchmark within this category might be "national police capable of controlling civil unrest".

[10] See Section 2.2.

[11] See also Sub-section 2.1.3.

[12] See Chapter 3 and Appendix E.

[13] See Chapter 3.

2.1.2. Principles for defining peace consolidation benchmarks

Unfortunately there are very few concrete principles or techniques available for defining well specified benchmarks of peace consolidation, as well as other ambiguous concepts of development. Perhaps the most concrete one is the principle of normality. This reflects the assumption that a core purpose of peace consolidation is to help a country return to a "development path." It uses "normal" rates of criminality, mortality, participation in elections, etc., as benchmarks for peace consolidation in a given post-conflict country.

Although the principle of normality can be very useful in specifying concrete benchmarks for peace consolidation monitoring, it should be used with caution. Comparing values for selected fields across different countries is challenging and risky. First, it is difficult to guarantee that the selected fields are strongly related to peace consolidation in a given country. Second, different societies function in different ways. In other words, it is the unique interaction of different factors in a given country or culture that is important to peace or conflict; comparing isolated fields between countries to measure peace consolidation is therefore of limited use.

If the principle of normality is to be used to establish benchmarks for peace consolidation, the risks of the approach should be taken into account, and one should use normal values from countries that are comparable to the country in question in as many respects as possible. It would be natural to use values from and to compare against the situation in countries in the same region and/or countries that have cultural similarities to the country in question.

2.1.3. Basic considerations when establishing peace consolidation benchmarks

Two primary considerations should be taken into account when establishing benchmarks for peace consolidation monitoring:

1) Assumptions versus time frame

The review of United Nations benchmarking undertaken in preparation of this handbook revealed a tendency to be unrealistic in defining benchmarks. Examples of this tendency were evident in several country experiences, including that of Burundi and Afghanistan,[14] where significant gaps emerged between anticipated and actual gains in various measures of stability. This reflects in part the reality that peace consolidation is rarely a linear and predictable process. But there is also another reason for the observed gaps: benchmarks related to stabilizing the security situation, as well as to addressing socio-economic issues and the root causes of conflict, are often overly ambitious and tend to underestimate the time and effort needed to achieve durable change. Particular attention should therefore be paid to identifying realistic time-frames for peace consolidation benchmarks.[15]

[14] See Box 2.1 and Appendices C2 and C4.

[15] See Sub-section 2.3.3.

Box 2.1. Unrealistic benchmark assumptions versus time frame in Burundi

There is a tendency to base benchmarks and indicators on ideal scenarios rather than most-likely scenarios. This discourages individuals and organizations from tracking these indicators and benchmarks because they will equate less-than-ideal information as pointing to their failure. The Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi contained several vague and unrealistic benchmarks, including the following: "By 2008, existence of a political environment conducive to the peaceful resolution of political conflict through the institutionalization of a culture and practice of dialogue on major issues and national strategies."

Source: Appendix C4

2) The level of benchmark specification

Consideration must be given to the appropriate level of benchmark specification. While it is advantageous analytically to define benchmarks as specifically as possible — by referring, for example, to the exact values and figures to be achieved — this entails risks. The inherently ambiguous nature of concepts such as peace consolidation makes specificity difficult to achieve in practice and an overly mechanistic approach to benchmarking could in any event lead to wrong conclusions and decisions, such as on withdrawal. To mitigate this risk, benchmarking exercises should always be contextualized using qualitative information during the analytical phase (see Chapter 3).

A general recommendation on the level of resolution and specification of benchmarks is to employ a total of 4-12 benchmarks in a peace consolidation benchmarking process. The resolution and specification levels should be adapted to this range while covering all relevant areas.

2.2. Benchmark frameworks

This handbook focuses on benchmarking the external environment rather than activities and actions carried out directly by United Nations entities. In some field presences, these have been termed "contextual benchmarks." Three types of general conceptual frameworks can be identified to guide the identification and definition of such benchmarks: 1) strategy-based, 2) sector-based, and 3) process-based frameworks. In addition, frameworks to guide identification of benchmarks can be derived from more general management methodologies such as Impact Assessment (IA) and Logical Framework Approaches (LFA).

2.2.1. Strategy-based frameworks

A strategy-based framework refers to mandates or other well-defined strategic goals as bases for establishing benchmarks. Most United Nations benchmarking exercises to date have been linked to mandates and/or strategic goals found in PRSPs or other national strategies.

Box 2.2. Combining various strategic goals into one benchmarking framework in Liberia

In Liberia, a M&E system has been developed to track the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs have been integrated into the PRS pillars, so that monitoring and evaluating the PRS will at the same time enable Liberia to report on its progress towards the MDG goals. The UNDAF has been designed to be the United Nations system's support framework to the PRS. The UNDAF goals and objectives are thus aligned with the PRS and this has enabled the Liberian government and the United Nations system to develop an integrated M&E system that simultaneously tracks the UNDAF, PRS, and MDGs, thus saving valuable time and reducing transaction costs.

Liberia's Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs plays the primary coordinating role for the monitoring and evaluation system. It collaborates with the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LISGIS) to generate reports on a periodic basis that measure progress towards indicators in the areas of security; economic revitalization; governance and the rule of law; and infrastructure and basic services—the four pillars that constitute the PRS.

Data for the reports is collected at both the national and county levels through LISGIS and line-ministry staff, and includes surveys, field assessments, administrative records, and census information. The development of the PRS has involved extensive community consultations, and the M&E system has been developed in such a way as to continue this process. In addition to input from the Liberian population as part of data collection, the participation of a broad array of governmental actors is involved in the monitoring and evaluation process.

This consultation process, facilitated by the M&E system, provides opportunities to foster national capacities and greater interagency coordination. County progress reports, national PRS progress reports, a mid-term evaluation of the PRS, and a final evaluation of the PRS in 2011 are among the various outputs. Reports are reviewed by the Liberian cabinet and the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC), a body that consists of working committees that represent each of the four pillar areas and are chaired by cabinet ministers. Shared publicly, these reports foster a sense of government accountability and transparency.

Source: Cedric de Coning and Paul Romita, rapporteurs, Monitoring and Evaluation of Peace Operations (New York, International Peace Institute, November 2009), pp. 11-12, http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_rpt_m_and_e_of_peace_ops_epub.pdf. Reprinted with permission.

The advantage of using well-defined strategic goals as bases for establishing benchmarks is obvious. It makes it possible to link monitoring directly to the defined objective of a United Nations presence and facilitates the establishment of benchmarks. The drawback of using a strategy-based framework resides in the fact that mandates and national strategies are often a result of political processes,[16] which may in turn produce benchmarks stated as political goals rather than realistic benchmarks consistent with the methodology outlined in Section 1.2.

[16] See Box 2.1. and Appendix C.

A second concern with regards to benchmarks based on mandated or strategic goals is that they tend to be biased towards measuring achievements in mandate areas and to overlook negative developments in the country context. Mandates and related benchmarks also tend to focus on structural achievements rather than processes, performance and effects; for example, they may define as a benchmark the establishment of police and national armed forces rather than measuring the contribution of either force to overall peace consolidation or the integrity of their selection processes.

Box 2.3. Examples of strategy-based benchmarks focusing on an output and a system-wide effect respectively

1. National security strategy and architecture operational (output benchmark)
2. Effective state authority throughout Liberia's territory (system-wide effect benchmark)

Source: Progress report on benchmarks for drawdown phase of UNMIL, March 2009

2.2.2. Sector-based frameworks

Sector-based frameworks use a set of sectors or priority areas as a basis for specifying benchmarks. Sectors are used as conceptual bases in most external peace/conflict M&E frameworks.[17] Most United Nations benchmarking systems also categorize benchmarks according to sectors or priority areas,[18] some of which are present in most peace consolidation strategies.

Sectors help organize overall system-wide objectives and may be divided into sub-sectors to further increase the level of resolution and the possibility of specifying benchmarks clearly. In theory, the different levels of sectors in a hierarchical results system leading up to a single system-wide effect target should have clear relationships to each other. In practice, however, sector-based benchmarks or indicator frameworks tend to be one-dimensional: they are based on the assumption that development in a number of sectors contributes to a system-wide effect, but it is unclear how the sectors interact to create the system-wide effect.

Box 2.4. Example of a sector-based benchmark

Sector: **Rule of law**

Benchmark: **Equality before law strengthened**

Source: John Agoglia, Michael Dziedzic, and Barbara Sotirin, eds., Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010) p. 46, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/MPICE_final_complete%20book%20(2).pdf

[17] See Appendix A.

[18] See Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. Typical sectors used by various institutions

United Nations[19]	OECD	World Bank	United States Institute of Peace	USAID
Peace and security, public safety	Good governance	Security	Security	Peace and security
Political processes, including electoral processes; reconciliation and conflict resolution	Reform of justice and security institutions	Governance, public sector reform	Political moderation and stable governance	Democratic governance (includes rule of law)
Human rights, rule of law, transitional justice	Culture of justice; truth and reconciliation	Rule of law	Rule of law	
Economic revitalization		Poverty reduction and economic management	Economic sustainability	Economic reform; macro-economic performance
	Socio-economic development			
Provision of basic services		Human and social development	Social well-being	Human capital

2.2.3. Process-based frameworks

Process-based frameworks refer to benchmarks defined by processes that are assumed to be vital to peace consolidation, and assume that the system-wide effects will be a result of the interaction of these processes. A typical example of a process-based framework is to apply the concept of resilience as an overarching framework for peace consolidation. The premise in this case is that sustainable peace is achieved by: (1) building the capacity to withstand pressure and shock (that may trigger conflict), and simultaneously (2) reducing pressure and potential shocks, including through conflict management.

One conflict-monitoring framework that applies the process-based approach to defining benchmarks (which it refers to as goals) and indicators is Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), developed by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).[20] MPICE combines a sector-based framework with a process-based framework[21], and relates the benchmarks and indicators to three phases of conflict transformation.[22]

[19] *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, 11 June 2009, A/63/881–S/2009/304, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/367/70/PDF/N0936770.pdf.

[20] See Box 2.5.

[21] See USIP in Table 2.1.

[22] See "Objective States" in Box 2.5.

Box 2.5. Process perspectives in the MPICE framework

The MPICE framework has its theoretical basis in a premise widely adopted in USAID and the State Department, but perhaps best articulated in the USIP publication, *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (USIP Press, 2005). Peace becomes "viable" when the means and motivations for violent conflict have been reduced to the point that peaceful institutional alternatives for the pursuit of wealth and power become more attractive to the parties to the conflict. In keeping with this premise, the MPICE framework tracks two factors:

1) **Drivers of conflict** (Motivations and means for violent conflict)
Example of goal: *Threat from ex-combatants diminished*

2) **Institutional performance** (Capacity of indigenous institutions to overcome conflict peacefully)
Example of goal: *Performance of national security forces strengthened*



MPICE seeks to measure the sources of conflict against the ability of indigenous institutions to manage conflicts peacefully. Institutional performance includes both the formal institutions of government and informal institutions adhered to by society. Formal institutions can be further divided into national, regional, and local levels.

MPICE recognizes three "Objective States:"

State Zero (Externally Stabilized): Focused on immediate implementation tasks and altering most critical dynamics necessary for change. In State Zero, drivers of violent conflict persist, requiring the active and robust presence of external military forces in partnership with a sizable international civilian presence to perform vital functions such as instituting an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord, imposing order, reducing violence, delivering essential services, and moderating political conflict.

State One (Assisted Stability): Focused on transitioning responsibility to host nation authorities. Drivers of violent conflict have been reduced to such an extent that they can be largely managed by local actors and developing indigenous institutions, enabling the reduction of outside military intervention and civilian assistance to levels that can be sustained by the intervening parties over the long term.

State Two (Self-Sustaining Peace): Focused on autonomous, self-sustaining host nation efforts. Local institutions are able to cope effectively with residual drivers of violent conflict and resolve internal disputes.

Source: Agoglia, Dziedzic and Sotirin, MPICE, p. xiv

In principle, the relationship between sectors and processes should be interconnected: sectors or priority areas are assumed to interact with and complement each other. Using the MPICE framework, security addresses the symptoms of conflict and provides space for institution building and development. Building institutions increases the capacity to withstand pressure and shock (building resilience), while at the same time reducing the influence of destructive institutions such as criminal networks, armed opposition groups, or systematic corruption. Development may be perceived as dealing with the root causes of conflict, which is a more long-term process.

Based on this example, one can formulate the following general recommendations for defining peace consolidation benchmarks with reference to CDW:

- Benchmarks for security – perceived as symptoms of conflict – should be defined as clear targets to be achieved (e.g. political violence diminished).
- Benchmarks for institution building should be defined as clear targets with respect to establishment of institutional structures (e.g. legal system established), and as progress with respect to performance of the institutions (e.g. performance of national police improved).
- Benchmarks for destructive institutions should be defined as progress in reducing their influence (e.g. the influence of criminal networks in social governance has been reduced and will continue to be reduced).
- Benchmarks for key signposts in a political process should be defined as objectives with respect to the integrity and inclusiveness of the process (e.g. elections assessed as reasonably free and fair and that result in a broadly representative government).
- Benchmarks for development – addressing the social, economic, cultural, and political root causes of conflict – should be defined as positive trends (e.g. formal sector employment increasing). Development is a long-term process and the fulfillment of development objectives as stated in development strategies such as PRSPs and MDGs cannot be a premise for CDW. The challenge will rather be to identify and define sustainable trends of development and assume that they will continue after external security forces are withdrawn.

The advantage of a process-based framework is its focus on the interactions and synergetic effects of different sectors and benchmarks. The drawback is that such a framework is more complex and dynamic (multi-dimensional) and requires that attention be paid to the more fundamental drivers and processes of conflict in a given country.

On reviewing the benchmarks that the United Nations has established to date in Haiti, Chad, Liberia, Timor-Leste and elsewhere, one can see a tendency to emphasise a pillar/sectoral approach over a process approach. However, many benchmark frameworks do not follow the general sectoral division in a strict manner when identifying benchmarks and indicators, but combine general sectoral benchmarks with contextual defined categories of benchmarks on special issues believed to be central for conflict and conflict resolution in a country, e.g. the issue of land ownership. Such combinations are highly recommended as they have the potential to target key benchmarks as well as to ensure that less exposed, but highly relevant, issues are covered in the benchmark framework.

Box 2.6. Example of a set of process-based benchmarks

Process A: Reducing pressure towards conflict

Benchmark A1: **Threat from ex-combatants diminished**

Benchmark A2: **Popular support for violent factions diminished**

Process B: Building resilience to withstand pressure towards conflict

Benchmark B1: **Performance of national security forces strengthened**

Benchmark B2: **Public confidence in national security forces strengthened**

Source: Benchmarks sourced from Agoglia, Dziedzic and Sotirin, MPICE, p. 1

2.2.4. Other frameworks

There are a number of more general planning and management methodologies that can be used to establish benchmark frameworks for peace consolidation monitoring. Two of the most common ones are: 1) the Logical Framework Approach (LFA)[23], and 2) various types of Impact Assessment (IA)[24].

LFA and IA provide different methodologies to identify relevant factors and indicators to be included in monitoring systems. The main strengths of these methodologies are that they: 1) are well developed and tested, and provide concrete guidance; 2) promote wide reflection on the potential positive, negative, direct, and indirect effects of certain interventions or programmes, including risks; and 3) give clear guidance on how to convert the reflections into well structured analytical frameworks.

However, the use of LFA and IA to identify relevant factors in monitoring systems does not solve the more fundamental problems, such as the tendency of selecting easily measurable factors (e.g. at output level); challenging the world-view or narrative behind an intervention; biases in the selection of factors; etc. Rather a common problem of the many types of IA, as well as the LFA, is that they may just consolidate certain pre-assumptions, wishes, or political interests behind an intervention by formalizing a logical network of factors supporting the initial narrative behind the intervention. Practice also shows that a normal outcome of an IA is that an intervention is being slightly modified within the frame of its original narrative rather than the narrative being challenged and the intervention being more radically re-structured accordingly.

These fundamental problems are, however, common to most well formalized methodologies for measuring effects of various interventions, and should not be seen as an argument not to use LFA and IA approaches. Various types of IA also attempt to deal with the more fundamental problems mentioned above, e.g. by involving different interest groups and stakeholders in the selection of relevant factors (e.g. Participatory Impact Assessment), and by taking more systemic and dynamic approaches (e.g. Adaptive Impact Assessment).

[23] See e.g. Kari Örtengren, *The Logical Framework Approach: A Summary of the Theory behind the LFA Method* (Stockholm, SIDA, January 2004), http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/download.jsp?f=SIDA1489en_web.pdf&a=2379.

[24] For more information, links, and resources, see www.iaia.org



3. Data Gathering and Indicators

This chapter provides guidelines on how to measure progress towards or regression away from established benchmarks, beginning with an overview of data gathering options and the main types of indicators that could be used in peace consolidation benchmarking. Its aim is to identify possible data sources and data gathering options as well as to impart a basic understanding of the methodologies for managing and aggregating indicators.

3.1. Data sources and collection methods

3.1.1. Leveraging existing data sources

Mapping existing data should be prioritized in the process of selecting data for benchmarking. Existing data are preferable where they are sufficient to meet the requirements of a M&E exercise, as the United Nations system has limited resources for dedicated data collection for M&E. What one should look for are the *best available sources of data at the lowest possible cost.*

The main sources of data in countries where peace consolidation benchmarking is undertaken are:

1. **National government bodies, including statistics offices.** Government bodies in host countries are tasked with collecting data appropriate to their respective mandates; they may also be able to direct United Nations system planners to external data sources. National statistics offices will generally be the primary sources of data,[25] but other government institutions – such as national police reporting systems – may also be able to provide relevant data. The availability and quality of such data vary considerably from country to country. In some countries, governments have long experience in collecting data despite instability and resource limitations. In others, particularly those emerging from protracted violent conflict, government-sourced data may be scarce, outdated, or otherwise flawed.

2. **United Nations agencies.** United Nations agencies collect data in different fields relevant to peace consolidation and should be the first port of call in a data mapping exercise. Besides being potential sources of data, many of the agencies will also have experience and competence in establishing M&E systems. Agencies are also involved in collaborative projects with other international actors, such as the World Bank and regional development banks, to establish national statistical databases. Examples of data collected by United Nations agencies are shown in Table 3.1.

[25] See Box 3.1.

Table 3.1. Examples of data collected by United Nations agencies

Types of Data	Collector/Provider	Links/Examples of data
MDG and PRSP-related data	UNICEF in collaboration with various other agencies	http://www.devinfo.org
Data for the Human Development Index	UNDP	http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
Historical data related to development	UNDP	
Multiple indicator cluster surveys	UNICEF	http://www.unicef.org/statistics/index_24302.html
Data on children and youth	UNICEF	http://www.unicef.org/statistics/
Humanitarian data, including baseline data from conflict early recovery phases	OCHA	
Food security, land issues and agricultural data	FAO	http://faostat.fao.org/default.aspx
Human Rights data	UNHCR, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, human rights offices within integrated peacekeeping operations	http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html
Health data	WHO	http://www.who.int/whosis/en/
Gender-related data, including gender violence	UNIFEM	
Topical information collected in various projects.	Various UNCT members in collaboration with consultants	E.g. Mapping human rights violations in the DRC; evaluation reports; etc.
Data consolidated for the purpose of a PCNA or Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)	Possibly hosted within DevInfo or by agencies, or in a national database	

3. **Other international organizations involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities.** International actors and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), European Commission, and regional development banks, collect different types of data at the country level including data related to needs assessments, PRSPs, human security, and economic development.

4. **Research institutions.** National and international research institutions, including statistics offices, collect a wide range of data in post-conflict countries, sometimes with support from donors. This includes data about living conditions, mortality rates, specific population groups, security indexes, and arms availability in society. Specific sources are cited in Appendix D.

5. **NGOs and bilateral development assistance agencies.** The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and major international NGOs collect considerable statistical data and information in the fields of security and development. Development assistance agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) also collect a wide range of relevant data.

Box 3.1. DevInfo

Since its launch in 2004, the United Nations System has been promoting the use of DevInfo for the management of databases on human development. DevInfo was initially endorsed by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) to be used by Member States to monitor the MDGs. Its use has since expanded beyond human development to include such areas as recovery (for example, in Aceh) and transition (as in Liberia). Existing DevInfo data-bases have proven to be valuable as central repositories of data that can be easily accessed for planning and monitoring purposes. In addition to enhancing the accessibility of data, the system generates tables, graphs and maps for reports and presentations. The database maintains indicators, by time periods and geographical areas, to monitor commitments to sustained human development.

For additional information on DevInfo, and a quick guide on how to produce maps, graphs and tables using the DevInfo technology, visit *www.devinfo.org*.

The first step toward effectively leveraging existing data should be to bring together those collecting that data with a view to identifying the available data sources and establishing a central data repository. Integration structures or exercises, such as an integrated mission or ISF, should be fully utilized as United Nations entities will have partnerships of varying strengths with different external data sources. (The mandate of the UNCT, for example, might be more conducive to accessing certain data held by the national government).

3.1.2. Collecting additional data

Data collected using non-statistical survey methods

Where there is no existing data, information can be gathered using non-statistical survey methods. These rely not on representative population samples but on information gathered from select groups of knowledgeable people or on consensuses reached among different persons on a panel. The key is to identify informants or other sources that can provide reliable information on a particular subject. The main advantage of these methods is that they can provide data that are sufficiently reliable for the purpose at hand while requiring fewer resources than statistical surveys.

At the same time, non-statistical methods can be used to collect qualitative data, which should complement the more mechanistic indicator measures normally obtained by benchmarking in any aggregate analysis of peace consolidation in a given country. This can serve as a reality check on the information obtained from a benchmarking system.

Non-statistical survey methods include **group interviews** (also called focus groups), **reference groups** (also called expert groups or panels), **media monitoring** and **observation:**

1. **Group interviews** obtain data by promoting discussion of specific topics and then trying to reach consensus on each topic raised. This method is commonly used in Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Surveys, where groups representing whole communities or particular groups of communities are gathered to express their views on different topics related to daily life in the community. (Despite the nomenclature, the method is equally applicable to urban communities).

2. **Reference groups** consist of individuals that have been selected for their knowledge of, though not necessarily formal expertise on, a certain topic. The defining feature of a reference group is that the same individuals are asked to offer their view on a particular topic (e.g. the security situation in a given area) over a period of time. It can sometimes be useful to include in the same group individuals whose knowledge of a certain topic comes from different perspectives (e.g. membership in the police or in NGOs).

3. **Media monitoring** can be used to register different incidents (e.g. of violence or civil unrest) or to reveal trends in society (such as greater exercise of free expression or shifting public priorities).

4. **Observation,** with a focus on particular issues, can reveal useful information if conducted in a structured and formalized way. This might include, e.g. observation of how public spaces such as parks, cinemas, and sports fields are used. The aim of many observation methods (e.g. participatory observation, as used by anthropologists) is to produce qualitative data, but observation techniques can also be used to produce quantitative data (e.g. by attaching some kind of measure for how people use public spaces).

Data collected through statistical surveys

A third option, which is sometimes necessary to obtain high quality data,[26] is to conduct statistical surveys through interviews with a representative sample of the population. Whereas data derived from existing sources or using non-statistical survey methods can in principle be collected by United Nations field staff, large-scale statistical surveys

[26] See Sub-section 3.2.

require resources, planning, and special competencies. They are normally conducted by specialists in survey methodologies, such as research institutions, highly skilled consultants, or NGOs.[27] While statistical surveys are normally the most resource intensive data collection methods, they also in many cases yield the most reliable data.

In order to keep costs reasonable, but at the same time collect primary data for a specific purpose, one could explore the possibility of including additional questions in surveys that have already been planned (e.g. national statistical surveys, large-scale living conditions surveys, or more specialized surveys, such as opinion polls on security-related issues). Another option for managing expenditure is to collaborate with other United Nations entities in planning and executing large-scale surveys. Given that such collaboration can be mutually beneficial, one should invite wherever possible other United Nations entities to build their data needs into any large-scale statistical survey (this can be done easily in the context of PCNA exercises).

3.2. Assessing types of data

Having identified and gained access to existing data sources, the next task is to ascertain what data could be most useful for measuring progress toward, or regression away from, the established benchmarks. One may then decide whether additional data collection is required. Below are some basic definitions and considerations to help assess the data available and determine whether it needs to be supplemented.

Primary data are collected in the field for a particular purpose (e.g. by conducting various types of surveys). The main advantages of primary data are that their collection can be (1) tailored to meet specific data requirements, and (2) controlled, including to document uncertainty.

Secondary data can be used for a purpose other than that for which can they were collected. This is the most common type of data used in relation to indicator methodologies (e.g. existing statistical data and survey data collected by other actors). Benchmarking exercises can be based entirely on the use of secondary data, which are usually readily available, even in conflict-affected situations.

Quantitative data refer to all types of data that we can attach a measure to and which can be quantified in some way to support our analysis. Quantitative data that are typically used in peace monitoring activities include mortality rates (number of deaths) related to political violence and the number of weapons in a society, all of which are objectively countable figures. However, quantitative data also include subjective data (e.g. data collected in perception surveys), which are considered relevant in monitoring peace consolidation.

Qualitative data refer to information that is used to exemplify an interpretation or an analysis, but which is not quantified. One way in which such information can be obtained is through surveys designed specifically for a benchmarking exercise, by asking open-ended questions and then quoting expressions or observations from the interviews. In a mission context, a critical resource is the Political Affairs Office and/or Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), both of which are tasked with gathering and analyzing qualitative information; their engagement in this activity over the life of the mission enables them to effectively assess and contextualize information derived from a variety of sources. Qualitative data are rarely the only type of data used in monitoring systems but they can be used to complement quantitative data and to assess the validity of results from quantification.

[27] This would ideally entail the use of local interviewers, who are often more capable of soliciting genuine responses to interview questions.

Register data refer to data that can be obtained from existing registers and files such as police files, registers of members in political parties, registers of people receiving public/municipal services (e.g. water supply), and files recorded by military observers. Register data are commonly used as bases for statistical systems and M&E systems in developed countries, but can be challenging to obtain – and to trust – in conflict zones. The availability of such data should however be assessed and creative use of register data have shown that such data may provide useful information on quite distinct topics.

Perceptional data are usually, but not necessarily, data collected through statistical surveys in which people are asked about their views on topics such as security, satisfaction with political leaders, and provision of public services. The main advantage of perception-related data is that they encompass information of diverse types (quantitative and qualitative) in single expressions and take into account the subjective views of the local population, which are a central factor in conflict areas. The drawback to perceptional data is they might change rapidly or slowly compared to more objective data on the same issues. This is often controlled by combining objective and perception data on the same variables or indicators (see Sub-section 3.1.2.).[28]

Other considerations concerning data collection

1. Can comparable data be collected over time? Regardless of the data sources selected for a benchmarking exercise, they need to be comparable over time. In general, comparability over time is more important than stating the correct level of a variable (e.g. an indicator) in any statistical system.

   Preoccupation with finding the correct level of a variable (e.g. the actual number of rapes committed in a conflict zone) leads sometimes to combining different sources of information in order to obtain a more complete picture of the situation. For the purpose of monitoring change over time, however, one need only use one of these sources; the source selected should be the one that consistently employs the same methodology. The level may be calibrated if needed using one of the results obtained by combining different sources of information.

2. When can data be viewed as valid and reliable? Another basic requirement for data used is that they are valid and reliable. The reliability of data depends on how they have been collected. A common problem with secondary sources is that the methodology used is not always transparent. In practice, however, one often has to use data that is not as reliable as would be ideal, particularly for newly established benchmark systems.

[28] A good example of a large-scale perception survey that could be employed in peace consolidation benchmarking is Afro Barometer, http://www.afrobarometer.org.

3.3. Attributing indicators to benchmarks

Chapter 2 recommended establishing relatively few (4-12) benchmarks for peace consolidation monitoring. Having so few benchmarks to track a goal as general as peace consolidation means that the benchmarks have to be defined at a relatively general level and that each benchmark must be sub-divided into measurable units.[29] Such measurable units are referred to as indicators and are expressed as single variables or as equations containing two or more measurable variables.

3.3.1. Types of indicators

Indicators can be classified in different ways. For the purpose of peace consolidation benchmarking it may be useful to classify indicators into the following main types:

- Objective versus subjective indicators
- Index versus proxy indicators
- Slow-changing versus fast-changing indicators
- Output versus outcome and system-wide impact indicators

Objective indicators refer to indicators measured by observational data, which is information that in principle should be observed and recorded as the same value or characteristic by different observers. Typical examples of objective indicators are mortality rate, GDP, food production, etc. *Subjective indicators,* on the other hand, are indicators that are measured by asking people about their views on and perceptions of certain phenomena.

Index indicators refer to sets of variables that in combination are meant to provide an indicator of certain phenomena, but where the behavior of each single variable in the index does not necessarily or fully correspond to the behavior of the phenomena in question. An index indicator may be a set of variables that need to be aggregated according to certain criteria (see section 3.4); an account, e.g. an account of the number of small arms present in society (number of arms imported + number of arms produced in the country – number of arms seized and destroyed – number of arms exported); or other equations producing a single measure from a number of selected variables.

A proxy indicator on the other hand is a variable that is assumed to fully reflect the behavior of the phenomena in question, and which thus can be used as a single indicator to measure change of the phenomenon. The assumed reflection may be based on theoretically verified correlations, e.g. number of homicides and the number of small arms in society; or on observed correlations not fully understood or theoretically verifiable, e.g. conflict level and infant mortality.

Slow-changing indicators refer to variables that change slowly over time and/or are quite insensitive to the surrounding environment. Typical examples of slow-changing indicators are socio-economic conditions and underlying causes of child mortality. *Fast-changing indicators* are variables that are sensitive to impacts from its surrounding environment and that fluctuate quite easily. Typical examples of such indicators are public opinion, epidemic mortality, and mortality from violence.

Output, outcome and *system-wide impact indicators* refer to variables that measure different points in the chain of cause-effect relationships between a strategy and its system-wide impacts.[30]

[29] See Table 3.1.

[30] See Section 1.2.2. and Figure 1.2.

3.3.2. Combining indicators

Combining indicators can be extremely useful in order to: (1) verify measurements by combining indicators measured by different types of data, and (2) obtain a multi-dimensional picture of a phenomenon by combining indicators that when put together provide "more than the sum of the parts". Below are four types of combinations useful for peace consolidation benchmarking:

Combining objective and subjective indicators can be useful to verify that objectively measured variables are linked to popular perceptions. This is especially relevant for conflict environments, where objective measures showing progress or regression may not validly state a change in the peace or conflict level as long as popular perceptions do not show the same trend. Figure 3.1 provides an example of strongly correlated subjective and objective indicators.

Combining output, outcome and system-wide impact indicators is often useful to obtain information on the relationships between different levels of results (and thus the chain of accountability and causal relationships) and to provide vital inputs to strategic planning. For example, an indicator on the establishment and structural state of a justice system (normally objective indicators) can be combined with the system's performance or function in a wider sense (measured through the use of subjective or perceptional indicators).

Figure 3.1. Diagram showing the correlation between subjective and objective indicators. Iraq, 2002-2008

Source: Downloaded 16 August 2008 from:
http://www.iraqbodycount.org/
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/poll/2008/0308opinion.pdf
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/resist/2007/09bbciraqipoll.pdf

Combining indicators representing two opposite dimensions of a process. Combining indicators representing two opposite dimensions of a process is a key principle in process-based benchmarking frameworks. The advantage of such combinations is that they counter biases towards measuring achievements only. (Using an example cited earlier,

indicators that represent the development and performance of a national police force could usefully be combined with others representing the influence in society of a criminal network or other destructive element).[31]

Combining variables to isolate a phenomenon from external impacts. A key objective of peace consolidation is that a country should reach a state of self-sustaining peace. External forces that contribute to keeping the conflict level low should therefore be subtracted in equations measuring peace consolidation. This principle is particularly relevant for indicators measuring security-related issues such as the number of conflict-related deaths; security-related indicators should always be expressed as formulas that seek to isolate the contribution of external security forces from that of national security forces.

3.3.3. Key considerations for selection of indicators

When identifying indicators in a benchmark system, five issues should be taken into consideration sequentially:

1. **How accurately and comprehensively do the indicators selected describe the benchmark?** Indicators are, by definition, not a complete measure of a benchmark or any other unit; they are used to indicate a trend or phenomenon. Thus, one normally employs multiple indicators to say something valid about progress towards a given benchmark. An important principle when employing many indicators (sets) to describe the achievement of one benchmark is to articulate the indicators in relationship to each other so that they cover different aspects of the benchmark (e.g. by using indicators for different social groups to say something about developments in the population as a whole). In addition, indicators are often combined to increase their collective reliability and accuracy. For example, tracking popular perceptions of the functioning of a specific institution, in combination with objective measures of that institution's performance, can increase the indicators' reliability.

2. **How can the indicators be measured, and what type of data do they require?** How indicators are defined or articulated often relates to the type of data being used to measure them. There are two main types of indicators: quantitative and qualitative, including so-called perception indicators. Quantitative indicators are those measured by quantitative data (e.g. number of deaths). Qualitative indicators are those measured by qualitative data (e.g. from surveys of popular perceptions about certain subjects or phenomena).
The decision to select quantitative or qualitative indicators is primarily based on the type of data that is available. Quantitative indicators are often preferable as they may express a higher degree of accuracy over periods of time. In many circumstances, however, qualitative indicators may be the best option as they normally encompass many dimensions of an issue that could not be measured quantitatively. Combining quantitative and qualitative indicators may therefore provide the most comprehensive understanding of an issue or a related set of issues.

3. **How comparable are the selected indicators over time?** A key principle to be followed when selecting indicators is that they should be stable over time, in the sense that: (1) it should be possible to measure the indicators using the same methods or data every time, and 2) the indicators should exist in the same way and have the same function every time they are measured. Conversely, phenomena that are capable of changing appearance or are easily replaceable might lead one to misinterpret change when tracking an indicator (e.g. one might misinterpret a change in the number of weapons collected as a positive trend,

[31] See Sub-section 2.2.3.

missing the fact that different weapons are in circulation and replacing the weapons that have been collected).

4. **What changes can we expect to identify using the selected indicators and over what time period must they be measured?** When selecting indicators, it is important to note that some indicators change fast while others change more slowly. Mortality rates from epidemics and violence are potentially fast-changing indicators while the underlying level of child mortality and socio-economic conditions are usually subject to slow change. Perception indicators may change fast if they relate to the popularity of a specific politician whereas they can change more slowly if they relate to trust in politicians generally.

5. **What resources are required to measure the selected indicators?** The selection of good indicators needs to take into account the availability and quality of existing data and the resources and related costs needed to collect new data. Finding the balance between ideal and practical indicators can therefore be a challenge. One should always consider whether to retain a theoretically defined indicator that has high validity but employs less reliable data, or whether to favor reliable data but employ a less valid indicator. The employment of two or more indicators of less validity may sometimes compensate for one highly valid indicator, if the data attributed to the former are more reliable than the data attributed to the latter.

6. **How frequently must data be collected?** A peace consolidation phase, as expressed in a Security Council mandate or request for CDW benchmarking, normally has a limited time frame of 2-6 years. It is therefore important to consider how frequently the United Nations presence will need to obtain the different types of data required for the benchmark framework. Indicators relying on non-statistical data collection methods such as expert groups can be obtained with high frequency, the only limitation being the time period required to expect any change in the indicator. On the other hand, large-scale statistical survey data and secondary data collected by external actors may be difficult to obtain with high frequency; this is due to respectively to the high costs entailed and to uncertainty over how frequently the external actors can conduct follow-up surveys of the data employed initially in the benchmark framework.

Table 3.2. Example of the combination of different types of indicators[32] attributed to a selected sector-based benchmark

Benchmark: *National security forces, including the police, operate lawfully and legitimately and are capable of ensuring a safe and secure environment for all citizens*

Indicators	Sub-indicators (measures)
Magnitude of conflict (symptoms)	Number of casualties divided by number of national security personnel (A)
	Number of casualties divided by number of external security personnel (A)
	Number and frequency of attacks against national security forces (B)
	Number and frequency of attacks against external security forces (B)
	Number of illegal arms and equipment seized by security forces

[32] See Sub-section 3.3.2.

	Number of newly displaced people (C)
	Number of asylum applicants from the conflict country (C)
	Share of population feeling insecurity at market places (C)
Ability and performance of national security forces	Number of people recruited to the national security forces
	Existence of a national security strategy and/or threat assessment
	Total number of personnel in national security forces
	Perception by public that they will be protected by national security forces (C)
	Perception that the national security forces function in the best interest of the people (C)
	Perception that the national security forces operate in accordance with the law and the population's general expectance of behavior (C)
	Extent to which soldiers fail to receive pay and compensation to which they are entitled
Ability and performance of armed opposition groups	Percentage of military-aged population that expresses an inclination to support or join an armed opposition group (C)
	Share of population that receives livelihood support, including protection, from armed opposition groups (C)
	Number of national security personnel killed or wounded while attempting to demobilize or disarm opposition groups
	Percentage of the population expressing sympathy with armed opposition groups (C)
Remarks: A and B, to be combined to form an index to isolate contribution of national forces only; C, by identity group	

3.4. Aggregation and analysis

3.4.1. Aggregation techniques

This handbook has so far proposed to operationalize the system-wide concept of peace consolidation by dividing the concept into a hierarchy of lower level measurable results and sub-results. Measures and empirical data are attributed to these lower units in the hierarchy only. Clear guidelines are therefore necessary on techniques to aggregate data from lower to higher levels in such a way that a general picture of peace consolidation in a country can be obtained. These techniques are of three main types:[33]

- Statistical methods
- Classification techniques
- Qualitative assessments

Statistical aggregation methods require data of high quality attributed to the different levels/areas of results to be compared statistically to each other (by regression and correlation analysis, etc.), in order to obtain aggregate views. Such methods can be relevant for certain survey or statistical data used in peace consolidation benchmarking (most commonly conducted by the actors responsible for the surveys), but are normally beyond the scope of *benchmarking* processes as described in this handbook.

Classification techniques, such as scaling and weighting, are the most commonly used aggregation techniques in peace/conflict M&E frameworks. Scaling is a way to convert units measured in different ways and using different scales into one common scale, which makes it possible to compare the different units against each other. A typical example is to divide different results (e.g. from data collected in a public opinion survey) on a scale of 1-5, where "1" can represent bad performance of police and "5" can represent excellent performance of police, or if there is data on change, where "1" can represent little change over time and "5" can represent substantial change over time.

Weighting is a way to allocate different emphases or weights to units when they are compared to each other, and is often used in combination with scaling to produce aggregate index figures (e.g. by summarizing each scale figure divided by their attributed weights). A typical example of weighting is to give higher weight to factors that are regarded as premises for peace consolidation (e.g. a minimal number of conflict-related deaths) in order to ensure that aggregate results cannot be satisfactory without this premise being met. Weighting techniques can also be used to scale down the importance of uncertain data in aggregate results.

Data is in practice often aggregated in a more informal way, e.g. by drawing aggregate conclusions based on a *qualitative assessment* of the underlying data or units. This is in principle the same procedure as for a more formalized weighting technique, only that the "weights" are not defined in advance. Qualitative assessments are used to produce aggregate conclusions in many of the traffic light reports.[34]

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[33] For a comprehensive overview of aggregation techniques and challenges associated with aggregation of conflict related data: see e.g. Francisco Gutiérrez, Diana Buitrago, Andrea González, and Camila Lozano, *Measuring Poor State Performance: Problems, Perspectives and Paths Ahead* (The Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC), London School of Economics, 2010)

[34] See Sub-section 4.1.2.

The most essential point with respect to data aggregation is to be conscious of the procedures employed and to ensure that these procedures are easily documented. In addition, aggregation can be made easier by considering how data and indicators are related to each other and how they can provide aggregate results from the outset of establishing a benchmarking system.

3.4.2. Assessing uncertainty and process improvements

Data on peace consolidation cover a wide range of data sources that may be of varying quality and possess varying degrees of uncertainty. Uncertainty attributed to the different data employed in benchmarking should be assessed for two main reasons:

- In order to avoid reaching fraudulent conclusions and making wrong strategic decisions based on data possessing high uncertainty
- In order to take steps to improve data collection methods in areas that are particularly uncertain and/or considered to be of high importance for peace consolidation monitoring

As with aggregation techniques, there are different methods of assessing data uncertainty, ranging from sophisticated statistical methods to qualitative assessments. For peace consolidation benchmarking, it will usually be sufficient to assess uncertainty qualitatively as many sources will possess a high degree of uncertainty given the post-conflict environment. Steps should be taken to see how the most uncertain data and collection methods could be improved. As with aggregation techniques, the most essential point is to focus on and be aware of data uncertainty and the way that it is used in analysis and in drawing conclusions from the benchmarking process.

4. Reporting

Reporting against benchmarks should respond to the collective and individual information requirements of different actors, inform their decision-making and broader strategic planning concerns, and if sufficiently robust, facilitate mutual accountability among stakeholders. Reporting requirements vary across United Nations field presences, which can take the form of peacekeeping operations, special political missions, or United Nations country teams led by a Resident Coordinator. Often representing different stages in the process of peace consolidation and with widely differing mandates and resources, these presences will have quite specific reporting obligations or needs. Much of the United Nations system's experience with benchmarking has arisen with respect to CDW of peacekeeping operations, a number of which have adopted the traffic light format, detailed below. Other contexts will require the use or development of alternative reporting formats. Given the broad diversity of reporting requirements across field presences, this chapter does not recommend specific formats but does outline some basic principles and guidelines to optimize benefits from the benchmarking process.

4.1. Presenting benchmarking results

Benchmarking results may appear either in reports to which they contribute indirectly by providing underlying information or in reports that are specifically formatted to present the results of a benchmarking process.

4.1.1. Use of benchmarking results in general policy and strategy reports

Benchmarking results usually contribute to the contents and conclusions of key policy and strategy papers, but tend to do so indirectly and framed in the context of broader political and strategic statements. While this means of presentation ensures that benchmarking results enter the political arena, where they can have practical value, it carries certain risks since the process of aggregating data up to the highest levels may not be guided by methodological principles. There are many examples of benchmarking results or other empirical data produced by researchers being used in ways for which they were not intended, e.g. by focusing only on parts of the data that support pre-defined conclusions.

One way to help ensure that benchmarking results are used properly is to provide decision-makers with high-level aggregate results, ideally with some analytical conclusions of policy relevance, rather than single element data. It should also be standard procedure to produce a simple report on the benchmarking process documenting the methodological basis of the results, including what data has been used and a general assessment of the quality and uncertainty attributed to the data on different elements. Brief reports presenting the main results from the benchmarking process and explaining the methodologies used should ideally be included as annexes to strategy and policy reports.

4.1.2. Reports formatted to present benchmarking results

Procedures and practices for reporting results from M&E processes, including benchmarking results, vary by institution. Examples include reports containing detailed descriptions of single benchmarks and indicators using different types of diagrams and tables,[35] and traffic light reports.[36]

Reports like the Iraq Index and the Afghanistan Index[37] provide an impressive amount of information on peace consolidation by presenting the results from a long list of indicators individually. They are, however, weaker at compliance with ideal reporting principles such as providing aggregate results and analysis for policy and decision-makers and documenting methodological issues, including data uncertainty. Other M&E frameworks, such as MPICE, present aggregate results in simple diagrams, using aggregation to convert the large amount of single indicators measured to sector-wide results with a process perspective (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1. Diagram showing the aggregate sector-wide result from a test of the process-based MPICE framework on the security situation in Cité Soleil, Port au Prince, Haiti, 2008.



Source: Ghassan Al-Chaar and Rob Grossman-Vermaas, US Army Corps of Engineers, "Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments & the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI)", presentation at the Monitoring and Evaluation of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding workshop co-organized by the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), New York, 7 May 2009

United Nations field presences are increasingly using traffic light reporting formats to present benchmarking results. The format is essentially a visualization tool whose usefulness is as good as the methodological process that underlies it. One of the main advantages of the format is that it promotes aggregate thinking in that the traffic lights presented are the result of aggregation of lower level information.

[35] See e.g. the Iraq Index, http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex.

[36] See Appendix C6 for an example from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[37] See http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx.

Traffic light reports presently employed within the United Nations system typically contain five main elements of information, normally in separate columns: (1) the benchmark, (2) the indicators, (3) the traffic lights, attributed to either the bench-marks or to the indicators, (4) a general comment or analysis related to the color of the light, and sometimes (5) recommendations for action based on the status of the benchmark/indicator.

In line with the general comments above on documentation of the benchmarking process, the traffic light format will benefit from adding a few more elements of information, primarily to promote a focus on the process behind the aggregate results presented as traffic lights and to make the color of the lights more methodologically accountable. Such elements, which could be presented as additional columns or as drop-down lists in electronic reports, could include (1) the type of data collected and the data collection methods used, (2) a general assessment of uncertainty attributed to the data used, and (3) the aggregation procedures that have been followed. In relation to this last point it might be useful to present traffic lights at different levels of the benchmark-indicator hierarchy, e.g. by presenting lights for both benchmarks and the underlying indicators.

4.2. Key principles for reporting

A reporting process refers to the steps taken from the analysis of benchmarking data to the vetting, formal presentation and actual use of the benchmarking report by policy-makers and other end users. The process normally involves consultations with several international and host country actors and steps for approval, including decisions pertaining to format and content. Good reporting should fully reflect the original analytical results. Incorrect, biased or incomprehensive reporting will be transmitted adversely from one step to the next in a benchmarking process, leading to suboptimal decision-making, corrective actions, longer-term planning, and overall performance.

Some basic principles to ensure good reporting are:

1. Develop field reporting formats adapted, in a user-friendly manner, to the end use of the benchmarking results (e.g. to better inform decision-making and strategic planning).

2. Ensure multidimensional and balanced reporting, which includes setbacks, risks, and uncertainty.

3. Document and share, in a transparent manner, the methodological basis of the reported results, including methods used, sources of data, and aggregation procedures.

(1) **Develop field reporting formats adapted, in a user-friendly manner, to the end use of the benchmarking results.** As stated earlier, it is important to ensure that the information collected and analyzed through the benchmarking exercise is consolidated and synthesized through the reporting process and then skilfully presented to the end users. One way to ensure this is to develop benchmarking reporting formats that are carefully adapted to the end users' needs; the reporting formats should therefore be kept as far as possible in their original form from the beginning to the end of the reporting process. They could take the form of a simple, standardized data sheet attached to the main report – a format similar to a traffic light, but covering more reporting aspects in greater detail and thereby reflecting better any subtle nuances in terms of change over time.

Another way to ensure that the original information is preserved throughout the reporting process is to engage and, where appropriate, delegate the responsibility of reporting to other national and international actors. This is particularly realistic when, for example, a national statistical bureau leads the benchmarking exercise. The added value of such

an arrangement is that the host country becomes more directly involved in the benchmarking exercise, including reporting through its own institutions, enabling critical national capacities to be developed over time.

(2) **Ensure multidimensional and balanced reporting, which includes setbacks, risks, and uncertainty.** A basic principle underlying informative benchmarking is to identify and measure factors that reflect achievements in stated priority areas alongside factors that threaten particular goals. For instance, if the aim is to develop a professional national police force, measure not only the progress of this institution but also that of competing elements, such as criminal networks and activities. The same principle is valid for reporting. If reports on peace consolidation contain only information on achievements according to stated goals or wishes and do not include information on setbacks and risk, considerable information valuable to informed decision-making and sound planning will be lost.

Box 4.1. Key benchmarking process points to be included in a report

Considerable useful information can be captured from a peace consolidation benchmarking exercise to better inform decision-making and planning, extending beyond simply the results identified in strategic priority areas. The list of such information includes:

Uncertainty in measured results

Uncertainty is especially important to consider when benchmarking results are presented in an extracted format (e.g. by employing the traffic light system). The use of traffic lights and other symbols and diagrams to report in a visual manner may sometimes reflect more certainty than is actually the case, and one should always consider whether it is appropriate to use such reporting techniques if the results are uncertain. If such techniques are used to present uncertain results, it is important to add relevant information about uncertainty.

Data quality and improvement opportunities

In order to improve the benchmarking exercise report, it may be useful to include an assessment of the quality of the data used in the exercise, and to identify certain data or areas where more resources should be employed to improve data quality.

Types of data and data collection methods used

Types of data and collection methods used to produce the results in relation to different benchmarks may be useful to include in reporting. This description can be of a general nature (e.g. by mentioning the main collection method such as expert or focus groups. The advantage of including such information is that it may reflect some of the uncertainty attributed to the different results.

The consideration of a benchmark's validity

With respect to measuring peace consolidation, we can rarely be certain that the selected benchmarks reflect, in a comprehensive and authoritative manner, a consolidated peace within a host country. It may therefore be useful to juxtapose a qualitative assessment of a country situation against the specifically measured progress toward achieving the selected benchmarks. This would not only add another dimension to the report, but will also provide a basis for revising and improving the overall benchmarking process.

Setbacks, negative developments, and risks

Setbacks, negative developments, and risks should, in principle, be reflected by the measurements conducted in the benchmarking process. It may, however, be useful in some cases to include a detailed analysis of the causes of such factors, which were not necessarily included and measured in the original benchmarking process.

Balanced and "honest" reporting should also reflect uncertainties attributed to different factors in the reports. In practice, some of the benchmarks and indicators selected for a benchmarking system may be more difficult to measure than others, depending upon the nature of phenomena and the available data. If one presents uncertain results from a benchmarking exercise, without actually reflecting the uncertainty, this could result in poor decisions and plans based on invalid and insufficient information. Reporting uncertainty also helps to identify areas where further technical and financial resources could help to improve data quality.

One way to ensure that both setbacks, disappointing results, risks and uncertainties are included in a benchmarking report is to develop reporting formats (at any level) that ask specifically for such information, and to promote a professional, transparent reporting culture that rewards good reporting of this information.

(3) **Document and share, in a transparent manner, the methodological basis of the reported results, including methods used, sources of data, and aggregation procedures.** A final principle for good reporting is to document or validate the results presented in the reports. Citing data sources used to measure different benchmarks and indicators, as well as procedures for analyzing raw data, may provide additional, valuable information in the reports. Such information does not necessarily need to be included in the reports themselves but should rather be stored for reference. This information should always be documented in order to: (1) ensure accountability of the reported results, (2) provide a basis for improving the benchmarking exercise, and (3) ensure consistency in the benchmarking process, especially when personnel change in an integrated peace operation.

Appendices



Appendix A: Understanding peace consolidation

There is no generally agreed definition of **"peace consolidation".** Instead, the term has often been used synonymously with **"peacebuilding"** to describe the processes and actions undertaken in order to build a lasting peace, understood minimally as the absence of armed conflict.[38] Unlike peacebuilding, however, peace consolidation tends to be associated with the culminating phase of a process of national and international attempts to establish and sustain peace.[39] Specifically, peace consolidation is associated with transition or exit on the part of international actors: "consolidated" peace triggers, or at least enables, a shift in mission priorities (for example, from stabilization and humanitarian relief to reconstruction and development) and/or the drawdown and ultimate closure of a peace-keeping/building mission. Consolidated peace thus implies a degree of stability and sustainability – in security terms, if not institutionally or developmentally – that is not necessarily encompassed by peacebuilding, which has a more active connotation.

Box 1.1. The concept of peace consolidation

A consolidated peace can be defined as a self-sustaining peace. It becomes sustainable when conflicts that arise within a state can be resolved peacefully through the use of national norms, institutions, and practices (both established and ad hoc). A consolidated peace is marked by more than just the absence of military conflict in a state; it is characterized by the absence of major threats to public security as well, such as political repression and discrimination against vulnerable groups (women, ethnic and other minorities), torture, and widespread serious crime. External assistance may contribute to the maintenance of a peace but a consolidated peace must be able to sustain itself[40]

Just as there is no widely accepted definition of peace consolidation, so its threshold and constituent activities are also unclear[39]. The point at which peace can be said to be consolidated will thus vary from situation to situation. The various actors within a post-conflict country or peacekeeping/building mission can also contest this designation. For example, some national actors would prefer an earlier exit by international military and civilian personnel and would therefore argue that a stable and secure environment is both established and irreversible; other national actors may have opposing interests and would argue accordingly. Similarly, the military leadership of a peacekeeping mission may have a different understanding of when peace is consolidated than would many civilian personnel, whose role is more akin to peacebuilding or statebuilding than peacekeeping per se. This gives users of the term peace consolidation great leeway to argue for a mission's success, or lack thereof, according to criteria that are perfectly valid but not generally agreed upon.

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[38] *Measuring Peace Consolidation and Supporting Transition,* Inter-Agency Briefing Paper Prepared for the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (New York, United Nations, 2008).

[39] See e.g. *.Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation,* a joint project involving the University of Oxford, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the International Institute for Strategic Studies: http://cis.politics.ox.ac.uk/research/Projects/consolidation_peace.asp

[40] For an influential account of the difference between peacebuilding and statebuilding, see Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Wars and Building Peace* (New York, International Peace Academy, 2007). In brief, the authors state that peacebuilding refers to "actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace" while statebuilding refers to actions undertaken to "establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding." Ibid, p. 3.

The conceptual flexibility of peace consolidation allows it to refer to a range of scenarios, outcomes and goals loosely associated with the culmination of a process of, or stage in, peacekeeping/building without necessarily favoring one endpoint or mandate over another. For the term to be meaningful in a given situation, however, interested actors should attempt to reach consensus over what is contained in and expressed by a "consolidated peace".

Narrower interpretations of peace consolidation would refer to the absence of armed conflicts and the absence of immediate or medium-term threats to peace; broader interpretations could also include the sustainability of institutional reforms, progress on developmental goals, and other criteria typically associated with peacebuilding or statebuilding.

Chapter 2 of this handbook presents different ways to make the concept of peace consolidation analytically operational for benchmarking purposes.

Appendix B: Main findings from a desk review of United Nations practice of benchmarking

A desk review of United Nations benchmarking practices, combined with findings from the four field visits carried out in the preparation of this handbook,[41] reveals that there was:

- A lack of clarity on the part of those requesting benchmarks. Strategic planners in the field therefore had to translate an often vague tasking to "benchmark" into a process that was clear with respect to the level of results being targeted and their links to ongoing strategy, planning, operations, and budgeting.
- No common understanding of key terms. The terms benchmark and benchmarking were used inconsistently across different countries, as were the terms priority areas and indicators.
- A clear tendency to focus on easily measurable benchmarks and indicators at output level. This included, e.g. the number of police staff trained and the number of ex-combatants entering DDR. When wider effects were taken into account they were almost exclusively focusing on mandated United Nations objectives and targets at the sector level. There were very few examples of benchmarks focusing on system-wide effects, and virtually no examples of benchmarks on system-wide effects not directly related to particular mandated United Nations objectives and targets, e.g. benchmarks focused purely on contextual aspects of progress toward sustainable peace in a country. However, the review also showed that virtually all United Nations benchmarking practice had a multidimensional perspective in the sense that it included security, governance, rule of law, and the socio-economic aspects of peace consolidation.
- Generally little awareness of potential and available sources of data that could be used for peace consolidation benchmarking. This was true even of data sources produced by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. It has resulted in a wide use of subjective assessments where such practice could have been substituted or combined with more objective and reliable data sources. The use of data was also generally unsystematic in nature, and the quality of measurements depended on the competence and dedication of the executing staff.
- Very little documentation of the benchmarking process and the methodological procedures that were followed. This included how benchmarks and indicators had been selected, what data sources had been

[41] See Preface.

used, how indicators had been aggregated to reflect progress towards a benchmark, and how general conclusions were based on underlying levels of empirical evidence.

- No standardized formats for the purpose of reporting benchmarking results. Benchmarking results were most commonly referred to indirectly in Secretary-General's reports, and referred to directly in these reports only when benchmarking was part of a mission's mandate. However, in the latter cases the results were normally presented without any documentation of methodological procedures. This resulted in a general bias toward positive developments and achievements according to mandated objectives and targets, while overlooking negative trends and risks that could have provided vital inputs for strategic planning.
- An ad hoc organization of benchmarking processes. The structure and procedures of these processes depended to a large degree on the dedication, competence, and capacity of individual people (including the ability to direct funding for the purpose). This has resulted in large differences in the size and ambition of benchmarking frameworks used in different countries, including with respect to integration with other monitoring frameworks, cooperation with other actors, and actual execution of the benchmarking process.

Appendix C: Benchmarking experiences from selected United Nations integrated peace operations

C1. Sierra Leone: Benchmarks for CDW and Peacebuilding (2002-2009)

I. Benchmarks for UNAMSIL drawdown

The field of peace consolidation benchmarking grew largely from innovations introduced in Sierra Leone, where the successfully conducted national elections of May 2002 brought to the fore the question of drawdown or adjustment of the United Nations peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL. The mission itself argued that the withdrawal of the peacekeeping presence from Sierra Leone should be based not on the elections but instead on the government's capacity to maintain external and internal security without international assistance.[42]

The Secretary-General's Report of September 2002 identified specific benchmarks to guide the envisaged drawdown of UNAMSIL.[43] The benchmarks corresponded to issues identified in the Lomé and Abuja Peace Agreements as crucial for the success of the peace process. The paramount concern was to avoid a security vacuum. Consequently, the key benchmarks identified were: (1) building the capacity of the Sierra Leone police and army, (2) completing the reintegration of ex-combatants, (3) consolidating the State's authority throughout the country, and (4) restoring effective Government control over diamond mining. Progress towards resolving the conflict in neighbouring Liberia was also included as an important benchmark.

[42] See *Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,* 11 June 2002, A/63/881–S/2009/304, http://http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/427/79/PDF/N0242779.pdf.

[43] The report noted that "the pace of the drawdown process will have to be governed by progress in achieving the specific benchmarks identified in this report." See *Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,* 5 September 2002, S/202/987, para 55, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/572/31/IMG/N0257231.pdf.

Although they addressed directly progress against the benchmarks, Security Council resolutions on Sierra Leone did not make explicit reference to them until July 2003, when the Council decided "to monitor closely the key benchmarks for drawdown" and requested the Secretary-General to report "on the progress made with respect to the benchmarks".[44] The benchmarks were subsequently included in resolutions renewing the mission's mandate and remained at the centre of the Secretary-General's reporting to the Council.

The benchmarks were specific to UNAMSIL CDW and were not reflected in the resolution establishing the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), adopted by the Security Council in August 2005. The precedent they set was, however, recognized by the Security Council. In December 2005, the Council "noted with satisfaction the innovations in UNAMSIL's methods of operation that may prove useful best practice in making other United Nations peacekeeping operations more effective and efficient, including an exit strategy based on specific benchmarks for drawdown".[45]

UNAMSIL's pioneering use of benchmarking also extended to its advice to the Government and international partners. The December 2002 Report of the Secretary-General encouraged the Government to define and work toward benchmarks relating to security, poverty reduction, governance, economic performance and management. The Consultative Group, meeting in the context of Sierra Leone's PRSP, subsequently identified a number of key benchmarks that would "serve as a frame of reference in evaluating the overall progress Sierra Leone is making towards the achievement of sustainable peace and development".[46]

II. A holistic approach to peace consolidation and benchmarking

The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was established in October 2008 as the first integrated peacebuilding mission to be led by the Department of Political Affairs. UNIPSIL was to build upon six years of robust United Nations peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone. Its mandate focuses on strengthening national institutions, containing emerging threats to peace and security, and coordinating strategy and programmes among the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Sierra Leone. During its first consultation on the work of UNIPSIL in February 2009, the Security Council requested that the mission develop clear benchmarks to measure progress in the implementation of its mandate.

In accordance with the Security Council's request to establish a fully integrated office with an effective peacebuilding strategy, UNIPSIL and the United Nations Country Team developed a United Nations Joint Vision for Sierra Leone. The Joint Vision brings together the peace consolidation efforts of the entire United Nations system around four key priorities that will be implemented through 21 projects, supported by a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. It is also fully aligned with the national peace and development priorities articulated in Sierra Leone's second PRSP, the Agenda for Change. Both the Joint Vision and the Agenda for Change were endorsed at the Peacebuilding Commission's Special Session on Sierra Leone on 10 June 2009.

The United Nations Joint Vision includes benchmarks under each of the priority areas. The seven benchmarks listed under the priority area of peace consolidation include: (1) the maintenance of a constructive political climate that allows for free, fair and non-violent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012; (2) professional and respected national

[44] Security Council Resolution 1492 (2003), 18 July 2003, S/RES/1492 (2003), paras. 1-2, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/433/05/PDF/N0343305.pdf.

[45] Statement by the President of the Security Council, 20 December 2005, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SL%20SPRST200563.pdf.

[46] See The World Bank, *Third Consultative Group for Sierra Leone: Report of Proceedings* (Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 13 April 2004), p. 111, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSIERRALEONE/Resources/WB_Chairmans_Report_of_Proceedings_2002.pdf.

security forces able to maintain a secure and peaceful environment throughout the country; (3) greater opportunities for the integration of youth into the economic and social life of the country; (4) effective support to the Government to prevent illicit drug trafficking; (5) tangible progress in reducing corruption that receives international recognition; (6) the improved observance of human rights and access to justice; and (7) an increasingly professional media and the full establishment of the first independent public broadcasting service for Sierra Leone.[47] Resolution 1886 (2009), extending the UNIPSIL mandate, calls on the Secretary-General to develop benchmarks for the transition of UNIPSIL into a United Nations Country Team, taking into account those already agreed by the Government and by the United Nations in the Joint Vision, as well as challenges related to the 2012 elections.

UNIPSIL, as the first integrated peacebuilding office, has in its first year of operation already offered lessons and good practices that will benefit the United Nations system's planning and operations in countries such as Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic.

C2. Afghanistan: Benchmarking for the Afghanistan Compact

The Afghanistan Compact is an agreement between the Afghan Government and the international community, endorsed at the London Conference on Afghanistan (31 January - 1 February 2006). The Compact seeks to promote joint accountability in the areas of security, governance, and socio-economic recovery and specifies in its annex 52 benchmarks for all major sectors within these three areas. A Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), co-chaired by the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations, was established to "ensure overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Compact".[48]

Meeting the Compact's benchmarks has proved challenging, for a variety of reasons. Part of the difficulty lies in the extent to which political wishes coloured the benchmarks. The Compact assumed continued stability, for example, which made managing expectations increasingly difficult in the face of a deteriorating security environment and growing narcotics trade. The time frames for several of the benchmarks were also overly ambitious and unrealistic. Rather than extending deadlines for many of the benchmarks, however, it may be preferable to adjust the targets themselves in light of reassessed or changed realities on the ground.

Another set of problems relates to how the Compact's benchmarks were stated. The benchmarks lacked consistency, as they were defined at different levels of engagement with unclear relationships between the various levels. Most of the benchmarks were process-oriented, with few outcomes stated. Several benchmarks were stated both as inputs and outputs.

The monitoring of the Afghanistan Compact was constrained by the poor quality and availability of data, both qualitative and quantitative. Many organizations now collect primary data in Afghanistan and, in particular, the Government of Afghanistan's National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment has shown steady improvement in the provision of high-quality socio-economic data from its biennial comprehensive household survey. This is, however, much less the case for tracking outcomes in the two critical categories of security and governance. Greater technical and financial investments are needed in the data collection, analysis, and reporting capacities of the Government, which could begin with a review of the National Statistical Council and Central Statistics Office, as well as efforts to implement the

[47] See *Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, 11 June 2002, A/63/881–S/2009/304, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/427/79/PDF/N0242779.pdf.

[48] See *The Afghanistan Compact* (London, 31 January – 1 February 2006), http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Dzcuments/Afghanistan Compact-English.pdf, Annex III.

2006 National Statistical Master Plan. With more ample and credible quantitative and qualitative data, better indicators could be employed to track progress towards commitments outlined in the Compact.

C3. Iraq: Benchmarking for the Iraq Compact[49]

The International Compact with Iraq (ICI) is an agreement between the Government of Iraq and the international community. Originally conceived in 2006 at the height of sectarian violence in Iraq, it was launched in the spring of 2007 with the aims of consolidating peace and pursuing political, economic and social development over five years.

In this context, the ICI became the vehicle to achieve three functions in channelling international assistance to the Government of Iraq. First, the ICI constituted an agreement in which Iraqi and international views converged on areas in need of development assistance and capacity building, as well as those that required reform and engagement by the government. Second, the ICI allowed for the coordination and harmonization of international engagement among Member States. Instead of the incongruent pursuit of bilateral policies, the ICI became the guiding document for all international assistance and thus merged programmatic planning under a strategic umbrella. Third, the ICI proved valuable to the work of the United Nations system as it served to generate cohesion and coherence of the United Nations Country Team in the implementation of its programmes.

In this regard, the implementation of the ICI benefited from the prior existence of the Iraq Trust Fund (ITF), a United Nations-managed fund for Iraq's development. The ICI was officially tasked with operating as the guiding document for the ITF, thus linking high-level political negotiations immediately to development work on the ground. As with the JCMB in Afghanistan, the ICI is co-chaired by the Government of Iraq and the United Nations. This arrangement allows Iraq to actively shape the ICI agenda, ensuring greater political will on the part of its government than if it had felt subject to internationally imposed demands.

Looking at the success of benchmarking in the Iraqi case, one can draw the following conclusions:

1. Iraqi government support for the Compact has been the key factor for successful benchmarking, as it requires the full cooperation of the government to conduct a meaningful and comprehensive review.
2. Since the Iraq Compact is a platform for quick successes as well as long-term development aims, some benchmarks (e.g. debt relief, certain forms of capacity-building, and progress on economic reform in the context of Iraq's engagement with the IMF) could be met rapidly. This enhanced the Compact's credibility and reinforced its longer-term goals.
3. None of the Compact benchmarks were subject to prioritization or sequencing, allowing all parties to make progress in any area they saw fit. This was reflected positively in the first review, as at least partial progress could be demonstrated toward most benchmarks. The Compact benchmarks benefited from a subdivision of priority actions and other measures that enabled measuring partial progress. Of the 262 actions, 52 were completed in the first year while another 142 were partially addressed.
4. A shortage of qualified technical personnel and political disconnects impeded the Iraqi government's capacity to implement and report. The top to bottom reconstitution of the government meant in effect that vast numbers of technocratic positions were left unfilled. The coalition nature of the government

[49] Further information about the Iraq Compact benchmarks can be found at: http://www.iraqcompact.org/en/default.asp and http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/10569

resulted moreover in a lack of systematic cooperation across ministries. To compensate, the United Nations both extended direct mission support through the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and supplied international personnel as consultants to Iraqi institutions.

C4. Burundi: Benchmarking for the Arusha Agreement and the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding

The United Nations in Burundi has made two serious attempts to benchmark the country's war-to-peace transition, both of which show the importance and challenge of measuring and understanding progress in post-conflict transitions. Burundi's transition out of war began in August 2000, with the signing of the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation. The result of over five years of formal and informal mediation, the Arusha Agreement outlined a comprehensive social, economic, political, and security framework intended to address the causes and the manifestations of Burundi's seven-year civil war and set the country on the road to peace. This framework was broken down into a clear timeline, with specific outputs that were to be overseen by an Implementation Monitoring Committee.

In 2007, two years after Burundi's first successful democratic elections, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission supported another attempt at monitoring and tracking Burundi's post-conflict transition, the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi. In addition to outlining a comprehensive coordination frame-work, the Commission presented five priority intervention areas and corresponding benchmarks, indicators, and areas of responsibility.

United Nations peacekeeping experience has shown that international and national actors are likely to have a greater impact if they work toward common context-specific strategic goals that take into account positive and negative changes in the context. Monitoring and tracking war-to-peace transitions are intended to support this effort. The United Nations' experiences with benchmarking in Burundi nevertheless point to several significant challenges to the implementation of this comprehensive evidence-based approach.

1. **Unpredictable context.** Efforts to monitor and track progress in war-to-peace transitions often forget to take the unpredictability of the country context into account. Benchmarks and indicators that presuppose a static context will become irrelevant as the context changes. Both the Arusha Agreement and the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding outlined very static scenarios, leaving little room for manoeuvre when Burundi's transitional phase took much longer than predicted or the country's politics did not coincide with the aims of the Strategic Framework.
2. **Unrealistic benchmarks and indicators.** There is a tendency to base benchmarks and indicators on ideal scenarios rather than most-likely scenarios. This discourages individuals and organizations from tracking these indicators and benchmarks because they will equate less-than-ideal information as pointing to their failure. The Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi contained several vague and unrealistic benchmarks, such as the following: "By 2008, existence of a political environment conducive to the peaceful resolution of political conflict through the institutionalization of a culture and practice of dialogue on major issues and national strategies."[50]
3. **Vague benchmarks and indicators hide disagreement.** Individuals will agree more easily on vague and ambiguous indicators that hide their areas of disagreement. These vague benchmarks and indicators will not provide the detail necessary to track positive or negative trends in the country or in the relationship

[50] See *Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi,* 27 November 2007, PBC/2/BDI/4, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/615/60/PDF/N0761560.pdf?OpenElement

between the international intervention and the evolving context. Both of the Burundi efforts suffered from this tendency.

4. **The importance of data and decisions in monitoring mechanisms.** Mechanisms that are designed to monitor progress in war-to-peace transitions often become overly politicized, fail to discuss real data, and make few decisions to alter programmes, approaches, and/or strategies based on real data about the changing context. The data gathered from benchmarking exercises must be translated into a format that is easily accessible to decision-makers, who should in turn meet regularly to evaluate the data and make decisions based on it.
5. **Systems and approaches intended to monitor and track war-to-peace transitions must be user friendly.** An effective system will be used; an ineffective system will be abandoned quickly.

C5. Haiti: Benchmarking for the reconfiguration of MINUSTAH forces[51]

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has held (March-April 2009) internal consultative meetings to develop an appropriate methodology to measure security and stability in order to inform decisions on the reconfiguration of the MINUSTAH forces, both Military and United Nations Police (UNPOL). The proposed methodology is designed to provide an accurate evidence-based picture of the situation in each of the 10 departments (administrative sub-divisions) in Haiti. Using this information, United Nations senior leadership may make decisions on geographical reconfiguration as well as recommendations to the United Nations Security Council regarding force strength and make-up.

The methodology is essentially a quarterly assessment by department of the following elements:

- Potential for organized political/civic unrest (e.g. number of violent demonstrations, protests against socio-economic situation, etc.)
- Level of crime and kidnappings
- Performance of Government authorities
- Capacity and performance of the Haitian National Police (current and planned numbers over 2010-11, as well as management, professionalism, and infrastructure).
- Frequency and level of MINUSTAH support required to address public unrest, ensure patrols, checkpoints, etc.
- Main threats to stability and security and their expected evolution over time.
- Progress on establishment of effective border management.

The Security Management Team (SMT) in each department are to complete quarterly reports drawing upon a pre-determined list of indicators of progress. The reports will look at eight main issues, with an assessment trend designated for each (i.e. improvement, no change, or deterioration). The SMT would also be able to suggest action in the reports. MINUSTAH's JMAC will support this process and may visit each department to provide guidance during the launch phase.

The reports will be submitted to the JMAC and analyzed jointly with the military and UNPOL. On the basis of this analysis, each department will receive a traffic light rating ranging from red to green, thereby illustrating the pace of nationalization of MINUSTAH security functions and providing guidance for Military and UNPOL reconfiguration planning.

[51] Source: MINUSTAH (Draft Methodology, May 2009).

The traffic light reporting system will employ the following scale (red to green):

1. Unstable and insecure: Heavily armed gangs and violent demonstrations. No capacity of local authorities to respond.
2. High degree of insecurity and instability: Frequent demonstrations (some violent) and gang-led criminality. Very limited capacity of local authorities to respond.
3. Volatile: Potential threats, fragmented criminality, and demonstrations (some violent). Limited capacity of local authorities to respond.
4. Emerging stability and security: Generally high crime rate. Local authorities responding to majority of situations.
5. Stable and secure: Law and order established.

C6. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS)[52]

The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) was developed in 2008-09 to deliver tangible dividends and reinforce political progress made following the 2006 elections, the Nairobi Communiqué, and the Goma Actes d'Engagement. It is now the main vehicle of the international community to provide support to the DRC's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC), launched in June 2009. The prioritization of ISSSS interventions takes place through STAREC coordination committees, which are co-chaired by the Government and MONUSCO, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission, at the provincial, regional and national levels.

There are three reporting tools for delivery under the ISSSS: the Update, the Dashboard and the Quarterly Report. Each of these is tailored for a specific audience and purpose. The Stabilization Support Unit, located in the office of the DSRSG/RC/HC, updates the tools based on inputs from ISSSS partners.

Tool	Frequency	Key Audience	Intended Purpose
Update	Biweekly	Implementing partners, provincial governments	Share operational developments as they happen; help coordinate decision-making in the field.
Dashboard	Monthly	United Nations senior management, STAREC Inter-Provincial Coordination	Circulate key performance data at the strategic level; enable steering and response to emerging trends.
Quarterly Report	Quarterly	Stabilization Funding Board, STAREC Comité de Suivi	Provide a consolidated overview; including key processes and substantive results.

[52] Sources: Stabilization Support Unit, Background Paper: Benchmarking/Evaluation for the ISSSS, September 2010, and ISSSS, Report to the Stabilization Funding Board, Quarter 3, 2010.

The Quarterly Report includes a Scorecard, which uses traffic lights and supplementary text to summarize progress against the four substantive outcomes in the ISSSS Results Framework: security; state authority; return, reintegration and reconciliation; and combating sexual violence. It also reports on two cross-cutting themes: financial support for the ISSSS, and national appropriation. (An illustrative extract from a Scorecard appears in Appendix C7).

The current priority for ISSSS M&E is improving measurement of the substantive outcomes. The Stabilization Support Unit points out that the indicators currently employed by the ISSSS are too focused on internal work related to the Strategy, and that there is a need to track results as experienced by the population. The Unit emphasizes that measures need not be quantitative, as a great deal of relevant information cannot be easily quantified and may be better reported as milestones or general trends.

C7. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Example of a traffic light report on the results of the ISSSS[53]

ISSSS SCORECARD
Quarter 3, 2010 (Extract)
Explanation of progress coding:

	Target likely to be achieved on time, or significant improvements in situation over the reporting period.
	Target will not be achieved on time, or uneven progress between areas.
	No progress or a deterioration; management intervention will be required.
ND	No data or undefined; methodology still under discussion with partners.

Component 1: Security

OBJECTIVE: Threats to life, property and freedom of movement are significantly reduced.

Indicators for progress towards objective :	
To be defined with key partners.	

Major trends and comments :

1) **Deterioration in South Kivu:** FDLR presence has increased significantly in the border area of NK/SK – and this is directly affecting the key ISSSS target area of Bunyakiri-Hombo. FDLR presence in Shabunda territory has also increased, with the potential to affect efforts along the 300km Bukavu-Shabunda axis. Clashes between militia and FARDC have continued at a moderate level in the southern part of the province, affecting the Fizi-Minembwe-Baraka priority axis.

(2) **FARDC discipline and control** remains a serious concern in target areas, as evidenced by reporting of Joint Human Rights Office, the Protection Cluster and MONUSCO military intelligence. There are very few initiatives underway in this area apart from pilot garrisoning initiatives; concrete output targets will need to be set for 2011.

(3) **Other notes:**
• The Walikale area in North Kivu, a focus area for initiatives relating to natural resources, has seen a clear upward trend in clashes between the FDLR, FARDC and militia groups and most recently a major reshuffling of FARDC deployments. The situation as at 30 September remains very much in flux.
• Heavy fighting between the FARDC and ADF-Nalu in the northern part of North Kivu has affected some activities under the 4th component, but otherwise has not overlapped with ISSSS target areas.

OUTCOME 1:	FARDC operations are more organized and effective.
	Lead: MONUSCO Force (G2, military intelligence)

Indicators for achievement of outcome :		
	Presence of foreign armed groups in ISSSS target areas	Increased FDLR activity in SK, some areas of NK.
	Presence of Congolese armed groups in ISSSS target areas	Some minor changes; major increases in activity remain outside of target areas at present.
ND	Reported weekly attacks by armed groups on civilians in target areas	Baseline to be established with MONUSCO Force.

Planned outputs under the ISSSS :			Jun '10	Sep '10	Target 2010
	FARDC battalions completing basic training programs	#	0	0	12
	To be defined with partners.	--	--	--	--

OUTCOME 2:	FARDC discipline is improved, and impunity for criminal activity is reduced.
	Lead: MONUSCO SSR

Indicators for achievement of outcome :		
	To be defined with key partners.	Refer GoDRC-MONUSCO Joint Assessment, currently ongoing under SC Res 1925.

Planned outputs under the ISSSS :			Last	Current	Target 2010
	New garrison capacity available for FARDC	#	0	0	2,627

OUTCOME 3:	Demobilization of armed groups and reintegration into civilian life.
	Lead: MONUSCO DDRRR / UNDP

Indicators for achievement of outcome :			Jun '10	Sep '10	Target 2010
	Residual combatants in Congolese armed groups in the Kivus	#	4,000	4,000	0

Planned outputs under the ISSSS :			Jun '10	Sep '10	Target 2010
	Combatants demobilized since beginning 2009	#	TBD	TBD	4,000
	Combatants in durable reintegration programs	#	N/D	3,920	6,920
	Average # days between demobilization and reintegration	#	N/D	N/D	N/D

[53] ISSSS, Report to the Stabilization Funding Board, Quarter 3, 2010, pp. 19-26.

Component 3: Restoration of State Authority

OBJECTIVE: Public security, access to justice and administrative services are progressively restored and strengthened.

Indicators for progress towards objective :		
	To be defined with key partners.	

Major trends and comments :
1. Shift of focus to personnel: A considerable amount of infrastructure has been delivered but deployment of the corresponding officials is lagging; it is likely that deployment targets for 2010 will not be met for police, justice or corrections officials.
2. Modest progress with parallel administration: In North Kivu, some formal appointments of ex-CNDP officials to administrative posts, and decreased levels of illegal taxation. Several key initiatives started during Quarter 3 to support this trend, including a project for the integration of 1,500 police from armed groups in North Kivu; and another for training and deployment support to civil administration.

OUTCOME 1:	Reliable road access to key population centres
	Lead: Stabilization Support Unit

Indicators for achievement of outcome :		
	% price differential between target and urban areas	Baseline to be established by Joint Monitoring Teams.

Planned outputs under the ISSSS :			Jun '10	Sep '10	Target 2010
	Key roads rehabilitated and handed over to GoDRC	km	103	244	720
	Rehabilitated roads with effective maintenance arrangements in place	km	0	0	720

OUTCOME 2:	Public order and community security are established
	Lead: UNPOL (MONUSCO)

Indicators for achievement of outcome :		
	To be defined with outcome lead.	

Planned outputs under the ISSSS :			Jun '10	Sep '10	Target 2010
	New facilities completed for Police Territoriale	#	6	8	14
	Deployments of Police Territoriale	#	300	300	1,300
	Deployments of Police de Frontiers	#	169	145	700
	Deployments of Police Intervention Rapide	#	0	0	1,620

OUTCOME 3:	Civilian penal chain is restored and strengthened.
	Lead: MONUSCO Rule of Law

Indicators for achievement of outcome :		
	To be defined with outcome lead.	

Planned outputs under the ISSSS :			Jun '10	Sep '10	Target 2010
	New court facilities completed	#	1	1	4
	New court facilities operational and hearing cases	#	0	0	4
	New prison facilities completed	#	1	0	4
	New prison capacity available for use	#	0	0	480

OUTCOME 4:	Core administrative and technical public services are restored at local level
	Lead: MONUSCO Civil Affairs / UNDP

Indicators for achievement of outcome :		
	Gross tax revenue collected in target localities	Baseline to be established with outcome lead.

Expected ISSSS outputs :			Jun '10	Sep '10	Target 2010
	Localities with administrative facilities completed / rehabilitated	#	2	6	17
	Administrative personnel who have completed basic training programme	#	0	0	378
	Localities with embedded expert support for civil administrators	#	0	0	Moved to 2011

C8. Liberia: CDW benchmarking guidance from UNMIL

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) took the initiative of presenting the Security Council with benchmarks in September 2006[54] as a means to help determine the pace of the mission's consolidation in accordance with developments in the country. Additional benchmarks for the drawdown phase were presented in May 2007[55]. Drawing upon her experience, SRSG Ellen Løj informally suggested the following "dos and don'ts" for practitioners.[56]

	DOs
Report on outcomes, not inputs/outputs	Focus on outcomes, not just simple inputs/outputs that are measurable (e.g. number of police deployed). This does involve subjective analysis.
Decide what you are measuring	Decide whether your benchmarks are measuring mission performance, government performance, UNCT performance, or donor performance. The preference is to measure the developments in the country, which means all of the above. It also means that other actors, beyond the United Nations, are accountable for progress. This can be politically sensitive.
Take a phased approach	UNMIL had separate benchmarks for the consolidation phase (1 year) and the drawdown phase (3 years).
Use the stoplight approach with contextual text for reporting	UNMIL reports to the Security Council on its benchmarks using a stoplight system. Each status indicator (red, for 'serious concern'; yellow, for 'concern'; and green, for 'on track') has a definition. Each benchmark is accompanied by contextual text, to facilitate discussion within the Council.
Propose your own benchmarks	UNMIL initiated the benchmarking exercise to ensure that consolidation and drawdown proceeded in accordance with developments in the country. This preempted externally imposed benchmarks whose priorities may not have reflected ground realties.
Pay close attention to your terms and define what they mean	A benchmark such as "judicial training institute established" will have little meaning if that institute is not properly utilized. Besides establish, other key terms to look out for include "operational/fully-operational", "active/fully-active", "increased/decreased", "completed", "underway", "in place", and "strengthened." The definitions of these terms should be contextualized to the country situation.
Engage outside consultants	The United Nations's expertise in benchmarking is underdeveloped. Outside consultants can be useful in facilitating the benchmarking process.

	DON´Ts
Present too many benchmarks	Define instead a limited number of benchmarks focused on the mission's core mandate.
Report over-optimistically	There is a tendency to report benchmarks as 'green' before they are actually achieved, especially when the reporting period is lengthy (e.g. 3 years). This may reflect an erroneous assumption that the benchmarks can be met before the end of the reporting period and risks giving the Security Council an overly optimistic impression of conditions on the ground.

[54] See *Twelfth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia,* 12 September 2006, S/2006/743, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/517/11/PDF/N0651711.pdf.

[55] See *Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia,* 8 August 2007, S/2007/479, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/447/68/PDF/N0744768.pdf.

[56] Notes from discussion with SRSG Løj on benchmarking, 18 March 2009.

Appendix D: Resources

D1. Existing indices related to peace consolidation monitoring

Political Stability and Absence of Violence (World Governance Indicators)	http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi
State Fragility Index (Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility)	http://www.systemicpeace.org
Political Instability Index	http://viewswire.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=instability_map&page=noads&rf=0
Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger	http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/52/intrastate_conflict_program.html
Index of African Governance	http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/52/intrastate_conflict_program.html
Global Peace Index	http://www.visionofhumanity.org/
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy / Fragility Index	http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/
Bertelsmann's Transformation Index	http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/16.0.html?&L=1
Index of State Weakness in the Developing World	http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx
Fragile States Index	http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/ffs.htm
Political Instability Task Force	http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/
The Failed States Index	http://www.fundforpeace.org
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)	http://www.usip.org/resources/measuring-progress-conflict-environments-mpice
Worldwide Governance Indicators	http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20771165~menuPK:1866365~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html

D2. Manuals and handbooks related to peace consolidation monitoring

Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes (Department for International Development, UK, 2009)

This booklet aims to provide practitioners with a resource to help: analyze conflict; better assess conflict-related risks associated with development or humanitarian assistance; and develop options for more conflict sensitive policies and programmes. A methodology is presented for conflict assessment at the country or regional level, termed 'Strategic Conflict Assessment'.
It is based on DFID's experience in conducting Strategic Conflict Assessments in seven countries.

http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf

An Approach to DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (OECD DAC study DCD (2007) 2, 13 March 2007).

This working paper is the product of a joint activity by the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and DAC Network on Development Evaluation. It represents a key step in the process toward the development of a DAC guidance note. Based on a review of 75 evaluations and studies, it offers concrete recommendation on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.

Available at: www.adb.org/Documents/Papers/DAC-Guidance/Approach-DAC-Guidance.pdf

An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005)

Based on the application of the transitional results matrix in five fragile states, this operational note summarizes its core principles, key elements and parameters, likely risks and strategies to mitigate them. It highlights the fact that matrices need to be simple, selective, integrated across political, security, economic and social aspects of recovery, nationally owned, and have sufficient donor buy-in.

Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/TRM.pdf

Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs (Cheyanne Church and Mark M. Rogers, Washington, D.C. Search for Common Ground and USIP, 2006)

Specifically tailored for the conflict transformation field, this manual addresses the many challenges faced by peacebuilding practitioners in their attempts to measure and increase the effectiveness of their work with practical tips and examples from around the world.

Available at: http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/ilr/ilt_manualpage.html

Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction (Craig Cohen, USIP: Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No.1, March 2006).

This short paper analyzes why measuring progress in stability and reconstruction operations remains an ongoing challenge. Arguing that the main barrier to measuring progress in political rather than conceptual, the paper provides concrete recommendations to build the US government's capacity to measure progress in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/srs1.pdf

Programming for Results in Peacebuilding: Challenges and Opportunities in Setting Performance Indicators (Anne-Marie Laprise (Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 1998).

This early effort at developing a methodology for programming for results in peacebuilding is a good example of translating peacebuilding objectives into concrete performance indicators.

Available at http://cpr.web.cern.ch/cpr/compendium/default.asp

Reflective Peacebuilding: A Planning, Monitoring and Learning Toolkit (John Paul Lederach, Reina Neufeld and Hal Culbertson, Catholic Relief Services, 2007).

This toolkit is designed to facilitate monitoring of peacebuilding impact, change and effectiveness at the community-level. It was developed over several years as part of a learning collaboration between Catholic Relief Services programme staff in Southeast Asia, and faculty and students at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Available at: http://crsprogramquality.org/pubs/peacebuilding/reflective_peacebldg.pdf

Strategic and Responsive Evaluation of Peacebuilding: Towards a Learning Model (Naivasha, Kenya, March 2001: Report of the Second Action-Reflection Seminar Convened by NPI-Africa and the NCCK-CPBD Project).

Jointly supported by the Nairobi Peace Initiative and the Community Peace Building and Development Project of the National Council of Churches of Kenya, this report is the outcome several meetings organized by the two organizations to develop appropriate planning and evaluation of peace initiatives. It reviews enhanced M&E systems, examines the dilemmas and challenges of M&E, and provides a learning model for peace evaluation.

Available at http://www.npi-africa.org/documents/strategic_response.pdf

D3. Data sources of relevance in peace consolidation monitoring

	Security
Human Security Report Project	http://www.hsrgroup.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=71&Itemid=62
Human Security Gateway (part of the Human Security Repot project)	http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System United States National Counter-terrorism Center	http://wits.nctc.gov/
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) Uppsala University	http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm
PRIO Centre for the Study of Civil War	http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/
Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers	http://www.prio.no/NISAT/Small-Arms-Trade-Database/
Correlates of War Project	http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
Intrastate Conflict Programme Belfer Center	http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/52/intrastate_conflict_program.html
The Military Balance International Institute for Strategic Studies	http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/
Arms Transfers Database Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	http://www.sipri.org/databases
Political Terror Scale	http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/
CIA World Factbook	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

	Governance / Rule of Law / Human Rights
Freedom of the World; Freedom of the Press Freedom House	http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1
Press Freedom Index Reporters Without Borders	http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29031
CIRI (Cingranelli-Richards) Human Rights Dataset Binghamton University	http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp
Corruption Perception Index Transparency International	http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008
Polyarchy and Contestation Scales University of Notre Dame	http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/crd/datacrd.htm
PRIO Centre for the Study of Civil War	http://www.afrobarometer.org/
Afrobarometer	http://www.afrobarometer.org/
Asian Barometer	http://www.asianbarometer.org/
Eurobarometer	http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives_en.htm
Latinobarómetro	http://www.latinobarometro.org/
International Centre for Prison Studies King's College	http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/law/research/icps
Institutional Profiles Database French Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment / French Development Agency	http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm
Political Instability Task Force	http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/
Political Risk Service	http://www.prsgroup.com/

	Governance / Rule of Law / Human Rights
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations	http://www.ohchr.org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/Publications.aspx
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment World Bank	http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/0,,menuPK:476823~pagePK:64165236~piPK:64165141~theSitePK:469372,00.html

	Economic Performance / Development
Index of Economic Freedom Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation	http://www.heritage.org/Index/
Doing Business World Bank	http://www.doingbusiness.org/
Global Competitiveness Index World Economic Forum	http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm
Business Risk Service	http://www.beri.com/brs.asp
Economist Intelligence Unit	http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?rf=0
Global Insight Global Risk Service/Business Condtions and Risk Indicators	http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/?gclid=CP6LxKXF6p8CFUGF3godmScDYg
Expanded Trade and GDP Data K. Gleditsch	http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html
World Competitiveness Yearbook Institute for Management Development	http://www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/index.cfm
International Monetary Fund	http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm
Grey Area Dynamics Merchant International Group	http://www.merchantinternational.com/grey_area_dynamics.php

	Social Performance / Development
State of the World's Mothers (Including school success, etc.) Save the Children	http://www.savethechildren.org/publications/state-of-the-worlds-mothers-report/full-report.html?WT.ac=0509_sowm_a_fullr
Millennium Development Goals Indicators United Nations	http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx
Human Development Indicators United Nations Development Programme	http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
Minorities at Risk University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management	http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
World Development Indicators World Bank	www.worldbank.org/data
Health Statistics World Health Organization	http://www.who.int/whosis/en/
Emergency Events Database Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters	http://www.who.int/whosis/en/
PRIO Centre for the Study of Civil War	http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Economic-and-Socio-Demographic/
Selected Statistics on African Countries African Development Bank	http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/publications/selected-statistics-on-african-countries/
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre	www.internal-displacement.org
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation University of Washington	http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/

	Social Performance / Development
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development	http://www.oecd.org/statsportal/0,3352,en_2825_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
United Nations Common Database	http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb_discontinued/cdb_discontinued.asp
UNESCO Institute of Statistics	http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?ID=2867_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html
United Nations Children's Fund	http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/index.html
International Labour Organization	http://www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/Statistics/lang--en/index.htm
ReliefWeb United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc100?OpenForm
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/index.html
WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation	http://www.wssinfo.org/en/welcome.html
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants	http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=2324&subm=179&area=About%20Refugeesaspx?id=2324&subm=179&area=About%20Refugees
International Data Base U.S. Census Bureau	http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/
World Values Survey	http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

	Environment / Natural Resources
Environmental Performance Index Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CISSIN) at Columbia University, and Center for Environmental law and Policy at Yale University	http://epi.yale.edu
PRIO Centre for the Study of Civil War	http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/
Global Footprint Network	http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/
Disaster Risk Index UNDP	http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/earlywarning/DRI/
Food and Agriculture Organization	http://www.fao.org/corp/statistics/en/
Energy Information Administration	http://www.eia.doe.gov/