

# Intentionality and Temporality in Husserl

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This article on intentionality and temporality shows how Husserl remains indebted to Brentano for his conception of time. Since, it is through the Brentanian conception of the intimate consciousness of time that Husserl was able to discover how immanent time and transcendent time are distinguished. The article shows how Husserl, by taking advantage of this distinction between immanent and transcendent time established by Brentano, thought he had discovered time as an object that is within consciousness and not outside it. However, this article makes it clear that Husserl denies the power of the imagination, to which Brentano had recourse, to continually make possible the modifications that arise through the moments of transcendent time. This denial for Husserl shows how Brentano ignored both the intimate consciousness of time and the imagination. Consequently, the article underlines the fact that if for Husserl the intimate consciousness of time discovers time within oneself, the major stake of Merleau-Ponty's criticism of Husserl consists rather in discovering time in the exteriority to oneself of the consciousness which cannot have a hold on time within oneself. Since it is in the movement that opens the consciousness on itself that time is discovered outside the consciousness and in the consciousness. This is how Merleau-Ponty understands the movement where the consciousness that accomplishes its passage towards itself accomplishes it by the retention that unceasingly opens on the protention.

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## Introduction

In favor of Husserl's resumption of the Cartesian gesture which has been set up as a "prototype of the philosophical return on oneself" (Husserl, 2008, p. 17) which shows how Husserl thought he had to take support on the *Metaphysical Meditations* to finally reach the establishment of the *Cartesian Meditations*, a major metaphysical event has been accomplished by which finally coincides the rediscovery of the thesis of intentionality with the birth of phenomenology. If, in his relationship to Descartes, Husserl follows Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and many other philosophers in the rediscovery of intentionality in the *Cartesian Meditations* through his interpretation and commentary on Descartes' six *Metaphysical Meditations*, this rediscovery of intentionality was only made possible through the way in which Husserl was finally inspired by Descartes' metaphysical gesture. Thus, it is through the way Descartes started from the methodical doubt to the discovery of the cogito in the metaphysical gesture of doubting that Husserl, inspired by Descartes, started from the epoch to the reduction where Descartes' cogito is rediscovered, that is to say intentionality through the transcendental ego. It is by rediscovering intentionality in the relation of the cogito, of consciousness to its object which is equivalent to its being that Husserl managed to discover in this object the time which is in

consciousness itself. Reflecting thus on the intimate consciousness of time amounts for Husserl to reflecting on this constitutive movement of consciousness where consciousness is contemporary of time. This is how Husserl clearly justifies the stake of understanding the *Lessons for a Phenomenology of the Intimate Consciousness of Time*. However, this challenge of understanding the intimate consciousness of time in *Lessons for a Phenomenology of the Intimate Consciousness of Time* remains indissociable from what Husserl owes to the conception of the intimate consciousness of time exposed by Franz Brentano in *Psychology from the Empirical Point of View*. But, how can we understand then the intimate consciousness of time in Husserl who was inspired by what Brentano said about this intimate consciousness of time? How does the Husserlian conception of time, whose inspiration is found in Brentano's thought on time, open up to Merleau-Ponty's discussions with Husserl on time?

### **Brentano's Relationship to Husserl Through the Question of the Origin of Time**

#### **Husserl and the Brentanian Conception of Time**

How precise is Husserl's relation to Brentano discovered through the Brentanian conception of the origin of time which remains indissociable from the pure movement of intentionality where this time is constituted? In fact, the textual place through which Husserl's relation to Brentano on the question of the origin of time is officially shown is the *Lessons for a Phenomenology of the Intimate Consciousness of Time*, where Husserl examines Brentano's theory of time in *Psychology from the Empirical Point of View*. This is why, from the introduction of the *Lessons for a Phenomenology of Time Consciousness*, Husserl considers that "the analysis of the intimate consciousness of time is a secular cross of descriptive psychology and the theory of knowledge" (Husserl, 1964, p. 3). Through the analysis of the intimate consciousness of time, which constitutes the secular cross of descriptive psychology and the theory of knowledge, the relation of psychology from the empirical point of view to the *Lessons for a Phenomenology of the Intimate Consciousness of Time* emerges clearly here. Why?

Because Husserl, showing how the analysis of the intimate consciousness of time remains the secular cross of descriptive psychology and of the theory of knowledge, shows precisely how the study of the intimate consciousness of time remains an object common to descriptive psychology and to phenomenology. For this, to want to understand what the intimate consciousness of time means through psychology and phenomenology is, for Husserl, to deal with the question of the origin of the consciousness of time, which belongs to the object of the theory of knowledge. The theory of knowledge, insofar as it belongs to him to show how consciousness arises, also shows precisely how time arises, which cannot be dissociated from the mode of arising of consciousness. It is precisely because Franz Brentano proceeds to describe the intimate consciousness of time in *Psychology from the Empirical Point of View* that his contribution to the theory of knowledge finally proved decisive in Husserl's eyes. Describing then the being of consciousness for psychology and phenomenology amounts to saying the mode of being of the intimate consciousness of time through intentionality which shows precisely how consciousness is constituted where its object is finally constituted by which time is constituted in consciousness. This is how Husserl, inspired by what Brentano says about this intimate consciousness of time, writes:

We now want to try, by linking our developments to the Brentanian doctrine of the origin of time, to find our way to the problems raised above. Brentano believes that he has found the solution in the original associations (...) When we see

that we hear or in a general way that we perceive something, it is the rule that the perceived remains present for a certain period of time, but not without being modified. (Husserl, 1964, p. 19)

How can we understand this statement, which constitutes the protocol for understanding Brentano's relationship to Husserl on the question of the intimate consciousness of time? To understand this protocol of Brentano's relation to Husserl on the question of the intimate consciousness of time, is to understand how Husserl starts from Brentano to understand such a question. For this, Husserl authorizes himself from Brentano's thought with whom he shares the presupposition according to which perception remains this originally instantaneous movement of time which then opens on the modifications of perception. This means that, for Husserl, who allows us to understand the postulate of Brentano's thought, time is constituted in this original movement of the intentionality of consciousness through its perception, which is constituted only by constantly modifying the perception itself. For Husserl, who thus inherits Brentano's thesis, no perception in which time is constituted through the intentionality of consciousness can be constituted without the perception itself being continuously modified by other perceptions. It is obvious that Brentano showed Husserl how the perception of the intentionality of the consciousness of the present time is distinguished from this other perception of the intentionality of the consciousness of the past time, through the consciousness that represents to itself this time. However, for Gérard Granel

the genius of Brentano, according to Husserl, is to have seen the necessity for the act of perception to understand in itself what is however separated by a fundamental difference: the present on the one hand and on the other the past as past. (Granel, 1968, p. 76)

By attributing to Brentano the merit that his disciple Husserl gave him credit for, Gérard Granel finally shows how Husserl could not do without his master Brentano in the understanding of this fundamental presupposition by which Brentano establishes very clearly the distinction between present time in the original consciousness and past time through consciousness.

That the intentionality of the perception of the original consciousness is thus modified by other perceptions that pass and succeed it, "what remains in consciousness in this way, recognizes Husserl, appears as something more or less past, and, so to speak, temporally postponed" (Husserl, 1964, p. 19). Following the example of his master Brentano, from whom he was inspired, Husserl clearly shows how the movement of intentionality of the perception of time in the consciousness always follows other movements where time is constituted outside the consciousness. Since, in the eyes of Husserl and his master Brentano, there can be no triggering of the movement of the intentionality of the perception of time that is not followed by other movements where the consciousness of time is constituted. Now, the gesture by which this movement of the perception is triggered where the intimate consciousness of time is constituted only makes the perceptions arise where time continues to be constituted in the consciousness through the movements of renewal of the consciousness of time. There can thus be renewal of the consciousness of time through the movements that follow one another only from a first movement of the consciousness time. To characterize finally and precisely the way in which Brentano distinguishes the first movement of time from the other movements that spring from it, Husserl notes

It is only because this specific modification intervenes, which wants that each sensation of sound, after the disappearance of the excitation which generated it, awakens of itself a similar representation and provided with a temporal determination, and because this temporal modification is continuously transformed, that the representation of a melody can

take place, in which the individual sounds have each one their determined place and their determined temporal measure. It is thus a general law that to each given representation is attached by nature a continuous succession of representations, each of which reproduces the content of the preceding one, but in such a way that it attaches unceasingly to the last one the moment of the past. (Husserl, 1964, p. 20)

How can we understand this occurrence of Husserl who relies on the thought of Franz Brentano to say how time is carried out through the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time? Indeed, to allow oneself to understand this occurrence is equivalent to understand how, following Brentano's example, Husserl shows how the movement of the perception of time in the consciousness is distinguished from the other movements through which time is modified. For this, the original movement of the perception of time in the consciousness of the sound always follows other movements of sounds where the modifications of the perception of time take place continuously. That is to say that, from the disappearance of the original movement of the perception of the sound in the intimate consciousness of the time, always appear movements whose sounds modify perpetually the perception of the time in the consciousness. It belongs to each modified movement of the perception that arises from the original movement of time to reach by itself its own representation of the perception of time. Thus, it is up to each movement of the consciousness where the perception of time is modified to have by itself a representation of time. The temporal determination of each movement of the perception of time in which time changes is always related to what is represented to the consciousness in each of its movements of the perception of represented time. This is why Brentano himself in *Psychology from the Empirical Point of View* recognizes

If we push the reflection further, we notice that, if the external object of the sensation is represented in another way than in *modo recto*, it also presents other peculiarities as for its mode of representation; we realize it in an unmistakable way if we think that every external object is represented as in rest or as in movement. In both cases it is a question of a temporal difference, because the object in rest the before and the after appear as identical, in the object in movement they appear as locally different. (Brentano, 1944, p. 384)

How can we understand this statement of Franz Brentano in order to finally understand the temporal difference between the object at rest and the object in motion? How can such a difference between the two types of objects allow us to understand the distinction that Husserl, inspired by Brentano's thought on time, establishes between the movement of the perception of time in consciousness and the modified movements of this perception of time consciousness? To get down in reality to understand the difference of nature there is between object at rest and object in movement, is equivalent to understand the relation of the immobile object to the mobile object, so that the temporal difference between the two objects proceeds from the fact that the object at rest reaches itself by itself by accomplishing a movement where it comes to itself without distancing itself from itself. Therefore, the object in motion requires the movement by which this object is shown to be seen running the interval that separates two points of the same temporal line. If between two points there is an interval to be covered, this means that the object at rest, which is the point, does not move so that the object in motion, which cannot move by itself, is moved. This is why, for Brentano and Husserl who share the thesis of the temporal difference between the two types of objects, there is the object at rest which is discovered in the pure movement of the intimate consciousness of time, whereas the object in movement which remains a simple consciousness unceasingly modified is outside this pure movement of the intimate consciousness of time. It is thus through Brentano's thought that Husserl finally succeeded in understanding how consciousness, as an unceasingly modified object, reaches the representation of time by means of imagination.

So, Husserl finally says of this imagination that it

shows itself here to be specific, productive. We are here in the presence of the unique case where it creates a moment, in truth new, of representations, namely the temporal moment. Thus we have discovered in the domain of imagination the origin of the representations of time. (Husserl, 1964, p. 20)

Thanks to Brentano's thought on time, Husserl has the opportunity to understand here the representation by the imagination which constitutes that from which the movements of the perception of time by a consciousness external to the intimate consciousness of time are constantly modified, so that the movements where the consciousness represents time as a temporal object cannot be modified, if the imagination, which wants to produce the representation of time in the consciousness, does not contribute to make this modification possible, whose role it plays in a permanent way in the understanding of this representation of time. That the imagination was understood by Husserl through Brentano as what is at the principle of the representations of time in the consciousness

According to Brentano, we must also consider a particularly important property of the representation of time. The temporal species of the past and the future have this particularity that, unlike the modes that are added, they do not determine but alter the elements of the sensible representation to which they are linked. A stronger C sound is still a C, a weaker C likewise; a past C is not a C, a past red is not a red. Temporal determinations do not determine, they essentially alter, exactly as do determinations represented, desired etc. (Husserl, 1964, pp. 23-24)

How can we understand precisely the temporal species of the past and the future, in so far as they do not determine but alter? For Husserl, to understand through Brentano the past and the future, as movements of temporal perception which do not determine, but alter, is precisely to understand them as movements of the perception of time which could not be at the principle or at the origin of the intimate consciousness of time. By finally reaching Brentano's understanding of the past and the future, which do not determine time but rather alter it, Husserl shares with Brentano the thesis that consists in seeing in the pure and true movement of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time this place of the present where time itself is discovered in the consciousness, which is thus equivalent to the consciousness present to itself. It is thus precisely because the truth of time resides only in the intimate consciousness of time through the way in which it remains present to oneself in the mode of the present that Husserl, who inherits this thesis from Brentano, was able to note

The modifying temporal predicates are, according to Brentano, unreal, only the determination of the present is real (...) The real present then becomes unreal again and again (...) Each appearance and disappearance that takes place in the present is linked in a certain way as a necessary consequence of temporal determinations of all kinds. For it is quite evident and understandable by itself that everything that is, by the mere fact that it is, will have been, and that it is, by the fact that it is, a past to come. (Husserl, 1964, p. 24)

How can we understand here and now the stake for Husserl to recognize his master Brentano as the one who allowed him to discover the truth of time in the unique movement of the intentionality of the perception of time inside a consciousness that relates to its being only by the way it remains present to itself on the original mode of the presence of the present? Thanks to Franz Brentano, who allowed him to understand the movement of the original founding gesture of the intentionality of the present where the true intimate consciousness of time is discovered, which remains contemporary to time itself, Husserl was finally able to reach a true understanding of the consciousness whose presence to itself that opens the present time to itself withdraws from the temporal determinations of the past and the future. This is why Franz Brentano's contribution to Husserl

remains that of having allowed him “to understand the pure sensation of intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time” as a means of reaching the representation of the difference between the past, the present, and the future. It is because understanding time for Brentano is precisely to understand how the present is distinguished from the past and the future that Husserl finally arrived at the legitimation of the thesis by which the present is distinguished from retention and protention. It is the fundamentally major stake of such a thesis that Husserl thematizes when he writes

If any phase of the duration of an immanent object is a present phase, if therefore we are conscious of it in an original sensation, to this last one are united in the mode of being antero-at the same time- retentions that cling to each other continuously, and that are characterized in themselves as modifications of the original sensations belonging to all the other temporally elapsed points of the constituted duration. Each of these retentions has a determined mode to which corresponds the temporal distance from the present moment. Each one is consciousness of the past of the corresponding anterior present instant, and gives it in the mode of the anterior that corresponds to its situation in the elapsed duration (Husserl, 1964, pp. 104-105)

To proceed to the comprehension of this statement of Husserl amounts to understand the relation of the original movement of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of the present time to the retention as well as to the protention. For, the renewals of the temporal movements of retention always open on the protention. All the originality to which Husserl was able to access through his master Brentano remains dependent on the way in which he rediscovered in the pure gesture of the movement of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time that from which become possible the retention of time that opens unceasingly on the protention. In favor of the way in which he could and knew how to distinguish the consciousness that is present to itself from this other consciousness that is retained in the movement where an already past consciousness that always opens on the protention is modified, Husserl has the rare merit to accomplish the discovery of time inside a pure original consciousness that by opening the present to itself opens the totality of the present time on itself. In favor of Brentano, Husserl finally discovers two types of intentionality, one of which is the one that shows how the time that is in the consciousness is discovered in and by the gesture that relates the consciousness to itself by relating it to its being. From then on, to be for consciousness to itself is equivalent for consciousness to be to the time present to itself, because there is no time that is to itself except in consciousness. Retention, insofar as it remains at work through this movement where time is modified, opens onto time that, far from being in consciousness, is rather outside of consciousness. There is thus, so to speak, a distance between time present in the consciousness and time that is outside the consciousness through the retention that is renewed each time in and by the protention. The proper of the intimate consciousness of time where time opens to itself in the consciousness is thus equivalent to this original force by which the totality of the present time opens on itself.

### **The Husserlian Critique of the Brentanian Conception of Time**

Why does Husserl, who was inspired by the Brentanian conception of time, criticize Brentano? By being inspired by the Brentanian conception of time, Husserl agrees with his master Brentano on the following principle: “it is the rule that the perceived remains present for a certain period of time, but not without being modified” (Husserl, 1964, p. 19). That is to say that Husserl, who is inspired by his master Brentano, agrees with him on the principle that the movement of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time, in so far as it comes from the pure original perception of time in the consciousness always opens on other movements of the consciousness of time through which the perception of time is modified. Now, this modification of time,

Brentano explains it by the imagination that contributes to make it possible. However, Husserl denies that this thesis of his master Brentano is true, that the imagination can contribute to make possible the modifications that occur in the movements of perception through which the representation of time is made in consciousness. This is why, Husserl considers that “Psychologists, until Brentano, have tried in vain to find the specific source of this representation” (Husserl, 1964, p. 20). The stake of the refusal that Husserl expresses here with regard to the way in which his master Brentano understands what is at the origin of the representation of time by the consciousness, rests in a certain way on the problem of the origin of the consciousness or the one of the intimate consciousness of time. Why? Simply because to think for Brentano that the representation of time by the consciousness is explained by the imagination, which he considers to be the producer of the modifications of the perception of time, is to ignore the movement of the original perception where time is constituted in the consciousness. For, in order for the modifications of the perception of time by the consciousness to occur, it is necessary that the original movement where time is constituted in the consciousness makes such modifications possible. It is precisely because it is not given to the imagination to make these modifications possible that Husserl then shows the confusion in which Brentano is immersed by writing precisely that

If we now turn to the criticism of the theory we have just exposed, we must first ask: to what does it respond and to what does it want to respond? It is obvious that it does not move on the ground that we recognize as necessary for a phenomenological analysis of the consciousness of time (...) It gives itself therefore for a theory of the psychological origin of the representation of time. (Husserl, 1964, pp. 24 -25)

In the end, Husserl’s questioning of what kind of questioning Brentano’s theory of time consciousness wants to answer shows precisely how such a theory of time evades the understanding of the precise question it wanted to answer. It is with regard to the types of questions that each of them wants to answer that psychology and phenomenology in Husserl’s eyes are clearly distinguished from each other by their respective objects. If it falls to phenomenology to answer the question of how time is constituted in consciousness through the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time, it is reserved to descriptive psychology to answer the question of the representation of time in consciousness. This is what Husserl wants us to understand when he thinks that

Brentano speaks (...) of a law of original association according to which to the perceptions hang each time representations of an instantaneous memory. It is obviously a psychological law of the new formation of psychic experiences from given psychic experiences. These experiences are psychic, they are objectified, they have their own time, and it is of their becoming, of their way of being, that it is question. Such considerations belong to the domain of psychology and do not interest us here. There is however in them a phenomenological core and it is to this core alone that the following developments want to stick. (Husserl, 1964, p. 25)

How can we understand Husserl’s criticism of his master Brentano? To understand Husserl’s criticism of Brentano is finally to understand what distinguishes the object of simply descriptive psychology from the object of phenomenology. Insofar as its object is to bring to light the experiences given to consciousness by consciousness in consciousness, phenomenology therefore gives psychology the psychological experiences that constitute its object of study. What Brentano did not understand, by studying the intimate consciousness of time through psychology, is time itself, because he believed that imagination produces the movements where time is modified through the representation of time in consciousness. Whereas for Husserl who criticizes this erroneous thesis of Brentano who believed that he had to discover the origin of the representations of time to

the consciousness in the imagination, it is rather the consciousness itself as it is constituted by constituting within itself the time that makes possible the representations of time to the consciousness. The fact that Brentano ignores that it is the power that consciousness has to constitute itself by constituting time within itself that produces the representations of time in consciousness, is equivalent for Brentano, in the eyes of Husserl, to ignoring time as well, insofar as it remains constituted in consciousness itself, which finally coincides with its own time, where it constitutes itself as an intimate consciousness of time.

This is why for Husserl “the question is to know if really, as Brentano claims, the past appears in this consciousness in the mode of imagination” (Husserl, 1964, p. 25). By allowing himself to understand the psychic experiences that belong to the movements where time represented to the consciousness is modified as experiences produced by the real experiences that have their time in the consciousness that produces it, Husserl denies the role that Brentano wrongly confers to imagination. For Husserl, who therefore discusses Brentano’s theses, the experiences that are the movements where time represented to the consciousness is modified have their time in them, all the more so as this time is the one where these experiences of time are represented to the consciousness in the grip of the perpetual modifications that arise in it. It is therefore a real paradox, for Brentano, in the eyes of Husserl, to allow himself to explain the origin of the representations of time in consciousness by the imagination. This is what finally makes Husserl say that

Brentano does not distinguish between act and content, and therefore he does not distinguish between act, content of apprehension and object apprehended. However, it is necessary to clarify the question of to which account to impute the temporal moment. If the originary association hangs on each moment of perception a continuous sequence of representations and that by that is produced the temporal moment, we must then ask: to which kind of moment is this? (Husserl, 1964, p. 25)

How can we understand this reproach that Husserl makes to Brentano? To understand what Husserl reproaches Brentano for is precisely to understand how Brentano was unable to distinguish between the content of apprehension and the object apprehended. Now, to understand what is the basis of the content of apprehension and the object apprehended is to know how to make the difference between the original association and the series of representations that follow from it. So that we can only understand how the series of representations arise from the original association that makes them arise. To allow oneself, therefore, to think that it is through the imagination that the sequence of representations is produced is to ignore the original association in so far as it is at the origin of the production of all representations. It is only from the original association that should have allowed Brentano to understand the origin of representations that each representation would then be understood by him as a temporal moment. But, how can Husserl understand that each temporal moment of the representation can find its origin in the originary association, whereas this originary association makes each representation possible once it has accomplished itself in order to continuously accomplish the representations by making them possible? For Husserl who denies the imagination thematized by Brentano the possibility of such a function to produce the representations which are rather produced by the original association

The whole difference is supposed to consist in the fact that the association must also be creative and that it adds a new moment, named past. This moment takes the form of a gradient, it changes continuously, and as the A is more or less past. It would thus be necessary that the past, insofar as it falls within the sphere of the original intuition of time, was at the same time present. It would be necessary in the same sense that the past temporal moment was a present moment lived, like the red one that we live at present, which is however an obvious counter sense. (Husserl, 1964, p. 28)



To understand this statement is equivalent to grasping how it is only given to the original association to be creator of representations that cannot be created by the imagination. It is precisely because the representations are created by the original association that such representations, which are the simple temporal moments of the past, are destroyed by successively giving place to other temporal moments. Precisely it is because they are thus created by the originary association where the pure intimate consciousness of time associates with itself, the simple temporal moments of the past cannot be the object of a moment of the lived of the intimate consciousness of time on the mode of the present. But, if the representations, insofar as they belong to the simple past moments of time, cannot be an experience of the consciousness of time in the mode of the present, how can we understand then that the present is always at the origin of the representations understood as temporal moments of the past?

To solve this aporia that Brentano blindly believed to be solved by the imagination that he thought to be productive of the representations pertaining to the temporal moments of the past, Husserl considers that

if a content A all the same is unceasingly in the consciousness, even with a new moment, then A is precisely not past but present; consequently it is now present, and unceasingly present and this jointly with the new past moment, past and present all at the same time (Husserl, 1964, p. 28)

All the genius of Husserl is understood by the way in which he discovers in the unceasingly new joint of the past to the present how the continuation of the representations of the temporal moments of the past is perpetuated. Because, the present that cannot be separated from the temporal moment of the past makes that there is always succession of the moments of the past where the consciousness of the present is perpetuated that is thus joined each time to the past that passes, whereas the present itself, as pure intimate consciousness of time, principle of redynamization of the past, hardly flows with the past. In other words, for Husserl, there is always, so to speak, a veiling in the past of the presence of an intimate consciousness of time that contributes every time to the successive unveiling without ceasing of the temporal moments of the past of which the present itself however never passes. Since the temporal moments only pass by virtue of the primacy that the intimate consciousness of the present time has over them, which only revitalizes the process of passage or flow of the temporal moments of the past until this process itself ends. It remains finally for Husserl to ask himself

How do we know that an A was before, was already before the existence of this present A? Where do we get the idea of the past? This present being of an A in consciousness cannot explain by the addition of a new moment, even if we name it moment of the past, the transcendent consciousness: A is past. It is unable to give the representation, even the most remote, of the fact that what I have now as A in the consciousness with its new character, would be identical to something that I do not have now in the consciousness, but which on the contrary is past. (Husserl, 1965, p. 29)

To ask ourselves for Husserl in order to know from where we know that an A has been before, that is to say how A has already been before the existence of present time, amounts to questioning and understanding the stake of the conjunction of the past and the future to the present rendered present by an originary present which has the dignity of the originary impression. So the real stake consists precisely in understanding how there is unceasing retention and protention from an originary present that can continuously make present the retentional present. Since it is through retention, where we see how the present is continually perpetuated through the past, that we understand this incessant modification of the past through retention, where the present is at work, which continually opens up to protention. This is why Françoise Dastur considers

that the concept of modification has the function of giving an account of the essential continuity of duration, that is to say of the passage from the present to the past of the impression to the retention (...) The past is thus retained in the form of shadows. (Dastur, 1995, p. 64)

In the light of this occurrence of Françoise Dastur, it appears clear that the modification allows understanding in Husserl's work how one passes from the original present to the retention and to the protention. Since there can be no temporal duration if there is no continuity which takes place through retention which opens each time on protention. By retaining the original consciousness on the mode of the past, the retention opens on a succession of simulacra where time cannot reside, but rather passes unceasingly through the retention which remains the disguised form of the retention. There is thus each time a divorce of the original consciousness of time with the moments that have just passed so that new moments arise continuously from this original consciousness that allows passing from retention to protention. This is how we can understand for Husserl the fact that

The source point with which the production of the lasting object begins is an original impression. This consciousness is seized in a continual change: ceaselessly the present of sound in flesh and bone is exchanged in a past; ceaselessly a present of sound passes always new relays that which is passed in the modification. But, when the present of sound, the original impression, passes into retention, this retention is itself in its turn a present something presently there (...) each present present of consciousness is subject to the law of modification (...) It results consequently an uninterrupted continuum of retention, so that each later point is retention for each previous point. (Husserl, 1964, pp. 43-44)

How can we understand here the relation of the present, as an original impression, to retention and protention? To understand the relation of the original present to retention and protention is to understand for Husserl the crucial stake of this source point where the original impression of time is constituted, without which there would be no retention and protention by way of consequence. If it is incumbent upon retention to retain the past in the mode of the present so that protention, in which retention is altered, may also unceasingly occur, there is in the source point an original time that is not altered through the flow of present time through retention and protention. It is precisely because Brentano's imagination cannot ensure the function of the original impression which alone allows us to think the issue of retention and protention that Husserl wrote

That Brentano did not fall into the error of reducing everything in the manner of sensualism to simple primary contents, even though he was the first to recognize the separation of primary contents and act characteristics, his theory of time shows, however, that he did not take into consideration precisely the decisive act characteristics in this matter. The question of how the consciousness of time is possible, and how it should be understood, remains unresolved. (Husserl, 1965, p. 30)

To return here to the way in which Brentano was unable to resolve the question of the intimate consciousness of time is precisely to return to the way in which Brentano ignored this intimate consciousness of time. If Brentano succeeded in distinguishing between the originally intimate consciousness of time and the moments of modification of time through retention and protention, the fact remains that Brentano, for having thought he understood the modifications of time through imagination, gives Husserl the proof of ignoring the original impression in which the intimate consciousness of time is constituted. For, to bring out the power to make representations possible, that is to say the modifications of the simple temporal moments to the imagination, is for Brentano in the eyes of Husserl to confuse the imagination with the original impression of the time of the consciousness. Brentano for Husserl has not understood that through the retention that is constantly renewed by means of the retention, there is a continuous disappearance of the modifications of the

moments of time that pass. While saying that the original impression that always withdraws from these modifications that it makes possible does not disappear for all that, it is the phenomenological stake of the intimate consciousness of time that escapes the understanding of his master Franz Brentano that Husserl finally allows us here and now to rediscover

When a temporal object is over when the real duration is over, the consciousness of the now past object is by no means extinguished with itself, although it does not function any more as perceptive consciousness, or better to say perhaps as impressional consciousness. We consider here, as before, immanent objects, which are not constituted strictly speaking in a perception. (Husserl, 1964, p. 45)

For Husserl, the intimate consciousness of time, which has the function to make arise the modifications of the temporal moments that pass, could not pass with these modifications. For, if the intimate consciousness of time were to flow like the temporal modifications that it makes appear, there would be no principle that is at the foundation of the modifications of these simple moments that disappear one after the other. The intimate consciousness of time, although it cannot function as an impressional consciousness during the disappearance of the sequence of temporal moments, it proves to be an indestructible force that always remains at work in the reactivation of the passage of the temporal moments. Although the movement that inaugurates the gesture of the intimate consciousness of time weakens progressively through the temporal moments that it makes appear, the mystery of time that resides in this invisible power of the intimate consciousness of time, contributes to the reactivation of the movements of the flow of time. There would not be movements of the flow of the time through its temporal moments of the past, if there was not on the mode of the present the intimate conscience that presides over such a flow. As much as the temporally modified moments of the past are destroyed, the intimate consciousness of time that presides over the perpetuation of these temporal moments is not destroyed for all that. It is precisely because the temporal moments are continuously destroyed from the present of the original consciousness that is hardly destroyed that

There is no need to ask how a consciousness acquires the dimension of the past, because the temporal dimension or the consciousness of the past is an a priori of the consciousness. And the retentive phases are not contents that would have their content outside of them, in a consciousness capable of synthesizing the past and the present or capable of associating the being and the non-being but the different moments of one and the same content of the consciousness that is originally in the past as in the present. We understand now Husserl's answer to Brentano: impression and retention are no longer opposed as two foreign terms that it would be necessary to associate even originally by calling upon this faculty of idealization that is the imagination, but their difference is internal to the living present itself that unfolds as an impression that is continuously retained. (Dastur, 1995, p. 66)

How can we understand this elucidation of the relation of the present to the past in order to understand precisely how past temporal moments are renewed while the present that makes them succeed each other is not renewed? How what seems to be a break of the past with the present is nothing else than a relation of the present to the past that hardly breaks? To understand the consciousness of the past as an a priori of the consciousness, it is precisely to see in the past of the consciousness that continuously passes the presence of the present consciousness that makes it associated to the present. So that the consciousnesses would hardly pass continuously one after the other, if the relation of what passes to what does not pass is not made possible by the power of the consciousness itself that explains how the present always relates to its past. Therefore, in the way in which the consciousness of the past relates to its present, it does not finally pass, all the more so as the consciousness always presentifies itself through its past. It is precisely in the way in which the consciousness

relates to itself that the consciousness that passes to itself unifies itself by associating the present to the past, thus the present to the retention and to the protention. Thus Fran çoise Dastur specifies

what has been discovered in this way is the double intentionality of consciousness. Under the transversal intentionality by which the consciousness directs itself towards its transcendent object, there is indeed a longitudinal intentionality by which the consciousness aims at itself and thus constitutes its own unity by retention and protention. (Dastur, 1995, p. 67)

It is in the way in which it constitutes itself by relating to its object that the consciousness unifying itself unceasingly also makes unceasingly possible the retention and the protention. Since there can be no retention and protention that do not result from the way in which consciousness makes each time this experience of its unity that constitutes its only means that it has to arise unceasingly through retention and protention.

### **Discussions on Time of Husserl With Merleau-Ponty**

How does Merleau-Ponty encounter the Husserlian question of the intimate consciousness of time, whose understanding he finally chose to renew following Husserl through the discussions he opened with him in *Phenomenology of Perception* through his chapter that deals precisely with temporality? It is by wanting to come back precisely on the understanding of the Husserlian question of time that Merleau-Ponty chose to reinterrogate the intimate consciousness of time. So Merleau-Ponty begins by pointing out to Husserl that “time as an immanent object of a consciousness is a levelled time, in other words is no longer time” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 474). Indeed, to understand the protocol by which his discussions with Husserl on time open is equivalent for Merleau-Ponty to understand beforehand what the intimate consciousness of time means. Circumscribing then the framework of comprehension of the intimate consciousness of time seems to be, in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, what gives us to understand time. Now, Merleau-Ponty, by beginning to show explicitly that time could not be defined as the immanent object of a consciousness, contributes precisely to show here how time could not be defined only from the immanence of its object. For Husserl, to define time from the immanence of its object is to enclose it wrongly inside an immanent consciousness of which Husserl does not take into account the dimension of exteriority. To believe therefore for Husserl in the truth of time that only comes from the object of the consciousness located in the consciousness, it is for Husserl in the eyes of Merleau-Ponty, to evade the comprehension of time that gives itself rather to be understood at the same time through its interiority and its exteriority. This is why, to take support on the immanent object of the consciousness to understand time from this object inscribed in the consciousness that the consciousness gives to see to itself, it is for Husserl in the eyes of Merleau-Ponty to proceed to the error of the enclosure of time in a subject of which it does not show the opening on the object that is outside this consciousness itself. To take into account the interiority as well as the exteriority of time, for Merleau-Ponty, it is to reach the legitimization of his thesis according to which “the consciousness is contemporary of all times” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 474-475). But, why and how does the consciousness remain contemporary of all times for Merleau-Ponty who makes it understand to Husserl?

For Merleau-Ponty, the consciousness remains contemporary of all times because it does not belong only to the unique original consciousness discovered by Husserl in the immanent ego to hold the truth of time. Merleau-Ponty thus considers that there is a succession of several movements of the original consciousnesses within which time is constituted. To want to make time the prerogative of a single immanent consciousness is for Husserl to ignore what time means. It is each time that there are movements where consciousnesses are

constituted that times are constituted inside these consciousnesses which are modalities of opening of time in the consciousness. Outside of the dimension of the unceasingly renewed opening that implies the relation of time to its space, there cannot be, for Merleau-Ponty, time for consciousness. Time is constituted in the consciousness only in virtue of this opening of the consciousness to the interior of oneself, which makes that it can be to its object. There is thus for each consciousness a time that belongs to it only in the way it perceives itself by perceiving inside itself its object, which is equivalent to the time opened on its space from which it cannot be separated. Now, this opening of time on its space remains a hold of the consciousness on itself, because the consciousness has a hold on itself only through its situation in the space on which time opens.

It is this stake of the capture of the time by the consciousness through the space where it is situated that Merleau-Ponty still allows us to understand when he writes “I am to the space and to the time my body applies to them and embraces them” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 164). But, what does it mean for Merleau-Ponty who addresses Husserl to be to space and time for the I? How is the I in time through space? To understand the major stake that shows itself to be seen through Merleau-Ponty’s statement, it is to be invited to understand how time is constituted for the I only where the gesture of its perception where it opens on itself brings it back to itself through the movement of opening of time on space. Because, without the opening of time on its space where the subject is constituted in the opening on itself through this space which is shown to see to the subject itself its object, this subject would not have finally access to time through space. Merleau-Ponty is thus concerned to give an account of the truth of the perception of time through space that Husserl has let fall into oblivion. For Merleau-Ponty, the space that opens time to itself is the place where the subject sees himself to finally see time by means of this gesture of opening on himself that remains a pure mode of opening of time through his space. The subject becomes then open to himself only by the opening of time inside his space where he reaches the sight of himself that remains basically a sight of the subject on the time opened on himself inside the space. The time in the eyes of Merleau-Ponty participates thus in the gesture of the spatialization of the subject that proceeds from an opening of the time to the subject by this originary object that is none other than its space where the time is seen inscribed in the space of the subject itself. This is why Merleau-Ponty considers that

Time is affection of oneself by oneself: the one who is affected is time as a developed series of presents; the affecting and the affected are one because the thrust of time is nothing but the transition from a present to a present. This ek-stasis, this projection of an undivided power in a term which is present to it, is subjectivity. The original flow, says Husserl, is not only: it must necessarily give itself a manifestation of itself, without our needing to place behind it another flow to become aware of it. It constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself. It is essential to time to be not only effective time or time that flows but also time that is known because the explosion or the dehiscence of the present towards a future is the archetype of the relation of oneself to oneself. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 487)

How do we understand for Merleau-Ponty the relation of self to self, as it proceeds from the self-affection of time? How does the self-affection that remains the mode on which the self affects itself open up the self within itself by the way in which the time that is equivalent to the self opens up through its exteriority within the space that remains its own? If Merleau-Ponty returns here and now to the Husserlian thesis of the self-affection of time within an original consciousness, through such self-affection of time in the original consciousness, the relation to oneself is constantly constructed where the present continually joins oneself. We might as well say that in the relation of the intentionality of the consciousness where the present joins itself to itself is always accomplished, for Merleau-Ponty, an opening of the time on itself in the way the present passes

to itself through its future. If therefore consciousness for Merleau-Ponty is constituted in its original flow, each original flow of a consciousness wants to be then this unceasingly renewed movement where consciousness in its passage to itself reaches its future. In Merleau-Ponty's eyes, Husserl, who did not finally understand how consciousness passes to itself, opening its own future to itself, was wrong to think of a consciousness of the past, which, according to him, is the one that simply remains retained by retention and flows ceaselessly, whereas the originally intimate consciousness of time does not flow with the one that passes. For Merleau-Ponty, it is thus wrong that Husserl succeeded in distinguishing the present as an originally intimate consciousness of time from the past and the future of the consciousness.

This is what Merleau-Ponty precisely makes Husserl understand by pointing out to him that

the last subjectivity is not temporal in the empirical sense of the word: if the consciousness of time were made of states of consciousness that succeed one another, it would require a new consciousness to be aware of this succession and so on. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 483)

By pointing out to Husserl that the past and the future are not empirical subjectivities, Merleau-Ponty invites him to give up thinking of the past and the future as simply temporal moments through which the consciousnesses that flow continuously succeed one another, whereas the unique and originally intimate consciousness of the time that cannot flow contributes rather for Husserl to make appear and disappear the consciousnesses that flow. Merleau-Ponty's genius in the way he returned to the Husserlian understanding of the intimate consciousness of time thus lies in the discovery of time within each consciousness.

Far then from the fact that the consciousnesses that follow one another, as Husserl wrongly thinks, can appear to disappear, as simple temporal moments that pass, these consciousnesses represent, in Merleau-Ponty's eyes, a mode of the original flow where time is originally constituted. Each consciousness, according to Merleau-Ponty, insofar as it remains perceptive, is thus constitutive of time. For, the perceptive consciousness is originally constituted in its movement by which the interiority of oneself is dug in the exteriority to oneself where the consciousness contemplates itself by discovering within oneself this original object which is none other than the time of the consciousness. It is in the way that the consciousness perceives within itself this original object time that is outside itself that the perceptive consciousness transits from itself to itself through its movement that opens it on itself only to open the consciousness present to itself to its past and its future. Since at each instant when the consciousness passes to itself by joining the present to the past in this kind of transitivity of time to itself, a pure original movement is always accomplished where present, past, and future are joined in one and the same intimate consciousness of time. That the pure original movement of the intimate consciousness of the time can thus open on itself a single and same place where the present past and the future of the consciousness join, for Merleau-Ponty, "such is the paradox of what we could call with Husserl the passive synthesis of the time" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 479). How does Merleau-Ponty allow Husserl to better understand here the simultaneous donation of time by the present, the past, and the future, by allowing him to understand precisely how the passive synthesis of time is made through this donation which is very far from being a successive donation of the temporal moments of the past and the future cut off from the present? Indeed, the passive synthesis of time could not be understood for Merleau-Ponty out of this instituting movement of time where the consciousness referring to itself accomplishes the passage from itself to itself. So that to relate to oneself for the consciousness where time is born implies a gesture of reversal of oneself by oneself on oneself of the consciousness which makes that the consciousness by joining to oneself joins through

itself the present, the past, and the future in the same time and the same place. It is what Merleau-Ponty allows Husserl to understand through his thesis of the passive synthesis of time when he writes

The gush of a new present does not cause a settling of the past and a shaking of the future, but the new present is the passage of a future to the present and of the old present to the past, it is of a single movement that from one end to the other time starts to move. The instants A B C are not successively, they differ one from the other, and correlatively A passes in A' and from there in A". Finally, the system of retentions at each instant collects in itself what was an instant earlier the system of protentions. There is there not a multiplicity of linked phenomena, but only one phenomenon of flow. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 479)

How can we understand here the way Merleau-Ponty, who shows the limits of the Husserlian conception of time, finally contributes to the elucidation of the notion of time through the present, the past, and the future that Husserl has wrongly distinguished? To understand how Merleau-Ponty works on the elucidation of the notion of time in order to allow Husserl to understand what he did not perfectly understand through the present, the past, and the future, is to understand how Merleau-Ponty has rightly chosen to rethink the major stake around which the understanding of the intimate consciousness of time is structured. Now, to rethink this issue is equivalent to understanding, for Merleau-Ponty, how time, where the present, the past, and the future are never distinguished, remains each time the emergence of a single and same original movement, a movement where time is constituted instant after instant in an intimate consciousness of time where past and future merge at the same time through a single present instant. This is why, to allow oneself for Husserl to think that "the successivity of time excludes simultaneity" (Husserl, 1964, p. 29), it is in the eyes of Merleau-Ponty to misunderstand the notion of time from the successivity which is not exclusive of the simultaneity. The proper of the movement of the instant of time, it is to open on itself a single and same place to which the present, the past, and the future relate simultaneously. The movement is thus the act of birth of the time in the place where the present, the past, and the future are joined. By contributing to the emergence of this original place where time is born, the movement of consciousness remains the primordial opening of this place where the present, the past, and the future co-born.

Even though there is, for Husserl, certainly, a plurality of movements where the past and the future follow one another in the present, each movement where the past and the future follow one another in the present simply shows, for Merleau-Ponty, how the present where time cannot be enclosed inside the consciousness, rather opens the consciousness on itself through its past and its future. Far then that the past and the future succeed each other in the present, there is rather a ceaselessly renewed appearance of the original movement where the opening of the present to the past and to the future is done at the same time in the consciousness of a single time. In order for time in consciousness to be open to itself, it is necessary each time that this movement be accomplished which opens to itself this original place where the present joins at the same time the past and the future. In order for the past of the consciousness of time to take place, there must be a movement of passage from the consciousness towards itself. Passage of the consciousness towards oneself through which is joined to oneself this original place which joined at the same time present, past, and future. The present, the past, and the future are thus joined through the place of one and the same time to which they belong without any distinction. This is why, when Merleau-Ponty writes "Husserl calls protentions and retentions the intentionalities that anchor me in an environment. They do not start from a central I" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 476), this way of thematizing and understanding these intentionalities shows a certain ignorance of Husserl with regard to the notion of time. Why? Because the only anchorage that can make the present, the retention, and the protention

participate in the same gesture of the intentionality of the consciousness of time, is indeed the consciousness whose movement opens on itself this place of time that is common to them.

To say for Husserl that retention and protention do not start from a central I is for him to ignore them, especially since it is from a single movement of consciousness that the present, retention, and protention arise. Thus, Husserl for Merleau-Ponty did not understand that each consciousness, insofar as it is constituted in and by this original movement where it opens on itself, opens the time to itself as a primordial place where present, retention, and protention begin. From then on, present, retention, and protention always appear on the same mode of being of time. There is not therefore for Merleau-Ponty several intentionalities, but rather one and the same intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time from which concomitantly springs present, retention, and protention. Each consciousness of time wants to be a central I that coincides with itself only through its movement where it passes to itself by the way it acquires its future through its past. Husserl has thus for Merleau-Ponty committed the error to dismember the original movement of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time in the sense that he dissociates the original present from its past that always makes the future arise. By discovering the past and the future through the present, which he believed to be the only time that is an original impression, Husserl showed himself incapable of understanding how time springs rather from a single movement of the intentionality of the consciousness that does not separate the present from the past and the future.

It is to the very great lucidity of Henri Bergson, on whom Merleau-Ponty knew and was able to rely, that we must finally have recourse to show how Bergson is the first in the tradition to have been able to rethink what Zeno of Elea said about time. By praising his master Zeno of Aeneas because for him “metaphysics was born indeed from the arguments of Zeno of Aeneas relating to movement and change” (Bergson, 1959, p. 1976), Bergson far from proceeding to a simple blind resumption of the Zeno’s thesis on time bases himself rather on the distinction that Zeno establishes between movement and change to think the time. Thus, after his careful analysis of Zeno’s four arguments about time, which concern: Achilles, the tortoise, the arrow, and the stage, Bergson refuses to accredit Zeno’s thesis on time. This is why, contrary to Zeno’s thesis that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise because the tortoise has preceded Achilles through the movements of their respective walks, Bergson considers that what Zeno thinks is time is rather “the confusion of movement with the space covered (...) Achilles, we are told, will never reach the tortoise, this one will have had time to walk and so on indefinitely” (Bergson, 1959, p. 1979). “(...) Achilles, we are told, will never reach the tortoise, this one will have had time to walk and so on indefinitely” (Bergson, 1959, p. 1979). Now, how can we understand here the aporia in which Zeno finds himself because he does not understand, in the eyes of Bergson, how Achilles catches up and overtakes the tortoise? How does the historical lucidity of Bergson’s arguments, by finally contributing to make Zeno understand the time he did not understand well, also contribute to make Husserl understand what Merleau-Ponty allows him to understand precisely through the *Phenomenology of Perception*? How do Zeno and Husserl, who are both from a mathematical tradition, meet Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, whose arguments have the very rare merit of contributing very significantly to the resolution of the very difficult question of time?

Indeed, thanks to the argument common to Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, which consists in showing Zeno and Husserl how Achilles catches up with and largely overtakes the tortoise, a decisive turning point in the understanding of the notion of time is opened. Why? Because the multiple movements of the steps accomplished by Achilles, contrary to the tortoise which because of its slowness accomplished less steps than



Achilles, constitute for Achilles more movements of steps through which he overtakes very largely the tortoise. The step as it is this gesture of movement where the consciousness joins to itself opens the space where the time is made inside the consciousness itself. So each step remains a movement of joining to itself a single space where the consciousness perceives itself through time which constitutes in itself a primordial object. Zeno's argument based on the fact that the tortoise having started walking before Achilles could not be caught up by him collapses by itself. Because, the movement of each step is the mode of accomplishment of an instant and the instants that follow one another show how the greater number of steps accomplished by Achilles compared to the tortoise give Achilles a very large lead over the tortoise. The mistake made by the mathematical tradition through Zeno, Husserl, and several other philosophers who participate in this tradition is the one that consists in thinking that the movement of time resides only in the whole that is equivalent to this force where this movement is triggered. And that the extension of the movement itself through its various phases during which it weakens makes sign towards simple moments, parts that are the changes of time.

However, the common thesis that Merleau-Ponty and Bergson defend, whom he succeeds at the Collège de France, consists rather in showing Zeno and Husserl how the intimate consciousness of time is constantly renewed in each of its instants that are its movements. From then on, Husserl, whose theses of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time are very subtly discussed by Merleau-Ponty, did not finally understand that what he believes to be simple instants, moments, changes, modifications of time represent each the intimate consciousness of time. For, it is given to the consciousness that has a hold on time to see itself in the place where time is made in it through each movement of its perception. It is precisely because he did not understand how time shows itself to be seen inside the consciousness through each movement where its perception of itself on itself opens that Gérard Granel underlines it in his doctoral thesis that deals with the sense of time and perception in Husserl in these terms: "the pure phenomenological seeing depends at each moment on what the ontological horizon in which it sees allows it or prevents it from seeing" (Gérard Granel, 1968, p. 220). Through the criticism that he rightly brings to the limits of the lessons for a phenomenology of the intimate consciousness of time, Gérard Granel strives to show, following Merleau-Ponty's example, how the succession of the intentionalities allows us to understand the intentionality itself as an instant of the pure seeing in which the consciousness sees itself inside the time. Through his thesis, the last chapter of which finally deals with the "critique of the phenomenology of perception" (Gérard Granel, 1968, p. 219), Gérard Granel, who was able and knew how to take a critical distance from Husserl's theses on time, has here and now the rare merit of redefining the issue of the phenomenological question of time, for which he has chosen to substitute a properly ontological issue.

### Conclusion

Reflecting on the very difficult question of time through the *Lessons for a Phenomenology of the Intimate Consciousness of Time* gives us the happy opportunity to discover Husserl's debt to his master Brentano. Being indebted to Brentano for the conception by which he began to understand time did not allow Husserl to lock himself into Franz Brentano's conception. What Husserl inherits from Brentano is the distinction between present, past, and future. For, it is through Brentano that Husserl was able to circumscribe the movement of the present as the original place of the exercise of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time. But, by denying to the imagination the role that Brentano confers to it in order to explain how moments of change or modification of time constantly arise, Husserl was able to establish how Brentano ignores the intimate

consciousness of time as well as the imagination that he believed to be at the principle of temporal modifications. It is by discovering in the intimate consciousness of time that remains present to oneself the explanatory principle of temporal modifications that Husserl was able to rethink the thesis of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time. That this thesis has been rethought by Husserl beyond Brentano, it is rather Merleau-Ponty who has the greatest merit to have brought to light the successively instantaneous character of the intentionality of the intimate consciousness of time. Merleau-Ponty, by criticizing Husserl, wanted to divert him from his conception which consists in thinking that the modifications or the changes through retentions and protentions are donations by sketches of time. Whereas what Husserl believes to be a sketch, a moment, a part that he distinguishes from the whole that he thinks to be the pure original impression that is this intimate consciousness where time opens to itself, constitutes for Merleau-Ponty a mode of opening of the whole inside the part, of the sketch, therefore of the temporal moment. So that the whole of the intimate consciousness of the time is revitalized inside the sketch, that is to say of the part that contributes unceasingly to the renewal of the opening of the whole on itself. Thus, ceases for Merleau-Ponty the difference that Husserl has wrongly established between the whole and the part, between the whole and its sketches.

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