FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

Twilight of the Idols

Or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer
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Foreword

It’s no small trick to preserve your cheerfulness in the midst of a gloomy matter which is loaded with inordinate responsibility. Yet what could be more necessary than cheerfulness? Nothing goes right unless exuberance plays a part in it. Overabundance of strength is the only proof of strength. —A revaluation of all values, this question mark so black, so monstrous that it casts a shadow on the one who poses it—such a fateful task forces one to run out into the sun at every moment, to shake off a heavy seriousness that has become all too heavy. Every means is right for this, every “case” is a lucky break. Above all, war. War has always been the great cleverness of all spirits who have become too inward, too deep; even wounds can have the power to heal. A saying whose source I withhold from scholarly curiosity has long been my motto:

\[
\text{increscunt animi, virescit vulnere virtus.}
\]

Another way to recover, which under certain circumstances I like even better, is sounding out idols . . . There are more idols than realities in the world: that’s my “evil eye” on this world, and my “evil ear” too . . . To pose questions here with a hammer for once, and maybe to hear in reply that well-known hollow tone which tells of bloated innards—how delightful for one who has ears even behind his ears—for me the old psychologist and pied piper, in whose presence precisely what would like to stay quiet \textit{has to speak up} . . .

This book too—the title gives it away—is above all a recovery, a sunny spot, a sidestep into a psychologist’s idleness. Maybe a new war as well?

1. Nietzsche often uses the expression “proof of strength,” which derives from I Cor. 2:4.
2. \textit{Jeder “Fall” ein Glücksfall}—probably an allusion to Nietzsche’s previous book, \textit{The Case of Wagner} (1888).
3. “With a wound, spirits soar and virtue thrives.” “Virtue” in the classical sense refers to excellence—a healthy, strong, peak condition. Nietzsche uses the word “virtue” (\textit{Tugend}) in this sense, for example, in the first section of “What the Germans Are Missing” and in §45 of “Raids of an Untimely Man,” below. Curious scholars have traced the source of Nietzsche’s motto: the poet Furius of Antium, \textit{Attic Nights} XVIII, 11, 4.
4. \textit{A Psychologist’s Idleness} was Nietzsche’s original title for this book; with the
And are new idols sounded out? . . . This little book is a great declaration of war, and as for sounding out idols, this time they are not just idols of the age, but eternal idols that are touched here with the hammer as with a tuning fork—there aren’t any older idols at all, none more assured, none more inflated . . . And none more hollow . . . That doesn’t stop them from being the ones that are believed in the most—and, especially in the most prominent case, they aren’t called idols at all . . .

Turin, September 30, 1888, on the day when the first book of the Revaluation of All Values was finished.

Friedrich Nietzsche
Epigrams and Arrows

1

Idleness is the start of all psychology. What? Would psychology then be—a vice?  

2

Even the bravest of us only rarely have the bravery for what we actually know . . .  

3

To live alone one has to be a beast or a god—says Aristotle. But there’s a third case: one has to be both—a philosopher.  

4

“All truth is simple.”—Isn’t that doubly a lie?  

5

Once and for all, there’s a lot that I don’t want to know.—Wisdom sets limits even to knowledge.  

6

It is in our wild nature that we best recover from our un-nature, our spirituality . . .  

6. An allusion to the German proverb “Idleness is the start of all vice.” As in his foreword, Nietzsche has in mind his original title for this book: A Psychologist’s Idleness. An earlier draft of this aphorism reads: “Idleness is the start of all philosophy. Is philosophy then—a sin?” Aristotle associates leisure with the origins of theoretical thinking in Metaphysics I, 1.  


9. Geistigkeit: while the English word “spiritual” now refers primarily to religious sensibility, the German geistig is a very broad term that can be applied to all
7

What? Is humanity just God’s mistake? Or God just a mistake of humanity?—

8

From life’s military school.—What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger.¹⁰

9

Help yourself: then everyone will help you. Principle of neighborly love.

10

Not to be cowardly in the face of one’s own deeds! Not to leave them in the lurch afterwards!—The pangs of conscience are unseemly.

11

Can a donkey be tragic?—To perish beneath a load one can neither carry nor cast off? . . . The case of the philosopher.

12

If you have your why for life, you can get by with almost any how.—Humanity does not strive for happiness; only the English do.

13

Man created woman—but out of what? Out of a rib of his God—of his “ideal” . . .
Epigrams and Arrows

14

What? You're searching? You'd like to multiply yourself ten times, a hundred times? You're looking for followers?—Look for zeros!—

15

Posthumous human beings—like me, for example—are understood worse than timely ones, but they are listened to better. More accurately: we are never understood—and that's the source of our authority . . .

16

Among women.—“Truth? Oh, you don’t know truth! Isn’t it an assault on all our pudeurs [modesties]?”

17

This is an artist as I like my artists, simple in his needs: he really wants only two things, his bread and his art—panem et Circen . . .

18

Those who don’t know how to put their will into things at least put a meaning into them: that is, they have faith that a will is already in things (principle of “faith”).

19

How’s that? You’ve chosen virtue and the puffed-up chest, but at the same time you look askance at the advantages of those who have no scruples?—But when one embraces virtue, one renounces “advantages” . . . (Posted on an anti-Semite’s front door.)

11. “Bread and Circe”—a pun on panem et circenses, “bread and circuses.” Juvenal accuses the decadent Romans of wanting only bread and circuses in Satires X, 81. In the Odyssey Circe is an enchantress who turns men into beasts.
20

The perfect woman commits literature as she commits a little sin: as an experiment, in passing, looking around to see if someone is noticing, and to see to it that someone notices . . .

21

To get into all kinds of situations where no fake virtues are allowed, where instead, like the tightrope walker on his rope, you either slip or you stand—or you get away . . .

22

“Evil people don’t have songs.” —How is it that the Russians have songs?

23

“German spirit”: for the last eighteen years a contradictio in adjecto.

24

Looking for beginnings turns you into a crab. Historians look backwards; they end up believing backwards too.

25

Contentment even protects you against catching cold. Has a woman who knew she was well-dressed ever caught cold?—I’m imagining a case where she was hardly dressed at all.

12. The original draft of this passage continues: “it is well known how well a small spot of decay and brown corruption suits the perfect woman—and even more so how all literary composition works on women, as retrospective question marks about all earlier feminine pudereus [decency].”

13. A popular saying based on the poem “Die Gesänge” (“The Songs”), by Johann Gottfried Seume (1763–1810). This entry was extracted from a longer paragraph that reads, in part: “Russian music brings to light with moving simplicity the soul of those at the bottom of society . . . But how is it then that the ruling class of Russia is not represented by its music? Is it enough to say, ‘Evil people don’t have songs?’”

14. “A contradiction in terms.” The reference is to Bismarck’s institution of the Reich, or German Empire, in 1871. For Nietzsche’s view of the Reich, see especially “What the Germans Are Missing,” below.
Epigrams and Arrows

26

I distrust all systematizers and stay out of their way. The will to a system is a lack of integrity.

27

Women are taken to be deep—why? Because with them, one never gets to the bottom of things. Women aren’t even shallow.

28

If a woman has masculine virtues, it’s enough to make you run away from her; and if she has no masculine virtues, away she runs herself.

29

“How much there once was for conscience to chew on! What good teeth it had!—And today? What’s it missing?”—A dentist’s question.

30

One rarely commits only one overhasty act. With the first, one always does too much. For this very reason, one usually commits still another—and this time, one does too little . . .

31

A worm squirms when it’s stepped on. That’s prudent. In that way it reduces the probability of being stepped on again. In the language of morality: humility.—

32

There is a hatred for lying and disguise which comes from a keen sense of honor; there is another such hatred which comes from cowardice, because lying is forbidden by a divine commandment. Too cowardly to lie . . .
How little it takes to make us happy! The sound of a bagpipe.—Without music, life would be an error. The German even imagines God as singing songs.

On ne peut penser et écrire qu’assis [one can’t think and write unless one is seated] (Gustave Flaubert).—Now I’ve got you, you nihilist! Assiduity is the sin against the Holy Spirit. Only thoughts that come by walking have any value.

There are cases where we’re like horses, we psychologists: we get disturbed because we see our own shadow bobbing up and down in front of us. Psychologists have to look away from themselves in order to see anything at all.

Are we immoralists doing harm to virtue?—Just as little as the anarchists are harming the princes. Only since the princes have been shot at have they been sitting securely on their thrones again. Moral: one must take shots at morality.

You’re running ahead?—Are you doing so as a shepherd? Or as an exception? A third case would be the escapee . . . First question of conscience.

15. “The German Fatherland,” a song written in 1813 by Ernst Moritz Arndt, includes the lines, “As far as the German tongue resounds / And to God in Heaven sings its songs.” But the German und Gott im Himmel Lieder singt can also be humorously misinterpreted as “and God in Heaven sings songs.”

Epigrams and Arrows

38

Are you genuine, or just an actor? A representative? Or the very thing that’s represented? In the end you may simply be an imitation of an actor . . . Second question of conscience.

39

The disillusioned one speaks.—I looked for great human beings, but all I ever found were the apes of their ideals.

40

Are you one who looks on? Or one who lends a hand?—Or one who looks away, turns aside . . . Third question of conscience.

41

Do you want to go along? Or go ahead? Or go on your own? . . . One has to know what one wills and that one wills.—Fourth question of conscience.

42

Those were steps for me; I climbed up over them—that’s why I had to pass over them. But they thought I wanted to settle down on them . . .

43

What difference does it make if I am right in the end! I am much too right. —And whoever laughs best today also laughs last.

44

Formula for my happiness: a yes, a no, a straight line, a goal . . .

17. German idioms allow Nietzsche to make a small pun. He literally writes, “What difference does it make if I retain the right! I have too much right.”
The Problem of Socrates

1

The wisest sages of all times have reached the same judgment about life: *it's worthless*. . . Always and everywhere we have heard the same sound coming from their mouths—a sound full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of fatigue with life, full of hostility to life. Even Socrates said, as he died, “Living—that means being sick a long time. I owe a rooster to the savior Asclepius.” Even Socrates had had enough.—What does that demonstrate? What does that indicate?—In the past one would have said (—oh, one has said it, and loud enough, and especially our pessimists!): “There must be something true here, in any case! The *consensus sapientium* [agreement of the wise] demonstrates the truth.”—Will we still speak this way today? *May* we do so? “There must be something *sick* here, in any case”—that’s our answer: these wisest sages of all times, one should take a close look at them first! Had they all become unsteady on their legs, maybe? Late? Shaky? Décadents? Does wisdom maybe appear on Earth as a scavenger bird, excited by a little scent of rotting meat? . . .

2

In my own case this disrespectful thought, that the great sages are *declining types*, first occurred to me precisely in regard to an instance where learned and unlearned prejudice most strongly opposes it: I recognized Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decay, as instruments of the Greek dissolution, as pseudo-Greek, as anti-Greek (*Birth of Tragedy*, 1872). That *consensus sapientium*—this I grasped better and better—dem-

18. Asclepius was the god of medicine. The second sentence within quotation marks is based on Socrates' last words according to Plato, *Phaedo* 118a; the first sentence is Nietzsche's interpretation of Socrates' last words. For another reflection on the death of Socrates, see *The Gay Science*, §340.

19. Nietzsche's regular use of the French words *décadence* and *décadent* expresses his respect for many psychological and sociological ideas current in the France of his day: see §4 of "What the Germans Are Missing," below.
The Problem of Socrates

...onstrates least of all that they were right about what they agreed on. Instead, it demonstrates that they themselves, these wisest ones, were somehow in physiological agreement, so that they took the same negative stance toward life—and had to take it.

Judgments, value judgments about life, for or against, can in the final analysis never be true; they have value only as symptoms, they can be considered only as symptoms—in themselves, such judgments are stupideities. One absolutely must reach out and try to grasp this astounding finesse, that the value of life cannot be assessed. Not by the living, since they are parties to the dispute; in fact, they are the objects of contention, and not the judges—and not by the dead, for another reason.—Thus, when philosophers see a problem in the value of life, this even amounts to an objection to them, a question mark attached to their wisdom, an unwisdom.—What? And all these great sages—are we saying they weren’t only décadents, but they weren’t even wise to begin with?—But here I come back to the problem of Socrates.

3

Socrates belonged, in his origins, to the lowest folk: Socrates was rabble. We know, we can still see for ourselves, how ugly he was. But ugliness, which in itself is an objection, was among the Greeks virtually a refutation. Was Socrates Greek in the first place? Ugliness is often enough the expression of interbreeding, of a development thwarted by interbreeding. In other cases it appears as a development in decline. Forensic anthropologists tell us that the typical criminal is ugly: monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo [monster in the face, monster in the soul]. But the criminal is a décadent. Was Socrates a typical criminal?—At any rate this wouldn’t contradict that well-known judgment of a physiognomist which sounded so offensive to Socrates’ friends. A visitor who knew about faces, when he passed through Athens, said to Socrates’ face that he was a monstrum—that he contained all bad vices and cravings within him. And Socrates simply answered: “You know me, sir!”

20. Nietzsche’s story about Socrates and the physiognomist, which he continues in §9 below, is based on Cicero, Tusculan Disputations IV, 37, 80. In Cicero, Socrates replies that vices are innate to him (insita).
Socrates' décadence is indicated not only by his admittedly depraved and anarchic instincts, but also by the overdevelopment of the logical and that rickety nastiness that characterizes him. And let's not forget those auditory hallucinations which have been interpreted in religious terms as "Socrates' daimonion [divine sign]."\textsuperscript{21} Everything about him is exaggerated, buffo [comical], a caricature; at the same time, everything is covert, reticent, subterranean.---I am trying to grasp the idiosyncrasy that is the source of that Socratic equation: reason = virtue = happiness—the most bizarre equation that there is, and one which in particular has all the instincts of the older Hellenes against it.

With Socrates, Greek taste takes a turn in favor of dialectic. What is really happening there? Primarily, a noble taste is thereby defeated; with dialectic, the rabble rises to the top. Before Socrates, dialectical manners were rejected in good society. They were taken to be bad manners, they were a compromising exposure. The youth were warned against them. And all such presentation of one's reasons was mistrusted. Respectable things, like respectable people, just don't carry their reasons around on their sleeves like that. Showing your whole hand is improper. Whatever has to get itself proved in advance isn't worth much. Wherever authority is still considered good form, so that one does not "give reasons" but commands, the dialectician is a sort of clown: people laugh at him, they don't take him seriously.---Socrates was the clown who got people to take him seriously: what really happened there?---

Dialectic is chosen only as a last resort. It's well known that it creates mistrust, that it is not very convincing. Nothing can be wiped away more easily than a dialectician's effect: this is proven by the experience of every gathering where people speak. It can only be self-defense in the hands of those who don't have any other weapons. One needs to get one's rights by force; otherwise, one makes no use of it. This is why the Jews were dialecticians; Reynard the Fox was one: what? And Socrates was one too?---

\textsuperscript{21} See, for example, Plato, \textit{Euthyphro} 3b and \textit{Apology} 31c–d.
—Is Socrates’ irony an expression of revolt? Of the rabble’s ressentiment? Does he, as one of the oppressed, relish his own ferocity in the knife-thrusts of the syllogism? Does he take revenge on the nobles whom he fascinates?—As a dialectician, one has a merciless instrument at hand; one can play the tyrant with it; one compromises by conquering. The dialectician lays on his opponent the burden of proving that he is not an idiot: he infuriates, and at the same time he paralyzes. The dialectician disempowers the intellect of his opponent.—What? Is dialectic just a form of revenge in Socrates?

I have made it understandable how Socrates could be repulsive. Now it’s all the more necessary to explain the fact that he was fascinating.—The first point is that he discovered a new kind of contest, that in this contest he served as the first fencing master for the noble circles of Athens. He fascinated by stimulating the combative drive of the Hellenes—he introduced a variant into the wrestling match between young men and youths. Socrates was also a great erotic.

But Socrates surmised even more. He saw past his noble Athenians; he grasped that his case, his idiosyncratic case, already wasn’t exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was silently preparing itself everywhere: the old Athens was coming to an end.—And Socrates understood that all the world had need of him—his means, his cure, his personal device for self-preservation . . . Everywhere, the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere, people were five steps away from excess; the monstrum in animo was the general threat. “The drives want to play the tyrant; we have to invent a stronger counter-tyrant” . . .


23. For Socrates’ claim to be an expert in things erotic, see Plato, Lysis 204c, Symposium 177d and 212b, and Phaedrus 257a.
When that physiognomist exposed to Socrates who he was, a cave full of all bad cravings, the great ironist allowed himself another word that gives us the key to him. “That’s true,” he said, “but I became the master of them all.” How did Socrates become master of himself?—His case was at bottom only the extreme case, only the most striking example of what began at that time to be the general crisis: the fact that no one was master of himself anymore, that the instincts were turning against each other. He was fascinating as this extreme case—his fearsome ugliness displayed him as such to every eye. He was even more fascinating, of course, as an answer, as a solution, as the semblance of a cure for this case.—

When one finds it necessary to make a tyrant out of reason, as Socrates did, then there must be no small danger that something else should play the tyrant. At that time rationality was surmised to be a rescuer; neither Socrates nor his “sick patients” were rational by free choice—it was de rigueur, it was their last resort. The fanaticism with which all Greek speculation throws itself at rationality betrays a situation of emergency: they were in danger, they had to make this choice: either to be destroyed, or—to be absurdly rational . . .

The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato onward is the result of a pathological condition; likewise their admiration for dialectic. Reason=virtue=happiness simply means: we have to imitate Socrates and produce a permanent daylight against the dark desires—the daylight of reason. We have to be cunning, sharp, clear at all costs: every acquiescence to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downward . . .

I have made it understandable how Socrates was fascinating: he seemed to be a doctor, a savior. Is it necessary to go on and point out the error which lay in his belief in “rationality at all costs”?—It is a self-deception on the part of philosophers and moralists to think that they can escape from décadence merely by making war against it. Escape is beyond their strength: for what they choose as a means, as salvation, is itself just another expression of décadence—they alter its expression, they don’t do

24. Socrates “said that he had cast [his vices] out by reason”: Cicero, Tusculan Disputations IV, 37, 80.
away with it itself. Socrates was a misunderstanding; the whole morality of improvement, Christian morality included, was a misunderstanding . . . The most glaring daylight, rationality at all costs, a life clear, cold, careful, aware, without instinct, in resistance to the instincts, was itself just a sickness, another sickness—and not at all a way back to “virtue,” to “health,” to happiness . . . To have to fight the instincts—that is the formula for décadence. As long as life is ascending, happiness is the same as instinct.—

—Did he even grasp this himself, this cleverest of all self-outwitters? Did he tell himself this in the end, in the wisdom of his courage in the face of death? . . . Socrates wanted to die: not Athens, but he gave himself the poison cup, he forced Athens to give him the poison cup . . . “Socrates is no doctor,” he said to himself softly, “death is the only doctor here . . . Socrates himself has just been sick for a long time . . .”
“Reason” in Philosophy

1

You ask me what’s idiosyncratic about philosophers? . . . There is, for instance, their lack of a sense of history, their hatred for the very notion of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they’re honoring a thing if they de-historicize it, see it *sub specie aeterni*—if they make a mummy out of it. Everything that philosophers have handled, for thousands of years now, has been conceptual mummies; nothing real escaped their hands alive. They kill and stuff whatever they worship, these gentlemen who idolize concepts—they endanger the life of whatever they worship. For them, death, change, and age, like reproduction and growth, are objections—refutations, even. Whatever is does not *become*; whatever becomes *is* not . . .

Now, they all believe, desperately even, in what *is*. But since they can’t get it into their clutches, they look for reasons why it’s being withheld from them. “There has to be an illusion, a deception at work that prevents us from perceiving what *is*; where’s the deceiver?”—“We’ve got the deceiver!” they cry happily, “it’s sensation! These senses, *which are so immoral anyway*, deceive us about the *true* world. Moral: free yourself from the senses’ deceit, from becoming, from history, from the lie—history is nothing but belief in the senses, belief in the lie. Moral: say no to everything that lends credence to the senses, to all the rest of humanity; all that is just ‘the masses.’ Be a philosopher, be a mummy, portray monotono-theism with a gravedigger’s pantomime!—And above all, away with the *body*, this pathetic *idée fixe* [obsession] of the senses, afflicted with every logical error there is, refuted, even impossible—although it has the nerve to behave as if it were real!” . . .

2

I set aside with great respect the name of Heraclitus. While the rest of the mass of philosophers were rejecting the testimony of their senses because the senses displayed plurality and change, he rejected the testimony of the senses because they displayed things as if they had duration

and unity. Even Heraclitus did not do justice to the senses. They do not lie either in the way the Eleatics thought or in the way that he thought—they do not lie at all. What we make of their testimony is what first introduces the lie, for example, the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of duration . . . “Reason” is what causes us to falsify the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses display becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie . . . But Heraclitus will always be in the right for saying that being is an empty fiction. The “apparent” world is the only world: the “true world” is just added to it by a lie . . .

And what fine tools of observation we have in our senses! This nose, for instance, of which no philosopher has yet spoken with admiration and gratitude, is in fact the most delicate instrument at our disposal: it can register minimal differences in motion which even the spectroscope fails to register. The extent to which we possess science today is precisely the extent to which we have decided to accept the testimony of the senses—and learned to sharpen them, arm them, and think them through to their end. The rest is an abortion and not-yet-science: that is, metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology. Or it is formal science, a theory of signs, like logic and that applied logic, mathematics. In these formal sciences, reality makes no appearance at all, not even as a problem; nor is there any hint of the question of what value such a convention of signs has in the first place.—

The other idiosyncrasy of philosophers is no less dangerous: it consists in confusing what is first with what is last. They posit what comes at the end—unfortunately, for it should never come at all!—the “highest concepts,” that is, the most universal, the emptiest concepts, the final wisp of evaporating reality—these they posit at the beginning as the beginning. This, again, just expresses their way of honoring something: the higher is not permitted to grow out of the lower, is not permitted to have grown at all . . .

26. Followers of Parmenides of Elea (ca. 475 B.C.), who asserted that what is, is unchangeable, uniform, unitary, and indivisible. Becoming, as displayed by the senses, is thus pure illusion or non-being.
Moral: everything of the first rank has to be \textit{causa sui} [caused by itself]. Origination from something else counts as an objection that casts doubt on the value of what has thus originated. All the supreme values are of the first rank, all the highest concepts, what \textit{is}, the unconditioned, the good, the true, the perfect—all this cannot have become, and \textit{must} consequently be \textit{causa sui}. But none of this can be at odds with itself either, it can’t contradict itself. . . . That’s where they get their stupendous concept “God” . . . The last, the thinnest, the emptiest is posited as the first, as a cause in itself, as \textit{ens realissimum} [the most real being] . . . To think that humanity has had to take seriously the brain diseases of sickly web-spinners!—And it has paid dearly for having done so! . . .

—Finally, let’s present the different way in which we (I politely say we . . .) view the problem of error and illusion. It used to be that one took alteration, change, becoming in general as a proof of illusion, as a sign that something must be there, leading us astray. Today, in contrast, it is precisely to the extent that we are compelled by the prejudice of reason to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, thinghood, being, that we see ourselves, as it were, entangled in error, \textit{forced} into error; so sure are we, on the basis of a rigorous self-examination, that it is \textit{here} that the error lies.

This case is just like that of the motions of the great star: in that case, error has our eyes as its constant advocates, whereas in the first case, its advocate is our \textit{language}. In its origin, language belongs to the time of the most rudimentary type of psychology: we encounter a crude set of fetishes when we become conscious of the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of language—or, to put it plainly, \textit{reason}. \textit{Reason} sees actors and actions everywhere: it believes in the will as an absolute cause; it believes in the “I,” in the I as being, in the I as a substance, and \textit{projects} its belief in the I-substance onto all things—that’s how it first \textit{creates} the concept “thing” . . . Being is thought into things everywhere as a cause, is \textit{imputed} to things; from the conception “I” there follows the derivative concept “being” . . . At the beginning there stands the great and fatal error of thinking that the will is something \textit{effective}—that will is an \textit{ability} . . . Today we know that it is just a word . . .

27. For further reflections on the will and being, see, for example, \textit{On the Genealogy of Morals}, First Essay, §13, and below, “The Four Great Errors,” §3.
Much, much later, in a world that was more enlightened by a thousandfold, certitude, subjective certainty in manipulating the categories of reason, entered the startled consciousness of the philosophers: they concluded that these categories could not come from experience—all experience stands in contradiction to them, after all. So where did they come from?—And in India, as in Greece, they made the same mistake: “We must already have been at home in a higher world at one time”—(instead of in a far lower one, which would have been the truth!)—“we must have been divine, since we have reason!” . . .

In fact, nothing up to now has been more naively persuasive than the error of being, as it was formulated by the Eleatics, for instance: after all, it has on its side every word, every sentence we speak!—Even the opponents of the Eleatics fell prey to the seduction of their concept of being: this happened to Democritus, among others, when he invented his atom . . . “Reason” in language: oh, what a tricky old woman she is! I’m afraid we’re not rid of God because we still believe in grammar . . .

You will be thankful to me if I condense such an essential and new insight into four theses: I thus make it easier to understand, and I dare you to contradict it.

First proposition. The grounds on which “this” world has been called apparent are instead grounds for its reality—another kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable.

Second proposition. The distinguishing marks which have been given to the “true being” of things are the distinguishing marks of nonbeing, of nothingness—the “true world” has been constructed by contradicting the actual world: this “true world” is in fact an apparent world, insofar as it is just a moral-optical illusion.

Third proposition. It makes no sense whatsoever to tell fictional stories about “another” world than this one, as long as the instinct to slander, trivialize, and look down upon life is not powerful within us: in that case, we revenge ourselves on life with the phantasmagoria of “another,” “better” life.

Fourth proposition. Dividing the world into a “true” and an “apparent” world, whether in the style of Christianity or in the style of Kant (a sneaky
Christian to the end,\textsuperscript{29} is merely a move inspired by \textit{décadence}—a symptom of \textit{declining} life . . . The fact that the artist prizes appearance over reality is no objection to this proposition. For “appearance” here means reality \textit{once again}, but in the form of a selection, an emphasis, a correction . . . Tragic artists are \textit{not} pessimists—in fact, they say \textit{yes} to everything questionable and terrible itself, they are \textit{Dionysian} . . .
How the “True World”
Finally Became a Fiction

History of an Error

1. The true world, attainable for the wise, the devout, the virtuous—they live in it, they are it.
   (Oldest form of the idea, relatively clever, simple, convincing. Paraphrase of the assertion, “I, Plato, am the truth.”)

2. The true world, unattainable for now, but promised to the wise, the devout, the virtuous (“to the sinner who does penance”).
   (Progress of the idea: it becomes more refined, more devious, more mystifying—it becomes woman, it becomes Christian . . .)

3. The true world, unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable, but a consolation, an obligation, an imperative, merely by virtue of being thought.
   (The old sun basically, but glimpsed through fog and skepticism; the idea become sublime, pallid, Nordic, Königsbergian.
   [30])

4. The true world—unattainable? In any case, unattained. And if it is unattained, it is also unknown. And hence it is not consoling, redeeming, or obligating either; to what could something unknown obligate us? . . .
   (Gray dawn. First yawnings of reason. Rooster’s crow of positivism.)

5. The “true world”—an idea with no use anymore, no longer even obligating—an idea become useless, superfluous, hence a refuted idea: let’s do away with it!
   (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens [good sense] and cheerfulness; Plato blushes; pandemonium of all free spirits.)
6. We have done away with the true world: what world is left over? The apparent one, maybe? . . . But no! Along with the true world, we have also done away with the apparent!

(Midday; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)
Morality as Anti-Nature

1

All passions have a time when they are nothing but fatal, when they drag their victim down with the heaviness of their stupidity—and a later, much later time when they marry the spirit, they “spiritualize” themselves. It used to be that on account of the stupidity in passion, one made war against passion itself: one conspired to destroy it—all the old moral monsters are of one mind on this point, “il faut tuer les passions” [“the passions must be killed”]. The best-known formula for this is in the New Testament, in that Sermon on the Mount in which, by the way, things are not contemplated from a height at all. For instance, there it is said with reference to sexuality, “if your eye offends you, pluck it out.” Fortunately, no Christian acts according to this prescription. To destroy the passions and desires, merely in order to protect oneself against their stupidity and the disagreeable consequences of their stupidity, seems to us today to be itself an acute form of stupidity. We no longer admire dentists who pull out teeth so that they won’t hurt anymore . . .

But on the other hand, it’s only fair to concede that on the soil from which Christianity grew, the concept of “spiritualizing the passions” was simply inconceivable. After all, the early Church fought, as is known, against the “intellectuals,” on behalf of those who were “poor in spirit”: how could one expect the Church to wage an intelligent war against passion?—The Church fights passion by cutting it out, in every sense; its practice, its “therapy” is castration. It never asks, “How does one spiritualize, beautify, deify a desire?”—its discipline has always emphasized eradication (eradication of sensuality, pride, the ambition to rule, covetousness, vengefulness).—But ripping out the passions by the root means ripping out life by the root; the practice of the Church is an enemy to life . . .
The same means, castration, eradication, is instinctively chosen in the struggle against a desire by those who are too weak-willed, too degenerate to moderate their own desire: by those natures who need La Trappe, to use a metaphor (and not to use one), some ultimate declaration of war, an abyss between themselves and a passion. Radical means are indispensable only for degenerates; having a weak will, or more precisely, being incapable of not reacting to a stimulus, is itself just another form of degeneration. Radical enmity, enmity to the death against sensuality, is always a symptom that repays reflection: it justifies one's suspicions about the general condition of one who goes to this kind of extreme.—

By the way, this enmity, this hatred reaches its peak only when such natures no longer have enough stamina even for the radical therapy, for the repudiation of their “devil.” Survey the whole history of priests and philosophers, and artists too: the most poisonous words against the senses have not come from the impotent, not even from the ascetics. They have come from the impossible ascetics, from those who were in need of being ascetics . . .

The spiritualization of sensuality is known as love: it is a great triumph over Christianity. Another triumph is our spiritualization of enmity. It consists in a deep grasp of the value of having enemies: in short, it is a way of acting and drawing conclusions that is the reverse of what people used to do. In every age, the Church wanted its enemies to be destroyed; we, we immoralists and anti-Christians, see our own advantage in the Church’s continued existence . . . In the political sphere, too, enmity has now become more spiritual—much more clever, much more reflective, much more considerate. Almost every party grasps that its own interest, its own self-preservation, depends on the opposing party’s not losing its strength; the same applies to politics on the grand scale. Above all, a new creation, such as the new Reich, needs enemies more than it needs friends; only in opposition does it feel that it is necessary, only in opposition does it become necessary . . .
Morality as Anti-Nature

We behave no differently as regards the “inner enemy”: here too we have spiritualized enmity, here too we have realized its value. One is fruitful only at the price of being rich in oppositions; one remains young only under the condition that the soul not slacken, not yearn for peace . . . Nothing has become more alien to us than that former object of desire, “peace in the soul,” the Christian object of desire; nothing makes us less envious than the morality-cow and the fat contentment of good conscience. One has relinquished great life when one relinquishes war . . .

In many cases, of course, “peace in the soul” is just a misunderstanding—something else which simply doesn’t know how to call itself by a more honest name. Without delay and without prejudice, here are a couple of cases. For instance, “peace in the soul” can be a rich animality, gently radiating into the moral (or the religious) realm. Or the beginning of fatigue, the first shadow cast by the evening, every kind of evening. Or a sign that the air is humid, that south winds are on their way. Or unconscious thankfulness for good digestion (sometimes called “love of humanity”). Or the growing calm of the convalescent to whom all things taste new, and who is awaiting . . . Or the condition that follows a powerful gratification of our dominant passion, the good feeling of a rare satisfaction. Or the senile feebleness of our will, our desires, our vices. Or laziness, convinced by vanity to dress itself up in morality. Or the arrival of a certainty, even a terrible certainty, after a long, suspenseful period of being tortured by uncertainty. Or the expression of ripeness and mastery in the midst of doing, creating, working, willing—unhurried breathing, the attained “freedom of the will” . . . Twilight of the Idols: who knows? Maybe this, too, is just a kind of “peace in the soul.”

—I put a principle into a formula. All naturalism in morality, that is, all healthy morality, is ruled by an instinct of life—some decree of life is fulfilled by a particular canon of “shall” and “shall not,” some restriction and hostility on life’s path is thereby shoved aside. Anti-natural morality, that is, almost every morality that has been taught, honored, and preached up to now, instead turns precisely against the instincts of life—it is a sometimes hidden, sometimes loud and bold condemnation of these instincts. By saying, “God looks into the heart,” it says no to the lowest
Given that one has grasped the sacrilege of such a revolt against life, like the revolt that has become nearly sacrosanct in Christian morality, one has, fortunately, grasped something else as well: the uselessness, illusiveness, absurdity, and mendacity of such a revolt. A condemnation of life by one who is alive is, in the end, just a symptom of a particular kind of life: this does not at all raise the question of whether the condemnation is justified or unjustified. One would have to occupy a position outside life, and on the other hand to know it as well as one, as many, as all who have lived it, in order to be allowed even to touch upon the problem of the value of life: these are reasons enough to grasp that, for us, this problem is an inaccessible problem. When we speak of values, we speak under the inspiration, under the optics of life: life itself is forcing us to posit values, life itself is valuing by means of us, when we posit values . . .

It follows from this that even that anti-natural morality that takes God to be the antithesis and condemnation of life is just one of life’s value judgments.—A judgment made by which life? Which kind of life?—But I already gave the answer: declining, weakened, tired, and condemned life. Morality as it has been understood up to now—as it was finally formulated once again by Schopenhauer, as “negation of the will to live”—is the décadence-instinct itself, making itself into an imperative. “Perish!” it says—it is the condemnation decreed by the condemned . . .

Finally, let’s consider how naive it is in general to say, “Human beings should be such and such!” Reality shows us a captivating treasury of types, the exuberance of an evanescent play and alteration of forms. And some pathetic bystander of a moralist says to all this, “No! Human beings should be different”? . . . He even knows how human beings should be, this
sanctimonious sniveler; he paints himself on the wall and pronounces, "ecce homo!" . . .

But even if the moralist just turns to the individual and says, "You should be such and such!" he doesn't stop making himself ridiculous. The individual is a slice of fate both before and after, one more law, one more necessity for everything that is coming and will be. To say to the individual, "change yourself," means insisting that everything should change, even retroactively . . . And there really have been consistent moralists; they wanted human beings to be different, namely virtuous, they wanted them made in their own image, namely sanctimonious. To this end, they said no to the world! No small lunacy! No modest sort of immodesty! . . . Morality, insofar as it condemns on its own grounds, and not from the point of view of life’s perspectives and objectives, is a specific error for which one should have no sympathy, an idiosyncrasy of degenerates which has done an unspeakable amount of harm! . . . In contrast, we others, we immoralists, have opened our hearts wide to every form of understanding, comprehending, approving. We do not easily negate, we seek our honor in being those who affirm. Our eyes have been opened more and more to that economy that needs and knows how to use all that the holy craziness of the priest, the sick reason in the priest, rejects—that economy in the law of life that draws its advantage even from the repulsive species of the sanctimonious, the priest, the virtuous.—What advantage?—But we ourselves, we immoralists, are the answer here . . .
The Four Great Errors

1

Error of confusing cause and effect.—There is no error more dangerous than confusing the effect with the cause: I call it the genuine corruption of reason. Nevertheless, this error is one of humanity’s oldest and most contemporary customs: it has even been made sacred among us, it bears the name of “religion” and “morality.” Every statement formulated by religion and morality contains it; priests and moral lawgivers are the ones who originated this corruption of reason.—

Let me take an example. Everyone knows the book by the famous Cornaro where he promotes his skimpy diet as a prescription for a long, happy—and virtuous—life. Few books have been read so widely; even today, it’s printed by the thousands of copies every year in England. I have no doubt that hardly any book (with the exception of the Bible, as is only fair) has done as much damage, has shortened as many lives as this curiosity which was so well-meaning. The reason: confusing the effect with the cause. The honorable Italian saw in his diet the cause of his long life, whereas in fact, the prerequisites for his long life—extraordinary metabolic slowness, low expenditure of energy—were the cause of his skimpy diet. He was not at liberty to eat a little or a lot, his frugality was not “freely willed”: he got sick if he ate more. But for anyone who’s not a cold fish, it not only does good but also is necessary to eat properly. Scholars of our day, with their rapid expenditure of nervous energy, would destroy themselves if they followed Cornaro’s regimen. Crede experto [believe the one with experience].—

2

The most general formula that lies at the basis of every religion and morality is, “Do such and such, don’t do such and such—that will make you happy! Or else . . .” Every morality, every religion is this imperative—I call it the great original sin of reason, the immortal unreason. In my mouth, this formula changes into its opposite—first example of my “revaluation of all values”: well-constituted people, “happy” ones, have
to do certain acts and instinctively shrink away from other acts; they import the orderliness which is evident in their physiology into their relations to people and things. In a formula: their virtue is the effect of their happiness . . . Long life and many offspring are not the reward of virtue; instead, virtue itself is that slow metabolism that, among other things, also has a long life, many offspring, and, in short, Cornarism as its consequence.—

The Church and morality say, “A race, a people is destroyed by vice and luxury.” My reconstituted reason says: when a people is perishing, physiologically degenerating, the effects of this are vice and luxury (that is, the need for stronger and stronger, more and more frequent stimuli, the kind of stimuli that are familiar to every exhausted nature). This young man gets prematurely pale and flabby. His friends say this is due to such and such a sickness. I say: the fact that he got sick, that he did not resist the sickness, was already the effect of an impoverished life, an inherited exhaustion. The newspaper reader says: this party is destroying itself by making such a mistake. My higher politics says: a party that makes such mistakes is over—it no longer has sure instincts.

Every mistake, in every sense, is the effect of degenerate instincts, of a disintegrated will: this virtually defines the bad. Everything good is instinct—and consequently is easy, necessary, free. Exertion is an objection, the god is typically different from the hero (in my language: light feet are the first attribute of godliness).

3

Error of a false causality.—In every age we have believed that we know what a cause is: but where did we get our knowledge, or more precisely, our belief that we have knowledge about this? From the realm of the famous “internal facts,” none of which has up to now proved to be factual. We believed that we ourselves were causal in the act of willing; there, at least, we thought that we were catching causality in the act. Likewise, we never doubted that all the antecedentia [antecedents] of an action, its causes, were to be sought in consciousness, and could be discovered there if we looked for them—discovered as “motives”: otherwise, the actor would not have been free for the action, responsible for it. Finally, who would have disputed the claim that a thought is caused? That the “I” causes the
thought? . . . Of these three “internal facts” which seemed to vouch for causality, the first and most convincing is the “fact” of will as cause; the conception of a consciousness (“mind” [“Geist”]) as cause, and still later of the “I” (the “subject”) as cause were merely born later, after causality had been firmly established by the will as given, as an empirical fact . . .

In the meantime, we have thought better of this. Today we don’t believe a word of all that anymore. The “internal world” is full of optical illusions and mirages: the will is one of them. The will no longer moves anything, so it no longer explains anything either—it just accompanies events, and it can even be absent. The so-called “motive”: another error. Just a surface phenomenon of consciousness, an accessory to the act, which conceals the antecedentia of an act rather than representing them. And as for the “I”! That has become a fable, a fiction, a play on words: it has completely and utterly ceased to think, to feel, and to will! . . . What’s the consequence of this? There aren’t any mental causes at all! All the supposed empirical evidence for them has gone to hell! That’s the consequence!—

And we had made a fine misuse of this “evidence,” we had created the world on that basis as a world of causes, a world of wills, a world of minds. The oldest and most long-standing psychology was at work here, and this is all it did: for it, all happening was a doing, all doing the effect of a willing; for it, the world became a multitude of doers, a doer (a “subject”) was imputed to everything that happened. Human beings projected their three “internal facts,” the objects of their firmest belief—will, mind, “I”—beyond themselves; they originally derived the concept of being from the concept “I,” they posited “things” as existing in their own image, according to their concept of the “I” as a cause. No wonder that they later rediscovered in things only what they had put into them!—The thing itself, to say it once again, the concept of a thing is just a reflex of the belief in the “I” as a cause . . . And even your atom, my dear mechanists and physicists—how much error, how much rudimentary psychology is left over in your atom!—Not to mention the “thing in itself,” the metaphysicians’ horrendum pudendum [horrible, shameful thing]! The error of mind as cause confused with reality! And made into the measure of reality! And called God!—

Error of imaginary causes.—I’ll begin with dreams: a particular sensation, for instance, a sensation due to a distant cannon shot, has a cause
imputed to it afterwards (often a whole little novel in which precisely the
dreamer is the protagonist). In the meantime, the sensation persists in a
kind of resonance: it waits, as it were, until the drive to find causes allows
it to come into the foreground—not as an accident anymore, but as
“meaning.” The cannon shot shows up in a causal way, and time seems to
flow backwards. What comes later, the motivation, is experienced first,
often with a hundred details that flash by like lightning; the shot follows . . . What has happened? The representations generated by a certain
state of affairs were misunderstood as the cause of this state of affairs.—

In fact, we do just the same thing when we’re awake. Most of our gen-
eral feelings—every sort of inhibition, pressure, tension, explosion in the
play and counterplay of the organs, and in particular the state of the nerv-
us sympathicus [sympathetic nervous system]—arouse our drive to find
causes: we want to have a reason for feeling that we’re in such and such a
state—a bad state or a good state. It’s never enough for us just to deter-
mine the mere fact that we find ourselves in such and such a state: we
admit this fact—become conscious of it—only if we’ve given it some kind
of motivation.—Memory, which comes into play in such cases without
our knowing it, calls up earlier states of the same kind, and the causal
interpretations that are rooted in them—but not their causation. Of
course, memory also calls up the belief that the representations, the
accompanying occurrences in consciousness, were the causes. In this way
there arises a habituation to a particular interpretation of causes that actu-
ally inhibits and even excludes an investigation of the cause.

A psychological explanation of this error.—Tracing something unfamil-
liar back to something familiar alleviates us, calms us, pacifies us, and in
addition provides a feeling of power. The unfamiliar brings with it danger,
unrest, and care—our first instinct is to do away with these painful condi-
tions. First principle: some explanation is better than none. Since at bot-
tom all we want is to free ourselves from oppressive representations, we
aren’t exactly strict about the means of freeing ourselves from them: the
first representation that serves to explain the unfamiliar as familiar is so
beneficial that we “take it to be true.” Proof of pleasure (“strength”) as cri-
terion of truth.” —
Thus, the drive to find causes is conditioned and aroused by the feeling of fear. Whenever possible, the "why?" should not so much provide the cause for its own sake, but instead provide a type of cause—a relaxing, liberating, alleviating cause. The fact that something already familiar, something we have experienced, something inscribed in memory is posited as the cause, is the first consequence of this requirement. The new, the unexperienced, the alien, is excluded as a cause.—So we not only look for some type of explanation as the cause, but we single out and favor a certain type of explanation, the type that eliminates the feeling of the alien, new, and unexperienced, as fast and as often as possible—the most customary explanations.—

Consequence: one kind of cause-positing becomes more and more prevalent, concentrates itself into a system, and finally comes to the fore as dominant, that is, as simply excluding any other causes and explanations.—The banker thinks right away about "business," the Christian about "sin," the girl about her love.

The entire realm of morality and religion belongs under this concept of imaginary causes.—"Explanation" of the unpleasant general feelings. These feelings are due to beings that are our enemies (evil spirits: the most famous case—misunderstanding of hysterics as witches). They are due to unacceptable actions (physical discomfort gets saddled with the feeling of "sin," of "sinfulness"—one always finds reasons to be dissatisfied with oneself). They are punishments, payment for something that we shouldn’t have done, that we shouldn’t have been. (Impudently generalized by Schopenhauer into a statement in which morality appears as what it is, as something that really poisons and despises life: "every great pain, be it bodily or spiritual, expresses what we deserve, for it could not come to us if we did not deserve it."—The World as Will and Representation, II, 666. ) They are the effects of thoughtless actions that turned out badly (the emotions, the senses, are posited as a cause, as "responsible"; physiological crises are interpreted as "deserved" with the help of other crises).—

"Explanation" of the pleasant general feelings. These feelings are due
The Four Great Errors

to trust in God. They are due to our awareness of good actions (the so-called “good conscience,” a physiological condition that sometimes looks so much like a good digestion that it might be confused with it). They are due to the successful outcome of our projects (a naive fallacy: the successful outcome of a project doesn’t create any pleasant general feelings for a hypochondriac or a Pascal\(^\text{45}\)). They are due to faith, love, hope—the Christian virtues.  

In truth, all these supposed explanations are derivative states and translations, so to speak, of feelings of pleasure or displeasure into a false dialect: one is in a hopeful state because the basic physiological feeling is once again strong and rich; one trusts in God because the feeling of fullness and strength gives one calm.—Morality and religion totally belong to the psychology of error: in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effect of what is believed to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with the causation of this state.

7

Error of free will.—Today we have no sympathy anymore for the concept of “free will”: we know only too well what it is—the most disreputable of all the theologians’ tricks, designed to make humanity “responsible” in the theologians’ sense, that is, to make it dependent on them . . . Here I am simply offering the psychology of all making-responsible.—Wherever responsibilities are sought, what tends to be doing the seeking is the instinct of wanting to punish and rule. One has stripped becoming of its innocence when some state of being-such-and-such is traced back to will, to intentions, to acts: the doctrine of the will was essentially invented for purposes of punishment, that is, for purposes of wanting to find people guilty. All the old psychology, the psychology of will, is predicated on the fact that its originators, the priests in the elites of ancient communities, wanted to create a right for themselves to inflict punishments—or wanted to create a right for God to do so . . . Human beings were thought to be “free” so that they could be ruled, so that they could be punished—so that they could become guilty: consequently, every action had to be thought of as willed, the origin of every action had to be thought to lie in consciousness (and thus the most fundamental act of counterfeiting in psy-
chologicis [in psychological matters] was itself made into the principle of psychology . . .). Today, when we have started in the opposite direction, when we immoralists are trying with all our strength to get the concepts of guilt and punishment back out of the world, and to purge psychology, history, nature, social institutions, and sanctions of these concepts, there is in our eyes no opposition more radical than that of the theologians, who, with the concept of the “moral order of the world,” go on infecting the innocence of becoming with “punishment” and “guilt.” Christianity is a metaphysics of the hangman . . .

What can be our doctrine alone?—That nobody gives human beings their qualities, neither God, nor society, nor their parents and ancestors, nor they themselves (the nonsense of this last notion we are rejecting was taught by Kant as “intelligible freedom,” and maybe was already taught by Plato as well). Nobody is responsible for being here in the first place, for being constituted in such and such a way, for being in these circumstances, in this environment. The fatality of our essence cannot be separated from the fatality of all that was and will be. We are not the consequence of a special intention, a will, a goal; we are not being used in an attempt to reach an “ideal of humanity,” or an “ideal of happiness,” or an “ideal of morality”—it is absurd to want to divert our essence towards some goal. We have invented the concept “goal”: in reality, goals are absent . . .

One is necessary, one is a piece of destiny, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole.—There is nothing that could rule, measure, compare, judge our being, for that would mean ruling, measuring, comparing, and judging the whole . . . But there is nothing outside the whole!—That nobody is made responsible anymore, that no way of being may be traced back to a causa prima [first cause], that the world is not a unity

47. According to Kant, we can know only the sensible world of appearances (the world of material objects in causal interaction), in which our actions, like the movements of material objects, seem to be determined by factors beyond our control. We must assume, however, that in the “intelligible” world of things in themselves, we are perfectly autonomous beings who freely choose our actions. (The term “intelligible” does not mean knowable, but only thinkable.) See e.g. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, §3. For a Platonic passage in which Socrates ascribes his actions not to his body, but to his own opinion of what is good, see *Phaedo* 98b–99b.
either as sensorium 48 or as “spirit,” only this is the great liberation—in this way only, the innocence of becoming is restored . . . The concept “God” was up to now the greatest objection against existence . . . We deny God, and in denying God we deny responsibility 49: only thus do we redeem the world.
Those Who
“Improve” Humanity

1

My demand on philosophers is well-known: that they place themselves beyond good and evil—that they put the illusion of moral judgment beneath them. This demand follows from an insight which was formulated for the first time by me: that there are no moral facts at all. Moral judgments have this in common with religious ones: they believe in realities that are unreal. Morality is just an interpretation of certain phenomena, or speaking more precisely, a misinterpretation. Moral judgments, like religious ones, belong to a level of ignorance at which the very concept of the real, the distinction between real and imaginary, is still absent, so that “truth” at this level refers to all sorts of things which today we call “fantasies.” Thus, moral judgments can never be taken literally: literally, they always contain nothing but nonsense. But they are semiotically invaluable all the same: they reveal, at least to those who are in the know, the most valuable realities of cultures and inner states that did not know enough to “understand” themselves. Morality is just a sign language, just a symptomatology: you already have to know what it’s all about in order to get any use out of it.

2

A first, completely provisional example. People have always wanted to “improve” human beings: this, above all, was called morality. But hidden under this same word is a completely different tendency. Both the taming of the human beast and the breeding of a particular human species have been called “improvement”: only this zoological terminology can express the realities—naturally, realities of which the typical “improver,” the priest, knows nothing and wants to know nothing . . . To call the taming of an animal its “improvement” sounds almost like a joke to our ears. Anyone who knows what happens in menageries has doubts about whether any beast gets “improved” there. The beast gets weakened, it is made less dangerous, and through the depressing feeling of fear, through pain, through wounds and hunger, it becomes a sickly beast.—It is no different with the tamed human being whom the priest
Those Who “Improve” Humanity

has “improved.” In the early Middle Ages, when the Church was in fact a menagerie first and foremost, the most beautiful exemplars of the “blond beast” were hunted down everywhere—for example, the noble Teutons were “improved.”

But what did such a “improved” Teuton look like, once he had been lured into the cloister? Like a caricature of a human being, like an abortion: he had become a “sinner,” he was stuck in a cage, imprisoned among all kinds of awful concepts . . . There he lay now, sick, wretched, with ill will towards himself; full of hate against the impulses to live, full of distrust for everything that was still strong and happy. In short, a “Christian” . . .

In physiological terms: in a struggle with a beast, making it sick can be the only means of making it weak. The Church understood that: it corrupted human beings, it weakened them—but it claimed to have “improved” them . . .

Let’s turn to the other case of so-called morality, the case of the breeding of a particular race and type. The most magnificent example is provided by Indian morality, which in the form of the “Law of Manu” was sanctioned as religion. This law sets the task of breeding no fewer than four races at once: a priestly race, a fighting race, a race of merchants and farmers, and finally a race of servants, the shudras. Obviously we are no longer among animal tamers here: a type of human being a hundred

50. Nietzsche introduces the expression “blond beast” in On the Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, §11. He probably has a lion in mind, and his expression refers not only to blond “Aryans,” but to any strong, untamed, warlike people.

51. The Laws of Manu is an important Hindu text that sets forth, among other things, the religious duties of kings and caste regulations; it is now believed to have been composed between 200 B.C. and A.D. 100. Nietzsche’s source for this text is Louis Jacolliot’s Les législateurs religieux: Manou—Moïse—Mahomet (1876). In a letter of May 31, 1888, to Peter Gast, Nietzsche writes that he has found “a great lesson in a French translation of the Laws of Manu . . . This absolutely Aryan achievement, a priestly codex based on the Vedas, the system of castes and a very ancient tradition—not pessimist, although always priestly—completes my ideas on religion in the most remarkable manner.” He relates the Laws of Manu to Plato, Chinese thought, and medieval European thought, and proposes that the Jews, as a “chandala” race (see next note), learned from their masters the “principles on which a clergy could organize a people and establish its power.” For a further discussion of the Laws of Manu, see The Anti-Christ, §§57–58.
times more gentle and reasonable is the prerequisite for even conceiving of such a breeding plan. We let out a sigh of relief as we step from the Christian air of sickness and dungeons into this healthier, higher, broader world. How pathetic the “New Testament” is in comparison to Manu, how bad it smells!—

But this organization, too, needed to be frightening—not in struggle with a beast this time, but with its own antithesis, with the nonbred human being, the mishmash human being, the chandala. And once again, it had no other means of making its antithesis harmless and weak than to make it sick—it was the struggle with the “great mass.” There may be nothing more contrary to our sensibility than these safety measures of Indian morality. The third edict, for example (Avadana-Shastra I), the edict “on unclean vegetables,” commands that the only nourishment allowed to the chandala must be garlic and onions, in consideration of the fact that the holy writ forbids that they be brought grain or seed-bearing fruits, or that they be given water or fire. The same edict declares that the water they need may be taken neither from rivers nor springs nor ponds, but only from the entries to swamps and from hollows made by animals’ hooves. Furthermore, the chandalas are forbidden to wash their clothes or to wash themselves, for the water which is provided to them as a favor may be used only to quench their thirst. Finally, it is forbidden for the shudra women to attend chandala women in birth, and similarly even for chandala women themselves to attend each other in birth . . .

—The success of such policing of sanitation was not long in coming: murderous plagues, horrible sexually transmitted diseases, and consequently the “law of the knife,” prescribing circumcision for the male children and the removal of the inner labia for the females.—Manu himself says: “The chandalas are the fruit of adultery, incest and crime” (this is the necessary consequence of the concept of breeding). “For clothing they shall have nothing but rags from corpses; for dishes, broken pots; for ornament, old iron; for worship, nothing but the evil spirits; they shall wander without rest from one place to the next. It is forbidden to them to write from left to right or to use their right hand in writing: the use of the right hand and the left-to-right is reserved exclusively for the virtuous, for the people of race.”—
4

Those provisions are instructive enough: in them we have, on the one hand, Aryan humanity, completely pure and primordial—we learn that the concept of “pure blood” is the very opposite of an innocuous concept. On the other hand, it becomes clear in which people hatred, chandala hatred against this “humanity” became eternal, where it became religion, became genius . . . From this point of view, the Gospels are a document of utmost importance; the Book of Enoch, even more so. —Christianity, which springs from a Jewish root and is understandable only as a growth on this soil, represents the countermovement to every morality of breeding, of race, of privilege—it is the anti-Aryan religion par excellence: Christianity as the revaluation of all Aryan values, the triumph of chandala values, the gospel preached to the poor, the lowly, the general rebellion of all the oppressed, the miserable, the failures, the unfortunates, against “race”—the immortal chandala vengeance as a religion of love . . .

5

The morality of breeding and the morality of taming are perfectly worthy of each other in the means they employ: we may posit as a supreme principle that in order to make morality, one must have the unconditional will to its opposite. This is the great, uncanny problem which I have pursued the farthest: the psychology of those who “improve” humanity. A small and basically modest fact first gave me access to this problem: the so-called pia fraus [pious fraud], the inheritance of all philosophers and priests who have “improved” humanity. Neither Manu nor Plato nor Confucius, nor the Jewish and Christian teachers, have ever doubted their
What the Germans Are Missing

1

Among Germans today, just having spirit is not enough: you also have to take it, take it upon yourself to take it . . .

Maybe I know the Germans; maybe I’m even allowed to tell them a couple of truths. The new Germany represents a great quantity of inherited and instilled ability, so that for a while it is allowed to spend its piled-up store of strength, and even to be a spendthrift. It is not a high culture that has become master with the new Germany, much less a delicate taste, a noble “beauty” of the instincts; instead, it is virtues more manly than any other European country can show. A lot of fortitude and self-respect, a lot of sureness in social interaction and in the reciprocity of duties, a lot of diligence, a lot of endurance—and an inherited restraint which needs to be goaded rather than braked. Let me add that here one still obeys without being humiliated by obedience . . . And no one despises his opponent . . .

You can see that I want to be fair to the Germans: I wouldn’t like to be untrue to myself in this—so I also have to raise my objection to them. One pays a high price for coming to power: power stupefies . . . The Germans—they were once called the nation of thinkers: are they still thinking today at all?—The Germans are bored with the spirit now, the Germans mistrust the spirit now, politics swallows up all seriousness about really spiritual things.—Deutschland, Deutschland über alles: I’m afraid that was the end of German philosophy . . . “Are there German philosophers? Are there German poets? Are there any good German books?” I’m asked when I go abroad. I blush, but with the bravery that’s typical of me even in hopeless cases, I answer: “Yes: Bismarck!”—Could I even admit what books are read today? . . . Damned instinct of mediocrity!
—What the German spirit could be—who hasn’t had melancholy thoughts about that! But this people has voluntarily stupefied itself for almost a thousand years: nowhere have the two great European narcotics, alcohol and Christianity, been abused more viciously. Recently they’ve gotten still another narcotic, which is enough on its own to give the death-blow to all refined and keen suppleness of the spirit: music, our constipated, constipating German music.—

How much tiresome heaviness, lameness, humidity, dressing-gown stupor—how much beer there is in the German intellect! How can it possibly be that young men who devote their existence to the most spiritual goals don’t feel in themselves the first instinct of spirituality, the spirit’s instinct of self-preservation—and drink beer? . . . The alcoholism of scholarly youths may not call their scholarliness into question—one can even be a great scholar without any spirit—but it’s still a problem in every other respect.—Is there anywhere you wouldn’t find the gentle degeneration that beer brings about in the spirit? I once put my finger on such a degeneration, in a case that has almost become famous—the degeneration of our foremost German free spirit, the clever David Strauss, into the author of a beerhall gospel and “new faith” . . . It wasn’t for nothing that he’d made his vow to the “lovely brunette” in verses—fidelity till death . . .

—I was talking about the German spirit: about how it’s getting coarser, how it’s getting shallower. Is that enough?—At bottom it’s something completely different that scares me: the way German seriousness, German depth, German passion in spiritual things are deteriorating more and more. The fervor has changed, not just the intellectuality.—Here and there I come in contact with German universities: what an atmosphere prevails among their scholars, what a barren spirituality that has grown
What the Germans Are Missing

self-satisfied and lukewarm! It would be a deep misunderstanding to hold up German science as an objection to me on this point—and furthermore, it would be proof that one hadn’t read a single word I have written. For seventeen years I have not tired of shedding light on the de-spiritualizing influence of our contemporary science business. The burdensome serfdom to which the immense range of the sciences condemns every individual today is the main reason why natures with fuller, richer, deeper constitutions can no longer find any suitable education or educators. Nothing makes our culture suffer more than the oversupply of arrogant loafers and fragments of humanity; our universities, despite themselves, are really the greenhouses for this sort of stunting of spiritual instincts. And all of Europe already has some idea of this—the grandiose politics don’t fool anyone . . . More and more, Germany is becoming the flatlands of Europe.——

I am still looking for a German with whom I could be serious—and how much more for one with whom I might be cheerful!—Twilight of the Idols: ah, who today could grasp from what sort of seriousness a hermit is recovering here!59 —Our cheerfulness is what is hardest to understand about us . . .

Let’s size it up: not only is it obvious that German culture is in decline, but there is also no lack of a sufficient reason for this decline. You can’t ultimately spend more than you have—that’s true of individuals, it’s true of peoples. If you spend yourself on power, on grandiose politics, on economics, world trade, parliaments, military interests—if you give away in this direction the quantity of understanding, seriousness, will and self-overcoming that you are, then this quantity isn’t available in the other direction. Culture and the state—let’s not fool ourselves about this—are antagonists: the “cultured state”60 is just a modern idea. One lives off the other, one prospers at the expense of the other. All the great ages of culture are ages of decline, politically speaking: what is great in the cultural sense has been unpolitical, even anti-political . . . Goethe’s heart opened
up at the phenomenon of Napoleon—it closed up at the “Wars of Liberation” . . .

At the very moment when Germany emerges as a great power, France achieves new importance as a cultural power. A lot of new seriousness, a lot of new spiritual passion has already emigrated to Paris. The question of pessimism, for example, the question of Wagner, virtually all psychological and artistic questions are considered there in an incomparably more refined and profound way than in Germany—the Germans are simply incapable of this kind of seriousness.—In the history of European culture, the rise of the “Reich” means one thing above all: a shift of the center of gravity. It’s already known everywhere that in what really counts—and what really counts is still culture—the Germans are no longer worth considering. We’re asked: can you show us even a single spirit who makes a difference to Europe? In the way your Goethe, your Hegel, your Heinrich Heine, your Schopenhauer did?—There is no end of amazement at the fact that there is not a single German philosopher anymore.—

5

The whole system of higher education in Germany has lost what is most important: the end, as well as the means to the end. The fact that education, cultivation is itself the goal—and not “the Reich”—that this goal requires educators—and not prep-school teachers and university scholars—this has been forgotten. . . . We need educators who are themselves educated, elevated, noble spirits who prove themselves at every moment, prove themselves by what they say and what they keep quiet, cultured spirits grown ripe and sweet—not the scholarly boors that prep schools and universities offer as “higher wet nurses” to the youth today. Not counting some most exceptional exceptions, the educators are missing, the first prerequisite for education is missing: that is why German culture is in decline.—One of those rarest exceptions of all is my honorable
friend Jacob Burckhardt, in Basel: to him, above all, Basel owes its preemi-

cence in the humanities.  

What the “higher schools” of Germany actually achieve is a brutal breaking-in, with the purpose of making a huge number of young men usable, exploitable for service to the state with the least possible waste of time. “Higher education” and the huge number—that’s contradictory to begin with. Higher education always belongs to the exception: one must be privileged in order to have the right to such a high privilege. No great, no beautiful thing can ever be a common possession: pulchrum est paucorum hominum [the beautiful belongs to the few].—

What is causing the decline of German culture? The fact that “higher education” is not a prerogative anymore—the democratism of a “cultivation” that has become “common,” become commonplace . . . Let’s not forget that military privileges formally require the overuse of the higher schools, that is, their ruination.—Nobody is free anymore in today’s Germany to give his children a noble education: our “higher” schools are all geared towards the most questionable mediocrity in their teachers, in their teaching plans, in their teaching goals. And everything is dominated by an indecent haste, as if something were spoiled when a young man, twenty-three years of age, isn’t “done” yet, doesn’t yet know an answer to the “main question”: which profession, which calling?—Human beings of a higher type, if I may say so, don’t like “callings,” precisely because they know that they are called . . . They have time, they take their time, they don’t think at all about getting “done”—at the age of thirty, when it comes to high culture, one is a beginner, a child.—Our overfilled prep schools, our overloaded, stupefied prep-school teachers are a scandal: to defend these conditions, as the professors at Heidelberg recently did—for this, one may have motivations—but reasons there are none.

—In order not to be untrue to my type, which is a yes-saying type and deals in contradictions and criticism only indirectly, only unwillingly, I
will set forth right away the three tasks for which educators are required. One must learn to see, one must learn to think, one must learn to speak and write. The goal of all three tasks is a noble culture.—

To learn to see—to accustom the eye to composure, to patience, to letting things come to it; to put off judgment, to learn to walk around all sides of the individual case and comprehend it from all sides. That is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react to a stimulus right away, but to keep in check the instinct to restrict and exclude. Learning to see, as I understand it, is almost what is unphilosophically termed will-power: what is essential here is precisely not to “will,” to be able to put off a decision. All unspirituality, all commonness is based on the inability to resist a stimulus—one has to react, one follows every impulse. In many cases, such a compulsion is already sickness, decline, a symptom of exhaustion—almost everything that unphilosophical coarseness calls vice is simply this physiological inability not to react.—

A useful application of having learned to see: one will have become, as a learner in general, slow, suspicious, and resistant. It will be with a hostile composure that one will let strange new things of every sort make their initial approach—one will draw one’s hand back from them. Leaving all one’s doors open, submissively flopping belly-down before every little fact, a constant readiness to jump in and interfere, to plunge into other people and other things, in short, the celebrated “objectivity” of modern times is bad taste, is ignoble par excellence.—

7

Learning to think: there is no concept of this in our schools anymore. At the universities themselves, even among real scholars of philosophy, logic as theory, as practice, as craft is starting to die out. Read German books: not even the most remote recollection of the fact that thinking needs a technique, a plan of study, a will to mastery—that thinking wants to be learned as dancing wants to be learned, as a kind of dancing . . . Who among Germans still knows from experience that refined shudder which light feet in spiritual matters send through all one’s muscles?—Wooden clumsiness in spiritual behavior, grasping with a coarsely grabbing hand—that is so German that foreigners take it for the essence of Germany as such. The German has no fingers for nuances . . . The mere fact that the Germans have been able to put up with their philosophers, especially that most misshapen concept-cripple there ever was, the great Kant, gives you a pretty good idea of German grace.—For we cannot subtract
dancing in any form from noble education, the ability to dance with feet, with concepts, with words: need I add that one must also be able to dance with the *pen*—that one must learn to *write*?—But at this point, I would become a complete riddle for German readers . . .
Raids of an Untimely Man

1

My impossible ones. — Seneca: or virtue’s bullfighter. — Rousseau: or the return to nature in impuribus naturalibus [in natural uncleanness]. — Schiller: or the moral trumpeter of Säckingen. — Dante: or the hyena that composes poetry in graves. — Kant: or “cant” as intelligible character. — Victor Hugo: or the lighthouse at the sea of senselessness. — Liszt: or the school of velocity—in running after women. — George Sand: or lactea...
ubertas [milky abundance]—in our own language, the dairy cow with the “beautiful style.” —Michelet: or enthusiasm that rips off its jacket. —Carlyle: or pessimism as undigested lunch. —John Stuart Mill: or clarity as an insult. —The Goncourt brothers: or the two Ajaxes in battle with Homer—music by Offenbach. —Zola: or “the joy of stinking.”

2

Renan. —Theology, or the corruption of reason by “original sin” (Christianity). Evidence: Renan, who as soon as he risks a yes or no of a more general sort, misses the point with embarrassing regularity. For instance, he’d like to unite la science and la noblesse [science and nobility]; but la science belongs to democracy, that’s just a palpable fact. With no small ambition, he wants to represent an aristocracy of the spirit: but at the same time, he falls on his knees before the opposite doctrine, the évangeile des humbles [gospel of the humble]—and not just his knees... what use is all your free-thinking, your modernity, your mockery and squirrely flexibility if in your guts you’re still a Christian, a Catholic, and even a priest! Renan has his clever means of seduction, just like a Jesuit or
father confessor; his spirituality isn't free of the fat priestly smirk—like all priests, he is dangerous only when he loves. No one is his equal in life-threatening adoration . . . This spirit of Renan, a spirit that enervates, is one more disaster for poor, sick France with its sick will.—

3

Sainte-Beuve. 80—Nothing manly about him; full of petty anger against all manly spirits. Roams around, refined, curious, bored, prying—a female at bottom, with a female thirst for revenge and female sensuality. As a psychologist, a genius at médisance [malicious gossip]; inexhaustibly rich in means for this; no one understands better how to mix poison in his praise. Plébian in his most basic instincts, and related to Rousseau’s ressentiment: consequently a romantic—for underneath all romantisme, Rousseau’s instinct for revenge is grunting and grasping. 81 A revolutionary, but kept pretty well in check by fear. Has no freedom in the face of anything strong (public opinion, the academy, the court, even Port-Royal). Embittered against everything great in human beings and in things, against everything that believes in itself. Enough of a poet and semi-female to experience greatness as power; always squirming, like the proverbial worm, because he always feels stepped on. As a critic, without standards, stability, or backbone, with the cosmopolitan libertine’s taste for diversity, but without the courage even to admit his own libertinage. As a historian, without philosophy, without the power of philosophical vision—so he turns down the task of judging in every important matter, holding up “objectivity” as his mask. He behaves differently when it comes to every question in which the highest court of appeal is a refined, experienced taste: there he really has the courage for himself, takes pleasure in himself—there he is a master.—In some respects, a forerunner of Baudelaire. 83
The *Imitatio Christi*[^84] is one of those books I can’t hold in my hands without being physically repelled: it gives off a *parfum* [perfume] of the Eternal Feminine[^85] for which one has to be French—or a Wagnerian . . .

This holy man has a way of talking about love that makes even Parisian women curious.—I’m told that that *cleverest* of Jesuits, Auguste Comte, who wanted to lead the French to Rome by the *detour* of science, was inspired by this book.[^86] I believe it: “the religion of the heart” . . .

[^84]: The *Imitatio Christi*: a work of mystical asceticism by Thomas à Kempis (1379–1471).

[^85]: *Das Ewig-Weibliche*: a well-known expression from the final scene of Goethe’s *Faust*, Part II.

[^86]: Auguste Comte (1798–1857): French positivist philosopher and social theorist for whom humanity was the proper object of religious devotion.

[^87]: George Eliot (pseudonym of Mary Ann Evans, 1819–1880): the well-known English novelist was also the translator of Ludwig Feuerbach's anti-religious *The Essence of Christianity* and David Strauss’ secular *Life of Jesus* (on Strauss, see above, “What the Germans Are Missing,” §2).
If the English actually believe they know on their own, “intuitively,” what is good and evil, if they consequently think they no longer need Christianity as a guarantee of morality, this itself is just the consequence of the domination of Christian value judgments, and an expression of the strength and depth of this domination: so that the origin of English morality has been forgotten, so that the highly conditional status of its right to exist is no longer sensed. For the English, morality is not yet a problem . . .

6

George Sand.—I read the first Lettres d’un voyageur: like everything that stems from Rousseau, false, contrived, full of hot air, overdone. I can’t stand this motley wallpaper style, any more than the vulgar ambition to have generous feelings. Of course, what’s worst is this female flirtation with manly things, with the manners of rude boys.—How cold she must have been in all this, this insufferable authoress! She wound herself up like a clock—and wrote . . . Cold, like Hugo, like Balzac, like all romantics as soon as they wrote poetry! And how pleased with herself she must have been as she lay there, this fertile writing-cow, who had something German in the bad sense about her, just like Rousseau himself, her master, and who became possible anyway only with the decline of French taste!—But Renan worships her . . .

7

Morality for psychologists.—Don’t do tabloid psychology! Never observe in order to observe! That leads to a false perspective, squinting, stilted, and overdone. Experiencing because you want to experience—that doesn’t work. You mustn’t look at yourself during an experience; every such look becomes the “evil eye.” A born psychologist instinctively avoids seeing in order to see; the same goes for the born painter. He never works “from nature”—he trusts his instinct, his camera obscura, to sift
through and express the “case,” “nature,” the “experience.” . . . The universal is what first comes into his consciousness, the conclusion, the result: he is not familiar with that willful process of abstracting from the individual case.—

What happens if you do otherwise? For example, if you do tabloid psychology in the manner of Parisian romanciers [novelists] great and small? That approach lies in wait for reality, so to speak; that approach brings home a handful of curiosities every evening . . . But just look at what comes of this in the end—a pile of scribbles, a mosaic at best, in any case something added together, something restless, with loud colors. The worst in this genre is what the Goncourts produce: they can’t put together three sentences that don’t simply pain the eye, the psychologist’s eye.—

Nature, in the judgment of an artist, is not a model. It exaggerates, it distorts, it leaves gaps. Nature is chance. Studying “from nature” seems like a bad sign to me: it betrays submission, weakness, fatalism—lying in the dust like this in front of petits faits [petty facts] is unworthy of a complete artist. To see what is—that’s typical of a different kind of spirit, the anti-artistic, the factual kind. One must know who one is . . .

Towards a psychology of the artist.—For there to be art, for there to be any aesthetic activity and observation, one physiological prerequisite is indispensable: intoxication. Intoxication must already have heightened the sensitivity of the whole machine: otherwise, no art will be forthcoming. All kinds of intoxication, as different as their causes may be, have this power: above all, the intoxication of sexual excitement, that oldest and most primordial form of intoxication. Likewise the intoxication that follows all great cravings, all strong emotions; the intoxication of the festival, of the competition, of daredevilry, of victory, of every extreme commotion; the intoxication of cruelty; the intoxication of destruction; intoxication due to certain meteorological influences, such as the intoxication of spring; or under the influence of narcotics; finally, the intoxication of the will, the intoxication of an overloaded and swollen will.—

What is essential in intoxication is the feeling of increased strength and fullness. This feeling leads us to donate to things, to make them take from us, to force ourselves on them—this process is called idealizing. Let’s get
rid of a prejudice at this point: idealizing does not consist, as is commonly thought, in taking away or subtracting what is small and incidental. Instead, what is decisive is an immense drive to bring out the principal traits, so that the others disappear in the process.

9

In this state, your own fullness leads you to enrich everything: whatever you see, whatever you will, you see as swollen, packed, vigorous, overloaded with strength. In this state you transform things until they are mirrors of your own power—until they reflect your perfection. This necessity to transform things into perfection is—art. Even everything that you are not turns into self-enjoyment; in art, human beings enjoy themselves as perfection.—

It would be permissible to imagine an opposite state, a species of instinctive anti-artistry—a way of being that would impoverish all things, thin them down, make them tubercular. And in fact, history is rich in such anti-artists, such people with starved lives—who necessarily have to clutch at things, emaciate them, make them thinner. For example, this is the case with the genuine Christian, Pascal for example: there just is no such thing as a Christian who is also an artist . . . I hope no one will be childish and bring up Raphael as an objection to me, or some homeopathic nineteenth-century Christians: Raphael said yes, Raphael did yes, and consequently Raphael was no Christian . . .

10

What is the meaning of the opposed concepts Apollinian and Dionysian which I introduced into aesthetics, both taken as kinds of intoxication? —

Apollinian intoxication keeps the eye excited, above all, so that it gets the power of vision. The painter, the sculptor, the epic poet are visionaries par excellence. In the Dionysian state, however, the whole system of emotions is excited and intensified: so it vents all its means of expression at once and brings out the power of representing, imitating, transfiguring, transforming, every sort of mimicry and acting, all at once. The essential
thing is always how easy the metamorphosis is, the incapacity not to react
(much as with certain hysterics, who also jump into any role at the least
provocation). For Dionysian human beings, it is impossible not to under-
stand any suggestion; they never overlook a sign of emotion, they have
the instinct for understanding and guessing the answer in the highest
degree, just as they possess the highest degree of the art of communica-
tion. They penetrate every skin, every emotion; they constantly trans-
form themselves.—

Music, as we understand it today, is also a total excitation and dis-
charge of the emotions, but it is just the leftover of a much fuller expres-
sive world of emotion, a mere residue of Dionysian histrionics. In order to
make music possible as a separate art, we have immobilized a number of
senses, the muscular sense above all (relatively, at least: for all rhythm still
appeals to our muscles to a certain degree), so that people no longer
immediately imitate and represent with their bodies everything they feel.
Nevertheless, that is the truly Dionysian normal state, or at least the pri-
mordial state; music is the specialization of this state, a specialization
which has been achieved slowly, at the expense of the most closely related
faculties.

The actor, the mime, the dancer, the musician, the lyric poet are fun-
damentally related in their instincts and are intrinsically one, but they
have gradually been specialized and separated from each other—even to
the point of contradicting each other. The lyric poet remained united the
longest to the musician; the actor, to the dancer.—

The architect represents neither a Dionysian nor an Apollinian state:
here is the great act of will, the will that moves mountains, the intoxica-
tion of great will which longs for art. The most powerful people have
always inspired architects; the architect was always susceptible to the
influence of power. In a building, pride is supposed to make itself visible,
victory over heaviness, the will to power; architecture is a kind of oratory
of power in forms, sometimes persuading or even flattering, sometimes
simply commanding. The highest feeling of power and sureness finds
expression in that which has a grand style. Power which needs no addi-
tional proof; which disdains to please anyone; which does not easily give
answers; which is unaware of any witnesses to it; which lives without any
consciousness that anything contradicts it; which rests in itself, fatalisti-
cally, a law among laws: that speaks of itself in the grand style.—
I read the life of Thomas Carlyle, this unwitting and unwilling farce, this heroic-moralistic interpretation of dyspeptic states.—Carlyle, a man of strong words and attitudes, a rhetorician by necessity, who is constantly irritated by the longing for a strong faith and the feeling of his own incapacity for it (in this, a typical romantic!). The longing for a strong faith is not proof of a strong faith, to the contrary. If one has a strong faith, one can afford the beautiful luxury of skepticism: one is sure enough, secure enough, constrained enough for it. Carlyle deafens something in himself with the fortissimo of the honors he pays to people of strong faith and with his fury against those who are less single-minded: he needs noise. A constant, passionate dishonesty with himself—that’s what is proper to him, that’s what makes him be and remain interesting.—Of course, in England he’s admired precisely on account of his honesty . . . Well, that’s English; and considering that the English are the people of consummate “cant,” it’s not only understandable but even fitting. At bottom, Carlyle is an English atheist who makes it a point of honor not to be one.

Emerson. —Much more enlightened, venturesome, complex, refined than Carlyle; above all, happier . . . The sort of man who instinctively feeds only on ambrosia, who leaves behind whatever is indigestible in things. In comparison to Carlyle, a man of taste.—Carlyle, who loved him very much, nevertheless said of him: “he does not give us enough to chew on”—which he may have been right to say, but not to Emerson’s disadvantage.—Emerson has that good-natured and brilliant cheerfulness that deters all seriousness; he simply does not know how old he already is and how young he will still be—he could say of himself, in the words of Lope de Vega, “yo me sucedo a mi mismo.” His spirit always finds reasons to be content and even thankful; and on occasion he approaches the cheerful transcendence of that worthy man who came back from an amorous tryst.
tamquam re bene gesta [as if the deed had been well done]. “Ut desint vires,” he said thankfully, “tamen est laudanda voluptas.”

Anti-Darwin.—As for the famous “struggle for life,” for the time being it seems to me more asserted than proved. It happens, but as the exception; the overall aspect of life is not a state of need and hunger, but instead, wealth, bounty, even absurd squandering—where there is struggle, it is a struggle for power . . . One should not confuse Malthus with nature. But supposing that there is such a struggle—and in fact, it does happen—its result is unfortunately the opposite of what Darwin’s school wants, maybe the opposite of what one might want along with the Darwinians: for it occurs at the expense of the strong, the privileged, the happy exceptions. Species do not grow more perfect: the weak become the masters of the strong, again and again—because they are the great majority, and also cleverer . . . Darwin forgot intelligence [Geist] (that’s English for you!), the weak have more intelligence . . . One has to need intelligence in order to get intelligence—one loses it if one no longer needs it. Anyone who has strength gets rid of intelligence (“Let it go!” they think today in Germany, “the Reich will still be ours” . . .). By intelligence, as you can see, I understand caution, patience, stealth, deception, great self-control, and all “mimicry” (a large part of so-called virtue belongs in the last category).

Casuistry of psychologists.—There’s someone who knows human beings: what is his real purpose in studying them? He wants to get little
advantages over them, or big ones—he’s a politician! . . . That one over there also knows human beings; and you say he’s not in it for himself at all, that he’s a great “impersonal” type. Take a closer look! Maybe he wants an even worse advantage: to feel superior to humanity, to be able to look down on it, not to confuse himself with it anymore. This “impersonal” type despises human beings: and the first type is the more humane species, whatever appearances may say. At least he puts himself on a par with humans, he puts himself amidst them . . .

16

The psychological tact of the Germans seems to me to be called into question by a whole series of cases which my modesty prevents me from tallying up. But one case gives me an especially great opportunity to prove my thesis: I hold a grudge against the Germans for making such a mistake about Kant and his “backdoor philosophy,” as I call it—that was not the paradigm of intellectual integrity.—The other thing I can’t stand to hear is the notorious “and”: the Germans say “Goethe and Schiller”—I’m afraid they even say “Schiller and Goethe” . . . Don’t they know this Schiller yet?100—There are even worse “ands”; with my own ears, although only among university professors, I have heard “Schopenhauer and Hartmann” . . .

17

The most spiritual human beings, if we suppose that they are the most courageous, also experience by far the most painful tragedies: but for this very reason they honor life, because it opposes them with all the force of its opposition.

18

On the “intellectual conscience.”—Nothing seems more rare to me today than genuine hypocrisy. I strongly suspect that this plant can’t stand the

100. On Schiller, see also §1 above. On Goethe, see also §§49–51 below.
101. For Nietzsche’s views on Schopenhauer, see e.g. §§21–22 below. Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906): German systematizing philosopher, author of the massive Philosophy of the Unconscious (1869). For Nietzsche’s view of Hartmann, see §9 of “On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life” (the second of his Un TIMELY MEDITATIONS, written in 1873).
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gentle air of our culture. Hypocrisy belongs to the ages of strong faith, when even if you were forced to display a different faith, you didn’t let go of the faith you had. Today, one lets it go; or, even more frequently, one piles yet another faith on top of the first—in any case, one remains honest. Without a doubt, today it’s possible to have a much greater number of convictions than ever before—possible, in other words allowed, in other words harmless. This is the origin of tolerance for oneself.—

Tolerance for oneself permits one to have several convictions: these convictions live comfortably with each other—they take care, as the whole world does today, not to compromise themselves. How do we compromise ourselves today? By being consistent. By going in a straight line. By meaning fewer than five things at once. By being authentic . . . I’m really afraid that modern humanity is simply too comfortable for certain vices: so these are just dying out. Everything evil that is due to a strong will—and maybe there is nothing evil without strength of will—degenerates, in our lukewarm air, into virtue . . . The few hypocrites I have met were imitating hypocrisy: they, like almost every tenth person today, were actors.—

Beautiful and ugly.—Nothing is more conditional, or let’s say more constrained, than our feeling of beauty. Anyone who wanted to conceive of it apart from human beings’ pleasure in themselves would immediately lose all ground to stand on. The “beautiful in itself” is just words, not even a concept. In the beautiful, humanity posits itself as the standard of perfection; in special cases, it worships itself in the beautiful. A species simply cannot do anything except say yes to itself alone like this. Its most basic instinct, the instinct of self-preservation and self-expansion, still shines through in such sublimities. Humanity believes that the world itself is piled with beauty—we forget that we are beauty’s cause. We alone have endowed the world with beauty—alas, only with a very human, all-too-human beauty . . .

At bottom, human beings mirror themselves in things; they consider anything beautiful if it casts their image back to them: the judgment “beautiful” is the vanity of their species . . . For a little suspicion may whisper into the skeptic’s ear: is the world really beautified by the mere fact that human beings take it to be beautiful? They’ve humanized it: that’s all. But nothing, nothing at all guarantees to us that we, of all things, should serve as the model for the beautiful. Do any of us know what we look like in the eyes of a higher judge of taste? Outrageous, maybe? Maybe even
funny? Maybe a little arbitrary? . . . “Oh divine Dionysus, why are you pulling my ears?” Ariadne once asked her philosophical lover in one of those famous dialogues on Naxos. “I find a sort of humor in your ears, Ariadne: why aren’t they even longer?”

Nothing is beautiful, only the human being is beautiful: on this bit of naiveté rests all aesthetics, this is its first truth. Let’s immediately add its second: nothing is as ugly as a human being in the process of degeneration—and that sets the limit of the domain of aesthetic judgment.—Physiologically speaking, everything ugly weakens and oppresses human beings. It reminds them of decline, danger, powerlessness; it actually makes them lose strength. You can measure the effect of the ugly with a dynamometer. Whenever human beings are depressed, they sense that something “ugly” is nearby. Their feeling of power, their will to power, their courage, their pride—it all falls with the ugly and rises with the beautiful . . .

In the one case as in the other we draw a single conclusion; the premises for this conclusion are piled up massively in our instincts. The ugly is understood as a signal and symptom of degeneration: whatever recalls degeneration, be it ever so remotely, causes the judgment “ugly” in us. Every sign of exhaustion, of heaviness, of age, of fatigue, every sort of unfreedom, such as a cramp or paralysis—above all, the smell, color, and shape of dissolution, of putrefaction, even if it is thinned out all the way into a symbol—all this provokes the same reaction, the value judgment “ugly.” Here, a feeling of hatred leaps forth: whom do human beings hate here? But there is no doubt: they hate the decline of their type. Here, they hate from out of the deepest instincts of their species; in this hatred there

102. In Greek mythology, Ariadne helped Theseus escape from the Labyrinth which held the Minotaur. Theseus then took Ariadne with him, but left her on the island of Naxos, where the god Dionysus found her and married her. Here, Nietzsche is alluding to writings of his own on the theme of Dionysus and Ariadne—writings which were not “famous” at all, but were still unpublished at the time of the appearance of Twilight of the Idols in 1888. In “Ariadne’s Lament,” a poem from Nietzsche’s Dionysus Dithyrambs, Dionysus says, “Be clever, Ariadne! . . . / You have small ears, you have my ears: / let a clever word into them!— / Must one not hate oneself before loving oneself? . . . / I am your labyrinth . . .” For another example of Nietzsche’s use of Dionysus and Ariadne, see Beyond Good and Evil, §295.
is horror, caution, depth, a far-seeing look—it is the deepest hatred that there is. And on its account, art is deep . . .

21

Schopenhauer.—Schopenhauer, the last German worth considering (who is a European event like Goethe, like Hegel, like Heinrich Heine, and not just a local, “national” event), is for all psychologists a case of the first rank: namely, as a wickedly ingenious attempt to enlist, in the service of a nihilistic devaluation of life as a whole, precisely the counterexamples, the great self-affirmations of the “will to life,” the forms of exuberant life. One after the other, he interpreted art, heroism, genius, beauty, great sympathy, knowledge, the will to truth, tragedy, as phenomena that followed from “negation,” or from the need for negation of the “will”—the greatest act of psychological counterfeiting in history, with the exception of Christianity. Considered more closely, in this he is just the heir of the Christian interpretation: it’s just that he knew how to sanction even what had been rejected by Christianity, the great cultural facts of humanity—sanction them in a Christian, that is, a nihilistic sense (that is, as paths to “salvation,” as prefiguring “salvation,” as stimulants of the need for “salvation” . . .).

22

Let me take a particular case. Schopenhauer speaks of beauty with a melancholy ardor—why, in the last analysis? Because he sees in it a bridge on which one goes farther, or gets the thirst to go farther . . . For him, beauty is momentary salvation from the “will”—and it entices us to eternal salvation . . . He prizes art especially as a savior from the “focal point of the will,” from sexuality—in beauty, he sees the negation of the reproductive drive . . .

You amazing saint! Someone is contradicting you—I’m afraid it’s nature. For what’s the purpose of beauty anyway—beauty in tones, colors, smells, rhythmic movement in nature? What does beauty bring out?—Fortunately, a philosopher also contradicts him. No less an authority than the divine Plato (as Schopenhauer himself calls him) maintains a different proposition: that all beauty stimulates reproduction—that this is precisely its own proper effect, from the lowest sensuality to the highest spirituality . . .
Plato goes farther. He says, with an innocence for which one has to be a Greek and not a “Christian,” that there would be no Platonic philosophy at all if there weren’t such beautiful youths in Athens: it was the sight of them that first set the philosopher’s soul into an erotic flurry and gave it no peace until it could plant the seed of all lofty things in such beautiful soil. Another amazing saint!—You can’t believe your ears, assuming that you trust Plato at all in the first place. At least you catch on that in Athens they philosophized differently, above all, publicly. Nothing is less Greek than the conceptual web-spinning of a hermit, amor intellectualis dei in Spinoza’s style. Philosophy in Plato’s style would be better defined as an erotic competition, as a development and internalization of the old competitive gymnastics and of its prerequisites . . . What finally grew out of this philosophical eroticism of Plato? A new art form of the Greek agon [competition]: dialectic.—

I will also recall, against Schopenhauer and to Plato’s credit, that all the higher culture and literature of classical France also grew on the soil of sexual interest. You can search everywhere in this culture for gallantry, sensuality, sexual competition, “woman”—and you will never search in vain . . .

L’art pour l’art [art for art’s sake].—The battle against purpose in art is always a battle against the moralizing tendency in art, against art’s subordination to morality. L’art pour l’art means: “to hell with morality!”—

But even this hostility betrays the overpowering force of prejudice. If we exclude the purpose of moral preaching and improving humanity from art, it by no means follows that art in general is purposeless, aimless, meaningless, in short, l’art pour l’art—a worm that bites its own tail. “Better no purpose at all than a moral purpose!”—so speaks mere passion. A psychologist asks, in contrast: what does all art do? Doesn’t it praise? Doesn’t it ennoble? Doesn’t it select? Doesn’t it promote? In all of this, it strengthens or weakens certain valuations . . . Is this just a side effect? An
accident? Something in which the instinct of the artist plays no part? Or isn’t it, instead, the prerequisite for the artist’s capabilities . . .? Is the artist’s most basic instinct directed at art, or instead at the meaning of art, at life? At something desirable in life?—Art is the great stimulant to life: how could one understand it as purposeless, as aimless, as l’art pour l’art?—

There is one question left over. Art also brings to light a lot that is ugly, hard, and questionable about life—doesn’t it seem to spoil life in this way?—And in fact, there have been philosophers who gave it this meaning: “liberation from the will” is what Schopenhauer taught as the entire aim of art, and “creating a mood of resignation” is what he honored as the great utility of tragedy.—

But this—as I already indicated—is a pessimist’s perspective and the “evil eye”: one has to appeal to the artists themselves. What do tragic artists communicate about themselves? Isn’t it precisely a condition of fearlessness in the face of the frightening and questionable things that they show us?—This condition itself is something desirable; whoever knows it honors it with the highest honors. He communicates it, he has to communicate it, as long as he is an artist, a genius at communication. Bravery and freedom of feeling in the face of a powerful enemy, a sublime catastrophe, a horrifying problem—this victorious condition is what tragic artists select, what they enoble. In the face of tragedy, the warlike part of our souls celebrates its saturnalia; whoever is used to suffering, who seeks out suffering, the heroic human being exalts his existence with tragedy—to him alone does the tragedian present this cup of sweetest cruelty.—

Getting along with people, keeping an open house in one’s heart—that’s liberal, but nothing more than liberal. You can recognize hearts that are capable of noble hospitality by their many curtained windows and closed shutters: they keep their best rooms empty. But why?—Because they are waiting for guests that one does not “get along with” . . .

We no longer think highly enough of ourselves when we communicate. Our real experiences aren’t chattery at all. They couldn’t communicate if they wanted to. That means that there are no words for them. When we have words for something, we’ve already gone beyond it. In all speaking there is a grain of contempt. Language, so it seems, was invented only for
what is mediocre, common, communicable. In language, speakers vulgar-
ize themselves right away.—From a morality for deaf-mutes and other philosophers.  

27

“This picture is enchantingly beautiful!” The literature-woman, dissatisfied, agitated, barren in her heart and innards, always listening with painful curiosity to the imperative which whispers, out of the depths of her constitution, “aut libri aut libri” [either children or books]: the literature-woman, cultured enough to understand the voice of nature, even if it speaks Latin, but still lazy enough, enough of a goose, to say secretly to herself in French, “je me verrai, je me lirai, je m’extasierai et je dirai: Possible, que j’aie eu tant d’esprit?” . . .

28

The “impersonal” ones get a turn to speak.—“Nothing is easier for us than being wise, patient, superior. We drip with the oil of considerateness and sympathy, we have justice to the point of absurdity, we excuse everything. For this very reason, we should be a bit stricter with ourselves; for this very reason we should, from time to time, cultivate a little emotion for ourselves, a little vice of an emotion. It may be a bitter pill, and in each other’s company we may laugh at how it makes us look. But what’s the use! We have no other way left to overcome ourselves: that is our asceticism, our penance” . . . Becoming personal—the virtue of the “impersonal” . . .

29

From a doctoral exam.—

“What is the task of all higher education?”—To make human beings into machines.—
“What is the means to this end?”—They must learn to be bored.—
“How is this achieved?”—Through the concept of duty.—
“Who is the model for this?”—The philologists: they teach us how to cram.—
“Who is the perfect human being?”—The civil servant.—
“Which philosophy provides the supreme formula for the civil servant?”—The philosophy of Kant: the civil servant as thing in itself established as a judge over the civil servant as appearance.

The right to stupidity.—The tired, slowly breathing worker with the good-natured expression, who lets things go their own way: this typical figure who in this age of work (and of the “Reich”!) is found in every social class, lays claim today even to art, including books, newspapers above all—not to mention the beauties of nature, Italy . . . The evening man, whose “wild instincts have fallen asleep,” as Faust puts it, requires summer resorts, beaches, glaciers, Bayreuth . . . In such ages, art has a right to pure foolishness—as a sort of vacation for spirit, wit, and mind. Wagner understood this. Pure foolishness is refreshing . . .

Another dietary problem.—The means by which Julius Caesar protected himself against sickliness and headaches: immense marches, the simplest form of life, uninterrupted outdoor living, constant toil—these, broadly speaking, are the general preservative regulations that protect one from the extreme vulnerability of that subtle machine, working under the highest pressure, known as genius.—
The immoralist speaks.—Nothing is more contrary to a philosopher’s taste than human beings, insofar as they wish . . . If a philosopher sees them only in action, even if these most courageous, most cunning, most resilient animals are lost in labyrinths of distress, how worthy of admiration they seem! They are even inspiring . . . But the philosopher despises the wishing human being, as well as the human being that is “to be wished for”—and all wishes in general, all human ideals. If philosophers could be nihilists, it would be because they find nothingness behind all human ideals. Or not even nothingness—but only what is worthy of nothing, what is absurd, sick, cowardly, weary, all kinds of dregs from the emptied cup of human life . . .

Human beings, who are so worthy of honor in reality—how is it that they deserve no respect insofar as they wish? Must they atone for being so capable as a reality? Must they balance their activity, the strain on the head and the will that all activity involves, by stretching their limbs in the realm of the imaginary and absurd?—The history of humanity’s wishes was up to now its partie honteuse : one should beware of reading in it too long. What justifies humanity is its reality—it will justify it eternally. How much more valuable is the actual human being, compared with any merely wished-for, dreamed-up, stinking lie of a human being? With any ideal human being? . . . And only the ideal human being is contrary to the philosopher’s taste.

The natural value of egoism.—The value of selfishness is equivalent to the physiological value of the one who has it: its value can be very great, or it can be worthless and contemptible. All individuals can be viewed in terms of whether they represent the ascending or the descending line of life. Once we have settled this question, we have a criterion for the value of their selfishness.

If they represent the ascending line, their value is in fact extraordinary—and for the sake of life as a whole, which with them takes a step forward, one may take extreme care to obtain and preserve the optimum conditions for them. After all, the single one, the “individual,” as understood by both the masses and the philosopher up to now, is an error: the
individual is nothing in himself, not an atom, not a “link in the chain,” nothing merely inherited from before—he himself is still the entire, unitary human lineage leading up to him . . .

If individuals represent the descending development, decline, chronic degeneration, sickness (in general, sicknesses are already phenomena that follow from decline, and not its causes), then they are of little value, and it is only fair that they should take away as little as possible from those who have turned out well. They are nothing but their parasites . . .

Christian and anarchist.—When the anarchist, as the mouthpiece of the declining levels of society, insists on “right,” “justice,” “equal rights” with such beautiful indignation, he is just acting under the pressure of his lack of culture, which cannot grasp why he really suffers, what he is poor in—in life . . .

A drive to find causes is powerful in him: it must be somebody’s fault that he’s feeling bad . . . Even his “beautiful indignation” does him good; all poor devils like to whine—it gives them a little thrill of power. Even complaints, the act of complaining, can give life the charm on account of which one can stand to live it: there is a subtle dose of revenge in every complaint; one blames those who are different for one’s own feeling bad, and in certain circumstances even being bad, as if they were guilty of an injustice, a prohibited privilege. “If I’m a lowlife, you should be one too”: on this logic, revolutions are built.—

Complaining is never good for anything; it comes from weakness. Whether one ascribes one’s feeling bad to others or to oneself—the socialist does the former, the Christian, for example, the latter—makes no real difference. What is common to both and, let us add, what is unworthy, is that it should be someone’s fault that one is suffering—in short, that the sufferer prescribes the honey of revenge as a cure for his own suffering. The objects of this need for revenge as a need for pleasure are just the incidental causes: the sufferer finds causes everywhere for venting his petty vengefulness—and if he’s a Christian, to say it once again, he finds them in himself . . .

The Christian and the anarchist—both are décadents.—Even when the Christian condemns, slanders, and dirties the “world,” he does so from the same instincts that lead the socialist worker to condemn, slander, and dirty society: even the “Last Judgment” is still the sweet comfort of revenge—the revolution which the socialist worker is also awaiting, just
thought of as a little more remote . . . The “Beyond” itself—what is a
Beyond for, if it’s not a means of dirtying this world?\textsuperscript{114} . . .

35

Critique of the morality of décadence.—An “altruistic” morality—a
morality in which selfishness wastes away—is a bad sign under any cir-
cumstances. This applies to individuals, and it especially applies to peo-
pies. What is best is missing when selfishness starts to be missing. To
choose instinctively what is harmful to oneself, to be enticed by “disinter-
ested” motives, is virtually the formula for décadence. “Not to seek one’s
own advantage”—that’s just the moral fig leaf for a totally different state
of affairs, namely a physiological one: “I don’t know how to find my own
advantage anymore” . . .

Dissolution of the instincts! It’s all over for human beings when they
become altruistic.—Instead of naively saying, “I’m not worth anything
anymore,” the lie of morality says in the mouth of the décadent: “Nothing
is worth anything—life isn’t worth anything” . . . Such a judgment is
always a great danger, it has an infectious effect—throughout the
unwholesome soil of society it soon spawns a tropical conceptual vegeta-
tion, sometimes as religion (Christianity), sometimes as philosophy
(Schopenhauerism). Under certain circumstances the fumes of such a
poisonous vegetation, born from putrescence, poison life itself, even for
thousands of years . . .

36

Morality for doctors.—The sick person is a parasite on society. In a cer-
tain condition, living any longer is improper. Vegetating on, in cowardly
dependence on doctors and treatments, once the meaning of life, the right
to life has been lost, should incur the profound contempt of society. Fur-
thermore, doctors should be the ones to convey this contempt—not pre-
scriptions, but every day a new dose of disgust with their patients . . . To
create a new responsibility, the responsibility of the doctor, in all cases in
which the highest interest of life, of ascending life, demands that degenerat-
ing life be shoved under and shoved aside with no mercy whatsoever—for
example, as regards the right to reproduce, the right to be born, the right to life . . .

To die proudly when it is not possible to live proudly anymore. Death, chosen of one's own free will, death at the right time, with brightness and cheer, done in the midst of children and witnesses, so that it is still really possible to take one's leave, when the one taking leave is still there, with a real assessment of what one has achieved and willed, a summation of life—all the opposite of the pitiful and appalling comedy that Christianity has made of the hour of death. One should never forget that Christianity abused the weakness of the dying for the sake of conscience-rape, and abused the manner of death itself for making value judgments on the person and the past!—

What is necessary here above all, in spite of all cowardly prejudice, is to establish the correct, that is, the physiological evaluation of so-called natural death—which ultimately is just another "unnatural" death, a suicide. One never perishes at the hand of anyone but oneself. Natural death is just death under the most contemptible conditions, an unfree death, a death at the wrong time, the death of a coward. Out of love for life, one should want a different death: free, conscious, without accidents, without surprises . . .

Finally, a recommendation for those gentlemen the pessimists and other décadents. It is not up to us to prevent ourselves from being born, but we can make up for this mistake—for sometimes it is a mistake. When one does away with oneself, one does the most honorable thing there is: it almost earns one the right to live . . . Society—what am I saying!—life itself gains more advantage from suicide than from any "life" of renunciation, anemia and other virtues—one has freed the others from the sight of one, one has freed life from an objection . . . Pessimism pur, vert [pure and raw] is first proved by the self-refutation of the pessimist gentlemen: one must go a step farther in one's logic, and not just negate life with "will and representation," as Schopenhauer did—one must first negate Schopenhauer himself . . .

Pessimism, by the way, as infectious as it may be, still does not increase the sickliness of an age, of a species as a whole: it is the expression of this sickliness. One succumbs to it as one succumbs to cholera: one already has to be morbidly enough disposed to it. Pessimism itself produces not a single décadent more; I recall the statistical finding that the years in which cholera rages are no different from other years in the total number of cases of death.
Whether we have become more moral.—As was to be expected, against my concept of “beyond good and evil” has been launched the whole ferocity of moral stupefaction that, as is well known, counts as morality itself in Germany; I could tell some nice stories about this. Above all, I was told to reflect on the “undeniable superiority” of our age in ethical judgment, the real progress we have made in this area: a Cesare Borgia (they said), in comparison to us, absolutely cannot be held up as a “higher human being,” as a sort of Übermensch, in the way I do . . . A Swiss editor at the Bund went so far as to “understand” the meaning of my work, not without expressing his respect for such courageous daring, to be that I was demanding the abolition of all decent feelings. Much obliged! 117—I allow myself, in reply, to pose the question of whether we have really become more moral. The fact that the whole world thinks so is already an objection to this claim . . .

We moderns, very tender, very easily wounded, giving and receiving consideration in a hundred ways, actually imagine that this tender humanity that we represent, this unanimity we have achieved in considerateness, in helpfulness, in mutual trust, is a positive step forward, and that in this we have advanced far beyond the people of the Renaissance. But this is how every age thinks—this is how it has to think. Certainly we couldn’t put ourselves into Renaissance conditions, or even think ourselves into them: our nerves couldn’t stand that reality, not to speak of our muscles. But this inability isn’t evidence of any progress, just of a different and later constitution, a weaker, more tender, more easily wounded constitution, which necessarily gives rise to a considerate morality. If we thought away our tenderness and lateness, our physiological elderliness, then our morality of “humanization” would also immediately lose its value—in itself, no morality has value—it would even invite our scorn. And on the other hand, let’s not doubt that we moderns, with our thickly padded humanity that doesn’t want to knock against any stone, would be a comedy at which the contemporaries of Cesare Borgia would laugh them-
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selves to death. In fact, we are eminently and involuntarily funny, with our modern “virtues” . . .

The amputation of our hostile, untrustworthy instincts—and that is what our “progress” comes down to—is just one of the consequences of the general amputation of vitality: it costs a hundred times more trouble and care to preserve such a dependent and late existence. So people help each other out, so each is the patient to a certain degree, and each is the nurse. That is then called “virtue”—among people who still knew a different sort of life, fuller, more extravagant, more overflowing, it would have been called something else, “cowardice” maybe, “pitifulness,” “old ladies’ morality” . . .

Our ethical softening—this is my claim, this is my innovation, if you will—is a consequence of decline; ethical hardness and awfulness can, in contrast, be the consequence of a surplus of life. For then, a lot can be dared, a lot can be demanded, a lot can also be wasted. What was then the spice of life would be poison for us . . .

To be indifferent—this, too, is a form of strength—for this we are also too old, too late; our morality of compassion, which I was the first to warn us about, what one could call l’impressionisme morale, is just another expression of the physiological hyperexcitability that typifies everything décadent. That movement that has tried to use Schopenhauer’s morality of pity to present itself as scientific—a very unsuccessful attempt!—is the genuine movement of décadence in morality, and as such it is deeply affiliated with Christian morality. Strong ages, noble cultures see in pity, in “loving one’s neighbor,” in a lack of self and of self-esteem, something contemptible.—

Ages are to be measured according to their positive forces—and thus that ever so extravagant and dangerous age of the Renaissance proves to be the last great age, and we, we moderns with our timid concern for ourselves and love of our neighbor, with our virtues of work, humility, propriety, scientific thought—hoarding, economical, mechanical—prove to be a weak age . . . Our virtues are conditioned, are demanded by our weakness . . .

“Equality,” a certain actually growing similarity of which the theory of “equal rights” is just an expression, belongs essentially to decline: the gulf between one human being and another, between class and class; the multiplicity of types; the will to be oneself, to distinguish oneself—what I call the pathos of distance is typical of every strong age. The tension, the exten-
sion between the extremes is getting smaller and smaller today—the extremes themselves are shrinking down to similarity in the end . . .

All our political theories and our constitutions, absolutely not excluding the “German Reich,” are implications, necessary consequences of decline; the unconscious effect of décadence has become dominant, even in the ideals of particular sciences. My continuing objection to all sociology in England and France is that it knows only the decaying forms of society from its own experience, and with perfect naïveté takes its own decaying instincts as the norm for sociological value judgments. Declining life, the waning of all organizing, that is, separating forces, forces that open gulfs, that rank some above and some below, is formulated in today’s sociology as an ideal . . .

Our socialists are décadents, but Mr. Herbert Spencer is also a décadent—he sees something desirable in the triumph of altruism! . . .

My concept of freedom.—Sometimes the value of a thing lies not in what we get by means of it, but in what we pay for it—what it costs us. I offer an example. Liberal institutions stop being liberal as soon as they have been established: from that point forward, there is nothing that harms freedom more severely and fundamentally than liberal institutions. After all, we know what they bring about: they undermine the will to power, they are the leveling of mountain and valley elevated into a morality, they make people small, cowardly, and pleasure-loving—with liberal institutions, the herd animal is victorious every time. Liberalism: in other words, herd-animalization . . .

The same institutions bring about completely different effects as long as they are still being fought for; then, in fact, they promote freedom in a powerful way. Considered more closely, it is war that brings about these effects, the war for liberal institutions, which, as war, lets the illiberal instincts persist. And war educates for freedom. For what is freedom? Having the will to responsibility for oneself. Maintaining the distance that separates us. Becoming indifferent to trouble, hardships, deprivation, even to life. Being ready to sacrifice people to one’s cause, not excluding oneself. Freedom means that the manly instincts, the instincts that cele-
brate war and winning, dominate other instincts, for example the instinct for “happiness.” The human being who has become free, not to mention the spirit that has become free, steps all over the contemptible sort of well-being dreamt of by grocers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free human being is a warrior.—

What is the measure of freedom, in individuals and in peoples? The measure is the resistance that must be overcome, the trouble it costs to stay on top. One would have to look for the highest type of free human beings wherever the highest resistance is constantly being overcome: five steps away from tyranny, right on the brink of the danger of servitude. This is true psychologically, if one conceives of the “tyrant” here as inexorable and terrible instincts that demand to be countered with the maximum of authority and self-discipline—the most beautiful type is Julius Caesar; it is also true politically, just take a walk through history. The peoples who were worth something, who became worthy, never became worthy under liberal institutions: great danger made them into something that deserves respect, danger, which first teaches us to get to know the means at our disposal, our virtues, our defense and weapons, our own spirit—danger, which forces us to be strong . . .

First principle: one must need to be strong; otherwise, one never becomes strong.—Those great greenhouses for the strong, the strongest sort of human being there has ever been, the aristocratic communities such as Rome and Venice, understood freedom precisely in the sense in which I understand the word freedom: as something that one has and does not have, that one wills to have, that one conquers . . .

Critique of modernity.—Our institutions are good for nothing anymore: everyone agrees on this. But that is not their fault, it’s ours. Now that we have lost all the instincts from which institutions grow, we are losing institutions altogether, because we are no good for them anymore. Democracy was always the declining form of organizational force: in Human, All Too Human (I, §472) I already characterized modern democracy and all democratic halfway measures, such as the “German Reich,” as a decaying form of the state. In order for institutions to exist, there has to be a kind of will, instinct, imperative, anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to authority, to responsibility for centuries to come, to the solidarity of chains of generations forwards and backwards in infinitum. If this will is there, something like the imperium Romanum [Roman Empire] is
founded—or like Russia, the only power that has physical endurance today, that can wait, that can still promise something—Russia, the antithesis of the pathetic European petty-state nonsense and nervousness which with the foundation of the German Reich has reached a critical condition.

The entire West no longer has those instincts from which institutions grow, from which a future grows: possibly nothing goes more against the grain of its “modern spirit” than this. One lives for the moment, one lives very quickly—one lives very irresponsibly: this is exactly what one calls “freedom.” What makes institutions into institutions is despised, hated, rejected: one thinks one is in danger of a new slavery whenever the word “authority” is merely uttered. This is how far décadence goes in the value-instincts of our politicians, our political parties: they instinctively prefer what dissolves them, what makes the end come faster.

A case in point: modern marriage. Obviously modern marriage has lost all rationality: but this is an objection not to marriage, but to modernity. The rationality of marriage—it lay in the exclusive legal responsibility of the husband: this is what gave marriage its center of gravity, while today it limps on both legs. The rationality of marriage—it lay in its indissolubility in principle: this is how it got a tone of voice which, as opposed to the accident of feeling, passion, and the moment, knew how to make itself heard. It lay, likewise, in the responsibility of families for selecting mates. With our growing indulgence for marrying for love, we have eliminated the very foundation of marriage, that which first makes an institution out of it. An institution is never, ever founded on an idiosyncrasy; marriage, as I said, is not founded on “love”—it is founded on the sex drive, on the drive for property (woman and child as property), on the drive for domination which constantly organizes the smallest unit of domination, the family—a drive which needs children and descendants in order to preserve an achieved amount of power, influence, and wealth even on the physiological level, in order to prepare long-lasting tasks, instinctive solidarity between centuries. Marriage as an institution already contains the affirmation of the greatest, most enduring form of organization: if society itself cannot touch for itself as a whole up to the most remote generations, then marriage has no meaning at all.—Modern marriage has lost its meaning—consequently, we are getting rid of it.

The question of the working class.—The stupidity—at bottom, the degeneration of the instincts—which is today the cause of all stupiditi-
ties lies in the fact that there is a question of the working class. There are certain things one does not ask about: primary imperative of instinct. — I just can’t see what one wants to do with the European worker now that one has made a question out of him. He is doing far too well not to ask more questions, step by step, not to ask questions less modestly. After all, he has the great mass on his side. The hope is now completely gone that a modest and self-sufficient sort of human being, a Chinese type, could build itself up into a class here: and this would have been rational, it would virtually have been a necessity. What has one done? — Everything to nip in the bud the very prerequisites for this development — through the most irresponsible thoughtlessness, one has destroyed the very basis of the instincts thanks to which a worker becomes possible as a class, becomes possible for himself. One has made the worker eligible for military service, one has given him the right to unionize, the right to vote: so no wonder that today the worker already experiences his existence as a crisis (expressed morally, as injustice). But what does one will? I ask once again. If one wills an end, one must also will the means: if one wills to have slaves, one is a fool to educate them to be masters.

41

“The freedom I don’t mean . . .”120 — In times like ours, depending on one’s instincts is just another disaster. These instincts contradict and disturb each other, mutually destroy each other; I already defined modernity as a physiological self-contradiction. Rationality in education would demand that at least one of these systems of instinct be paralyzed, pinned under an iron pressure, in order to allow a different one to gain its forces, to become strong, to become master. Today, one would have to make individuals possible by paring them down: possible, that is, whole . . . What happens is the reverse: the demand for independence, for free development, for laissez aller [letting go] is raised with the most insistence precisely by those for whom no bridle would be too severe — this is the case in politics [in political matters], this is the case in art. But that is a symptom of décadence: our modern concept of “freedom” is another proof of the degeneration of the instincts. —
Where faith is needed.—Nothing is more rare among moralists and saints than integrity. They may say the opposite, they may even believe it: for if faith is more useful, more effective, more convincing than conscious hypocrisy, then right away, hypocrisy instinctively turns into innocence—first rule for understanding great saints. Among the philosophers, too, another kind of saint, it’s essential to their whole trade that they allow only a certain kind of truths: namely, those for which their trade is publicly authorized—in Kantian language, truths of practical reason. They know what they have to prove, and in this they are practical—they recognize each other by the fact that they agree on the “truths.”—“Thou shalt not lie”—in plain language: watch out, Mr. Philosopher, and don’t tell the truth . . .

Whispered into the conservatives’ ear.—This is what was unknown earlier and is known today, or could be known today—a reversion, a reversal in any sense or to any degree is completely impossible. We physiologists, at least, know this. But all priests and moralists have believed in such a thing—they wanted to bring humanity back, wind it back to an earlier measure of virtue. Morality was always a Procrustean bed. Even the politicians have imitated the preachers of virtue in this: even today there are parties whose dream and goal is for everything to do a crab-walk. But no one is free to be a crab. It’s no use: one must go forwards, that is to say, further, step by step, into décadence (this is my definition of modern “progress” . . .). One can hinder this development, and in this way block up the degeneration, gather it up, make it more vehement and sudden: more than that one cannot do.—

My concept of genius.—Great men, like great ages, are explosives in which an immense force has been piled up; their prerequisite is always, historically and physiologically, that things have long been gathered up, piled up, saved, and preserved for them—that for a long time, no explosion has taken place. When the tension in the mass has grown too great, the most casual stimulus is enough to call “genius,” the “deed,” the great destiny into the world. What difference does environment make then, or the age, the “spirit of the age,” or “public opinion”!—
Take the case of Napoleon. The France of the Revolution, and pre-revolutionary France even more, would have brought forth the type opposite to Napoleon’s type: it did bring it forth, in fact. And because Napoleon was different, the heir of a stronger, longer, older civilization than the one that was going up in smoke in France, he became the master there, he was master only there. Great human beings are necessary, the age in which they appear is accidental; the fact that they almost always become masters of their age is simply due to the fact that they are stronger, that they are older, that things have been gathered up longer for them. The relation of a genius to his age is like the relation between strong and weak, or between old and young: the age is always relatively much younger, thinner, more immature, less secure, more childish.—

The fact that the French opinion on these questions is today very different (the German, too, but this is irrelevant), the fact that over there the theory of the milieu, a real neurotic’s theory, has become sacrosanct and virtually scientific, and has its believers even among the physiologists—this “doesn’t smell good,” this leads one to sad reflections.—In England, too, they understand things no differently, but no one will bother with that. For the Englishman there are only two available ways to deal with the genius and the “great man”: either democratically, in the style of Buckle, or religiously, in the style of Carlyle. —

The danger that lies in great human beings and ages is extraordinary; exhaustion of every sort, sterility follows upon their heels. The great human being is an end; the great age, such as the Renaissance, is an end. The genius—in work, in deed—is necessarily a spendthrift: his greatness lies in the fact that he spends himself... The instinct of self-preservation is suspended, as it were; the overpowering pressure of the forces that are flowing out forbids the genius every such care and precaution. One calls this “self-sacrifice”; one praises the “heroism” of the genius in his indifference to his own good, his devotion to an idea, a great cause, a fatherland—all a misunderstanding... He flows out, he overflows, he uses himself up, he doesn’t spare himself—fatally, disastrously, involuntarily, just as a river breaks out of its banks involuntarily. But because one owes so much to such explosives, one has also given them many gifts in return,
for example, a sort of *higher morality* . . . For this is the way of human gratitude: it *misunderstands* its benefactors.—

45

*The criminal and what is akin to him.* — The criminal type is the type of the strong human being under unfavorable conditions, a strong human being who has been made sick. He lacks the wilderness, a certain freer and more dangerous nature and form of existence, in which everything that is a weapon and a defense in the instincts of the strong *has a right to be*. His *virtues* are banned by society; the most lively drives he was born with have been entangled right away with depressing emotions, with suspicion, fear, dishonor. But this is virtually the *recipe* for physiological degeneration. Anyone who has to do in secret what he can do best, what he would most like to do—with drawn-out suspense, caution, slyness—becomes anemic. And since he always reaps only danger, persecution, and disaster from his instincts, even his feelings turn against these instincts—he feels they are fatal. It is society, our tame, mediocre, castrated society, in which a natural human being, who comes from the mountains or from seafaring adventures, necessarily degenerates into a criminal. Or almost necessarily: for there are cases where such a person proves to be stronger than the society—the Corsican Napoleon is the most famous case.

For the problem that faces us here, the testimony of Dostoyevsky is useful—Dostoyevsky, the only psychologist, by the way, from whom I had something to learn: he is one of the finest strokes of luck in my life, even more than my discovery of Stendhal. This *deep* human being, who had the right ten times over not to think much of the superficial Germans, lived for a long time among Siberian convicts, really serious criminals, for whom there could be no return to society. And the impression they made on him was not at all what he had expected—he perceived them as carved from about the best, hardest, and most valuable wood that grows anywhere on Russian soil.

Let us generalize the case of the criminal: let us think of natures who, for some reason, are deprived of public approval, who know that they are not perceived as beneficial, as useful—that chandala feeling of not count-
ing as an equal, but of being excluded, unworthy, a source of impurity. All such natures have a subterranean tint to their thoughts and deeds; with them, everything turns paler than with those on whose existence daylight shines. But almost all forms of existence that we single out for praise today once lived in this semi-sepulchral atmosphere: the scientific character, the artiste, the genius, the free spirit, the actor, the merchant, the great explorer . . . As long as the priest was taken as the highest type, every valuable sort of human being was devalued . . . The time is coming—I promise—when the priest will be taken as the lowest type, as our chandala, as the most mendacious, most improper sort of human being . . .

I draw your attention to the fact that even today, under the mildest ethical regime that has ever held sway on earth, or at least in Europe, every deviation, every long, all too long stay underneath, every unusual, untransparent form of existence approaches that type which is perfected in the criminal. All renewers of the spirit bear the sallow and fatalistic sign of the chandala on their forehead sometime: not because they are thus perceived, but because they themselves feel the terrible gap that separates them from everything that is conventional and honored. Almost all geniuses know as one of their developmental stages the “Catilinarian existence,” a feeling of hate, vengefulness and rebellion against everything that already is, that no longer becomes . . . Catiline—the form of every Caesar’s pre-existence.”

46

*Here the view is free.* 124—It can be elevation of the soul when a philosopher is silent; a philosopher’s self-contradiction can be love; a lying politeness is possible in a knower. It has been said, not without subtlety: *il est indigne des grands coeurs de répandre le trouble qu’ils ressentent* [it is unworthy of great hearts to share the distress that they feel]. One must simply add that having no fear of *what is most unworthy* can also be greatness of soul. A woman who loves sacrifices her honor; a knower who “loves” may sacrifice his humanity; a god who loved became a Jew . . .

123. Catiline (ca. 108–62 B.C.): Roman officer who organized a major conspiracy in 63 B.C. He is the target of a famous accusatory oration by Cicero. Julius Caesar (100 or 102–44 B.C.) may have been involved in the Catilinarian conspiracy before attaining renown as general and dictator.

124. A line from the last scene of Goethe’s *Faust*, Part II.
**47**

*Beauty no accident.*—Even the beauty of a race or family, its charm and grace in all its demeanor, has to be worked for: just like genius, it is the final result of the accumulated work of generations. One must have made great sacrifices to good taste, one must have done a lot against one’s will for the sake of good taste, and left a lot undone—the seventeenth century in France is admirable in both respects—one must have used good taste as a principle in choosing one’s society, location, dress, sexual satisfaction, one must have preferred beauty to advantage, custom, opinion, sloth. Supreme guideline: one must not “let oneself go,” not even when one is by oneself.—

Good things are extraordinarily expensive: and there is an invariable law that those who have them are not those who earn them. Everything good is an inheritance: whatever is not inherited is imperfect, is just a start . . .

In Athens at the time of Cicero, who expresses his surprise at this fact, the men and youths were by far superior to the women in beauty. But what work and effort the male sex had demanded of itself for centuries there in the service of beauty!—For one must not be mistaken about the method here: merely training one’s feelings and thoughts is worth practically nil (here lies the great misunderstanding in German education, which is completely illusory): first one must convince the body. Keeping a meaningful and select demeanor strictly in place, being committed to live only with people who do not “let themselves go”—this is fully enough to become meaningful and select: in two or three generations, everything has already been internalized. It is decisive for the lot of a people and of humanity that one begin culture at the right place—not in the “soul” (as was the fatal superstition of the priests and semi-priests): the right place is the body, demeanor, diet, physiology, and the rest is a consequence . . .

For this reason, the Greeks are still the *first cultural event* of history—they knew, they did, what was needed. Christianity, which despised the body, is the greatest misfortune of humanity up to now.—

**48**

*Progress in my sense.*—Even I speak of a “return to nature,” although it is really not going back, but coming up—up into high, free, even terrible nature and naturalness, a nature that plays with great tasks, is allowed to play . . . To put it in a metaphor: Napoleon was a piece of “return to
nature,” as I understand it (for example, *in rebus tactis* [in tactics], and even more, as military men know, in strategy).—

But Rousseau—what did *he* really want to go back to? Rousseau, this first modern human being, an idealist and a lowlife in a *single* person; who needed moral “worth” in order to stand the sight of himself; sick with unbridled sloth and unbridled self-loathing. This abortion, too, which camped out on the doorstep of the new age, wanted a “return to nature”—what, I ask once again, did Rousseau want to go back to?—

I hate Rousseau even *in* the Revolution: it is the expression in world history of this combination of idealist and lowlife. The bloody farce in which this revolution played itself out, its “immorality,” makes little difference to me: what I hate is its Rousseauian *morality*—the so-called “truths” of the Revolution, through which it still has an effect, and persuades everything superficial and mediocre to join its side. The doctrine of equality! . . . But there is no more poisonous poison: *for it seems* to be preached by justice itself, while in fact it is the *end* of justice . . . “Equal for equals, unequal for unequals”—*that would* be the true voice of justice. And its consequence: “Never make unequals equal.”—The fact that this doctrine of equality was surrounded by such horrors and blood has given this “modern idea” par excellence a sort of glory and radiance, so that the Revolution as a *spectacle* has seduced even the noblest of spirits. But that is ultimately no reason to respect it any more.—I see only one who perceived it as it must be perceived, with *nausea*—Goethe.

49

*Goethe*—not a German event, but a European one: a great attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by a return to nature, by coming up to the naturalness of the Renaissance, a sort of self-overcoming on the part of that century.—He carried its strongest instincts in him: sentimentality, idolatry of nature, the anti-historical, idealistic, unrealistic, and revolutionary instincts (the last is just a form of the unrealistic). He availed himself of history, natural science, antiquity, Spinoza as well, and above all, practical activity; he surrounded himself with all sorts of well-defined *horizons*; he did not detach himself from life, but put himself into it; he was not faint-hearted, and took as much as possible upon himself, above himself, into himself. What he wanted was *totality*; he fought against the separation of reason, sensation, emotion, and will (preached with the most horrifying scholasticism by *Kant*, the antipodes of Goethe); he disciplined himself into wholeness, he *created* himself . . .
Goethe was, in the midst of an unrealistically minded age, a convinced realist: he said yes to everything that was akin to him in this—he had no greater experience than that ens realissimum called Napoleon. Goethe conceived of a human being who was strong, highly cultivated, skilled in everything bodily, with self-control and self-respect—a human being who is allowed to dare to accept the entire scope and wealth of naturalness, who is strong enough for this freedom, a tolerant human being, not out of weakness but out of strength, because he knows how to use to his own advantage even what would make an average nature perish; the human being for whom nothing is forbidden anymore, with the exception of weakness, whether it be called vice or virtue . . . Such a spirit who has become free stands with a glad and trusting fatalism in the midst of the universe, with a faith that only the particular is to be rejected, that as a whole, everything redeems and affirms itself—such a spirit does not negate anymore . . . But such a faith is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the name of Dionysus.—

One could say that, in a certain sense, the nineteenth century has also striven for everything that Goethe as a person strove for: universal understanding and approval, letting everything come close, a bold realism, a respect for everything factual. How is it that the total result of all this is no Goethe, but a chaos, a nihilistic sigh, complete cluelessness, an instinct of exhaustion that in praxi [in practice] constantly impels us to reach back to the eighteenth century? (For example, in the form of emotional romanticism, altruism and hyper-sentimentality, feminism in taste, socialism in politics.) Isn’t the nineteenth century, especially at its end, just a stronger, cruder eighteenth century, that is, a century of décadence? So that Goethe was, not only for Germany but for all of Europe, just an interruption, a beautiful “in vain”?—But one misunderstands great human beings when one looks at them from the petty perspective of public utility. The fact that one knows no way of getting any use out of them may itself be part of their greatness . . .
Goethe is the last German I respect. He would have perceived three things that I perceive—we also understand each other regarding the “cross” . . .

I am often asked why I write in German at all: nowhere am I read more poorly than in the fatherland. But who knows, in the end, whether I even want to be read today?—To create things on which time will try its teeth to no avail; to be concerned in form, in substance with a little immortality—I was never humble enough to demand less of myself. The aphorism, the pithy saying, of which I am the first master among Germans, are the forms of “eternity”; my ambition is to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a book—what everyone else does not say in a book . . .

I have given humanity the deepest book that it possesses, my Zarathustra; I will shortly give it the most independent.—
What I Owe to the Ancients

1

In closing, a word about that world to which I have sought access, to which I may have found a new access—the ancient world. My taste, which is perhaps the opposite of a tolerant taste, is far from saying yes wholesale, even when it comes to the ancients: it doesn’t like to say yes at all, it prefers to say no, and what it likes best is saying nothing at all . . . This applies to entire cultures, it applies to books—it also applies to places and landscapes.

Ultimately it is a very small number of ancient books that count in my life; the most famous are not among them. My feeling for style, for the epigram as a style, awoke almost instantly when I came into contact with Sallust. I have not forgotten the amazement of my honored teacher Corssen when he had to give the very top grade to the worst of his Latin students—I had finished in one blow. Concise, severe, founded on as much substance as possible, with a cold spite for the “beautiful word” and the “beautiful feeling”—I discovered myself in this. One will recognize in me, even in my Zarathustra, a very earnest ambition for the Roman style, for the “aere perennius” in style.—

It was no different upon my first contact with Horace. To this day I have never derived as much artistic delight from any poet as I got right away from a Horatian ode. In certain languages, what is attained here is not even desirable. This mosaic of words in which every word pours out its force as sound, as place, as concept, to the right and to the left and over the whole, this minimum in the range and number of signs, this maximum in the energy of the signs which is thus achieved—all that is Roman, and, if one wishes to believe me, noble par excellence. All remaining verse is, as compared to this, something too popular—just emotional verbosity . . .

2

To the Greeks I owe no impressions that are comparably strong. And, to come right out and say it, they cannot be for us what the Romans are.
One does not learn from the Greeks—theyir way is too alien, and also too fluid, to have an imperative effect, a “classical” effect. Who would ever have learned to write from a Greek! Who would ever have learned it without the Romans! . . .

Please don’t bring up Plato as an objection to me. In relation to Plato I am fundamentally a skeptic, and I was always incapable of joining in the admiration for Plato the artist which is traditional among scholars. In this case, I ultimately have on my side the most refined arbiters of taste among the ancients themselves. It seems to me that Plato mixes all the stylistic forms together, and thus he is one of the first décadents in style: he has something similar on his conscience to what the Cynics had, who invented the satura Menippea. In order for the Platonic dialogue, this repulsively self-satisfied and childish kind of dialectic, to exert its charm, one must never have read good French authors—for instance, Fontenelle. Plato is boring.—Ultimately, my mistrust in the case of Plato reaches into the depths; I find him so divergent from all the fundamental instincts of the Hellenes, so overmoralized, such a Christian before his time—he already takes the concept “good” to be the highest concept—that in regards to the whole Plato phenomenon I would rather use the harsh expression “exalted swindle”—or, if it sounds better, idealism—than any other. We have paid dearly for the fact that this Athenian went to school with the Egyptians (or with the Jews in Egypt? . . .). In the great disaster of Christianity, Plato is that ambiguity and fascination called an “ideal” which made it possible for the nobler natures of antiquity to misunderstand themselves and to step on the bridge that led to the “cross” . . . And how much Plato there still is in the concept “Church,” in the structure, system, and practice of the Church!—

My recreation, my predilection, my cure for all Platonism has always been Thucydides. Thucydides and, maybe, Machiavelli’s prince are most closely related to me by their unconditional will to fabricate nothing and to see reason in reality—not in “reason,” and still less in “morality” . . .
There is no cure more fundamental than Thucydides for the miserable prettification of the Greeks into an ideal, which the “classically educated” youth brings with him into life as the reward for his prep-school training. One has to turn Thucydides over line by line and read his background thoughts as clearly as his words: there are few thinkers so rich in background thoughts. In him, the culture of the sophists, which means the culture of the realists, reaches its perfect expression: this invaluable movement in the midst of the Socratic schools’ moralistic and idealistic swindle, which was then breaking out on every side. Greek philosophy as the décadence of Greek instinct; Thucydides as the great summation, the final appearance of that strong, strict, hard factuality that was a matter of instinct for the older Hellenes. Courage in the face of reality is, in the final analysis, the point of difference between natures such as Thucydides and Plato. Plato is a coward in the face of reality—consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control over himself—consequently he also has control over things . . .

3

Smelling out “beautiful souls” in the Greeks, “golden means” and other perfections, admiring in them, for instance, calm in grandeur, an ideal disposition, elevated simplicity—I was protected from this “elevated simplicity,” which is in the end nuiserie allemande [German foolishness], by the psychologist in me. I saw their strongest instinct, the will to power; I saw them tremble before the boundless force of this drive—I saw all their institutions arise from security measures, in order to make themselves safe in the face of each other’s inner explosives. The immense internal tension then discharged itself in frightening and ruthless external hostility: the city-states ripped each other to shreds so that the citizens might, each of them, attain peace with themselves. It was necessary to be strong; danger was nearby—it lay in ambush everywhere. The wonderfully supple bodily character, the bold realism and immoralism that characterizes the Hellenes, was a necessity, not their “nature.” It was just a consequence, it was not there from the start. And with their festivals and arts, they wanted nothing but to feel superior, to show that they were superior: these were means of glorifying themselves, and in certain circumstances, of making themselves frightening . . .

To judge the Greeks, in the German fashion, by their philosophers, to use, say, the simpleminded uprightness of the Socratic schools to eluci-
date what is essentially Hellenic! . . . After all, the philosophers are the décadents of the Greek world, the countermovement against the old, noble taste (against the combative instinct, against the polis, against the value of the race, against the authority of tradition). The Socratic virtues were preached because the Greeks had lost them: excitable, fearful, inconstant comedians all of them, they had a couple of reasons too many to let morality be preached at them. Not that it was any help—but big words and attitudes suit décadents so well . . .

For the sake of understanding the older, the still rich and even overflowing Hellenic instinct, I was the first to take seriously that wonderful phenomenon that bears the name of Dionysus: it is explainable only in terms of too much energy. Anyone who investigated the Greeks—such as that deepest living connoisseur of their culture, Jacob Burckhardt of Basel—knew right away that with this, something had been achieved: Burckhardt included a special section on this phenomenon in his Civilization of the Greeks. If one wants to see the opposite, one should look at the almost amusing poverty of instinct of the German philologists when they come close to the Dionysian. The famous Lobeck, in particular, who crept into this world of enigmas with the respectable self-assurance of a worm dried out between books, and convinced himself that being nauseatingly flippant and childish made him scientific—Lobeck made it known, sparing no pedantry, that there was really nothing to all these curiosities. Of course, the priests might have communicated to the participants in such orgies some things not devoid of value, for instance, that wine excites desire, that people can survive by eating fruit under certain circumstances, that plants bloom in the spring and wither in the fall. As for the bewildering wealth of rites, symbols, and myths of orgiastic origin with which the ancient world was quite literally overgrown, Lobeck finds an opportunity here to increase his cleverness by another notch. “The Greeks,” he says (Aglaophamus I, 672), “when they had nothing else to do, used to laugh, jump, and race around—or, since people sometimes have
this desire too, they sat down, wept and wailed. *Others* then came along
and sought some reason for this remarkable activity. And thus, as explana-
tions of these customs, arose those countless sagas and myths. On the
other hand, one believed that this *comical behavior* which now took place
on festival days also necessarily belonged to the festivities, and one took it
to be an indispensable part of the worship.”—

That is despicable blather, one will not take a Lobeck seriously for a
single moment. We feel completely different when we test the concept
“Greek” that Winckelmann and Goethe developed, and find it incompa-
tible with that element out of which Dionysian art grows—the orgiastic.
In fact, I have no doubt that Goethe would have excluded anything of
the sort in principle from the possibilities of the Greek soul. *Consequently,*
*Goethe did not understand the Greeks.* For only in the Dionysian mysteries,
in the psychology of the Dionysian condition, does the *fundamental fact* of
the Hellenic instinct express itself—its “will to life.” *What* did the Hel-
lene procure in these mysteries? *Eternal* life, the eternal recurrence of life;
the future promised and made sacred in the past; the triumphant yes to
life beyond death and change; *true* life as collective survival through
reproduction, through the mysteries of sexuality. Thus, for the Greeks,
the *sexual* symbol was the ultimate revered symbol, the authentic, deep
meaning in all ancient piety. Every element of the act of reproduction, of
pregnancy and birth, awoke the highest and most festive feelings. In the
teachings of the mysteries, *pain* is declared holy; the “pangs of the child-
bearer” make pain in general holy—all becoming and growth, everything
that vouches for the future *requires* pain . . . For there to be the eternal joy
of creation, for the will to life to affirm itself eternally, there *must* also
eternally be the “torment of the childbearer” . . .

All this is signified by the name Dionysus: I know no higher symbol-
ism than this *Greek* symbolism, the symbolism of the Dionysian rites. In
them, the deepest instinct of life, the instinct for the future of life, for the
eternity of life, is experienced religiously—the very way to life, reproduc-
tion, as the *holy way* . . . It was Christianity, on the basis of its *resentment
against* life, that first made something unclean out of sexuality: it threw *
filth* on the beginning, on the prerequisite of our life . . .
The psychology of the orgiastic as an overflowing feeling of life and energy, where even pain works as a stimulant, gave me the key to the concept of the tragic feeling, which has been misunderstood as much by Aristotle as, especially, by our pessimists. Tragedy is so far from giving any evidence for the pessimism of the Hellenes in Schopenhauer's sense that it instead has to count as the decisive rejection of and counterauthority to such pessimism.

Saying yes to life even in its most strange and intractable problems, the will to life, celebrating its own inexhaustibility by sacrificing its highest types—that is what I called Dionysian, that is what I found as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to be released from terror and pity, not in order to purify oneself of a dangerous emotion through its vehement discharge—as Aristotle understood it—but instead, beyond terror and pity, in order to be oneself the eternal joy of becoming—that joy that also includes in itself the joy of destruction...

And thus I touch again upon the spot from which I first set out—The Birth of Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values: thus I take my stand again upon the ground from which grows my willing, my being able—I, the final follower of the philosopher Dionysus—I, the teacher of the eternal recurrence . . .

136. On Schopenhauer and tragedy see also above, “Raids of an Untimely Man,” §21.

137. For Aristotle's claim that the function of tragedy is katharsis, or the "purification" of terror and pity, see his Poetics VI, 1.
The Hammer Speaks

*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

[Section 29 of “On the Old and the New Law Tables,” in Part III]

“Why so hard!—” spoke the kitchen coals once to the diamond: “For are we not next of kin?”

Why so soft? O my brothers, I ask you thus: for are you not—my brothers?

Why so soft, so yielding and submissive? Why is there so much denial, self-denial in your hearts? So little destiny in your gazes?

And if you will not be destinies and implacable: how else could you—win with me someday?

And if your hardness will not flash and cut and cut to bits: how else could you—create with me someday?

For all creators are hard. And it must seem blessed to you to impress your hand on millennia as on wax—

—blessed to write on the will of millennia as on bronze—heavier than bronze, nobler than bronze. Only what is noblest is altogether hard.

This new law table, O my brothers, I set over you: Become hard!