

Jonathan A. Silk

Buddhist Cosmic Unity

An Edition, Translation and Study of the *Anūnatvāpūṇatvanirdeśaparivarta*

Hamburg Buddhist Studies 4
Series editor: Michael Zimmermann

Jonathan A. Silk

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Foreword

About *Hamburg Buddhist Studies*

Buddhism has enjoyed a prominent place in the study of Asian religious ideas at the University of Hamburg for almost 100 years, ever since the birth of Buddhist Studies in Germany. We are proud that our program is housed in one of the pioneering academic institutions in Europe at which the study of Buddhism has become a core subject for students focusing on the religious dimensions of South and Central Asia.

With this publication series, the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of Hamburg aims to honor this long-standing commitment to research and share the results of this tradition with the academic community and the wider public. Today, Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline makes use of a broad variety of approaches and methods. The field covers contemporary issues as much as it delves into the historic aspects of Buddhism. Similarly, the questions shaping the field of Buddhist Studies have broadened. Understanding present-day Buddhist phenomena, and how such phenomena are rooted in a distant past, is not a matter of indulgence. Rather, it has become clear that fostering such an understanding is one of the many crucial obligations of modern multicultural societies in a globalized world.

Buddhism is one of the great human traditions of religious and philosophical thought. The *Hamburg Buddhist Studies* series aims to discuss aspects of the wide variety of Buddhist traditions that will be of interest to scholars and specialists of Buddhism, but it also wants to confront Buddhism's rich heritage with questions whose answers might not be easily deduced by the exclusive use of philological research methods. Such questions require the penetrating insight of scholars who approach Buddhism from a variety of disciplines building upon and yet going beyond the solid study of textual materials. We are convinced that the *Hamburg Buddhist Studies* series will contribute to opening up Buddhist Studies to those who are not necessarily trained in the classical languages of the Buddhist traditions but want to approach the field with their own disciplinary interests in mind. We

very much hope that this series will encourage a wider audience to take interest in the academic study of the Buddhist traditions.

About this publication

It is my great pleasure to introduce the fourth volume in the *Hamburg Buddhist Studies* series. The *Anūnatvāpurnatvanirdeśaparivarta*, extant in its entirety only in Chinese translation, is, to judge from its use as a proof-text in the seminal treatise *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, one of the fundamental scriptures expressing ideas about the nature of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, and the individual's innate capacity for awakening, called in this text and elsewhere 'tathāgatagarbha,' 'embryo of the tathāgatas.' While the text also deals extensively with notions such as the *dharmakāya*, it centers most of its attention on the term *dhātu*, especially in the terms *sattvadhātu* and *dharmadhātu*. The former term is particularly important and, Jonathan Silk argues, crucially changes meaning within the text, from 'realm of beings' to 'quintessence of beings.' In fact, perhaps in part because we have access to only portions of the text in its original Sanskrit, it remains often rather difficult to understand.

Buddhist scriptural literature, despite a century and a half of study, remains, truth be told, largely terra incognita. Slowly, however, scholars are beginning to prepare critical editions based on the best available sources, be they manuscripts or printed editions, make translations with sufficient scientific annotations, and attempt to comprehensively interpret their sources in a global context. The present edition, translation and study is intended as such a contribution to scholarship. We are especially pleased that its publication chronologically overlaps with the forthcoming fifth volume of the Hamburg series, with which it is conceptually so closely coordinated, Michael Radich's *The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra and the Emergence of Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine*. These works may be fruitfully read together, as offering related though slightly different views of one of the interesting areas of Indian Buddhist scriptural literature.

Michael Zimmermann

Preface

The first dated version of an annotated translation and short study of the AAN I find in my files dates to 1984, when I submitted it (written on a typewriter!) as a piece of work at the end of my first year of graduate study at the University of Michigan. Prof. Luis Gómez awarded it the generous mark of 92, with the notation: “I expected the notes and the intro. to be a little bolder and [more] comprehensive in matters of meaning and interpretation.” I do not know whether the present result of my having revisited the text thirty years on fulfills those unsatisfied expectations; it is certain that still, in matters of meaning and interpretation, it falls far short of what is possible. But as I write these words I feel confident that I have done all that I, at least, wish to do with this text, as interesting and as challenging as it no doubt remains.

I picked up the text again after so many years soon after my parents died, thinking I would work on something simple and quick, which did not require a terrific amount of sustained attention. Boy was that a miscalculation! For long stretches over the last two years the work has absorbed my energies and taxed my abilities. What is worse (or from another perspective, better), much of what I once thought I understood now seems to me highly fragile and tenuous. There is however, I believe, some value in the work, and thus I dare to publish it even in its present form, however imperfect.

I have been very fortunate in the process of this project to profit from the advice of a number of friends and colleagues, among whom the place of honor must go to Michael Radich, who sent me pages and pages of detailed and extremely helpful corrections and suggestions. The book would have been much the poorer without his generously shared insights. Stefano Zacchetti looked carefully at the translation and much else, sharing his profound knowledge of Buddhist Chinese and, as ever, his much treasured friendship. Likewise I have received very helpful notes and corrections from Kazuo Kano, and a few from Seishi Karashima. The indices of technical terms which close the volume were graciously prepared by my student Li Channa. I received help with materials from many colleagues, including

Funayama Tōru and Prof. Ochiai Toshinori. It is thanks to the kindness of Prof. Ochiai and the permission of the Nihon Koshakyō Kenkyūjo 日本古写経研究所 of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, the Amanosan Kongoji 天野山金剛寺 and the Iwayaji 岩屋寺 that I was able to make use of several old copies of the text preserved in Japan. I had the opportunity to present this work some time ago at the Ekō-haus in Düsseldorf, and for this and for his advice I thank Hermann-Josef Röllicke, as well as all who participated in the seminar on the theme of *tathāgatagarbha* Dr. Röllicke arranged. I am very grateful to Michael Zimmermann for his generous suggestion to include this volume in the series he edits.

Although it is pro-forma for one to say so, with utter sincerity I avow that it is only the errors in what follows that I take credit for, and it is these which belong to me alone.

Leiden
October 2013

Addendum

Due to some serious misunderstandings, for which I take full responsibility, the production of this book was delayed by almost precisely one year. I very much regret this, and the attendant fact that in the end I have been reduced to typesetting it myself. I apologize for the infelicities that have resulted. In this regard, I am very grateful to Andrea Schlosser for valuable advice on typesetting, and for her precious friendship, and to Pu Chengzhong for some last minute corrections.

November 2014

Introduction

The *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta* (AAN) is a short Mahāyāna sūtra in which the Buddha preaches about, most centrally, the *sattvadhātu*, *dharma-makāya* and *tathāgatagarbha*, and their ultimate equivalence, in the framework of a critique of false views.¹ It has been grouped with texts like the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevīsīrhanāda*, although its exact historical relation to these texts remains unclear.² Both of the latter texts have been studied, the former especially well,³ but the AAN has yet to receive its due.⁴ Modern scholarly attention directed at the text has empha-

¹ I use the following abbreviations here and in the notes to the translation:

AAN: *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta*

MDN: **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa*

RGV: *Ratnagotravibhāga*

² One expression used to refer to these texts, ‘Nyoraizō sambukyō’ 如来藏三部經, “triad of Tathāgatagarbha sūtras,” though now used also by others, was invented by Takasaki Jikidō (Takasaki 1982: 27), no doubt on the basis of the expression Jōdo-sambukyō, “triple Pure Land sūtra,” which itself, however, has an older, medieval, pedigree. Note that at the same time, Takasaki (1974: 768–769; 1996: 42) considers the AAN to be “almost śāstra-like (an opinion shared by Matsumoto 1983: 64/389n38). For India we have no evidence other than the RGV and MDN, but the citations in these treatises do implicitly group the AAN with the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and a number of others, although basing any argument upon this fact is bound to lead to circularity. Whether it makes sense to speak of “tathāgatagarbha sūtras” as a class (at least in an Indian context), and how this might be historically meaningful, are questions which remain to be explored.

³ For the first, see the fine study of Zimmermann (2002). The *Śrīmālādevī* has been studied more often, but awaits a critical edition and good (at least Western language) translation. For an edition I have used Tsukinowa 1940, which however of course lacks reference to the extant Sanskrit portions of the text (all of which were published only after the war), and moreover is not presented in a form convenient for citation. The translation of Wayman 1974 is inadequate for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it avowedly conflates distinct versions.

⁴ Since I first began to pay attention to this text (in 1984), a number of works have appeared, including Watanabe (1984), Tsai (2004) (unfortunately not useful to me due to my ignorance of modern Chinese), Wakiya (2005) (a very short summary of his unpublished thesis), Shiu (2006), and Srisetthaworakul (2010), adding to the older and still seminal studies of Takasaki, in particular (1965, 1974, 1975a). See also Shimamura (2007) which, however, I find rather hard to understand. In addition, at least one translation is to be

sized its second half, almost entirely ignoring its discussions of wrong views, primarily because interest in and awareness of the text has for the most part been motivated by its identification as a scriptural source representing an earlier stage and aspect of the tradition later codified in the philosophical treatise *Ratnagotravibhāga-(mahāyānottaratantra)* (RGV), a work focused on the fundamental notion of the *tathāgatagarbha*.⁵ In seeking, however, to study and appreciate the standpoint of influential scriptures, a fundamental challenge remains that of trying to gaze on them free from the intervening filter of later scholastic configurations, one implication of which is that the focus of study should be wholistic, rather than concentrating on aspects singled out or elaborated upon by later authors. If we wish to explore the intrinsic ideological or doctrinal position of a given text (which is itself also an essential step in the progress toward appreciating how later authors utilized their sources), we should endeavor to read the text—in so far as this is possible—on its own terms. With this in mind, the short study presented here as an introduction to an edition and annotated translation of the *Anūnatvāpurnatvanirdeśaparivarta* attempts to treat the sūtra more on its own terms, and in the context of other scriptures to which it might be conceptually related,⁶ than through its interpretation in the RGV and other later, systematizing works, although naturally the RGV cannot and should not be ignored.

found on the web at <http://www.sutrasmantras.info/sutra14.html>, attributed to “Rulu (如露),” whose further identity is not known to me; it is now published in Rulu (2012: 97–102). None of these works is established on a philologically firm basis. Shiu is a doctoral thesis which the author proclaims to be philosophical rather than philological (p. 4), and moreover as he avows on p. 1, “My understanding of the *tathāgatagarbha* in this thesis is in essence characteristic of the Nyingma hermeneutic,” which he clarifies by saying (p. ii) “the result of my examination of the *tathāgatagarbha* does reflect the position of the Dzogchen tradition of the Nyingma school.” Despite this, he points out a number of parallels (mostly in Chinese translations) and other references that have been of use.

⁵ By the abbreviation RGV I aim to include the commentary *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā*, which Ruegg and others call RGVV. Since the RGV consists only of verses, while all quotations occur in the commentary, it seems to me unnecessary in this particular context to distinguish the *mūla* from the commentary in my abbreviations. Since both RGV and RGVV equally postdate the AAN, even taking account of the chronological layers within the former, I do not hesitate to use one overarching abbreviation.

⁶ By this I mean to point particularly to the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevīsīrhanāda*, and not to obviously related but (as I now believe) more advanced texts like the **Mahābherihāraka* and the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*.

Textual History

The *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta* survives as a whole in a single Chinese translation, with several quotations preserved in Sanskrit in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. No Tibetan version of the sūtra is known to exist, or to have ever been made.⁷ The Chinese bears the title *Fóshūo bù zēng bù jiǎn jīng* 佛說不增不減經 and is credited to Bodhiruci, translated in Luoyang 洛陽 in 520.⁸ This date is well established. In addition to the AAN, Bodhiruci trans-

⁷ Not only was the AAN apparently never translated into Tibetan, but it seems that the canonical Tibetan translators of the RGV did not even recognize the title of the text as a title. They render it twice in the RGV (Nakamura 1967: 3,7 and 14; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 75a3–4 and 6–7), without consistency and without any indication that a text name is meant. First we find *'grib pa med pa dang 'phel ba med pa nyid bstan pa*, almost immediately followed by *'grib pa med cing 'phel ba med pa nyid bstan pa*. The translation of Obermiller (1931: 114–115), an incredible work of scholarship achieved before the discovery of the Sanskrit text of the RGV (and without reference to the Chinese translation), demonstrates this. Obermiller rendered, respectively, “Such do we know to be the fourth adamantine topic which is not subject to augmentation and decrease as it is demonstrated in *Scripture*,” and “The 6th diamond subject is thus demonstrated as something which can neither increase, nor become diminished.” If correct, this is curious since one of the translators was an Indian who also wrote a short commentary on the text, Sajjana (Kanō 2006a; on the other translator, Rngog Blo ldan shes rab [1059–1109], see Kramer 2007). Later authors were, however, evidently aware of the text as a sūtra. 'Gos lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal (1392–1481), for instance, cites it under the name *'grib pa med pa dang | 'phel ba med pa'i mdo* (Mathes 2008: 440n275; *sic* the punctuation in the middle of the title!), Mkhas grub rje Dge legs dpal bzang (1385–1438) has *'phel ba dang 'grib pa med par bstan pa'i mdo* (Lessing and Wayman 1968: 48,14–15), while Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge (1429–1489) refers to it with the shorter title *'phel 'grib med par bstan pa'i mdo* (Cabezón and Dargyay 2007: 74). See below note 14. These versions of the title seem to me perhaps to have been influenced by the title of the Chinese translation, though I am not aware of any uses of the sūtra in Tibet drawing from passages other than those cited in the RGV, such as we might expect if authors had some access to the complete sūtra. It is also possible that, since the RGV was translated into Tibetan as many as six times (Kano 2006b: 89–111), these authors were aware of different renderings of the title of the AAN. Despite the Tibetan unfamiliarity with the AAN as a whole, I do not think that we must necessarily assume, with Ogawa 2001: 24, that the sūtra was already lost in India by the eighth century. In our present state of knowledge, we simply cannot know why it was not translated into Tibetan.

⁸ *Lidai sanbao ji* 歷代三寶紀 T. 2034 (XLIX) 45a11: 庚子 普通元 ... 正光元 ... 不增不減經二卷。... 並菩提流支。為司州牧汝南王於第出。See also T. 2034 (XLIX) 85c24: 不增不減經二卷。正光年於洛陽譯。或一卷。The *Kaiyuan Shijiao lu* 開元釋教錄 (T. 2154 [LV] 541a07) points out that the attribution of 2 *juan* to the text is an error: 不增不減經一卷。正光年於

lated many other seminal texts including the *Vajracchedikā*, *Viśeṣacintibrahmapariṣcchā*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Sandhinirmocana*, *Dharmasamgīti*, and *Daśabhūmika*.⁹ As for the date of the Indian scripture itself, it is notoriously difficult to date any Indian Buddhist text, and scriptures all the more so. However, given that the AAN clearly predates the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, and that the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* may date to the early fifth century,¹⁰ or even the middle of the fourth,¹¹ we will not be far wrong to suggest that the AAN must be older than the early fifth century.¹² On the other hand, given its doctrinal standpoint and style of presentation, I believe that it post-dates the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and *Śrīmālādevī*.¹³

The Sanskrit title *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta* is found in the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*,¹⁴ and the Chinese rendering *bù zēng bù jiǎn jīng* 不增不

洛陽出。七紙。錄云二卷者，誤。See also 604c21; 688b23; 712a06. Almost certainly only an error misreading 元 as 六 lies behind the *Zhenyuan xinding shijiao mulu's* 貞元新定釋教目錄 (T. 2157 [LV] 839b06) dating to 525: 不增不減經一卷。正光六年於洛陽出。七紙。云二卷者，誤。According to Fuse 1937: 128–129, the name Bodhiruci was written 菩提流支 before the Sui period, in the Sui 菩提留支, in the early Tang both forms were used, and in the middle Tang once again 菩提流支 became the standard.

⁹ For biographies, see T. 2154 (LV) 541b4ff.; T. 2157 (LV) 839c3ff.; T. 2060 (L) 428a22ff. A systematic comparison of translation techniques would be useful, but is beyond the scope of this study. In the meanwhile see Oda 1993, which is, however, more a doctrinal than a terminological investigation.

¹⁰ Takasaki (1966: 61).

¹¹ Zimmermann (2002: 79).

¹² The AAN is quoted three times in T. 1668, the *Shi moheyan lun* 釋摩訶衍論, which is by tradition attributed to Nāgārjuna and *Vṛddhimata (筏提摩多, 384–417). If this were correct, it would push back the date of the AAN considerably. The *Shi moheyan lun*, however, is a Chinese apocryphon, a commentary on the *Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論, itself an apocryphal composition. Therefore, the alleged early date of these quotations may be dismissed.

¹³ A Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Śrīmālādevī* has been published by Matsuda (2000); Sander (2000: 293) dates this manuscript to the fifth century. Since however we already have both a fifth century Chinese translation, and quotations in the RGV, this does not push back the date of the *Śrīmālādevī* past what was heretofore known. Zimmermann (2002: 15) offers “the middle of the fourth century CE” as a *terminus ante quem* for the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*. The relative chronology must from almost any perspective be postulated on internal grounds.

¹⁴ A variant, *Anūnāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta* (Johnston 1950: viii; 3n1), is, despite Johnston's hesitation, probably a scribal error, although it is understandable. According to the kind information of Madhav Deshpande (email 20 September 2012), Sanskrit commen-

減經 corresponds well to this Sanskrit.¹⁵ As is habitual, the Chinese label the text *jīng* 經, whereas the Sanskrit instead calls it a *nirdeśa-parivarta*. It may have been this word *parivarta*, ‘section, chapter,’ which led Johnston, the editor of *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, to speculate that the sūtra “is possibly a section of some larger work.”¹⁶ If this were ever so, no trace remains of its situation within any larger compendium.¹⁷

Our only Indian evidence aside from the translated sūtra itself is its quotations in the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* and in the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa* (*Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論, for which see below). All other texts known to cite the AAN are either native Chinese works, or commentaries in Tibetan on the RGV.¹⁸ Since the latter can provide no more

taries cite a maxim, namely: *dvandvānte śrūyamāṇam padam pratyekam abhisambadhya-te*, which Deshpande translates “A word attached at the end of a dvandva compound is construed individually with each member of that dvandva.” He goes on, however, to cite several passages from the *Tarkasaṃgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa and its commentary *Siddhāntacandrodaya* in which in fact each member of a dvandva receives its own *-tva* suffix, concluding, “In fact, I have not come across the use of *-tva* just occurring at the end of a dvandva compound.” This suggests that the variant cited by Johnston is less likely to be correct. That said, it may well be the form standing behind the Tibetan renderings in the RGV, namely *’grib pa med pa dang ’phel ba med pa nyid bstan pa* and *’grib pa med cing ’phel ba med pa nyid bstan pa* (see above note 7). Both of these Tibetan phrases contain the abstract suffix *nyid* (= *tva*) only once.

¹⁵ Note that, of course, this terminology is not the only possible. In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, for instance, 不增不減 (T. 1579 [XXX] 285b24) corresponds to *na ... ūrdhvaṃ nārvāk* (Bhat-tacharya 1957: 31.5).

¹⁶ Johnston (1950: viii); Takasaki (1965: 88). Note that the Tibetan translations (see above notes 7 and 14) also only render *nirdeśa* (= *bstan pa*), ignoring *parivarta* (usually *le’u*). It is theoretically possible that a translation of the AAN is included under a different title within some larger work. If this were so, however, this fact also seems to have escaped the attention of all Tibetan scholars who have written on the RGV. This seems to me most unlikely.

¹⁷ Concerning the combination of *nirdeśa-parivarta*, we do find two texts titled *-nirdeśaparivarta* in the *Mahāratanakūṭa* collection, namely *Trisaṃvara-nirdeśaparivarta* and *Ananta-mukhapariśodhana-nirdeśaparivarta*, alongside which we find quite a number of simple *-nirdeśas* and simple *-parivartas*. For a brief study beginning to address the naming practices of Mahāyāna sūtras, see Yonezawa 2012.

¹⁸ Examples include the work of Bu ston (Ruegg 1973: 135–136; 63n2), or the *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i ’tikā* of Rgyal tshab rje (Jiang 2008). See also Bernert (2009), Shiu (2006: 70n116). For a listing of Tibetan commentaries on the RGV, see the unpublished Kanō (2006b: 593–600) and Burchardi (2006); the latter, though extensive, remains incomplete. For instance, the discussion list H-Buddhism on 4 September 2012 carried a note by Karl

evidence for the sūtra than that already to be found in the RGV, I do not devote further attention to them.¹⁹ The Chinese works, however, may be of some interest for studies on the reception of the sūtra. Appendix 6 therefore provides a list of citations of the AAN in Sanskrit and in Chinese sources.²⁰

Three commentaries on the AAN in Chinese may once have existed, though none is (known to be) extant.²¹ These are (or were):

1. *Fuzōfugengyō kaihotsu* 不增不減經開發 by Saichō 最澄.

2. *Bujūngbulgamgyōngso* 不增不減經疏 by Wōnhyo 元曉.²²

3. 不增不減經疏 by 榮業.²³

Brunnhölzl making reference to the existence of a 172 folio commentary called *Rgyud bla ma'i 'grel pa* by Paṇḍita *Ratnavajra, grandfather (or uncle?) of the Kashmirian Sajjana, credited himself as a commentator on and one of the translators of the RGV into Tibetan (this commentary already mentioned by Kanō, 2006b: 53n140; 594). See van der Kuijp Forthcoming.

¹⁹ Note however that the RGV was translated into Tibetan repeatedly, and careful study of the citations of AAN passages in the works of Tibetan authors might uncover renderings of these quotations different from those now found in the Tanjur translation of the RGV credited to Sajjana and Rngog lo tsā ba. For one example, see the remark of Ruegg (1969: 360n3; 1973: 104) on Bu ston's rendering of the technical term *jñānaḡa* as *ye shes kyis bsdus pa'i yon tan* rather than *ye shes kyi yon tan*, mentioned below in Appendix 2.

²⁰ There is at least one putative quotation of the AAN which does not in fact appear in the sūtra as we have it. In the *Jin'gang xian lun* 金剛仙論, falsely attributed to Vasubandhu, we find (T. 1512 [XXV] 803b18–19): 不增不減經中明: 性地菩薩畢竟不墮地獄. See Ōtake (2003–2004: I.72). (The same in T. 1708 [XXXIII] 394b16–17 and T. 2196 [LVI] 661c21.) In view of this apparent misattribution I do not list this in Appendix 6. I likewise cannot identify the passage cited by Morita (1922: 16) as from the 起信教理抄 4.12a (a Chinese or a Japanese work?), which cites paragraphs §4i and 15ii of the AAN by name, as do for example other commentaries on the “Awakening of Faith” such as the *Kishinron Shōshutsu* of Sonben, and thus even if I cannot identify Morita's text, its genre is recognizable.

²¹ Ono (1932–1935: 9.193bc). Shiu (2006: 71) is thus wrong to deny the existence of commentaries.

²² T. 2180 (LV) 1139a12; T. 2181 (LV) 1141b07; T. 2183 (LV) 1152c10; T. 2184 (LV) 1171b16. Although no copy has been discovered, the existence of manuscripts of this text in Japan at an early period is well documented: see Fukushi 2004: 130–163. I am grateful to my friend Funayama Tōru for informing me of this study and sending me a copy of the relevant pages.

²³ T. 2183 (LV) 1152c11. I do not transcribe the text title or author's name since I do not know whether the author is Korean or Japanese; I doubt that he is Chinese. Thomas Sung Eun Kim, a post-doc working in Leiden, informs me that he is unable to trace such a name in Korean sources. Thus: the author may be Japanese, he may be unknown, or the

Nothing further is known of these works, although both Saichō and Wōnhyo do quote the sūtra in their extant works.²⁴

A question connected with the date of the AAN translation arises in relation to the Chinese rendering of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, the *Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun* 究竟一乘寶性論, since the latter contains quotations which clearly demonstrate familiarity with the Chinese translation of the AAN, and not just its Indic text. The dating of the Chinese translation of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, therefore, is pertinent to the question of the date of the translation of the AAN, which catalogues agree on dating to 520, as mentioned above. However, the attribution and dating of the RGV translation, which modern scholarship generally attributes to Ratnamati (Lenamoti 勒那摩提), is fraught with problems.²⁵ The oldest extant post-Bodhiruci catalogue of Chinese Buddhist literature, the *Zhongjing mulu* 衆經目錄 of 594, attributes the translation to the self-same Bodhiruci who translated the AAN.²⁶ Almost immediately thereafter, in 597, another catalogue, the *Lidai sanbao ji* 歷代三寶紀, on the contrary credits what appears to be the same translation to Ratnamati, initially assisted, however, by Bodhiruci. They then quarrelled, and each translated independently.²⁷ The same is found in the *Kaiyuan Shijiao lu* 開元釋教錄.²⁸ This may, however, be mistaken, and it

single reference we have may contain an error. Note that the title is the same as that of the (lost) work of Wōnhyo, a possible source of confusion.

²⁴ Wōnhyo's use of the sūtra may be discussed in Lee 1988, a work I have not been able to see. For the citations in question, see the author index to Appendix 6.

²⁵ Ui (1959: 3–21) gives an extensive discussion, although I cannot always agree with his interpretations.

²⁶ T. 2146 (LV) 141b14: 寶性論四卷 後魏世菩提留支譯。

²⁷ T. 2034 (XLIX) 86b23–24: 究竟一乘寶性論四卷 亦云寶性分別七乘增上論。或三卷。於趙欣宅出。見寶唱錄, listing it as a translation of Ratnamati (86b26–c1): 梁武帝世。中天竺國三藏法師勒那摩提。或云婆提。魏言寶意。正始五年來在洛陽殿內譯。初菩提留支助傳。後以相爭, 因各別譯。沙門僧朗、覺意侍中崔光等筆受。Ui (1959: 3), followed by Takasaki (1999: 19), is wrong to say that this catalogue is the oldest record of the translation of the RGV.

²⁸ See Takasaki (1966: 7–9; 1999: 18–20). At T. 2154 (LV) 541b2, the text states there to have been a translation by Bodhiruci: 寶性論四卷, and that it was translated by Ratnamati from the same original as the first: 或五卷。初出, 與寶意出者同本。已上並見長房錄及內典錄。However, it also attributes a translation with another title to Bodhiruci: T. 2154 (LV) 540b6: 究竟一乘寶性論四卷。亦云: 寶性分別七乘增上論, 或三卷, 或五卷。於趙欣宅出。見寶唱錄第二譯與菩提留支出者同本。The final attribution here, that an earlier and now lost

may be that there either never existed a translation by Bodhiruci, or that what was essentially a joint product ended up bearing only a single name. This leaves us with the question of the date of what we might, by convention, term Ratnamati's translation. Since Ratnamati arrived in China in 508, the translation must date to this year or later. Takasaki claims the date of translation as "c. 511," without providing any reason.²⁹ If this were to be correct, we would have the difficulty of explaining how a translation of, let us say, 511 could cite passages from a scripture the translation of which was 'published' by Bodhiruci only nine years later in 520. However, it is clear that there was at least at one point a very close working relationship between Bodhiruci and Ratnamati,³⁰ and whatever the date of translation—or perhaps better, publication—of the *Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun*, there is no question that in its redaction the Chinese translation of the AAN was closely consulted.

Very clear evidence for this relation between the Chinese translation of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the AAN is found in the latter's §§11–12. In the first place, while the Sanskrit quotations corresponding to the sūtra here are found widely separated in the Sanskrit text of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, the Chinese translation of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* gives both passages continuously, and almost verbatim with the Chinese text of the AAN as we have it. Moreover, in §12 of the transmitted text of the AAN we find the term *shìjiān dēng* 世間燈, representing the Sanskrit **loka-pradīpa*. The Sanskrit *Ratnagotravibhāga* here has merely *pradīpa* (and the Tibetan rendering has the corresponding *mar me*), while in this context no sense could be derived from *loka-pradīpa*, an epithet of the Buddha ("lamp of the world"). The Chinese translation of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, however, like the AAN, has here *shìjiān dēng* 世間燈. It is significant to note that both Chinese translations of the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa* have *dēng* 燈, which suggests, if it does not indeed prove, that the Indic texts known to the author and

catalogue, the *Baochang lu* 寶唱錄, spoke of two translations, appears to be an error; see also T. 2154 (LV) 637b5. For the attribution to Ratnamati see T. 2154 (LV) 608c28–609a1.

²⁹ Takasaki (1966: 7). Funayama Tōru suggests to me that he may have taken this idea from Tsukinowa (1935), or Ui (1959: 21), who suggests on dubious grounds that the RGV may have been translated between 511–515, the latter date hinging on suppositions about Ratnamati's date of death.

³⁰ The best discussion I have seen of the working relationship between the two, with special focus on the *Shidi jing lun* 十地經論, is Ōtake (2005: 20–29).

both Chinese translators of this text also read *pradīpa*. Another piece of evidence presents itself in §21i, where the Sanskrit text of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* corresponds only to the latter portion of the Chinese of the AAN, while the Chinese of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* corresponds to the entirety of the AAN text. In the following section §21ii, the Chinese text of the AAN introduces the notion of the *icchāntika*, something absent from the *Ratnagotravibhāga*'s quotation in Sanskrit. All of these points taken together indicate that Bodhiruci's translation of the AAN was known to the translator(s) or redactor(s) of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* in Chinese.³¹

Aside from the RGV, our sole independent Indian source for the AAN is the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa* (MDN), extant in two Chinese translations.³² The relation between this text and the RGV raises a number of questions. Although Takasaki accepts the traditional attribution to the putative author of the RGV itself, *Sāramati,³³ there is some confusion about the Chinese translator of the MDN. Both Chinese translations are ascribed to the late-seventh century Khotanese monk *Devendraprajña 提雲般若, though the two are clearly by different hands,³⁴ and only the first, T. 1626, is to be attributed correctly to *Devendraprajña.³⁵ In any event, there can be

³¹ It is not likely that the Sanskrit text of the RGV available to its Chinese translator(s) itself contained these variations, in light of the overall pattern of dependence seen throughout.

³² Found in T. 1626 (MDN₁) and T. 1627 (MDN₂), both of which bear the same title, *Da-sheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論. Perhaps the most detailed discussion of the text to date is Takasaki (1999: 36–48). See also, inter alia, Tagami (1965, 1986). Note that the Sanskrit title, often given as **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣasāstra*, is a complete invention, which *could* correspond to the Chinese, but for which, as far as I know, there is no evidence. Johnston (Johnston and Bailey 1935: 79) writes *Dharmadhātuvaiśeṣasāstra*, which (without Mahāyāna, of course) would equally well correspond to the Chinese. (He, as others [e.g., Péri 1911: 353], apparently follows Nanjio (1883, number 1258), who was more cautious than others, writing Mahāyāna-dharmadhātuv-aviseshatā (?)-sāstra.) I would at least suggest, in any event, that the element °*sāstra* is unlikely to be correct. Zimmermann (2002: 89) writes that this text “is based on the 佛性論”, but the *Foxing lun* 佛性論 was composed in China (Hattori 1955); this must be a misprint for 寶性論 = RGV.

³³ Takasaki (1999: 37) considers the common authorship of the two texts to be obvious (*magiremonai*), while earlier (1966: 45–46) he was considerably less conclusive. On this author and his name, see Appendix 3.

³⁴ According to Forte (1979: 297n3), referring implicitly to T. 1627 (XXXI) 896b18–19, T. 1627 must post-date the compilation of the *Kaiyuan Shijiao lu* 開元釋教錄 catalogue in 730; so also Takasaki (1999: 46).

³⁵ Takasaki (1999: 40) and elsewhere takes the name to be Devaprajña, but see Forte (1979: 289–290) (apparently unknown to Takasaki).

no question that the MDN is both an authentic Indian work, and to some extent independent of the RGV. In the narrow frame of reference of the AAN, that evidence comes not only from the manner of translation of quotations, but from the fact that, corresponding to our §17ii, the MDN quotes a passage from the sūtra not quoted in the RGV. When the MDN quotes the AAN, however, it nowhere does so by name; it is therefore interesting to note that while the commentary on the MDN by a direct student of the translator *Devendraprajña, Fazang 法藏 (643–712) (*Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu* 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, T. 1838), does quote the AAN by name (see §§ 10iii, 13ii, 14i in Appendix 6), these citations are all based on the Chinese translation of the RGV, and not on the MDN.

While these clues tell us something about the existence and state of the AAN in India, as I suggested earlier, little can be said with certainty about the absolute chronology of the text. Moreover, despite some efforts to offer hypotheses concerning the chronologies of the so-called Tathāgatagarbha-sūtras as a group, even relative determinations are often fraught with difficulties. However, based on considerations of style and presentation, it seems to me most likely that the AAN does not represent a particularly early phase of the development of the ideas it discusses. The primary ground for this conclusion is the terse manner in which it introduces each of its key terms, almost without exception free from explanation or argument. The authors of the AAN evidently felt no need either to explain or defend their use of technical terms, which they consequently obviously expected their audience to already understand. The terms I have in mind here start with the basic term *sattvadhātu*, “realm of beings,” which the Buddha uses in answer to Śāriputra’s question concerning “the mass of beings, the ocean of beings” (§§2–3ii). While one might argue that the context sufficiently explains what the Buddha means here by “realm of beings,” his immediately following “single dharma-realm” (§4i) remains opaque. However, one could once again argue that it is indeed clarified when the text, beginning at §8ii, discusses the “single realm.” This term in its turn is ‘clarified’ as equivalent to the ultimate truth, *paramārtha*, and to the *tathāgatagarbha* and *dharmakāya*, both of which appear here without further explanation (§10iii). This term *dharmakāya* is deployed in order to argue that the three modes of being—ordinary being, bodhisattva and buddha—are in fact one, but the basic idea of *dharmakāya* appears to be assumed by the text. What I would

argue is most important, however, in terms of the likely relative chronology of the text is that the term *tathāgatagarbha* itself is entirely assumed by AAN.

When one compares the presentation in the AAN with those in the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda*, it is clear that these latter, albeit considerably longer, works indeed argue for their positions, while the AAN simply asserts them. Both the relation of the AAN with the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevī* and the fact that it post-dates these texts seem to me to be virtually certain.³⁶ As is well known, the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* provided the overall structural impetus of the RGV, but this very fact has also led to the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* itself having been

³⁶ So too Oda (1993: 576 [36]). The opinion is, however, not universal; Takasaki (1975b: 235) speaks of a sequence from the *Tathāgatagarbha sūtra* through the AAN to the *Śrīmālādevī*, and (pp. 242) offers as examples the reliance of the *Śrīmālādevī*'s *avidyāvāsabhūmi* on the AAN's discussion of the beginninglessness of *āgantukakleśa*, and (1974: 83) the *Śrīmālādevī* passage cited in the note to §15i(a) as another example of that text's reliance on the AAN. Takasaki (1974: 111–121) elaborates his arguments for the priority of the AAN, but I remain unconvinced. Srisetthaworakul (2010: 63) probably simply follows Takasaki (and also adopts without caveat the term '*nyoraizō sambukyō*', for which see above note 2). I do not understand Matsumoto's view in his 1983 paper. He says once (p. 404 [49]) that he shares Takasaki's opinion of the relative chronology of the texts, as well as Takasaki's view that the *Jñānālokālamkārasūtra* was composed between the two (筆者もまたこの経を通読して、『勝鬘経』以前との印象をもつ). However, in a note he later says (389 [64] n38) that he believes the AAN to be later than the *Śrīmālādevī* because of its śāstric, which is to say philosophically abstract, character (筆者が『不増不減経』を『勝鬘経』以後と見ることについて、その理由を説明しなければならないが、その最大の理由は、『不増不減経』の方がより論書性格が強い、即ち、哲学的抽象度が高いという筆者の印象に他ならないので、論証はできない). I have not studied the *Jñānālokālamkārasūtra*, now available in Sanskrit, but my initial impression is that it should post-date the AAN. Possible connections with the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* are much harder to sort out, chiefly on account of the very complex textual history of this sūtra. At one point it was held that the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* went so far as to quote the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* by name (Zimmermann 2002: 88n190, 137n204[5], Takasaki 1974: 138), but new research indicates that the reference is rather to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* itself (Radich 2015). Zimmermann (2002: 90) earlier held that two other texts also cite the sūtra, the *Aṅgulimāliya* and the **Mahābherihāraka*, but this too may be rather a generic reference. On the former text see Kanō (2000); for the latter, see Suzuki (2002), who terms it the latest of the "*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* group," in which he includes the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*, *Mahāmegha*, *Aṅgulimāliya* and the **Mahābherihāraka*. The most detailed considerations on the relative dating of these related texts, including the AAN, are those found now in Radich (2015) which, however, deal primarily with questions of relative chronology with respect to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*.

read—not only by modern scholars—primarily through the lens(es) of the RGV. Even if Zimmermann is not right that the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* is the first source of the term *tathāgatagarbha*,³⁷ his archaeological dissection of the history of the text makes it abundantly clear that its various versions available to us in Sanskrit quotations, two Tibetan translations and two Chinese translations demonstrate the struggles its authors and/or editors had with defining and expressing their nascent and developing ideas. The very fact that not everything they say coheres with everything else they say, and that some of what they say appears to lead in directions they would not have wished (in particular, in regard to the implications of similes), suggests a state of evolution of ideas that is immature and in progress, still cooking, as it were.³⁸ In contrast to this, the AAN is simple; it assumes a great familiarity with ideas, rather than arguing for any given stance. Moreover, although it makes ample use of highly pregnant doctrinal terminology, it never feels a need to explain any of it. This is manifestly not the case in the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*. This contrast places almost beyond doubt the suggestion that the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* predates the AAN. Although the matter is somewhat less clear, I believe that the case is the same with the *Śrīmālādevī*. Oda, for instance, points to the example of the AAN's identification of the *sattvadhātu* and the *dharmakāya* through the intermediary of the *tathāgatagarbha*, saying that it “takes as a given what the *Śrīmālādevī* was at pains to define.”³⁹ As is evident in the many cases in which I have cited passages from the *Śrīmālādevī* in the notes, there is frequently a close relation between the wordings of the two texts, suggesting to my mind that the authors of the AAN may have been familiar precisely with the *Śrīmālādevī* itself.

³⁷ Zimmermann (2002: 32). If he is right about this, then there is no question that the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* is the oldest *tathāgatagarbha* text. Radich (2015), however, argues very convincingly that it is instead the *Mahāparinirvāna-mahāsūtra* which should be considered the prime innovator or, as he explains, “our earliest *tathāgatagarbha* text,” in the sense that it is the earliest such text now available to us.

³⁸ I include within this consideration Zimmermann's suggestion (2002: 21) that mention of *sattvadhātu* and, as he writes, (*citta*)*prakṛti/āgantukakleśa* could be later additions to the text in the course of its development. This, if correct, suggests in its turn that the authors of the AAN knew a fuller, more developed form of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* rather than an earlier (?) or less developed form.

³⁹ Oda (1993: 576 [36]).

All of this does not *necessarily* mean that the AAN post-dates the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevīsīrhanāda*, for it could still theoretically be the case that some earlier literature, some ‘third source,’ which could no longer exist, provided the context lacking in the AAN itself, although one must confess that at a certain point such reasoning seems to become somewhat too fastidious. Be that as it may, what this necessary doctrinal background was will, I believe, become clear through an examination of the sūtra, as will the likelihood that the authors of the AAN were indeed familiar either with the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevīsīrhanāda*, or with some very, very similar literature.

How to situate the AAN more broadly still remains unclear. Takasaki asserts that the usage of the category of the ten perfections (§14ii) places the sūtra in the lineage of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* sūtra, and associates it with the Yogācāra school.⁴⁰ This, however, seems to me to be reaching too far. In the first place, as is typical of the text’s absence of elaboration of terminology which plainly is simply assumed by its authors, we have nothing more than a mere mention of “ten perfections,” without any specification of the itemization of these ten. Classical Buddhist doctrine knows at least two different sets, however, that associated most closely with the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* (included in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* corpus) and that belonging to the Theravāda.⁴¹ In the latter tradition the category of ten perfections is known already to the *Buddhavaṃsa* and to the *Vimuttimaggā*,⁴² and therefore is probably chronologically prior to the composition of the AAN, or closely contemporaneous to it. However, even in Mahāyāna sources the term “ten perfections” is not limited to the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* literature. Mention appears in a portion of the Large Perfection of Wisdom text translated into Chinese in the sixth century,⁴³ and much more prominently in the *Akṣayamati-paripṛcchā* of the Mahāratnakūṭa collection, where a set of ten is

⁴⁰ Takasaki (1999: 325n22), and somewhat less assertively in (1975a: 378n24). I think there is little need to engage the suggestions of Shiu (2006: 82–87), which without any detectable logic suggest origins for the AAN from Andhra to North India to Central Asia (!).

⁴¹ See Mochizuki (1932–1936: III.2367c–2369b); Eimer (2006: 107–118); Furuyama (1997); Suzuki (1999).

⁴² Katsumoto (2002). The version found in the Jātaka commentary (Suzuki 1999, quoting from the *Nidānakathā*), is borrowed from the *Buddhavaṃsa* (Norman 1983: 79).

⁴³ T. 231 (VIII) 705c10. The term is found in Sanskrit in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Dutt 1934: 225.8).

discussed at length.⁴⁴ The category also appears in the *Guṇāparyantastotra* of Triratnadāsa and its commentary by Dignāga, a text which otherwise shows no association with the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*.⁴⁵ Knowing that we cannot necessarily associate the AAN with the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* traditions on the basis of the mere appearance of the term ‘ten perfections’ does not in itself help us locate the text more broadly, of course.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, for other reasons Takasaki’s idea is not wholly fanciful; there are some cases in which the AAN does seem to have at least some doctrinal similarities with expressions in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* literature, such as the reference to *dharmavaśitā* in §4i(i). The question requires further study.

Doctrine

Turning now more directly to the contents of the AAN, the Buddha’s interlocutor is the ubiquitous Śāriputra who, however, as is usual in such Mahāyāna scriptures, speaks rarely, in fact only twice. The question which motivates the Buddha’s discourse at the outset concerns the extent of the mass of beings in the universe, the *sattavadhātu*: does this expand or contract? In other words, the basic question which frames the discourse is, does the number of beings in saṃsāra increase or decrease?⁴⁷ The short answer is that it does not, the reason lying in the fundamental nature of reality. The Buddha’s response, constituting the body of the scripture, falls into two logi-

⁴⁴ T. 310 (45) (XI) 648c9–649b7.

⁴⁵ See Uno (1992). The category appears from verse 12, and comprises: *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣānti*, *vīrya*, *dhyāna*, *prajñā*, *upāya*, *prañidhāna*, *bala* and *jñāna*, indeed the same 10 as in the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*. The information that this text has no [other?] particular affinity with the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* I owe to Jens-Uwe Hartmann (personal communication), who is editing the text along with Michael Hahn.

⁴⁶ It may be germane to mention that Zimmermann (2002: 56) considers the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* and the *Tathāgatopattisambhavanirdeśa* to be the texts “most closely related to the [*Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*]”; the latter of these forms part of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* collection. By “most closely related” here, Zimmermann means: as sources, since he earlier says (p. 54) that the *Tathāgatopattisambhavanirdeśa* “may have been the prototype for the authors of the [*Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*].”

⁴⁷ On the question of whether there is an end to saṃsāra, see, from a point of view filtered through the lens of Gelukpa scholasticism, Lopez (1992). For an extensive discussion of the question of the expansion or contraction of the two realms in East Asian Buddhist scholasticism, see Morita (1922).

cal halves, the first focusing on mistaken views (**mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) which arise from the basic mistake in view about the *sattvadhātu*, the second taking up more directly the nature of this *sattvadhātu*, the realm of beings, and the concepts to which this is related, namely the *dharmakāya*, the *dharmadhātu*, and the *tathāgatagarbha*. We might see the division between the two halves coming around §10i, where—I would suggest: not coincidentally—we find the first quotation of the text in the RGV. It is this limitation of quotations to the second half of the text which has led to scholarly disregard for the sūtra’s presentation of wrong views and, in my view, consequent misunderstanding of the overall nature of the text.

It is not my goal here in this Introduction to expound and explain the AAN in its entirety; the annotated translation should serve this function. Rather, in what follows I seek to highlight some of the interesting issues raised by the text, the first of which concerns its vision of ‘wrong views.’ A number of indications suggest that the AAN’s presentation of wrong views is indebted, perhaps even directly, to that in the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* and its well-known presentation of sixty-two wrong views (or rather, following Anālayo [2009: 190], sixty-two grounds for the formation of views). The first indication is visible in the version of the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* in the *Dirghāgama*, preserved only in Chinese and generally agreed to be a Dharmaguptaka text. There, in the first three views of eternalism we find that some hold the self and the world to be eternal, *śāśvata*, 我及世間是常.⁴⁸ They reach this conclusion on the basis of recalling, successively, twenty, forty and eighty aeons of the evolution and devolution of the cosmos, during which they observe that “beings in that [universe] did not increase and did not decrease,” 其中衆生不增不減.⁴⁹ The same is found in the citation of the

⁴⁸ T. 1 (21) (I) 90a11–12, 19, 27. Note that while this is clearly a negative thing for the authors of the AAN, they also assert the beginninglessness of the universe. These two notions are positively connected for example in a sentence from the Sūtrasthāna of the *Caraka Saṃhitā* 30.27, so *’yam āyurvedaḥ śāśvato nirdiśyate anādītvād ...*, “this Āyurveda is taught as eternal since it is beginningless.”

⁴⁹ T. 1 (21) (I) 90a14, 21, 29. See Anālayo (2009: 188) for a translation in English. Similar expressions are as old as the oldest Upaniṣads, as for instance we read in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 6.2.2: *vettho yathāsau loka evaṃ bahubhiḥ punaḥ punaḥ prayadbhir na saṃpūryatā3 iti*, “Do you know how the world beyond is not filled up, even as more and more people continuously go there?” (Olivelle 1998: 145). See also *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 5.1.1 and *Chāndogya* 5.10.8.

section of the sūtra on views in the **Śāriputrābhidharma* 舍利弗阿毘曇論, also perhaps a Dharmaguptaka text.⁵⁰ Therefore, in the Dharmaguptaka recension of the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, wrong views about the eternity of the world—views mentioned in the AAN—are directly connected to the absence of increase or decline in the number of beings in existence, providing precisely the connection taken as the basis of the Buddha’s preaching in the AAN. What is more, the AAN repeats for each set of views it sets forth the logical implication of one set for the next, saying “these ... views and those ... views are inseparable, like a gauze net,” that is, like a *jāla*, the very term appearing in the title of the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*.⁵¹ It seems abundantly clear, then, that both in the logic of its overall problematic and in a particular key term it employs as a metaphor, *jāla*, the AAN bases itself on the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*. What is of further interest is that while we can identify the particular wording with “increase and decrease” in the Dharmaguptaka *Dīrghāgama* version of the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* and in the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, it is not found in the Pāli recension of the *Brahmajāla-sutta*, the (Mūla)-Sarvāstivāda version quoted by Śamathadeva in his *Upāyikā Abhidharma-kośaṭīkā*,⁵² the independent translation of the scripture in Chinese (*Fanwang liushi’er jian jing* 梵網六十二見經),⁵³ or an independent translation of the sūtra in Tibetan.⁵⁴ This might suggest a special connection of the AAN with the Dharmaguptakas, but, since we do not have access to versions of the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* from across the Buddhist sectarian spectrum, such a conclusion may be premature.

The section on views in the AAN begins in earnest in §5i and continues through §8i. As just mentioned, each set of views is said to lead further onwards to the next set, that indeed one view or set of views implies the next inevitably: they are intertwined like the threads of a gauze fabric, a *jāla* or

⁵⁰ T. 1548 (XXVIII) 656c12–13, 20, 28. See Bareau (1950).

⁵¹ Anālayo (2009: 219) points out that *jāla* has been interpreted differently in various traditions which have transmitted versions of the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, and that these do not always agree with each other. This disparity of interpretation does not, however, affect the point I am suggesting here.

⁵² Text 3050 (Honjo 1984: 38–39): Derge Tanjur 4094, *mngon pa, ju* 143b7; Peking Tanjur 5595, *mngon pa’i bstan bcos, tu* 165a1.

⁵³ T. 21 (I) 266a16ff.

⁵⁴ *Tshangs pa’i dra ba’i mdo*, Derge Kanjur 352, *mdo sde, ah*, 73a44.

net. Although the text repeats this poetic image again and again, I confess that, at least for me, while individual views may, in most cases, be identifiable, the implied logical linkage between these listed views often remains unclear.

The text begins with the view that the realm of beings, the *sattvadhātu*, decreases. The reason this comes about is that, hearing that the Buddha attained nirvāṇa, persons may conclude that this led to a decrease in the realm of beings, that is, that the number of beings in saṃsāra has decreased by at least one. This is the fundamental error, from which all else proceeds. It leads in the first place to a set of three views, namely “1. The view of annihilation, that is, that there is absolute exhaustion. 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa. 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence.” The first view here seems to refer to the notion of *ucchedavāda*, while the second points to a “hīnayānistic” view of nirvāṇa as complete cessation, but what the difference between these two views is remains unclear to me. What is meant by the third view, if I have even understood the laconic Chinese correctly, is moreover also not clear to me. Be that as it may, these views as a set lead toward a further set of two views, namely: “1. The view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa]. 2. The view of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa.” The first seems to mean that, having concluded that nirvāṇa is not real, beings cease to strive for it, while the second seems to repeat the third item of the former set, and as such once more remains unclear to me. These two lead onwards to a further two: “1. The view of attachment to practices and observances. 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.” While these two are, on the one hand, well-known examples of error and as such clear in themselves, at the same time their connection to the previous set of two is far from obvious. Be that as it may, they in turn generate six views: “1. The view that the world has a beginning. 2. The view that the world has an end. 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation. 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure. 5. The view that beings [produce] no (karmically significant) activity. 6. The view that there are no noble truths.” Once again, these views, or at least most of them, are in and of themselves known and as such clear, while their logical connection to what precedes them is less so. The list begins with the old ideas that it is an error to think that the world either begins or ends (for this, see below), but goes on to list

ideas which seem to me to be, at least from a Mahāyānistic śūnyavādin point of view, on the whole correct doctrinal stances. If beings are not illusory creations, what are they?⁵⁵ They can hardly be asserted to be real in any ultimate sense. The danger of the fourth view is obvious, as it can lead to antinomianism, but again, from a Mahāyānistic point of view aware of a śūnyavādin critique, it seems perfectly orthodox. The fifth view is very hard to understand, and I would not like to base an argument on my guess as to its meaning. The sixth view from one perspective seems equivalent to the claim that the Buddha's message in toto is false. But once again, at least from some Mahāyāna standpoints, one might well say just this.

The following set of views sets out the idea that it is erroneous to accept: "1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. 2. The view that without causes or conditions suddenly [something nevertheless] exists." The text itself analyzes the problem here: "These two types of views cause beings to lack the aspiration to desire and the aspiration to diligence [to cultivate] good qualities." The two views that nirvāṇa was initially produced and that without causes or conditions suddenly something nevertheless exists produce all that is dangerous, "all forms of defilements caused by ignorance," and in turn produce all other wrong views altogether. Here we come to the ultimate problem identified by the AAN with regard to these wrong views: holding wrong views will lead one to conceptualize reality in a wrong way, and this in turn will quench one's energy to practice and cultivate oneself spiritually, and thus will vitiate the path itself. This seems to be the closest that the text comes to actually advocating practice, yet even here it does not directly advert to any specific areas of cultivation or suitable techniques. To reiterate this message, then: wrongly conceiving of the nature of the realm of beings—which is to say ultimately, of the single realm, the *ekadhātu*—leads to the utter rejection of all correct visions of reality, rendering the Buddha's message and path null and void.

It is important to observe in this context that the opinions cited in the first half of the sūtra seem, in so far as I can identify them, to be positions which might be held equally by Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Some of the positions, such as "attachment to practices and observances," seem ipso facto to refer to non-Buddhist positions. Whether the text was therefore intended as some sort of missionary document seems to me, however, to be

⁵⁵ See however the note to §6(f).

questionable, especially since so much of its overall dynamic assumes so much of the system-internal discussions found in other Buddhist texts such as the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* and the *Śrīmālādevī*, as I have argued above.

One of the central points of this discussion is nothing other than the basic position of the realm of beings. What, then, is this realm of beings, this *sattvadhātu*, a correct understanding of which is so very vital for the AAN?

The term *sattvadhātu*, with the ordinary meaning of ‘the collectivity of living beings,’ is not particularly rare. Although it seems to be a primarily Buddhist term, it does occur in other contexts.⁵⁶ A common-sense understanding of the nature of existence, of *samsāra*, is that beings, *sattva*, exist in *samsāra* and attain liberation in *nirvāṇa*. This, for instance, is certainly the notion underlying a passage in the *Vajracchedikā*:⁵⁷

However many living beings are comprised in the total aggregation of living beings, be they born from eggs, or born from wombs, or born from moisture, or arising spontaneously, whether having physical form or being non-material, whether having apperception, or lacking apperception, or neither having apperception nor lacking apperception—however the realm of living beings [*sattvadhātu*] is defined when one defines it—I should bring all of them to final extinction in the realm of extinction [*nirvāṇadhātu*] without substrate remaining.

Here the *sattvadhātu* as the realm of beings is contrasted with the opposite state, that of the realm of *nirvāṇa*, without any hint of a commensurability between the two.

The question our *sūtra* raises implicitly occurs elsewhere explicitly, however, and is clearly not an innovation of the AAN. For instance, in the

⁵⁶ At least I have noticed it in the royal inscription cited by Sanderson (2009: 71n85), in which the term *sakalasattvadhātu* appears to mean simply all persons, although technically we might understand it to mean all *beings*. There does not appear to be an term parallel to *sattvadhātu* in Pāli. Note however the parallel expression also found in inscriptions, *sakalasattvarāṣi*, for which see Schopen (1979/2005: 228).

⁵⁷ Harrison and Watanabe (2006: 114,1–4): *yāvaṃtaḥ satvāḥ satvasaṃgrahaṇa saṃgrhitāḥ aṇḍajā vā jarāyujā vā saṃsvedajā vā upapādukā vā rūpiṇo vā arūpiṇo vā saṃjñīno vā asaṃjñīno vā naiva saṃjñīno nāsaṃjñīnaḥ yāvat satvadhātuḥ prajñāpyamānaḥ prajñāpyate te mayā sarve anupadhiṣeṣe nirvāṇadhātāu parinirvāpayitavyāḥ*. Translation Harrison (2006: 142).

Mahāvastu, which certainly predates the AAN, we find Mahā-Kāśyapa asking Mahā-Kātyāyana the following:⁵⁸

If, Son of the Victor, there are a great number of Perfectly Awakened Ones, and each Perfectly Awakened One brought a limitless number of beings to nirvāṇa, would not they in a short time have brought all beings to nirvāṇa? In this manner this world would become entirely empty of everything, free from all beings.

The answer is that there is no limit (*paryanta*) to beings. The ‘arithmetic’ behind this ‘calculation,’ although left implicit, is quite simple: subtracting from infinity leaves infinity remaining, just as adding to infinity yields the same.⁵⁹ Because the universe is beginningless and beings infinite, depletion and expansion are not possible. Similarly, the *Saṅghāṭasūtra*, although perhaps not for the usual reasons of politeness, asks substantially the same question three times:⁶⁰

There are beings, Sarvaśūra, who speak as follows: “Day and night the Tathāgata liberates many beings from saṃsāra, but still the realm of beings does not diminish. Many make vows toward awakening, many are reborn in the heavens, many attain extinction—so why do beings not diminish?”

⁵⁸ Senart (1882–1897: i.126.5–8): *evam ukte āyusmān mahākāśyapo āyusmantam mahākātyāyanam uvāca || yadi bho jinaputra [em. Tournier] ettakā samyaksambuddhā eko ca samyaksambuddho aparimitān satvā parinirvāpayati nanu acireṇa kālena sarvasatvān parinirvāpayiṣyanti | evam ayaṃ lokāḥ sarveṇa sarvaśūnyam bhaviṣyati sarvasatvavirahita iti ||*. See Skilling and Saerji 2012 on *bho jinaputra*.

⁵⁹ The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu, in discussing the triple realm of desire, form and the formless, reflects this kind of thinking when it says (Pradhan 1975: 113.22–24, *ad* III.3): *traidhātukānām anto nāsti | yāvad ākāśam tāvanto dhātavaḥ | ata eva ca nāsty apūrvasattvaprādurbhavaḥ | pratibuddhotpādam cāsamkhyeyasattvaparinirvāṇe pi nāsti sattvānām parikṣaya ākāśavat*, “There is no end to the triple realms. The realms extend as far as space, And precisely for this reason, there is no appearance of beings who did not exist previously, nor even in the face of the parinirvāṇa of uncountable beings when a buddha appears [in the world] is there the disappearance of beings, as with space.”

⁶⁰ Canevascini (1993: §144; p. 63, the Sanskrit from von Hinüber’s unpublished edition): *santi sarvaśūra satvā ya evaṃ kathayanti | rātrindivam tathāgato bahūni satvāni saṃsārāt parimocayati | adyāpi satvadhātuḥ kṣayam na gacchanti [sic] | bahavo bodhāya prañidhānam kurvanti | bahavaḥ svargaloka upapadyante | bahavo nirvṛtim anuprāpnuvanti | atha kena hetunā satvānām kṣayo na bhavati |*

The question is asked again in almost the same terms:⁶¹

[Some beings stood before the Buddha, and] they asked the Blessed One: “Day and night, Blessed One, the Tathāgata liberates many beings from saṃsāra, but still the realm of beings knows no decrease nor increase. What is the reason, Blessed One, what is the cause that these beings display arisal and destruction in equal measure?”

Finally, when the question is asked for a third time by the bodhisattva Bhaiṣajyasena, the Buddha offers some sort of answer, which however hardly seems coherent.⁶² The AAN for its part does offer a coherent, if indeed rather abstract, reason for its claim. Its answer, however, is not based on the type of arithmetical reasoning outlined above, but upon a revisualization of the question—albeit, again, an implicit one.

The central concept of the AAN—or one of its central concepts—remains precisely the denial of the possibility that the grand total of the number of beings in the universe could increase or decrease. This is an old notion in Buddhist thought, although the reasoning which leads to the conclusion is not, as I have suggested, necessarily always the same. Although expressed in different terms, this denial appears to be the idea, or a parallel to

⁶¹ Canevascini (1993: §171; p. 70): *bhagavantam pariṣṛcchanti sma | bahūni bhagavaṃ satvāni rātrindivas tathāgataḥ saṃsārāt parimocayati | na ca satvadhātor ūnatvaṃ vā pūrṇatvaṃ vā prajñāyate | ko bhagavan hetuḥ kaḥ pratyayaḥ yat te satvā samānā utpādānirodhaṃ darśayanti |*

⁶² For the passage see Canevascini (1993: §184–185; p. 74–75), and for a keen observation his comment on §144 (p. 144): “The answer the Buddha finally gives ... certainly does not contribute to diminish the validity of the objection: his reply (after exhaustion of merit new merit is accumulated) can only imply that beings are reborn in good lives (for instance in some pure buddha-field) after having accumulated enough merit and that they are reborn in this world after the exhaustion of that merit. The answer does not meet the objection that beings who have become extinct cannot be reborn at all; it would be only acceptable if this text did not promise deliverance but only many good rebirths and this is certainly not the case as the question itself correctly states. The weakness of the answer might point to an author of these passages who had quite a confused idea of the Buddhist doctrine of salvation: he probably could not figure out that deliverance from saṃsāra, extinction means just the end of the process of rebirth. On the contrary, for him these terms probably meant a temporary condition of suspension of the rebirth process in saṃsāra ...” In fact, as a whole the *Śaṅghāṭasūtra* is a baffling text, since whatever coherence it might have is far from immediately obvious. While such might be said of a number of Mahāyāna sūtras, the *Śaṅghāṭasūtra* seems to present an extreme case.

the idea, expressed in the following passage from the *Udāna*, a text which belongs to the older strata of Pāli literature:⁶³

As an example, monks, in the world rivers flow into the ocean and showers fall from the sky, but one does not thereby discern a decrease or an increase of the ocean. In precisely the same way, monks, although many monks attain perfect nibbāna in the realm of nibbāna without remainder [*anupādisesa nibbānadhātu*], one does not thereby discern a decrease or an increase of the realm of nibbāna.

The question underlying this discussion is whether the extent of nirvāṇa changes as beings attain liberation, or in other words, whether as beings transition from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa the latter, at any rate, grows larger, to which the *Udāna* responds in the negative.⁶⁴ The correlate of this, however, would be a question about the extent of saṃsāra, that is to say, the number of existing beings, and this is the notion captured by the term *sattvadhātu*.

In contrast to the meaning of this term in its common usage, a usage in which it indicates in a straight-forward manner the entirety of beings, a number of texts, including the AAN, play (although certainly not humorously) with the term *sattvadhātu*, and especially with the polyvalency of the term *dhātu*, which has a rather wide semantic range. Here the relevant foci of the term are its sense of 'realm' on the one hand, and 'element,' 'quintessence,' 'essential core' and possibly 'motivating factor,' 'cause,' on the other. Indian Buddhist scriptures contain a number of examples of explicit manipulation of this key term. The Perfection of Wisdom literature, which

⁶³ Steinthal (1885: 55,29–34 = 5.5.5): *seyyathāpi bhikkhave yā ca loke savantiyo mahāsamuddam appenti yā ca antalikkhā dhārā papatanti na tena mahāsamuddassa unattam vā pūrattam vā paññāyati evam eva kho bhikkhave bahū cepi bhikkhū anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyanti na tena nibbānadhātuyā unattam vā pūrattam vā paññāyati*. This passage is a bit more concise but otherwise virtually identical to that in the *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, Mahāvagga 19.15 (Hardy 1899: iv.202–203); I thank Ven. Anālayo for pointing this out to me. He finds it significant that this expression does not occur in the Chinese parallels to the list found in Pāli, an issue which requires further research. Several of the passages cited in the following were brought to my attention by Shiu 2006.

⁶⁴ Note that here and elsewhere, at least in part the logic is convoluted: there is no way that rivers flowing into the sea could cause the sea to grow *smaller*. The original form of the image must have conveyed the notion that the flow of water from a river into the sea does not diminish the river or cause the sea to grow larger, but somehow in the process of telescoping the metaphor, perhaps quite early on, the key distinction got lost.

abounds in verbal and conceptual play, provides several good, if perhaps on occasion extreme, examples. The following passage is found in the *Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā*:⁶⁵

When this had been said, the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī spoke to Śāradvatīputra saying: “Just so, Venerable Śāradvatīputra, it is as you say. This armor has been donned [that is, I have undertaken the bodhisattva path] in order that all beings attain final liberation, yet I apprehend no beings, I yearn for no beings whatsoever. [Thus] this armor,

⁶⁵ Masuda (1930: 197,3–200,10): *evam ukte mañjuśrīḥ kumārabhūta āyuṣmantam śāradvatīputram etad avocat | evam etad bhadanta śāradvatīputra yathā kathayasi | sarvasattva-parinirvāṇāya sannāhaś caīṣa sannaddho na ca me kācit sattvopalabdhir vā sattvābhini-veśo vā | nāyam bhadanta śāradvatīputra sannāha eva sannaddhaḥ | katham aham sattvadhātor ūnatvam vā kuryām pūrṇatvam vā | saced bhadanta śāradvatīputra parikalpam upādāya ekaikasmin buddhakṣetre gaṅgānadīvālukopamā buddhā bhagavanto bhaveyur ekaikaś ca tathāgato gaṅgānadīvālukopamān kalpāms tiṣṭhet | sarātrīm divam ca dharmam deśayamāna ekaikayā dharmadeśanayā yāvanto gaṅgānadīvālukāsamair buddhair bhagavadbhiḥ sattvā vinitās tāvataḥ sattvān ekaikas tathāgata ekaikayā dharmadeśanayā vinayed evam api kṛtvā naiva sattvadhātor ūnatvām vā pūrṇatvam vā prajñāyate ||*

tat kasmād dhetoh | sattvaviviktatvāt sattvāsattvād | bhadanta śāradvatīputra sattvadhātor na conatvam vā pūrṇatvam vā prajñāyate ||

evam ukte āyuṣmān śāradvatīputro mañjuśriyam kumārabhūtam etad avocat | yadi mañjuśrīḥ sattvaviviktatvāt sattvāsattvāt sattvadhātor naivonatvam na pūrṇatvam vā prajñāyate | tat kasyedānīm bodhim abhisambudhya dharmam deśayiṣyasi ||

evam ukte mañjuśrīḥ kumārabhūta āyuṣmantam śāradvatīputram etad avocat | yadā tāvad bhadanta śāradvatīputra atyantatayā sattvānupalabdhiḥ | tat ko 'trābhisambhotsyate | kasya vā dharmam deśayiṣyate | tat kasmād dhetoh | tathā hi bhadanta śāradvatīputra atyantatayā sarvadharmānupalabdhiḥ ||

atha khalu bhagavān mañjuśriyam kumārabhūtam etad avocat | yadā tāvan mañjuśrīr atyantatayā sarvadharmānupalabdhiḥ | tat kim idānīm sattvam api prajñāpayiṣyasi | api ca sacen mañjuśrīḥ kaścīd evam pṛcchet | kiyantaḥ sattvā iti | kim tasya tvarṇ vadeḥ |

mañjuśrīr āha | tasyāham bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yāvanta eva buddhadharmā iti | saced bhagavan punar api pṛcchet | kiyatpramāṇaḥ sattvadhātur iti | tasyāham bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yatpramāno buddhaviṣayaḥ ||

bhagavān āha | sacet punar api te mañjuśrīḥ kaścīd evam pṛcchet | kimpariyāpannaḥ sattvadhātur iti | kim tasya tvarṇ vadeḥ |

mañjuśrīr āha | tasyāham bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yatparyāpannānutpādācintyatā ||

bhagavān āha | sacet punar api te mañjuśrīḥ kaścīd evam pṛcchet | kimpratiṣṭhitaḥ sattvadhātur iti | kim tasya tvarṇ vadeḥ |

mañjuśrīr āha | tasyāham bhagavann evam pṛṣṭa evam vadeyam | yatpratiṣṭhito 'nutpādadhātur iti ||

Venerable Śāradvatīputra, has not actually even been donned, [for] how could I bring about the diminution or the expansion of the realm of beings? To take a hypothetical case, Venerable Śāradvatīputra, if, in each and every buddha-field, there were to be buddhas, blessed ones, as numerous as the sands of the Ganges river, and if each and every tathāgata were to remain there for aeons as many as there are sands in the Ganges river, teaching the teaching day and night, and each and every one of those tathāgatas were to guide with each and every instruction in the teaching as many beings as were guided by each instruction in the teaching by buddhas, blessed ones as numerous as the sands of the Ganges river—even accepting this case, no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings would be discerned.

“Why? Because of the fact that beings are isolated, because of the fact that beings have no be-ing. Venerable Śāradvatīputra, neither diminution nor expansion of the realm of beings is discerned.”

When this had been said, Śāradvatīputra said to the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī: “If, Mañjuśrī, due to the fact that beings are isolated and do not exist neither diminution nor expansion of the realm of beings is discerned, then, having awakened to what awakening will you expound the teaching?”

When this had been said, the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī spoke to Śāradvatīputra saying: “When, Venerable Śāradvatīputra, there is in the first place absolutely no apprehension of a being, who will fully awaken to that fact? To whom will he expound the teaching? Why? For, Venerable Śāradvatīputra, in this manner there is absolutely no apprehension of all existent things.”

Then the Blessed One spoke to the Crown Prince Mañjuśrī as follows: “When, Mañjuśrī, there is in the first place absolutely no apprehension of all existent things, how on earth can you now assertively speak of a being at all? Or if someone were to ask, Mañjuśrī, ‘How many beings are there?’ what would you say to him?”

Mañjuśrī said: “If, Blessed One, I were asked such a question, I would say that there are as many as there are teachings of the Buddha. If, Blessed One, I were again asked ‘How large is the realm of beings?’ Blessed One, I would reply that it is as large as the domain of the Buddha.”

The Blessed One said: “If once again, Mañjuśrī, someone were to ask ‘In what is the realm/quintessence of beings included?’ what would you say to him?”

Mañjuśrī said: “If, Blessed One, I were asked such a question, I would say that it is included in that in which are included nonarisa and the inconceivable.”

The Blessed One said: “If once again, Mañjuśrī, someone were to ask ‘Upon what is the realm/quintessence of beings based?’ what would you say to him?”

Mañjuśrī said: “If, Blessed One, I were asked such a question, I would say that the realm/quintessence of beings is based upon that upon which nonexistent things are based.”

The same notion is found in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*.⁶⁶

Bodhisattvas who desire to awaken to unexcelled complete awakening for the sake of beings have obtained the perfection of great vigor. Why? If this great universe of three times many thousands of worlds⁶⁷ were quite full of tathāgatas, like a thicket of reeds, a bamboo wood, a sugar cane forest, a forest of *Saccharum Sara* reed or like a rice field, and if these tathāgatas would teach the Teaching for an aeon or for the remainder of an aeon; and if each single tathāgata were to cause limitless, innumerable, uncountable beings to attain Nirvāṇa; still one

⁶⁶ Kimura (1986: 174.23–175.6): *mahāvīryapāramitāprāptās te bhagavan bodhisattvā mahā-sattvā ye sattvānāṃ kṛtaśo ’nuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambodhukāmāḥ | tat kasya hetoḥ | saced bhagavann ayam trisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātus tathāgataiḥ paripūrṇaḥ syāt | tadyathāpi nāma naḍasvanam vā veṇuvanam vā ikṣuvanam vā śaravanam vā śāli-vanam vā | te tathāgatāḥ kalpaṃ vā kalpāvaśeṣam vā dharmam deśayeyuḥ | ekaikaś ca tathāgato ’prameyān asaṃkhyeyān aparimānān sattvān parinirvāpayet | na ca bhagavan sattvadhātor ūnatvaṃ vā pūrṇatvaṃ vā prajñāyate | tat kasya hetoḥ | sattvāsadbhūtātām upādāya sattvaviviktātām upādāya | evam ekaikasyām diśi yāvad daśasu diḥsu sarvaloka-dhātavaḥ tathāgataiḥ paripūrṇā bhavēyuh | tadyathāpi nāma naḍavanam vā veṇuvanam vā ikṣuvanam vā śaravanam vā śālivanam vā | te ca tathāgatās tiṣṭhantaḥ kalpaṃ vā kalpāvaśeṣam vā dharmam deśayeyuḥ | ekaikaś ca tathāgato ’prameyān asaṃkhyeyān aparimānān sattvān parinirvāpayet | na ca bhagavan sattvadhātor ūnatvaṃ vā pūrṇatvaṃ vā prajñāyate | tat kasya hetoḥ | sattvāsadbhūtātām upādāya sattvaviviktātām upādāya |* My translation is heavily modified from that of Conze (1975: 304).

⁶⁷ There are a number of ways of calculating what is meant by the term here, *trisāhasra-mahāsāhasra-lokadhātu*, but since its precise meaning is clearly irrelevant, the sense of magnitude being the point, I offer an imprecise impressionistic rendering.

could not discern the decrease or increase of the realm of beings. Why? On account of the non-be-ing [*a-sat*] of beings [*sat-tva*], on account of the isolatedness of beings. (And the same would be true if all the world systems in all the ten directions were considered.)

An even more extreme version of more or less the same passage is found in another text belonging to the same genre, the *Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā*, which offers a passage replete with wordplay and a sort of linguistic and conceptual deconstruction which comes across very poorly (or not at all) in translation. That said, the passage is worth presenting as an example of the deconstruction of the notions at play here. In the translation below I have translated *dhātu* as ‘realm’ or ‘quintessence’ according to my understanding of the particular context,⁶⁸ but the reader should remember that in Sanskrit there is one and only one word being deployed here, and in a number of cases below it might have been better to give both renderings together, as I did above:⁶⁹

⁶⁸ To a great extent my interpretation and identification of the semantics of *dhātu* in particular follows the Chinese rendering of Xuanzang, T. 220 (VII) 1070a17–b15. However, I have not attempted to record the differences between Xuanzang’s rendering and the Sanskrit text, which would require careful study.

⁶⁹ Hikata (1958: 14,20–15,24; cf. de Jong 1977: 192–193): *satvadhātur ity asatvatāyā etad adhivacanam | na hi satvaḥ satve saṁvidyate | asaṁvidyamānatvāt satvadhātoḥ | yadi satve satvaḥ syāt nocyeta satvadhātur iti | adhātunidarśanam etad satvadhātur iti | adhātuko hi satvadhātuḥ | yadi satvadhātau satvadhātur bhavet sa jīvas tac charīram bhavet | atha satvadhātunirmukto dhātur bhavet | adhātuko hi satvadhātuḥ | dhātuḥ saṁketena vyavahārapadam gacchati | na hi satvadhātau dhātuḥ saṁvidyate | nāpy anyatra satvadhātoḥ satvadhātuḥ saṁvidyate | adhātukā hi sarvadharmāḥ |*

idam ca me saṁdhāya bhāṣitam | na satvadhātor ūnatvaṁ vā pūrṇatvaṁ vā prajñāyate | tat kasmād dhetoḥ | asatvāt satvadhātor viviktatvāt satvadhātoḥ | yathā ca satvadhātor nonatvaṁ na pūrṇatvaṁ prajñāyate | evaṁ sarvadharmāṇām api nonatvaṁ na pūrṇatvaṁ prajñāyate | sarvadharmāṇām hi na kācit pariniṣpattiḥ | yenaśāṁ ūnatvaṁ vā pūrṇatvaṁ vā bhavet | ya evaṁ sarvadharmāṇām anubodhaḥ | sa ucyate sarvadharmānubodha iti |

iyam ca mayā saṁdhāya vāg bhāṣitā | yathā satvadhātor nonatvaṁ na pūrṇatvaṁ prajñāyate | evaṁ sarvadharmāṇām api nonatvaṁ na pūrṇatvaṁ prajñāyata iti | yac ca sarvadharmāṇām anūnatvam apūrṇatvam <tad deleted with de Jong> apariniṣpattiyogena tad eva buddhadharmāṇām api anūnatvam apūrṇatvam | evaṁ sarvadharmāṇām anubodhād buddhadharmāṇām anūnatvam apūrṇatvam | sarvadharmāṇām anūnatvād apūrṇatvād buddhadharmāṇām ity | tena tad buddhadharmāṇām adhivacanam | na hi buddhadharmāḥ kenacic chakyā ūnā vā pūrṇā vā kartum | tat kasmād dhetoḥ | sarvadharmānubodha eṣaḥ | yaś ca sarvadharmānubodhas tatra na kasyacid dharmasya ūnatvaṁ vā

The 'realm of beings' is a synonym of the state of lack of being. For no be-ing exists in a being because of the fact of the present non-be-ing of the quintessence of beings. If there were to be a being in be-ing, one could not use the term 'realm of beings.' 'Realm of beings' is an indication of no realm, for the realm of beings has no realm. If there were a quintessence of beings within the realm of beings, then life would be the body. Then the quintessence would be free from the realm of beings, for the realm of beings has no quintessence. 'Realm' is used as a conventional designation, for no quintessence exists in the realm of beings, nor does there exist a realm of beings elsewhere than the quintessence of beings, for all things are without quintessence.

I say this with hidden intention: no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings is discerned.

Why? Because of the lack of be-ing in the realm of beings, because of the isolation of the realm of beings. And as no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings would be discerned, so too no diminution or expansion of all things would be discerned. For there is no perfection [and consequent disappearance in nirvāṇa?] whatsoever of all things, through which there would be this diminution or expansion. Such a profound understanding of all things is called 'profound understanding of all things.'

I have spoken of this with a hidden intention, saying: As no diminution or expansion of the realm of beings is discerned, so too no diminution or expansion of all things is discerned. The absence of diminution and expansion of all things [*sarvadharmā*] due to the absence of perfection is precisely the absence of diminution and expansion of the buddha-qualities [*buddhadharma*] as well. Because of such a profound understanding of all things, there is the absence of diminution and expansion of the buddha-qualities. Because of the absence of diminution and expansion of all things, they are called 'buddha-qualities.' Therefore this is a synonym of the buddha-quali-

*pūrṇatvaṃ vā | sarvadharmā iti dharmadhātor etad adhivacanam | na ca dharmadhātor
 ūnatvaṃ vā pūrṇatvaṃ vā | tat kasya hetoḥ | ananto hi dharmadhātuḥ | na hi satvadhātoś
 ca dharmadhātoś ca nānātvam upalabhyate | nāpi satvadhātor vā dharmadhātor vā ūna-
 tvaṃ vā pūrṇatvaṃ vopalabhyate vā saṃvidyate vā | ya evam anubodha iyaṃ ucyate
 bodhir iti |*

ties, for no one can cause the buddha-qualities to diminish or expand. Why? This is the profound understanding of all things, and in the profound understanding of all things there is no diminution or expansion of any thing. ‘All things’ is a synonym of the dharma-realm [*dharmadhātu*]. And there is no diminution or expansion of the dharma-realm. Why? For the dharma-realm is endless; for no distinction appears between the realm of beings and the dharma realm, nor does there appear or exist any diminution or expansion of the realm of beings and the dharma-realm. Profound understanding in this manner is termed ‘awakening.’

One of the things brought out by these, in some respects obscure, passages is the flexibility of the term *dhātu*. It is very clear both that the polyvalency of the word—or at least its bivalency as both ‘realm’ and ‘quintessence’—is essential to the message of the authors of some scriptures, including the AAN, and that this built-in ambiguity presents a challenge to translators, modern and ancient. The solution of the translator of the AAN, Bodhiruci, was to maintain the identity of the term throughout by retaining a single translation equivalent, *jiè* 界, such that *sattvadhātu* in the sense of ‘realm of beings’ is indistinguishable in Chinese from *sattvadhātu* in the sense of ‘quintessence of beings.’ Other translators chose other solutions, including the translator of the RGV.⁷⁰ In that text *dharmadhātu* is often *fǎjiè* 法界, but also *fǎxìng* 法性, *sattvadhātu* is usually *zhòngshēngjiè* 衆生界 but also *zhòngshēngxìng* 衆生性, *nirvāṇadhātu* is *nièpánjiè* 涅槃界 while *buddhadhātu* is *fóxìng* 佛性 and *tathāgatadhātu* is *rúláixìng* 如來性 (or an extended form, *rúlái zhī xìng* 如來之性).⁷¹ It is evident that while the RGV in Sanskrit makes full use of the broad semantic range of the term *dhātu*, as do its sources, in its Chinese translation no consistent treatment was carried through. We

⁷⁰ See, though too brief, Ichikawa (1960), and Takasaki (1966: 290–291n175, and the note to §10i[b–c]).

⁷¹ The following makes no pretension to completeness: *dharmadhātu* = *fǎjiè* 法界: Johnston 1950: 32.7 = T. 1611 [XXXI] 830a20; 32.9 = 830a22; 35.3 = 831a1; 39.4 = 831c19; *dharmadhātu* = *fǎxìng* 法性: 9.18 = 823b1; 24.15 = 827c13; *sattvadhātu* = *zhòngshēngjiè* 衆生界 is common, but = *zhòngshēngxìng* 衆生性: 6.1 = 822a13; *nirvāṇadhātu* = *nièpánjiè* 涅槃界: 58.13 = 836c3; 59.7 = 836c27; *buddhadhātu* = *fóxìng* 佛性: 5.5 = 821c27; 35.18 = 831a7; 36.2 = 831a11; *tathāgatadhātu* = *rúláixìng* 如來性: 6.8 = 822a21–22; 54.3 = 835a26; = *rúlái zhī xìng* 如來之性: 72.8 = 839a13. Some unusual equivalents include: *anāsravadhātu* = 無漏法界: 39.3 = 831c18, while at 56.10 = 835c18 the same Sanskrit is rendered 無漏界; *tathāgatadhātu* = 如來性因 at 72.10 = 839a16.

should not attribute this variety to sloppiness. As Suzuki points out, in the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*, *dhātu* is both the cause within beings which enables them to attain buddhahood and at the same time the essence of the Buddha, the *dhātu* within each being which is like the *dhātu* of the Buddha which rests in a *stūpa*, the relic.⁷² In light of such a wide semantic range, it is simply impossible to expect an unannotated translation—whether it be into Classical Chinese or modern English—to convey anything like the full sense of the term. The broad scope of this key term in the AAN becomes all the clearer when we appreciate the pairing of *sattva-dhātu* with *dharmadhātu*.

The key term *dharmadhātu* is rich with significance and central to (not to mention, once again, polyvalent in) the AAN, as it was in some of the passages cited above. It is again paired with *sattvadhātu* in several other scriptures, such as the **Aniṣabodhisattvaparivarta* (*Bushun pusa pin* 不問菩薩品), a text from the Mahāsaṃnipāta collection:⁷³

There may be bodhisattvas who perceive two realms, a realm of beings [*sattvadhātu*] and a dharma-realm [*dharmadhātu*]. They perceive the realm of beings as having the nature of the dharma-realm, and they perceive the dharma-realm as having the nature of the realm of beings. Apart from the dharma-realm there is no realm of beings. In both the dharma-realm and the realm of beings, nothing is produced and nothing is destroyed. If one is able to penetrate this thoroughly, this is called insight into the fact that nothing is produced. Insight into the fact that nothing is produced is precisely the intellectual tolerance of the fact that nothing is produced (*anutpattika-dharma*]*kṣānti*).

⁷² Suzuki (2000: 80).

⁷³ T. 397 (7) (XIII) 43c19–23: 若有菩薩觀二種界：一衆生界。二者法界。以法界性觀衆生性，以衆生性觀法界性。若離法界無衆生界。法界衆生界無生無滅。若能如是通達知者，名無生智。無生智者即無生忍。The passage is translated in Shiu (2006: 107). No version other than the Chinese translation is known to exist.

Such passages could be multiplied,⁷⁴ but the point is clear: numerous texts are aware of the issue of the extent of the *sattvadhātu*, and the question whether it increases or decreases, it being virtually universally denied that this is the case. Several texts, in fact, go on to state a position also maintained by the AAN, namely the identity of the realm of beings with the dharma-realm.⁷⁵ In the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, for instance, we read:⁷⁶ “There is ultimately no distinction between the dharma-realm and the realm of beings. To thoroughly understand all realms is to understand the domain of the tathāgata.” A passage in the *Trāyastriṃśatparivarta* extends the identity of the dharma-realm and the realm of beings to all existence:⁷⁷ “Just as the dharma-realm, so is the realm of beings. Just as the realm of beings, so too is the domain of the buddha. All dharmas are also like that.” The *Ratna-cūḍaparipṛcchā* says the following:⁷⁸

⁷⁴ For instance, the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, Derge Kanjur 44, *phal chen, ka* 320a2ff. = T. 278 [IX] 470b15ff.; *Daji piyuwang jing* 大集譬喻王經, T. 422 (XIII) 954c17–21; **Mañjuśrī-vihārasūtra*, Derge Kanjur 196, *mdo sde, tsa* 270a7–b4 = T. 471 (XIV) 514a15–24 = T. 470 (XIV) 511b28–c7; *Sarvapuṇyasamuccayasamādhi*, Derge Kanjur, Tōh 134, *mdo sde, na* 106b7–107a5; **Mahāyānābhisamaya-sūtra* (?), T. 673 [XVI] 643a21–b3.

⁷⁵ As an aside, as Ruegg (1969: 265n2) points out (his reference to *Catuḥśataka* is a slip for *Catuḥstava*), this identity is expressed in Nāgārjuna’s *Acintyastava* verse 42 (Lindtner 1982: 154), as follows: *buddhānām sattvadhātoś ca tenābhinnatvam arthataḥ | ātmanas ca pareṣām ca samatā tena te matā ||*, “Thus in truth there is no distinction between buddhas and the realm of beings, thus you believe in the equality of self and others.” (The citation in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* [La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 590.14–15] has *vena* for *tena* in b, which may be better: “since ... thus ...”). The Tibetan translation renders here not *sattvadhātu* but *dharmadhātu*, *chos dbyings*, while in the Tibetan version of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* we have instead (Derge Kanjur 3872, *dbu ma, la*, 281b6–7): *sangs rgyas rnams dang sems can khams || don gyis de dang tha dad med || bdag nyid kyang ni gzhan rnams kyang || de dang mnyam par khyod bzhed legs ||*, in contrast to the version of the *Acintyastava*: *sangs rgyas dang chos dbyings dang || des na don du tha mi dad || bdag nyid dang ni gzhan rnams dang || des na mnyam par khyod bzhed lags ||*.

⁷⁶ T. 279 [X] 69a21–22: 法界衆生界 究竟無差別 一切悉了知 此是如來境. Derge Kanjur 44, *phal chen, ka* 209b5–6: *chos kyi dbyings ni tha mi dad || sems can khams rnams rtogs par mkhyen || dbyings rnams thams cad rab tu brnyes || de ni sangs rgyas yul yin no ||*.

⁷⁷ Derge Kanjur 223, *mdo sde, dza* 146a1: *chos kyi dbyings ji lta ba bzhin du sems can gyi khams kyang de dang 'dra'o || sems can gyi khams ji lta ba bzhin du sangs rgyas kyi yul yang de dang 'dra'o || chos thams cad kyang de dang 'dra'o ||*

⁷⁸ Derge Kanjur 91, *dkon brtsegs, cha* 230a1–3: *rigs kyi bu de ltar chos rnams la chos kyi rjes su lta zhing dran pa nye [xylograph prints nyi] bar gzhas pa la gnas pa'i byang chub sems dpa' de ni chos kyi dbyings dbyer med pa'i phyir dran pa la gnas te | de chos thams cad chos*

Noble devotee, examining in this way objects of mind in terms of objects of mind (**dharme dharmānu*√*ḍṛś-*) the bodhisattva who dwells in the foundation of mindfulness (**smṛtyupasthāna*) dwells in mindfulness because it is inseparable from the dharma-realm (**dharmadhātvasambhinna*). He knows that all things (*dharmā*) are included in the dharma-realm. The dharma-realm is precisely the realm of beings. He comprehends that because the dharma-realm is inseparable [from the realm of beings?], the realm of beings is inseparable [from the dharma-realm?]. He understands that that dharma-realm and the realm of beings are both equivalent to the realm of space (**ākāśadhātu*). Knowing that all things belong to a single realm (**ekadhātu*), even while examining objects of mind in terms of objects of mind, there will be neither attachment to nor views (**ḍṛṣṭi*) regarding the objects.

Finally, an interesting pair of verses found both in the *Pūrvasāilanikāyānuvarttanā-gāthā*—whence it is quoted in the *Prasannapadā* and *Madhyamakāvātāra*, and in the *Lokānuvartanā-sūtra*—seems to come part way toward the position of the AAN, or to surpass it, in that it accepts only the *dharmadhātu*, relegating the *sattvadhātu* to the realm of notions taught by the Buddha only in conformity to the expectations of the world:⁷⁹

kyi dbyings su 'du bar rab tu shes so || chos kyi dbyings gang yin pa de nyid sems can gyi khams so || de chos kyi dbyings dbyer med pas sems can gyi khams dbyer med par khong du chud do || chos kyi dbyings gang yin pa dang sems can gyi khams gang yin pa de gnyi ga yang nam mkha'i dbyings dang mtshungs par rab tu shes so || des chos thams cad dbyings gcig tu shes nas chos rnam la chos kyi rjes su lta zhing gnas kyang chos la mngon par chags shing lta bar yang mi 'gyur ro || The Chinese versions appear to differ substantially: T. 397 (11) [XIII] 178a18–23: 復次，善男子，菩薩摩訶薩觀法法念，不分別法界。如法界，衆生界亦如是。如是二界名虛空界。一切諸法悉入法界。夫法界者，即衆生界。衆生界者，即無分別。是名觀察一切法等。見一切界，即是法界。雖明了見而心不著，以不著故，則無分別。T. 310 (47) [XI] 663c16–20: 佛告族姓子：其觀於法了法本無。爲意止者，不壞法界其意自然，而得意止。彼導法界曉了諸法，計其法界及與人界。於彼法界，亦無所壞不毀人界。人界法界，此二事者，等如空界。彼以一界普見諸法。See Katō (2000) who observes another connection between this sūtra and the AAN.

⁷⁹ Harrison (1982: 225–226), Yonezawa (2010: 139). The verse, evidently really only understandable in Prakrit, is badly transmitted and has not so far been reconstructed convincingly. I more or less follow the translation of Harrison, while aware that it is far from definitive. For what it is worth, the verse might look something like: *ṇa viṇaddham ṇa upaṇṇam dharmadhāusamam jagam | sattadhāum cedam śesi eṣā loṇṇuvattanā || tisu adhvāsu sattāṇam pakati nopalambhatī | sattadhāum cedam śesi eṣā loṇṇuvattanā ||*.

Not destroyed, not produced, the world is equivalent to the dharma-realm,

But he taught this realm of beings; this is [only] in conformity with the world.

He does not apprehend the original nature of beings in the three times,

But he taught this realm of beings; this is [only] in conformity with the world.

If these verses have been understood at least minimally correctly, the first asserts that while the *dharmadhātu* is all that there really is, the Buddha spoke also of the *sattvadhātu* because common language and expectation lead us to think in these terms. This seems to be a position equally radical to that of the AAN, although going in a slightly different direction. At least for the AAN, the ‘identity’ of the *sattvadhātu* with the Absolute (if we may term it that) is the very heart of its message. This is, however, for the AAN less an ontological assertion than a soteriological promise: and here lies the powerful vision of the AAN. All of reality is unitary—what the AAN calls the ‘single realm,’ *ekadhātu*. But this identity of reality is not mere description. This unitary foundation appears in several guises. Arguably the central philosophical notion of the AAN, though one which appears not to be an innovation of the text, is precisely that these three modalities, or perhaps better, ‘aspects,’ through which this single realm appears provide the ground for spiritual cultivation. A common ground underlies the realm of ordinary beings, bodhisattvas and awakened buddhas, and consequently, the map of reality is by definition also fundamentally a map to liberation: ordinary beings, those perhaps not very far along the spiritual path, are less pure than bodhisattvas, who in turn are less pure than those who have achieved the goal, buddhas. These three, however, belong not to different realms but to a single realm, although they appear as if they are distinct, not because of their nature, but because—as will be explained—adventitious defilements prevent realization of this inherent unity. Despite the prominence of this three-fold division, it is well to note that the bodhisattva plays only a very small part in this scheme. In fact, one might even say that, structurally speaking, the place of the bodhisattva in the AAN is somewhat akin to that of the lone buddha (*pratyekabuddha*) in the classical Mahāyāna scheme of auditor (*śrāvaka*), lone buddha and bodhisattva, in which the lone buddha

receives almost no attention, and seems to exist in the scheme for purely formal reasons. One can see this clearly in the AAN §15ii, when after discussing the three it states (in the Sanskrit version): “Therefore the quintessence of beings is not different from the dharma-body. The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body. The dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. This [pair] is nondual with respect to meaning; only the designations differ.” Perhaps as a result of this relative unimportance, the sentences devoted to the bodhisattva in the tripartite scheme in the AAN are very hard to understand.

The terminology inherited by the authors of the AAN speaks of ordinary beings and of *dharmakāya*, *dharmadhātu* and *tathāgatagarbha*, all of which share in the essential identity of all existence. Although it is not possible to posit one of these terms as being most potent, the word *dharmakāya* is certainly a highly pregnant term which has several distinct semantic ranges. In modern scholarship the most well-known of these is as one of the three bodies (*trikāya*) of the Buddha, and in that context its meaning has been taken to indicate something like ‘transcendental buddhahood.’ As Paul Harrison (1992) has demonstrated, however, it more originally had the sense of ‘totality of dharmas,’ ‘the body of dharmas’ in the sense that a buddha is one who embodies his teachings, or more broadly, the ultimate truths of reality.

The reified *dharmakāya* as the matured, completed state of Buddhahood may be, Harrison proposes, an innovation of the Yogācāra school, assuming that the term in scholastic contexts has been properly understood. While it is hard to be certain of the exact sense intended by *dharmakāya* in the AAN, its depiction as equivalent to the fundamental ground of reality suggests that it was imagined in a sense closer to a reified ‘absolute’ than as a (mere?) ‘totality of dharmas.’ The AAN posits its *dharmakāya* as appearing under different aspects—impure, part-pure and part-impure, and pure—and thus as constituting the ground of all being, both defiled and pure, both ‘ordinary’ and transcendent. These three aspects are equated, respectively, with (ordinary) beings, bodhisattvas, and *tathāgatas*. This presentation seems to assume some kind of monistic standpoint, which may well justify a reified interpretation of *dharmakāya* as ‘body of the buddha’ in the sense of an absolute principle of transcendent reality. Although I refer here to ‘monism,’ this is not necessarily to be understood in precisely the sense intended by Obermiller, who sometimes used this term to point to *śūnyatā*-

based Madhyamaka ideas.⁸⁰ The monism of the AAN consists in its vision of an essential unity to all (sentient) existence: the basic reason why there is no increase or decrease in the realm of beings, despite the attainment of awakening by beings, is that the domain of existence is fundamentally unitary. This is the meaning of the *ekadhātu* propounded by the AAN.

By means of its absolutely monistic standpoint, the AAN logically side-steps questions such as those concerning the beginning and end of saṃsāra, and such views are castigated as among those doomed to lead one astray. Much debate is recorded on the question of the origin of saṃsāra and its eventual end, but none of this is at all relevant for the authors of the AAN since, for them, saṃsāra is nothing more than a mode of overall being. There is no question of beings “being” in saṃsāra and then undergoing some “nirvanization,” after which they no longer inhabit saṃsāra, and equally no question of the swelling of the realm of nirvāṇa, a possibility also considered (and rejected) by traditional scholastics and by authors of scriptures, as discussed above. There is only one reality, one state of “the way things are,” termed among other things *dharmatā* or *dharmadhātu*, not in any reified sense of another *mode* of being, but rather as the absolute *ground* of being, of “is-ness.” While it states this three-fold reality within which ordinary beings, bodhisattvas as those progressing toward awakening, and tathāgatas differ only subjectively, so to speak, what the AAN does not address is how one may transform oneself from ordinary being afflicted by defilements to purified awakened one.

The reality of the three modes is something beyond the ken of ordinary beings, and even of auditors and lone buddhas. This underlying reality, the dharma-body, is by definition the full collection of the qualities which

⁸⁰ Obermiller (1931: 95, 104). However, when he states (p. 106): “We see that Āryāśāṅga in his last work has come to a fully monistic and pantheistic conception. The statement that ‘the fundamental element of a living being and the Cosmical Body of the Buddha are the same, there being a difference only in the names,’ is a very pregnant expression of his standpoint,” Obermiller is doing nothing other than quoting the AAN. His immediately following reference to a further passage also refers to an expression of the AAN, and therefore one might well argue that as far as the RGV is concerned, what Obermiller saw as monism was indeed the doctrine of the AAN. His overall stance is a bit confusing, however, since he also translates Dignāga for instance (1933, 1936: 247) saying “Prajñā-pāramitā is the pure monistic spiritual principle,—the Divine Wisdom which is devoid of every differentiation into subject and object.” This śūnyavādin idea seems not quite the same as what the AAN is saying. Cp. Ruegg (1969: 3–4, 268n5).

identify, and indeed constitute, a buddha. In other words, the dharma-body is buddhahood, and this is the most fundamental reality, not only of awakened existence but of all modes of existence. But we must take care: to use the word ‘existence’ here may lead to confusion if it were to be read to imply existence as opposed to non-existence, saṃsāra as opposed to nirvāṇa. No such dichotomy is possible for the vision of the AAN.

One and ‘the same’ dharma-body manifests or appears as ordinary beings when it is covered by defilements, in which case it transmigrates, or seems to transmigrate—the sūtra does not attempt a distinction here—through realms of existence. It appears as one on the path, as a bodhisattva, when it has attitudes indicative of dissatisfaction with transmigration and of attraction to the path set forth by the Buddha. It is plain that this characterization of the dharma-body as bodhisattva is not precisely parallel to that of the dharma-body as ordinary being, since the latter portrays an essence concealed beneath shrouds of negative elements while the former refers explicitly to volition, attitude and activity (§14ii). Final perfection, buddhahood, is the same dharma-body free from all negativity, on the one hand, and perfect in all of its aspirations on the other. The AAN’s repetition (§§10iii and 15ii) of its complete identification of ordinary existence with buddhahood frames its discussion of this topic, which it then elaborates with its three-fold typology.

Ordinary beings are qualified thus (§14i, in the Sanskrit): “This very dharma-body, hidden by tens of millions of sheaths of limitless defilements, borne along by the current of transmigration, wandering through deaths and births in the destinies of beginningless and endless transmigration, is termed ‘The quintessence/realm of beings.’” Bodhisattvas (§14ii) are described as follows: “That very dharma-body, being disgusted with the suffering of the currents of transmigration, indifferent to all objects of pleasure, practicing the practice which leads to awakening, by means of the eighty-four thousand teachings which include the ten perfections, is termed ‘bodhisattva.’” Finally, buddhas are described (§15i) in these terms: “This very dharma-body, thoroughly freed of all sheaths of defilements, having transcended all sufferings, the stains of all defilements vanished, well and truly pure, fixed in the Absolute Reality that is ultimately pure, risen to the stage looked forward to by all beings, having attained peerless heroic strength with respect to all spheres of knowledge, perfected in sovereign

power over all things free of all hindrances and unobstructed—this is termed “Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfect Buddha.” There follow in §§17i~19i three descriptions of the variant natures of the embryo of the tathāgatas, obviously meant to correspond to these three types. However, it is extremely difficult to understand these precisely. On the assumption that their ordering corresponds to that above, namely ordinary being, bodhisattva and buddha, they seem to identify the modes of the embryo of the tathāgatas as follows:

ordinary being: “The nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and has a pure nature is in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and the quality of being inconceivable. From the beginningless beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated [with it].”

bodhisattva: “The embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it], is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing, is from the very beginning free and released, not associated [with it], covered by defilements and is impure. It can only be cut [free] by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.”

buddha: “The nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant, and existing is precisely the basis of all qualities [definitive of a buddha]. It is furnished with all [such] qualities, joined with all [such] qualities, and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all [such] qualities, it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.”

I frankly admit that, although this is arguably one of the most central portions of the AAN, much remains obscure to me. The overall point, however, should be clear, namely that the three modes are nothing more than modalities of the embryo of the tathāgatas, variously related to ultimate Reality. Upon this basis, to conceptualize reality as limited in one way or another, as would be required in order to speak of an increase or decrease in the number of beings, makes no sense at all.

The complete failure to find increase in any one realm or decrease in another—to conclude that the realm of *nirvāṇa* does not expand nor the realm of beings contract—despite spiritual ripening, despite the attainment of buddhahood by beings who, once defiled, purify themselves through cultivation as *bodhisattvas*, is both true and, as the AAN concedes, inconceivable. While this may seem to be little more than a rhetorical slight of hand, intended to salve an audience which might sense some discontinuity in the text's logic, it is also something more. Starting from a standpoint in which defilements require purification, and perfection consists in the complete absence of defilements, it is hard to logically argue both that the defiled and the pure are fundamentally equivalent and that, simultaneously, practice is necessary. The AAN does not argue solely for the essential unity of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.⁸¹ Rather, it takes a classical Mahāyāna position in which ontology and soteriology fuse.

Much that would be required to more precisely understand the AAN's fine philosophical position is, it seems to me, missing from the text itself, which is to say, it is assumed by its authors. An example is evident in the AAN's deployment of the preexisting technical term *dharmakāya*. While the AAN presents the *dharmakāya* as the fundamental, unitary ground of all existence, in which ordinary beings then appear as the defiled, transient aspect of the unitary and real existence, it makes not the slightest effort to explain the terminology of the notion itself. *Bodhisattvas* are in turn a kind of pivotal, dynamic aspect, wherein the defiled is in the process of becoming the pure but, as discussed above, this is hardly expanded upon. Finally, the state of buddhahood is the realization of the pure, undefiled essence, the accomplishment of the original, pure, essence. Before we consider this process of purification in more detail, however, we should turn our attention to the other key terms employed here.

The term *tathāgatagarbha*, here rendered as “embryo of the *tathāgatas*,” has given rise to much discussion.⁸² In brief, following Zimmerman, it may

⁸¹ Ruegg (1969: 268): “La non-dualité (*advaya*) du *tathāgatagarbha* (ou *sattvadhātu*) et du *dharmakāya* [in the AAN] doit sans doute s'expliquer de la même manière que la doctrine de la non-dualité du *saṃsāra* et du *nirvāṇa*.”

⁸² Important studies include Ruegg (1969: 499–516), Zimmermann (2002: 42–46), and many of the studies by Takasaki, but to these much could be added. While most scholarship, to be sure, concentrates on later systematic analyses, rather than scriptural presentations, the portrayals in the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda* and Mahāyāna

be said that when beings are characterized by the term *tathāgatagarbha*, the word may have the sense of the “embryo of a/the tathāgata(s) within all living beings” or living beings as “the womb of the tathāgata,” understanding the compound as a tatpuruṣa, while as a bahuvrīhi one may understand that “living beings contain a tathāgata,” or “living beings contain a tathāgata as an embryo.”⁸³ Zimmermann concludes that the best interpretation is as a bahuvrīhi, “containing a tathāgata.” If he is right, and if his results hold also for the AAN, then when the text says that the *sattvadhātu* (here to be understood as “quintessence of beings”) is *tathāgatagarbha*, the meaning is that beings contain the nascent state (embryo) of buddhahood. In other words, the quintessence of beings is to contain a tathāgata; their nature is to be loci of future buddhas. As Zimmermann states, for the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*, beings carry a full-fledged tathāgata within themselves; “the nature of living beings is not different from that of the Buddha and these living beings will become buddhas themselves once the sheaths of defilements have been removed.”⁸⁴ This stance fits perfectly with what is presented in the AAN and, as I have suggested above, seems to have been assumed as a basis by its authors, although they nowhere trouble themselves to explain anything like this.

Perhaps the least problematic of the central terms used with reference to the totally pure are, ironically, *dharmadhātu*, the dharma-realm or the quintessence of the dharma, and *dharmatā*, an abstract noun from *dharmā* whose meaning is even less evident, but probably should be understood in the AAN as something like ‘the nature of reality as it is.’ I find this situation ironic both because here again the AAN does not trouble itself to explain either term, and because both terms are abstract to the point of virtually defying translation or clear definition. What the AAN does devote slightly more attention to is the question of the ultimate equivalence of absolute and mundane from the point of view of essential nature.

In §17ii, we read: “Regarding this dharma-realm of pure thusness, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind, which is an incon-

Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra at least have drawn some scholarly attention.

⁸³ Takasaki (1973: 297) asserts that the AAN (as the *Śrīmālādevīsīmaṇāda* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*) never uses the term as a bahuvrīhi, but he does not defend this assertion.

⁸⁴ Zimmermann (2002: 50).

ceivable teaching.” This sentence as quoted in MDN presents the idea slightly differently: “This pure dharma-nature (**dharmatā*) is precisely the dharma-realm. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it as an inconceivable teaching.” Soon after, in §18ii, the text speaks of “the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements.” There is a long history of this idea of the intrinsically pure or naturally luminous mind and its (apparent) defilement,⁸⁵ going back to a much discussed passage in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* (I.6.1–2) which reads:⁸⁶ “Luminous, monks, is this mind, but sometimes it is defiled by adventitious defilements. ... sometimes it is free from adventitious defilements.” In fact, this expression is often cited, and an argument can be made that the authors of the AAN were familiar with it in a form close to what we find here, since the full form of the first phrase just cited is: “Luminous, monks, is this mind, but sometimes it is defiled by adventitious defilements. Ignorant common people do not understand this in accord with reality,”⁸⁷ and this second portion is nearly exactly what we read in the AAN §4i, which begins “Because all foolish common people do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality ...”⁸⁸

⁸⁵ A sketch of the place of ‘purity’ from the Upaniṣads to the AAN and *Śrīmālādevī* is given in Fujita (1992). An excellent examination of the idea in toto is Shinoda (1964). See also the detailed study of Nakamura (1975). Michael Radich brings to my attention the following bibliography, which I cite on his authority: Kaginushi (1978), Miyasawa (1991), Keenan (1982), Ye (1974), Hasegawa (1998), Nishi (1968), Fujita (1982, 1986a, 1986b).

⁸⁶ Morris (1885: i.10,11–16): *pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkilittṭhaṃ ... tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi vippamuttaṃ*. The same position appears, according to scholastic sources, to have been held by the Mahāsāṃghikas, Vibhajyavāda and by the (Dharmaguptaka) *Śāriputrābhidharma*, for which see Bareau (1955: 67–68, 175, 194), respectively, and the discussions in Takaoka (2007). Some of the theological problems related to this issue concern the nature of mind, including whether it exists more than momentarily; see Shih (2009) for a detailed discussion. See also Gethin (1994). Earlier discussions of the Theravāda tradition include Mizuno (1972). The discussion in what is probably the oldest scholastic source, the Spitzer manuscript, is studied in Franco (2000: 94–98). Ruegg (1969: 411–454) discusses later Madhyamaka and Yogācāra scholastic sources, as well as the RGV. For considerations on still later developments, see Sferra (1999).

⁸⁷ *taṃ assutavā puthujjano yathābhūtaṃ nappajānāti*.

⁸⁸ I do not mean that the authors of the AAN were necessarily familiar with a tradition like that transmitted in Pāli. However, as far as I know, so far no version of this whole expression has been found in other sources.

The expression for the intrinsically pure mind in the AAN is *zìxìng qīngjìng xīn* 自性清淨心, potentially a rendering of something like *prakṛtipariśuddhacitta* or *prakṛtiprabhāsvara* but, as demonstrated in Appendix 1, it is not possible to determine precisely what term stood in the Vorlage of the AAN. While we might expect a difference between a mind that is pure or purified and one that is luminous, in actual fact, it seems not to matter.

In brief, the general idea is that mind is fundamentally, originally, and naturally pure and undefiled. It is only by the accumulation of so-called incidental or adventitious defilements (*āgantukakleśa*, *kèchén fánǎo* 客塵煩惱) that this natural purity and luminosity of the mind is obscured.⁸⁹ What this means is not constant through the tradition, as Shih Ru-nien points out:⁹⁰

Unlike the Mahāyāna theory of tathāgatagarbha, which claims that the innately pure mind possesses all the virtues of the Buddha and that the revelation of this mind is the attainment of the Buddhahood, statements in the Pali texts only emphasize the knowledge of the innate purity of the mind as a prerequisite step in the cultivation of the mind and the restoration of the purity of the mind is not the end of religious practices. As a matter of fact, after the removal of the defilements, the mind is not only pure, tranquil, and luminous but also soft, pliant, and adaptable. It then becomes suitable for the destruction of all the āsavas or the cultivation of the seven limbs of wisdom, and the like. This means that the tranquil, luminous, and pliable mind is just the basis for further religious practice.

In the AAN, in line with a Mahayānistic approach, ultimately the intrinsically pure mind is identified with the *dharmadhātu* itself. It is inconceivable, the AAN says, that this mind which is so fouled by defilements is actually pure and luminous just as is the *dharmadhātu*, the pure ground of being itself, virtually identical with buddhahood. To say that this is inconceivable means that one cannot logically conceive how the ordinary mind of beings is identical with the purity of the *dharmadhātu*, the pure *dharmatā*. In other words, the initial and innate state of the mind is equivalent to awakening, and realizing this means that no further practice is necessary.

⁸⁹ See Takasaki (1975b).

⁹⁰ Shih (2009: 168).

However, as stressed above, this is beyond ordinary imagination, which leads the text to offer that those who do not understand—all save buddhas—can do nothing but have faith.

This idea of intrinsic purity is intimately linked, as we just saw, with the notion of adventitious defilement, the condition in which we find ourselves. In the AAN as in the *Śrīmālādevī*, the connection between the pure originary state of being and defilements is that the latter are temporarily associated with the former; the AAN goes on, however, to emphasize that there is something which *is* intrinsically associated with this originary state, namely the qualities of a buddha, that is to say, the nature of awakening itself. It is this of which the sūtra speaks when it associates *dharmadhātu*, *dharmatā* and *dharmakāya* with the *tathāgatagarbha*.⁹¹

While the AAN is noticeably silent on the question of practice, offering no practical or direct guidance for the practitioner who might wish to become awakened, it makes clear the necessary beginning point. One cannot simply jump to buddhahood; that is, one cannot simply leap to an understanding of the underlying unity of the three aspects of being. Rather, the AAN teaches that the profound meaning of its teaching cannot be understood by auditors and lone buddhas, much less ordinary beings, and that the only recourse for those who have not achieved the necessary insight is to have faith (*śrāddha*) in its meaning, saying (§10ii): “It is indeed only the wisdom of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport. (Despite) the wisdom possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāriputra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality.” A similar passage from the *Śrīmālādevī* reads:⁹² “[You, goddess, can understand the doctrine being preached, as can advanced bodhisattvas]. For the rest, goddess, all the auditors and lone buddhas, these two teachings are to be embraced only through faith in the Tathāgata.” The notion of faith as a fundamental element in Buddhist spiritual cultivation is far from unexpected, and it plays, moreover, a crucial role even in the RGV.⁹³ What it might have meant to the authors of the AAN, however, is not clear, beyond the

⁹¹ On this complicated question, see Appendix 2.

⁹² See the note to §10i(b–c).

⁹³ In the specific context of the tathāgatagarbha teaching, concentrating in the RGV see Takasaki (1964), and more briefly but also more broadly Ichikawa (1976).

obvious observation that they consider the essential truth they are preaching to be beyond the grasp of virtually all who might encounter it. Their deployment of faith can certainly be read—if a bit subversively—to signal their own lack of faith in the transparency of their message, and its lack of intuitive appeal. Seen from another perspective, however, it is also puzzling. For what it avers is that while the message of the AAN is offered to, presumably, ‘ordinary beings,’ they will never understand it *as long as they are not awakened*. At the same time, at least when read in light of the parallel expression in the *Śrīmālādevī*, the rejection of auditors and lone buddhas is a common Mahāyāna trope, and the *Śrīmālādevī* says explicitly that advanced bodhisattvas—the ‘middlemen’ of the AAN’s scheme—are capable of understanding, a reassuring and doctrinally expected assertion.

Is the possibility of spiritual progress held out to all equally? In §21ii of the sūtra, we encounter the term *icchāntika*, identified as one who holds the view that the realm of beings increases or decreases. The originality of this reference in the AAN is questionable, however, in the first place because the term does not occur in the Sanskrit quotation of the passage, despite the fact that the concept and the term *icchāntika* are well known to the RGV.⁹⁴ In the absence of any citation of this passage in the MDN it is hard to be sure, but it seems most likely that the reference occurred either in a recension of the sūtra different from that known to the compiler of the RGV, or that it was added in China.⁹⁵ Much has been written on this term, which is sometimes understood to refer to a category of individual who is forever debarred from reaching awakening, and thus identified with the *agoṭraka*, the individual who lacks the ‘genetics’ of buddhahood. This notion is not only unknown to the AAN, but would appear to be incoherent with its overall stance, suggesting that however *icchāntika* in the AAN may have been understood by whomever added it (as I suppose), it was not meant to imply the permanent impossibility of buddhahood. Regarding the meaning of the term, the hypothesis of Karashima Seishi is quite convincing. Suggest-

⁹⁴ It might be possible to argue that the author of the RGV simply felt no need to cite the AAN’s reference to *icchāntika* in his citation of the passage, but the immediate context in the RGV within which the AAN is quoted, in which precisely *icchāntika* is the topic of discussion, argues strongly against this. Takasaki (1975a: 379n33) also believes the reference not to have belonged to the original sūtra.

⁹⁵ The presence of the term in the Chinese translation of the RGV is easily explained in light of that translation’s demonstrably close reliance on the Chinese translation of the AAN.

ing that the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* “is probably the first text to contain this word,”⁹⁶ he proceeds to argue that “[a]ccording to the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, an *icchantika* ... is a monk who, claiming (or fanc[ying] ...) himself to be an Arhat, rejects the teaching of the *Vaipulya*—namely the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* itself—as told by *Māra*.”⁹⁷ In this perspective, an *icchantika* is one who rejects a certain version of the Mahāyāna teaching, namely that espoused by the authors of (at least portions of) the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*. From a rhetorical point of view, the term might then fall into a class similar to the term *hīnayāna*, which I understand to mean something like (roughly) “those idiots who refuse to accept that we are right.” However, in Karashima’s view, from this apparent beginning, an evolution in the meaning of *icchantika* takes place, one in which the earlier sense “one who claims (to be an authority),” thereby rejecting the authority of the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*, becomes “one who desires (transmigration),” this based in part at least on a reestimation of the etymological sense of the root $\sqrt{iṣ}$.⁹⁸ Like some other texts, the RGV assumes this latter sense, as when it says, for instance, *ye nāpi saṃsāram icchanti yathecchantikā*, “[Those beings] do not wish for transmigration, as do the *icchantikas*.”⁹⁹ For the *Laṅkāvatāra*, some beings, *icchantika*, simply do not desire deliverance.¹⁰⁰ To return to the AAN, however, given the isolation of the term, we simply do not possess any context which would help us to understand what the term might have meant to the scripture’s author or, as I would suggest, to those who added the term to the scripture at some later time.

⁹⁶ Karashima (2007: 73). For translations of some relevant passages from this sūtra, see Silk (2007: 268–270). For remarks on the *icchantika* in this text, see Tagami (2000).

⁹⁷ Karashima (2007: 76). Note that although the internal chronology of the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* is complex, if it is correct that the AAN was composed earlier than the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* (see note 36, above), this might serve as another argument for the secondary addition of the mention of *icchantika* in the AAN.

⁹⁸ Karashima (2007: 78). I am not quite sure whether every step in Karashima’s reasoning is as strong as his overall point.

⁹⁹ Johnston (1950: 28.14–15), Karashima (2007: 78). See Silk (2007: 271–274).

¹⁰⁰ See Ruegg (1969: 75). The exact reading of the Sanskrit text is not clear, but it involves something like *anicchantikatā mokṣe*. More details on this sūtra’s presentation are found in Ruegg (1969: 75–77); see the translation in Silk (2007: 270–271).

In addition to those aspects discussed above, the rhetoric of the AAN conveys its message in a number of rhetorically interesting ways. Time, for example, is an idea which percolates in the background of a number of Buddhist scriptural presentations. One might think, for instance, of the multiple layers of the *Sukhāvativyūha-sūtra*, in which the framing action takes place in the Buddha's time, since he is the preacher, while he narrates the time of Amitābha, the distant past as well as the present, and finally, though still simultaneously, the text works in the time of the listener, the audience, as well, since the narration of Amitābha and his vows is something that is active and valid in every present in which the text is heard.¹⁰¹ In a similar but somewhat different fashion, the notion of time is also fundamental to the AAN and its ontology (if it is indeed best understood as an ontology). The text speaks of 'beginningless time,' (*anavarāgra*, §§2, 14i[b]), of the present and the future (§§3i[d], 3ii[c], [e]), and of the long time during which one travels through transmigration. Likewise, it speaks of the time when the Tathāgata was in the world (the historical 'present' of the narration, but clearly the 'past' from the perspective of any intended audience) and of an age to come, 500 years after the death of the Buddha (§4i[b], [c]). As tempting as this may be, it is not possible to decide whether by this expression, the numeration of which is a stock example, the compilers of the scripture necessarily meant to indicate their 'present day,' and thus whether they intended the (again, stock) accompanying warning about degeneration of the teaching to serve as a comment on their contemporaneous circumstances.

The text identifies as erroneous views the idea that the world has a beginning or an end (§6[d], [e]), and speaks of the ultimate reality (variously named, for example as the *dharmakāya*) which is unlimited in both the past and the future (§13i[b]). The expression of this last term in particular is a bit problematic, since the text also says that the dharma-body is equal to this future limit (*aparāntakoṭīsamatā*, §§13ii[b], 16[f]).

A very important term related to time is *anāditva*, beginninglessness (Tola and Dragonetti 1980). Most fundamentally, beginninglessness is essential for Buddhist cosmology (and soteriology) because all that exists,

¹⁰¹ Much has been written on concepts of time in Buddhism, but I mention below only that most relevant for our narrow discussion. See specifically Takasaki (1966: 232n242; 1989: 280–281n3); Ruegg (1969: 205n3) does not add to Takasaki's considerations.

which is to say saṃsāra itself, is motivated by karma, action and its results. All existence is driven by karmic energy, such that, for instance, the circumstances of the individual, and of even the world or the universe as such, are created as a result of earlier actions (this karmic ‘savings’ surviving even the periodic devolution of the cosmos itself). If one thinks of karma in terms of inertia, the logic becomes clear: it is not possible to imagine an initial state of rest out of which motion begins on its own. Since beings qua saṃsāric entities are the sum-total of their karma, or karmic momentum, it is not possible to posit a state of rest *ab initio* out of which inertia or momentum could arise *ex nihilo*: there would have been no saṃsāra, no existence, before there was karmic energy, and thus one cannot posit a time before there was karma. The AAN says, “All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time” (§2), just as later it asserts that the *dharmakāya* rides the waves of saṃsāra from beginningless ages (§14i[b]). Given this logic of karmic inertia, Buddhist theorists were forced to assume beginninglessness as an ‘initial condition.’ This is a soteriological conclusion as well, directing attention away from any initial cause (since the search will lead only to infinite regress) and toward a future solution of the problem of saṃsāric cycling. If the cause of saṃsāra is karma, the solution is the future non-production of karma. This is standard Buddhist doctrine.

Beginninglessness is closely related to the notion of *nitya*, often translated as ‘permanent’ or even ‘eternal.’ As Tola and Dragonetti (1980: 2) point out, however, although later it acquires the notion of eternality through all time, in its early meaning this term refers to “permanency or eternity *in the future*” (my emphasis), and not to the idea of beginninglessness. Rather, *nitya(tva)* probably is best understood in English with terms such as ‘stable,’ ‘intransient,’ and ‘constant,’ since the notion is not one of eternal permanence. In fact, the key background for the use of the pair *nitya/anitya* is not ontology but soteriology. Therefore, the refusal to accept *nitya(tva)* is at basis an assertion of the possibility of spiritual progress, although perhaps needless to say this makes sense only in the broader context of the overall nature of the world. From that perspective, attention is paid to the origins of things—most of all, individuals—only from the standpoint of their possible future liberation. The AAN’s assertions about the nature of temporal reality likewise should be seen against this backdrop.

In the AAN a key term is *anavarāgra*, a word with special significance to the Yogācāra school,¹⁰² but which can be traced in Pāli as well to the form *anamattagga*. In fact, however, the history of this word is complex, and it is not a trivial task to determine how the authors of the AAN might have intended their use of it.¹⁰³ Although he was not the first to do so,¹⁰⁴ Sasaki has offered a suggestion for an etymology of the Pāli form *anamattagga* which makes sense of both word and meaning. A canonical passage, mentioning only the past, reads:¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² See for example Sasaki (1942), which takes as its starting point *Mahāyānasamgraha* I.1 (although the key term there is rather *anādikālika*); see the note to §16(d).

¹⁰³ The Pāli form *anamattagga* has been subjected to various analyses. Much of what follows in this note has been summarized by Sasaki (1978, 1984, 1986); see also Takasaki (1996). Pischel, in discussing the change of *m* > *v* (1981 §251), cites Ardhamāgadhi *aṇavadagga*, listing Jaina Māhāraṣṭrī “*aṇayagga* = Pāli *anamattagga* = *anamadagra*, from √*nam*.” His note suggests that this term as an adjective of *saṃsāra* “probably means ‘whereof the beginning is not bent off,’ = ‘what does not change’ = ‘endless.’” He goes on, “The scholiasts explain the word as *ananta*, *aparyanta*, *aparyavasāna* and mostly consider *avadagga*, *avayagga* as Deśī words used in the sense of ‘end,’ and, therefore, analyse the word as *aṇ+avadagga*.” A *Critical Pāli Dictionary* (Trenckner et al. 1924–: 156) writes the word as *an-amat’-agga*. It begins by citing Sanskrit *anavarāgra*, for which it cites the Tibetan equivalent *thog ma dang tha ma med pa*, “taking *avara* and *agra* as lowest and highest limit.” It goes on “*anavarāgra* is an adaptation of ≠ *A* [rdha]m[ā]g[adhī] *anava(d)agga*,” citing a commentary which understands *an+avayagga*, or *an+avanatāgra* or *an+avagatāgra*. The entry goes on to refer to Helmer Smith’s suggestion (1928–1966: 396n10 [§520]) “*an+amuto+agga* = ‘of which you cannot say that it begins from there or there.’” Edgerton (1953, s.v. *anavarāgra*) considers *anavarāgra* to be probably a hyper-Sanskrit form of *aṇavayagga*. He goes on to say that “it may, and probably does, mean *without beginning and end*,” but it appears as if the “it” in this sentence refers to the Sanskrit form as used in the texts studied by Edgerton. And indeed, there is a strong argument to be made that the meaning of the term—canonical and yet not well, or perhaps not at all, understood—shifted over time.

¹⁰⁴ I do not know if his is the first discussion, but see already Bapat (1955: 234–235).

¹⁰⁵ Feer (1884–1898: ii.178,8–10 [15.1.1.3]): *anamattaggāyaṃ bhikkhave saṃsāro pubbā koṭi na paññāyati avijjānivarāṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsamyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsaratāṃ*. Very similar passages appear elsewhere. Among Chinese equivalents, see T. 99 (II) 240b20–21: 衆生無始生死，無明所蓋，愛繫其頸，長夜生死輪轉，不知苦之本際。I owe this reference to Li (2012: 200–201n106), who discusses it in the context of Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* citation in regard to *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* XI.1, for which see the note to §17i(b).

Monks, saṃsāra has a completely unthought-of beginning (*anamat-tagga*). Its prior limit is not discerned by beings running and revolving [through existences], hindered by ignorance and bound by thirsts.

Sasaki suggests that, rather than taking the initial *an-* of the term *anamat-tagga* as a negation, it should be understood as *an-a-mata-agga* from **anu-a-mata-agga*. In support of this understanding, Sasaki cites a gloss by Buddhaghosa from his commentary to the *Samyutta-Nikāya*, the *Sāratthappakāsinī*, in which the key term is *amata*, a negation of $\sqrt{\text{man}}$, ‘to think’:¹⁰⁶

anamataggo: ‘completely unthought-of beginning.’ Even if one seeks it with knowledge for one hundred years or one thousand years, its beginning is unthought-of, its beginning is unknown; it is impossible to know its beginning as from here or from there. [So] it means its former and latter extremes in time cannot be determined.

If this solution is adopted, it would imply that the original term referred only to the past, to the beginning, and indicated that the beginning was inconceivable, although Buddhaghosa also associates the term with the future limit as well. It is important to note that here the focus is on epistemology and not ontology: the beginning is not recognized, and the prior limit is not discerned.

The eventual Sanskritization of this term followed the course visible in Buddhaghosa’s interpretation (although it is not necessarily chronologically later), the sense being: without both lower—that is to say, beginning—and higher—that is to say, final—limit. In other words, in their attempt to understand the term, at some point those who transmitted the texts and led

¹⁰⁶ I cite from Sasaki’s citation, which he attributes to iii.149, namely the commentary on *Samyutta-Nikāya* 15.1.1.3 (Nidāna-vagga, Anamatagga-samyutta, paṭhama vaggo, Tīṇakatṭham): *anamataggo ti anu-amataggo, vassasataṃ vassasahassam nāṇena anugantvāpi amataggo aviditaggo, nāssa sakkā ito vā etto vā aggam jānitum, aparicchinnapubbāpara-koṭiko ti attho*. As Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000: 795n254) points out, there is an etymological gloss here with *anu-gantvā* and *amatagga*. He is also correct that grammatically speaking the subject of the passive sentence is *nāṇena* in the instrumental, but this seems to me to produce odd English, namely “Even if it should be pursued by knowledge for a hundred or a thousand years, it would be with unthought-of beginning, with unknown beginning. It wouldn’t be possible to know its beginning from here or from there; the meaning is that it is without a delimiting first or last point.” My English is probably not much better, however.

them through linguistic transformations added to the notion of an inconceivable *beginning* the idea of an unattainable *ending* as well. However, the sense of focus on the origin (or lack thereof) is maintained in the Chinese translation *wúshǐshìláì* 無始世來 for *anavarāgra*, which clearly refers only to the origin, although it is hard to imagine how the Sanskrit word itself could mean this from an etymological point of view.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, it alters the epistemological focus to an (apparently) ontological one. Sasaki argues that the Pāli expression at least is not ontological, and refers to the (un)knowability of the origin, and not to its (non)existence. While the Sanskrit expression, at least as understood by the Chinese translation, does seem to be ontological, the expression *pūrvakoṭir na prajñāyate*, “its prior limit is not discerned,” found in the passage above in Pāli, and adopted by sources including the *Śrīmālādevī* and the RGV,¹⁰⁸ emphasizes the subjectivity of the notion of prior limit, in contrast to its objective, ontological status.

Time, then, is an important notion underlying the vision of the AAN, whose authors posit a world in some sense almost without time: there is no beginning, and no end, for in contrast to the early Buddhism of a beginningless universe which nevertheless does have an end in *nirvāṇa*, for the ‘cosmology’ of the AAN this dichotomy has vanished. Although the text does certainly speak of purity and impurity, and of the presence of defilements which obscure the innate purity which characterizes a *tathāgata*, it appears—although the text is not explicit on this point—that spiritual progress within this timeless realm consists not in transforming oneself from an impure to a pure state so much as it does in recognizing one’s innate purity.

In light of the above, it seems an obvious conclusion that the authors of a text like the AAN would have held a world-view permeated by notions of equality. After all, their fundamental message is one of the unitary ground of being. And yet, what Michael Zimmermann has to say about the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* applies equally, *mutatis mutandis*, to the AAN: “The fact ... that nowhere in the sūtra are there ethical conclusions drawn on the basis of this *ekayānist* theory of equality somehow comes as a surprise.”¹⁰⁹ In

¹⁰⁷ This duality is reflected in the Tibetan translation, *thog ma dang tha ma med pa*. Cp. the observation of Takasaki (1996: 49), who offers as an explanation the association with the term *anādikālika* on the one hand and *pūrvakoṭir na prajñāyate* on the other.

¹⁰⁸ See the note to §17i(b).

the AAN, if we read *ekadhātu* in place of *ekayāna*, the point is the same. It seems to be the case that neither for the authors of the AAN nor at least for those of its precursor the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* was the ethical implication of real-world equality arising from abstract philosophical identity a matter of concern. In this respect, even in details, the close relation between the AAN and the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* is evident. A passage from the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* reads as follows:¹¹⁰ “Sons of good family, apply energy without giving in to despondency! It will happen that one day the tathāgata who has entered and is present within you will become manifest. Then you will be designated ‘bodhisattva,’ rather than ‘ordinary sentient being (*sattva*).’ And again in the next stage you will be designated ‘buddha,’ rather than ‘bodhisattva.’” Regarding this, Zimmermann writes:¹¹¹

In the [*Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*] it is this message alone that directly urges the people to draw consequences from the fact that they possess the buddha-nature. The call is not very detailed, and we cannot know what exactly the authors had in mind when they put these words into the mouth of the Buddha. Nevertheless ... the passage suggests that energy (*vīrya*) was considered a central element to be employed. Obviously it was not the purpose of the authors to deal with the question of how to realize one’s buddha-nature in detail. Nor did they draw any ethical conclusions. This is surprising for the modern reader, since the *tathāgatagarbha* theory would seem to be an ideal ground for establishing an ethical system, namely one based on the principle that all living beings are equal by virtue of their buddha-nature. This absence of ethical implications indicates that the (early) buddha-nature theory centered on the importance of the individual’s

¹⁰⁹ Zimmermann (2002: 15).

¹¹⁰ Quoted with original text in the notes to §14ii; the translation is Zimmermann’s.

¹¹¹ Zimmermann (2002: 76). In note 155 Zimmermann writes: “ Ethical implications in the texts propounding *tathāgatagarbha* thought are found, for example, in RGVV I.157ff. which, on the basis of the buddha-nature doctrine, calls for the same respect for other living beings as for a teacher. In the *Angulimāliyasūtra*, the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha* is used to argue for a life of chastity and continence, against killing, and against the consumption of meat Seyfort Ruegg supposes that *tathāgatagarbha* thought provided the decisive motive for the appearance of vegetarianism in Buddhism.” The title of Takasaki (1997) would lead one to believe that he addresses similar issues, but at least to my mind he never fully engages the problem.

inclusion in the “family of the buddhas” rather than on a doctrinal basis for ethical behavior. Even in later texts of this strand, direct ethical implications continue to be rather [infrequent], in contrast to the prevailing worldly orientation of some of the sutras propounding the *tathāgatagarbha* theory.

In fact, the AAN’s authors do not even go as far as did the authors of the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, since they do no more than describe a situation, without advocating action. But of course, the AAN should not be read in a vacuum, and there are other Indic sources which more directly bring out the ethical implications of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ekadhātu* idea, texts like the **Mahābherīhāraka*, which appears to post-date the AAN and which deserves its own study.¹¹² When it comes to East Asia, the situation is clearer, because ideas of universal buddhahood took hold there and widely influenced the development of Buddhist ideology from relatively early times. However, here again modern expectations (and for some, hopes) are apt to be disappointed, as became clear in the debates raised by the ‘Critical Buddhism’ (*hihan bukkyō* 批判仏教) movement, which focused originally on Japanese issues of Social Justice.¹¹³ Although the AAN was not singled out as a central topic of discussion in these controversies, many of the issues raised do relate to the question of the ethical implications of the ideas found in this sūtra. Outside the context of debates over ‘Critical Buddhism,’ Suzuki Takayasu (2000) raises the question of the ethical standpoint of the *tathāgatagarbha* sūtras as a class, from the standpoint of the question why, if everyone is ultimately fated for buddhahood, one should nevertheless both be moral and work toward spiritual cultivation, precisely parallel to the question which has drawn, at least from the time of Hōnen and Shinran, so much attention in Pure Land traditions, in which one’s salvation is assured by the fulfillment of Dharmākāra’s vows by Amitābha’s buddhahood. It is in sum interesting that, although we cannot deny any recognition of an issue to be addressed in terms of morality and ethics, there seems to have been surprisingly little traditional consideration of the ethical implications of these potent ideas—although one should rush to say that this critique prob-

¹¹² Suzuki Takayasu published several papers on this text, but apparently has not continued along this line. See <http://suzuki.ypu.jp/research.html>.

¹¹³ For a selection of papers on the topic, see Hubbard and Swanson (1997).

ably applies to much of Buddhist literature of any stripe, in which attention to issues of importance to many moderns is often conspicuously absent.¹¹⁴

Despite all that we might say about the location of the scripture within a pre-existing discourse, and its debts to earlier materials and articulations—all important contextualizations—the vision of the authors of the AAN remains a truly awesome one, a vision of a universe, a reality in which the immanence of buddhahood is strongly emphasized. Future studies may be expected to more carefully take into account how this vision may have influenced later developments.

¹¹⁴ It is perhaps not necessary to add that in discussing such things one must avoid the ‘teleological fallacy’ of imagining one’s own moral standpoint, for example, to be applicable to the past, final and complete, or necessarily ‘higher’ than that held by others, whom one then is entitled to judge harshly for not being as sensitive as oneself.

Edition
and
Translation

Edition and Translation

What follows is an edition of the text, below which are citations of first-hand sources: the two Indian texts, RGV and MDN (in two versions), which quote the AAN. Below this is a translation, and annotations. The printed text represents my attempt to establish a critical edition, which is to say, I have tried to reconstruct what I believe may have left the brush of the translator. However, in this policy with respect to emendations, I have not been entirely consistent, and some possible emendations are relegated to the annotations. I have tried to translate the Chinese text I print, placing observations on possible Indic background in the notes. However, the translation of the Chinese does assume it to be a rendition from Sanskrit (or some Indic language, although I see no evidence that the AAN ever existed in anything other than [Buddhist] Sanskrit). In other words, I do not assume either a naive Chinese reading, nor do I directly render what I imagine the Indic source text *should* have meant. I offer separately, in Appendix 5, a picture of what I imagine the ‘original’ of the AAN may have looked like in its Indian context. While this is to be considered highly speculative, nevertheless I believe such a venture may be helpful in trying to approach a form the text may have had in its homeland.

The sources for the Chinese text printed here, with their respective sigla, are as follows:¹

- F1:** Fangshan 房山 285, volume 3, page 597. A single stele, carved in the Tang 唐 dynasty, damaged in its lower portion and thus only partially legible.
- F2:** Fangshan 房山 635, volume 14, pages 53-55, carved in the Jin 金 dynasty.
- K:** Korean 高麗 (Second Koryŏ edition) 490, volume 13, page 1309–1311. Also reproduced in the *Zhonghua Dazangjing* 中華大藏經 as 542, volume 24, page 270–273 (with notes of variants which are not, however, entirely reliable). The Jin 金 edition normally reproduced in these volumes was not available.

¹ The text is of course also printed in the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, T. 688.

- Kongo:** Kongoji 金剛寺 manuscript, catalogued as 0602–001 in Koku-sai Bukkyōgaku Daigakuin Daigaku Gakujutsu Furontia Jikkoiinkai (2006). Photos courtesy of Prof. Ochiai Toshinori 落合俊典.
- Li:** A Dunhuang manuscript collected by Li Shengduo 李盛鐸 (1859–1937), now in the collection of Takeda Seiyaku 武田製薬 (Takeda Pharmaceutical Co.). Facsimiles were published in Koizumi (2010: 255–259, Item 201, frames 1–7). On the collection see Takata (2007), and earlier Rong (2002, in which this manuscript is listed as number 201).
- Q:** Qisha 磧砂 in *Yingyin Song Qisha zangjing* 影印宋磧砂藏經 (Shanghai: Yingyin Songban zangjinghui 影印宋版藏經會, 1934): 201.43b–46a. See Zacchetti (2005: 115).
- S:** Old Song (舊宋本 = “Palace” 宮内庁本) edition; see Zacchetti (2005: 110–112).
- SX:** Sixi 思溪 edition held at the Iwayaji 岩屋寺; see Zacchetti (2005: 112–115). Photos courtesy of Prof. Ochiai.

The collation of these sources reveals few transmissional errors. However, I believe that there occurred, probably early on, several corruptions in the text. In §9ii we must remove an expression, as I have detailed in my emendation note. A second instance occurs in §12, where, as I have discussed above in the Introduction, we find a contextually impossible word, *shijiān dēng* 世間燈. Another problem arises in §4ii, in which it seems that the repetition of a formula has led a number of copyists to repeat variations on an error. I print, thus, what I believe to be the text closest to the original which left the translator’s brush.

Portions of this text have staunchly resisted my attempts to fully understand them. In this attempt, however, I have studied in particular the renderings of Tokiwa (1932) and Takasaki (1975a) with much profit, though I refrain from noting all instances of disagreement. Although the following constitutes, to my knowledge, the most extensive treatment of this sūtra so far, I am keenly aware of how much more remains to be done.

The *Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta*

0

佛說不增不減經

元魏北印度三藏菩提流支譯

佛說不增不減經] F1, Kongo: 佛說不增不減經 一卷; F2: 不增不減經 一卷

元魏北印度三藏菩提流支譯] Kongo: ø

北印度] F1 (F2 not legible), Q: 天竺; S, SX: ø

三藏] S, SX: ø

菩提流支] Q, S, SX: 菩提留支

The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of Decrease [in the Realm of Beings].

Translated by the Northern (Yuan) Wei Dynasty Tripiṭaka Master from Northern India, Bodhiruci.

Northern India: variant: India

1

a) 如是我聞：一時婆伽婆住王舍城，耆闍崛山中，^{b)} 與大比丘衆千二百五十人俱，諸菩薩摩訶薩無量無邊不可稱計。

a) Thus I heard: At one time the Bhagavat was dwelling in Rājagṛha on Mount Gṛdhṛakūṭa, ^{b)} together with a large assembly of one thousand two hundred and fifty bhikṣus, and with an immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas.

a-b) Perhaps rendering something like **evam mayā śrutam ekasmin samaye bhagavān rājagṛhe viharati sma gṛdhṛakūṭe parvate mahatā bhikṣusamghena sārđham arđhatrayodaśabhir bhikṣuśataiḥ sambahulaiś ca bodhisattvair mahāsattvaiḥ ...*

a) **Bhagavat**: Since the Chinese transcribes this, I do as well, but we might better translate as 'Lord' or 'Blessed One.'

b) **immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number**: 無量無邊不可稱計：
**aparimāṇa- aprameya- asaṁkhyeya- ?*

2

a) 爾時，慧命舍利弗於大衆中即從坐起，前至佛所。b) 到已，頂禮佛足，退坐一面。合掌白佛言：c) 「世尊，一切衆生從無始世來周旋六道，往來三界，於四生中輪迴生死，受苦無窮。d) 世尊，此衆生聚、衆生海爲有增減，爲無增減。e) 此義深隱，我未能解。f) 若人問我，當云何答。」

a) 即從坐起] Kongo: 即從生起; SX: 即從座起

a) At that time, the venerable Śāriputra got up from his seat in the great assembly and approached the Buddha. b) Bowing his head to the Buddha's feet, he withdrew and sat to one side. Placing his palms together reverentially, he spoke to the Buddha, saying: c) "World-honored One! All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time, transmigrate in the three realms and, repeating the cycle of birth and death through the four types of birth, experience pain without exhaustion. d) World-honored One! Does this mass of beings, this ocean of beings, undergo increase and decrease, or does it not undergo increase and decrease? e) The purport of this is profound and mysterious, and I am not yet able to understand it. f) If someone asks me about it, how should I respond?"

a) **the venerable:** Chin. *huìmìng* 慧命, Skt. *āyusmat*.

got up from his seat ...: The most stable part of the set phrase is something like **yena bhagavāms tenāñjalim praṇamya bhagavantam etad avocat*.

c) **six paths:** *gatis*. These are the realms of possible rebirth within *samsāra*, namely: (1) Hell, *naraka* (2) Hungry Ghosts, *preta* (3) Animals, *tiryagyoni* (4) Asuras (5) Men, *manuṣya* (6) Gods, *deva*.

beginningless: Takasaki (1975a: 45): いつはじまったとも知れぬ昔から。See the Introduction.

three realms: (1) of desire, *kāmadhātu* (2) of form, *rūpadhātu* (3) the formless realm, *ārūpyadhātu*.

four types of rebirth: Birth from (1) a Womb (2) an Egg (3) Moisture (4) by Transformation.

without exhaustion: should this be understood distributively with each verb in this sentence?

d) **mass of beings:** **sattvanikāya*?

ocean of beings: **sattvasāgara*?

e) **The purport of this is profound and mysterious:** See §9ii.

3i

a) 爾時，世尊告舍利弗：^{b)}「善哉！善哉！舍利弗，汝為安隱一切衆生，安樂一切衆生，憐愍一切衆生，利益一切衆生，饒益安樂一切衆生諸天人故，乃能問我是甚深義。^{c)}舍利弗，汝若不問如來、應供、正遍知如是義者，有多過咎。^{d)}所以者何。於現在世及未來世，諸天人等一切衆生長受衰惱、損害之事，永失一切利益安樂。

c) Li: MS begins with 如來應供

d) 衰惱] Kongo: 衰愆

a) At that time the World-honored One said to Śāriputra: ^{b)} “Good! Good! Śāriputra, you ask me about this extremely profound purport in order to pacify all beings, to bring happiness to all beings, to show compassion for all beings, to benefit all beings, to avail and bring happiness to all beings, gods and men. ^{c)} If you were not to ask the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One about such a purport as this, Śāriputra, there would be many faults. ^{d)} How so? In the present age and in future ages all beings—gods, men, and so on—would suffer and be harmed for an extended time, and would forever lose all that is beneficial and brings them happiness.

b) **you ask me ...** : 乃能問我 . In the *Laṅkāvatāra* we find the following expression: 佛告大慧: 善哉, 善哉。善哉, 大慧。汝為哀愍一切天人, 多所安樂多所饒益, 乃能問我如是之義。善哉, 善哉。善哉, 大慧。諦聽, 諦聽 (T. 671 [XVI] 531b23–26) = 佛告大慧: 善哉, 善哉。汝能問我如是之義, 多所安樂多所饒益, 哀愍一切諸天世人。佛告大慧: 諦聽, 諦聽, 善思念之 (T. 670 [XVI] 491a1–4). This corresponds to the Sanskrit *bhagavān āha | sādhu sādhu mahāmate sādhu khalu punas tvam mahāmate yat tvam etam artham adhyēsitavyam manyase bahunahitāya tvam mahāmate pratipanno bahunasukhāya lokānukampāyai mahato janakāyasyārthāya hitāya sukhāya devānām ca manuṣyāṇām ca* | (Nanjio 1923: 89.12–16). The Sanskrit *sādhu ... yat tvam etam artham adhyēsitavyam manyase* means something like “It is good that you think that you should ask about this point.’ Generally speaking *néng* 能 indicates ‘can’ in the sense of ‘have the ability to,’ ‘be competent to,’ or may just indicate agency, in contrast to *dé* 得 which suggests ‘can’ in the sense of ‘have an opportunity to.’ In this

light, I translate 乃能問我 simply ‘you ask me’; would a rendering like ‘you are competent or qualified to ask me’ understand *manyase* as pointing to something like ‘you judge that I should be asked’? Takasaki (1975a: 46) has simply “asked.”

extremely profound purport: See the note to §9ii(a).

to pacify ...: a version of a very frequent stock expression, appearing perhaps most commonly as *bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāyai arthāya hitāya sukhāya devamanuṣyāṇām*. See the note above.

gods and men: probably this is meant to qualify the realm of beings in the sense of ‘comprising the world of gods and men.’ Notice that just below in (d) the wording is “all beings—gods, men, and so on.” The expression is inclusive rather than exclusive.

- c) Takasaki (1975a: 46) takes this in the past tense, “if you had not asked ... there would have been,” which is equally possible.

3ii

a) 「舍利弗，大邪見者：所謂，見衆生界增，見衆生界減。^{b)} 舍利弗，此大邪見，諸衆生等，以是見故，生盲無目。^{c)} 是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於現在世墮諸惡趣。^{d)} 舍利弗，大險難者：所謂，取衆生界增堅著妄執；取衆生界減堅著妄執。^{e)} 舍利弗，此諸衆生堅著妄執。是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於未來世墮諸惡趣。

a) 見衆生界減] Q: 見衆生界減

d) 取衆生界減] Q: 取衆生界減

e) 此諸衆生堅著妄執] F1: 此諸衆生堅者妄執
長夜妄行邪道] Kongo: 長妄行邪道

a) “It is a greatly mistaken view, Śāriputra, to see the realm of beings as increasing or to see the realm of beings as decreasing. ^{b)} Because of these views, Śāriputra, beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are born blind and sightless. ^{c)} Consequently, for a very long time they errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in the present age they fall into evil destinies. ^{d)} It is great disaster, Śāriputra, to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as increasing, or to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as decreasing. ^{e)} These beings, Śāriputra, cling to and grasp at [these notions]. Consequently, for a very long time they will errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in future ages they will fall into evil destinies.

a) **greatly mistaken view:** *dàxiéjiàn* 大邪見. See the expression in the *Saṃyuktāgama*: 時有一梵，起大邪見 (T. 100 [109] [II] 412c20) ≈ *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* : *tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa brahmuno evarūpaṃ pāpa-karṇ dīṭṭhigataṃ uppannaṃ hoti* (Feer 1884–1898: i.144,11–12). However, at least the term *xiéjiàn* 邪見 is rather common as a rendering of *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*, *kudṛṣṭi* and so on.

the realm of beings: *zhòngshēngjiè* 衆生界, *sattvadhātu*.

b) **blind and sightless:** I have translated the Chinese as if it contained two words, *shēngmáng* 生盲 and *wúmù* 無目 (lit. ‘eye-less’), but the whole is probably simply pleonastic (or a hendiadys?): ‘blind.’ In Dharmarakṣa’s translation of the Lotus Sutra, we find 生盲無目 (T. 263 [IX] 79a15) where

the Sanskrit has *kāṇāndha* (vs. III.122c: Kashgar, Toda 1983: 50 = Gilgit, Watanabe 1975: 220), which appears again to be a pleonasm for ‘blind’. The term *shēngmáng* 生盲 may reflect Sanskrit *jātyandha*, as in *Mahāvvyutpatti* §8874. However, note that in *RGV_c* itself *shēngmánggrén* 生盲人 corresponds to *acaḥṣuṣman* (Johnston 1950: 74.3 = *RGV_c* T. 1611 [XXXI] 839b19). Takasaki (1975a: 47) interprets the second term metaphorically as meaning one is not able to see things correctly: ものを正しく見る目をもたず. For an excellent detailed study of the term *andha* and related vocabulary, see Hara (2006), who argues that in many cases the operative notion is not that of complete blindness but something closer to ‘short-sighted’ or ‘dim-sighted,’ that is, an inability to see the correct object or the big picture. In this light, it might be better to render loosely “beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are of impaired vision” or some similar expression. It is not the utter blindness of the individuals in question which causes them to wander down mistaken paths, but their inability to see correctly, as Takasaki suggests.

c) **for a very long time:** **dīrgharātra*: lit. the long night. A common expression.

c-e) **present age ... future ages:** 現在世, 未來世. The reference is to incarnations within *saṃsāra*. There is no indication how far into the future is meant by the second term, and in this sense English ‘ages,’ which may be read to imply a distant future, might not be the best rendering.

d) **great disaster:** Takasaki (1975a: 47) has 越すに越されぬ大難所, which seems stronger: the ultimate or unsurpassable disaster. I do not read the Chinese as making such a comparative claim.

There is a very clear example here of the disposal construction with *qǔ* 取 - object - verb. See Cao and Yu (2000).

4i

a) 舍利弗, 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故, 不如實見一法界故, 起邪見心, 謂衆生界增, 衆生界減。^{b)} 舍利弗, 如來在世, 我諸弟子不起此見。^{c)} 若我滅後, 過五百歲, 多有衆生愚無智慧。^{d)} 於佛法中雖除鬚髮, 服三法衣, 現沙門像, 然其內無沙門德行。^{e)} 如是等輩實非沙門, 自謂沙門。非佛弟子, 謂佛弟子。^{f)} 而自說言: 「我是沙門, 眞佛弟子」。如是等人起增減見。何以故。

a) 起邪見心] Li: 趣邪見心

衆生界減] Q: 衆生界減

c) 多有衆生愚無智慧] F1: 多有衆生愚 [illegible character] 無有智慧; Kongo:

多有衆生愚癡無有智慧; Li: 多有衆生愚癡無有智慧

e) 非佛弟子, 謂佛弟子] S: 非佛弟子

a) “Because all foolish common people, Śāriputra, do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, because they do not see the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, they entertain ideas informed by mistaken views, thinking that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases.^{b)} While the Tathāgata is in the world, Śāriputra, my disciples will not entertain these views.^{c)} (However,) when five hundred years have passed after my nirvāṇa, there will be many beings who are foolish and lack insight.^{d)} [Being] within the Buddhist community, although they will remove their beards and hair, put on the three dharma robes, and manifest outwardly the appearance of śramaṇas, nevertheless inwardly they will lack the virtuous behavior of śramaṇas.^{e)} Such people, although actually not śramaṇas will call themselves śramaṇas, although not disciples of the Buddha will call themselves disciples of the Buddha.^{f)} Still they themselves will say: ‘I am a śramaṇa, a true disciple of the Buddha.’ This sort of persons will entertain the view that there is increase or decrease. Why?

a) **foolish common people:** *yúchī fánfū* 愚癡凡夫, *bālapṛthagjana*, this Sanskrit equivalent attested in §10i(d), below (although in several other instances in the RGV it appears to render only *bāla*, 13.2 = 842b3, 13.8–12 = 842b10–14, 84.18 = 842b21). I am uncertain whether, or rather how far,

to understand this word as a technical term. It comes to have a special significance in path theories, in which it designates the being at the lowest stage of spiritual development, the details of which however differ according to system. On the concept and term, see, with reservations, Haneda (1979: 6–24), and from another perspective Hakamaya (2006). Haneda makes the important point that formulations such as that in *Jñānaprasthāna*, which state that the *prthagjana* will never, in the past, present or future, obtain holy states (云何異生性。答：若於聖法、聖暖、聖見、聖忍、聖欲、聖慧諸非得已，非得，當非得，是謂：異生性 [T. 1544 (XXVI) 928c5–7]) come very close to the idea of the *icchantika*, for which see the Introduction. It is equally interesting to note that in early sources including the *Theragāthā* and the *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* we find, respectively, *andhabālā puthujjanā* and *bālam puthujjamam andham* (Oldenberg and Pischel 1883: verse 575b and Feer 1884–1898: iii.140,2). This is very suggestive in light of the expression above in 3ii(b) that speaks of those who are born blind, clearly the same individuals as these foolish common people. I do not understand Takasaki (1975a: 47), *さまざまの生まれをもつすべての凡夫たち*, which seems either to skip what I take as ‘foolish,’ or to somehow extend the plain sense of ‘all’ to mean ‘belonging to various modes of rebirth’.

the single dharma-realm: **ekadharmadhātu*. See below §8ii.

in accord with reality: **yathābhūtam*.

thinking: this meaning for *wèi* 謂 is quite common in this literature; it might also on occasion be rendered ‘to wit,’ which would also be possible here.

- c) **when five hundred years ... after my nirvāṇa:** In the *Kāmāpavāka-sūtra* quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, Chinese 若我滅後，正法欲沒 corresponds to *yadāham parinirvṛto bhavāmi saddharmaś cāntarhito bhavati* (T. 1636 [XXXII] 91b8 = Bendall 1897–1902: 78,3–4), referring to the destruction of the teaching after the nirvāṇa of the Buddha. Here in the AAN, however, we have no reference to the disappearance of the teaching as a whole. I am not sure if there is any significant difference here between nirvāṇa and parinirvāṇa.

(Note that the *Kāmāpavāka-sūtra* is called the *Hēyùjīng* 訶欲經 in the Chinese translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. However, this is not the same as T. 615 菩薩訶色欲法經, translated by Kumārajīva, a very short text, despite the fact that this text is cited under the title 訶欲經 by the *Sifenlü xingshichao zichi ji* 四分律行事鈔資持記 (T. 1805 [XL] 275b7ff.). The *Lidai sanbao ji* 歷代三寶紀 of 597 cites a 菩薩訶欲經一卷 (T. 2034 [XLIX] 92a1), which it attributes to Guṇabhadra 求那跋陀羅, while the *Kaiyuan shijiaolu* 開元

釋教錄 of 730 also refers to a 菩薩訶欲經一卷 (T. 2154 [LV] 528c17) which, however, it identifies as the same as Kumārajīva's translation. Whatever lack of clarity there might be in the catalogues, for the moment we must conclude that we cannot otherwise identify the *Kāmāpavāka-sūtra* quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.)

- d) **[Being] within the Buddhist community:** I remain slightly uncertain whether to understand *fó fǎ* 佛法 as referring to Sanskrit *buddhadharma* (in which case we should understand “many beings who are foolish and lack insight into the Buddha's teaching[s],” connecting the clause to sentence [c]), or whether we should see in 於佛法中 **buddhaśāsane*, as I understand it here. In the *Sarvadharmāpravṛttinirdeśa*, the expression 於佛法中 corresponds to *de bzhin gshegs pa'i bstan pa la* (Braarvig 2000: 134.13–14 = T. 650 [XV] 0753c7), no doubt **buddhaśāsane*. However, when it occurs in the RGV, it reflects rather Sanskrit *ihadhārmika* (Johnston 1950: 28.2 = RGV_c T. 1611 [XXXI] 828c11; 29.7 = 828c20). (Although the Sanskrit here is nominal, the Chinese appears to rephrase the meaning.) Both Tokiwa (1932: 105) and Takasaki (1975a: 48) attach the clause to (d), and indeed when we consider that the expression is followed by *suī* 雖, there do not appear to be examples in which the sense of ‘teachings of the Buddha’ is to be preferred. In a sūtra passage quoted in the *Prajñāpradīpa* (T. 1566 [XXX] 131b2–3), we find 愚癡衆生於佛法中雖得出家, “foolish beings renounce the world into the Buddhist community”; the same is quoted in the *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 540. 12–541.1): *tad ime bhagavan mohapurūṣā [ye] svākhyāte dharmavinaye pravrajya*, and in the Chinese versions of the sūtra we find (T. 585 [XV] 4c7): 天中天, 於正法律而行出家; (T. 586 [XV] 36c28–29): 世尊, 是諸比丘於佛正法出家; (T. 587 [XV] 66c16–17): 世尊, 是諸比丘已於如來正法出家. In the *Sūryagarbhasūtra* (T. 396 [XIII] 291b23–25) we find: 我等憶念過去世時, 於佛法中雖得出家, 備造如是種種惡業, “we remember in a past age when, although we renounced the world into the Buddhist community, we still performed a variety of such bad actions.” The same syntax, however, can also appear when the meaning of the phrase is rather clearly ‘the Buddha's teaching,’ as in the *Da zhidu lun* 大智度論 (T. 1509 [XXV] 320b4–5), when several monks are mentioned as excellent with respect to the teachings of the Buddha, but not so with respect to those of the non-Buddhists: 富樓那、迦鄰那、阿那律等於佛法中雖大, 於外法中不如.
- e) **although actually not śramaṇas ... disciples of the Buddha:** See the passage in *Ratnarāśi* §1.3c (Silk Forthcoming): “in the future will there be some monks who destroy the Tathāgata's awakening perfected over uncountable aeons, who are not śramaṇas but will falsely claim to be

śramaṇas, who are not followers of the practice of purity but will falsely claim to be followers of the practice of purity?” (*ma mchis pa'i dus na gang dag de bzhin gshegs pa'i byang chub bskal pa grangs ma mchis par yang dag par bsgrubs pa nub par bgyid pa dge sbyong ma lags la dge sbyong du mchid kyis 'che zhing | tshangs par spyod pa ma lags par tshangs par spyod par mchid kyis 'che ba'i dge slong la la dag 'byung bar 'gyur lags sam*; 若未來世有諸沙門非實沙門自言我是沙門, 非梵行人自言我有梵行). In Sanskrit we see an example of the stock phrase in a passage of the *Kṣitigarbhasūtra* quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: *yo mahābrahman mamoddiśya pravrajito duḥśīlapāpasamācāro bhikṣur anubhūtaḥ kaśambakajāto aśramaṇaḥ śramaṇapratijñāḥ abrahmacārī brahmacāripratijñāḥ* (Bendall 1897–1902: 67.19–20), and see *Mahāvvyutpatti* §§9143–9144. There are numerous other examples of the same (e.g., *Sūryagarbhasūtra* [Derge 257, *mdo sde, za* 103b5], T. 721 (XVII) 286b2–3: 實非沙門, 而自說言: 我是沙門. In T. 1462 (XXIV) 709b11: 非沙門者, 自言我是沙門 ≠ Pāli *Samantapāsādikā* (Takakusu and Nagai 1924: i.195,19–20): *te hi assamaṇā va hutvā samaṇapaṭi-ññatāya paresaṃ paccaye corenti*).

- f) **I am a śramaṇa**: Takasaki (1975a: 48): われこそは沙門であり. I do not think the Chinese contains the emphasis and exclusion implied by *こそ*, which seems to convey the sense that ‘while I am a śramaṇa, others are not.’

increase or decrease: Takasaki (1975a: 48 and 374n6) translates ないものをあるとする見方 (増見) やあるものをないとする見方 (減見) を起こすことである. His note explains that he takes these to refer to *adhyāropa* (*samāropa*) and *apavāda*, with the view that beings become greater (the view of increase) being one example of the former type. I have grave doubts about whether it makes sense to apply such notions as *adhyāropa* (or even the older form, *samāropa*) to a sūtra like the AAN. At least according to Tanji (2000: 347), “The word *samāropa* is used together with *apavāda*, the pair forming a dual category, for the first time in the Vijnāna-vāda school.”

4ii

a) 此諸衆生以依如來不了義經, 無慧眼故; b) 遠離如實空見故; c) 不如實知如來所證初發心故; d) 不如實知修集無量菩提功德行故; e) 不如實知如來所得無量法故; f) 不如實知如來無量力故; g) 不如實知如來無量境界故; h) 不信如來無量行處故; i) 不如實知如來不思議無量法自在故; j) 不如實知如來不思議無量方便故; k) 不能如實分別如來無量差別境界故; l) 不能善入如來不可思議大悲故; m) 不如實知如來大涅槃故。

b) 遠離如實空見故] S: 離如實空見故

d) 不如實知修集] Q, S, SX: 不如實知修習

i) 不思議] Kongo: 不思可議

k) 不能如實分別] F1, 2: 不能如實知分別; Li: 不能如實知分別; Q, S, SX: 不如實知分別

l) 不可思議] Li: 不思思議

m) 大涅槃] Kongo: 火涅槃

a) “[They entertain the view that there is increase or decrease] because these beings, having resorted to the Tathāgata’s sūtras of provisional meaning, lack the wisdom-eye; b) because they are remote from the view of emptiness in accord with reality; c) because they do not know in accord with reality the initial aspiration (to awakening) realized by the Tathāgata; d) because they do not know in accord with reality the practices which accumulate immeasurable merits for bodhi; e) because they do not know in accord with reality the immeasurable qualities attained by the Tathāgata; f) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable power; g) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere (of knowledge); h) because they do not believe in the Tathāgata’s immeasurable range of action; i) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings; j) because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable skillful means; k) because they are not able to distinguish in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of discrimination; l) because they are not good at penetrating into the Tathā-

gata's inconceivable great compassion; ^{m)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata's great nirvāṇa.

- a) **sūtras of provisional meaning:** **neyārthasūtra*. I do not know precisely how old this term is, but we do find already in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the sentences *yo ca neyyattham suttantaṃ nītattho suttanto ti dīpeti. yo ca nītattham suttantaṃ neyyattho suttanto ti dīpeti* (Morris 1885: 60,13–14; II.iii.5). Here the two bad positions are declaring a sermon as of final meaning when it really is provisional, and vice versa. That is, in this passage *nītattha* is not given priority; the problem is simply confusing the categories. For the AAN, however, priority is clearly to be given to *nītārtha*. Takasaki (1975a: 48) takes the second expression somewhat more positively, understanding 'who have not yet opened the eye of wisdom.' However, he also (1965: 89) interpreted the reference to *neyārtha* scriptures to point to Hinayāna texts, although I see no reason this should be so.
- b)-c): Takasaki (1975a: 48) considers these two items to be one reason, understanding our (b) as the reason for (c), but he offers no explanation for the connection he sees here. I do not see any. Earlier (1965: 89) his division of the items corresponds to that given here.
- d) Takasaki (1975a: 48) understands immeasurable practices which lead to the attainment of the merits termed (?) bodhi: (如来が) 菩提という功德を得るために無量の修行を積み重ねたということありのままにしないから. I do not see how the syntax of the Chinese would permit this understanding. I render *púti* 菩提 in English as bodhi, rather than Awakening, because the Chinese transliterates the term, but I admit that I am not consistent in this practice.
- g) **immeasurable sphere (of knowledge):** In §15i(g), with note, *jīngjiè* 境界 is to be understood as *jñeyabhūmi*. If this same terminology applies here, the insertion in parentheses is thereby justified. Takasaki (1965: 89) also identifies this as the sphere of knowledge: 境界 (*viṣaya) すなわち智の対象. Takasaki (1975a: 48) however translates: 如来の(無量)のはたらきの対象(境界)が無量であることをありのままに知らないから. 'The object of the Tathāgata's work is infinite' does not make much sense to me, unless this would refer to salvific work. See also §10i(b) where we find 如来智慧境界.
- h) **range of action:** Takasaki (1965: 89): 行処 (*gocara) すなわち悲心の活動領域の無限性. See §10i(b): 如来智慧境界 and 如来心所行處.

- i) **inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings:** 不思議無量法自在. I understand the reference here to be to one of the ten masteries, *daśavaśitā*, namely (*Mahāvvyūtpatti* §777) *dharmavaśitā*. In the *Daśabhūmikāsūtra* it is said that the bodhisattva “attains the mastery of the Teachings because he displays the radiance of the teachings which are without middle or extremes,” *dharmavaśitām ca pratilabhate | anantamadhyadharmamukhālokaśāṃdarśanatayā* (Kondo 1936: 143,6). Precisely the same expression is found in a variety of texts. The ordering of the ten can differ; that the AAN refers to *dharmavaśitā* suggests that it referred to a list in which this was the final item. See Funahashi (1977) for a brief discussion, with references.
- k) **the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of discrimination.** This is a curious expression, since ‘discrimination’ is usually a negative notion. For example, the *Acintyabuddhaviṣayanirdeśa* uses precisely the Chinese expression we have here, 差別境界, when it says 無如是等差別境界, 是乃名爲諸佛境界 (T. 340 [XII] 108a18–19), which is paralleled in the Tibetan translation with: *bcom ldan ’das yul khyad par ma mchis pa ni sangs rgyas kyi yul lags te* (Derge Kanjur 79, *dkon brtsegs, ca*, 267a7–b1). The meaning is that the domain of the Buddha is not a domain of discrimination as was explained in the preceding sentences, namely, there is no discrimination of eye, ear and so on. In our passage here in the AAN, therefore, where the discrimination must be taken positively, it may be that this discrimination refers to the Tathāgata’s skillful means or something similar. This may be what is intended by Takasaki (1975a: 49): 如来のはたらきの対象の無量の差異種別をありのままに理解できないから。
Note (by examining the variant readings) that this expression created great problems for the copyists of the sūtra, who probably were so used to writing 知 in this series that they automatically inserted it here as well, against the required sense.
- l) **not good at:** For the term *néngshàn* 能善, see Ōta (1988: 41).
- m) For Takasaki (1965: 90), misunderstanding the nature of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa (which he takes as equivalent to misunderstanding the nature of the *dharmakāya*) leads directly to the error of concluding that there is a decrease in the realms of beings. In this he bases himself on the *Tathāgatopattisambhava-nirdeśa* (*Xingqǐ* 性起 chapter) of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* sūtra.

5i

a) 舍利弗，愚癡凡夫無聞慧故，聞如來涅槃，起斷見滅見。^{b)} 以起斷想及滅想故，謂衆生界滅，成大邪見極重惡業。

a) “Śāriputra, because foolish common people lack [even that] insight which comes from hearing [the teachings], hearing of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa they entertain the view that it is annihilation and the view that it is cessation.^{b)} Because they entertain the notion that it is annihilation and the notion that it is cessation, they consider that the realm of beings decreases, and this creates the extremely heavy evil karma of a greatly mistaken view.

a) **insight which comes from hearing:** *wénhuì* 聞慧, **śrutamāyī-prajñā*.

Probably what is meant is that foolish common people lack even the most basic of the three forms of insight, that obtained by (mere) listening, that is, learning from a teacher, not to mention that obtained through rational thinking (*cintāmayī*-) or the highest form, that obtained through meditative contemplation (*bhāvanāmayī*-). Because they do not even know the doctrine as it is taught, they confuse the nature of nirvāṇa with that of *nirodha*, extinction. In Sanskrit, learning is aural, and thus to say that one is *bahuśruta*, ‘one who has heard much,’ is to express what we mean by saying someone is ‘well read.’ Therefore, it would be more technically correct to render the expression ‘insight which comes from learning,’ but the connection with the following ‘hearing of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa’ would then be lost.

Tokiwa (1932: 105n9) rejects the identification of *wénhuì* 聞慧 with *śrutamāyī-prajñā* and appeals instead to the pair *yǎnjiàn* 眼見 and *wénjiàn* 聞見 in the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*. There (T. 374 [XII] 527c–528a) bodhisattvas and buddhas see through eyes and know that all beings have the buddha-nature. Bodhisattvas of the tenth stage are in-between, while those in the ninth and lower stages see by hearing. Those who hear that all beings possess the buddha-nature, but do not believe it, do not have even this seeing through hearing. Thus, while it is possible to see why this passage came to Tokiwa’s attention (and perhaps he knew it since it is quoted by Shinran in his *Kyōgyōshinshō* 教行信證 [T. 2646 (LXXXIII) 624a1–25]), as the category does not seem to be known elsewhere, I do not believe that we can reasonably apply it here.

annihilation and ... cessation: Takasaki (1975a: 49) interprets this to refer to the annihilation of transmigration and that there is nothing after death. In RGV we find *duànjiàn* 斷見 as *ucchedadr̥ṣṭi* (Johnston 1950: 34.20 = RGV_C T. 1611 [XXXI] 830c28). See §13i(b).

- b) **entertain the notion:** For the construction with 以起 ... 想, Stefano Zaccchetti points to Edgerton's discussion (1953, s.v. *saṃjñā* [5]) concerning an object, generally in the locative, followed by *saṃjñā* and the verb *utpādayati*, with the meaning 'conceives an idea.'

extremely heavy evil karma: In the *Suvarṇabhāsottama*, 極重惡業 corresponds to *kṛtaṃ pāpaṃ sudāruṇam* (Nobel 1937: 28; Skjaervø 2004: 3.38b = T. 663 [XVI] 337b5). Later in the AAN (§20ii), those who hold the views of increase and decrease will be called *icchāntika*. In the *Zhufo jingjie shezhenshi jing* 諸佛境界攝真實經 (T. 868 [XVIII] 276c11–12), we find the expressions *icchāntika* and 'extremely heavy evil karma' connected: 若凡夫人修此觀門, 雖造五逆、一闡提等極重惡業, 皆悉消滅, "If common persons practice this visualization, although they commit extremely heavy evil karma such as the five sins of immediate retribution, [those of] the *icchāntika*, and so on, all [their evil] will be wiped out." As written this sentence makes it look like *icchāntika* is something one can 'do' 造, which does not seem to make sense, but the overall sense of the association between being an *icchāntika* and 'extremely heavy evil karma' is clear, and my rendering attempts to make logical sense of the expression.

Takasaki (1975a: 49) understands two things, greatly mistaken views and extremely heavy evil karma. This is also possible, I suppose.

5ii

a) 復次, 舍利弗, 此諸衆生依於滅見, 復起三見。^{b)} 此三種見與彼滅見不相捨離, 猶如羅網。^{c)} 何謂三見。^{d)} 一者, 斷見, 謂: 畢竟盡;^{e)} 二者, 滅見, 謂: 即涅槃;^{f)} 三者, 無涅槃見, 謂: 此涅槃畢竟空寂。^{g)} 舍利弗, 此三種見, 如是縛, 如是執, 如是觸。

b) 猶如羅網] F1: 由如羅網

d) 畢竟盡] Kongo: 畢竟盡

e) 滅見] Kongo: 滅見

a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view that there is decrease, these beings further entertain three types of views.^{b)} These three types of views and that view that there is decrease are inseparable, like [the threads of] a gauze net.^{c)} What are the three views?^{d)} 1. The view of annihilation, that is, that there is absolute exhaustion.^{e)} 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa.^{f)} 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence.^{g)} These three types of views, Śāriputra, fetter [beings] in this way, grasp [beings] in this way, and cling [to beings] in this way.

a) **on the basis of:** The Chinese *yī* 依 here perhaps renders some form of *ā√śrī*, ‘to depend on, prefer, or resort to’. Compare this usage with that discussed below in the note to §17ii(a).

b) **inseparable:** *avinirbhāga*. See Takasaki (1958), and Appendix 2.

gauze net: In the *Da zhidu lun*, the variety of wrong views about the world are compared to the tangled threads of a net, 是世間種種邪見, 羅網如亂系相著 (T. 1509 [XXV] 258c3–4). As detailed in the Introduction, the term *luówǎng* 羅網 certainly renders *jāla*, ‘net,’ a key framing term in the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, famous for its exposition of wrong views.

d) **annihilation ... absolute exhaustion:** The first term seems to render *ucchedavāda*. Compare the expression in the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* of the *Dirghāgama*: ‘living beings are annihilated without remainder,’ 衆生斷滅無餘 (T. 1 [21] [I] 93a21–24). The Chinese expression 以一切法是畢竟盡不可盡故 in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (T. 220 [VII] 202b3) corresponds to *sarvadharmāṇām atyantakṣayaakṣiṇatām upādāya* (Kimura 1990: 1.25). In the *Kāśyapa-parivarta* 一切諸法畢竟盡故 corresponds to

atyantakṣayatvāt sarvadharmāṇām (Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya et al. 2002: §148 [75r1 = p 52.27–28] = T. 659 [XVI] 282c9–10). In the *Jñānā-lokālamkāra*, the manuscript reading should be confirmed, but in any event certainly nearly the same sort of equivalent is found (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2004: 138,3 = T. 359 [XII] 262a25–26). However, in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, 不壞慈畢竟盡故 corresponds to what the extant Sanskrit has as *akopyamaitry atyantaniṣṭhānatayā* (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006: 66.13, 40b2, §VI.2 = T. 475 [XIV] 547b18). This demonstrates that while the vocabulary is stable, it is not invariant.

- e) **extinction:** This term *mièjiàn* 滅見 seems hard to distinguish from the previous one *duànjiàn* 斷見. The term *miè* 滅 may render *nirodha*, but in the *Karuṇāpūṇḍarīka* we find instead (with a slight difference in vocabulary) 若有衆生於三寶中起斷滅見, 聞佛說法即得諸寶莊嚴三昧 equivalent to *triratnocchedaḍṣṭīnām ratnavyūhavyāhāreṇa* (Yamada 1968: II.254.10–11 = T. 157 [III] 210a27). In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* we find the sequence 有見、無見、斷滅見、常在爲斷大見 equivalent to *bhavadṛṣṭi, vibhavadṛṣṭi, ucchedaḍṣṭi, śāsvatadṛṣṭi*, and thus it looks like the last term misses an equivalent (T. 225 [VIII] 480c8–9 = Wogihara 1932–1935: 80.26–81.1). (When we find 滅見 in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* V.8d, it corresponds to *draṣṭavyopasāma*, ‘pacification of visible objects [that is, what can be experienced].’ [Saigusa 1985: 144–145] It is intriguing to notice, however, that Candrakīrti comments *draṣṭavyopasāmaṁ śivalakṣaṇaṁ sarvakaḷpanājālarahitaṁ*, ‘characterized by calm, the pacification of visible objects is free from the net [*jāla*] of all conceptualization’ [La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 135.3]. Here note especially the use of the key term *jāla*.) How exactly to sort out the terms here is not clear, but it does suggest that the vocabulary in question requires further investigation.

Incidentally, what seems to be the view criticized here has been repeated in modern times, for example by Oldenberg (1882: 273): “The Nirvāna is annihilation,” and La Vallée Poussin (1917: 117): “It may therefore be safely maintained that Nirvāṇa is annihilation.”

- f) **absolute quiescence:** *bījīng kōngjì* 畢竟空寂. In the *Ratnacūḍa* quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, we find corresponding to this Chinese term *atyantopasāma* (Bendall 1897–1902: 272.10 = T. 1636 [XXXII] 127c4), with the same in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (Lévi 1907: XVIII.77cy; and see Nagao 1958: 7). Takasaki (1975a: 375n8) suggests rather **atyanta-vivikta*, in which *vivikta* has the original sense of ‘separated’ as in ‘pure,’ separated from stain, or ‘quiet,’ separated from activities, such as a busy village, or

‘empty,’ ‘nul,’ separated from the substantial. Here he suggests that the reference is to nirvāṇa as quiescence understood as empty or nothing.

g) It is not clear whether this sentence should rather be attached to the following section §5iii.

fetter in this way, grasp in this way, and cling in this way: Seishi Karashima points out to me that the grammatical construction with 如是x, 如是y, 如是z is found in a famous expression in the Lotus Sutra (T. 262 [IX] 5c11–13): 所謂諸法如是相。如是性。如是體。如是力。如是作。如是因。如是緣。如是果。如是報。如是本末究竟等. For an interesting discussion see Robert (2011). In the *Dirghāgama* (T. 1 [I] 90b11–12) we find 唯有如來, 知此見處, 如是持, 如是執, 亦知報應, translated by Sueki (2002: 43): ただ如来だけが、この説がこのように維持執着されることを知り、またその報いを知る。

5iii

a) 以是三見力因緣故，展轉復生二種邪見。b) 此二種見與彼三見不相捨離，猶如羅網。c) 何謂二見。d) 一者，無欲見；e) 二者，畢竟無涅槃見。

b) 猶如羅網] F1: 由如羅網

a) “Through the forceful influence of these three views, [those beings] in their turn further entertain two types of mistaken views. b) These two types of views and those three views are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa]. e) 2. The view of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa.

d) **devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa]**: I follow Takasaki (1975a: 375n9) here in understanding the reference to be to nirvāṇa. He reaches this conclusion based on the following §5iv, which he understands to suggest that one does not seek nirvāṇa because one rather 1) follows other paths, and 2) confuses the pure and impure. He then—to me it seems like a leap—connects this with the Lokāyata doctrine. Srisetthaworakul (2010: 67) understands “they have no interest in nirvāṇa,” 涅槃に興味を持たない。These suggestions seem to me be more or less guesses, and since the expression does not appear elsewhere, so far as I can tell, its meaning is not obvious. When the words 無欲見 appear in the *Madhyamāgama* (T. 26 [198: Dantabhūmi] [I] 757b11, 22, c12) they are to be understood as “seeing the absence of sensual pleasures” (Anālayo 2006: 7), or as Ven. Anālayo now writes to me, ‘dispassionate vision.’

e) **the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa**: In *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* we find the expression 畢竟無涅槃法 corresponding to *atyantāparinirvāṇadharmā* (Lévi 1907: III.11cy, and see Nagao 1958: 7), where, however, it refers to those who absolutely do not have the capacity for attaining nirvāṇa at all, ever. On this see (with some reservations) D’Amato (2003).

5iv

a) 舍利弗，依無欲見，復起二見。^{b)} 此二種見與無欲見不相捨離，猶如羅網。^{c)} 何謂二見。^{d)} 一者，戒取見；^{e)} 二者，於不淨中起淨顛倒見。

b) 猶如羅網] F1: 由如羅網

a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa], [those beings] further entertain two views.^{b)} These two types of views and the view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa] are inseparable, like a gauze net.^{c)} What are the two views?^{d)} 1. The view of attachment to practices and observances.^{e)} 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.

d) **The view of attachment to practices and observances:** In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu offers this explanation for *śilavrataparāmarśa*: “Falsely viewing what is not a cause as a cause and falsely viewing what is not a genuine path towards salvation as a genuine path towards salvation is what we call attachment to practices and observances. For example, [Śiva] Maheśvara is not the cause of the different worlds, but one nonetheless views him, or Prajāpati, or another one, as their cause. Practices such as [voluntarily] entering fire or water [so that death ensues] are not the cause of heaven, but one nonetheless views them as its cause. Mere practices and observances as well as things such as the knowledge of Sāṅkhya and Yoga are not a genuine path to salvation, but one nonetheless views them as a genuine path to salvation,” *ahetau hetudṛṣṭir amārgemārgadṛṣṭiḥ śilavrataparāmarśaḥ | tadyathā maheśvaro na hetur lokānām | taṁ ca hetuṁ paśyati prajāpatim anyam vā | agnijalapraveśādayaś ca na hetuḥ svargasya tāṁś ca hetuṁ paśyati | śilavratamātrakam sāṅkhyayogajñānādayaś ca na mārgo mokṣasya tāṁś ca mārgam paśyati* (text Pradhan 1975: 282,8–12, ad V.7, trans. Eltschinger Forthcoming, with extensive removal of brackets).

e) **inverted view:** **viparyāsa*. The view mentioned here is the last of the four inverted views, at least as old as the *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*: *asubhe ... subhanti saññāvipallāso cittavipallāso diṭṭhivipallāso* (IV.V.49.1, Morris 1888: ii.52,7–8), apparently without Chinese equivalent, although the category is well known (for an extensive examination, see Watanabe 1987). In the RGV conceiving the impure with respect to what is pure is detailed as one of four inverted views: ... *aśubhe śubham iti sañjñā | ayam ucyate caturvidho viparyāsaḥ* = 於不淨中起於淨想。是等名為四種顛倒應知 (Johnston

1950: 30.11–12 = RGV_c T. 1611 [XXXI] 829b19–20), with almost the identical expression found in the *Wushangyi jing* 無上依經 (T. 669 [XVI] 471c16), a Chinese work composed under the influence of the RGV, where as the fourth in a list of inverted views we find 於不淨中而生淨見. Note that the Indic wording may slightly differ, as illustrated by a passage from the *Ugradattaparipṛcchā* (quoted in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, Bendall 1897–1902: 198.12): *aśucau śucir iti viparyāsbhayabhīto*.

6

a) 舍利弗，依畢竟無涅槃見，復起六種見。^{b)} 此六種見與無涅槃見不相捨離，猶如羅網。^{c)} 何謂六見。^{d)} 一者，世間有始見；^{e)} 二者，世間有終見；^{f)} 三者，衆生幻化所作見；^{g)} 四者，無苦無樂見；^{h)} 五者，無衆生事見；ⁱ⁾ 六者，無聖諦見。

b) 猶如羅網] F1: 由如羅網

a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa, [those beings] further entertain six types of views.”^{b)} These six types of views and the view of the nonexistence of nirvāṇa are inseparable, like a gauze net.^{c)} What are these six views?^{d)} 1. The view that the world has a beginning.^{e)} 2. The view that the world has an end.^{f)} 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation.^{g)} 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure.^{h)} 5. The view that beings [produce] no (karmically significant) activity.ⁱ⁾ 6. The view that there are no noble truths.

d-e) These first two views represent the first of the *avyākṛtavastu*, the unresolved questions to which the Buddha declined to offer an answer as both unfruitful and incomprehensible, namely ‘Is the world eternal?’ This category is widely discussed in Buddhist literature.

f-i) While the first two views are clearly problematic for Buddhism as a whole, views 3–6 could be doctrinally acceptable from a śūnyavādin point of view, or even a Mahāyānistic point of view more generally.

f) **illusory creation:** In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* we find 幻師幻化所作 = *māyākāranirmita* (T. 228 [VIII] 674a13–14 = Wogihara 1932–1935: 965.19), while in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* 幻化所作 = *nirmita* (§XI.2: T. 476 [XIV] 584c8–9, Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006: 111.4). The doctrinal point in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* is that asking about rebirth makes no sense because all beings are no different from illusory creations. As the *Da zhidu lun* makes clear (Lamotte 1944–1980: I.357–360, in the note), all conditioned things are indeed nothing but *māyā*. However, is the point here rather about the ontological (?) status of *nirmita* (Lamotte 1944–1980: I.468–469n)? I do not see the direct connection here with nirvāṇa and its nonexistence, but perhaps I am being too literal.

- h) **activity:** *shì* 事 is very difficult to understand here, and I am not at all sure of this rendering, which is in fact a guess. Takasaki (1975a: 51), 衆生のよりどころはない. Ogawa (2001: 228n22) uses precisely the same wording, adding 仏道を求める意味がない; neither explains this understanding. Generally *yoridokoro* means something like ‘authority,’ ‘ground (upon which one can rely).’ See the entirely context-free expression in the *Samādhirāja*: 不得衆生事 = *vastu nopalabhate* (Dutt 1953: 346.14–15 = Vaidya 1961: 167.1 = T. 639 [XV] 586a6–7), although this hardly makes things clearer. Dr Pu Chengzhong brings to my attention a passage in T. 468 [XIV] 494a22ff., in which Mañjuśrī asks the Buddha 若如來無心意識, 云何當作衆生事. While I am not certain this would necessarily be relevant, in any case, the Buddha’s answer does not clarify the precise sense of the expression here.
- i) **no noble truths:** I do not know what stance this is meant to represent. While on the one hand to deny the Noble Truths is to deny Buddhism tout court, this seems like a very elementary point and not in keeping with the tenor of the rest of the discussion. In the *Śrīmālādevī* the “profound teaching” of the Noble Truths is identified with the tathāgatagarbha (Tsukinowa 1940: 120–122), and perhaps it is this discussion which was in the mind of the AAN’s authors.

7i

a) 復次, 舍利弗, 此諸衆生依於增見, 復起二見。^{b)} 此二種見與彼增見, 不相捨離, 猶如羅網。^{c)} 何謂二見。^{d)} 一者, 涅槃始生見; ^{e)} 二者, 無因無緣忽然而有見。

b) 猶如羅網] F1: 由如羅網

a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view of increase, these beings further entertain two views. ^{b)} These two views and the view of increase are inseparable, like a gauze net. ^{c)} What are these two views? ^{d)} 1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. ^{e)} 2. The view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes or conditions.

d) **initially produced:** The *Milindapañha* has Nāgasena state: “Nibbāna ... is unarisable, therefore a cause for the arising of nibbāna has not been pointed out,” *anuppādanīyam ... nibbānaṃ tasmā na nibbānassa uppādāya hetu akkhāto ti* (Trenckner 1880: 269.17–18, trans. Horner 1964: 88), and further, “It should not be said of nibbāna ... that it is born of kamma or born of cause or born of physical change; or that it has arisen or has not arisen or is arisable; or that it is past or future or present,” *nibbānaṃ pana mahārāja na vattabbaṃ kammajan ti vā hetujan ti vā utujan ti vā uppānnaṃ ti vā anuppānnaṃ ti vā uppādanīyaṃ ti vā atītaṃ ti vā anāgataṃ ti vā paccuppānnaṃ ti vā* (Trenckner 1880: 271.13–16, Horner 1964: 90).

e) **suddenly without causes or conditions:** Takasaki (1975a: 51) takes this to refer to nirvāṇa, translating: (涅槃は) 因も縁もなくして突如として出現するという見方である。If the emphasis is on the point that nirvāṇa is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), this cannot be a false view. In fact, this seems to be backwards (I owe the observation to Robert Sharf): nirvāṇa is by definition unconditioned. I wonder, therefore, whether the sense of the sentence may be that it is an error to believe that anything *other than* nirvāṇa, that is to say, any *saṃskṛtadharma*, exists without conditions. In the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, we read of the category of claims that “this world has come into existence without a cause,” 無因而出有此世間 (*Dirghāgama*, T. 1 [21] [I] 92a15–16). Or is the sense, as we might gather from §7ii, that either (d) nirvāṇa already exists, and therefore need not be sought, or (e) will come to exist without one creating the conditions for it oneself? Is there an important contrast between *shǐ* 始 and *hūrán* 忽然, ‘at first, initially,’ and ‘suddenly’?

7ii

a) 舍利弗, 此二種見令諸衆生於善法中無願欲心、勤精進心。^{b)} 舍利弗, 是諸衆生以起如是二種見故, 正使七佛、如來、應、正遍知次第出世爲其說法,^{c)} 於善法中若生欲心, 勤精進心, 無有是處。

a) “These two types of views, Śāriputra, cause beings to lack the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities. ^{b)} Because, Śāriputra, these beings entertain these two views, even if the seven Buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Perfectly Awakened Ones were successively to appear in the world to expound the Teachings for them, ^{c)} it would be impossible for them to produce the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities.

- a) **the desire and the zeal [to cultivate]:** Notice the parallelism between 於善法中無願欲心、勤精進心 in (a) and 於善法中若生欲心, 勤精進心 in (c). The expression 願欲心 appears in Bodhiruci’s 十地經論 (T. 1522 [XXVI] 138a11), but its correspondence to the Tibetan version of the text is not entirely clear (Ōtake 2005: 163n22). It is conceivable that we should look here to categories 1 (信, faith) and 3 (精進, energy) in the list of 10 faiths (十信), for which see Nakamura (1981: 594a), but if so I do not know why only these two items would be adduced here. The overall expression remains unclear. Takasaki (1975a: 51) translates the two phrases: 望み願う心 and 得ようとつとめ努力する心, respectively.
- b) **the seven Buddhas:** Probably a reference to the standard list: Vipaśyin, Śikhin, Viśvabhu, Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, Kāśyapa, Śākyamuni. Compare the expression in the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya referring to the spiritual chances of a patricide: 正使七佛一時出世爲其說法, 於正法中終不生善, “Even if the seven Buddhas were to appear in the world simultaneously to expound the dharma, he would ultimately not be able to produce [roots of] good with respect to the true teaching.” (T. 1425 [XXII] 417c4–5).
- c) **impossible:** *wúyǒushìchù* 無有是處, perhaps rendering *asthānam ... anavakāśaḥ, naitat sthānam bhavati, nedam sthānam vidyate* or a similar idiom.

7iii

a) 舍利弗, 此二種見乃是無明諸惑根本, ^{b)} 所謂: 涅槃始生見, 無因無緣忽然而有見。

a) 諸惑根本] Kongo: 諸或根本

a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the foundation of all forms of defilements caused by ignorance. ^{b)} [‘These two views’] means the view that nirvāṇa was produced in the beginning, and the view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes and conditions.

a) **the foundation of all forms of defilements:** See the expression 爲我斷除疑惑根本諸見之病 ≈ *vicikicchākathāṅkathāsalla* (in the **Śakraparipṛcchā*, T. 15 [I] 249b23 ≈ *Sakkapañhasutta*, *Dīgha-nikāya* 21, Rhys Davids and Carpenter 1890–1911: ii.283,26–27).

8i

a) 舍利弗, 此二種見乃是極惡根本大患之法。 b) 舍利弗, 依此二見起一切見。 c) 此一切見與彼二見不相捨離, 猶如羅網。 d) 一切見者, 所謂: 若內, 若外, 若麤, 若細, 若中, 種種諸見, 所謂: 增見、減見。

b) 依此二見起一切見] F1: 此二見起一切見

c) 猶如羅網] F1: 由如羅網

a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the teaching of fundamental great calamity brought about by extreme evil. b) On the basis of these two views, Śāriputra, [beings] give rise to all views. c) All these views and those two views are inseparable, like a gauze net. d) ‘All views’ means all sorts of views, of inner and outer, gross and subtle, and in-between, that is, it refers to the view that there is increase and to the view that there is decrease.

a) **teaching**: I am unsure of the sense of 法 here. Takasaki (1975a: 375n13) takes it as ‘notion, idea, concept’ (概念).

fundamental great calamity: In the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, *dàhuàn* 大患 corresponds to *mahāvvyādhi* (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2006: 49.22 [MS 29b6] §IV.12 = T. [XIV] 475 545a7; T. 476 [XIV] 568c1–2). We might also understand: ‘nothing other than the root of great evil and an extremely calamitous thing.’

d) **inner and outer** ...: The expression is common; see the Lamotte (1944–1980: II.730, translating *Da zhidu lun* T. 1509 [XXV] 148a03): 色若麤若細若內若外, with reference to canonical sources and quoting Pāli *atītānāgatapaccuppannam ajjhataṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhamāṃ vā* In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* we find likewise: *atītānāgatapratyutpannam ādhyātmikabhāṣyam audārikaṃ vā sūkṣmaṃ vā* ... (*ad* I.20ab, Pradhan 1975: 13.5). In light of these expressions, Takasaki’s (1975a: 52) understanding of ‘inner and outer’ as Buddhist and non-Buddhist seems unlikely.

8ii

a) 舍利弗, 此二種見依止一界, 同一界, 合一界。^{b)} 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知彼一界故, 不如實見彼一界故,^{c)} 起於極惡大邪見心, 謂: 衆生界增, 謂: 衆生界減。」

b) 一切愚癡凡夫] Q, S, SX: 一切愚夫. Note that in §9i all have 一切愚癡凡夫.

a) “These two views, Śāriputra, rely on the single realm, are the same as the single realm, are united with the single realm.^{b)} Because all foolish common people do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality,^{c)} they entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases.”

a) **the single realm:** This most probably corresponds to **eka(dharma)dhātu*. See above §41(a).

b) **Because ... in accord with reality:** Takasaki (1965: 90, 1975a: 376n15) is right to draw attention to the passage in the RGV which, while not a quotation, certainly presents precisely the idea found here in the AAN: *bālānam ekasya dhātor yathābhūtam ajñānād adarśanāc ca pravartate*, “[various problems] develop because fools do not know and see the single realm in accord with reality” (Johnston 1950: 13.11–12).

c) **extremely evil greatly mistaken views:** See the passage in the *Perfection of Wisdom*: 曼殊室利, 假使碎此四大洲界悉爲極微, 一一極微各爲一佛。有一極惡邪見衆生起毒害心殺爾所佛。劫奪一切法財資財, 破滅世間法王法藥 (T. 220 (6) [VII] 959a6–9), “Mañjuśrī, suppose one were to smash this realm of four continents into atoms, and each atom became a buddha. A being with extremely evil mistaken views might have malevolent intention to kill all those buddhas. Plundering all the dharma treasures and material treasures, he might destroy the medicine of the worldly law and the royal law.” According to Hikata (1958: xv), there exists no Tibetan correspondent.

that is: I understand *wèi* 謂 to function here, as elsewhere, as equivalent, at least functionally, to *yad uta*.

9i

a) 爾時, 慧命舍利弗白佛言: ^{b)} 「世尊, 何者是一界而言: ^{c)} ‘一切愚癡凡夫, 不如實知彼一界故, 不如實見彼一界故, ^{d)} 起於極惡大邪見心, 謂: 衆生界增, 謂: 衆生界減。’

d) 衆生界減] Kongo: 衆生界減

a) At that time the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the Buddha, saying: ^{b)} “World-honored One! What is this single realm of which it is said: ^{c)} ‘All foolish common people, because they do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, ^{d)} entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases?’

b-c) Takasaki (1975a: 53) translates: 世尊よ、ただ一つの根元とはいったいなんですか。なぜ愚かな凡夫たちはすべて I think the Chinese syntax does not support this. Moreover, the sūtra is no longer interested in why beings would hold the wrong views—it has already addressed this in detail. Now the question is not why some might understand this single realm wrongly, but how it should be correctly understood.

9ii

a) 善哉，世尊。此義甚深，我未能解。 b) 唯願如來爲我解說，令得解了。」

a) **Emendation:** The transmitted text reads: 舍利弗言善哉世尊此義甚深我未能解。 Since Śāriputra is already speaking, 舍利弗言 seems unnecessary or even impossible (already noticed by Takasaki 1975a: 376n16). Therefore, I **delete** 舍利弗言. For the interjection which begins the paragraph, see below.

b) 唯願如來] Q, S, SX: 惟願如來

a) “Good, World-honored One! The purport of this is extremely profound. I am not yet able to comprehend it. b) Would the Tathāgata please expound it for me, causing me to be able to completely comprehend it.”

a) **Good, World-honored One!** The Chinese 善哉，世尊 probably represents something like *sādhu bhagavā*. The expression is very frequent, even, as here, in the midst of a statement.

The purport ...: Compare §2e, where we find 此義深隱，我未能解， and note that in §3i(b) we find 甚深義 (which may suggest **gambhīrārtha*). Here we have *shènshēn* 甚深 where §2e has *shēnyīn* 深隱. That the phrasing with 此義甚深 is much more common does not necessarily indicate that the other is incorrect, however. The expression 甚深義, “extremely profound purport,” can also be equivalent, apparently, merely to *artha*, as in the *Jñānālokāṅkāra* (Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2004: 20.2 [6] = T. 357 [XII] 240a28). It seems to me most likely that we have to do in these cases with some sort of elegant variation.

10i

a) 爾時, 世尊告慧命舍利弗。 b) 「此甚深義乃是如來智慧境界。亦是如來心所行處。 c) 舍利弗, 如是深義一切聲聞、緣覺智慧所不能知, 所不能見, 不能觀察。 d) 何況一切愚癡凡夫而能測量。

b) 此甚深義] F1: 此具深義

d) 測量] Kongo: 側量; S, SX: 側量

2.8–10: b) *tathāgataviṣayo hi śāriputrāyam arthas tathāgatagocaraḥ* | c) *sarvaśrāvakaḥ pratyekabuddhair api tāvac chāriputrāyam artho na śakyah samyak svaprajñayā <jñātum vā> draṣṭum vā pratyavekṣitum vā* d) *prāg eva bālaprthagjanair* |

c) *jñātum vā*] Johnston (1950: 2n4) suggested this restitution of the damaged akṣaras in the MS on the basis of Tibetan *shes pa*; see too Takasaki (1966: 143n16), Ruegg (1969: 298). It is confirmed by the 不能知 of AAN. RGV_c has only the verb 觀察, with the verb 證 in (d).

RGV_c T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a20–23: 如來經中告舍利弗言: 舍利弗, 言衆生者, b) 乃是諸佛如來境界, c) 一切聲聞、辟支佛等, 以正智慧不能觀察衆生之義。 d) 何況能證毛道凡夫。

a) At that time the World-honored One said to the venerable Śāriputra: b) “This extremely profound purport is exactly the Tathāgata’s sphere of insight and it is the range of the Tathāgata’s mind. c) Śāriputra, such a profound purport as this cannot be known by the insight of all the auditors and lone buddhas, cannot be seen, cannot be examined. d) Still how much less could all foolish common people fathom it.

b-d) The RGV Sanskrit version has: “b) For this purport, Śāriputra, is the Tathāgata’s sphere, the Tathāgata’s range. c) Even all the auditors and lone buddhas are not able through their own insight to correctly know, see or examine this purport to such an extent, Śāriputra, d) still how much less foolish common people.” I agree with Takasaki (1975a: 376n17) that the inclusion of insight and mind, respectively, as in the Chinese, is better, or at least clearer. Takasaki (1989: 5 and note 216n2) understands ‘purport’ as *paramārthasatya*. (*tāvāt* indicates that the auditors and lone buddhas cannot do this *as far as* the Tathāgata can.)

b-c) **the Tathāgatha's sphere of insight:** In the *Śrīmālādevī* we read: *bcom ldan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i spyod yul lags te | nyan thos dang | rangs sangs rgyas thams cad kyi spyod yul ma lags so ||* (Tsukinowa 1940: 122.4–7), “Blessed One, the embryo of the tathāgatas is the sphere of the Tathāgata, not the sphere of all the auditors and lone buddhas.” On this and the role of faith (in §10ii, below), see Ruegg (1971).

Note that at least in some contexts, other expressions may be found. In the *Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviśayavikurvāṇanirdeśa* we read that *sems can gyi khams kyi mtha' ni rtogs par nus srid kyi*, “although it is possible to comprehend the end of the realm of beings” (Derge Kanjur 146, *mdo sde*, pa 133b1).

Takasaki (1974: 215) suggests that the relationship between the single dharma-realm and the realm of beings here in the AAN is of the same type as that portrayed in the *Āṅgulimāliya*, in which we read: *'jam dpal sems can thams cad kyi dbyings yin pas na | srog gcod pa spangs pa ni sangs rgyas so || rigs kyi bu ji ltar bdag gsod pa ltar 'jig rten na srog gcod pa yang de bzhin te | bdag nyid kyi dbyings 'joms pa'o ||*, 文殊師利白佛言：世尊，以一切衆生界是一界故，諸佛離殺生耶。佛言：如是。世間殺生如人自殺，殺自界故 (Derge Kanjur 213, *mdo sde*, *tsha* 196b2–3 = T. 120 [II] 540c2–4), [Chinese] “Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: ‘Do the buddhas refrain from killing living beings because the realm of all beings is the single dharma-realm?’ The Buddha answered: ‘Yes, killing living beings is like suicide, because it is killing one’s own quintessence [or: the quintessence of the self?].’” [See Schmithausen (2003: 24n14), who reconstructs **sarvasattva-<dhātveka>dhātutvāt prāṇātīpātāt pratīviratā buddhāḥ.*] A few lines below we find: *gzhan yang 'jam dpal sems can thams cad kyi dbyings ni chos kyi dbyings te | dbyings gcig tu gyur pa'i sha za bar 'gyur bas | sangs rgyas rnams sha mi gsol lo ||*, 復次，文殊師利，一切衆生界我界即是一界。所食之肉即是一肉。是故，諸佛悉不食肉 (Derge Kanjur 213, *mdo sde*, *tsha* 197a5–6 ≠ T. 120 [II] 540c26–27, with Ogawa 2001: 156n4), “Again, Mañjuśrī, the realm of all beings is [Chinese: my quintessence; or: the quintessence of all beings is the quintessence of the self, that is, precisely] the single quintessence. The flesh which is eaten is precisely a single flesh. Therefore all buddhas eat no flesh at all.” (Tib.: “Again, Mañjuśrī, the realm of all beings is the dharma-realm; since it is the flesh of the single realm that is eaten, all buddhas do not eat flesh.” Schmithausen [2003: 25n14] translates the Chinese: „Der Wesenskern (dhātu) aller Lebewesen und mein eigener Wesenskern sind ein [und derselbe] Wesenskern. Das Fleisch [der anderen], das man ißt, [und das eigene Fleisch: das] ist

[somit] ein [und dasselbe]. Deshalb essen die Buddhas keinesfalls Fleisch.“ For the Tibetan he offers: „Der Wesenskern aller Lebewesen ist der dharmadhātu. Weil man [somit stets] das Fleisch von [etwas,] das eines Wesens [mit einem selbst] ist (*ekadhātubhūta?), essen würde, essen die Buddhas kein Fleisch.“ Takasaki (1974: 232n83) remarks that the notion of ‘one’s own realm’ is unique to this sūtra, explaining that while contextually it is clear that this refers to the buddha nature, it is unclear to whom the ‘own’ (*bdag* or *rang* in Tibetan) refers, but that in any event it does not refer to *ātman*. (Note that in this text Tibetan *dbyings*, **dhātu*, sometimes corresponds to Chinese 性, sometimes to 界, a variation discussed in the Introduction.) Michael Radich points to a passage in the Mahāyāna *Mahā-parinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra* (T. 374 [XII] 409b12–17; T. 376 [XII] 884b12–14; Derge Kanjur 120, *mdo sde, tha* 107a) in which the sūtra apparently speaks of an **ātmadhātu*. On the *Āṅgulimāliya* see Kanō (2000: 68), who suggests that both the idea of the single realm and that of the purity and impurity of mind in the *Āṅgulimāliya* are related to presentations in the AAN.

The Sanskrit text’s *svaprajñayā* is not represented in AAN; is RGV_c’s *zhèngzhīhuì* 正智慧 **suprajñā* < *svaprajñā*? Or does *zhèng* 正 represent **samyak*?

Sanskrit has *sarvaśrāvakaḥpratyekabuddhair api*, in RGV_c 一切聲聞、辟支佛等. Was *api* misunderstood as °*ādi* (*děng* 等)?

- d) Takasaki’s rendering (1975a: 53) seems to merge the Sanskrit and Chinese: ましていわんや、あらゆる愚かな凡夫たちにとってをや。彼らは推測することすらできない。

10ii

a) 唯有諸佛如來智慧乃能觀察、知、見此義。 b) 舍利弗，一切聲聞、緣覺所有智慧，於此義中，唯可仰信； c) 不能如實知、見、觀察。

a) 唯有諸佛如來] Q, S, SX: 唯有諸佛如來

b) 唯可仰信] S, SX: 惟可仰信

c) 知見觀察] S: 觀察

2.10–11: [*anyatra tathāgataśraddhāgamanataḥ | śraddhāgamanīyo hi śāriputra paramārthaḥ |*]

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a23–25: 於此義中唯信如來。是故，舍利弗，隨如來信此衆生義。

a) “It is indeed only the insight of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport. b) (Despite) the insight possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāriputra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; c) they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality.

a-b) RGV here quotes (?) something quite different, syntactically connected with the sentence cited above in §10i: “Except through embracing faith in the Tathāgata—for, Śāriputra, the supreme truth is to be embraced through faith.” Takasaki (1989: 5): ただ、如来に対し信仰をもつ者の場合を除く。けれど、シャーリプトラよ、最勝の義理(第一義[諦])はただ信仰を通してのみ達せられる。 This interpretation introduces a limitation (“the supreme truth is to be penetrated *only* through faith”) that I simply do not see in the Sanskrit, and which seems to me—if this is not going too far—to be distinctly Japanese, although it is interesting to observe that Prof. Takasaki himself belonged to the Sōtō Zen sect, and not to one of the Pure Land schools, in which I would have been more inclined to discover such a view.

We read in the *Śrīmālādevī*, quoted in Sanskrit: *śeṣāṇām devi sarvaśrāvākapratyekabuddhānām tathāgataśraddhāgamanīyāv evaitau dharmāv iti*, in RGV: *sangs rgyas kyis ni chos 'di gnyis de bzhin gshegs pa la dad pas rtogs par bya ba nyid do zhes gsungs pa yin no*, in the sūtra: *lha mo lhag ma nyan thos rnam ni chos 'di gnyis la de bzhin gshegs pa la dad pas 'gro bar zad de |*, “[You, goddess, can understand the doctrine being preached, as

can advanced bodhisattvas]. For the rest, goddess, all the auditors and lone buddhas, these two teachings are to be embraced only through faith in the Tathāgata.” (Johnston 1950: 22.3–4 ≈ Derge Tanjur 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 86a1 ≈ Tsukinowa 1940: 154.1–3).

- a) **examine, know and see:** This understanding of 觀察知見 is confirmed by §10i(c) (不能知, 所不能見, 不能觀察), pace Tokiwa (1932: 107) = Ogawa (2001: 229), who understand 觀察知見 as two verbs, 觀察 and 知見. Note in addition the passage in the *Śrīmālādevī*: 此經成就無量無邊功德。一切聲聞緣覺不能究竟觀察、知、見 = *nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas thams cad kyis kyang mdo sde 'di'i don thams cad ma lus par shes pa 'am | blta ba 'am nye bar brtag par mi nus na sems can gzhan dag gis lta ci smos |* (T. 353 [XII] 223a23–24 = Tsukinowa 1940: 164–166).

10iii

a) 舍利弗, 甚深義者, 即是第一義諦。 b) 第一義諦者, 即是衆生界。 c) 衆生界者, 即是如來藏。 d) 如來藏者, 即是法身。

2.11–13: b) *paramārtha iti śāriputra sattvadhātor etad adhivacanam* | c) *sattvadhātur iti śāriputra tathāgatagarbhasyaitad adhivacanam* | d) *tathāgatagarbha iti śāriputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam* |

56.2–3: d) *tathāgatagarbha iti śāriputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam iti* |

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a25–27: a) 舍利弗, 言衆生者, 即是第一義諦。 b) 舍利弗, 言第一義諦者, 即是衆生界。 c) 舍利弗, 言衆生界者, 即是如來藏。 d) 舍利弗, 言如來藏者, 即是法身故。

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 835c9–10: d) 舍利弗, 言如來藏者, 即是法身故。

a) “The extremely profound purport, Śāriputra, is precisely the supreme truth. b) The supreme truth is precisely the quintessence of beings. c) The quintessence of beings is precisely the embryo of the tathāgatas. d) The embryo of the tathāgatas is precisely the dharma-body.

a) **the supreme truth:** Note that while Chinese has **paramārthasatya*, 第一義諦, the Sanskrit in (b) has only *paramārtha*. There are, however, several examples in the RGV in which 第一義諦 appears to render something other than *paramārthasatya*. In one case 第一義諦攝 corresponds to *paramārthasamgraha* (Johnston 1950: 89.18 = RGV_C T. 1611 [XXXI] 843c11), and shortly thereafter we find 第一義諦身 corresponding to *paramārthakāya* (Johnston 1950: 91.5 = RGV_C T. 1611 [XXXI] 844a3). What *di* 諦 = **satya* is doing in these expressions I do not know.

b-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “^(b) The supreme, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the quintessence of beings. ^(c) The quintessence of beings, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the embryo of the tathāgatas. ^(d) The embryo of the tathāgatas, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the dharma-body.” See Ruegg (1969: 265n2) on Tibetan scholastic interpretations of the significance of the term *adhivacana* here.

b) **quintessence:** the key word *dhātu* here shifts its locus from the semantic domain of ‘realm’ to that of ‘essential core,’ ‘quintessence,’ though the Chinese translator chose to maintain the same translation, *jiè* 界, the sense of which is rather ‘realm.’ I suspect that by doing so the translator made

things as difficult for his Chinese audience as it would be for an English audience to keep the rendering ‘realm’ throughout. The authors of the AAN were clearly playing with the polyvalency of the term *dhātu*, for which see the Introduction.

- c) **embryo of the tathāgatas:** *tathāgatagarbha*
 d) **the dharma-body:** *dharmakāya*. Cp. the *Śrīmālādevī*, quoted in the note to §15i, below.

The *Śrīmālādevī* is also quoted in RGV as follows: *nānyo bhagavaṃs tathāgato ’nyo dharmakāyaḥ | dharmakāya eva bhagavaṃs tathāgata iti | duḥkhanirodhanāmnā bhagavann evaṃguṇasamanvāgatas tathāgata-dharmakāyo deśita iti | nirvāṇadhātur iti bhagavaṃs tathāgatadharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam |*, “Blessed One, the Tathāgata is not other than the dharma-body, and the dharma-body itself, Blessed One, is the Tathāgata. Through the designation, Blessed One, ‘destruction of suffering’ is indicated the Tathāgata’s dharma-body endowed with such good qualities. The realm of nirvāṇa, Blessed One, is a synonym of the Tathāgata’s dharma-body.” (Johnston 1950: 56.3–6). The passages are not sequential in the sūtra itself; see for the first and third Tsukinowa (1940: 108), with the third preceding the first on the same page. As for the second passage, although Takasaki (1966: 261n463) locates it on T. 353 (XII) 222a, I wonder if it is not to be connected with the passage quoted in the note to §15i(a) instead, where we find *duḥkhanirodhanāmnā bhagavann anādikāliko ... gaṅgāvālikāvyativṛttair avinirbhāgair acintyair buddhadharmaiḥ samanvāgatas tathāgatadharmakāyo deśitaḥ*, corresponding to: 所言苦滅者, 名無始 ... 世尊, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不異、不思議佛法成就說如來法身, T. 353 (XII) 221c7–10.

11

a) 舍利弗，如我所說，法身義者，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法，如來功德智慧。

3.4–5: a) *yo 'yam śāriputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyaḥ so 'yam avinirbhāgadharmāvinirmuktajñānaguṇo yad uta gaṅgānadīvalikāvyatikrāntais tathāgatadharmaiḥ |*

RGV_c T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b1–3: a) 舍利弗，如來所說，法身義者，過於恒沙不離，不脫，不思議佛法，如來智慧功德。

a) “As I have expounded, Śāriputra, the meaning of the dharma-body is inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha, greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, [namely,] the merits and insight of a tathāgata.

a) The RGV in Sanskrit has: ^(a) This same dharma-body the Tathāgata has spoken of, Śāriputra, possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and attributes indivisible, from what it is, that is, [inseparable from the] qualities definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.” Ruegg (1969: 360): “O Śāriputra, le *dharmakāya* enseigné par le Tathāgata a pour qualité d’être inséparable, et il a la propriété du savoir non séparé—[inséparable] des *dharmas* et *tathāgatas* dépassant [en leur nombre] les sables de la Gaṅgā.” This translation makes *-dharma* and *-guṇa* logically and semantically parallel, which I wonder about. See below.

as I have expounded: AAN has 如我所說 corresponding to Sanskrit *tathāgatanirdiṣṭa*, which however means rather: “The dharma-body the Tathāgata has spoken of is ...” Although the meaning remains the same, the Chinese of the RGV reads here 如來所說, corresponding to the Sanskrit. However, even though the latter is much more common, as both expressions are well attested there is no reason to emend the AAN’s reading. See also §16(a), below.

meaning of the dharma-body: I have some doubt about the sense and usage of *yi* 義 in *fāshēnyì* 法身義. Generally speaking, 義 represents something like *artha*, but I am not sure what that might mean here. There is no equivalent in the RGV, which has only *dharmakāya*, which seems to me to

be better. As far as I can see, the few times the term 法身義 appears in Chinese Buddhist scripture translations it is a grammatical predicate.

inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from: The Sanskrit here, *avinirbhāgadharmaṁavinirmuktajñānagaṇo*, has occasioned some discussion, especially focused on the related term *amuktajñāna*, on which see Appendix 2.

The RGV speaks of the wisdom and merits of the dharma-body, and has the qualities of the Tathāgata as greater in number than the sands of the Ganges. The AAN on the contrary seems to assume **acintyabuddhadharma-s* which are *gaṅgānadivālikāvvyatikrānta*, and more or less in apposition to this **tathāgatajñānagaṇa*. Cp. the *Śrīmālādevī: śūnyas tathāgatagarbho vinirbhāgair muktajñāiḥ sarvakleśakośaiḥ | aśūnyo gaṅgānadivālikāvvyatīrṭtair avinirbhāgair amuktajñair acintyair buddhadharmair*, “The embryo of the tathāgatas is empty of all separable casings of defilements unconnected to [buddha] knowledge. It is not empty of the inseparable, inconceivable buddha qualities, connected with [buddha] knowledge, greater in number than the sands of the Ganges river.” (Tsukinowa 1940: 130–131, Sanskrit quoted in RGV, Johnston 1950: 76.8–9.) Chinese has: 空如來藏, 若離、若脫、若異一切煩惱藏。世尊, 不空如來藏, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不異、不思議佛法 (T. 353 [XII] 221c16–18). See Ruegg (1969: 360), who in discussing the Tibetan translations of the RGV and the *Śrīmālādevī* says: “Il est possible que la tradition porte les traces d’une certaine tendance à interpréter le [*Śrīmālādevī*] à la lumière de la doctrine de l’[AAN] (ou d’un autre texte très proche de ce dernier).” Note that Ruegg is not here asserting that the AAN is in origin older than the *Śrīmālādevī*; he is speaking of (ipso facto, later) interpretive traditions.

sands of the Ganges: The syntactic position of 過於恒沙 within the sentence is extremely difficult to account for. Its meaning is obvious, but how it could relate to the rest of the sentence is less so.

merits and insight: I have taken *jñānagaṇa*, which in AAN corresponds to 功德智慧, as a dvandva, but I am not sure that this is right; Takasaki (1974: 82–84) understands it as a karmadhāraya. The Tibetan translation of the RGV appears to understand a genitive relation: *ye shes kyi yon tan*. This has been followed by most scholars (see above for Ruegg’s translation of the passage). However, see Appendix 2.

The Chinese *gōngdé zhīhuì* 功德智慧, without benefit of the Sanskrit, might have been taken otherwise, as in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*: 普放功德智慧光故, 為歡喜 = *vipulapunyajñānaprabhāpramuñcanatayā paramapṛitīkārah bhavati* (T. 278 [IX] 755a17–18 = Suzuki and Idzumi 1949: 388.3–4), where we find *puṇya* and *jñāna*.

12

a) 舍利弗, 如燈所有明、色及觸不離、不脫。^{b)} 又如摩尼寶珠所有明、色、形相不離、不脫。^{c)} 舍利弗, 如來所說法身之義亦復如是, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法, 如來功德智慧。

a) 如燈] All sources: 如世間燈. However, while 世間燈 is a rendering of *loka-pradīpa*, 'lamp of the world,' a well-known term, it gives no sense here. The Sanskrit quotation has only *pradīpa*, lamp, which I follow, and **emend** accordingly. Note that while MDN₁ and MDN₂ have 譬如燈, RGV_C has 如世間燈, thoughtlessly copied from the Chinese translation of the sūtra.

c) 不思議佛法] Q: 不思議無法

39.5–8: ^{a)} *tadyathā śāriputra pradīpaḥ | avinirbhāgadharmaṁvinirmuktaguṇo yad utālokoṣṇavarṇatābhiḥ |* ^{b)} *maṇir vālokavarṇasamsthāniḥ |* ^{c)} *evam eva śāriputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyo 'vinirbhāgadharmaṁ vinirmukta-jñānaguṇo yad uta gaṅgānadīvālikāvyaivṛttaiḥ tathāgatadharmair iti ||*

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b3–7: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 如世間燈, 明、色及觸不離, 不脫。^{b)} 又如摩尼寶珠, 明、色、形相不離、不脫。^{c)} 舍利弗, 法身之義亦復如是, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不思議佛法, 如來智慧功德故。

MDN₁ T. 1626 (XXXI) 893b15–19: 如說: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 諸佛法身有功德法。譬如燈有光明熱色不離, 不脫。^{b)} 摩尼寶珠光、色、形狀, 亦復如是。^{c)} 舍利弗, 如來所說諸佛法身智功德法不離, 不脫者。所謂: 過恒河沙如來法也。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c25–29: 如佛說言: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 譬如燈無二法功能無異。所為光明及煖色等不相離故。^{b)} 或如寶珠光明、形、色。^{c)} 如是, 如是, 舍利弗, 如來所說法身不相離法, 智慧功能所為過殞伽沙如來之法。

^{a)} “It is like a lamp, Śāriputra, whose brightness, color and tactile sensation are inseparable and indivisible [from the lamp itself]. ^{b)} Again, it is like a maṇi gem whose characteristics of brightness, color and form are inseparable and indivisible [from the gem itself]. ^{c)} The meaning of the dharmabody expounded by the Tathāgata, Śāriputra, is also once again like this: It is inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, the merits and insight of a tathāgata.

a-c) The RGV in Sanskrit has: ^{a)} Take as an example, Śāriputra, a lamp. It possesses qualities and attributes inseparable and indivisible from it, namely brightness, heat and coloration. ^{b)} Or a gemstone [which is inseparable and indivisible from its] brightness, color and form. ^{c)} Just so, Śāriputra, the dharma-body spoken of by the Tathāgata possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and attributes indivisible, from it, namely the qualities definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.” In (c), Takasaki (1989: 68) understands ‘qualities inseparable from wisdom,’ 智と離れない徳性を有するものである。

a) **lamp**: The image is expressed in a verse in RGV as follows: *pradīpavad anirbhāgagunayuktasvabhāvataḥ*, namely, “[The buddhagotra] is like a lamp, since its intrinsic nature is to be joined to qualities indivisible from it.” (Johnston 1950: 37.12; Nakamura 1967: 71.19 = Derge Tanjur 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 56b4: *dbyer med yon tan dang ldan pa'i || ngo bo nyid phyir mar me bzhin ||*; RGV_c T. 1611 (XXXI) 831b12: 如燈明、觸、色 性功德如是。) Note that here for *guṇa*, ‘qualities,’ Chinese has 明、觸、色, brightness, tactile sense and color; see next.

brightness, color and tactile sensation: Chinese 明色及觸 might be taken (as does Ogawa 2001: 229) as two things, 明色 and 觸, but Sanskrit *āloka-ṣṇavarṇa* argues against this, although the word order is different: *āloka* = 明, *uṣṇa* ≠ 觸 and *varṇa* = 色. The second is of course a problem; *uṣṇa* means heat, but *chù* 觸 usually renders *sparsā*, contact or tactile sensation. MDN₁ and MDN₂ complicate matters further, the former having 光明熱色, and the latter 光明及煖色, this being particularly hard to understand. In the second example of the jewel, AAN has 明色形, Sanskrit *āloka-varṇa-samsthāna*, RGV_c (as usual copying AAN) has 明色形, while MDN₁ reads 光色形狀, and MDN₂ 光明形色. These must be understood then as 光、色、形狀 and 光明、形、色, respectively. (It seems unlikely that *chù* 觸 is an error for *zhú* 燭, since the latter would still not give the required sense of ‘warmth.’)

b) **maṇi gem**: This expression is no coincidence, given that images of gems abound in discussions of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *gotra*. Ruegg (1976: 342–344) cites several pertinent examples from sūtras, among which one from the *Dhāraṇīśvararāja* (= *Tathāgatamahākaraṇānirdeśa*), cited in the RGV (Johnston 1950: 5,9–10; 6,1), provides the image of uncleaned maṇi gems (*aparyavadāpitāni maṇiratnāni*) and the impure *sattvadhātu* (*apari-suddham sattvadhātu*).

c) **meaning**: see the note to 11(a).

It is inseparable from ...: See §15i(a) for a *Śrīmālādevī* passage paralleling this expression, and Takasaki (1999: 47–48).

13i

a) 舍利弗，此法身者，是不生不滅法，^{b)} 非過去際，非未來際，離二邊故。^{c)}

舍利弗，非過去際者，離生時故。^{d)} 非未來際者，離滅時故。

a) 是不生不滅法 | Kongo: 是不生不滅法

b) 離二邊故 | Kongo: 離二滅邊故

a) “This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing.^{b)} It is unlimited in the past and unlimited in the future, because it is free from the two extremes.^{c)} It is unlimited in the past, Śāriputra, because it is free from a time of birth,^{d)} and it is unlimited in the future because it is free from a time of perishing.

a) **one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing:** or: is an unborn and unperishing thing? I would expect the underlying Sanskrit may be a bahuvrihi. Here *ñā* 法 may render an abstract suffix, °tā.

b) **unlimited:** In the *Śrīmālādevī* we read: *bcom ldan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa rnam ni dus kyi mtha' mchis pa la gnas pa ma lags te | bcom ldan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas rnam ni phyi ma'i mtha'i mur thug par gnas pa'i slad du'o ||* (Tsukinowa 110.4–7), “Because [—answering a question elided here] Blessed Ones, tathāgatas, do not dwell within the limits of time; Blessed Ones, tathāgatas, Complete and Perfect Buddhas dwell at the utmost [future] limit (*aparāntakoṭiniṣṭha*).” As Takasaki (1966: 213n102) points out, in the *Daśabhūmika* we find (in a bigger series) the following, obviously used synonymously: *dharmadhātuvipulām ākāśadhātuparyavasānam aparāntakoṭiniṣṭham* (Kondo 1936: 19.5–6). Once again in the *Śrīmālādevī* we find: *de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po nyid kyi dbang du bgyis nas bcom ldan 'das kyis sngon gyi mtha' med do zhes bshad cing btags so ||*, “Referring to this very embryo of the tathāgatas [which is the basis of saṃsāra], the Blessed One explained that it has no prior limit.” (Tsukinowa 144.10–12). See the note to §17i(b).

the two extremes: In this context, perhaps the extreme of nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) and that of eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*), respectively. This is, of course, an idea of considerable importance to Nāgārjuna, but the ideas themselves are much older. This harks back to the views mentioned above in §6(d)(e). In the *Brahmajāla-sūtra* it is an error to claim that the self or the world does or does not have a limit, 我及世間有邊無邊 (*Dirghāgama* T. 1 [21] [I] 91a19, 26, b3).

13ii

a) 舍利弗, 如來法身常, 以不異法故, 以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗, 如來法身恒, 以常可歸依故, 以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗, 如來法身清涼, 以不二法故, 以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗, 如來法身不變, 以非滅法故, 以非作法故。

54.12–15: a) *nityo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'nanyatvadharmākṣaya-dharmatayā* | b) *dhruvo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo dhruvaśaraṇo 'parānta-koṭisamatayā* | c) *śivo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpa-dharmatayā* | d) *śāśvato 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'vināśadharmākṛtrimad-dharmatayā* |

12.2: c) *śivo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpadharmā*

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 835b8–13: a) 舍利弗, 如來法身常, 以不異法故, 以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗, 如來法身恒, 以常可歸依故, 以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗, 如來法身清涼, 以不二法故, 以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗, 如來法身不變, 以非滅法故, 以非作法故。

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 824a7–8: c) 舍利弗, 如來法身清涼, 以不二法故, 以無分別法故。

a) “The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent because of its quality of immutability, because of its quality of inexhaustibility. b) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant because it can permanently be taken as a refuge, because it is equal with the future limit (of saṃsāra). c) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil because of its non-dual nature, because of its nature as free from discrimination. d) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangable because of its imperishable nature, because of its non-created nature.

a-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent, because of its quality of immutability and its quality of inexhaustibility. b) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant, a constant refuge, because of its equality with the future limit (of saṃsāra). c) This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil, because of its nondual, nondiscriminative qualities. d) This

dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangable, because of its imperishable and uncreated nature.” The logical structure of causality in the AAN seems to differ from that implied in the Sanskrit text quoted in the RGV. Cp. Ruegg (1969: 363), who seems to understand the Sanskrit syntax somewhat differently than I do. Takasaki (1989: 94) seems to read the grammar of the Sanskrit impossibly when he takes *ananyatvadharma* as an independent modifier of *dharmakāya*, although Tibetan *gzhan du mi 'gyur ba'i chos kyi sku* may support this understanding.

The well-known four topics of permanence, constancy, tranquility and unchangeableness—explicit inversions of the older categories of the impermanent and so on—are mentioned indirectly in verse 79 in RGV in a fashion that follows the AAN: *ananyathātmākṣayadharmayogato jagac-charaṇyo 'naparāntakoṭiḥ | sadādvayo 'sāv avikalpakatvato 'vināśa-dharmāpy akṣtasvabhāvataḥ ||*, “This (Essence of the Buddha) possesses an unalterable identity because it is endowed with inexhaustible qualities. It is the refuge of the world because it has no future limit. It is always non-dual because of its absence of discrimination. Likewise it is indestructible because its intrinsic nature is uncreated.” (Johnston 1950: 53.10–13; trans. Takasaki 1966: 256, modified.) This category is much discussed by, for instance, Tsuchihashi (1954), Nakamura (1966), Ruegg (1969: 362–392); Shimoda (1991 = 1997: 304–319, 618–629).

- a) **permanent:** *cháng* 常, *nitya*. This is not a happy translation, but it is hard to find a term that will allow us to distinguish it from *dhruva* (note that in Pāli we frequently find the string *niccam dhuvaṃ sassatam*, probably used essentially synonymously). *Nitya* refers to constancy into the future (Tola and Dragonetti 1980: 2–3). Note that, for instance, in the *Trīṃśikāvijñāptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu, in verse 30 *dhruva* is translated by 常 in Xuanzang's translation. Moreover, in Sthiramati's commentary it is glossed: *dhruvo nityatvād akṣayatayā*, translated by Deleanu (2012: 163n 50–51) as “[the word] stable [is used] because [the uncontaminated Realm (the topic in the verse, *anāsrava-dhātu*: JAS)] is permanent through its inexhaustibility.” Here in the AAN *akṣayadharmatā* is connected with *nitya*, not *dhruva*. This demonstrates that even in the hands of a careful philosopher like Sthiramati or Xuanzang, these categories are hard to distinguish.

14i

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, b) 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流, c) 往來生死, d) 名爲‘衆生’。

a) 恒沙] F 1, 2: 恒河沙

b) 波浪漂流 Kongo: 波浪灑流

40.16–18: ^{a)} *ayam eva śāriputra dharmakāyo ’paryantakleśakośakoṭigūḍhaḥ* | ^{c)} *saṃsārasrotasā uhyamāno* ^{b)} *’navarāgrasaṃsāragaticyutyupapattiṣu saṃcāran* ^{d)} *sattvadhātur ity ucyate* |

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a24–26: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無量煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始來隨順世間生死濤波, ^{c)} 去來生退, ^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。

MDN₁ T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a9–11: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身爲本際無邊煩惱藏所纏, ^{b)} 從無始來, 生死趣中生滅流轉, ^{d)} 說名‘衆生界’。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c2–5: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法界過於恒沙無邊煩惱穀所纏裏, ^{b)} 無始世來, 常爲生死波浪漂流, ^{c)} 往來生滅恒處中流, ^{d)} 說名‘衆生’。

a) “When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, ensnared by limitless defilements greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, ^{b)} drifting on the waves of the world from beginningless ages, ^{c)} comes and goes through birth and death, ^{d)} then it is termed ‘Beings.’

a-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “^{a)} This very dharma-body, Śāriputra, hidden by tens of millions of sheaths of limitless defilements, ^{c)} borne along by the current of transmigration, ^{b)} wandering through deaths and births in the destinies of beginningless and endless transmigration, ^{d)} is termed ‘The quintessence/realm of beings.’”

a) **dharma-body**: Here, in §14ii(a) and 15i(a), MDN₂ has *fājiè* 法界 (*dharmadhātu*) against *fāshēn* 法身 (*dharmakāya*) in other texts. Note that at RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 835c18 = Johnston 1950: 56.10, 如來法身 corresponds to *tathāgatadhātu*. Is the reading in MDN₂ merely a transmission error? A more systematic comparison of such equivalents would help clarify such questions.

greater in number than the sands of the Ganges: The Chinese translation of RGV has 過於恒沙, absent from the Sanskrit of RGV but found in the sūtra itself. MDN₁ lacks the term, which is found also however in MDN₂.

It is likely that the expression did not stand in the version of the sūtra known to the compiler of the RGV and MDN.

- b) **beginningless ages:** 從無始世, *anavarāgra*. See the Introduction.
- c) **comes and goes through birth and death:** 往來生死 is found in one translation of the *Kāśyapaaparivarta* (§67, T. 659 [XVI] 279a4) as equivalent to *saṃsāre bhrāmyanti*. Further in §152 (283a3): 常習法船往來生死度諸群品 corresponds to *yayā dharmanāvā sarvasatvā saṃsārārṇavaprāptān uhyamānān uttārayiṣyāmi*.
- d) **Beings.** The AAN terms the result of the process here ‘beings,’ while the RGV uses the term ‘quintessence/realm of beings,’ *sattvadhātu*. The Chinese translation of the RGV has only 衆生, sentient beings, while MDN₁ has 衆生界, *sattvadhātu* (but again MDN₂ has only 衆生). Once again, it is likely that the original of AAN known to the RGV and MDN read *sattvadhātu*.

This and the following two items are mentioned in verse 47 of the RGV, with prose commentary: *aśuddho ’suddhaśuddho ’tha suviśuddho yathākramam | sattvadhātur iti prokto bodhisattvas tathāgataḥ*, “[Depending on whether the *jinagarbha* is] impure, both pure and impure, and completely pure these refer in order to the realm of beings, the bodhisattva and the Tathāgata.” (Johnston 1950: 40.7–8; following Schmithausen 1971: 148). The commentary has: *tiṣṭṣv avasthāsu yathākramam trināmanirdeśato nirdiṣṭā veditavyāḥ | yad utāśuddhāvasthāyām sattvadhātur iti | aśuddhaśuddhāvasthāyām bodhisattva iti | suviśuddhāvasthāyām tathāgata iti*, “The explanation in three names is to be known as explained in sequential order in respect to the three states, to wit: the state of impurity refers to the realm of beings, the state of both purity and impurity refers to the bodhisattva, and the state of complete purity refers to the Tathāgata.” (Johnston 1950: 40.14–16).

This triad is not an innovation of the AAN. The connection between the realm of beings and the state of being a tathāgata is expressed in the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* as follows: “In this connection the true nature (*dharmatā*) of a tathāgata, being in the womb (*garbha*) inside the sheaths of such defilements as desire, anger, misguidedness, longing and ignorance, is designated ‘*sattva*.’ When it has become cool, it is extinct (*nirvṛta*). And because it is then completely purified from the sheaths of defilements of ignorance, it becomes a great accumulation of knowledge in the realm of sentient beings (*sattvadhātu*). The world with its gods, having perceived that supreme, great accumulation of knowledge in the realm of sentient beings speaking like a tathāgata, recognizes him as a tathāgata.”

*de la 'dod chags dang | zhe sdang dang | gti mug dang | sred pa dang | ma
 rig pa'i nyon mongs pa'i sbubs kyi nang na snying bor gyur pa de bzhin
 gshegs pa'i chos nyid de ni sems can zhes bya ba'i ming du chags so || de la
 gang bsil bar gyur pa de ni mya ngan las 'das pa ste | ma rig pa'i nyon
 mongs pa'i sbubs yongs su sbyangs pa'i phyir | sems can gyi khams kyi ye
 shes chen po'i tshogs su gyur pa gang yin pa de ni rnyed pa'o || sems can gyi
 khams kyi ye shes chen po'i tshogs dam pa de ni | de bzhin gshegs pa ji lta
 ba de bzhin du smra bar lha dang bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyis mthong nas | de
 bzhin gshegs pa zhes bya ba'i 'du shes su byed do ||* (Zimmermann 2002:
 §6B; trans. Zimmermann). See Zimmermann's extensive notes on this pas-
 sage (2002: 127–129nn159–164), especially his speculation that the men-
 tion of *sattvas* and *sattvadhātu* may not have been present in an earlier
 state of the text represented by one of the Chinese versions. See also verses
 §6.3–4.

14ii

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, ^{b)} 厭離世間生死苦惱, ^{c)} 棄捨一切諸有欲求, ^{d)} 行十波羅蜜, ^{e)} 攝八萬四千法門, ^{f)} 修菩提行, ^{g)} 名爲‘菩薩’。

b) 厭離] Taishō prints 厭離
苦惱] Kongo: 苦愆

40.18–41.1: ^{a)} *sa eva śāriputra dharmakāyaḥ* ^{b)} *samsārasrotoduḥkhanirviṇṇo*
^{c)} *viraktaḥ sarvakāmaṇiṣayebhyo* ^{d)} *daśapāramitāntargatais* ^{e)} *caturaśītyā*
dharmaskandhasahasrair ^{f)} *bodhāya caryām caran* ^{g)} *bodhisattva ity ucyate* |

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a26–28: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身, ^{b)} 厭離世間生死苦惱, ^{c)} 捨一切欲, ^{d)} 行十波羅蜜, ^{e)} 攝八萬四千法門, ^{f)} 修菩提行, ^{g)} 名爲‘菩薩’。

MDN₁ T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a11–14: ^{a)} 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, ^{b)} 厭離生死漂流之苦, ^{c)} 捨於一切諸欲境界, ^{d)} 於十波羅蜜及 ^{e)} 八萬四千法門中, ^{f)} 爲求菩提而修諸行, ^{g)} 說名‘菩薩’。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c5–7: ^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法界無邊, ^{b)} 厭離生死, 不住涅槃, ^{c)} 一切欲界中住, ^{d)} 行十波羅蜜, ^{e)} 攝八萬四千法門, ^{f)} 行菩提行時, ^{g)} 名爲‘菩薩’。

a) “When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, ^{b)} repels the anguish and suffering of birth and death in the world, ^{c)} banishes all desires, ^{d)} practices the ten perfections, ^{e)} collects the eighty-four thousand teachings, ^{f)} and cultivates the practices leading to bodhi, ^{g)} then it is termed ‘bodhisattva.’

a-f) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “^{a)} That very dharma-body, Śāriputra, ^{b)} being disgusted with the suffering of the currents of transmigration, ^{c)} indifferent to all objects of pleasure, ^{f)} practicing the practice which leads to awakening ^{e)} by means of the eighty-four thousand teachings ^{d)} which include the ten perfections, ^{g)} is termed ‘bodhisattva.’” So too Takasaki (1966: 222): “10 Supreme Virtues as including and representing all the 84 thousands groups [*sic*] of Doctrines,” noting in note 244 that *antargata* “lit. represented by or summarized in [the 10 pāramitās].” In (1989: 71) he translated: 十波羅蜜にまとめられる八万四千の法蘊によって。

RGV has past passive participles here, potentially indicating accomplished states, as I have translated, but also possibly active ones, while AAN has what can only be understood as active verbs.

c) **banishes all desires:** RGV has *viraktaḥ sarvakāmaṇiṣayebhyo*, corresponding in the Chinese of RGV_C to 捨一切欲. MDN₁, however, has 捨於一

切諸欲境界 and MDN₂ 一切欲界中住, both of the latter rendering the term *viṣaya*, missing in both AAN and the Chinese translation of the RGV. However, they do this with the Chinese terms *jingjiè* 境界 and *jiè* 界, respectively; while *viṣaya* should here mean not ‘domain’ but something like ‘object (of perception),’ it is possible that these standard Chinese equivalents are meant to be taken in this way. Tokiwa (1932: 108) = Ogawa (2001: 230) understand 一切の諸有の欲求を棄捨して, Ogawa adding in note 2: 諸有: 三有。詳しくは二十五有を数える。三界. This interpretation gives weight to the words 諸有, identifying them with twenty-five modes of existence in the three realms. In light of the extant parallel versions, however, I do not think this is correct. Moreover, one would expect the individual free of desire for all the realms to be already liberated, as is in fact claimed, for instance, by the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra*: 眞解脱者, 亦復如是, 皆悉遠離二十五有, “the truly liberated one is also like this: completely distanced from the twenty-five [modes of] existence.” (T. 374 [XII] 393a11–12).

- d) **the ten perfections**: certainly the more common accounting has six perfections, but several versions of ten also exist. See the discussion in the Introduction.
- e) **the eighty-four thousand teachings**: This is a common expression indicating the totality of teachings.
- f) **cultivates the practices leading to bodhi**: The text reads 修菩提行, while the Sanskrit has *bodhāya caryāṃ caran*. MDN₁ has 爲求菩提而修諸行, while MDN₂ has 行菩提行時 (which, perhaps not entirely incidentally, argues for its independent rendering of a Sanskrit source rather than simply rewriting MDN₁, since its duplication of *xíng* 行 reflects the Sanskrit *caryāṃ caran*). My slightly free rendering of the Chinese follows the meaning of the Sanskrit and MDN₁.
- g) Compare the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*: “Sons of good family, apply energy without giving in to despondency! It will happen that one day the tathāgata who has entered and is present within you will become manifest. Then you will be designated ‘bodhisattva,’ rather than ‘ordinary sentient being (*sattva*).’ And again in the next stage you will be designated ‘buddha,’ rather than ‘bodhisattva.’” *rigs kyi bu dag khyed bdag nyid sro shi bar ma byed par khyed brtson ’grus brtan par gyis shig dang | khyed la de bzhin gshegs pa zhugs pa yod pa dus shig na ’byung bar ’gyur te | khyed byang chub sems dpa’ zhes bya ba’i grangs su ’gro bar ’gyur gyi | sems can zhes bya bar ni ma yin no || der yang sangs rgyas shes bya ba’i grangs su ’gro’i | byang chub sems dpa’ zhes bya bar ni ma yin no zhes chos ston to ||* (Zimmermann 2002: §8B; trans. Zimmermann).

15i

a) 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, 離一切世間煩惱使纏, b) 過一切苦, c) 離一切煩惱垢, d) 得淨, 得清淨, e) 住於彼岸清淨法中, f) 到一切衆生所願之地, g) 於一切境界中究竟通達, 更無勝者, h) 離一切障, 離一切礙, 於一切法中得自在力, i) 名爲‘如來、應、正遍知’。

a) 煩惱使纏] Kongo: 煩惱使纏

c) 煩惱垢] Kongo: 煩惱垢

d) 得淨得清淨] Q, S, SX: 得清淨. However, the reading printed above is confirmed by Sanskrit *śuddho viśuddhaḥ*. MDN₁ has 清淨極清淨 (though MDN₂ has only 證得清淨).

41.1–5: a) *sa eva punaḥ śāriputra dharmakāyaḥ sarvakleśakośaparimuktaḥ* b) *sarvaduḥkḥātīkrāntaḥ* c) *sarvopakleśamalāpagataḥ* d) *śuddho viśuddhaḥ* e) *paramapariśuddhadharmatāyām sthitaḥ* f) *sarvasattvālokanīyām bhūmim ārūḍhaḥ* g) *sarvasyām jñeyabhūmāv ’dvitīyām pauraṣaṁ sthāmaprāptaḥ* | h) *anāvarenaḍharmāpratihatasarvadharmaiśvaryaśālatām adhigatas* i) *tathāgato ’rhan samyaksaṁbuddha ity ucyate* |

RGV_c T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a29–b4: a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, 得離一切煩惱使纏, b) 過一切苦, c) 離一切煩惱垢, d) 得淨, 得清淨, e) 得住彼岸清淨法中, f) 到一切衆生所觀之地, g) 於一切境界中, 更無勝者, h) 離一切障離一切礙, 於一切法中得自在力, i) 名爲‘如來應正遍知’故。

MDN₁ T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a14–19: a) 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, 解脫一切煩惱藏, b) 遠離一切苦, c) 永除一切煩惱隨煩惱垢, d) 清淨, 極清淨, e) 最極清淨住於法性, f) 至一切衆生所觀察地, g) 盡一切所知之地, 昇無二丈夫處, h) 得無障礙無所著一切法自在力, i) 說名‘如來應正等覺’。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c7–12: a) 舍利弗, 即此法界一切俱抵煩惱解脫, b) 度一切苦, c) 遠離一切煩惱隨眠纏垢, d) 證得清淨, e) 最極清淨法性中住, f) 一切衆生之所瞻仰, g) 住一切爾焰地, 得大勢力, h) 無障無著於一切法得自在力, i) 說名‘如來應正等覺’。

a) “Once again, Śāriputra, when this very same dharma-body is free from the covering of all the world’s defilements, b) beyond all suffering, c) and free from the stains of all defilements, d) it attains purity, it attains perfect purity, e) and dwells among the pure dharmas of the other shore. f) It reaches the

stage of what is desired by all beings, ^{g)} it thoroughly penetrates all spheres (of knowledge), and there is none surpassing it. ^{h)} It is free of all hindrances, free of all obstacles, and it attains sovereign power over all things. ⁱ⁾ [This then] is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One.’

a-i) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “^{a)} Once again, Śāriputra, this very dharma-body, thoroughly freed of all sheaths of defilements, ^{b)} having transcended all sufferings, ^{c)} the stains of all defilements vanished, ^{d)} well and truly pure, ^{e)} fixed in the Absolute Reality that is ultimately pure, ^{f)} risen to the stage looked forward to by all beings, ^{g)} having attained peerless heroic strength with respect to all spheres of knowledge, ^{h)} perfected in sovereign power over all things free of all hindrances and unobstructed—ⁱ⁾ this is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfect Buddha.’”

a) **this very dharma-body ... all the world’s defilements:** Compare a passage quoted from the *Śrīmālādevī: na khalu bhagavan dharmavināśo duḥkhanirodhaḥ | duḥkhanirodhanāmnā bhagavann anādikāliko ’kṛto ’jāto ’nutpanno ’kṣayaḥ kṣayāpagataḥ nityo dhruvaḥ śivaḥ śāsvataḥ prakṛtipariśuddhaḥ sarvakleśakośavinirmukto gaṅgāvālikāvyaativṛttair avinirbhāgair acintyair buddhadharmair samanvāgatas tathāgatadharmakāyo deśitaḥ | ayam eva ca bhagavaṁs tathāgatadharmakāyo ’vinirmuktakleśakośas tathāgatagarbha ity ucyate*, “The cessation of suffering, Blessed One, is not the destruction of the dharma (? dharmas?). The dharma-body of the Tathāgata, Blessed One, is taught under the name ‘cessation of suffering,’ being beginningless, uncreated, unborn, unarisen, inexhaustible, free from exhaustion, permanent, constant, peaceful, eternal, naturally pure, free from the casing of all defilements, accompanied by inseparable, inconceivable buddha qualities more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river. Just this dharma-body of the Tathāgata, Blessed One, when not liberated from the casing of defilements, is said to be the embryo of the tathāgatas.” (Tsukinowa 1940: 128–130, quoted in RGV 12.10–14, corr. Schmithausen 1971: 137). (Cp. Ruegg 1969: 267, 358; Takasaki 1974: 83; and see above §10iii[d] note).

c) **defilements:** Sanskrit has *upakleśa*, though as Edgerton (1953: s.v.) points out, this is functionally equivalent to *kleśa*. Although in (1966: 232) he understood it as a karmadhārya, in (1989: 71) Takasaki translated *upakleśa-mala* as a dvandva, 些細な煩惱や垢.

d) **purity ... perfect purity:** My distinction between *jing* 淨 and *qīngjìng* 清淨 is perforce artificial, and faut de mieux I follow the Sanskrit. See the next note.

- e) **dwells among the pure dharmas of the other shore:** 住於彼岸清淨法中. RGV has *paramaparīśuddhadharmatāyām sthitaḥ*, which Takasaki (1966: 232) translates: “abiding in the Absolute Essence which is the highest point of purity.” Bodhiruci here in his AAN translation has [mis]understood *parama* as *pāramitā*, ‘other shore.’ While the Chinese translation of RGV reproduces the AAN, MDN₁ has 最極清淨住於法性 and MDN₂ 最極清淨法性中住. Both of these render more literally the extant Sanskrit. Therefore, we may conclude that what the sūtra *should* express is “dwells in / fixed in the Absolute Reality [*dharmatā*] that is ultimately pure,” or something along those lines.
- f) **reaches the stage of what is desired by all beings:** 到一切衆生所願之地. RGV has *sarvasattvālokanīyām bhūmim ārūḍhaḥ*, RGV_C has 到一切衆生所觀之地, MDN₁ has 至一切衆生所觀察地 and MDN₂ 一切衆生之所瞻仰. These parallels suggest that AAN might contain a mistake here, and 願 should perhaps be **emended** to 觀. Takasaki (1975a: 56) translates: すべての衆生から仰ぎ見られる地位に登り.
- g) **all spheres (of knowledge):** the sūtra has 一切境界, corresponding to what RGV quotes as *sarvasyām jñeyabhūmau*. RGV_C as usual repeats the sūtra, but MDN₁ has 一切所知之地, corresponding to the Sanskrit of the RGV; MDN₂ likewise has here 一切爾焰地, in which *jñeya* is transcribed rather than translated. In the *Śrīmālādevī* (Tsukinowa 1940: 104,15 = T. 353 [XII] 220c10–11) the Tathāgata is characterized as one who *shes bya’i sa thams cad la thogs pa ma mchis pa’i chos kyi dbang phyug mdzad pa* = 於一切爾焰地得無礙法自在, “has become lord of the teaching (**dharmeśvara*) unobstructed in all spheres of knowledge (**jñeyabhūmi*).” The original text of the AAN most likely indeed contained the term *jñeya*, which either was absent in Bodhiruci’s exemplar or dropped out of his translation at some point. See §4ii(g).
- there is none surpassing it / peerless heroic strength:** I have understood *pauruṣa* in the RGV as ‘heroic,’ but is it possible that it is to be understood in a sense closer to ‘personal’? MDN₁ has 丈夫, while MDN₂ has 大勢力 (but see the next note). AAN has *gèngwúshéngzhě* 更無勝者, a term which occurs in several texts but not, as far as I can see, as a particular technical term. Takasaki (1975a: 56) translated: それに次ぐものない男性的な威力を獲得し. In (1966: 232) he offered “has attained the unexcelled, manly strength.”
- h) I edit MDN₂ with 無障無著 in this clause, following the parallel versions, although it might be more natural to attach it to the previous item from the point of view of Chinese grammar.

- i) One might compare here the following from the *Tathāgatarbha-sūtra*: “When in this connection the bodhisattva-*mahāsattvas* who assiduously apply themselves to these Dharmas have completely become free from all defilements and impurities [*upakleśa*], then they will be designated ‘tathāgata, honorable one and perfectly awakened one,’ and they will also perform all the tasks of a tathāgata,” *de la byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen po chos de dge la mngon par brtson par gnas pa de dag gang gi tshe | nyon mongs pa dang | nye ba’i nyon mongs pa thams cad las yongs su grol bar gyur pa de’i tshe | de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas shes bya ba’i grangs su ’gro ste | de bzhin gshegs pa’i bya ba thams cad kyang byed do ||* (Zimmermann 2002: §1B; trans. Zimmermann, with removal of brackets). The Chinese translations differ significantly here (Zimmermann 2002: 108n75).

15ii

a) 是故, 舍利弗, 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。 b) 衆生界即法身。 c) 法身即衆生界。 d) 舍利弗, 此二法者, 義一名異。

a) 不離法身] Kongo: 不離身法身

41.15–17: a) *tasmāc chāriputra nānyaḥ sattvadhātur nānyo dharmakāyaḥ* | b) *sattvadhātur eva dharmakāyaḥ* | c) *dharmakāya eva sattvadhātuḥ* | d) *advayam etad arthena | vyañjanamātrabhedah* |

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 832b17–20: a) 舍利弗, 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。 b) 衆生界即法身。 c) 法身即衆生界。 d) 舍利弗, 此二法者, 義一名異故。

MDN₁ T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a19–21: a) 是故, 舍利弗, 衆生界不異法身, 法身不異衆生界。 b) 衆生界即是法身。 c) 法身即是衆生界。 d) 此但名異, 非義有別。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c12–14: a) 是故, 舍利弗, 無別衆生界, 無別法身。 b) 衆生界即法身。 c) 法身即衆生界。 d) 此無二義, 文字差別。

a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, there is no quintessence of beings separate from the dharma-body, there is no dharma-body separate from the quintessence of beings. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body, c) the dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) These two things, Śāriputra, have one meaning; [only] the names differ.

a-d) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “a) Therefore, Śāriputra, the quintessence of beings is not different from the dharma-body. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body. c) The dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) This [pair] is nondual with respect to meaning; only the designations differ.”

d) [only] the names differ: “only” is added on the basis of *mātra* in the Sanskrit. MDN₁ preserves this sense with 此但名異, but—following a pattern evident elsewhere—it is absent in RGV_C and MDN₂.

16

a) 復次, 舍利弗, 如我上說, 衆生界中亦三種法。b) 皆眞實如、不異、不差。c) 何謂三法。d) 一者, 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法; e) 二者, 如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法; f) 三者, 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法。

a) 亦三種法] Q: 示三種法

a) “Once again, Śāriputra, as I expounded earlier, within the realm of beings too there are three types of natures. b) All are true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate. c) What are the three natures? d) 1. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and is pure. e) 2. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it] and, being covered with defilements, is unpurified. f) 3. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit (of saṃsāra), constant, and existing.

a) **as I explained earlier:** See §11 for the a very similar expression.

three types of natures: Here *fū* 法, therefore likely *dharma*, though other terms are also possible. Takasaki (1974: 78–79, 1975a: 379n32, 1996: 59n26) makes the intriguing suggestion that the three modes of the *sattva-dhātu* have as their background etymologies of *sattva*: 1. existence (nature), 2. *sakta*, defiled/polluted nature, and 3. good and pure thing. He connects these with 1) the dharmatā, 2) *āgantukakleśa*, and 3) the intrinsically pure mind.

b) **true thusness:** *zhēnshírú* 眞實如 rendering *(*bhūta*)*tathatā*? Or is this to be understood as “true and thus”? Apparently this is how Takasaki (1975a: 56) takes it: 眞實にして、眞如と異ならず、無差別である。See also §19iii(a).

not different, not discriminated: 不異不差: RGV: *ubhayam anāsrave dhātāv advayam iti draṣṭavyam abhinnaṃ acchinnaṃ*, 此二種法於無漏法界中不異、不差別、不斷、不相離 (Johnston 1950: 56.13 = RGV_c T. 1611 [XXXI] 835c21–22).

d) **from the very beginning:** Cp. here the first half of a verse quoted in the RGV (Johnston 1950: 72.13), *Mahāyānasamgraha* I.1, *Trīṃśikāvijñapti-*

bhāṣya (Buescher 2007: 116.1): *anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ*, “The beginningless essence (*dhātu*) is the basis of all things.” The verse is attributed in the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and *Trimśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* to an “Abhidharma-Mahāyāna-sūtra” (*Trimśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: abhidharmasūtra*) which Nagao (1982: 28–33) believes to be an imaginary creation of Asaṅga, the author of the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.

- d-f) RGV: *etad aparāntakoṭisamadhruvadharimatāsāmvidyamānatām adhi-kṛtya daśavidhenārthena tathāgatagarbhavyavasthānam uktam | punar anādisāmniidhyāsambaddhasvabhāvakleśakośatām anādisāmniidhyāsambaddhasvabhāvaśubhadharimatām cādhi-kṛtya navabhir udāharaṇair aparyantakleśakośakoṭigūḍhas tathāgatagarbha iti*, “With reference to the present existence of constant Reality as equal to the future limit [of existence], we have demonstrated the embryo of the tathāgatas from ten points of view. Again, with reference to the fact that the sheath of defilements is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with the embryo of the tathāgatas], although joined with it from the beginningless past, and with reference to pure Reality, associated [with the embryo of the tathāgatas] from the beginningless past, and in its intrinsic nature joined [with the embryo of the tathāgatas], it should be understood by nine illustrations based upon the Scripture that the embryo of the tathāgatas is concealed by limitless sheaths of defilements.” (Johnston 1950: 59.11–14; trans. Takasaki 1966: 268, heavily modified. Tib. Nakamura 1967: 117.10–14 = Derge 106a7–b2: *de ltar phyi ma’i mtha’i mu dang mtshungs pa rtag pa’i chos nyid rig par bya ba nyid kyis dbang du byas nas don rnam pa bcus | de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po ’di rnam par gzhas pa bshad pa yin no || thog ma med pa’i dus nas nye bar gnas pa ma ’brel ba’i rang bzhin gyi nyon mongs pa’i sbubs nyid dang | thog ma med pa’i dus nas nye bar gnas pa brel ba’i rang bzhin dag pa’i chos nyid kyi dbang du byas nas | dpe dguś de bzhin gshegs pa’i gnyen po nyon po nyon mongs pa’i sbubs bye ba mtha’ yas pas gtums pa ni | mdo ji lta ba bzhin rtogs par bya’o ||*; Chn. RGV_c T. 1611 [XXXI] 837a9–13). In the RGV, the subject is the pure nature of the sheath of defilements, to which something is attached or not, in adjectival relation; this may ultimately be the same thing as what the AAN is saying by having the *tathāgatagarbha* as subject, to which the pure nature or sheath of defilements are respectively attached or not. See Takasaki (1974: 81–82). In light of the above (following Takasaki 1965: 103, 1966: 39n66, 1974: 79, 90), we might suggest something like:

- d) 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法 ≈ *anādisāmniidhyāsambaddhasvabhāvas tathāgatagarbhaḥ śubhadharmaiḥ*

- e) 如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法 ≈ *anādisāmnidhyāsambaddhasvabhāvas tathāgatagarbho ’śubhadharmaiḥ kleśakośaiḥ*
- f) 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法 ≈ *aparāntakoṭisamadhruvas tathāgatagarbho [dhruva-]dharmatāsamvidyamānatayā*
- e) The distinction between the *tathāgatagarbha* and what is covered with a sheath (*kośa*) shows that here the Tathāgatagarbha’s *garbha* refers to what is inside being covered, and it is thus not the covering (hence not ‘womb’). Compare Zimmermann (2002: 48).
- f) **equal to the future limit:** Literally ‘equality,’ *píngděng* 平等 representing an expression most probably with *samatā*.
- existing:** *yǒu* 有. Evidently this corresponds to *samvidyamānatā*. Takasaki (1975a: 57) seems to skip it, as he does in §19i(a), below. However, in (1974: 74, 76, 79), he connects this with *sattva*, analyzed as *sat-tva*.

17i

a) 舍利弗，當知如來藏本際相應體及清淨法者，此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智慧清淨真如法界，不思議法。^{b)} 無始本際來有此清淨相應法體。

a) 不虛妄] SX: 不虛無
智慧清淨] F1, Kongo, Li: 智清淨

a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and has a pure nature is in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and the quality of being inconceivable.”^{b)} From the beginningless beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated [with it].

b) **beginningless beginning:** 無始本際: In the RGV, 無始本際不可得知 = *pūrvakoṭīr na prajñāyate*, “no earlier limit is discerned.” (Johnston 1950: 72.15–16 = RGV_C T. 1611 [XXXI] 839a21–22) Takasaki (1966: 291n177) points out that the Chinese translation of RGV suggests this expression to belong to a quotation of the *Śrīmālādevī*: 世尊，生死者，依如來藏。以如來藏故。說本際不可知。世尊，有如來藏故，說生死。是名善說 = 世尊，生死者，依如來藏。以如來藏故。說前際不可了知。世尊，有如來藏故，得有生死。是名善說 = *bcom ldan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po ni 'khor ba na rton pa lags te | de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po nyid kyi dbang du bgyis nas bcom ldan 'das kyis sngon gyi mtha' med do zhes bshad cing btags so || bcom ldan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po mchis na 'khor ba zhes mchi na ni tshig de rigs pa lags so ||*, “Blessed One, the embryo of the tathāgatas relies on saṃsāra, and it was in reference to this very embryo of the tathāgatas that the Blessed One stated that ‘there is no earlier limit.’ Blessed One, it is reasonable to speak of ‘saṃsāra’ given that the embryo of the tathāgatas exists.” (T. 353 [XII] 222b5–7 = T. 310 [XI] 677c7–9 = Tsukinowa 1940: 144.9–13). As Takasaki also points out in the same note, the canonical source of the attribution to the Buddha is something like *Āṅguttara-Nikāya* XV.1.1.3: *anamataaggāyaṃ bhikkhave saṃsāro pubbakoṭi na paññati* (Morris 1888: ii.178,8–9), to which the *Śrīmālādevī* has added the reference to the embryo of the tathāgatas. See the note to §13i(a). In the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* XI.1 we read: *pūrvā prajñāyate koṭīr nety vāca*

mahāmuniḥ | saṃsāro ’navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam ||, “The great sage said ‘No earlier limit is discerned.’ Transmigration is indeed without beginning or end-point, it has no origin nor any finality.” In this context Candrakīrti quotes the Buddha as saying in a scripture: *anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jātijarāmarāṇasaṃsāraḥ*, “Transmigration, monks, consisting of birth, old age and death, is without beginning or end-point.” (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 219.6). See Takasaki (1966: 232n242).

reality: *fǎtǐ* 法體, almost certainly a rendering of **dharmatā*.

17ii

a) 舍利弗, 我依此清淨眞如法界, 爲衆生故說爲不可思議法自性清淨心。

MDN₁ T. 1626 (XXXI) 892c19–21: 又如說: a) 舍利弗, 此清淨法性即是法界。我依此自性清淨心, 說不思議法。

MDN₂ T. 1627 (XXXI) 895b19–22: 如經中說。a) 舍利弗, 此善法如實眞如法界自性清淨心相應法體。我依此自性清淨心, 爲衆生故說爲不可思議。

a) “Regarding this dharma-realm of pure thusness, Śāriputra, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind, which is an inconceivable teaching.

a) **regarding**: See the note to §5ii(a). Although not discussed in the sources at my disposal, I believe that the construction *yī* 依 (... *gū* 故) renders Sanskrit *adhikṛtya*, ‘regarding,’ ‘concerning.’ This equivalence is found several times in RGV_C. Although more examples could be cited, note: the expression *caturo ’rthān adhikṛtya catvāro nāma paryāya veditavyāḥ* (Johnston 1950: 55,10–11) corresponds to 依四種義有四種名應知 (RGV_C T. 1611 [XXXI] 835b23). Again, *tatra kenārthena kim adhikṛtya* (17,14) corresponds to 依何等義爲何等人 (825c21), and *bhayanidānaprahāṇam adhikṛtya* (19,14) corresponds to 依遠離彼怖畏之處 (826b21). Finally, several similar expressions appear: *yam adhikṛtyoktam* (55,14, 55,19–20) corresponds to 依此義故 (835b27, c5), while *yad adhikṛtyāha* (50,10) corresponds in the same way (834b28) (see also 10,15 = 823b24 and 13,22 = 824b28). This being as it may, it is also possible that a more causal relation should be understood, in line with a rendering “Relying on/on the basis of this dharma-realm.”

intrinsically pure mind: **prakṛtipariśuddhacitta* or *prakṛtiprabhāsva*. One and the same Chinese expression was used as an equivalent for both Sanskrit terms; see Appendix 1.

an inconceivable teaching: I understand the expression 不可思議法 thus to mean that the dharma-realm and the intrinsically pure mind are characterized as inconceivable, but it is possible that *fǎ* 法 should be understood otherwise, as ‘nature’ perhaps.

The MDS quotations differ, both from the sūtra and from each other.

MDN₁: “Śāriputra, this pure dharma-nature is precisely the dharma-realm. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it as an inconceivable teaching.”

MDN₂ (which looks like it lies somewhere between the expression of the AAN and that of MDN₁): “Śāriputra, this dharma-realm of good qualities [善法?], pure thusness and the intrinsically pure mind are associated to the nature of reality. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it for beings as inconceivable.”

18i

a) 舍利弗, 當知如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏, 不清淨法者, b) 此本際來離脫, c) 不相應, d) 煩惱所纏, e) 不清淨法。 f) 唯有如來菩提智之所能斷。

f) 唯有如來] Q, S, SX: 惟如來

a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it], is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing, b) is from the very beginning free and released, c) not associated [with it], d) covered by defilements e) and is impure. f) It can only be cut [free] by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.

c) **not associated:** Is it possible that a character has dropped out (rhythmically this is possible) so that we should emend to 不相應體? In RGVC 相應煩惱 corresponds to *saṃprayuktāḥ kleśāḥ*, but always in compound with 善根, *kuśalamūla*^o. I am uncertain about the separation here of 不相應 (if we should maintain this reading) from 煩惱所纏. If they are to be read together, however, this would produce: “is not covered by associated defilement,” which doctrinally speaking is incorrect here. It seems best to assume a dropped 體 and **emend**. We should then understand “is not associated with its intrinsic nature.”

f) **It can only be cut [free] by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom:** RGVC: *ye ’rhatsāntānikā anāsravakarmapravṛtīhetavo vimalamanomayātmabhāvanirvartakās tathāgatabodhijñānavadhyāḥ* = 又阿羅漢身中, 所攝煩惱能作無漏諸業行緣能生無垢意生身果報, 唯如來菩提智能斷. “The causes which motivate defiled actions and thus bring about polluted mind-bodies within the mental continua of Saints are to be destroyed by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.” The Chinese translation states this with a qualification: “only the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom can cut them off.” (Johnston 1950: 67.17–18 = RGVC T. 1611 [XXXI] 837c3–5).

18ii

a) 舍利弗, 我依此煩惱所纏不相應不思議法界, 爲衆生故說爲客塵煩惱所染自性清淨心不可思議法。

a) “Regarding this non-associated and inconceivable dharma-realm, covered with defilements, Śāriputra, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements, which is an inconceivable teaching.

a) **non-associated ... covered with defilements:** 煩惱所纏不相應不思議法界. Takasaki (1965: 103–104, 1975a: 57) corrects the text to read *不相應煩惱所纏, namely: 本質的に結合していない煩惱の蔽いに纏われた不思議なる法の根元という点にもとづいて. Should we imagine something like **āgantukakleśagudhāsamprayuktācintyadharmadhātu*?

covered with defilements: As Zimmermann (2002: 53) points out in relation to the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, “whereas the figure of buddhas wrapped in the defilements of living beings was a fitting one, it is odd to describe buddhahood in such terms.” In the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* we read in the simile of the kernels enclosed in husks that “tathāgatahood, buddhahood, *svayambhūta*—wrapped in the skin of the sheaths of defilements—is always present in every sentient being,” *sems can thams cad la de bzhin gshes pa nyid | sangs rgyas nyid rang byung nyid | nyon mongs pa'i sbubs kyi shun pas dkris shing gnas par ...* (Zimmermann 2002: §3B, trans. Zimmermann). In a similar fashion, the mention here of the *dharmadhātu* as covered by defilements is worthy of note.

adventitious defilements: **āgantukakleśa*.

The entire expression may be compared with the following from the **Śāriputrābhidharma*, a Dharmaguptaka text: 心性清淨, 爲客塵染。凡夫未聞故, 不能如實知見, 亦無修心。聖人聞故, 如實知見, 亦有修心, “The nature of the mind is intrinsically pure, stained by adventitious defilements. Because common people have not yet learned this, they are not able to know or see it in accord with reality, and they do not cultivate the mind. Because Nobles have learned it, they are able to know and see it in accord with reality, and cultivate their minds.” (T. 1548 [XXVIII] 697b18–20)

19i

a) 舍利弗, 當知如來藏未來際平等恒及有法者, 即是一切諸法根本。^{b)} 備一切法, 具一切法, ^{c)} 於世法中不離、不脫真實一切法, ^{d)} 住持一切法, 攝一切法。

a) 及有法者] Q, S, SX: 及有法界者

a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant, and existing is precisely the basis of all qualities [definitive of a buddha]. ^{b)} It is furnished with all [such] qualities, joined with all [such] qualities, ^{c)} and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all [such] qualities, ^{d)} it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.

a) **existing:** See the note to §16(f). Takasaki (1975a: 58) seems to skip *yōfū* 有法, but see his note (379n32) and the note above to §16(a). If this is equivalent to *sarṁvidyamānatā*, then we should render something like “presently existing.” However, it may be that I have not understood Takasaki’s translation, which runs: 如来藏は、未来永劫に堅固不変な本性があるとは、すなわち、この（如来藏）が、（善・不善の）すべての諸性質の根本であり。According to this interpretation, the *tathāgatagarbha* is the basis of all qualities, good and bad. Immediately thereafter, however, Takasaki understands ‘all qualities’ to refer to those of the Tathāgata. I am afraid that I have also not well understood the discussion at Takasaki (1974: 76–77). His point seems to concern the present embryonic existence of future buddhahood within beings, this existence being *sat-tva*, the fact of presently existing. See Zimmermann (2002: 127–129n164).

all things: *sarvadharmā*, the expression 一切諸法 apparently being a prosodic variant for 一切法.

c) **from the truth and from all [such] qualities:** I disagree with (or do not understand) Tokiwa (1932: 109) = Ogawa (2001: 231 眞實の一切法) and Takasaki (1975a: 58 眞実なる一切の徳性) who see here “all true qualities,” because I understand that if 眞實 were to modify 法, we would expect *一切眞實法 rather than the 眞實一切法 of the text. Karashima Seishi (personal communication) is of the opinion that we should understand here “true sarvadharmas,” which I likewise do not understand. The text remains unclear to me. In line with my bracketed insertion in (a), however, I do understand ‘all qualities’ to refer to ‘all buddha qualities,’ those qualities constitutive of a buddha.

19ii

a) 舍利弗, 我依此不生、不滅、常恒、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界, 說名‘衆生’。 b) 所以者何。 c) 言‘衆生’者, 即是不生、不滅、常恒、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界等異名。 d) 以是義故, 我依彼法, 說名‘衆生’。

a) 清涼 | Kongo: 清淨

c) 清涼 | Kongo: 清淨

a) “Regarding this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, Śāriputra, the inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, I term it ‘beings.’^{b)} Why?^{c)} To say ‘beings’ is (only) a synonym for precisely this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, (this) inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, and so on.^{d)} With this intention, regarding those qualities, I term it ‘beings.’

a) **eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge:** See §13ii, where the Sanskrit terminology is attested.

c) **To say ‘beings’:** The same grammatical construction, 言~~者, is found in RGV_C in §10iii, where for instance 言衆生者, 即是第一義諦 corresponds to *paramārtha iti ... sattvadhātor etad adhivacanam*. Here *yì míng* 異名 renders *adhivacana*.

and so on: I do not know precisely what is meant to be elided here, but of course similar lists appear earlier in the text.

d) **intention:** *yì* 義, **artha*, here not in the sense of ‘meaning’ or ‘purport’ but rather of ‘goal’.

20

a) 舍利弗, 此三種法皆真實如, 不異、不差。 b) 於此真實如、不異、不差法中, 畢竟不起極惡不善二種邪見。 c) 何以故。 d) 以如實見故。 e) 所謂: 減見增見, 舍利弗, 此二邪見, 諸佛如來畢竟遠離。 f) 諸佛如來之所呵責。

b) 於此真實如不異] F1: 於此真如不異
極惡不善] S: 極惡不

e) 減見增見] F1, 2: 減見故增見故; Kongo, Li: 減見故增見

f) 呵責] Q, S, SX: 訶責

a) “These three types of natures, Śāriputra, are all true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate. b) With respect to these truly thus, not distinct and not [mutually] separate natures, one absolutely does not entertain the two types of extremely evil and bad views [that there is an increase or decrease in any of the three categories]. c) Why? d) Because this is a view in accord with reality. e) As for the views that there is increase or decrease, Śāriputra, the buddhas and tathāgatas absolutely distance themselves from these two mistaken views. f) They are criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas.

a) **true thusness:** *zhēnshírú* 真實如. See the note to §16(b).

b) **natures:** It is possible that we should understand *fǎ* 法 here not to refer to the same 法 as in the preceding sentence, as I have taken it, but instead as ‘teaching,’ thus: “Regarding this teaching of true thusness as not distinct and not [mutually] separate.” But this seems to me not very likely.

extremely evil and bad: This is somewhat odd, but what the Chinese says: 極惡不善. It is apparently a very rare expression. Michael Radich wonders if these are the names of two views. I wonder if it is merely a stylistic hendiadys.

e) It is unusual in the AAN for 舍利弗 (Śāriputra) to occur as a vocative in the midst of a sentence. This suggests that we should perhaps put a full stop between 所謂: 減見增見 and 舍利弗. This leaves 所謂: 減見增見, however, pendant, since it cannot be attached to the preceding answer to the question ‘Why?’ Therefore, in the end I reject this solution and have

chosen the uncomfortable but otherwise possible mid-sentence vocative. Tokiwa (1932: 109) chose the same.

- f) **criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas**: Cp. the *Dīrghāgama*, T. 1 (I) 74c14–15 (et seq.): 此是如來至真等正覺之所呵責也。 I wonder if we have to do with some expression with *avasādayati*, Pāli *apasādeti*, chastise, rebuke.

21i

a) 舍利弗，若有比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見，^{b)} 諸佛如來非彼世尊，如是等人非我弟子。

b) 諸佛如來非彼世尊如是等人非我弟子] F1: 諸佛如來非彼弟子? The rubbing is not entirely clear.

28.3: ^{b)} *nāham teṣāṃ śāstā na te mama śrāvakāḥ* |

RGV_c T. 1611 (XXXI) 828c12–14: ^{a)} 舍利弗，若有比丘，比丘尼，優婆塞，優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見。^{b)} 諸佛如來非彼世尊，如是等人非我弟子。

a) “If, Śāriputra, there are bhikṣus or bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas or upāsikās, who entertain one or the other view, ^{b)} the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their teachers, and such people are not my disciples.

a) Note that the Chinese translation of RGV cites the whole text of the sūtra, while in the Sanskrit only part (b) is quoted.

b) The RGV in Sanskrit has: ^{“b)} I am not their teacher; they are not my auditors.”

the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their teachers, and such people are not my disciples: The Chinese here is a bit odd in that it literally says ‘the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their bhagavanta.’ It is possible, as Vincent Tournier suggests to me, that this is based on some sort of expression like that found in the *Mahāvastu* (Senart 1882–1897: iii.3–4, quoted in Tournier 2012: 385n49): *śāstā me bhagavāṃ śrāvako ’ham asmim sugate || evam ukte āyusman ānanda bhagavāṃ mama etad uvāca || evam eva kāśyapa ahaṃ kāśyapa śāstā tvam ca me śrāvako*. See also Silk (2003: 183–184). For the negative formulation, as we have here in the AAN, cp. *Ratnarāśi* II.2 (Silk Forthcoming): *’od srung gang la la zhig chos ’di dag dang mi ldan la | bdag ni dge slong dge slong ngo snyam du khas ’che na bsam pas mos pa ma gtogs par nga yang de’i ston pa ma yin la de yang nga’i nyan thos ma yin no ||*; 迦葉，若有比丘自知不成就如是之法及餘善法。又離是法行於餘道。迦葉，彼比丘非我弟子，我非彼師，“If there is someone, Kāśyapa, who does not possess these characteristics but falsely thinks “I am a monk, I am a monk,” rejecting zealous cultivation [of the path], I am not his teacher, nor likewise is he my disciple.”

21ii

a) 舍利弗, 此人以起二見因緣故, 從冥入冥, 從闇入闇。 b) 我說是等名 ‘一闡提’。

a-b) F1: This entire section is missing.

28.3–4: a) *tān ahaṃ śāriputra tamasas tamontaram andhakārān mahāndhakāragāminas tamobhūyiṣṭhā iti vadāmi* |

RGV_C T. 1611 (XXXI) 828c14–17: a) 舍利弗, 是人以起二見因緣。從闇入闇, 從冥入冥。 b) 我說是等名 ‘一闡提’ 故。

a) “Because these people, Śāriputra, entertain these two views, from gloom they enter gloom, from darkness they enter darkness. b) I speak of these terming them ‘icchantika.’

a) The RGV in Sanskrit has: “^{a)} I say, Śāriputra, that they, filled with pitch-darkness, go from pitch-darkness into pitch-darkness, from gloom into greater gloom.”

from gloom they enter gloom, from darkness they enter darkness: An old expression in India, found already in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.4.10 = *Īśā-Upaniṣad* 9 (cf. 12): *andhaṃ tamaḥ praviśanti ye ’vidyām upāsate | tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyām ratāḥ* ||, “Into darkness enter those who serve ignorance; those who delight in knowledge [enter] a darkness seemingly greater than that.” [Śaṅkara on BĀU: *andham adarśanātmakam tamaḥ saṃsāriyāmakam praviśanti pratipadyante ... tatas tasmād api bhūya iva bahutaram iva tamaḥ praviśanti*]. The Jaina *Uttarajjhayana* 14.12 has: *veyā ahīyā na bhavanti tāṇaṃ | bhuttā diyā ninti tamaṃ tameṇaṃ || jāyā ya puttā na havanti tāṇaṃ | ko āma te aṇu-mannejja eyaṃ* ||, “The study of the Vēdas will not save you; the feeding of Brāhmanas will lead you from darkness to darkness, and the birth of sons will not save you. Who will assent to what you said ?” (trans. Jacobi 1895: 63).

The expression is also common in Buddhist texts, including the *Madhyamāgama*: 從冥入冥, 從闇入闇 (T. 26 [I] 647a29), and the *Samyuktāgama*: 譬如士夫從闇而入闇, 從冥入冥, 從糞廁出復墮糞廁 (T. 99 [II] 72a15–16). On the Sanskrit vocabulary of *tamas* and *andhakāra*, see the very interesting study of Hara (2006), who concludes (p. 299) that “there exists a grade

of darkness in the semantic content of *andha-kāra*, from gloominess to complete darkness. It is not like *tamas* (pitch darkness).”

- b) **icchantika**: The RGV quotation does not mention *icchantika*, although as is typical it is found in the Chinese translation. This is not the only reason to doubt that the version of the AAN known to the author of the RGV contained any reference to *icchantika*, an issue discussed in the Introduction.

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a) 是故, 舍利弗, 汝今應學此法, 化彼衆生, 令離二見, 住正道中。 b) 舍利弗, 如是等法汝亦應學, 離彼二見, 住正道中。

a) 是故舍利弗汝今應學此法] F1: 舍利弗此法? The stone is damaged, and the reproduction of the rubbing very difficult to read.

a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, you now should study this teaching and convert those beings, causing them to give up the two views and dwell in the correct path. b) You too, Śāriputra, should study teachings such as this, give up those two views and dwell in the correct path.”

b) The text here makes clear that Śāriputra is in need of further spiritual maturation.

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a) 佛說此經已，慧命舍利弗，比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷、菩薩摩訶薩，及諸天、龍、夜叉、乾闥婆、阿修羅、迦樓羅、緊那羅摩睺羅伽、人、非人等一切大眾，皆大歡喜，信受奉行。

a) The Buddha having expounded this sūtra, the venerable Śāriputra, bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas and upāsikās, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahorāgas, men, non-men, and so on—the whole assembly—were all greatly delighted, in faith accepted and honored (the teaching), and bore it in mind.

a) Something like: **idam avocad bhagavān āttamanā āyusmān śāriputras te ca bhikṣubhikṣuṇyupāsakopāsikāḥ te ca bodhisattvamahāsattvās sā ca sarvāvātī parṣat sadevanāgayakṣagandharvāsuraḡaruḡakimnaramahora-gamanuṣyāmanuṣyādipramukhā bhagavato bhāṣitam abhyanandann iti ||*
bore it in mind: See Bingenheimer (2011: 51–56).

佛說不增不減經

The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of
Decrease [in the Realm of Beings].

Appendices

Appendix 1

Is the Mind Originally Pure or is it Luminous?

Sanskrit sources provide ample examples of characterizations of the mind as innately pure (*prakṛtipariśuddhacitta*) or innately luminous (*prakṛtiprabhāsvacitta*), using two distinct Sanskrit terms. The difference between these expressions is not, as far as I know, anywhere made clear, and although Tibetan translators carefully distinguish them, at least as far as Chinese translators are concerned, the two terms (with their variations) appear to have been treated synonymously. Since the AAN exists as a whole only in Chinese, the challenge of looking backward from Chinese toward Sanskrit poses the question of what might have stood behind the AAN's *zìxìng qīngjìng xīn* 心自性清淨. The goal of the following is demonstrate that there is no clear correlation between the Chinese expression *zìxìng qīngjìng xīn* 心自性清淨 and either of two possible Sanskrit counterparts, *prakṛtipariśuddhacitta* or *prakṛtiprabhāsvacitta* (or grammatical variations thereon). Therefore it is not possible to hypothesize which Sanskrit term originally stood in the text.¹ However, since whatever differences might be assumed to be inherent in the different terminologies are not actually of much moment, our failure to be able to reconstruct the Sanskrit forms is not actually problematic.

Equivalences with *pariśuddha* or *viśuddha* (or variants thereof)

The RGV has the expression *cittaprakṛtiviśuddhyadvayadharmatām*,² in Chinese 以自性清淨心雖言清淨而本來無二法故 (T. 1611 [XXXI] 838c18–19).³ Takasaki (1966: 287n152) observes: “C[hinese] reads this passage

¹ For an earlier discussion relevant to this question, see Shinoda (1964).

² Johnston (1950: 71,12). For comparison see Tibetan in Derge Tanjur 4025, *sems tsaṃ, phi* 111a6: *sems kyi rang bzhin rnam par dag pa gnyis su med pa'i chos nyid*. All Tibetan references below are to this text, so I give only the folio and line number, as references to the RGV in Sanskrit are to Johnston 1950.

³ When references below are to the Chinese translation of this text, I give only page, register and line numbers.

curiously as that ‘*cittaprakṛti*, though it is *śuddhi*, still is *advaya* by nature; therefore ...’” Since however 自性 plainly represents *prakṛti*, it is very clear that *viśuddhi* here is rendered with 清淨, although this term appears twice (the source of Takasaki’s *śuddhi* is not clear to me).

A quotation from the *Śrīmālādevī* reads: *atha ca punar bhagavan prakṛtipariśuddhasya cittasyopakliṣṭārtho duṣpravedhyah*,⁴ In Chinese we find 世尊, 然有煩惱有煩惱染心, 自性清淨心而有染者, 難可了知 (824c28–825a1). Here *pariśuddha* corresponds to 清淨. The RGV Chinese translation quotes exactly from Guṇabhadra’s translation of the sūtra (T. 353 [XII] 222b27–29). Another citation contains the Buddha’s answer to the statement just cited: *dvāv imau devi dharmau duṣpravedhyau | prakṛtipariśuddhacittam duṣpravedhyam*,⁵ corresponding to: 天女, 自性清淨心而有染污難可了知。有二法難可了知。謂自性清淨心難可了知 (827a16–18). Here again Guṇabhadra’s translation is quoted (T. 353 [XII] 222c3–5).

Equivalences with *prabhāsvara*

In a passage in the *Dhāraṇīśvararāja*, also known as the *Tathāgatamahākaraṇānirdēśa*, the second text in the *Mahāsāmnipāta* collection, quoted in the RGV, we find the expression *prakṛtiprabhāsvaram cittaṃ*,⁶ corresponding to Chinese 心自性清淨 (827a23). In the sūtra itself, we find 知心性淨 (T. 397 [XIII] 20b25–26).

A verse in the RGV reads: *ye samyak pratividhya sarvajagato nairātmyakoṭim śivām taccittaprakṛtiprabhāsvaratayā kleśāsvabhāvekṣaṇāt | sarvatrānugatam anāvṛtadhiyaḥ paśyanti sambuddhatām tebhyaḥ sattvaviśuddhyanantaviṣayaññānekṣaṇebhyo namaḥ ||*.⁷ Although there is certainly some

⁴ Johnston 15,6–7. For comparison see Tibetan 82b2 = *bcom ldan ’das de lta lags mod kyi rang bzhin gyis yongs su dag pa’i sems nye bar nyon mongs pa’i don rtogs par dka’o*. In the Tibetan of the sūtra we find *bcom ldan ’das rang bzhin gyis yongs su dag pa’i nye ba’i myon mongs pa’i don ni khong du chud par dka’ ba lags te* (Tsukinowa 152.4–5).

⁵ Johnston 22,1–2. Tibetan 85b6–7: *gang gi phyir lha mo chos ’di gnyis ni rtogs par dka’ ba ste | sems rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa rtogs par dka’ ba dang | sems de nyid kyi nye bar nyon mongs pa rtogs par dka’ ba’o ||*.

⁶ Johnston 22,6. For comparison see Tibetan 86a2: *sems ni rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba*.

⁷ Johnston 14,1–4. For comparison see Tibetan 81b7–82a1: *sems de rang bzhin ’od gsal bas na nyon mongs ngo bo med gzigs pas || gang dag ’gro kun bdag med || mtha’ zhi yang dag rtogs nas thams cad la || rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas rjes zhugs gzigs pa sgrub pa med pa’i blo*

problem in the correspondence of the Chinese rendering with the Sanskrit as a whole, we can see how *prabhāsvara* is rendered 清淨 (although *viśuddhi* may also have the same rendering here, and thus this passage should perhaps belong to the next category instead): 正覺正知者 見一切眾生 清淨無有我 寂靜真實際 以能知於彼 自性清淨心 見煩惱無實 故離諸煩惱 無障淨智者 如實見眾生 自性清淨性 佛法身境界 無閼淨智眼 見諸眾生性 遍無量境界 故我今敬禮 (824c1–8). Another example reads: *cittasya yāsau prakṛtiḥ prabhāsvarā na jātu sādya iva yāti vikriyām*,⁸ for which Chinese has: 如虛空淨心常明元轉變 (832c24).

A passage from the RGV reads: *prakṛtiprabhāsvaratādarśanāc ca cittasyādikṣayanirohadarśanāc ca tadupakleśasya | tatra yā cittasya prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā yaś ca tadupakleśa ity etad dvayam anāsrave dhātau kuśalākūśalayoś cittayor ekacaratvād dviṭiyacittānabhisamdhānayogena paramaduṣpravedhyam*,⁹ corresponding to Chinese: 一者，見性本來自性清淨。二者，見諸煩惱本來寂滅。偈言：以能知於彼，自性清淨心，見煩惱無實故，離諸煩惱故。又自性清淨心本來清淨。又本來常為煩惱所染。此二種法於彼無漏真如。法界中善心不善心俱，更無第三心。如是義者難可覺知 (824c20–25). It is curious that immediately after this, the RGV cites the *Śrīmālādevī*, discussed below, which states: *atha ca punar bhagavan prakṛtipariśuddhasya cittasyopakleśārtho duṣpravedhyaḥ*. That is, the sūtra citation uses the wording with *pariśuddha* in place of the *prabhāsvara* found in the immediately preceding passage. It is not only the RGV which displays this flexibility. A verse (Lévi 1907, verse 13.19) in the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* reads:¹⁰ *mataṃ ca cittam prakṛtiprabhāsvaram sadā tadāgantukadoṣadūṣitam | na dharmatācittam ṛte nyacetasaḥ prabhāsvaratvam prakṛtau vidhīyate ||*,¹¹ correspond-

mnga' ba || sems can rnam dag mtha' yas yul can ye shes gzigs mnga' de la 'dud ||.

⁸ Johnston 43,9–10; Tibetan 97b5–6: *sems kyi rang bzhin 'od gsal gang yin pa || de ni nam mkha' bzhin du 'gyur med de ||.*

⁹ Johnston 14,15–15,2; Tibetan 82a5–6: *sems rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal bar mthong ba'i phyir dang | de'i nye ba'i nyon mongs pa gdod ma nas zad cing 'gags par mthong ba'i phyir ro || de la sems rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba gang yin pa dang | de'i nye ba'i nyon mongs pa zhes bya ba gang yin pa 'di gnyis ni dge ba dang mi dge ba'i sems dag las gcig rgyu bas sems gnyis pa mtshams sbyor ba med pa'i tshul gyis zag pa med pa'i dbyings la mchog tu rtogs par dka' ba yin no ||.*

¹⁰ On the relation between the RGV and the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* in regard to this topic, see Ichikawa 1974.

¹¹ Tibetan is in the Derge Tanjur 4026, *sems tsam*, phi 188b3–4: *sems ni rtag tu rang bzhin*

ing to Chinese: 已說心性淨 而為客塵染 不離心真如 別有心性淨 (T. 1604 [XXXI] 622c3–4).

Instances in which Chinese appears to render both terms, or distinguishes them

The apparent disregard for any distinction between the two terms in question is seen in the following small passage in which both terms appear: *viśuddho jñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇāt | prabhāsvaras tadubhayāgantukatāprakṛtitaḥ*,¹² for which we find: 清淨者, 以離智障故。光明者, 如自性清淨體。彼二是客塵煩惱 (831c15–17). Yet another example is found in a sūtra passage cited in the RGV, which reads: *ayoniśomanaskāraḥ prakṛtipariśuddhipraṭiṣṭitaḥ | tata ucyate prakṛtiprabhāsvaraṃ cittam āgantukair upakleśair upakliśyata iti*,¹³ corresponding to Chinese: 不正思惟依於佛性自性清淨心住。以是義故, 經中說言: 自性清淨心客塵煩惱染 (833a28–b1). According to Takasaki (1966: 239n292), the passage quoted here is found in the *Gaganagañjaparipṛcchā*, where we find the sentence in question: 非如理作意依自性清淨心住, 是清淨心不為客塵煩惱所染 (T. 404 [XIII] 643c5–6).¹⁴

When the terms in question occur together, translators are able to differentiate them, although as we saw above, they may not do so. An example is found in the following verse: *vaimalyād avikalpatvād yoginām gocaratvataḥ | prabhāsvaraṃ viśuddhaṃ ca dharmadhātoḥ svabhāvataḥ* ||,¹⁵ to which corresponds: 以離一切垢 故聖人境界 清淨光明照 以法性如是 (843a8–9). On the other hand, a quotation from the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā* contains the following: *evam eva sāgaramate bodhisattvaḥ sattvānām prakṛtiprabhāsvaratām cittasya prajānāti | tām punar āgantukopakleśopakliṣṭām paśyati | tatra bodhisattvasyaivaṃ bhavati | naite kleśāḥ sattvānām cittaprakṛtipra-*

'od gsal 'dod || de ni glo bur nyes pas ma rung byas || chos nyid sems las gzhan pa sems gzhan ni || 'od gsal ma yin rang bzhin la brjod do ||

¹² Johnston 39,1–2; Tibetan 95b1: *rnam par dag pa ni shes bya'i sgrub pa spangs pa'i phyir ro || 'od gsal ba ni de gnyi ga glo bur ba nyid kyi rang bzhin ma yin pa'i phyir ro ||*

¹³ Johnston 45,1–3; Tibetan 98b1–2: *tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa ni rang bzhin gyis yongs su dag pa la gnas pa ste | des na sems kyi rang bzhin ni 'od gsal ba ste | glo bur gyi nyon mongs pas nyon ma mongs pa'o zhes brjod do zhe'o ||*

¹⁴ I could not find an equivalent in T. 397 (XIII) 124c.

¹⁵ Johnston 87,1–2; Tibetan 118b1–2: *dri med rnam par rtog med dang || rnal 'byor rnam kyi yul yin phyir || chos dbyings ngo bo nyid kyi ni || dag pa'i phyir ni 'od gsal ba ||*

bhāsvaratāyām praviṣṭāḥ | *āgantukā ete kleśā abhūtaparikalpāsamutthitāḥ*,¹⁶ corresponding to Chinese: 大海慧, 菩薩摩訶薩亦復如是。如實知見一切眾生自性清淨光明淨心, 而為客塵煩惱所染。大海慧, 諸菩薩等生如是心: 彼諸煩惱不染眾生自性淨心, 是諸煩惱客塵虛妄分別心起 (834b5–9). Here the first *prabhāsvara* corresponds in Chinese to 清淨光明淨, appearing to yield both 清淨 and 光明淨, or perhaps even 清淨 and 光明 and 淨?

In another example from the RGV, we find both Sanskrit terms, *viśuddhi* and *prabhāsvara*, this time however corresponding identically to 清淨: *tatra prakṛtiviśuddhir yā vimuktir na viśamyogaḥ prabhāsvarāyās citta prakṛter āgantukamalāviśamyogāt* | *vaimalyaviśuddhir vimuktir viśamyogaś ca vāryādīnām iva rajojalādibhyaḥ prabhāsvarāyās citta prakṛter anavaśeṣam āgantukamalebhyo viśamyogāt*,¹⁷ 自性清淨者, 謂性解脫無所捨離, 以彼自性清淨心體不捨一切客塵煩惱, 以彼本來不相應故。離垢清淨者, 謂得解脫。又彼解脫不離一切法, 如水不離諸塵垢等而言清淨, 以自性清淨心遠離客塵諸煩惱垢更無餘故 (841b19–24). A final instance also seems to show this distinction, setting the two terms directly next to each other: *sa khalv eṣa tathāgatadhātur buddhabhūmāv atyantavimalaviśuddhprabhāsvaratāyām svaprakṛtau sthitaḥ pūrvāntam upādāya nityatvān na punar jāyate manomayair ātmabhāvaiḥ*,¹⁸ corresponding to Chinese: 此偈明何義, 明如來性於佛地時無垢清淨光明常住自性清淨。以本際來常故不生。以離意生身故 (835a26–28).

In one passage we see what appears to be a clear distinction in Chinese between *viśuddhi* and *prabhāsvara*, respectively 清淨 and 光明: *tadubhayā-*

¹⁶ Johnston 49,9–12; Tibetan 101a2–3: *blo gros rgya mtsho de bzhin du byang chub sems dpa' sems can rnam kyis sems rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal bar rab tu shes te* | *'on kyang glo bur gyi nye ba'i nyon mongs pas nyon mongs par mthong ngo* || *de la byang chub sems dpa' 'di snyam du sems te* | *nyon mongs pa 'di dag ni sems can rnam kyis sems kyis rang bzhin 'od gsal bar zhugs pa ma yin no* || *nyon mongs pa 'di dag ni glo bur ba ste* | *yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pas bskyed pa'o* ||.

¹⁷ Johnston 80,16–19; Tibetan 116a5–7: *de la rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa ni* | *gang zhig rnam par grol ba dang bral ba ni ma yin pa ste* | *sems kyis rang bzhin 'od gsal ba glo bur gyi dri ma dang ma bral ba'i phyir ro* || *dri ma med pa'i rnam par dag pa ni* || *rdul la sogs pa la chu la sogs pa bzhin du rnam par grol pa dang bral ba ste* | *sems kyis rang bzhin 'od gsal ba la glo bur gyi dri ma mtha' dag dang bral ba'i phyir ro* ||.

¹⁸ Johnston 54,3–4; Tibetan 103a6–7: *shin tu dri ma med cing rnam par dag pa 'od gsal ba rang gi rang bzhin sangs rgyas kyis la rnam par gnas pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i khams de ni sngon gyi mtha' nye bar bzung nas* | *yid kyis rang bzhin gyi lus kyis skye ba yang ma yin te* | *rtaḡ pa'i phyir ro* ||.

śrayasya cittaprakṛtivismukter atyantavimalaprabhāsvaratayārkaṃḍala-viśuddhisādharmyam,¹⁹ corresponding to: 三者, 依止彼二自性清淨心解脫, 無垢離垢光明輪清淨相似相對法應知 (836c11–12).

As is evident from the the evidence collected above, there is both no apparent pattern to differential usage in the Sanskrit terminology, and no clear distinction possible between *prakṛtipariśuddhacitta* and *prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta* in the guise of Chinese translations. Therefore, while it is not possible to suggest a firm reconstruction of the Vorlage of the expression *zì-xìng qīngjìng xīn* 心自性清淨 as it occurs in the AAN, it does not seem in the end that from a doctrinal, or perhaps even a rhetorical, point of view, this makes any difference.

¹⁹ Johnston 58,17–18; Tibetan 106a1–2: *de gnyis ka'i rten sems kyi rang bzhin rnam par grol ba ni shin tu dri ma med cing 'od gsal ba nyid kyis nyi ma'i dkyil 'khor rnam par dag pa dang chos mtshungs so ||*.

Appendix 2

On *amuktajñā*

In 1958, Takasaki devoted an article to the question of the meaning of the term *amuktajñā*. The same author later promised (in 1973: 298) to return to the issue in the light of critiques from Schmithausen (1971: 131–132) and Ruegg (1969: 360) of his treatment in his English translation of the RGV, but he apparently never did so.¹ In his English translation of the RGV he suggested understanding *amukta-jñā/jñāna* as “inseparable/unreleased from Wisdom.” In a note on the question, discussing the sequence *avinirbhāgadharma-avinirmuktajñānaguṇa-*, he wrote of the last item:²

For ‘*avinirmuktajñānaguṇa*’, T. *ma-bral-bahi ye-śes-kyi yon-tan-can*, which does not seem correct (it should be ‘*ye-śes-dañ ma-bral-baḥi yon-tan can*’); C. 不脱 ... 智慧功德, but 智慧功德 is placed at the end, and probably the whole sentence could not be understood properly by [the] C[hinese] translator. The term ‘*avinirmuktajñānaguṇa*’, being appositional to ‘*dharmakāya*’, is a Bahuvrihi compound, in which the former part ‘*avinirmuktajñāna*’ is relating to the latter part ‘*guṇa*’ as an apposition. And hence, ‘*avinirmuktajñāna*’, being an adjective to ‘*guṇa*’ (which means ‘*buddhaguṇāḥ*’ or ‘*tathāgata-dharmāḥ*’ i.e. the Qualities of the Buddha), forms again a kind of Bahuvrihi compound. It should mean ‘unreleased from *jñāna*’. Here, ‘*jñāna*’ signifies ‘*buddhajñāna*’, i.e. the Wisdom, by which the Buddha has realized ‘*bodhi*’. Therefore, this term ‘*avinirmuktajñāna*’ is an attribute, exclusive to the Buddha’s Qualities. ...

In other passages, ‘*amuktajñāna*’ or ‘*amuktajñā*’ is used as an attribute to ‘*guṇa*’. They are nothing but the abbreviated forms of ‘*avinirmuktajñāna*’ and seem to have the same sense as the latter.

The key sentence in question in the AAN appears in §11, and reads in Sanskrit: *yo ’yam śāriputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyaḥ so ’yam avinirbhā-*

¹ In (1988–1989: II.354–355), in his brief addendum to the reprinted paper, he limits himself to noting Schmithausen’s critique in a single sentence.

² (1966: 144–145n23; see also 235n262).

gadharmāvinirmuktajñānaguṇo yad uta gaṅgānadīvālikāvvyatikrāntais tathāgatadharmaiḥ. A parallel passage (although the connection is cautiously questioned by Ruegg 1969: 360n3) in the *Śrīmālādevī* (quoted in the note to AAN §11[a]) reads: *sūnyas tathāgatarbho vinirbhāgair mukta-jñaiḥ sarvakleśakośaiḥ | aśūnyo gaṅgānadīvālikāvvyativṛttair avinirbhāgair amuktajñair acintyair buddhadharmair*. Ruegg understood the AAN passage as follows: “... le *dharmakāya* ... a pour qualité d'être inseparable, et il a la propriété du savoir non séparé — [inséparable] des *dharmas* de *tathāgata* dépassant [en leur nombre] les sables de la Gangā.” Ruegg notes that the canonical translation of the *Śrīmālādevī* understands *amuktajñ(ān)a* to modify *buddhadharma*, while the Tibetan translation of the RGV takes it in the AAN with *dharmakāya*, “qui a pour *guṇa* le savoir inséparable,” *ma bral ba'i yes shes kyi yon tan can*. Ruegg (1969: 360n3; 1973: 104) remarks, however, that Bu ston understands *jñānaguṇa* as *ye shes kyis bsdu pa'i yon tan*, qualities included in wisdom. (It is not unlikely, although Ruegg does not mention it here, that Bu ston had access to a Tibetan translation other than that of Rngog lo tsā ba.)

As Schmithausen observed, Ruegg saw that in the AAN *avinirbhāga-* and *avinirmuktajñāna-* are qualifications of the *dharmakāya*, while in the *Śrīmālādevī* these refer rather to the *buddhadharma*-s. Ruegg explicitly stated (1969: 361) that “le *dharmakāya* est donc qualifié d'*avinirmuktajñānaguṇa* et d'*avinirbhāgadharman*,” but when he cited the Sanskrit of AAN §12, evidently by oversight he misprinted *avinirmuktajñānaguṇaḥ* in place of *avinirmuktaguṇaḥ*. This elicited the following response from Takasaki (1973):

Prof. Ruegg writes ‘*avinirmuktajñānaguṇaḥ*’ for ‘*avinirmuktaguṇaḥ*’ as a description of a lantern (*pradīpaḥ*) (p. 361, 1.11). It may be merely a slip of the pen, but it is quite important to consider why the term *jñāna* is added in the case of *dharmakāya* as part of its epithet, and this point seems to be more or less related to the formation of the terms *amuktajñāna* and *amuktajñā*. As to the application of the term *muktajñā* (*muktajñāna*) to the *buddhadharmas* in the second Chinese translation of the *Śrīmālāsūtra* (at the beginning of the 8th century A.D.) as well as in the Tibetan translation of the same text (9th century A.D.), this is clearly a change caused by misunderstanding, for example, *muktajñāna* as (*vi*)*muktijñāna* (knowledge of liber-

ation), which probably took place in the course of the transmission of the original text from the seventh century onwards. The first Chinese translation of the *Śrīmālāsūtra* (5th century A.D.) uses the term equivalent to *amukta-* in the parallel passage, which supports the term *amuktajña* (*amuktajñāna*) as the original reading.

Schmithausen's critique was as follows:³

It is, off hand, possible to translate the AAN passage as follows: 'The *dharmakāya* ... possesses inseparable qualities and merits which are ... *avinirmuktajñāna-*,⁴ that is, in the form of Buddha-qualities, which are more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.' As for the terms (*a*)*vinirmuktajñāna-*, (*a*)*muktajñāna-* and (*a*)*muktajña-* (which surely are synonymous), I might remark that Takasaki's rendering with 'inseparable from the Wisdom' ... seems grammatically very problematic. As the term (*vinir*)*muktajñ(ān)a-* (and its opposite) always follows the expression *vinirbhāga-* (and its opposite)—in one spot *asambaddha-* (and its opposite *sambaddha-*) also precedes it—it is to be assumed that it had a significance closely associated with the idea of 'inseparable' (and its opposite, 'separable'). This is

³ Es ist ohne weiteres möglich, auch an der vorliegenden AAN-Stelle zu übersetzen: „Der *dharmakāyaḥ* ... besitzt unabtrennbare Eigenschaften, und Vorzüge, welche *avinirmuktajñāna-* sind, u. zw. in Gestalt von Buddha-Eigenschaften, die zahlreicher sind als Sand der Gangā.“ — Zu den Termini (*a*)*vinirmuktajñāna-*, (*a*)*muktajñāna* und (*a*)*muktajña-* (die gewiß gleichbedeutend sind) möchte ich bemerken, daß mir Tak.s Wiedergabe mit „inseparable from the Wisdom“ (vgl. auch Tak. p. 144f., A. 23) grammatisch sehr problematisch erscheint. Da der Terminus (*vinir*)*muktajñ(ān)a-* (bzw. sein Gegenteil) immer dem Ausdruck *vinirbhāga-* (bzw. dessen Gegenteil) folgt — an einer geht auch noch *asambaddha-* (bzw. *sambaddha-*) vorher — ist davon auszugehen, daß er eine eng mit dem Begriff „unabtrennbar“ (bzw. „abtrennbar“) verbundene Bedeutung hat. Das legt auch Bodhirucis chinesische Übersetzung (*pu t'o* („(nicht) losgelöst“) nahe. Am günstigsten ist es m. E., den Ausdruck in (*vinir*)*muktatvena jñānam* (bzw. *jñā*) *yeṣāṃ* (*na*) *bhavati* aufzulösen, ihn somit zu verstehen als „bei denen Erkenntnis als losgelöst nicht stattfindet“, d. h. „die (niemals) als [von der absoluten Wesenheit] losgelöst oder beseitigt festgestellt werden“. Denkbar wäre aber auch eine Zerlegung in (*vinir*)*muktāṃ jñānaṃ* (bzw. *muktā jñā*) *yeṣāṃ* (*na*) *bhavati* = deren Erkenntnis [von der Erkenntnis der absoluten Wesenheit] (nicht) losgelöst [werden kann]“, d. h. „ohne deren gleichzeitiges Erkenntwerden die absolute Wesenheit nicht erkannt werden kann“.

⁴ Schmithausen's note: There is no reason why *avinirbhāga-* and *avinirmuktajñāna-* in the AAN should be *tatpuruṣa*s and not *bahuvrīhi*s as in the *Śrīmālādevī*.

also close to Bodhiruci's Chinese rendering (*bu*)*tu* 不脱 ('(not) detached'). In my opinion, it is best to resolve the expression as (*vinir*)*muktatvena jñānam* (or *jñā*) *yeṣāṃ (na) bhavati*, understanding 'in whom knowledge is not found separately,' that is, 'which (never) is found to be separated or removed [from the absolute truth].' An analysis as (*vinir*)*muktam jñānam* (or *muktā jñā*) *yeṣāṃ (na) bhavati* = 'whose knowledge [can(not)] be separated [from knowledge of the absolute truth]' is also conceivable, that is, 'without whose simultaneous recognition the absolute truth cannot be recognized.'

In light of this critique, it might make sense to try to understand Takasaki's arguments for his understanding. Since his 1958 (Japanese) paper is the most detailed discussion of the issue, I will attempt to summarize his points here.

He begins with seven passages from the RGV in which the term appears, of which two are quotations from the AAN, four from the *Śrīmālādevī*, while one is a sentence of the RGV itself. In the AAN we find *avinirmukta-jñāna*, in the *Śrīmālādevī* both *amuktajñāna* and *amuktajña*, and in the RGV itself *amuktajña*. He states that *amuktajña*, appearing in sequence with *avinirbhāga*, *acintya*, and *gaṅgānadīvālikā-vyativr̥tta* is a modifier of *buddhadharma* or *buddhagūṇa*. The term *avinirbhāga*, translated in Chinese as 不相捨離, 不捨, or 不相離, in Tibetan as *rnam par dbyer med pa*, frequently appears indicating the close relation between the *dharmakāya* and the *buddhagūṇa* or the *dharmakāya* and wisdom, etc. In the same fashion *avinirmukta* and *amukta* are used in expressions like *sarvakośavinirmukto ... dharmakāyaḥ* and *avinirmuktakośas tathāgatagarbhaḥ*, or in the example of a gem stone or a lamp, the qualities of which are inseparable from the object.

One cannot say that the *dharmakāya* is separable from the *buddhagūṇa*. Thus we have the expression *dharmakāyo 'vinirbhāgadharmāvinirmukta-jñānagūṇaḥ*. Here *avinirmuktajñānagūṇaḥ* is an adjective modifying *dharmakāyaḥ* (in the same case), therefore a bahuvrīhi with the former member being *avinirmuktajñāna* and the latter member *gūṇa*, both also in the same case, such that the compound's internal construction is that of a karmadhāraya. In other words, *avinirmuktajñāna* modifies *gūṇa*, functioning as does *amukta* elsewhere.

In opposition to *avinirbhāga* and *amuktajña* we find *vinirbhāga* and *muktajña*. They modify *kleśakośa* or *saṃskṛtadharmā*. Here too, *vinirbhāga* and *muktajña* take the *buddhadharmakāya* as their reference and signify fundamental *nonattachment* (*asambaddha*). All *saṃskṛta* dharmas are void (*mṛṣaṃśadharmā*) and *kleśas* are adventitious (*āgantuka*). In opposition to the *buddhadharma* which is *amuktajña*, all *saṃskṛta* dharmas are *muktajña*.

It is possible that *mukta* was understood as *mukti*, then connected with *jñāna*, such that *muktijñāna* was liable to be confused with *vimuktijñāna-darśana*, as apparently happened in the Tibetan translation of the *Śrīmālādevī*. There we find the following sentences:⁵

sangs rgyas kyi chos tha dad du mi gnas pa | *grol bar shes pa* bsam
gyis mi khyab pa gang gā'i klung gi bye ma las 'das pa snyed dang
ldan pa ni ... (Tsukinowa 1940: 130,3–5)

gaṅgāvālikāvyaṭivṛttair avinirbhāgair <**amuktajñair*>⁶ acintyair
buddhadharmaiḥ samanvāgatas

T. 353 (XII) 221c9–10: 世尊，過於恒沙不離不脫不異不思議佛法成就

T. 310 (48) (XI) 677a17–18: 世尊，如來成就過於恒沙具解脫智不思議法。

de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po ni tha dad du mi gnas shing 'brel la
sbubs nas *grol ba'i shes pa can* dag gi gzhi dang | ... 'brel pa ma
mchis shing tha dad du gnas la *shes pa grol ba ma lags pa* phyi rol
gyi 'dus byas kyi chos rnam kyi gzhi dang | ... (Tsukinowa 1940:
146,11–16)

tathāgatagarbho nīśraya ādhāraḥ pratiṣṭhā sambaddhānām avinir-
bhāgānām *amuktajñānānām* asaṃskṛtānām dharmāṇām | asaṃ-
baddhānām api bhagavan vinirbhāgadharmaṇām *muktajñānānām*
saṃskṛtānām dharmāṇām nīśraya ādhāraḥ pratiṣṭhā tathāgata-
garbha iti |

⁵ I tacitly correct Takasaki's transcription errors from Tsukinowa's edition.

⁶ Takasaki inserts this on the basis of the Chinese translation of the RGV, and the Tibetan translation of the *Śrīmālādevī* along with both of its Chinese translations.

T. 353 (XII) 222b12–14: 世尊，不離不斷不脫不異不思議佛法。世尊，斷脫異外有爲法依持建立者。是如來藏。

T. 310 (48) (XI) 677c14–16: 如來藏者。與不離解脫智藏。是依是持。是爲建立。亦與外離不解脫智諸有爲法。依持建立。

de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi sbubs dang tha dad du gnas pa *ma grol bas shes pa* rnam kyis stong pa dang | ... sangs rgyas kyi chos tha dad du mi gnas shing *grol bas shes pa* ... snyed dag gis mi stong pa lags so || (Tsukinowa 1940: 130,15–132,4)

śūnyas tathāgatagarbho vinirbhāgair *muktajñaiḥ* sarvakleśakośaiḥ | aśūnyo gaṅgānadīvālikāvyativṛttair avinirbhāgair *amuktajñair* acintyair buddhadharmaiḥ

T. 353 (XII) 221c17–18: 若離若脫若異，一切煩惱藏。世尊，不空如來藏，過於恒沙不離不脫不異不思議佛法。

T. 310 (48) (XI) 677a23–25: 所謂，離於不解脫智一切煩惱。世尊，不空如來藏。具過恒沙佛解脫智不思議法。

Takasaki asserts that here the Tibetan translators have reversed *amuktajña* and *muktajña*, attaching the first to *kleśa* or emptiness, and the second to the *buddhadharmas* or the non-empty. The same error appears in the second Chinese translation of the sūtra, that contained in the *Mahāratnakūṭa* collection, while the older translation has rendered the passages correctly. He further discusses the Chinese translation of the RGV, judging it with ambivalence. As for the Tibetan translation of the RGV, it correctly renders the negations of the Sanskrit, with such expressions as *bral ma shes pa* and *bral shes pa*, translating *avinirmuktajñānagūṇa* with *ma bral ba'i ye shes kyi yon tan can*.

In this light, for Takasaki both the Chinese and Tibetan translations have not correctly understood *amuktajña*. When the Chinese translations render 不離不脫, as far as the meaning of *amukta* goes, they are correct, but it is not sufficient to speak of the inseparability of the buddha qualities (*dharmas* or *guṇas*), raising the question of the position of *jñāna*. This is not used in the discussion of the lamp, the qualities of which are inseparable but in which wisdom is not at issue. The term *amuktajñāna* is used only with relation to the *buddhadharmas*, and the key to its understanding comes from Sanskrit grammar.

Having suggested that *avinirmuktajñāna* is an adjectival karmadhāraya modifying *guṇa*, and that it was contracted to *amuktajña*, Takasaki suggests that *avinirmuktajñāna* > *amuktajña* was understood as a bahuvrīhi modifying *guṇa* or *dharmā*, and that it was understood that one could split *avinirmukta* and *jñāna* and *amukta* and *jña*. Here both compounds have a past passive participle with negative prefix. According to Pāṇini ii.2.36, bahuvrīhis take the past passive participle as their prior member. In the case of a tatpuruṣa, a past passive participle comes second, in the same case as the prior noun, but in the case of a bahuvrīhi it must come first, and can be in a case relation with the latter element. Thus: *avinirmuktajñāna* is to be understood as *jñānād avinirmuktaḥ, ye shes las ma bral ba*. This is clear from the use of *avinirmuktakleśakośa* in the expression *dharmakāyo — avinirmuktakleśakośas tathāgatagarbhaḥ sūcyate* [read: *ity ucyate*].

It is obvious that *jña* in *amuktajña* means the same as *jñāna*, *jña* merely being the nominalized root and agent of the action. It is adjectivalized as the latter member of a bahuvrīhi compound. However, *-jña* is only used as the latter element of a normal compound in verbal usage of ‘knowing’ the former element (Pāṇini iii.1.135), that is, as a tatpuruṣa. However, here that is not appropriate. It retains its verbal sense, to be sure, but although it is possible, there are not many examples.

Takasaki asserts that he has shown *amuktajña* to be used in the sense of ‘not separate from wisdom’ as a bahuvrīhi, modifying only *buddhadharma* or *buddhaguṇa*. It is obvious that *jñāna* refers to the Buddha’s wisdom, the wisdom through which the Buddha attained awakening. Without it there is no buddhahood, thus it is inseparable from buddhahood. One cannot imagine the *dharmakāya* separate from the *buddhadharmas*, nor from wisdom, thus the fundamental quality of the *dharmakāya* is wisdom as well.

It should be clear from this presentation of Takasaki’s views that he has, at least to some extent, started from a doctrinal standpoint rather than from the philology of the texts. At the same time, while we must give utmost respect to the classical translations of Buddhist texts, it is also true that sometimes their translators make mistakes, sometimes ideas change, and sometimes there are disagreements among authorities. Takasaki attempts to get to some ‘root’ meaning of the term in question, though it is not clear that he has been completely successful in doing so.

Appendix 3

*Sāramati

The name Sthiramati is well known, amply attested in Sanskrit in manuscripts and inscriptions.¹ A number of works are attributed to (a, maybe not the same) Sthiramati, including the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā-Tattvārtha*, *Trimśīkāvijñaptibhāṣya*, *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, *Madhyāntavibhāṣyaṭīkā*, *Dasheng zhongguan shilun* (大乘中觀釋論, a *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* commentary) and perhaps also (with various degrees of uncertainty) the [*Mahāyāna*] *sūtrālarṅkāravṛttibhāṣya*, **Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā*, *Akṣayamatinirdeśaṭīkā*, and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*.² All of these works are written from a Yogācāra point of view (or maybe more than one point of view).

A question, however, remains about the authorship of another work, not exactly classically Yogācāra in its orientation, namely the *Ratnagotravibhāga*-(*mahāyānottaratantra*). This work is composed of verses and commentary, of which the former are attributed in the Tibetan tradition to Ārya Maitreya (*'phags pa mgon po byams pa*) and the latter to Ācārya Asaṅga (*slob dpon thogs med*).³ A bilingual fragment from Khotan, dated on paleographical grounds to between the second half of the ninth and the beginning of the eleventh century,⁴ ascribes the first verse of the text explicitly to Maitreya demonstrating,⁵ as Takasaki has said, that the tradition of Maitreya as the author of the root verses was accepted in Central Asia

¹ There do, however, remain, to my mind, questions about the identification of all the individuals who may have borne this name, and his or their date(s). See Silk (2009: 383-385), particularly regarding the inscriptional evidence. I was well on the way to preparing these notes when Leonard van der Kuijp shared with me his Forthcoming paper, in which most of what I have to say below is already said. However, at his urging I go ahead and offer what I have here anyway.

² A number of these are known to be extant in Sanskrit, whether published yet or not, including the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā-Tattvārthā*, *Trimśīkāvijñaptibhāṣya*, *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*, *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, and *Madhyāntavibhāṣyaṭīkā*.

³ See Cordier (1915: 374 [§XLIV5-6]).

⁴ Kano (2012).

⁵ Bailey and Johnston (1935: 87), and Skjaervo (2002: 484).

(perhaps better to say, at least in Khotan) and in Tibet in the period between the later ninth and eleventh centuries (when the text was translated into Tibetan).⁶ In Chinese sources, however, a different attribution is made. The translation of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* itself does not identify its author,⁷ but other sources have led to the suggestion that the name of the author is *Sāramati. Is this sustainable, and is this *Sāramati a different author from (some) Sthiramati?

Several sources provide information about Sthiramati. The historian Bu ston tells us that Sthiramati (*slob dpon blo gros brtan pa*) was born in *Mtha' 'khob 'dra ma* to a śūdra family.⁸ We do not learn much more than this, and later Tibetan sources appear to be derivative from Bu ston's account, or at least to agree with it on the whole.

The name Sthiramati is normally rendered in Chinese as Anhui 安慧, as found for instance in the Chinese versions of some of the works mentioned above, *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*,⁹ *Dasheng zhongguan shilun*,¹⁰ and *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā*,¹¹ with the coordination of this name and its Sanskrit form being provided elsewhere by the transcription *xīchǐluómòdǐ* 悉恥羅末底 or *xīdīluómòdǐ* 悉地羅末底.¹² According to a reconstruction of Old Chinese (Schuessler 2009, MC omitting tone notation), this should produce something like *sjet-tʰi-lâ-mwât-tiei* and *sjet-di-lâ-mwât-tiei*, re-

⁶ Takasaki (1966: 7) actually writes '12th century', for reasons I do not understand. The text was translated by the Kashmiri Sajjana together with Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059-1109). See note 7 in the Introduction.

⁷ For the date of this translation as around 520 CE, see the Introduction.

⁸ Lhasa edition (Lokesh Chandra 1971, folio 107b6ff.), translated in Obermiller (1932: II.147ff.). Since Schiefner (1869: 129), at least, this place name has been repeatedly 'reconstructed' by translators as Daṇḍakāraṇya, without any reason as far as I have been able to detect. I do not know what place name it is meant to represent. Note that not all sources agree that Sthiramati's caste was śūdra.

⁹ T. 1613 (XXXI) 850c16 (the text however is not quite the same as that preserved in Sanskrit and Tibetan).

¹⁰ T. 1567 (XXX) 136a7.

¹¹ T. 1606 (XXXI) 694b16; the *Bhāṣya* is by *Jinaputra and the *Vyākhyā* by Sthiramati. See now van der Kuijp (2013).

¹² Respectively the *Chengweishilun shuji* 成唯識論述記 of [Kui]ji [窺]基 (T.1830 [XLIII] 231c19-20: 梵云悉恥羅末底, 唐言安慧) and the *Jushelun shiyishu* 俱舍論實義疏 which attributes its authorship (T. 1561 [XXIX] 325a10) as follows: 尊者悉地羅末底造, 唐言安惠. Note that in the latter case *hui* is written 惠, not 慧, a common variant.

spectively. I am not sure on the basis of Chinese phonology alone whether one could thus conclude that behind these transcriptions stood the form Sthiramati, but given that we know this form with certainty from Indian evidence, the equivalences must be taken as sure. Probably, however, whatever apparent distance appears between the Sanskrit and reconstructed forms may be put down to the attempt to render the cluster *s-thi* on the one hand and the vagaries of phonological reconstruction on the other (even leaving aside the obvious facts of local pronunciation, shifts over time, and so on).

Another Chinese rendering said to correspond to Sthiramati is Jianhui 堅慧.¹³ The problem is further complicated by the appearance of yet another form (or another name altogether), Jianyi 堅意, the name under which, for instance, is recorded the authorship of the **Mahāyānāvātāra* (*Ru dasheng lun* 入大乘論).¹⁴

It is the name Jianyi 堅意 which draws us toward the hypothesized *Sāramati. According to de Jong, “[p]robably the earliest reference to Sāramati as the author of the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* is to be found in Zhiyi [智顓 (538–597)]’s *Mohe zhiguan* [摩訶止觀],” in which we find the name Jianyi 堅意: 堅意寶性論云.¹⁵ Before we turn to the reason for this reconstruction of Jianyi as *Sāramati, we must consider another text also attributed to the same author, the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa* (*Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論).¹⁶ This text is very closely related to the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, and there is to my mind no question that it is authentically Indian, as discussed in the Introduction. Moreover, the common authorship of this text and the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* also seems to be clear.

Out of this mass of similar names there has apparently arisen some confusion, such that the conclusion of Hidenori Sakuma is far from unique

¹³ If not the first in modern scholarship, one of the first to make this identification was Julien (1858: 46), and the table on 489, who referred to the *Mahāvīyūtpatti* as his source. (In the edition of Sakaki 1916, however, this item §3484 is given a Chinese equivalent of 意堅.)

¹⁴ T. 1634 (XXXII) 36a22. Note that this name is also attested as equivalent to a completely different Sanskrit form, namely Dhṛdhamati, in a quotation in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* from the *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra*, T. 1636 (XXXII) 93c24 = Bendall (1897-1902: 91.8).

¹⁵ De Jong (1968: 37) referring to T. 1911 (XLVI) 31b18. I have given the Chinese in Pinyin.

¹⁶ See the Introduction.

when, without referring to the *Ratnagotravibhāga* or to *Sāramati, he writes:¹⁷

Sthiramati (Anhui 安慧) ... is said to have been based at Valabhī and to have been a contemporary of Dharmapāla. But the scholar mentioned by Xuanzang alongside Guṇamati (Dehui 德慧) in the *Datang xiyu ji* in his accounts of Nālandā (9.3.5) and Valabhī (11.8.4) is not Anhui but Jianhui 堅慧. In the *Datang Daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan* 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳 his name is given as Anhui. Among works included in the Taishō edition, the author of the *Dacheng fajie wuchabie lun* 大乘法界無差別論 (T. 31, nos. 1626 & 1627; neither translated by Xuanzang) is given as Jianhui, while the author of the *Dacheng apidamo zaji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (T. 31, no. 1606; translated by Xuanzang) and *Dacheng guang wuyun lun* 大乘廣五蘊論 (T. 31, no. 1613; translated by Divākara) is given as Anhui. While a detailed examination of this state of affairs will be omitted here, the original Sanskrit equivalent of both Jianhui and Anhui may be considered to have been Sthiramati.

Sakuma concludes his consideration by saying “On the assumption that this view [that Jianhui might be the same person as Anhui] has become established in academic circles, I have therefore decided to regard both Jianhui and Anhui as Chinese equivalents of Sthiramati.”¹⁸ A careful look at the evidence, however, may demonstrate that this position cannot be upheld, at least as presented. As Sakuma’s formulation informs us, however, the key to the problem lies in Chinese forms of Indic names, and how they are to be understood. The focus in what follows is not on Sthiramati per se, although the name will not be forgotten.

A key piece of the puzzle is the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirvīṣeṣa*, translated into Chinese by the Khotanese *Devendraprajña. A commentary was authored by *Devendraprajña’s direct disciple, the great Fazang 法藏 (643–712), the *Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu* 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, within which Fazang writes the following:¹⁹

¹⁷ Sakuma (2006: 359-360).

¹⁸ Sakuma (2006: 360n5).

¹⁹ T. 1838 (XLIV) 63c5-21. My thanks to Chen Jinhua for his suggestions on the understanding of this passage. At the stage of preparing this manuscript for the press I came upon a

第八造論緣起者，堅慧菩薩者，梵名娑囉末底。娑囉，此云堅固。末底云慧。菩薩者，具云菩提薩埵。

諸論通釋有其三義。一從境爲名，以此二法是所緣境故，如骨觀等。菩提云覺，即所求佛果。薩埵名有情，即所度衆生。以智悲內起，是以外緣二境。

一云：菩提是所求佛果，薩埵是能求行者，謂求菩提之薩埵。即境智和合目。

一云：菩提同前，薩埵云勇猛，謂有志有能，於大菩提勇猛求故。謂此論主，有稱理求佛堅固正慧，故以爲名。

三藏云：西域相傳，此是地上菩薩。於佛滅後七百年時，出中天竺，大剎利種。聰叡逸群，備窮俗典。出家學道，慧解踰明。大小乘教，無不綜練。但以行菩薩行，留意大乘。以已所遊平等法界，傳示衆生，方爲究竟廣大饒益。是故造《究竟一乘寶性論》及《法界無差別論》等。皆於大乘捨權歸實，顯實究竟之說矣。

The eighth topic concerns the originator of the treatise, Jianhui pusa. In Sanskrit he is named Suōluōmòdǐ [Schuessler 2009: sâ-lâ-mwât-tie]. As for *suōluō*: Here [in China] we say ‘firm.’ For *mòdǐ* we say ‘wisdom.’ Púsà is, in full, Pútísàduǒ [bodhisattva].

Of the comprehensive explanations given in various treatises, there are three meanings. One is named from the external object, given that these two things (*bodhi* and *sattva*) are the object support, like the contemplation of bones and so on [is called that because its object is the bones]. ‘*Bodhi*’ is awakening, that is, the sought-after fruit of buddhahood. ‘*Sattva*’ indicates sentient beings, namely the beings who are saved. Because wisdom and compassion arise internally, they take the two objects (*bodhi* and *sattva*) as external supports.

A[nother explanation] says: *Bodhi* is the sought-after fruit of buddhahood, *sattva* indicates the practitioner seeking [*bodhi*], that is to say, the *sattva* who seeks *bodhi*, from the viewpoint of the combination of the object and wisdom.

A[nother explanation] says: *Bodhi* is the same as above. *Sattva* means heroic, that is, to have will and capacity, because one heroically

complete translation of this text published by Shimamura Daishin (2008-2009). My understanding of the present passage (translated by Shimamura at 2008: 29-30) differs from his, which in my opinion contains several very serious errors.

seeks great *bodhi*. That is to say, the author of the treatise possesses the firm correct wisdom [enabling him] to pursue Buddhahood in accordance with the truths, and so is given [this] name.²⁰

The Tripiṭaka [Master Devendraprajña] says that according to an account of the Western Lands, [the author] was an upper level bodhisattva. He belonged to the time 700 years after the death of the Buddha. A great kṣatriya from Central India, he was of outstanding intelligence and insight. Already deeply familiar with the books of the non-Buddhists, he renounced the family and studied the way. With wise understanding and deep clarity,²¹ he thoroughly and completely studied the teachings of the Great and Little Vehicles. But he only practiced the practices of the bodhisattva, concentrating on the Great Vehicle. He transmitted to and showed beings the equal *dharmadhātu* he himself had already traversed, delivering ultimate and widespread benefits. Therefore he composed the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga*, the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirvīṣeṣa*, and others, all of which are about how to reject the provisional and return to the true within the Great Vehicle, manifesting the ultimate true doctrines.

What we find here, then, is Fazang offering the name Jianhui pusa 堅慧菩薩 as the author of the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirvīṣeṣa*. A portion of the phonetic analysis here is trivial: *púsà* is an abbreviated transcription of *bodhisattva*. The remainder, however, appears to raise problems, to which I will return below. The text goes on to analyze the compound *bodhisattva* in three ways.

The text refers to the author as an “upper level bodhisattva” *dishàng púsà* 地上菩薩, a technical designation of a bodhisattva in the level of the saint (*ārya*, *shèng* 聖), that is, in one of the final ten stages of spiritual ascent.²² He

²⁰ Compare the presentation in the **Buddhabhūmi-śāstra* 佛地經論, T. 1530 (XXVI) 300a19-24. See also the passage from the *Madhyamakāvātāra* translated in La Vallée Poussin 1911: 239.

²¹ Chen Jinhua suggests that the term *yú míng* 踰明 alludes to the following passage from the *Dadaili* 大戴禮：孔子曰：「野哉！君子不可以不學，見人不可以不飾。」不飾無貌，無貌不敬，不敬無禮，無禮不立。夫遠而有光者，飾也；近而逾明者，學也。譬如滂邪，水潦漏焉，莞蒲生焉，從上觀之，誰知其非源泉也。

²² The term *dishàng púsà* 地上菩薩 is a technical category in path theory; as a translation equivalent it renders *bhūmipraviṣṭo bodhisattva*. See Funayama (2003: 131, 123n11).

further and perhaps more historically considers him to have been a kṣatriya who lived in Central India 700 years after the death of the Buddha. One problem with appreciating this information comes from determining which system was used by Fazang for calculating the date of the Buddha. As demonstrated by Antonello Palumbo, such references must be to a calculation with ongoing centuries, and therefore should be understood to mean that *Sāramati lived during the seventh century of the Buddhist era. As Palumbo further points out, there are strong indications of a Buddhist era beginning in 530 BCE, giving dates in the seventh century between 70 and 169 CE.²³ It is not at all clear to me how much weight should be given to such indications, and we should recall that a number of figures are placed by various authors in this time-frame, including Saṃgharakṣa (as discussed by Palumbo), and Nāgārjuna, whose dating to the seventh century is cited by Fazang himself, although it is not clear whether he accepts it.²⁴ All of this is relevant, perhaps, in that since such an early date for *Sāramati cannot be accepted, one might ask whether the rest of the information should be accorded greater credit.

Discussing the text of Fazang and related passages,²⁵ Ui (1959: 89-97) takes up the question of the identity of the author of the *Ratnagoṭravibhāga* (and thus the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa* as well). In the first place,

²³ See Palumbo (2011). If the often cited date of 686 BCE is taken for the Buddha's birth, that should mean that the seventh century after the nirvāṇa should produce a date something like 0~100 CE. If the dating of Daoxuan is adopted, however, the nirvāṇa is placed around 566 BCE, which provides a date closer to 50~150 CE. For the bases of these rough calculations, see Franke (1991).

²⁴ In his *Shi'er men lun zongzhiyi ji* 十二門論宗致義記, T. 1826 (XLII) 218c13, but in the same paragraph he also cites sources which date Nāgārjuna to the eighth, or on the other hand the third, century after the nirvāṇa.

²⁵ Such as Fazang's note in his *Huayan jing zhuanji* 華嚴經傳記 (T. 2073 [LI] 156c10-13), in which it is said, based on first-hand reports, that the same author wrote a compact commentary on a work by *Vajrasena on the *Daśabhūmi*[*vibhāṣa*?] which was not yet available in China, but was to be found in Khotan.: 近問西來三藏梵僧, 皆云: 金剛軍菩薩造十地釋論, 有一萬二千頌, 翻可成三十餘卷。又堅慧菩薩, 亦造略釋。竝未傳此土, 于闐國見有其本。 See Péri (1911: 353), who in this context also addresses the question of the existence of more than one Sāramati. See also the *Hae simmil kyōng so* 解深密經疏 (*Zokuzōkyō* 21, 369, 173c16-17) by Wōnch'uk 圓測 (613-696): 堅慧論師及金剛軍, 皆同此釋。堅慧論師, 即是舊翻寶性論主, 五印度北也。 Here *Sāramati is said to be from North India; Fazang says Central India. Both Fazang and Wōnch'uk worked directly with Devendraprajña, the translator of the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa*.

based on Fazang's 'transliteration' he proposes (or assumes), as had others before him, a form *Sāramati*, then going on to identify this individual with the well known Yogācāra author Sthiramati (generally Anhui 安慧, also Jianyi 堅意),²⁶ whom he dates to between 350-400. This, to say the very least, would produce serious problems of chronology if we were to identify this author with the author of the well-known works associated with the name Sthiramati, since these seem to belong to a somewhat later period.

De Jong and others have claimed that *Sāramati* is a "somewhat unusual form,"²⁷ and "[u]sually, personal names ending in *-mati* have as first element an adjective or participle." De Jong does not offer examples, but one might think of Akṣayamati or Śuddhamati. However, Ui is of course quite right to appeal to well-attested names such as Sāgaramati, Ratnamati and Guṇamati, and to these we might add Dharmamati, Dharmākaramati and Prajñākaramati. In addition, one must point out that forms of the word (not name) *sāramati* occur in a verse found in the Dhammapada corpus,²⁸ and in some Yogācāra texts such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, and *Mahāyānasamgraha*.²⁹

One hypothetical objection to the suggestion of **Sāramati* as the identity of the author of the **Mahāyānadharmadhātunirviśeṣa* and the RGV might be that, this form being based solely on the report of Fazang, there might have been some misunderstanding between Devendraprajña and Fazang, since the former was a native speaker of Khotanese. However, Giuliana Martini informs me as follows:

The Old and Late Khotanese consonant group *sth-* cannot be simplified into **s-*; that is, the group is preserved (even in Late Khotanese,

²⁶ It is not possible to confuse Jianhui 堅慧 and Jianyi 堅意 phonologically: *hui* 慧 [OCM, Schuessler 2009] < wɨs, yɨ 意 < ʔəkʰ. There is overlap in their respective semantic ranges, however, leading to functional equivalence as elements of names (so already Péri 1911: 348n4). Likewise, the equivalence in meaning of *jiān* with either *sthira* or *sāra* is quite possible.

²⁷ De Jong (1968: 38n10), specifically engaging Ui. So already Johnston in Bailey and Johnston (1935: 81), who says: "Now the restoration of the name *Sāramati* from the Chinese seems to me doubtful. It is a somewhat unusual form ..."

²⁸ Pāli *Dhammapada* 11a (= Patna 171a) *asāre sāramatino*, *Udānavarga* 29.3 *asāre sāramatiyaḥ*, Gāndhāri *Dharmapada* 213a *asari saravadiṇo*.

²⁹ Lévi (1907: 82.20), Pradhan (1950: 107.5), Nagao (1982: II.31B, 398-399n5).

the native language of Devendraprajña), and there is no phonetic reason for it to be simplified. Moreover, short -ī- cannot become long -ā- (though it could become short -ā-), even in an oral context, and it is possibly less likely in a highly “controlled” oral-cum-written context such as that of a careful and professional translation team (especially in the case of foreign monks present in the group, utmost attention and questioning would be expected).

Let us remember in this context that the *Ratnagotravibhāga* was known in Khotan, and the first published Sanskrit evidence of the text in fact came from a bilingual scroll from the Stein collection which has been dated to the second half of the ninth ~ eleventh century Khotan.³⁰ This suggests that there would have been little confusion about the accepted name of its author.

In conclusion, it is not possible at this moment to clarify with absolute certainty the name of the author of the RGV/MDN, but I doubt that it is possible that he is the same individual as the one responsible for works such as the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* and so forth (leaving aside the question of whether this author is the same as the author of the commentary on the *Kāśyapaṭivarta*, and so on).³¹ For this reason, there seems no good reason not to accept the validity of the form Sāramati.

³⁰ Bailey and Johnston (1935), Kano (2012).

³¹ Note that Nguyen (1990) accepts that the author of the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* and the *Kāśyapaṭivarta* commentary are the same, although to my eyes perhaps rather more work is needed before reaching such a conclusion.

Appendix 4

Reading Text and Translation

0	佛說不增不減經 元魏北印度三藏菩提流支 譯	The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of Decrease [in the Realm of Beings]. Translated by the Northern Wei Dynasty Tripiṭaka Master from Northern India, Bodhiruci.
1	a) 如是我聞：一時婆伽婆住 王舍城，耆闍崛山中， ^{b)} 與 大比丘衆千二百五十人俱， 諸菩薩摩訶薩無量無邊不 可稱計。	a) Thus I heard: At one time the Bhagavat was dwelling in Rājagrha on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa, ^{b)} together with a large assembly of one thou- sand two hundred and fifty bhikṣus, and with an immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas.

2	<p> ^{a)} 爾時，慧命舍利弗於大衆中即從坐起，前至佛所。^{b)} 到已，頂禮佛足，退坐一面。合掌白佛言：^{c)} 「世尊，一切衆生從無始世來周旋六道，往來三界，於四生中輪迴生死，受苦無窮。^{d)} 世尊，此衆生聚、衆生海爲有增減，爲無增減。^{e)} 此義深隱，我未能解。^{f)} 若人問我，當云何答。」 </p>	<p> ^{a)} At that time, the venerable Śāriputra got up from his seat in the great assembly and approached the Buddha. ^{b)} Bowing his head to the Buddha's feet, he withdrew and sat to one side. Placing his palms together reverentially, he spoke to the Buddha, saying: ^{c)} "World-honored One! All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time, transmigrate in the three realms and, repeating the cycle of birth and death through the four types of birth, experience pain without exhaustion. ^{d)} World-honored One! Does this mass of beings, this ocean of beings, undergo increase and decrease, or does it not undergo increase and decrease? ^{e)} The purport of this is profound and mysterious, and I am not yet able to understand it. ^{f)} If someone asks me about it, how should I respond?" </p>
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<p>3i</p>	<p>a) 爾時，世尊告舍利弗： b) 「善哉！善哉！舍利弗，汝爲安隱一切衆生，安樂一切衆生，憐愍一切衆生，利益一切衆生，饒益安樂一切衆生諸天人故，乃能問我是甚深義。^{c)} 舍利弗，汝若不問如來、應供、正遍知如是義者，有多過咎。^{d)} 所以者何。於現在世及未來世，諸天人等一切衆生長受衰惱、損害之事，永失一切利益安樂。</p>	<p>a) At that time the World-honored One said to Śāriputra: ^{b)} “Good! Good! Śāriputra, you ask me about this extremely profound purport in order to pacify all beings, to bring happiness to all beings, to show compassion for all beings, to benefit all beings, to avail and bring happiness to all beings, gods and men. ^{c)} If you were not to ask the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One about such a purport as this, Śāriputra, there would be many faults. ^{d)} How so? In the present age and in future ages all beings—gods, men, and so on—would suffer and be harmed for an extended time, and would forever lose all that is beneficial and brings them happiness.</p>
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3ii	<p>a) 「舍利弗，大邪見者：所謂，見衆生界增，見衆生界減。^{b)} 舍利弗，此大邪見，諸衆生等，以是見故，生盲無目。^{c)} 是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於現在世墮諸惡趣。^{d)} 舍利弗，大險難者：所謂，取衆生界增堅著妄執；取衆生界減堅著妄執。^{e)} 舍利弗，此諸衆生堅著妄執。是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於未來世墮諸惡趣。</p>	<p>a) “It is a greatly mistaken view, Śāriputra, to see the realm of beings as increasing or to see the realm of beings as decreasing. ^{b)} Because of these views, Śāriputra, beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are born blind and sightless. ^{c)} Consequently, for a very long time they errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in the present age they fall into evil destinies. ^{d)} It is great disaster, Śāriputra, to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as increasing, or to cling to and grasp at [the notion of] the realm of beings as decreasing. ^{e)} These beings, Śāriputra, cling to and grasp at [these notions]. Consequently, for a very long time they will errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in future ages they will fall into evil destinies.</p>
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4i

a) 舍利弗，一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故，不如實見一法界故，起邪見心，謂衆生界增，衆生界減。^{b)} 舍利弗，如來在世，我諸弟子不起此見。^{c)} 若我滅後，過五百歲，多有衆生愚無智慧。^{d)} 於佛法中雖除鬚髮，服三法衣，現沙門像，然其內無沙門德行。^{e)} 如是等輩實非沙門，自謂沙門。非佛弟子，謂佛弟子。^{f)} 而自說言：「我是沙門，眞佛弟子」。如是等人起增減見。何以故。

a) “Because all foolish common people, Śāriputra, do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, because they do not see the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, they entertain ideas informed by mistaken views, thinking that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases.^{b)} While the Tathāgata is in the world, Śāriputra, my disciples will not entertain these views.^{c)} (However,) when five hundred years have passed after my nirvāṇa, there will be many beings who are foolish and lack insight.^{d)} [Being] within the Buddhist community, although they will remove their beards and hair, put on the three dharma robes, and manifest outwardly the appearance of śramaṇas, nevertheless inwardly they will lack the virtuous behavior of śramaṇas.^{e)} Such people, although actually not śramaṇas will call themselves śramaṇas, although not disciples of the Buddha will call themselves disciples of the Buddha.^{f)} Still they themselves will say: ‘I am a śramaṇa, a true disciple of the Buddha.’ This sort of persons will entertain the view that there is increase or decrease. Why?

4ii	<p>a) 此諸衆生以依如來不了義經, 無慧眼故; ^{b)} 遠離如實空見故; ^{c)} 不如實知如來所證初發心故; ^{d)} 不如實知修集無量菩提功德行故; ^{e)} 不如實知如來所得無量法故; ^{f)} 不如實知如來無量力故; ^{g)} 不如實知如來無量境界故; ^{h)} 不信如來無量行處故; ⁱ⁾ 不如實知如來不思議無量法自在故; ^{j)} 不如實知如來不思議無量方便故; ^{k)} 不能如實分別如來無量差別境界故; ^{l)} 不能善入如來不可思議大悲故; ^{m)} 不如實知如來大涅槃故。</p>	<p>a) “[They entertain the view that there is increase or decrease] because these beings, having resorted to the Tathāgata’s sūtras of provisional meaning, lack the wisdom-eye; ^{b)} because they are remote from the view of emptiness in accord with reality; ^{c)} because they do not know in accord with reality the initial aspiration (to awakening) realized by the Tathāgata; ^{d)} because they do not know in accord with reality the practices which accumulate immeasurable merits for bodhi; ^{e)} because they do not know in accord with reality the immeasurable qualities attained by the Tathāgata; ^{f)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable power; ^{g)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere (of knowledge); ^{h)} because they do not believe in the Tathāgata’s immeasurable range of action; ⁱ⁾ because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings; ^{j)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s inconceivable, immeasurable skillful means; ^{k)} because they are not able to distinguish in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s immeasurable sphere of discrimination; ^{l)} because they are not good at penetrating into the Tathāgata’s inconceivable great compassion; ^{m)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata’s great nirvāṇa.</p>
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5i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 愚癡凡夫無聞慧故, 聞如來涅槃, 起斷見滅見。 b) 以起斷想及滅想故, 謂衆生界滅, 成大邪見極重惡業。</p>	<p>a) “Śāriputra, because foolish common people lack [even that] insight which comes from hearing [the teachings], hearing of the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa they entertain the view that it is annihilation and the view that it is cessation. b) Because they entertain the notion that it is annihilation and the notion that it is cessation, they consider that the realm of beings decreases, and this creates the extremely heavy evil karma of a greatly mistaken view.</p>
5ii	<p>a) 復次, 舍利弗, 此諸衆生依於滅見, 復起三見。 b) 此三種見與彼滅見不相捨離, 猶如羅網。 c) 何謂三見。 d) 一者, 斷見, 謂: 畢竟盡; e) 二者, 滅見, 謂: 即涅槃; f) 三者, 無涅槃見, 謂: 此涅槃畢竟空寂。 g) 舍利弗, 此三種見, 如是縛, 如是執, 如是觸。</p>	<p>a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view that there is decrease, these beings further entertain three types of views. b) These three types of views and that view that there is decrease are inseparable, like [the threads of] a gauze net. c) What are the three views? d) 1. The view of annihilation, that is, that there is absolute exhaustion. e) 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa. f) 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence. g) These three types of views, Śāriputra, fetter [beings] in this way, grasp [beings] in this way, and cling [to beings] in this way.</p>

5iii	<p>a) 以是三見力因緣故, 展轉復生二種邪見。 b) 此二種見與彼三見不相捨離, 猶如羅網。 c) 何謂二見。 d) 一者, 無欲見; e) 二者, 畢竟無涅槃見。</p>	<p>a) “Through the forceful influence of these three views, [those beings] in their turn further entertain two types of mistaken views. b) These two types of views and those three views are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa]. e) 2. The view of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa.</p>
5iv	<p>a) 舍利弗, 依無欲見, 復起二見。 b) 此二種見與無欲見不相捨離, 猶如羅網。 c) 何謂二見。 d) 一者, 戒取見; e) 二者, 於不淨中起淨顛倒見。</p>	<p>a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa], [those beings] further entertain two views. b) These two types of views and the view devoid of desire [for nirvāṇa] are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are the two views? d) 1. The view of attachment to practices and observances. e) 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.</p>

6	<p>a) 舍利弗，依畢竟無涅槃見，復起六種見。 b) 此六種見與無涅槃見不相捨離，猶如羅網。 c) 何謂六見。 d) 一者，世間有始見； e) 二者，世間有終見； f) 三者，衆生幻化所作見； g) 四者，無苦無樂見； h) 五者，無衆生事見； i) 六者，無聖諦見。</p>	<p>a) “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa, [those beings] further entertain six types of views. b) These six types of views and the view of the nonexistence of nirvāṇa are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these six views? d) 1. The view that the world has a beginning. e) 2. The view that the world has an end. f) 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation. g) 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure. h) 5. The view that beings [produce] no (karmically significant) activity. i) 6. The view that there are no noble truths.</p>
7i	<p>a) 復次，舍利弗，此諸衆生依於增見，復起二見。 b) 此二種見與彼增見，不相捨離，猶如羅網。 c) 何謂二見。 d) 一者，涅槃始生見； e) 二者，無因無緣忽然而有見。</p>	<p>a) “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view of increase, these beings further entertain two views. b) These two views and the view of increase are inseparable, like a gauze net. c) What are these two views? d) 1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. e) 2. The view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes or conditions.</p>

7ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 此二種見令諸衆生於善法中無願欲心、勤精進心。 b) 舍利弗, 是諸衆生以起如是二種見故, 正使七佛、如來、應、正遍知次第出世爲其說法, c) 於善法中若生欲心, 勤精進心, 無有是處。</p>	<p>a) “These two types of views, Śāriputra, cause beings to lack the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities. b) Because, Śāriputra, these beings entertain these two views, even if the seven Buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Perfectly Awakened Ones were successively to appear in the world to expound the Teachings for them, c) it would be impossible for them to produce the desire and the zeal [to cultivate] good qualities.</p>
7iii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 此二種見乃是無明諸惑根本, b) 所謂: 涅槃始生見, 無因無緣忽然而有見。</p>	<p>a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the foundation of all forms of defilements caused by ignorance. b) [“These two views”] means the view that nirvāṇa was produced in the beginning, and the view that [nirvāṇa] exists suddenly without causes and conditions.</p>

8i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 此二種見乃是極惡根本大患之法。^{b)} 舍利弗, 依此二見起一切見。^{c)} 此一切見與彼二見不相捨離, 猶如羅網。^{d)} 一切見者, 所謂: 若內, 若外, 若麤, 若細, 若中, 種種諸見, 所謂: 增見、減見。</p>	<p>a) “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the teaching of fundamental great calamity brought about by extreme evil. ^{b)} On the basis of these two views, Śāriputra, [beings] give rise to all views. ^{c)} All these views and those two views are inseparable, like a gauze net. ^{d)} ‘All views’ means all sorts of views, of inner and outer, gross and subtle, and in-between, that is, it refers to the view that there is increase and to the view that there is decrease.</p>
8ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 此二種見依止一界, 同一界, 合一界。 b) 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知彼一界故, 不如實見彼一界故,^{c)} 起於極惡大邪見心, 謂: 衆生界增, 謂: 衆生界減。」</p>	<p>a) “These two views, Śāriputra, rely on the single realm, are the same as the single realm, are united with the single realm. ^{b)} Because all foolish common people do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, ^{c)} they entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases.”</p>

9i	<p>a) 爾時，慧命舍利弗白佛言：^{b)}「世尊，何者是一界而言：^{c)}‘一切愚癡凡夫，不如實知彼一界故，不如實見彼一界故，^{d)}起於極惡大邪見心，謂：衆生界增，謂：衆生界減。’</p>	<p>a) At that time the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the Buddha, saying:^{b)} “World-honored One! What is this single realm of which it is said:^{c)} ‘All foolish common people, because they do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality,^{d)} entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases?’</p>
9ii	<p>a) 善哉，世尊。此義甚深，我未能解。^{b)}唯願如來爲我解說，令得解了。」</p>	<p>a) “Good, Blessed One! The purport of this is extremely profound. I am not yet able to comprehend it.^{b)} Would the Tathāgata please expound it for me, causing me to be able to completely comprehend it.”</p>
10i	<p>a) 爾時，世尊告慧命舍利弗。^{b)}「此甚深義乃是如來智慧境界。亦是如來心所行處。^{c)}舍利弗，如是深義一切聲聞、緣覺智慧所不能知，所不能見，不能觀察。^{d)}何況一切愚癡凡夫而能測量。</p>	<p>a) At that time the World-honored One said to the venerable Śāriputra:^{b)} “This extremely profound purport is exactly the Tathāgatha’s sphere of insight and it is the range of the Tathāgata’s mind.^{c)} Śāriputra, such a profound purport as this cannot be known by the insight of all the auditors and lone buddhas, cannot be seen, cannot be examined.^{d)} Still how much less could all foolish common people fathom it.</p>

10ii	<p>a) 唯有諸佛如來智慧乃能觀察、知、見此義。</p> <p>b) 舍利弗，一切聲聞、緣覺所有智慧，於此義中，唯可仰信；^{c)} 不能如實知、見、觀察。</p>	<p>a) “It is indeed only the insight of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport.</p> <p>b) (Despite) the insight possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāriputra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; ^{c)} they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality.</p>
10iii	<p>a) 舍利弗，甚深義者，即是第一義諦。^{b)} 第一義諦者，即是衆生界。^{c)} 衆生界者，即是如來藏。^{d)} 如來藏者，即是法身。</p>	<p>a) “The extremely profound purport, Śāriputra, is precisely the supreme truth. ^{b)} The supreme truth is precisely the quintessence of beings. ^{c)} The quintessence of beings is precisely the embryo of the tathāgatas. ^{d)} The embryo of the tathāgatas is precisely the dharma-body.</p>
11	<p>a) 舍利弗，如我所說，法身義者，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法，如來功德智慧。</p>	<p>a) “As I have expounded, Śāriputra, the meaning of the dharma-body is inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha, greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, [namely,] the merits and insight of a tathāgata.</p>

12	<p>a) 舍利弗, 如燈所有明、色及觸不離、不脫。^{b)} 又如摩尼寶珠所有明、色、形相不離、不脫。^{c)} 舍利弗, 如來所說法身之義亦復如是, 過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法, 如來功德智慧。</p>	<p>a) “It is like a lamp, Śāriputra, whose brightness, color and tactile sensation are inseparable and indivisible [from the lamp itself].^{b)} Again, it is like a maṇi gem whose characteristics of brightness, color and form are inseparable and indivisible [from the gem itself].^{c)} The meaning of the dharma-body expounded by the Tathāgata, Śāriputra, is also once again like this: It is inseparable from, indivisible from, not cut-off from, not different from the inconceivable qualities definitive of a buddha greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, the merits and insight of a Tathāgata.</p>
13i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 此法身者, 是不生不滅法,^{b)} 非過去際, 非未來際, 離二邊故。^{c)} 舍利弗, 非過去際者, 離生時故。^{d)} 非未來際者, 離滅時故。</p>	<p>a) “This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing.^{b)} It is unlimited in the past and unlimited in the future, because it is free from the two extremes.^{c)} It is unlimited in the past, Śāriputra, because it is free from a time of birth,^{d)} and it is unlimited in the future because it is free from a time of perishing.</p>

13ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 如來法身常, 以不異法故, 以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗, 如來法身恒, 以常可歸依故, 以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗, 如來法身清涼, 以不二法故, 以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗, 如來法身不變, 以非滅法故, 以非作法故。</p>	<p>a) “The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent because of its quality of immutability, because of its quality of inexhaustibility. b) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant because it can permanently be taken as a refuge, because it is equal with the future limit (of saṃsāra). c) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil because of its non-dual nature, because of its nature as free from discrimination. d) The Tathāgata’s dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangable because of its imperishable nature, because of its non-created nature.</p>
14i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, b) 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流, c) 往來生死, d) 名為‘衆生’。</p>	<p>a) “When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, ensnared by limitless defilements greater in number than the sands of the Ganges, b) drifting on the waves of the world from beginningless ages, c) comes and goes through birth and death, d) then it is termed ‘Beings.’</p>

14ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, ^{b)} 猷離世間生死苦惱, ^{c)} 棄捨一切諸有欲求, ^{d)} 行十波羅蜜, ^{e)} 攝八萬四千法門, ^{f)} 修菩提行, ^{g)} 名爲‘菩薩’。</p>	<p>a) “When this very same dharma-body, Śāriputra, ^{b)} repels the anguish and suffering of birth and death in the world, ^{c)} banishes all desires, ^{d)} practices the ten perfections, ^{e)} collects the eighty-four thousand teachings, ^{f)} and cultivates the practices leading to bodhi, ^{g)} then it is termed ‘bodhisattva.’</p>
15i	<p>a) 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, 離一切世間煩惱使纏, ^{b)} 過一切苦, ^{c)} 離一切煩惱垢, ^{d)} 得淨, 得清淨, ^{e)} 住於彼岸清淨法中, ^{f)} 到一切衆生所願之地, ^{g)} 於一切境界中究竟通達, 更無勝者, ^{h)} 離一切障, 離一切礙, 於一切法中得自在力, ⁱ⁾ 名爲‘如來、應、正遍知’。</p>	<p>a) “Once again, Śāriputra, when this very same dharma-body is free from the covering of all the world’s defilements, ^{b)} beyond all suffering, ^{c)} and free from the stains of all defilements, ^{d)} it attains purity, it attains perfect purity, ^{e)} and dwells among the pure dharmas of the other shore. ^{f)} It reaches the stage of what is desired by all beings, ^{g)} it thoroughly penetrates all spheres (of knowledge), and there is none surpassing it. ^{h)} It is free of all hindrances, free of all obstacles, and it attains sovereign power over all things. ⁱ⁾ [This then] is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One.’</p>

15ii	<p>a) 是故, 舍利弗, 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。 b) 衆生界即法身。 c) 法身即衆生界。 d) 舍利弗, 此二法者, 義一名異。</p>	<p>a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, there is no quintessence of beings separate from the dharma-body, there is no dharma-body separate from the quintessence of beings. b) The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body, c) the dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings. d) These two things, Śāriputra, have one meaning; [only] the names differ.</p>
16	<p>a) 復次, 舍利弗, 如我上說, 衆生界中亦三種法。 b) 皆真實如、不異、不差。 c) 何謂三法。 d) 一者, 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法; e) 二者, 如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法; f) 三者, 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法。</p>	<p>a) “Once again, Śāriputra, as I expounded earlier, within the realm of beings too there are three types of natures. b) All are true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate. c) What are the three natures? d) 1. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and is pure. e) 2. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it] and, being covered with defilements, is unpurified. f) 3. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit (of saṃsāra), constant, and existing.</p>

17i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 當知如來藏本際相應體及清淨法者, 此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智慧清淨真如法界, 不思議法。 b) 無始本際來有此清淨相應法體。</p>	<p>a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature associated [with it] and has a pure nature in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and the quality of being inconceivable. b) From the beginningless beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated [with it].</p>
17ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 我依此清淨真如法界, 為衆生故說為不可思議法自性清淨心。</p>	<p>a) “Regarding this dharma-realm of pure thusness, Śāriputra, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind, which is an inconceivable teaching.</p>
18i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 當知如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏, 不清淨法者, b) 此本際來離脫, c) 不相應, d) 煩惱所纏, e) 不清淨法。 f) 唯有如來菩提智之所能斷。</p>	<p>a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated [with it], is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing, b) is from the very beginning free and released, c) not associated [with it], d) covered by defilements e) and is impure. f) It can only be cut [free] by the tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.</p>

18ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 我依此煩惱所纏不相應不思議法界, 爲衆生故說爲客塵煩惱所染自性清淨心不可思議法。</p>	<p>a) “Regarding this non-associated and inconceivable dharma-realm, covered with defilements, Śāriputra, I expound for [ordinary] beings the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements, which is an inconceivable teaching.</p>
19i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 當知如來藏未來際平等恒及有法者, 即是一切諸法根本。 b) 備一切法, 具一切法, c) 於世法中不離、不脫真實一切法, d) 住持一切法, 攝一切法。</p>	<p>a) “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant, and existing is precisely the basis of all qualities [definitive of a buddha]. b) It is furnished with all [such] qualities, joined with all [such] qualities, c) and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all [such] qualities, d) it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.</p>

19ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 我依此不生、不滅、常恒、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界, 說名‘衆生’。b) 所以者何。c) 言‘衆生’者, 即是不生、不滅、常恒、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界等異名。d) 以是義故, 我依彼法, 說名‘衆生’。</p>	<p>a) “Regarding this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, Śāriputra, the inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, I term it ‘beings.’ b) Why? c) To say ‘beings’ is (only) a synonym for precisely this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, (this) inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, and so on. d) With this intention, regarding those qualities, I term it ‘beings.’</p>
20	<p>a) 舍利弗, 此三種法皆真實如, 不異、不差。b) 於此真實、如不異、不差法中, 畢竟不起極惡不善二種邪見。c) 何以故。d) 以如實見故。e) 所謂: 滅見增見, 舍利弗, 此二邪見, 諸佛如來畢竟遠離。f) 諸佛如來之所呵責。</p>	<p>a) “These three types of natures, Śāriputra, are all true thusness, not distinct and not [mutually] separate. b) With respect to these truly thus, not distinct and not [mutually] separate natures, one absolutely does not entertain the two types of extremely evil and bad views [that there is an increase or decrease in any of the three categories]. c) Why? d) Because this is a view in accord with reality. e) As for the views that there is increase or decrease, Śāriputra, the buddhas and tathāgatas absolutely distance themselves from these two mistaken views. f) They are criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas.</p>

21i	<p>a) 舍利弗, 若有比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷, 若起一見, 若起二見, b) 諸佛如來非彼世尊, 如是等人非我弟子。</p>	<p>a) “If, Śāriputra, there are bhikṣus or bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas or upāsikās, who entertain one or the other view, ^{b)} the buddhas and tathāgatas are not their teachers, and such people are not my disciples.</p>
21ii	<p>a) 舍利弗, 此人以起二見因緣故, 從冥入冥, 從闇入闇。 b) 我說是等名‘一闍提’。</p>	<p>a) “Because these people, Śāriputra, entertain these two views, from gloom they enter gloom, from darkness they enter darkness. ^{b)} I speak of these terming them ‘icchantika.’</p>
21iii	<p>a) 是故, 舍利弗, 汝今應學此法, 化彼衆生, 令離二見, 住正道中。 b) 舍利弗, 如是等法汝亦應學, 離彼二見, 住正道中。</p>	<p>a) “Therefore, Śāriputra, you now should study this teaching and convert those beings, causing them to give up the two views and dwell in the correct path. ^{b)} You too, Śāriputra, should study teachings such as this, give up those two views and dwell in the correct path.”</p>

22	<p>a) 佛說此經已，慧命舍利弗，比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷、菩薩摩訶薩，及諸天、龍、夜叉、乾闥婆、阿修羅、迦樓羅、緊那羅摩睺羅伽、人、非人等一切大眾，皆大歡喜，信受奉行。</p>	<p>a) The Buddha having expounded this sūtra, the venerable Śāriputra, bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs, upāsakas and upāsikās, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinaras, mahorāgas, men, non-men, and so on—the whole assembly—were all greatly delighted, in faith accepted and honored (the teaching), and bore it in mind.</p>
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Appendix 5

A Hypothetical Reconstruction of an Indic Form of the AAN

The text printed here is nothing more than an extremely tentative attempt to explore what the AAN *may* have looked like in India. Based on the edition and its notes provided above, in one or two places I have speculated about mistranslations in the Chinese rendering, and tried to see through them, but more than that, when we have Sanskrit evidence, or evidence from the MDN, I have favored this in attempting to imagine a slightly more Indic text. I would not for a moment defend this methodologically, but since it does seem to me interesting to speculate on a (not *the!*) form the text may have had in India, I have gone ahead with this little game. I should emphasize that I do not for a moment propose this as representing anything that actually ever existed.

- 1 ^{a)} Thus I heard at one time the Blessed One was dwelling in Rājagṛha on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa, ^{b)} together with a large assembly of one thousand two hundred and fifty bhikṣus, and with an immeasurable, infinite and innumerable number of bodhisattva-mahāsattvas.
- 2 ^{a)} At that time, the venerable Śāriputra got up from his seat amid the large assembly and approached the Buddha. ^{b)} Bowing his head to the Buddha's feet, he withdrew and sat to one side. Placing his palms together reverentially, he spoke to the Buddha, saying: ^{c)} "Blessed One! All beings wander in the six paths from beginningless time, transmigrate in the three realms and, repeating the cycle of birth and death through the four types of birth, experience pain without exhaustion. ^{d)} Blessed One! Does this mass of beings, this ocean of beings, undergo increase and decrease, or does it not undergo increase and decrease? ^{e)} The purport of this is profound and mysterious, and I am not yet able to understand it. ^{f)} If someone asks me about it, how should I respond?"
- 3i ^{a)} At that time the Blessed One said to Śāriputra: ^{b)} "Good! Good! Śāriputra, you ask me about this extremely profound purport in order to pacify all beings, to bring happiness to all beings, to show compassion

for all beings, to benefit all beings, to avail and bring happiness to all beings, gods and men. ^{c)} If you were not to ask the Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfectly Awakened One about such a purport as this, Śāriputra, there would be many faults. ^{d)} How so? In the present age and in future ages all beings—gods, men, and so on—would suffer and be harmed for an extended time, and would forever lose all that is beneficial and brings them happiness.

- 3ii) ^{a)} “It is a greatly mistaken view, Śāriputra, to see the realm of beings as increasing or to see the realm of beings as decreasing. ^{b)} Because of these views, Śāriputra, beings who hold these greatly mistaken views are born blind. ^{c)} Consequently, for a very long time they errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in the present age they fall into evil destinies. ^{d)} It is great disaster, Śāriputra, to cling to and grasp at the notion of the realm of beings as increasing, or to cling to and grasp at the notion of the realm of beings as decreasing. ^{e)} These beings, Śāriputra, cling to and grasp at these notions. Consequently, for a very long time they will errantly tread mistaken paths, and therefore in future ages they will fall into evil destinies.
- 4i) ^{a)} “Because all foolish common people, Śāriputra, do not know the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, because they do not see the single dharma-realm in accord with reality, they entertain ideas informed by mistaken views, thinking that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases. ^{b)} While the Tathāgata is in the world, Śāriputra, my disciples will not entertain these views. ^{c)} However, when five hundred years have passed after my nirvāṇa, there will be many beings who are foolish and lack insight. ^{d)} Being within the Buddhist community, although they will remove their beards and hair, put on the three dharma robes, and manifest outwardly the appearance of śramaṇas, nevertheless inwardly they will lack the virtuous behavior of śramaṇas. ^{e)} Such people, although actually not śramaṇas will call themselves śramaṇas, although not disciples of the Buddha will call themselves disciples of the Buddha. ^{f)} Still they themselves will say: ‘I am a śramaṇa, a true disciple of the Buddha.’ This sort of persons will entertain the view that there is increase or decrease. Why?
- 4ii) ^{a)} “They entertain the view that there is increase or decrease because these beings, having resorted to the Tathāgata’s sūtras of provisional

meaning, lack the wisdom-eye; ^{b)} because they are remote from the view of emptiness in accord with reality; ^{c)} because they do not know in accord with reality the initial aspiration to awakening realized by the Tathāgata; ^{d)} because they do not know in accord with reality the practices which accumulate immeasurable merits for Awakening; ^{e)} because they do not know in accord with reality the immeasurable qualities attained by the Tathāgata; ^{f)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata's immeasurable power; ^{g)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata's immeasurable sphere of knowledge; ^{h)} because they do not believe in the Tathāgata's immeasurable range of action; ⁱ⁾ because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata's inconceivable, immeasurable mastery of the Teachings; ^{j)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata's inconceivable, immeasurable skillful means; ^{k)} because they are not able to distinguish in accord with reality the Tathāgata's immeasurable sphere of discrimination; ^{l)} because they are not good at penetrating into the Tathāgata's inconceivable great compassion; ^{m)} because they do not know in accord with reality the Tathāgata's great nirvāṇa.

- 5i ^{a)} “Śāriputra, because foolish common people lack even that insight which comes from hearing the teachings, hearing of the Tathāgata's nirvāṇa they entertain the view that it is annihilation and the view that it is cessation. ^{b)} Because they entertain the notion that it is annihilation and the notion that it is cessation, they consider that the realm of beings decreases, and this creates the extremely heavy evil karma of a greatly mistaken view.
- 5ii ^{a)} “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view that there is decrease, these beings further entertain three types of views. ^{b)} These three types of views and that view that there is decrease are inseparable, like the threads of a gauze net. ^{c)} What are the three views? ^{d)} 1. The view of annihilation, that is, that there is absolute exhaustion. ^{e)} 2. The view that there is extinction, that is, precisely nirvāṇa. ^{f)} 3. The view that there is no nirvāṇa, that is, that this nirvāṇa is absolute quiescence. ^{g)} These three types of views, Śāriputra, fetter beings in this way, grasp beings in this way, and cling to beings in this way.
- 5iii ^{a)} “Through the forceful influence of these three views, those beings in their turn further entertain two types of mistaken views. ^{b)} These two

- types of views and those three views are inseparable, like a gauze net. ^{c)} What are the two views? ^{d)} 1. The view devoid of desire for nirvāṇa. ^{e)} 2. The view of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa.
- 5iv** ^{a)} “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, devoid of desire for nirvāṇa, those beings further entertain two views. ^{b)} These two types of views and the view that there is no desire are inseparable, like a gauze net. ^{c)} What are the two views? ^{d)} 1. The view of attachment to practices and observances. ^{e)} 2. The inverted view through which one conceives of the impure as pure.
- 6** ^{a)} “On the basis of the view, Śāriputra, of the absolute nonexistence of nirvāṇa, those beings further entertain six types of views. ^{b)} These six types of views and the view of the nonexistence of nirvāṇa are inseparable, like a gauze net. ^{c)} What are these six views? ^{d)} 1. The view that the world has a beginning. ^{e)} 2. The view that the world has an end. ^{f)} 3. The view that beings are an illusory creation. ^{g)} 4. The view that there is neither suffering nor pleasure. ^{h)} 5. The view that beings produce no karmically significant activity. ⁱ⁾ 6. The view that there are no noble truths.
- 7i** ^{a)} “Once again, Śāriputra, on the basis of the view of increase, these beings further entertain two views. ^{b)} These two views and the view of increase are inseparable, like a gauze net. ^{c)} What are these two views? ^{d)} 1. The view that nirvāṇa was initially produced. ^{e)} 2. The view that nirvāṇa exists suddenly without causes or conditions.
- 7ii** ^{a)} “These two types of views, Śāriputra, cause beings to lack the desire and the zeal to cultivate good qualities. ^{b)} Because, Śāriputra, these beings entertain these two views, even if the seven Buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Perfectly Awakened Ones were successively to appear in the world to expound the Teachings for them, ^{c)} it would be impossible for them to produce the desire and the zeal to cultivate good qualities.
- 7iii** ^{a)} “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the foundation of all forms of defilements caused by ignorance. ^{b)} ‘These two views’ means the view that nirvāṇa was produced in the beginning, and the view that nirvāṇa exists suddenly without causes and conditions.
- 8i** ^{a)} “These two views, Śāriputra, are nothing other than the teaching of fundamental great calamity brought about by extreme evil. ^{b)} On the basis of these two views, Śāriputra, beings give rise to all views. ^{c)} All

these views and those two views are inseparable, like a gauze net. ^{d)} ‘All views’ means all sorts of views of inner and outer, gross and subtle, and in-between, that is, it refers to the view that there is increase and to the view that there is decrease.

- 8ii** ^{a)} “These two views, Śāriputra, rely on the single realm, are the same as the single realm, are united with the single realm. ^{b)} Because all foolish common people do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, ^{c)} they entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases.”
- 9i** ^{a)} At that time the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the Buddha, saying: ^{b)} “Blessed One! What is this single realm of which it is said: ^{c)} ‘All foolish common people, because they do not know that single realm in accord with reality, because they do not see that single realm in accord with reality, ^{d)} entertain ideas of extremely evil greatly mistaken views, that is, that the realm of beings increases or that the realm of beings decreases?’
- 9ii** ^{a)} “Good, Blessed One! The purport of this is extremely profound. I am not yet able to understand it. ^{b)} Would the Tathāgata please expound it for me, causing me to be able to completely comprehend it.”
- 10i** ^{a)} At that time the Blessed One said to the venerable Śāriputra: ^{b)} “This purport is exactly the Tathāgata’s sphere of insight and the range of the Tathāgata’s mind. ^{c)} Even all the auditors and lone buddhas are not able through their own insight to correctly know, see or examine this purport to such an extent, Śāriputra, ^{d)} still how much less foolish common people.
- 10ii** ^{a)} “It is indeed only the insight of the buddhas and tathāgatas which can examine, know and see this purport. ^{b)} Despite the insight possessed by all auditors and lone buddhas, Śāriputra, with respect to this purport, they can only have faith; ^{c)} they are not able to know, see or examine it in accord with reality.
- 10iii** ^{a)} “The extremely profound purport, Śāriputra, is precisely the supreme truth. ^{b)} The supreme truth, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the quintessence of beings. ^{c)} The quintessence of beings, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the embryo of the tathāgatas. ^{d)} The embryo of the tathāgatas, Śāriputra, is a synonym for the dharma-body.

- 11 ^{a)} “This same dharma-body the Tathāgata has spoken of, Śāriputra, possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and attributes indivisible, from what it is, that is, inseparable from qualities definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.
- 12 ^{a)} “Take as an example, Śāriputra, a lamp. It possesses qualities and attributes inseparable and indivisible from it, namely brightness, heat and coloration. ^{b)} Or a gemstone which is inseparable and indivisible from its brightness, color and form. ^{c)} Just so, Śāriputra, the dharma-body spoken of by the Tathāgata possesses qualities inseparable, and wisdom and attributes indivisible, from it, namely the qualities definitive of a tathāgata, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges river.
- 13i ^{a)} “This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is one which has the quality of being unborn and unperishing. ^{b)} It is unlimited in the past and unlimited in the future, because it is free from the two extremes. ^{c)} It is unlimited in the past, Śāriputra, because it is free from a time of birth, ^{d)} and it is unlimited in the future because it is free from a time of perishing.
- 13ii ^{a)} “This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is permanent, because of its quality of immutability and its quality of inexhaustibility. ^{b)} This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is constant, a constant refuge, because of its equality with the future limit of saṃsāra. ^{c)} This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is tranquil, because of its nondual, nondiscriminative qualities. ^{d)} This dharma-body, Śāriputra, is unchangable, because of its imperishable and uncreated nature.
- 14i ^{a)} “This very dharma-body, Śāriputra, hidden by tens of millions of sheaths of limitless defilements, ^{b)} borne along by the current of transmigration, ^{c)} wandering through deaths and births in the destinies of beginningless and endless transmigration, ^{d)} is termed ‘The quintessence/realm of beings.’
- 14ii ^{a)} “That very dharma-body, Śāriputra, ^{b)} being disgusted with the suffering of the currents of transmigration, ^{c)} indifferent to all objects of pleasure, ^{f)} practicing the practice which leads to awakening ^{e)} by means of the eighty-four thousand teachings, ^{d)} which include the ten perfections, ^{g)} is termed ‘bodhisattva.’
- 15i ^{a)} “Once again, Śāriputra, this very dharma-body, thoroughly freed of all sheaths of defilements, ^{b)} having transcended all sufferings, ^{c)} the strains of all defilements vanished, ^{d)} well and truly pure, ^{e)} fixed in the

Absolute Reality that is ultimately pure,^{f)} risen to the stage looked forward to by all beings,^{g)} having attained peerless heroic strength with respect to all spheres of knowledge,^{h)} perfected in sovereign power over all things free of all hindrances and unobstructed—ⁱ⁾ this is termed ‘Tathāgata, Arhat, Perfect Buddha.’

- 15ii^{a)} “Therefore, Śāriputra, the quintessence of beings is not different from the dharma-body.^{b)} The quintessence of beings is precisely the dharma-body.^{c)} The dharma-body is precisely the quintessence of beings.^{d)} This pair is nondual with respect to meaning; only the designations differ.
- 16^{a)} “Once again, Śāriputra, as I expounded earlier, within the realm of beings too there are three types of natures.^{b)} All are true thusness, not distinct and not mutually separate.^{c)} What are the three natures?^{d)} 1. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is from the very beginning in its intrinsic nature associated with the embryo of the tathāgatas and pure.^{e)} 2. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is its intrinsic nature unassociated with the embryo of the tathāgatas and, being covered with defilements, unpurified.^{f)} 3. The nature that is the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit of saṃsāra, constant, existing.
- 17i^{a)} “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is its intrinsic nature associated with it and has a pure nature is in accord with reality, is not illusory, is inseparable and indivisible from the dharma-realm of insight and pure thusness, and has the quality of being inconceivable.^{b)} From the beginningless beginning exists this reality which is both pure and associated with it.
- 17ii^{a)} “This pure dharma-nature, Śāriputra, is precisely the dharma-realm. Regarding this intrinsically pure mind, I expound it as an inconceivable teaching.
- 18i^{a)} “You should know, Śāriputra, that the embryo of the tathāgatas which from the very beginning is in its intrinsic nature unassociated with it, is covered with defilements, and is an unpurified thing,^{b)} is from the very beginning free and released,^{c)} not associated with it,^{d)} covered by defilements^{e)} and impure.^{f)} It can only be cut free by the Tathāgata’s bodhi-wisdom.

- 18ii** ^{a)} “Regarding this non-associated and inconceivable dharma-realm, covered with defilements, Śāriputra, I expound it for ordinary beings the intrinsically pure mind stained by adventitious defilements, which is an inconceivable teaching.
- 19i** ^{a)} “You should know, Śāriputra, that the nature of the embryo of the tathāgatas which is equal to the future limit, constant and existing, is precisely the basis of all qualities definitive of a buddha. ^{b)} It is furnished with all such qualities, joined with all such qualities, ^{c)} and while engaged in worldly affairs it is inseparable and indivisible from the truth and from all such qualities, ^{d)} it maintains all qualities, it embraces all qualities.
- 19ii** ^{a)} “Regarding this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, Śāriputra, the inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, I term it ‘beings.’ ^{b)} Why? ^{c)} To say ‘beings’ is only a synonym for precisely this unborn, unperishing, eternal, tranquil, unchanging refuge, this inconceivable, pure dharma-realm, and so on. ^{d)} With this intention, regarding those qualities, I term it ‘beings.’
- 20** ^{a)} “These three types of natures, Śāriputra, are all true thusness, not distinct and not mutually separate. ^{b)} With respect to these truly thus, not distinct and not mutually separate natures, one absolutely does not entertain the two types of extremely evil views [that there is an increase or decrease in any of the three categories]. ^{c)} Why? ^{d)} Because this is a view in accord with reality. ^{e)} As for the views that there is increase or decrease, Śāriputra, the buddhas and tathāgatas absolutely distance themselves from these two mistaken views. ^{f)} They are criticized by the buddhas and tathāgatas.
- 21i** ^{a)} “If, Śāriputra, there are bhikṣus or bhikṣunis, upāsakas or upāsikās who entertain one view or the other view, ^{b)} I am not their teachers, and they are not my auditors.
- 21ii** ^{a)} “I say, Śāriputra, that they, filled with pitch-darkness, go from pitch-darkness into pitch-darkness, from gloom into greater gloom.
- 21iii** ^{a)} Therefore, Śāriputra, you now should study this teaching and convert those beings, causing them to give up the two views and dwell in the correct path. ^{b)} You too, Śāriputra, should study teachings such as this, give up those two views and dwell in the correct path.”

- 22 ^{a)} The Buddha having preached this sūtra, the venerable Śāriputra, bhikṣus and bhikṣunis, upāsakas and upāsikās, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas, and the gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinaras, mahorāgas, men, non-men, and so on—the whole assembly—were all greatly delighted, in faith accepted and honored the teaching, and bore it in mind.

The Scripture on the Absence of Increase and the Absence of Decrease [in the Realm of Beings] is complete.

Appendix 6

Citations of the AAN

The following listing limits itself almost entirely to citations of the AAN by name; especially since I have for the most part searched electronically, there are sure to be other citations which I have overlooked, and thus the following should in no way be considered complete. In particular, I have not had access to collections of Japanese works, although I know that the AAN is quoted by, for instance, Kūkai (Watanabe 1984). Finally, the punctuation of the citations was done without consideration of their context, and thus is sure also to contain errors (in addition to those due simply to my own inattention and poor understanding).

2

^{a)} 爾時，慧命舍利弗於大眾中即從坐起，前至佛所。^{b)} 到已，頂禮佛足，退坐一面。合掌白佛言：^{c)} 「世尊，一切眾生從無始世來周旋六道，往來三界，於四生中輪迴生死，受苦無窮。^{d)} 世尊，此眾生聚、眾生海為有增減，為無增減。^{e)} 此義深隱，我未能解。^{f)} 若人問我，當云何答。」

Huayan xuantanhui xuanji 華嚴懸談會玄記, Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞.
X0236 8.288c9114:

舍利弗問佛：一切眾生從無始來輪迴生死。此眾生聚為有增減，為無增減。此義甚深。若人問我，當云何答。

3ii

^{a)} 「舍利弗，大邪見者：所謂，見眾生界增，見眾生界減。^{b)} 舍利弗，此大邪見，諸眾生等，以是見故，生盲無目。^{c)} 是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於現在世墮諸惡趣。^{d)} 舍利弗，大險難者：所謂，取眾生界增堅著妄執；取眾生界減堅著妄執。^{e)} 舍利弗，此諸眾生堅著妄執。是故，長夜妄行邪道。以是因緣，於未來世墮諸惡趣。」

Dasheng qi xin lun yiji 大乘起信論義記, Fazang 法藏. T. 1846 (XLIV) 243c25–26:

a) 大邪見者, 見衆生界增, 見衆生界減。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang 華嚴一乘教義分齊章, Fazang 法藏. T. 1866 (XLV) 487a19–20:

a) 舍利弗, 大邪見者: 所謂, 見衆生界增, 見衆生界減, 乃至廣說。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 509b12:

a) 大邪見者, 見衆生界增, 見衆生界減。

Jōyuishikiron honmonshō 成唯識論本文抄, unknown author. T. 2262 (LXV) 412b24–25:

若見衆生界有增減者, 是大邪見。

Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔, Ryōsan 良算. T. 2263 (LXVI) 27b25: 衆生界無增減。

Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔, Ryōsan 良算. T. 2263 (LXVI) 34a19: 衆生界增減スト者, 是大邪見。

Kegonshū shushō gishō 華嚴宗種性義抄, Shin'en 親圓. T. 2328 (LXXII) 58c21–22:

a) 舍利弗, 大邪見者, 所謂見衆生界增乃至起邪見心。

Kegon gokyōshō mondōshō 華嚴五教章問答抄, Shinjō 審乘. T. 2340 (LXII) 697a4–5:

衆生界不增減。

Kegon gokyōshō shinishō 華嚴五教章深意鈔, Shōsen 聖詮. T. 2341 (LXXIII) 10a29–b1:

a) 舍利弗, 大邪見者: 所謂, 見衆生界增, 見衆生界減。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511a14–15:

a) 舍利弗, 大邪見者: 所謂, 見衆生界增, 見衆生界減。乃至廣說。

Shugo kokkaishō 守護國界章, Saichō 最澄. T. 2363 (LXXIV) 217b24–25: 若見衆生界有增減者, 是大邪見。

Ichijō yōketsu 一乘要決, Genshin 源信. T. 2370 (LXXIV) 339c21–22: 若見衆生界有增減者, 是大邪見。

Shūyō Kashiwabara anryū 宗要柏原案立, Teishun 貞舜. T. 2374 (LXXIV) 550a28–29:

a) 舍利弗, 大邪見者, 所謂: 見衆生界增, 見衆生界減。

Huayan xuantanhui xuanji 華嚴懸談會玄記, Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞. X236 8.288c9114:

佛言：大邪見者：所謂，見眾生界增，見眾生界減。以是見故，生盲無目。是故，長夜妄行邪道。於現在世墮諸惡趣。舍利弗，大嶮難者，所謂，取眾生界增減堅著妄執。於未來世墮諸惡趣。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui 師會. X998, 338b16:

舍利弗，大邪見者：所謂，見眾生界增，見眾生界減。乃至廣說。

4i

^{a)} 舍利弗，一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故，不如實見一法界故，起邪見心，謂眾生界增，眾生界減。^{b)} 舍利弗，如來在世，我諸弟子不起此見。^{c)} 若我滅後，過五百歲，多有眾生愚無智慧。^{d)} 於佛法中雖除鬚髮，服三法衣，現沙門像，然其內無沙門德行。^{e)} 如是等輩實非沙門，自謂沙門。非佛弟子，謂佛弟子。^{f)} 而自說言：「我是沙門，眞佛弟子」。如是等人起增減見。何以故。

Dasheng qi xin lun yiji 大乘起信論義記, Fazang 法藏 T. 1846 (XLIV) 243c26–27:

^{a)} 以不如實知一法界故，於眾生界起增減見。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang 華嚴一乘教義分齊章, Fazang 法藏. T. 1866 (XLV) 487a25–27:

^{a)} 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故，不能實見一法界故，起邪見心，謂眾生界增眾生界減。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 509b12–13:

^{a)} 以不如實知一法界故，於眾生界起增減見。

Jōyuishikiron honmonshō 成唯識論本文抄, unknown author. T. 2262 (LXV) 419b5–6:

^{a)} 一切凡夫不如實知一界起大邪見故。

Kishinron shōshutsu 起信論抄出, Sonben 尊辯. T. 2283 (LXIX) 544b15:

^{a)} 以不如實知一法界故。

Kishinron shōshutsu 起信論抄出, Sonben 尊辯. T. 2283 (LXIX) 544b28–29:

大邪見者，見眾生界增，見眾生界減。以不如實知一法界故，於眾生界起增減見。¹

¹ Telescoped with 3ii.

Kegon gokyōshō shiji 華嚴五教章指事, Jurei 壽靈. T. 2337 (LXXII) 259b9–14:

^{b)} 舍利弗, 如來在世, 我諸弟子不起此見。^{c)} 若我滅後, 過五百歲, 多有衆生愚無智慧。^{d)} 於佛法中雖除鬚髮, 服三法衣, 現沙門像, 然其內無沙門德行。[乃至如是等人。起增減見。何以故。4ii:] ^{a)} 此諸衆生。以依如來不了義經。無慧眼故。乃至廣說。(includes 4ii).

Kegon gokyōshō shinishō 華嚴五教章深意鈔, Shōsen 聖詮. T. 2341 (LXXIII) 10ab4:

起邪見心。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511c6–8:

^{a)} 一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界, 不如實見一法界故, 起邪見心, 謂衆生界增, 衆生界減。

Xianshou wujiao yi 賢首五教儀, Xufa 續法 (1641–1728), *Zokuzōkyō* X1024 58: 679c17120:

一切愚癡不如實知一法界故, 起邪見心, 謂衆生界增, 衆生界減。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui 師會. X998, 338c5:

一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故, 不如實見一法界故, 起邪見心, 謂衆生界增, 衆生界減。

4ii

^{a)} 此諸衆生以依如來不了義經, 無慧眼故; ^{b)} 遠離如實空見故; ^{c)} 不如實知如來所證初發心故; ^{d)} 不如實知修集無量菩提功德行故; ^{e)} 不如實知如來所得無量法故; ^{f)} 不如實知如來無量力故; ^{g)} 不如實知如來無量境界故; ^{h)} 不信如來無量行處故; ⁱ⁾ 不如實知如來不思議無量法自在故; ^{j)} 不如實知如來不思議無量方便故; ^{k)} 不能如實分別如來無量差別境界故; ^{l)} 不能善入如來不可思議大悲故; ^{m)} 不如實知如來大涅槃故。

Kegon gokyōshō shiji 華嚴五教章指事, Jurei 壽靈. 華嚴五教章指事 T. 2337 (LXXII) 259b13–14:

^{a)} 此諸衆生以依如來不了義經, 無慧眼故。

5i

a) 舍利弗，愚癡凡夫無聞慧故，聞如來涅槃，起斷見滅見。b) 以起斷想及滅想故，謂衆生界滅，成大邪見極重惡業。

Yuishikiron dōgakushō 唯識論同學鈔, Ryōsan 良算. T. 2263 (XLVI) 27c1–3:
衆生界不增減不生滅者，知無有畢竟入涅槃者，若有定性入無餘依，彼經
應言衆生界滅。

Kegonshū shushō gishō 華嚴宗種性義抄, Shin'en 親圓. T. 2328 (LXXII) 59a2–
5:

不增不滅經說十二見：一，滅見。二，斷見。三，滅見。四，無涅槃見。五，
無餘見。六，畢竟無涅槃見。七，世間有始見。八，世間有終見。九，幻
化所見。十，無滅無樂見。十一，無衆生界見。十二，無聖諦見也。²

10i

a) 爾時，世尊告慧命舍利弗。b) 「此甚深義乃是如來智慧境界。亦是如來心所
行處。c) 舍利弗，如是深義一切聲聞、緣覺智慧所不能知，所不能見，不能觀
察。d) 何況一切愚癡凡夫而能測量。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 2.8–10 [Nakamura 1961: 3.1–4]):

b) *tathāgataviṣayo hi sārīputrāyam arthas tathāgatagocaraḥ |* c) *sarvaśrā-*
vakapratyekabuddhair api tāvac chārīputrāyam artho na śakyah
samyak svaprajñayā jñātum vā draṣṭum vā pratyavekṣitum vā d) *prāg*
eva bālaprthagjanair |

Nakamura 1967: 3.1–3; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 74b7–
75a2:

b) *shā ri'i bu don 'di ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i yul te | de bzhin gshegs pa'i*
spyod yul lo || c) *shā ri'i bu don 'di ni re zhig nyan thos dang | rang*
sangs rgyas thams cad kyis kyang rang gi shes rab kyis yang dag par
shes pa'am | blta ba'am | brtag par mi nus na | d) *byis pa so so'i skye bo*
dag gis lta ci smos te |

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a20–23:

如來經中告舍利弗言：舍利弗，言衆生者，b) 乃是諸佛如來境界，c) 一切聲
聞、辟支佛等，以正智慧不能觀察衆生之義。d) 何況能證毛道凡夫。

² The identification of both citations here is problematic.

10ii

a) 唯有諸佛如來智慧乃能觀察、知、見此義。b) 舍利弗，一切聲聞、緣覺所有智慧，於此義中，唯可仰信；c) 不能如實知、見、觀察。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 2.10–11 [Nakamura 1961: 3.4–5]):

[*anyatra tathāgataśraddhāgamanataḥ | śraddhāgamanīyo hi śāriputra paramārthaḥ |*]

Nakamura 1967: 3.3–4; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 75a2:

de bzhin gshegs pa la dad pas rtogs pa ni ma gtogs so || shā ri'i bu don dam pa ni dad pas rtogs par bya ba yin no ||

Jiujing yisheng baoting lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a23–25:

於此義中唯信如來。是故，舍利弗，隨如來信此衆生義。

10iii

a) 舍利弗，甚深義者，即是第一義諦。b) 第一義諦者，即是衆生界。c) 衆生界者，即是如來藏。d) 如來藏者，即是法身。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 2.11–13 [Nakamura 1961: 3.5–8]):

b) *paramārtha iti śāriputra sattvadhātor etad adhivacanam | c) sattvadhātur iti śāriputra tathāgatagarbhasyaitad adhivacanam | d) tathāgatagarbha iti śāriputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam |*

(Johnston 1950: 56.2–3 [Nakamura 1961: 109.18–19]):

d) *tathāgatagarbha iti śāriputra dharmakāyasyaitad adhivacanam iti |*

Nakamura 1967: 3.4–7; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 75a2–3:

b) *shā ri'i bu don dam pa zhes bya ba 'di ni sems can gyi khams kyi tshig bla dags so || c) shā ri'i bu sems can gyi khams zhes bya ba 'di ni | de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po'i tshig bla dags so || d) shā ri'i bu de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba 'di ni chos kyi sku'i tshig bla dags so ||*

Nakamura 1967: 109.13–14; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 104a7:

d) *shā ri'i bu de bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po zhes bya ba 'di ni chos kyi sku'i tshig bla dags so zhes bya ba dang |*

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821a25–27:

- ^{a)} 舍利弗，言衆生者，即是第一義諦。^{b)} 舍利弗，言第一義諦者，即是衆生界。^{c)} 舍利弗，言衆生界者，即是如來藏。^{d)} 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身故。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 835c9–10:

- ^{d)} 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身故。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏. T. 1838 (XLIV) 74a23–24:

- ^{d)} 舍利弗，言如來藏者，即是法身。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 925b20–22:

- ^{a)} 甚深義者，即第一義諦。^{b)} 第一義諦者，即衆生界。^{c)} 衆生界者，即如來藏。^{d)} 如來藏者，即法身。

Jōyuishikiron honmonshō 成唯識論本文抄, unknown author. T. 2262 (LXV) 421c5–7:

- 一界者，即是第一義諦。^{b)} 第一義諦者，即是衆生界。^{c)} 衆生界者，即是如來藏。^{d)} 如來藏者，即是法身。

11

^{a)} 舍利弗，如我所說，法身義者，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法，如來功德智慧。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 3.4–5 [Nakamura 1961: 3.15–17]):

^{a)} *yo 'yam sārīputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyaḥ so 'yam avinirbhā-gadharmāvinirmuktajñānaguṇo yad uta gaṅgānadīvālikāvvyatikrāntais tathāgatadharmaiḥ |*

Nakamura 1967: 3.12–14; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 75a5–6:

^{a)} *shā ri'i bu de bzhin gshegs pas bstan pa'i chos kyi sku gang yin pa de ni 'di lta ste | gang gā'i klung gi bye ma snyed las 'das pa'i de bzhin gshegs pa'i chos dag dang | rnam par dbyer med pa'i chos dang ldan pa ma bral ba'i ye shes kyi yon tan can yin no ||*

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b1–3:

- ^{a)} 舍利弗，如來所說法身義者，過於恒沙不離，不脫，不思議佛法，如來智慧功德。

12

^{a)} 舍利弗，如燈，所有明、色及觸不離、不脫。^{b)} 又如摩尼寶珠所有明、色、形相不離、不脫。^{c)} 舍利弗，如來所說法身之義亦復如是，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不斷、不異不思議佛法，如來功德智慧。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 39.5–8 [Nakamura 1961: 75.15–20]):

^{a)} *tadyathā śāriputra pradīpaḥ | avinirbhāgadharmaṁavinirmuktaguṇo yad utālokoṣṇavarṇatābhiḥ |* ^{b)} *mañir vālokavarṇasarṁsthānaiḥ |* ^{c)} *evam eva śāriputra tathāgatanirdiṣṭo dharmakāyo 'vinirbhāgadharṁo 'vinirmuktajñānaguṇo yad uta gaṅgānadīvālikāvvyativṛttais tathāgata-dharmair iti ||*

Nakamura 1967: 75.12–15; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 95b3–4:

^{a)} *shā ri'i bu dper na mar me ni 'di lta ste | snang ba dang dro ba dang mdog dag gis sam |* ^{b)} *nor bu snang ba dang mdog dang dbyibs dag gi rnam par dbyer med pa'i chos can dang ma bral ba'i yon tan can no ||*
^{c)} *shā ri'i bu de bzhin du de bzhin gshegs pas bstan pa'i chos kyi sku ni 'di lta ste | gang gā'i klung gi bye ma snyed 'das pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i chos rnam kyis rnam par dbye ba med pa'i chos can ma bral ba'i ye shes kyi yon tan can no ||*

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 821b3–7:

^{a)} 舍利弗，如世間燈，明、色及觸不離、不脫。^{b)} 又如摩尼寶珠，明、色、形相不離、不脫。^{c)} 舍利弗，法身之義亦復如是，過於恒沙不離、不脫、不思議佛法，如來智慧功德故。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893b15–19:

如說：^{a)} 舍利弗，諸佛法身有功德法。譬如燈有光明熱色不離，不脫。^{b)} 摩尼寶珠光、色、形狀，亦復如是。^{c)} 舍利弗，如來所說諸佛法身智功德法不離，不脫者。所謂：過恒河沙如來法也。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c25–29:

如佛說言：^{a)} 舍利弗，譬如燈無二法功能無異。所為光明及煖色等不相離故。^{b)} 或如寶珠光明、形、色。^{c)} 如是，如是，舍利弗，如來所說法身不相離法，智慧功能所為過殑伽沙如來之法。

13ii

a) 舍利弗，如來法身常，以不異法故，以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗，如來法身恆，以常可歸依故，以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗，如來法身不變，以非滅法故，以非作法故。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 54.12–15 [Nakamura 1961: 107.5–10]):

a) *nityo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'nanyatvadharmākṣayadharmatayā*
| b) *dhruvo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo dhruvaśaraṇo 'parāntakoṭisamatayā* |
c) *śivo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpadharmatayā* |
d) *śāśvato 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'vināśadharmākṛtrimadharmatayā* |

(Johnston 1950: 12.2 [Nakamura 1961: 21.1–2]):

c) *śivo 'yaṃ śāriputra dharmakāyo 'dvayadharmāvikalpadharmā*

Nakamura 1967: 107.8–11; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 103b4–6:

a) *shā ri'i bu mi zad pa'i chos nyid kyis na gzhan du mi 'gyur ba'i chos kyi sku 'di ni rtag pa'o ||* b) *shā ri'i bu phyi ma'i mtha'i mu dang btsungs pa nyid kyis bstan pa'i skyabs su gyur pa'i chos kyi sku'i ni brtan pa'o ||* c) *shā ri'i bu rnam par mi rtog pa nyid kyis gnyis su med pa'i chos kyi sku 'di ni zhi ba'o ||* d) *shā ri'i bu ma bcos pa'i chos nyid kyis 'jig pa med pa'i chos kyi sku 'di ni g.yung drung ngo ||*

Nakamura 1967: 21.2–3; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 80b1–2:

c) *shā ri'i bu 'gog pa zhes bya ba 'di ni chos kyi sku ste | gnyis su med pa'i chos can rnam par mi rtog pa'i chos so ||*

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 835b8–13:

a) 舍利弗，如來法身常，以不異法故，以不盡法故。 b) 舍利弗，如來法身恆，以常可歸依故，以未來際平等故。 c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。 d) 舍利弗，如來法身不變，以非滅法故，以非作法故。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun T. 1611 (XXXI) 824a7–8:

c) 舍利弗，如來法身清涼，以不二法故，以無分別法故。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏. T. 1838 (XLIV) 70c16–18:

a) 舍利弗, 如來法身常, 以不異法故, 以不盡故, ^{c)} 以無分別法故。 ^{d)} 如來法身不變, 以非滅法故, 以非作法故。

Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 叡尊. T. 2356 (LIV) 80a8–10:

^{d)} 舍利弗, 如來法身不變, 以非滅法故, 以非作法故。

14i

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流, ^{c)} 往來生死, ^{d)} 名為‘衆生’。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 40.16–18 [Nakamura 1961: 79.7–10]):

a) *ayam eva śāriputra dharmakāyo 'paryantakleśakośakoṭigūḍhaḥ |* ^{c)} *sāmsārasrotasā uhyamāno* ^{b)} *'navarāgrasāmsāragaticyutyupapattiṣu saṁcaran* ^{d)} *sattvadhātur ity ucyate |*

Nakamura 1967: 79.6–8; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, phi 96a7–b1:

a) *shā ri'i bu chos kyi sku de nyid nyon mongs pa'i sbus bye ba mtha' yas pas gtums pas |* ^{c)} *'khor ba'i rgyun gyis khyer ba |* ^{b)} *thog ma dang tha ma med pa'i 'khor ba'i 'gro bar 'chi ba dang |* *skye ba dag tu 'khor ba ni* ^{d)} *sems can gyi kham zhes brjod do ||*

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a24–26:

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無量煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始來隨順世間生死濤波, ^{c)} 去來生退, ^{d)} 名為‘衆生’。

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 469c17–19:

a) 阿難, 是如來界無量無邊諸煩惱蔽之所隱蔽。 ^{b)} 隨生死流漂沒六道無始輪轉。 ^{c)} 我說名‘衆生界’。

Jingang xian lun 金剛仙論. T. 1512 (XXV) 805c18–20:

惑覆法身全不淨者, 名為‘衆生’。修行斷惑半淨半不淨, 名為‘菩薩’。十地行滿斷惑障盡具足清淨者, 名之為‘佛’。³

³ Ōtake (2003–2004: I.87n14–15).

Jingang xian lun 金剛仙論. T. 1512 (XXV) 851b4–9:

又如不增不減經中明。就佛性法身體上有衆生、菩薩、佛。故知凡聖雖殊，而同依佛性。若同一法界，所以有斯四法差別者，明未修行不斷惑者，名為‘衆生’。修行之中分別斷惑者，或為‘菩薩’。全修行滿足除二惑永盡故，名為‘佛’也。既得圓報法身。⁴

Jingang xian lun 金剛仙論. T. 1512 (XXV) 861c14–15:

惑覆法身名為‘衆生’也。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a9–11:

^{a)} 舍利弗，即此法身為本際無邊煩惱藏所纏，^{b)} 從無始來，生死趣中生滅流轉，^{d)} 說名‘衆生界’。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c2–5:

^{a)} 舍利弗，即此法界過於恒沙無邊煩惱殼所纏裏，^{b)} 無始世來，常為生死波浪漂流，^{c)} 往來生滅恒處中流，^{d)} 說名‘衆生’。

Renwang huguo banruo boluomiduo jing shu 仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經疏，
Liangbi 良賁. T. 1709 (XXXIII) 460b13–14:

^{a)} 清淨法身為諸煩惱之所漂動，^{c)} 往來生死，^{d)} 名為‘衆生’。

Huayanjing tanxuan ji 華嚴經探玄記，Fazang 法藏. T. 1733 (XXXV) 227b1–2:

衆生界法界無二無別。即此法身以惑污故，流轉五道，名為‘衆生’。

Da fanguang fo huayan jing shu 大方廣佛華嚴經疏，Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1735 (XXXV) 606a22–23:

即此法身流轉五道，名曰‘衆生’。

Cp. *Da fanguang fo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao* 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔，Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1736 (XXXVI) 593b1–4:

今當更釋初法身流轉五道，名曰‘衆生’。即不增不減經。法身即是真如。流轉五道即是隨緣，名曰‘衆生’是差別義。

Amituo jing shu 阿彌陀經疏，[Kui]ji [窺]基. T. 1757 (XXXVII) 319b5–6:

此法身本性清淨，但為恒沙煩惱所纏，隨順世間，往來生死，即名‘衆生’。

Yōlban chōng'yo 涅槃宗要。Wōnhyo 元曉. T. 1769 (XXXVIII) 250b2–4:

^{a)} 即此法身煩惱纏，^{b)} 無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流，^{c)} 去來生死，^{d)} 名為‘衆生’。

⁴ This appears to be a paraphrase of §§14i–15i; see Ōtake (2003–2004: II.454).

Dafangguang yuanjue xiuduoluo liaoyi jing lieshu zhu 大方廣圓覺修多羅了義經略疏註, Zongmi 宗密. T. 1795 (XXXIX) 538a5–6 = 554a29:

法身流轉五道名曰‘衆生’。

Pömmanggyöng kojökki 梵網經古述記, T'aehyön 太賢. T. 1815 (XL) 689c19–21:

即此法身飄流生死名爲‘衆生’。即此法身修行諸度名爲‘菩薩’。即此法身住於彼岸名爲‘諸佛’。(≈ 14i–iii)

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lunshu bing xu 大乘法界無差別論疏并序, Fazang 法藏. T. 1838 (XLIV) 62c26–28:

^{a)} 即是法身爲本際, 無邊煩惱藏所纏, ^{b)} 從無始來生死趣中, 生滅流轉, ^{d)} 說名‘衆生界’等。

Qi xin lun shu bixiao ji 起信論疏筆削記, Zixuan 子璿. T. 1848 (XLIV) 343c6–8:

^{a)} 即此法身爲過於恒河沙無邊煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流, ^{c)} 往來生死, ^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。

Dashengyi zhang 大乘義章, Huiyuan 慧遠. T. 1851 (XLIV) 486b21–22:

法身輪轉五道。名曰‘衆生’。

Dashengyi zhang 大乘義章, Huiyuan 慧遠. T. 1851 (XLIV) 530a29 = 551a17–18:

即此法界。輪轉五道。名曰‘衆生’。

Zhaolun xinshu 肇論新疏, Wencai 文才. T. 1860 (XLV) 203c4:

法身流轉五道云云。

Huayan youxin fajie ji 華嚴遊心法界記, Fazang 法藏. T. 1877 (XLV) 649a2–3:

法界身流轉五道, 名曰‘衆生’等。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 518c6–8:

^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無量煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始來隨順世間生死濤波, ^{c)} 去來生滅, ^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。

Huayan yanyi chao zuanshi 華嚴演義鈔纂釋, Tan'ei 湛叡. T. 2205 (LVII) 252c20–22:

^{a)} 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流, ^{c)} 性[>往]來生死, ^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。

Jōyuishikiron honmonshō 成唯識論本文抄, unknown author. T. 2262 (LXV)
787b11–12:

是法身飄何性生大名‘衆生’。即此法身修行 諸度云‘菩薩’。即此法身住
彼岸云‘佛’之。

Shakumakenron kanchū 釋摩訶衍論勘注, Raihō 賴寶. T. 2290 (LXIX)
793c20–22:

即此法身流轉五道, 名爲‘衆生’。即此法身修行六度, 名爲‘菩薩’。即此
法身到於彼岸, 名爲‘如來’。法性法身即是眞如異名。

Hashhiki gishō kenjūshō 八識義章研習抄, Chinkai 珍海. T. 2305 (LXX)
658c11–13:

^{a)} 即是法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始世來隨順世間波浪漂流, ^{c)} 往
來生死, ^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。

Kegon gokyōshō shiji 華嚴五教章指事, Jurei 壽靈. T. 2337 (LXXII) 231b27–
29:

^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始世來隨順世間波浪
漂流, ^{c)} 往來生死, ^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。

Kegon gokyōshō fushin 華嚴五教章不審, Jitsuei 實英. T. 2343 (LXXIII)
222c11:

即此法身流轉五道, 名爲‘衆生’等。

Kegon gokyōshō fushin 華嚴五教章不審, Jitsuei 實英. T. 2343 (LXXIII)
223a2–4:

^{a)} 此法身本性清淨。若爲恒沙煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 隨順世間, ^{c)} 往來生死, ^{d)} 即名
衆生。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344
(LXXIII) 507b9–10:

^{a)} 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱藏所纏, ^{b)} 從無始來, 生死趣中, ^{c)} 往來生死,
^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。乃至即此法身。離一切使纏, 名爲‘如來’等。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344
(LXXIII) 511b9–10:

衆生界無二無別。即此法身。以惑污故。流轉五道。名爲‘衆生’。

Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 叡尊. T.
2356 (LIV) 80a10–12:

^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身過於恒沙無邊煩惱所纏, ^{b)} 從無始世來隨順世間波浪
漂流, ^{c)} 往來生死, ^{d)} 名爲‘衆生’。

Shingonshū kyōjigi 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c3–4:

即此法身流轉五道名爲衆生。

Ōjōjūin 往生拾因, Eikan 永觀. T. 2683 (LXXXIV) 99a27–28:

即此法身輪轉五道名曰衆生。

14ii

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 厭離世間生死苦惱, c) 棄捨一切諸有欲求, d) 行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 修菩提行, g) 名爲‘菩薩’。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 40.18–41.1 [Nakamura 1961: 79.10–13]):

a) *sa eva śāriputra dharmakāyaḥ* b) *saṃsārasrotoduḥkhanirviṇṇo* c) *virak-
taḥ sarvakāmaṇiṣayebhyo* d) *daśapāramitāntargatais* e) *caturaśītyā
dharmaskandhasahasrair* f) *bodhāya caryām caran* g) *bodhisattva ity
ucyate* |

Nakamura 1967: 79.8–11; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 96b1–2:

a) *shā ri'i bu chos kyi sku de nyid* b) *'khor ba'i rgyun gya sdug bsngal
las skyo bar gyur pa* | c) *'dod pa'i yul thams cad la chags pa dang bral
ba* d) *rol tu phyin pa bcu'i khongs su gtogs pa* | e) *chos kyi phung po
brgyad khri bzhi stong gi* f) *byang chub kyi don du spyad pa spyod pa
ni* g) *byang chub sems dpa' zhes brjod do* ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a26–28:

a) 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 厭離世間生死苦惱, c) 捨一切欲, d) 行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 修菩提行, g) 名爲‘菩薩’。

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 469c19–21:

阿難, 是衆生界於生死苦。而起厭離除六塵欲。依八萬四千法門, 十波羅蜜所攝, 修菩提道。我說名‘菩薩’。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a11–14:

a) 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, b) 厭離生死漂流之苦, c) 捨於一切諸欲境界, d) 於十波羅蜜及 e) 八萬四千法門中, f) 爲求菩提而修諸行, g) 說名‘菩薩’。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c5–7:

a) 舍利弗, 即此法界無邊, b) 厭離生死, 不住涅槃, c) 一切欲界中住, d) 行十波羅蜜, e) 攝八萬四千法門, f) 行菩提行時, g) 名爲‘菩薩’。

Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集, Eison 叡尊. T. 2356 (LIV) 80a12–15:

^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身, ^{b)} 厭離世間生死苦惱, ^{c)} 棄捨一切諸有, ^{d)} 欲求行十波羅蜜, ^{e)} 攝八萬四千法門, ^{f)} 修菩提行, ^{g)} 名爲‘菩薩’。

Shingonshū kyōjigi 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c4–5:
即此法身, 修行六度, 名爲‘菩薩’。

15i

^{a)} 復次, 舍利弗, 即此法身, 離一切世間煩惱使纏, ^{b)} 過一切苦, ^{c)} 離一切煩惱垢, ^{d)} 得淨, 得清淨, ^{e)} 住於彼岸清淨法中, ^{f)} 到一切衆生所願之地, ^{g)} 於一切境界中究竟通達, 更無勝者, ^{h)} 離一切障, 離一切礙, 於一切法中得自在力, ⁱ⁾ 名爲‘如來應正遍知’。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 41.1–5 [Nakamura 1961: 79.14–20]):

^{a)} *sa eva punaḥ sārīputra dharmakāyaḥ sarvakleśakośaparimuktaḥ* ^{b)} *sarvaduḥkhātīkrāntaḥ* ^{c)} *sarvopakleśamalāpagataḥ* ^{d)} *śuddho viśuddhaḥ* ^{e)} *paramapariśuddhadharmatāyāṁ sthitaḥ* ^{f)} *sarvasattvālokanīyāṁ bhūmim ārūḍhaḥ* ^{g)} *sarvayāṁ jñeyabhūmāv ’dvitīyāṁ pauraṣaṁ sthāmaprāptaḥ* | ^{h)} *anāvaraṇadharmāpratihatasarvadharmaiśvaryaabalatām adhigatas* ⁱ⁾ *tathāgato ’rhan samyaksaṁbuddha ity ucyate* |

Nakamura 1967: 79.11–15; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 96b2–4:

^{a)} *shā ri’i bu chos kyi sku de nyid nyon mongs pa’i sbubs thams cad las yongs su grol ba* | ^{b)} *sdug bsngal ba thams cad las ’das pa* | ^{c)} *nye ba’i nyon mongs pa’i dri ma mtha’ dag dang bral ba* ^{d)} *dag pa rnam par dag pa* ^{e)} *mchog tu yongs su dag pa’i chos nyid la gnas pa* | ^{f)} *sems can thams cad kyi blta bar bya ba’i sa la bzhugs pa* | ^{g)} *shes bya’i sa thams cad la gnyis su med pa’i skyes bu’i mthu thob pa* | ^{h)} *sgrib pa med pa’i chos can chos thams cad kyi dbang phyug gi stobs thogs pa med pa thob pa ni* | ⁱ⁾ *de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas zhes brjod do* ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 832a29–b4:

^{a)} 舍利弗, 即此法身, 得離一切煩惱使纏, ^{b)} 過一切苦, ^{c)} 離一切煩惱垢, ^{d)} 得淨, 得清淨, ^{e)} 得住彼岸清淨法中, ^{f)} 到一切衆生所觀之地, ^{g)} 於一切境

界中，更無勝者，^{b)} 離一切障離一切礙，於一切法中得自在力，ⁱ⁾ 名為‘如來應正遍知’故。

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 469c21–26:

^{a)} 阿難，是衆生界已得出離諸煩惱礙。^{b-c)} 過一切苦洗除垢穢。^{d)} 究竟淡然清淨澄潔。爲諸衆生之所願見。微妙上地一切智地一切無礙。^{b)} 入此中住至無比能已得法王大自在力。ⁱ⁾ 我說名‘多陀阿伽度阿羅訶三藐三佛陀’。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a14–19:

^{a)} 復次，舍利弗，即此法身，解脫一切煩惱藏，^{b)} 遠離一切苦，^{c)} 永除一切煩惱隨煩惱垢，^{d)} 清淨，極清淨，^{e)} 最極清淨住於法性，^{f)} 至一切衆生所觀察地，^{g)} 盡一切所知之地，昇無二丈夫處，^{h)} 得無障礙無所著一切法自在力，ⁱ⁾ 說名‘如來應正等覺’。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c7–12:

^{a)} 舍利弗，即此法界一切俱脫煩惱解脫，^{b)} 度一切苦，^{c)} 遠離一切煩惱隨眠纏垢，^{d)} 證得清淨，^{e)} 最極清淨法性中住，^{f)} 一切衆生之所瞻仰，^{g)} 住一切爾焰地，得大勢力，^{h)} 無障無著於一切法得自在力，ⁱ⁾ 說名‘如來應正等覺’。

Yōlban chong'yo 涅槃宗要，Wōnhyo 元曉 T. 1769 (XXXVIII) 250b4–5:

^{c)} 離一切垢，^{e)} 住於彼岸，^{h)} 於一切法得自在力，ⁱ⁾ 名為‘如來應正遍知’乃至廣說。

Bosatsukai honshū yōbu gyōmonshū 菩薩戒本宗要輔行文集，Eison 叡尊. T. 2356 (LIV) 80a15–20:

^{a)} 復次，舍利弗，即此法身，離一切世間頓惱使纏，^{b)} 過一切苦，^{c)} 離一切煩惱垢，^{d)} 得清淨，^{e)} 住於彼岸清淨法中，^{f)} 到一切衆生所願之地，^{g)} 於一切境界中究竟通達，更無勝者，^{h)} 離一切障，離一切礙，於一切法中得自在力，ⁱ⁾ 名為‘如來應正遍知’。

Shingonshū kyōjigi 眞言宗教時義，Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c5:

即此法身到於彼岸，名為‘如來’。

15ii

^{a)} 是故，舍利弗，不離衆生界有法身，不離法身有衆生界。^{b)} 衆生界即法身。^{c)} 法身即衆生界。^{d)} 舍利弗，此二法者，義一名異。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 41.15–17 [Nakamura 1961: 81.4–6]):

^{a)} *tasmāc chāriputra nānyaḥ sattvadhātur nānyo dharmakāyaḥ* | ^{b)} *sattvadhātur eva dharmakāyaḥ* | ^{c)} *dharmakāya eva sattvadhātuḥ* | ^{d)} *advayam etad arthena | vyañjanamātrabhedah* |

Nakamura 1967: 81.4–6; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 97a1–2:

^{a)} *shā ri'i bu de'i phyir na sems can gyi khams kyang gzhan la* | ^{b)} *chos kyi sku yang gzhan pa ni ma yin te* | ^{c)} *sems can gyi khams nyid chos kyi sku chos kyi sku nyid kyang sems can gyi khams te* | ^{d)} *'di ni don gyis gnyis su med de yi ge tsam dang tha dad par yin no* ||

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 832b17–20:

^{a)} 舍利弗，不離衆生界有法身，不離法身有衆生界。^{b)} 衆生界即法身。^{c)} 法身即衆生界。^{d)} 舍利弗，此二法者，義一名異故。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 893a19–21:

^{a)} 是故，舍利弗，衆生界不異法身，法身不異衆生界。^{b)} 衆生界即是法身。^{c)} 法身即是衆生界。^{d)} 此但名異，非義有別。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895c12–14:

^{a)} 是故，舍利弗，無別衆生界，無別法身。^{b)} 衆生界即法身。^{c)} 法身即衆生界。^{d)} 此無二義，文字差別。

Huayanjing tanxuan ji 華嚴經探玄記, Fazang 法藏 T. 1733 (XXXV) 413c3–4:

^{b)} 衆生即法身。^{c)} 法身即衆生。^{d)} 衆生法身，義一名異。

Da fangguang fo huayan jing shu 大方廣佛華嚴經疏, Chengguan 澄觀. T. 1735 (XXXV) 606a23–24:

^{c)} 法身即衆生。^{b)} 衆生即法身。^{d)} 法身衆生，義一名異。

Dasheng qi xin lun yiji 大乘起信論義記, Fazang 法藏. T. 1846 (XLIV) 275a10–12:

^{c)} 法身即衆生。^{b)} 衆生即法身。^{d)} 法身與衆生，義一名異也。

Taesūng kisillon naeüi yakt'amgi 大乘起信論內義略探記, T'aehyön 太賢. T. 1849 (XLIV) 421a5–6:

^{c)} 法身即衆生。^{b)} 衆生即法身。^{d)} 法身與衆生，義一名異也。

Nengxian zhongbian huiji lun 能顯中邊慧日論, Huizhao 慧沼. T. 1863 (XLV) 418b6–9:

^{a)} 舍利弗，不離衆生界有法身，不離法身有衆生界。^{b)} 衆生界即法身。^{c)} 法身即衆生界。^{d)} 此二法者，義一名異。

Huayan yisheng chengfo miaoyi 華嚴一乘成佛妙義, Jian Dengzhi 見登之. T. 1890 (XLV) 779a2–3:

b) 衆生即法身。c) 法身即衆生。d) 衆生法身, 義一名異。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 509b15–16:

b) 衆生即法身。c) 法身即衆生。d) 衆生法身, 義一名異。

Jōyuishikiron honmonshō 成唯識論本文抄, unknown authorship. T. 2262 (LXV) 412b19–22:

寶性論引不增減經云。a) 舍利弗, 不離衆生界有法身。不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即法身。c) 法身即衆生界。d) 此二法者, 義一名異。

Kishinron shōshutsu 起信論抄出, Sonben 尊辯. T. 2283 (LXIX) 544b15–16:

b) 衆生即法身。c) 法身即衆生。d) 衆生法身, 義一名異。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 507b8–9:

衆生界不異法身, 法身不異衆生界。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡眞鈔, Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511b10–12:

c) 法身即衆生。b) 衆生即法身。d) 法身衆生, 義一名異。

Shingonshū kyōjigi 眞言宗教時義, Annen 安然. T. 2396 (LXXV) 375c5–6:

法性法身, 即是眞如異名。

Himitsu sanmaiya butsukaigi 祕密三昧耶佛戒儀, Kūkai 空海. T. 2463 (LXXXVIII) 6c4–6:

a) 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即是法身。c) 法身即是衆生界。

Shingatsurin hishaku 心月輪祕釋, Kakuban 覺鑊. T. 2520 (LXXIX) 41c12–14:

a) 不離衆生界有法身, 不離法身有衆生界。b) 衆生界即是法身。c) 法身即是衆生界。

Dasheng qi xin lun guangshi 大乘起信論廣釋, Tankuang 曇曠. T. 2814 (LXXXV) 1151a12–13:

c) 法身即衆生。衆生即法身。d) 法身衆生, 義一名異。

Huayan xuantanhui xuanji 華嚴懸談會玄記, Cangshan Purui 蒼山普瑞. X236 8.309c14235:

衆生法身衆生, 義一名異。

Hwaõm-gyõng Munüi Yogyõl Mundap 華嚴經文義要決問答, P'yowon 表員.
X237 8.435a9-10:

眾生即法身。法身即眾生。眾生法身, 義一名異。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記, Shihui
師會. X998, 338b18:

法身即是眾生。眾生即是法身。法身眾生, 義一名異。

16

^{a)} 復次, 舍利弗, 如我上說, 衆生界中亦三種法。^{b)} 皆真實如、不異、不差。^{c)} 何謂三法。^{d)} 一者, 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法;^{e)} 二者, 如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法;^{f)} 三者, 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法。

Kûmgang sammaegyõng non 金剛三昧經論, Wõnhyo 元曉 T. 1730 (XXXIV)
968a6-13:

^{a)} 衆生界中示三種法。^{b)} 皆真實如、不異、不差。^{c)} 何謂三法。^{d)} 一者, 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法。此法如實不虛妄。不離, 不脫智, 不思議法。無始本際來有此清淨相應法體。^{e)} 二者, 如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏不清淨法。此本際離脫不相應煩惱纏不清淨法。唯有如來菩提智之所能斷。^{f)} 三者, 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法。

17i

^{a)} 舍利弗, 當知如來藏本際相應體及清淨法者, 此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智慧清淨眞如法界, 不思議法。^{b)} 無始本際來有此清淨, 相應法體。

Shi moheyan lun 釋摩訶衍論. T. 1668 (XXXII) 608c14-17:

^{a)} 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法, 此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智、不思議法。^{b)} 無始本際來有此清淨, 相應法體故。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 871a1-3:

^{a)} 如來藏本際相應體及清淨法, 此法如實、不虛妄、不離、不脫智、不思議法。^{b)} 無始本際來有此清淨, 相應法體故。

17ii

^{a)} 舍利弗, 我依此清淨眞如法界, 爲衆生故說爲不可思議法自性清淨心。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1626 (XXXI) 892c19–21:

又如說。^{a)} 舍利弗，此清淨法性即是法界。我依此自性清淨心，說不思議法。

Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大乘法界無差別論. T. 1627 (XXXI) 895b19–22:

如經中說。^{a)} 舍利弗，此善法如實真如法界自性清淨心相應法體。我依此自性清淨心，為眾生故說為不可思議。

Shingatsurin hishaku 心月輪祕釋, Kakuban 覺鑊. T. 2520 (LXXIX) 41c14–16:

眾生界清淨。應知即法身。法身即涅槃。涅槃即如來。(?)

18i

^{a)} 舍利弗，當知如來藏本際不相應體及煩惱纏，不清淨法者，^{b)} 此本際來離脫，^{c)} 不相應，^{d)} 煩惱所纏，^{e)} 不清淨法。^{f)} 唯有如來菩提智之所能斷。

Shi moheyana lun 釋摩訶衍論. T. 1668 (XXXII) 608c23–26:

^{a)} 如來藏本際不相應體，及煩惱纏不清淨法，此本際離脫，不相應煩惱纏不清淨法。^{b)} 唯有如來菩提智之所能斷故。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 871a9–12:

^{a)} 如來藏本際不相應體，及煩惱纏不清淨法，此本際離脫，不相應煩惱纏不清淨法。^{b)} 唯有如來菩提智之所能斷故。

19i

^{a)} 舍利弗，當知如來藏未來際平等恒及有法者，即是一切諸法根本。^{b)} 備一切法，具一切法，^{c)} 於世法中不離、不脫真實一切法，^{d)} 住持一切法，攝一切法。

Shi moheyana lun 釋摩訶衍論. T. 1668 (XXXII) 609a2–4:

^{a)} 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法，則是一切諸法根本。^{b)} 備一切法，具一切法，^{c)} 於世法中不離、不脫故。

Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄, Yanshou 延壽. T. 2016 (XLVIII) 871a17–19:

^{a)} 如來藏未來際平等恒及有法，即是一切諸法根本。^{b)} 備一切法，具一切法，^{d)} 於世法中不離、不脫故。

19ii

- ^{a)} 舍利弗，我依此不生、不滅、常恆、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界，說名‘衆生’。^{b)} 所以者何。^{c)} 言‘衆生’者，即是不生、不滅、常恆、清涼、不變歸依、不可思議、清淨法界等異名。^{d)} 以是義故，我依彼法，說名‘衆生’。

Wuliangshou jing youpotishe yuansheng ji zhu 無量壽經優婆提舍願生偈註，
Tanluan 曇鸞.⁵ T. 1819 (XL) 831b23–24:

- ^{c)} 言‘衆生’者，即是不生、不滅義。

21i

- ^{a)} 舍利弗，若有比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見，^{b)} 諸佛如來非彼世尊，如是等人非我弟子。

RGV (Johnston 1950: 28.3 [Nakamura 1961: 53.15]):

- ^{b)} *nāham teṣāṃ śāstā na te mama śrāvakāḥ* |

Nakamura 1967: 53.9; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam, phi* 89a6–7:

- ^{b)} *nga ni de dag gi ston pa ma yin la | de dag kyang nga'i nyan thos ma yin no* ||

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 471a26–27:

阿難，是等衆生非佛弟子，佛非大師，非歸依處。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 828c12–14:

- ^{a)} 舍利弗，若有比丘、比丘尼、優婆塞、優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見。^{b)} 諸佛如來非彼世尊，如是等人非我弟子。

Yanggwōn muryangsu kyōng chong'yo 兩卷無量壽經宗要，Wōnhyo 元曉. T. 1747 (XXXVII) 129b26–28:

- ^{a)} 若有比丘乃至優婆夷，若起一見，若起二見。^{b)} 諸佛如來非彼世尊，如是等人非我弟子。

21ii

- ^{a)} 舍利弗，此人以起二見因緣故，從冥入冥，從闇入闇。^{b)} 我說是等名‘一闡提’。

⁵ See Tomotsu 1995.

RGV (Johnston 1950: 28.3–4 [Nakamura 1961: 53.15–17]):

^{a)} *tān ahaṃ śāriputra tamasas tamontaram andhakārān mahāndhakā-
ragāminas tamobhūyiṣṭhā iti vadāmi |*

Nakamura 1967: 53.9–10; Derge Tanjur Tōh. 4025, *sems tsam*, *phi* 89a7:

^{a)} *shā ri'i bu de dag ni mun pa bas kyang ches mun pa | mun pa nas
mun pa chen por 'gro ba mun pa chen po dang ldan paò zhes nga
smraò zhes gsungs paò ||*

Wushangyi jing 無上依經. T. 669 (XVI) 471a27–29:

如是人等已住愚盲。必墮嶮怖大闇之中。於曠野地更入黑穢棘刺稠林。
以生死縛作於後際，落闡提網，不能自出。

Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論. T. 1611 (XXXI) 828c14–17:

^{a)} 舍利弗，是人以起二見因緣。從闇入闇，從冥入冥。^{b)} 我說是等名‘一闡提’故。

Kegon gokyōshō kyōshinshō 華嚴五教章匡真鈔，Hōtan 鳳潭. T. 2344 (LXXIII) 511b12–13:

若有言眾生界法界有二有別者，我說彼人名‘一闡提’也。

Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang fuguji 華嚴一乘教義分齊章復古記，Shihui 師會. X998, 338b18:

眾生界法界無二無別。若言眾生法界有二有別者，我說彼人名‘一闡提’。

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Indices

Principally of Terminology Discussed in the Notes

Chinese

bijing kongji 畢竟空寂: 5ii(f)

chang 常: 13ii(a)

congmingruming 從冥入冥: 21ii(a)

dahuan 大患: 8i(a)

daxiejian 大邪見: 3ii(a)

duanjian 斷見: 5ii(d),

fajie 法界: 14i(a)

fashen 法身: 14i(a)

fofa 佛法: 4i(d)

fati 法體: 17i(b)

Heyujing 訶欲經: 4i(c)

huiming 慧命: 2(a)

jie 界: introduction, 10iii(b), 14iii(c)

jingjie 境界: 4ii(g), 14iii(c)

luowang 羅網: 5ii(b)

miejian 滅見: 5ii(e)

mingse ji chu 名色及觸: 12(a)

qingjing 清淨: p. 135ff.

shengmang wumu 生盲無目: 3ii(b)

shi 事: 6(h)

shijiandeng 世間燈: pp. 8–9; 12(a)

wanglaishengsi 往來生死: 14i(c)

wei 謂: 4i(b)

wenhui 聞慧: 5i(a)

wushishi 無始世: 14i(b)

wuyoushichu 無有是處: 7ii(c)

xin zixing qingjing 心自性清淨: p. 135ff.

yi 依: 5ii(a), 17ii(a)

yi 義: 11(a), 19ii(d)

yichanti 一闍提: 21ii(b)

yiming 異名: 19ii(c)

yuchi fanfu 愚癡凡夫: 4i(a)

zixing 自性: p. 136

zhenshiru 真實如: 16(b), 20(a)

zhongsheng 眾生: 14i(d)

zhongshengjie 眾生界: 3ii(a), 14i(d)

zhuyou 諸有: 14ii(c)

Indic

atyantopāśama: 5ii(f)

atyantavivikta: 5ii(f)

adhivacana: 10iii(b-d), 19ii(c)

adhikṛtya: 17ii(a)

adhyāropa: 4i(f)

anavarāgra: introduction, 14i(b)

antargata: 14ii(f)

andha: 3ii(b)

andhakāra: 21iii(a)

apavāda: 4i(f)

amuktajña: 11(a), p. 141ff.

avasādayati, Pāli *apasādeti*: 20(f)

āgantukakleśa: 18ii(a)

ācakṣuṣman: 3ii(b)

āyusmat: 2(a)

icchantika: p. 42; 5i(b), 21iii(b)

ucchedavāda: 5ii(d)

upakleśa: 15i(c)

kāṇāndha: 3ii(b)

kāmāpavākasūtra: 4i(c)

kośa: 16(e)

jātyandha: 3ii(b)

jāla: 5ii(b)

jñeyabhūmi: 4ii(g), 15i(g)

tamas: 21ii(a)

dīrgharātra: 3ii(c)

dharmakāya: 10iii(d), 14i(a)

dharmadhātu: 14i(a)

dhātu: 10iii(b)

nitya: 13ii(a)

nirodha: 5i(a), 5ii(e)

nītārtha: 4ii(a)

neyārtha: 4ii(a)

pauruṣa: 15i(g)

prakṛtipariśuddhacitta: p. 40; 15i(a), 17ii(a),
p. 135ff.

prabhāsvaracitta: 17ii(a), p. 135ff.

bālaprthagjana: 4i(a)

viparyāsa: 5iv(e)

viśuddhi: p. 135ff.

viśaya: 14ii(c)

śrutamāyī-prajñā: 5(i)

sattvadhātu: 3ii(a), 14i(d)

samāropa: 4i(f)

Sāramati: p. 149ff.

Sthiramati: p. 149ff.