

*Eurasian Maritime History Case Study:  
Northeast Asia Thirteenth Century*

**Mongol Invasions of Northeast Asia  
Korea and Japan**

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# Mongol Invasions of Northeast Asia

## Korea and Japan



### The Defeat of the Mongol Invasion Fleet<sup>1</sup>

#### *Kamikaze, the “Divine Wind”*


At the end of the second Mongol invasion of Japan in 1281, a great typhoon struck the Mongol fleet south of the island of Takashima in Kyushu, resulting in devastation of the fleet, forcing the return of fleet remnants to Korea.<sup>2</sup> Religious orders in Japan took credit for the Mongol defeat, saying that their prayers to the *kami*, Shinto gods, had been answered when the great wind, *kaze*, was sent by the *kami* to sink the Mongol fleet. Thus, the *kamikaze*<sup>3</sup> divine wind, saved Japan from the Mongols. Japanese samurai had organized a gritty defense against the Mongols during both the first and second invasion attempts, but the credit and consequent rewards following the conflict went more to religious orders than to samurai soldiers. Thus, the *kamikaze* lodged for centuries in the Japanese imagination as the primary cause of the Mongol defeat.

As the tide of war turned against the Japanese in the Pacific during World War II and the American forces under Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz pushed closer toward the Japanese home islands, the Japanese remembered how the “divine wind” had saved Japan from invasion during the thirteenth century. Between two and three thousand Japanese pilots volunteered to become the new “divine wind” to save Japan from invasion. Their *kamikaze* suicide missions sank or damaged 350 American ships, but this time, the *kamikaze* results were not enough to save Japan from occupation by outside forces. After the war, Admiral Nimitz said that pre-World War II war-gaming had prepared him for every Japanese move in the Pacific, including the complex island-hopping campaigns, with one exception. He had not anticipated the *kamikaze* suicide missions, just as the Mongols had been unprepared for the *kamikaze* typhoon.<sup>4</sup>

Because they were failures, the Mongol sea expeditions are less well remembered than Mongol subjugation of almost 5,000,000 square miles of the Eurasian continent during less than seventy years between 1211 and 1279 under four generations of Mongol Khans. During the thirteenth century, the Mongols established the largest contiguous empire in world history, sweeping from their homeland in central Asia into Europe to their west and to the Pacific littoral to their east, bringing much of the Eurasian super continent under their control. No land power was able to oppose them for long. Genghis Khan (Chinggis Khan) established the empire beginning with eastern campaigns against the Jin in north China, then western campaigns against central Asians and Persians. He passed away in 1227, buried in an unmarked grave in Mongolia per his own request. After Genghis Khan’s death, the Mongols were led by Genghis’s son Ogodei, who completed the subjugation of the Jin Dynasty north of the Yangzi River. The Jin had driven the

Chinese Song Dynasty south of the Yangzi a century earlier in 1127. This action split the former Song Dynasty into two approximately equal halves, with the Jurchen Jin Dynasty in the north and the Southern Song Dynasty in the south. The Mongols subjugated the Jin under Ogodei in 1234, but it took them another forty-five years to subdue the Southern Song Dynasty. In the intervening years, Ogodei consolidated Russia, Poland, and Hungary under Mongol control, but died in 1242 before taking Vienna. Genghis's grandson Mongke succeeded Ogodei. Mongke Khan's great achievement was overseeing the capture of Baghdad in 1258 before he died in 1259. He was replaced in 1260 by Kublai, another grandson of Genghis. Kublai became Great Khan in the East, and established Eurasian Pax Mongolica through maintaining security ties with the khanates to the west.<sup>5</sup>

## The Mongol Continental Vision Turns Maritime



**Map 1: The Mongol Empire by 1279**  
**Showing Attempted Mongol Conquests by Sea<sup>6</sup>**

After subjugating much of the Eurasian continent, the Mongols still had not satisfied their hegemonic plans, and took to the seas between 1274 and 1293 in a series of expeditions to Japan, Annam, Champa<sup>7</sup>, and Java in an effort to further their conquests. During these two decades, the Mongols attempted to expand their huge land empire to encompass the substantial eastern maritime perimeter referred to now as the China Seas. These included enormous amphibious operations. For instance, the attempted Mongol invasions of Japan in 1281, and of Annam in 1288, compete in scope and scale with the size of the World War II Normandy invasion of 1944. These invasions included massive amphibious sea crossings and landings involving 100,000 to 200,000 sailors and soldiers. These were serious expeditions in terms of resources, preparation, and commitment. However, the Normandy amphibious invasion succeeded, while the Mongol maritime invasions failed to achieve their objectives. **Why were the Mongols serially defeated at sea subsequent to their successive victories on land?** This leads to a second important question: **Under what conditions can a successful land power become a successful sea power, and does the Mongol failure at sea provide useful lessons to other land powers looking to take to the sea with the goal of expansion?** This case study will examine the Mongol expeditions at sea in a search of answers to these questions.

### ***Mongol Naval Successes Against the Southern Song***

The Southern Song Dynasty of China, the last large land area of East Asia outside the control of the Mongols, was a capable naval power which used the rivers and their valleys in the west as shields and moats protected by substantial riverine naval patrols. The Song navy controlled the southeast coast of China from the Yangzi River to Guangdong as well. Upon becoming Khan,

Kublai turned his attention to subjugating the Southern Song, a process that took well over a decade. Although riverine and sea battles against the Song lasted from 1267 to 1279, Kublai declared in 1271 the start of the Mongol Dynasty, which is usually referred to as the Yuan Dynasty in Chinese history. Kublai ruled as emperor of the Yuan Dynasty from 1271 until his death in 1294, although the remnants of the Song were not defeated conclusively until the sea battle of Yamen in 1279.<sup>8</sup> The Southern Song Dynasty, both a seafaring and riverine naval power<sup>9</sup>, taught the Mongols much about battle using ships on the water, a far different type of warfare from using horses on the land, techniques in which they had shown themselves to be preeminent. The Mongols had greater ambitions to control maritime domains in Northeast Asia including Japan, and in Southeast Asia including Annam, Champa, and Java. Although the Mongols created a navy, they were unsuccessful in these maritime endeavors. Notwithstanding these failures, it is worth exploring the Mongols' riverine and coastal naval operations and the role they played in their triumph over the Southern Song Dynasty. By adapting to a new type of war on the water with perseverance, allocation of resources, and technological innovation, the Mongols succeeded in defeating the Southern Song with naval power, thus giving the Mongols the confidence to attempt more ambitious maritime operations.

As the Mongols pushed east toward China where the Southern Song had established naval competence, they began deploying ships on the rivers of western China, instead of using their familiar and preferred horses. The Mongols succeeded in overthrowing the Southern Song in riverine battles near Xiangyang in western China, and in sea battles off the coast of China near Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Quanzhou, and Yamen. The Mongols ultimately succeeded in all of these

naval battles, which enabled them to incorporate the great Southern Song Dynasty territory south of the Yangzi River into their far-flung Eurasian Empire.

The Han River, the longest tributary of the mighty Yangzi River, flows through the region of the Han people who established China's great Han Dynasty a millennium before the Song Dynasty. It was in the Han River valley where the Mongols finally entered China, although it took them six years, from 1267 until 1273, to crack open the Song Dynasty Han River defenses.<sup>10</sup> Early in the campaign, the Mongol commander, Aju, saw a potential gap in Song defenses on the river. He determined that if he controlled Xiangyang and Fancheng, settlements across from each other on the Han River, the Mongols could drive further into the heart of China. The vaunted Mongol cavalry would play a lesser role here, where a river invasion scenario prevailed, than it could on the open plains. In order to be successful in battle on the Han River, the Mongols needed a navy, although for riverine rather than sea combat. Aju launched a siege with five hundred ships in September 1268. In response, the Song reinforced with three thousand junks farther up the Han River in August, 1269. A Mongol ambush captured one hundred ships in seven days. This victory encouraged them to continue building a navy, because they recognized their fighting ability on the water was inferior to that of the Song Navy. The Mongol field forces requested priority to building warships. Kublai Khan responded by authorizing the construction of five thousand ships. The Song tried to sail up the Han River, but were repulsed by smaller, faster Mongol boats which forced the larger, slower Song boats into the shallows. The Song then built shallower boats and relieved the siege of Xiangyang in June 1272.



The Song fleet attempted to fight their way out of the city three months later in their faster paddle boats, but Mongols broke cover of darkness with fire beacons 'bright as day.' The Mongols pinned down the Chinese ships along fifteen miles of the river. The exhausted Song soon succumbed to Mongol forces who had continued their ship building production. In a major technological innovation developed in the Battle of Baghdad in 1258, the Mongols mounted counterweight trebuchet catapults onto their ships. The catapults hurled stones weighing up to 170 pounds. With this new weaponry, the Mongols forced the capitulation of Fancheng in January, 1273, and of Xiangyang in March, 1273. Access upon the Han River was now secure for the Mongols, marking the beginning of the end for the Southern Song Dynasty. During these riverine encounters, the Mongols developed an appreciation for the value of naval technology, including hull configuration optimization, oar and sail versus paddle propulsion techniques, and added their own twist to naval weaponry by introducing floating catapults. They would continue to learn more about and adapt ship technology as they moved from the rivers to coastal naval expeditions.

In 1277, Fuzhou on the Fujian coast fell to the Mongols. The exiled Song royal family fled to Quanzhou, the great Fujian seaport which Marco Polo subsequently visited. Muslim merchants refused to lend boats to the Song, who stole them anyway and fled. Nevertheless, many of the Song imperial clan were slaughtered. Quanzhou surrendered to the Yuan Mongols, strengthening Mongol naval power through acquisition of the abandoned ships and port. Song Commander Zhang Shijie, who fled Quanzhou with the Song Child Emperor, led the last stand of the Song at Yamen, a harbor on the coast about one day's sail from Guangzhou in Guangdong Province south of Fujian.

Zhang Shijie ordered about one thousand warships to be chained together in the bay in order to form a long, connected line to prevent ships from fleeing. He placed Emperor Huaizong's boat in the middle of the line in order to protect the child emperor, and coated the ships with fire resistant mud. The Mongol fleet blockaded the bay, and the Song fleet soon ran out of supplies, including drinking water. Many of the Song sailors and soldiers became ill by drinking seawater. The Mongol commander, Zhang Hongfan, captured the Song commander's nephew and asked for surrender, but without result.

During the subsequent Mongol assault, the Mongol commander did not allow the use of cannons, because he did not want to break the chains tying the Song ships together so that the ships could run free. Initially, the Song repulsed the Mongol attack. The siege-weakened Song lowered their guard when the Mongols held a banquet on their ships with distracting music. Although the Song were prepared for a small skirmish, the Mongols attacked in force, raining arrows on the Song ships. The weakened Song troops were no match for the Mongols in close combat. During the chaos, the Song commander tried to escape with a dozen ships to save the Child Emperor. A Song minister dove to save the boy who had gone overboard, but they both drowned. Records say that hundreds of thousands of corpses floated to the surface after the battle, including that of the Song Child Emperor. The body was reportedly found in Shekou near Shenzhen, although the grave site of the emperor has never been found.

At Yamen<sup>11</sup> the Mongol forces won a great victory, the announcement of which is carved on a rock above the harbor channel entrance. Most of the sailors, including the Mongol commander, were Han Chinese from north China, with a few ethnic Mongols among them.

Chinese historian Lo Jung-pang points out that in retrospect, the Yuan navy was essentially a Song navy, an ironic assessment of how the Mongols, a horse mounted cavalry by inclination, came to defeat the maritime power of the Song in a final consolidation of their Eurasian land empire.

## **Korea's Historic Place in Asian Geopolitics**

For many centuries, Korea has occupied contested geopolitical space between its more powerful neighbors China and Japan. During the fourth through seventh centuries, the Korean peninsula was divided into three kingdoms that allied at different times with either China or Japan, and sometimes with each other in a two against one alliance structure. Even during this early period, there was division and competition on the peninsula, as well as outside great power involvement. These same issues haunt Korea today. Variants of this pattern took place not only during the thirteenth century Mongol period, the subject of this case study, but also during the 1590s Imjin War invasions of Korea by the Japanese, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Sino-Japanese War of 1931-1945, the Korean War of 1951-1953, and the Cold War and post-Cold War aftermath. This history is about the changing map of Korea over centuries. While the map has changed, patterns have repeated as divisions on the peninsula have been marked by invasion routes of great powers, often with tragic consequences for Koreans.

### ***Ancient pattern: The Korean Three Kingdoms Period***

Between about 50BCE and 668CE, three kingdoms called Goguryeo, Baekche, and Silla, and a smaller state in the region of present-day Busan, Gaya (Mimana in Japanese), governed the Korean peninsula.<sup>12</sup> The relationship between these political entities was dynamic and complex.

Mimana and Baekche usually were allied to Japan through tributary relations, and Silla tended to be allied with China. Goguryeo preferred to be independent when possible, but it often entered into alliances for strategic reasons. This was typical of a general pattern in which alliance dynamics changed to accommodate present circumstances convenient to the parties. Korea's Three Kingdoms period and its aftermath includes configurations and reconfigurations of political entities on the peninsula for many centuries, as well as invasions of the peninsula as a corridor between the greater powers of China and Japan.

In the early 6<sup>th</sup> century, the Korean peninsula looked something like this:



**Map 2: Three Kingdoms Korea, c. 50BCE-668CE**  
**Route of Japanese toward the Battle of Baek River, 663<sup>13</sup>**

In 562, Silla annexed Mimana, thereby pushing Japan off of the peninsula. Japan sought to repossess this territory from Silla, in spite of the latter's strong relations with China. In terms of

balance of power relations, for the next one hundred years, China cultivated relations with Silla, while Japan cultivated relations with Baekche and Goguryeo, under the principle that “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” For instance, Sui Emperor Yang invaded Goguryeo in 612, using ships built along Yangzi. He defeated the Goguryeo fleet, but not its land forces. The competition increased after the establishment of the Tang Dynasty in China in 618. Japan armed Goguryeo and Baekche, then all three collaborated to invade Silla in 642. China’s relations with Goguryeo and Baekche deteriorated when their navies interfered with China’s-Silla trade. China entered the conflict, deploying 400 warships built in Jiangxi in 644 by Chinese Emperor Tang Taizong. Taizong’s strategy was to attack Liaodong to draw out Goguryeo, then surprise Goguryeo with a strike by sea at the Goguryeo capital Pyongyang. When the Chinese naval force arrived, Goguryeo did not send all of its troops to Liaodong, across the Yalu River border with China. Winter bogged down the Chinese army, and they were forced to retreat in this first invasion attempt.<sup>14</sup>

A second invasion was planned for the following year, with the construction burden on Jiang-nan, the ship-building area south of the Yangzi River. Again, preparations went too late in the season and winter prevented a successful invasion. In 648, China planned a third invasion. However, when Emperor Taizong died, the invasion was cancelled. Tang Taizong never fully defeated Goguryeo, but occupied parts of it, saving Silla from attack by Goguryeo for over a decade. In 660, the new Tang emperor, Tang Gaozong, developed an alternate strategy to attacking Goguryeo, deciding to strike Baekche instead. Silla would strike Baekche by land, while China would strike it by sea, thereby gripping Baekche in a vice from both sides. Baekche fell quickly, prompting the Chinese navy to put Pyongyang (in Goguryeo) under siege. The Chinese navy lifted

the siege in winter, by now, a familiar constraint on Chinese operations on the Korean peninsula. In 663, China was back on the Korean peninsula, and succeeded in subduing the recalcitrant Baekche. In October, 663, the Chinese navy defeated the Japanese fleet decisively at Kibol Island in the Baek River. Almost one thousand years passed between Japan's Battle of Baek River defeat in 663 and Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea in 1592. This defeat of early Yamato Japan is considered to be the greatest military defeat of Japan during that millennium. The victory at the mouth of the Baek River is thought to be the "apogee of Tang (China) naval activities."<sup>15</sup>

In 668, after a five-year war, China and Silla defeated Goguryeo as well, leading to the capture of Pyongyang. The Chinese administered eastern Korea as a province for the subsequent period. The Later or Unified Silla Dynasty became the ascendant kingdom on the Korean peninsula from 668 to 935, occupying much of the same territory that South Korea does today. When the Mongols arrived on the Korean peninsula in the thirteenth century, Korea again became the subject of great power intrusion. This time the intrusion was by the Mongols, a power from central Asia that subjugated China and then attempted to subjugate Japan, coercing Korea to assist in this effort.

### ***Mongol Subjugation of Korea***


The Mongols under Ogedei invaded Korea in 1231 before the Jin Dynasty was finally subdued in 1234, three decades before the Mongols entered Song territory at Xiangyang. However, the Mongols were unable to overthrow the Korean king because he took refuge with his court on Ganghwa Island in the estuary of the Korean Han River as it exits to the Yellow Sea west of Seoul. The Mongols had such little sea power capability at the time that they could not cross the one

kilometer of water to the island. Despite fierce infighting between pro- and anti-Mongol factions, the Koreans resisted the Mongols until 1270, when the royal family invited the Mongols to overthrow the hardline anti-Mongol faction. Goryeo, the Korean kingdom at the time, had its palace site in exile on Gangwha Island between 1232 and 1270, a site which still exists. When the Goryeo king partnered with the Mongols, the Korean rebels fled to Jeju Island. In 1273, the Mongols allied with the Koreans through the marriage of the Korean crown prince to Khan's daughter. The rebels on Jeju Island ended their resistance, and the island subsequently became a pasture for Mongol horses. Unfortunately for the Koreans, within a year the Mongols had humiliated the Korean king by commandeering ships and sailors for an expedition to Japan to push their ambitions forward, even though they had just broken into Song territory with their 1273 victory at Xiangyang. They would learn a lot from the Song navy during the next few years, but also would learn from the Korean navy as they crossed the Strait of Tsushima during their first invasion of Japan during 1274.

## **Mongol Invasions of Japan**

Although it had taken forty years for the Mongols to subjugate Korea between 1230 and 1270, Kublai Khan wasted no time in pushing Mongol influence beyond the East Asian littoral to include the Japanese islands. Already in 1266, Kublai had composed a letter to the Kamakura *bakufu* feudal government sent through Dazaifu in Kyushu. The letter arrived in 1268, and received a mixed response. On the one hand, the letter spoke of friendly relations without resort to arms. On the other hand, it referred to Kublai as the “master of the universe,” and equated Japan to Goryeo/Korea whose people were described as subjects. The Japanese took a prudent course and

instructed Kyushu lords to prepare to defend against a Mongol incursion. Receiving no reply, Kublai ordered some ships to be built, yet continued to send unanswered letters.<sup>16</sup>



Map 3: Mongol Invasions of Japan, 1274 and 1281<sup>17</sup>

### ***First Mongol Invasion of Japan, 1274***

The first Mongol invasion of Kyushu, the southern main island of Japan, was unsuccessful. In hindsight, the Mongols learned that the Japanese resistance was stronger than expected, perhaps because Mongol intelligence appeared to have been faulty about preparations that began after Kublai Khan's letters had been received. Daizaifu, the administrative capital of Kyushu, did not fall easily. Rather, the Mongols' ammunition and food supplies were exhausted just as they reached their primary engagement, leading to the failure of the siege of Hakata Bay. Aside from lack of planning for adequate supply, crossing the sea had its own perils, including weather, as well as the challenge of confronting a fierce enemy.




Without the benefit of these hindsight observations, the Mongols began shipbuilding specifically for the expedition in February, 1274. Since Mongol expertise was horse warfare, not naval warfare, they relied heavily on the experienced shipbuilding and sailing skills of the Koreans. The expeditionary force included 900 ships, 30,500 combatants, and 6,700 sailors and oarsmen. The Mongol expedition leaders included Hindu, Hong Dagu, and Liu Feng. The first expedition may have been intended as a Mongol reconnaissance mission, explaining its short duration, as it lasted about a month during November, 1274.

The Mongols originally scheduled their invasion to start in August, 1274, during the reliable southwest monsoon season. Unexpectedly, the Korean king died in July and the funeral was held in October, delaying the departure of the invading forces until after the funeral, when less favorable northeast monsoon winds prevailed. Thus, the expedition did not set sail from Korea's Masan Bay<sup>18</sup>, where the Mongols had a fort headquarters for their Eastern Army, until November 2. On November 4, the Mongol expedition forces arrived in Tsushima, the large island in the middle of the Korea Strait fifty miles away from the Korean peninsula. The Mongols overran the Japanese defensive forces, who were under the leadership of the So Clan, at Sasuura on the southwest side of Tsushima. On November 13, after another fifty-mile sail, the Mongols arrived at Iki Island where they also prevailed despite strong Japanese resistance. The combined Mongol and Korean fleet sailed on to Hakata Bay, present day Fukuoka, arriving on November 18.

The Mongol goal was to capture Dazaifu, located about fifteen kilometers inland and east of Hakata Bay. It only took a day for the Mongol forces to reach Dazaifu, but despite the Mongols' use of fearsome exploding artillery shells, the Japanese samurai forces at Mizuki Castle, an ancient

fortress near Dazaifu, strongly resisted and repelled them. Suffering from an exhausted supply of incendiary missiles, the Mongols withdrew to the beach at Hakata Bay, and while passing the Hakozaki Shrine, burned it down. They boarded their ships in the harbor that night. A raging gale with strong rain drove a number of the Mongol ships onto the shore. In the morning, the Japanese witnessed the Mongol fleet departing Hakata Bay and executed about two hundred Mongol stragglers. The Mongol fleet arrived back at Hapcho Bay in Korea about one week later.<sup>19</sup> An estimated one-third of the expeditionary party had been lost during the first invasion.

A larger expedition force would be needed for a second invasion, both in terms of personnel and supply. Meanwhile, the Mongols had not yet defeated the Southern Song dynasty. Defeating the Song would take priority, both to allow the Mongols to concentrate more force on Japan, but also to coopt the substantial Song sea power into the second invasion of Japan. While the Mongols focused on defeating the Song during these intervening years, the Japanese on Kyushu were also busy in anticipation of another Mongol invasion attempt. Beginning in 1276, they built approximately twenty kilometers of high stone walls along the beach at Hakata Bay. The walls were sheer stone, three to four meters high, and facing the bay, with graduated ramping behind so the samurai could ride their horses to the top, firing their arrows and slashing their *katana* down on the Mongols arriving on the beach from their ships. The value of these walls became apparent during the second Mongol invasion of Japan.



Map 4: Hakata Bay Battles, 1274 and 1281<sup>20</sup>

### *Second Mongol invasion of Japan, 1281*

Following the first Mongol invasion of Japan in 1274, Japan executed Mongol envoys sent by Kublai Khan to negotiate in 1275 and 1277, acts crying out for Mongol revenge. Following the final demise of the Song navy and the drowning of the Child Emperor on March 19, 1279, at Yashan, Kublai Khan decided to launch his second invasion of Japan, despite hearing advice to the contrary from some of his senior councilors.<sup>21</sup> He ordered 600 ships to be built in Quanzhou on the Fujian coast, and 900 ships to be built in Korea. In 1280, he ordered another 3,000 ships, and mobilized 100,000 men. This time he would send two divisions, a Southern Division from eastern China, and an Eastern division from Korea. The preparations dwarfed those of the first expedition, which had been about the same size of the second expedition Eastern Division alone. The Southern Division was to have 100,000 troops, 65,000 sailors, 3,500 ships, and supply of 500,000 piculs<sup>22</sup> of


rice. The Eastern Division was to have 15,000 Mongol, Han, and Korean troops, 17,000 Korean sailors, 900 ships, and 123,560 piculs of rice. Thus, the joint expedition would total over 200,000 men and 4,400 ships. Since the winds were not favorable for the Southern Division to sail to Happon in Korea to rendezvous with the Eastern Division, the two divisions planned to meet at Iki Island, a short distance from the northwest coast of Kyushu. As with the first invasion, the initial goal would be to take the Kyushu administrative center of Dazaifu, fifteen kilometers inland from Hakata Bay.

The Mongol Eastern Division sailed from Happon Bay on May 21, 1281, and was delayed on Koje Island off the Korean coast by a storm before arriving on Tsushima on June 8. As had happened during the first invasion, the Tsushima islanders under the So Clan resisted in bloody fighting, but were again overwhelmed. Japanese captives told the Mongols that the shores of Hakata Bay were undefended. Iki Island was captured a week later on June 13. Without waiting for the larger Southern Division that was due to arrive in July, the Eastern Division arrived in Hakata Bay on June 22. The Mongols fired *huopao*, incendiary bombs, at the shore for two days before landing. When the Mongols stormed the beaches from the ships, Japanese samurai standing on top of the walls forced the Mongols to remain on the narrow strip of beach between the shore and the walls. Japanese reinforcements were added as necessary from the inland regions of Kyushu. Having believed the misinformation that Hakata Bay was lightly defended, the Mongols were unprepared for the rigorous defense. Fierce, indecisive fighting took place for a week with no Mongol advances beyond the strip of beach along the bay. This time the Mongols did not make it to Dazaifu as they had during the first invasion. Mongol ships in the bay formed a ring to repel

smaller, more agile Japanese attack craft. By June 30, the Mongol Eastern Division was suffering from spoiled food and bad water as well as many losses in their unsuccessful fight for Hakata Bay. The division commanders decided to retreat to Iki Island to wait for the larger Southern Division.

The Southern Division fleet was delayed by the death of Mongol commander Alaqa. Under new leadership of Fan Wenhui and Ataqui, a segment of the fleet arrived at Iki on July 10, but the bulk of it arrived at Hirado beginning on June 16. Japanese attacks prevented the two parts of the fleet from meeting at Hirado and Iki, as fearsome *samurai* bands alternately boarded the Mongols' ships and were repulsed by incendiary bombs. After three weeks of inconclusive sea battles with intermittent delays, the Southern Division fleet left Hirado to sail for Takashima Island, while the Eastern Division fleet left Iki to rendezvous with them in Imari Bay south of Takashima. The intent of the combined fleet was to land along the shore of Imari Bay, which was unprotected by the high stone walls that had been built along the shores of Hakata Bay fifty kilometers to the east. As the fleets arrived in the bay south of Takashima beginning on August 16, the weather deteriorated. The wind and tides became ferocious as a great typhoon, the *kamikaze* divine wind, struck from the southwest, driving hundreds of ships against the southern shore of Takashima.<sup>23</sup> Other ships crashed together, the stronger Korean ships surviving better than the larger, less well-constructed Mongol ships built in Fujian province of southeast China. Estimates of loss of life from the storm ran as high as seventy to eighty percent. On August 20, Mongol commander Fan Wenhui sailed away with a small fleet, leaving at least 100,000 behind. Japanese mop-up operations were reported to have killed 20,000-30,000 shipwrecked stragglers, primarily Mongols, Koreans, and Jurchens from Manchuria. The Japanese forces reputedly spared former Song troops, as the Song previously

had good relations with Japan. Fan Wenhu was convicted at a Mongol court martial for abandoning the scene. From this time forward, the myth of invincibility of the Japanese islands began to grow in Japan, based on the intervention of the *kamikaze* divine wind.<sup>24</sup>



Map 5: Takashima Bay Battle, 1281<sup>25</sup>

In spite of the terrible losses during the second invasion attempt of Japan, Kublai Khan remained convinced until his death in 1294 that the Mongols could subjugate Japan. In fact, he even worried that the Japanese would invade the mainland if he did not finish the job of conquering Japan. He planned to invade Japan again during 1283, but delayed in order to concentrate on Southeast Asian invasion operations against Champa and Annam. The loss to Annam in 1285 prompted him to cancel invasion plans of Japan in August, 1286.

The Japanese defense was more effective than the Mongol offense, and the weather was a significant factor. Because the Mongols were more vulnerable to natural disaster, due to their extended amphibious operation, the typhoon winds affected them negatively much more than they did the Japanese. Aside from the devastation caused by the typhoon, the Mongols had several recurring military problems that inhibited their naval success. The subjugated Song boat builders may have constructed lower quality ships than required for the demanding Japan expeditions. The Japanese were fierce fighters, and built effective defensive walls, enabling them to repel the Mongol forces. In addition, they also improved their *katana* long swords so they could penetrate Mongol leather armor. On the Mongol side, they suffered from dissension within the ranks by combining their own non-seafaring Mongol horsemen with seafaring Chinese and Koreans. In addition, rushed shipbuilding contracts and graft likely contributed to poor construction of Mongol vessels and consequent defeat. Thus, despite sustained efforts for twenty years, Kublai Khan was unsuccessful at sea in northeast Asia against the Japanese.

### ***Mongol support for maritime commerce***

Motivation for the Mongol invasions of Japan appears to have been driven by a desire for wealth, especially gold and pearls. After the failed second invasion attempt, brisk trade continued between Japan and Mongol-occupied Korea, even as the Mongols contemplated a third invasion.<sup>26</sup> It is worth noting that two medieval travelers made important observations on Mongol connections with the sea, especially in relation to trade. Venetian Marco Polo served Kublai Khan during the course of his travels. Although he traveled overland through central Asia to China, he returned by sea, accompanying a Persian wedding party by ship from Quanzhou to the Persian

Gulf, then on to the Mediterranean. Moroccan Ibn Battuta served as a judge in Delhi before traveling on to China by sea, also spending time in Quanzhou about fifty years after Marco Polo. Both of them noted the vibrancy of trade with Quanzhou that was encouraged by the Mongols. The economy of Yuan China depended to a large extent on the Mongol support for trade-based sea power, even though its navy had been unsuccessful in bringing offshore entities under Mongol domination.

## **Reflections on the Mongol Maritime Experience**

The Mongols had ambitions to control maritime domains in Japan in northeast Asia, and in Annam, Champa, and Java in southeast. Although they created a navy, the Mongols were not successful in these maritime endeavors. Their fabled ability to conquer by land did not extend to the sea. Although the Mongols were the world's most successful land conqueror, they were unsuccessful in their attempts to conquer by sea, with the exception of defeating the remainder of the Song Dynasty at the Battle of Yashan. The Mongol navy declined after the death of Kublai Khan, and subsequently, the Mongols made no further maritime military expeditions to northeast or southeast Asia.<sup>27</sup>

The Mongol maritime experience demonstrates that great land powers do not inevitably become great sea powers. Despite being successful both on land and on sea against the Southern Song Dynasty, which resulted in the addition of the last big piece of continental territory to their vast Eurasian land empire, the Mongols were unable to extend their initial maritime victories over the Song to significant offshore territorial gain in northeast and southeast Asia. Why were the



Mongols' defeated at sea? The answer to this question is multi-dimensional, requiring consideration of all of the case study material on the Mongols at sea.

### ***Maritime Strategic and Tactical Lessons***

Useful lessons can be learned from a review of the case study material on why the Mongols failed to prevail against their opponents when they took to sea in northeast and southeast Asia. These lessons are presented below in nine areas and are meant to provide a base for further discussion to help answer the question of why the Mongols were not successful in their attempts to conquer maritime northeast Asia. They include local knowledge of natural phenomena, military technology advantages, continental versus maritime identities, deeply felt national identities, military leadership, relative power relations, alliance relations, relationship of maritime economic success to maritime military success, and importance of historical and current knowledge.

***Local knowledge of natural phenomena:*** Successful naval campaigns require local knowledge of tides, currents, winds, and weather, as well as coastal configurations, water depths, and obstruction locations. These phenomena are the maritime equivalents of terrain and weather, the importance of which Sun Tzu noted in his classic volume of military strategy translated as *The Art of War*.<sup>28</sup> Although the Mongols relied to a certain extent on the local knowledge of Korean sailors in their employ, they were not familiar with the typhoon season, nor with the appropriate caution that should be exercised in relation to it. Also, the shallowness of water in the Hakata and Imari Bays was a condition known to the Japanese, but not to the Mongols. The smaller, faster Japanese boats were better suited to moving easily in these shallow waters where there was little room for maneuver. The Mongols did not make a strategic decision to avoid the insurmountable

natural challenges presented by typhoons, nor did they have a tactical plan to find a 'hurricane hole' to attempt to ride out storms. The results were devastating, as the Mongols lost the bulk of their fleet to storm damage, and tens of thousands of their soldiers were set adrift to be slaughtered on the beaches by Japanese.

***Military technology advantages:*** Superior military technology can be decisive, both historically and today. The Mongols successfully used trebuchet catapults, a new naval technology, on the rivers of western China by placing them on their vessels, but were unable to use them in their overseas expeditions, as tossing sea conditions were unlike placid river conditions. They wrought havoc on the Japanese with their *huopao*, incendiary shells memorialized by Japanese in the Mongol Scrolls. The super strong and sharp Samurai *katana*, long swords, prompted improvements to Mongol leather armor to cope with the finest sword blades in the world. Once the Japanese built their defensive walls near Hakata Bay in 1275, developing ramps from the back side so they could ride their horses to the top of the walls and fight down against the Mongols, they were in superior defensive positions to repel the Mongols using both their swords and bows. The Mongols had no offensive technology to combat this successful defense, although they brought some horses by sea in an attempt to use their famed equine techniques, though they did not work well on the wall-lined beach. Mongol tactics of speed and mobility that had been successful across the plains of Eurasia did not couple well with amphibious operations. The Mongol forces were in over their heads, literally.

***Continental versus maritime identities:*** Great power continental and maritime pressures to expand have existed in East Asia for two millennia. Periodically, forces from China have pushed

toward the Japanese islands, and Japanese forces have pushed back toward the continent. During the late nineteenth century, American naval strategist A.T. Mahan identified six key elements of sea power: geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population, character of the people, and character of the government.<sup>29</sup> These six traits overall fit Japan better than China, even as they fit Britain as an island nation better than France or Germany as continental powers, albeit with coastlines. For a continental power, coopting established navies by conquest appears not be the best way to become a maritime power. In the Mongol case, they coopted the Song and Korean navies, but with limited results. At the very least, the Mongols attempted to do too much in the maritime realm, and too fast.

***Deeply felt national identities:*** Asian nationalisms are deeply felt and affect international relations in profound ways today. The same was true during the Mongol period. For example, Korean and Song national identity affiliations also were impediments to smooth Mongol operations. Even though the Mongols coopted Song and Korean forces to work in their invasion expeditions, Song loyalists tended to defect to the Cham or Annamese when they were able to exercise their preference, and many Koreans were happier to see the Mongols lose to the Japanese in their hope to throw off the Mongol yoke from Korea. Although the Mongols had been successful enough maintaining control among disparate nationalities on the continent, it proved more difficult to do so in the maritime environment where they suffered from less expertise.

***Military leadership:*** Capable and wise military leaders can make a critical difference in the success or failure of a military campaign, whether on land or at sea. On the Mongol side, Kublai Khan had surprising success against the Song, overthrowing its rule and establishing the Yuan

Dynasty in its place. He juggled campaigns concurrently in China, Korea and Japan, and Southeast Asia. Although he might have stretched the Mongol forces such that their maritime campaigns failed, he never gave up his dream of maritime dominance. Rather, his death resulted in the cancellation of further Mongol maritime expeditions in both northeast and southeast Asia. Without Kublai's leadership, the Mongols lost both the will and ability to pursue further conquest attempts at sea.

***Relative power relations:*** Preponderant power does not necessarily lead to military victory. Aside from shrewd strategic and tactical practice playing key roles, chance and luck always are factors in the outcome of war according to military theorist Carl von Clausewitz.<sup>30</sup> In the case of the overwhelming force that the Mongols brought to Japan in the two-pronged Southern and Eastern Naval Divisions, the death of a commander delayed the larger Southern force, an interruption that led to the demise of the fleet in a devastating typhoon. It is quite possible that the Mongols were overconfident about winning their battles in northeast and southeast Asia, based on their almost unbroken record of success on the continent. They may have confused preponderant power at sea with preponderant power on land, whereas the two are very different in terms of necessary experience, skills, and technology. Korean states on the peninsula did not have the preponderant power that China and Japan have had during their peak periods of power. As a result, the pattern of Korea's divisions and subservience has been clearly shown both during the Three Kingdoms and Mongols periods. This pattern has continued to the present day.

***Alliance relations:*** The Japanese had significant outposts on the islands of Tsushima and Iki with feudal lords loyal to Japan, but they had no external allies on which to rely. Having no

allies, but having internal unity of purpose mitigated Japan being on its own. On the other side the Mongols had allies, relying on Korean and Song ships and sailors. However, neither the Koreans nor the Song supported the Mongols out of free choice; rather, both served the Mongols because they had been forced into submission. Korean politics were divided between those who supported the royal Mongol/Korean marriage between one of Kublai Khan's daughters and King Chungnyeol of Goryeo, and those Koreans who wished to continue to oppose the Mongols. Thus, Korean sentiments about the Mongols ranged along a spectrum of compliance and resistance. Meanwhile, the Song who escaped south after their defeat at Yamen in 1279 were sympathetic to and supported the resistance of the Annamese and Cham to the Mongols. Those Song who were coopted by the Mongols to build a fleet and sail with the Mongols most likely also had divided sympathies.

***Relationship of maritime economic success to maritime military success:*** Mongol maritime trade flourished in Northeast and Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, even though Mongol maritime military success was limited to the China coast. The accounts by Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta about the market of Quanzhou, the greatest of the Mongol merchant ports, were glowing. In this regard, the Mongols were following both the tradition of free ocean trade that had existed for over a thousand years in the Indian Ocean and China Seas, as well as the tradition of their promotion of trade and business along the silk roads across the Mongol heartland. European trading in later centuries was more closely linked to naval power, including the trade and naval patterns of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English, successively. In this regard, the Mongols largely followed the standard peaceful, non-militarized pre-European pattern of Asian sea trade.

***Importance of historical and current knowledge:*** As Sun Tzu said, “Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.”<sup>31</sup> Sun Tzu was cautioning not only about knowing the history and psychology of one’s opponent for strategic advantage, but also knowing about current intelligence to gain tactical advantage. The Mongol record is thin in this regard, so few lessons can be drawn for the Mongol case study about the use of intelligence procedures, aside from the fact that the Mongols did not understand the devastating impact of storms at sea. Sun Tzu was a proponent of deception as well as intelligence collection. Misinformation given to the Mongols on Tsushima that Japanese forces in Hakata Bay were unprepared, led to the Mongols being unpleasantly surprised by unsurmountable walls and fierce defensive samurai troops on the Hakata Bay beaches.

### ***Limits on Mongol Expansion at Sea***

Most Westerners are aware of the highly significant amphibious invasion that took place in Normandy in 1944, known as Operation Overlord by the American, English, and Canadian troops involved. On D-Day, June 6, 1944, between 130,000 and 150,000 troops landed on the Normandy beaches after following various routes from the south coast of England to cross the approximate one-hundred-mile-wide English Channel. After securing the landing area, these initial Allied troops were followed by many more in the ensuing days and months, as Axis opponents were forced into retreat. The Normandy landing was successful, and led toward the successful Allied conclusion of World War Two.

Fewer Westerners are aware that a similar sized Mongol invasion of Kyushu of approximately 200,000 troops took place in 1281 across the one-hundred-mile-wide Korea Strait.

The Mongol amphibious landings in Japan were unsuccessful, leading back to the questions raised at the beginning of this case study: **Why were the Mongols serially defeated at sea subsequent to their successive victories on land? Under what conditions can a successful land power become a successful sea power, and does the Mongol failure at sea provide useful lessons to other land powers looking to take to the sea with the goal of expansion?**

Notwithstanding that the Mongols had no substantial rival and were able to deploy overwhelming military power with their horse-mounted cavalry, the Mongols suffered significant defeats at sea based on their lack of knowledge of ships, the sea, and seamanship. They sailed during typhoon season, and did not have safe harbors in mind if and when severe storms arose. In terms of amphibious landings in Kyushu, the horses they brought were of little use, especially during the second invasion when the Mongols were faced with tall defensive walls that the Japanese had built between the 1274 and 1281 invasions. The seas were too rough to deploy the catapults that they had used during their riverine entry to China. Thus, the Mongols were forced out of Hakata Bay to await the larger fleet reinforcement from the Southern Division. Communication between Mongol fleets was difficult and coordination was poor, with increasing danger from limited supplies and possible weather changes. Although the Japanese ships were smaller, they were mobile and allowed for successful asymmetrical naval operations in the shallow Hakata and Imari Bays against the larger Mongol ships built by the Koreans and the Song. The Japanese were on 'death ground' defending their native soil, adding a national fervor to the samurai skill set during the defense. The Japan case illustrates that weaker powers can stand up to preponderant power when they have home advantage with short supply lines and a united response. The Japanese lacked

external allies, while the Mongols had problematic allies, relying on Korean and Song ships and sailors, although neither the Koreans nor Song supported the Mongols out of free choice or conviction. Neighbors in northeast Asia accepted Mongol economic but not military motivations. The Mongols suffered from a lack of both historical and contemporary maritime intelligence, which led them into carelessness with the weather in Japan. All of these aspects limited Mongol expansion at sea.

Becoming a successful maritime power is a complex process that must address the many aspects where failure can take place. Building maritime power and capability differs from land power, and strength in one arena does not guarantee strength in the other. Patience is required to learn the ways of maritime power, which takes decades to understand and implement. Moreover, a successful land power must have significant sea frontage to become a sea power. The Mongols only brought the major portion of the Chinese coast under their control when they defeated the Song at sea in 1279. Yet they had already attempted to invade Japan in 1274. The Mongols clearly moved too quickly in thinking they could become a major Asian sea power while having so little experience of the sea and access to it. Thus, the Mongols provide a cautionary tale to land powers seeking to be sea powers. Sea power has distinct parameters that must be studied, respected, and developed systematically, with care, time, and patience. With the hubris of inexperience, the Mongols attempted too much at sea, too quickly.

Although the Mongol amphibious landings in Japan and Vietnam were unsuccessful, they have left a residue of historic consciousness about vulnerability to invasion. These episodes of northeast and southeast Asian maritime history are part of the fabric of Asian historic



consciousness. Although the Mongol maritime case may seem far away from European and American concerns, the saving of the Japanese islands by the “divine wind” is still commemorated in a song sung by Japanese adults and children alike.<sup>32</sup> In a southeast Asian echo of the Mongol invasion event, statues of Tran Hung Dao, the Vietnamese prince and military commander who repelled the thirteenth century Mongol invasions," are omnipresent in Vietnam.<sup>33</sup> Because these cases of Mongol maritime invasion in northeast and southeast Asia have such relevance in East Asia, they deserve to be studied and better understood globally.

## Text and Visual Source Evidence

Following is a text excerpt from an account by Marco Polo written while he was a resident in Mongol-controlled China, and a Japanese oral history song about the attempted Mongol invasions. The visual images include ancient museum artifacts and an excerpt from a Mongol scroll commissioned by a Japanese commander who participated in defending Japan against Mongol attack.<sup>34</sup>

### Texts

#### **T 1 Marco Polo on Kublai's Decision to Invade Japan with Storm Description**<sup>35</sup>

*Now that I have described the ships in which merchants' voyage to and from India, let us change the subject and pass on to India itself. But first I will tell you of many islands that lie towards the east in this Ocean at which we have now arrived. We shall begin with an island that is called Japan. Japan is an island far out at Sea to the Eastward, some 1,500 miles from the mainland. It is a very big island. The people are fair-complexioned, good-looking, and well-mannered. They are idolaters, wholly independent and exercising no authority over any nation but themselves.*

*They have gold in great abundance, because it is found there in measureless quantities. And I assure you that no one exports it from the island, because no trader, nor indeed anyone else, goes there from the mainland. That is how they come to possess so much of it - so much indeed that I can report to you in sober truth a veritable marvel concerning a certain palace of the ruler of the island. You may take it for a fact that he has a very large palace entirely roofed with fine gold. Just as we roof our houses or churches with lead so this palace is roofed with fine gold. And the value of it is almost beyond computation. Moreover, all the chambers, of which there are many, are likewise paved with fine gold to a depth of more than two fingers' breath. And the halls and the windows and every other part of the palace are likewise adorned with gold. All in all, I can tell you that the palace is of such incalculable richness that any attempt to estimate its value would pass the bounds of the marvelous.*

*They have pearls in abundance, red in color in color, very beautiful, large and round. They are worth as much as the white ones, and indeed more. In this island the dead or sometimes buried, sometimes cremated; but everyone who is buried has one of these pearls put in his mouth. Such is the custom that prevails among them. They also have many other precious stones in abundance. It is a very rich Island, so that no one could count its riches.*

*When tidings of its riches were brought to the Great Khan - that is the same Kublai who now reigns - he declared his resolve to conquer the island. Thereupon he sent two of his barons with a great fleet of ships carrying cavalry and infantry. One of these barons was named Abakan, the*

*other Vonsamchin. Both were men of ability and courage. Now mark what happened. They set sail from Zaiton and Kinsai and put out to sea and sailed to the island. They landed and occupied some open country and a number of villages, but they had not yet captured a single city or fortified town when the following disaster overtook them. You must understand that when there was great jealousy between the two commanders and neither would do anything to help the other. Now it happened one day that such a gale was blowing from the north that the troops declared that, if they did not get away, all their ships would be wrecked. So they all embarked and left the island and put out to sea. And let me tell you that, when they had sailed about four miles, the gale began to freshen and there was such a crowd of ships that many of them were smashed by colliding with one another. Those that were not jammed together with others but had enough sea room escaped shipwreck. Not far away was another island of no great size. Those that succeeded in clearing this island made good their escape. The others who failed to get clear were driven aground by the gale. When the violence of the storm had abated and the sea grew calmer, the two barons returned to the island with those ships - and there were a great many of them - that had escaped shipwreck by keeping to the open sea. There they picked up such of the survivors as were officers, that is, captains of hundreds and thousands and ten thousands. The others were so numerous that there was no room for them on board. Then the ships left the island and set sail for home.*

## **T 2 Japanese Traditional Song: The Mongol Invasion of Japan<sup>36</sup>**

Hundreds of the foe appear,  
Looms a peril to the nation  
In the fourth the Koan year.  
What should be our fear? Among us  
Kamakura men will go.  
Martial discipline and justice  
To the world with shout we'll show.

From the Tartar shores barbarians,  
What are they? The Mongol band,  
Fellows insolent and haughty,  
'Neath their heaven we will not stand.  
Onward now our arms were practised  
For our native country's sake,  
For our country now a trial  
Of thee Nippon swords we'll make.

To the waters of Tsukushi  
We advance through flood and wave;  
We with bodies stout and vigorous.  
If we fail, and find a grave,  
Dying, we become the guardian  
Gods of home, for which we fell,

To Hakozaki's God I swore it,  
And he knows the pure heart well.  
Heaven grew angry, and the ocean's  
Billows were in tempest tossed;  
They who came to work us evil,  
Thousands of the Mongol host.  
Sank and perished in the sea-weed,  
Of that horde survived but three.  
Swift the sky was clear, and moonbeams  
Shone upon the Ghenkai Sea

### ***Visual Sources***

#### **VS 1 Military Technology: Exploding Cannon Balls**



**Mongol bomb shells: earliest examples of explosive weapons from an archaeological site<sup>37</sup>**

## VS 2 Mongol ship anchor stone



Anchor stone from Mongol ship wooden anchor<sup>38</sup>

## Selected Reading for Further Study

Conlan, Thomas. *In Little Need of Divine Intervention: Takezaki Suenaga's Scrolls of the Mongol Invasions of Japan*. New York, Cornell East Asia Series, 2001.

Delgado, James P. *Khubilai Khan's Lost Fleet: in Search of a Legendary Armada*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008.

Lo Jung-pang. *China as a Sea Power 1127-1368: Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song & Yuan Periods*. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012.

Polo, Marco, trans. by Ronald Latham. *The Travels of Marco Polo*, New York: Penguin Books, 1958.

Turnbull, Stephen. *The Mongol Invasions of Japan 1274 and 1281*. Oxford: Osprey, 2010.

Yamada, Nakaba. *Ghenko: The Mongol Invasions of Japan*. First published in 1916. London: Leonaur Ltd, 2012.

## NOTES

1. This woodblock print of the “Defeat of the Mongol Invasion Fleet” was done by Utagawa Yoshitora who was active from about 1850 to 1880. Photo by Fuji Arts, <https://www.fujiarts.com/cgi-bin/item.pl?item=855595>, Ann Arbor, MI; print is in the author’s collection.
2. Typhoon is one of the few words in English borrowed from Chinese. In Chinese *tai feng* means ‘greatest wind’ or ‘supreme wind’.

3. *Kamikaze* (“divine wind”) may be pronounced either as *kamikaze* or *shinpu*. Both the wind that sank the Mongol fleet and the World War II suicide air corps are referred to as *kamikaze* in Japan, while the 1876 rebellion in Kumamoto designated by the same characters is referred to as *shinpu-ren*. *Shinpu* is closer to the Chinese pinyin pronunciation of these characters, *shen feng*.
4. Admiral Nimitz’s comment is documented in the U.S. Naval War College Museum. It is drawn from his 4,000-page operational diary of World War Two in the Pacific covering the period December 7, 1941 through August 31, 1945. Referred to as *The Nimitz Graybook*, this document was put online in 2014: <http://www.usnwc.edu/graybook>, after thirty years of remaining classified after the war.
5. Accounts containing more detail on Mongol continental expansion include Jack Weatherford, *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*, New York: Broadway Books, 2004; Paul Khan, *The Secret History of the Mongols: The Origins of Chingis Khan* (translation of a 13th century account), San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984; and Robert W. Strayer and Eric Nelson, *Ways of the World: A Brief Global History With Sources* (Fourth ed.), Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2019, 520-567.
6. All maps were drawn or adapted by Jamie Rhode. Map 1 is adapted from Mountain High base maps and Strayer and Nelson, *Ways of the World*, 530.
7. Annam and Champa are roughly the areas of current northern and central Vietnam respectively.
8. The year 1279, the year the Mongols defeated the Song at sea, is more often used for marking the start of the Yuan Dynasty, rather than 1271, the year Kublai Khan announced himself as emperor of the dynasty.
9. Song influence on Mongol sea power is discussed in detail by Lo Jung-pang, *China as a Sea Power 1127-1368: a Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song and Yuan Periods*, Singapore: NUS Press, 2012, 129-208.
10. Lo, *China as a Sea Power*, 212-217.
11. Lo, *China as a Sea Power*, 275-245.
12. For an account of the Korea’s three kingdoms period, and relations with the Japanese, see Nakaba Yamada, *Ghenko: The Mongol Invasions of Japan*, First published in 1916. London: Leonaur Ltd, 2012, 15-31.
13. Map 2 adapted from map in Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958, 407.
14. Lo, *China as a Sea Power*, 48-54.
15. Lo, *China as a Sea Power*, 54.
16. Ishii Susuma, “The Decline of the Kamakura Bakufu” in Kozo Yamamura, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan*, Cambridge, 1990, 131-135. A translation of Kublai’s letter to the Kamakura *bakufu* is included.
17. Map 3 adapted from maps in Stephen Turnbull, *The Mongol Invasions of Japan 1274 and 1281*, Oxford: Osprey, 2010, 34, 56.
18. Masan Bay is also sometimes called Happo Bay.
19. Lo, *China as a Sea Power*, 252-259
20. Map 4 adapted from map in Turnbull, *The Mongol Invasions of Japan*, 57.
21. Lo, *China as a Sea Power, The Mongol Invasions of Japan*, 260-279.

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22. A picul equals approximately 60 kilograms, as much as a man could carry on a pole. It is considerably more than the amount of rice a man might eat in one year, approximately 35 kilograms. Thus, the Mongols were prepared to advance with full provisions in hand, even if the Japanese engaged in a scorched earth policy preventing the Mongols from relying on Kyushu grown rice.
  23. The museum on the south shore of Takashima contains artifacts from the underwater archaeology that has taken place where the Mongols ships sank along the shore. An account of the role of maritime archaeology in understanding the results of the *kamikaze* is provided by maritime archaeologist James Delgado, *Kublai Khan's Lost Fleet: In Search of a Legendary Armada*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
  24. Current scholarship is divided over the role that the typhoon played in the Mongol failure to subjugate Japan. Certainly, it was a factor, but some feel that the Japanese might have successfully defended their home island even without the help of the typhoon. The Hakata Bay repulse of the Mongols is evidence to support this argument. For instance, Conlan argues this point of view in his analysis of the Mongol Scrolls drawn shortly after the Mongol invasion attempts, expressing his point of view in the title of his book, Thomas Conlan, *In No Need of Divine Intervention: Takezaki Suenaga's Scrolls of the Mongol Invasions of Japan*, New York: Cornell East Asia Series, 2001.
  25. Map 5 adapted from map in Turnbull, *The Mongol Invasions of Japan*, 68.
  26. Kawazoe Shoji, "Japan and East Asia" in Kozo Yamamura, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan*, Cambridge, 1990, 419-420.
  27. Lo, *China as a Sea Power*, 323-343.
  28. Sun Tzu, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith, *The Art of War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, 124-140.
  29. A.T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*, New York: Dover Publications, 1987, 25-89. (based on fifth edition, 1894, originally published 1890).
  30. Clausewitz, *On War*, 85.
  31. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 129.
  32. See translated lyrics of the song in the section Document: Texts T 2.5.
  33. See photo by author in the Documents Visual Resources.
  34. For a discussion of the relationship between how history *then* is remembered *now*, see Paul Cohen, *A Path Twice Traveled: My Journey as a Historian of China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019, 228-247.
  35. Marco Polo, *The Travels of Marco Polo*, 243-244.
  36. Nakaba Yamada, *Ghenko: The Mongol Invasions of Japan*, London, 1916, 11-12.
  37. Photograph of maritime archaeological findings by author at Takashima Historical Folk Museum, 2019.
  38. Photograph of anchor stone by author in Hakata, Fukuoka, 2019.