Leadership Power in Congress, 1890-2014
Evidence from PAC Contributions and Newspaper Coverage

Pamela Ban*
Harvard University

Daniel J. Moskowitz †
Harvard University

James M. Snyder, Jr.‡
Harvard University and NBER

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Abstract

Congressional scholars have long studied the relative power of parties and committees. Empirical evidence is limited on the relative power of party and committee leaders due to the difficulty of observing the power of legislators. To overcome difficulties in measuring elite power, we propose a creative solution: analyze the behavior of two astute observers of Congress, interest groups and newspapers. Since PACs are sophisticated donors who target contributions for access and influence, following the money allows us to measure relative power. From 1978-2014, we find a close relationship between party polarization and the share of PAC contributions to party leaders. Another measure of power, based on the share of newspaper coverage of party leaders, produces similar patterns from 1890-2014. Our results suggest a strong shift in power to party leaders as intra-party preferences converge and inter-party preferences diverge, consistent with the Conditional Party Government hypothesis.

*Ph.D. Candidate. Corresponding Author. pban@fas.harvard.edu.

†Ph.D. Candidate. danielmoskowitz@fas.harvard.edu.

‡Leroy B. Williams Professor of History and Political Science. jsnyder@gov.harvard.edu.

1 Introduction

One key hypothesis regarding the evolution of behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives is that changes in rules and norms transferred power from committee chairs and ranking members to party leaders and party caucuses. For example, changes beginning in the early to mid 1970s include: the Subcommittee Bill of Rights; weakening the agenda control of committee chairs; giving the Speaker the authority to choose the majority party's members of the Rules committee (i.e., 8 of 12 members); for Democrats, shifting the authority to make committee assignments from the Ways and Means committee to a steering committee and giving the Speaker the authority to choose a majority of that committee's members; giving party caucuses the authority to choose committee chairs, Appropriations subcommittee chairs, and ranking members (by secret ballot); making it easier for members to force recorded votes on the floor; reducing committee staff; and imposing term limits on committee chairs.[1]

One especially influential argument as to why these institutional changes occurred is the Conditional Party Government (CPG) theory (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Rohde, 1997, 2000). According to the CPG theory, strong party government is conditional on the extent to which the preferences within parties align and the preferences between parties diverge. More specifically, the theory posits that as the preferences of the party caucuses become more homogeneous and the distance between the party caucuses grows (the "condition" in CPG), rank-and-file party members are more willing to transfer responsibilities and power to their party leaders.[2] The CPG theory is perhaps the most prominent explanation of the ostensible rise in party responsibility and power in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures. That numerous congressional and legislative scholars have extended, revised, and utilized the theory as an explanation for their findings is evidence of the theory's prominence in the field.[3]

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[1]For example, see Shepsle (1989) and Rohde (1991).

[2]The CPG theory is rooted in both electoral and policy incentives. Members of a party have less electoral risk in transferring power to party leaders when member and leader preferences align (Aldrich and Rohde, 2001). Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007) further point out that there is a tradeoff that occurs with party unity – party leaders strive for party unity to win legislative battles because legislative success yields electoral success for the party, but inducing members to vote the party line can increase the risk of electoral defeat for certain members.

[3]For a few examples among many possibilities, see Carroll and Kim (2010), Hall and Shepsle (2014), Ladewig (2005), Patty (2008), Roberts and Smith (2003), Volden and Bergman (2006), and Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger (2007).

While the CPG theory is a common explanation for shifts in congressional power, it is difficult to empirically investigate shifts in congressional power because of measurement limitations. The existing literature has relied predominantly on roll call related outcomes such as party unity scores and roll rates (Aldrich and Rohde, 2000; Cox and McCubbins, 2005).[4] This reliance on roll call based measures subjects existing research to a compelling critique from Krehbiel (1999, 2000), who argues that it is extremely difficult to disentangle legislators' true preferences from partisan pressures when analyzing their roll call votes.[5] In Krehbiel's view, as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied, members engage in roll call behavior that is ostensibly indicative of increased party power but is in fact the result of homogeneous policy preferences within the party. In other words, when members from the same party vote together more often, it could simply be a function of their similar policy preferences rather than the party leadership exerting influence over their votes. This highlights the concern that the use of roll call related outcomes in existing CPG studies are subject to an endogeneity problem.[6]

Another way to put Krehbiel's critique is that roll call votes have been used in the literature to measure both the degree to which the condition in CPG is satisfied—the explanatory variable of interest—and the degree to which members transfer power to their party leaders—the outcome

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[4]For example, Aldrich and Rohde (2000) find that the majority party is more likely to win on final passage party unity votes as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. Interestingly, while Cox and McCubbins (2005) find no relationship between CPG and negative agenda control, as measured by the majority-party roll rate, they do find a relationship between CPG and positive agenda control, as measured by the minority-party roll rate. Another common approach is to examine trends in the use of special rules that might steer policy away from the floor median and towards the majority party median. For instance, Rohde (1991) and Aldrich, Perry, and Rohde (2013) find that votes on special rules grow more partisan with the condition. Numerous other studies, such as Forgette and Sala (1999), Roberts (2005), Kriner and Schwartz (2008), and Moscardelli, Haspel, and Wike (1998), explore this question and related questions using a variety of outcome measures constructed from roll call votes and legislator behavior within the chamber.

[5]"Analyzing roll calls can only recover the preferences that rationalize the observed votes given the assumed model of individual choice as implemented via a statistical model" (Clinton, 2012).

[6]Taylor (2003) is an important exception to the literature's focus on outcomes based on legislators' roll call voting behavior, but is limited to a specific time period and certain industries. He examines campaign contributions from PACs associated with tobacco and alcoholic beverage industries, and finds that PACs associated with both industries donate relatively more to the majority party leadership as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. While Taylor (2003) does not fall prey to the problem of using roll call related outcome measures, his study is limited to a specific 25-year period and two industries (albeit influential industries of the time). In addition, in their studies of state legislatures, Fouirnaies and Hall (2015) and Fouirnaies (2016) adopt a similar approach, using campaign contributions to assess how powerful or valuable different sets of legislators are. While Fouirnaies and Hall (2015) find that assuming a role as a majority party leader in a state legislature yields a sizable increase in campaign contributions for a legislator, they "find no link between the polarization of the legislature and the power that flows to the majority-party leader." Interestingly, in this study we find the opposite for the U.S. House of Representatives; party polarization within the chamber is strongly related to the relative power of party leaders.

of interest. An observed relationship between two measures derived from the same roll call votes is worryingly tautological.[7]

In this paper we use a new approach to investigate shifts in congressional power, using two outcome measures neither of which rely on roll call votes. The first measure uses PAC contributions, and the second utilizes newspaper coverage. In using these two measures of political power, we are the first to provide extensive evidence that relates the distribution of party preferences within the chamber to the relative power of party leaders without measuring party leadership power based on roll call votes.

For the first measure, we measure relative power by tracking campaign contributions from the affiliated political action committees (PACs) of interest groups. The idea follows from Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) and is straightforward: interest groups use campaign contributions to gain access to, and possibly influence, members of Congress. These groups are strategic actors with a stake in policy outcomes. The value of access to a given representative is increasing in the power that the representative commands. Therefore, more PAC resources flow to relatively more powerful members.[8]

The second measure is based on newspaper coverage. The idea is similar in spirit: given the limited space available for covering politics in general and Congress in particular, newspaper editors and journalists tend to devote more space to powerful political actors rather than weak actors. Ban et al. (2017) present the logic in more detail and present a number of examples that demonstrate the validity of the general idea. We adapt the idea and use newspaper coverage to analyze the relative power of party leaders and committee leaders in Congress. Furthermore, the newspaper measure spans a much longer time period, i.e. 1890-2014, compared to the PAC contributions measure.[9]

Our two measures are complementary, as both newspapers and PACs are careful external observers of Congress with finite resources (i.e., space on their pages and money to contribute). However, PACs and newspapers have very different sets of incentives driving their behavior. PACs

[7]In his critique, Krehbiel (2000) states, "Vote-based measures of partisanship are often correlated with one another (Cox and McCubbins, 1991, 1993), and it is not uncommon to interpret such collinearity as evidence of validity. A more skeptical stance is adopted in this paper."

[8]See Snyder (1992, 1993), Romer and Snyder (1994), and Cox and Magar (1999) for other applications of this general idea.

[9]Federal Election Commission data on campaign contributions from PACs are only available starting in 1978.

seek access to powerful elected officials in search of favorable policy outcomes, while newspapers publish content on matters of importance and interest to their readership.[10] The advantage of utilizing both measures is that they are driven by different actors with distinct sets of incentives, and thus the measures are unlikely to be susceptible to the same sources of bias.[11]

As intra-party preferences converge and inter-party preferences diverge, does power shift to party leaders? In other words, as the condition for CPG is satisfied, do party leaders gain more power relative to committee leaders and the rank-and-file? The findings are clear. During the period 1978-2014—the period for which we have detailed data on campaign contributions—party leaders experience a dramatic growth in their average share of all PAC contributions as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. The expected increase in the share of PAC contributions to a majority party leader is over 8 times greater than the expected increase for a committee chair given the observed growth in CPG during this time period.[12,13] In fact, for a majority party leader, this growth corresponds to a 54% increase in their expected share of PAC contributions. On the minority side, the expected increase in the share of PAC contributions to a party leader is about 5 times greater than the expected increase for a ranking member given the observed increase in CPG.[14] The increase in the share of PAC contributions to party leaders relative to committee leaders as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied is remarkably stable and robust to the inclusion of various controls (including seniority and measures of electoral risk), member fixed effects, restricting the sample to only party and committee leaders, restricting the sample to only senior members, measuring the condition in CPG based on district ideology, and including PAC contributions to members' leadership committees.

It is important to note that the outcome under study is the share of PAC contributions (in percentage terms) distributed to members in a given Congress. Thus, the growth in PAC contributions

[10] Newspapers want to provide coverage that their readers find interesting so as to maximize their circulation and advertising revenues.

[11] For a given potential source of bias to be problematic, it needs to affect the behavior of both newspaper editors and PACs.

[12] When we write *expected* increase, we are referring to the conditional expectation function.

[13] Throughout the paper we refer to majority party leaders and minority party leaders. When we do so, we are referring to members serving in the three majority party leader positions in the House (Speaker, Majority Party Leader, and Majority Whip) and the two minority party leader positions (Minority Leader and Minority Whip).

[14] All of the calculations in this paragraph are derived from specification (1) in Table 3 and Table A7.

to party leaders that we document in this study is entirely due to PACs directing relatively more resources to party leaders and away from other members rather than simply a secular increase in PAC spending.

The patterns are similar when we examine newspaper coverage. During the much longer period of 1890-2014, newspaper coverage of party leaders relative to committee leaders declined substantially after the revolt against Cannon in 1910 and remained relatively low until the committee reforms of the 1970s. Since 1970, the share of newspaper coverage devoted to party leaders relative to committee leaders has increased to pre-Cannon revolt levels. Examining the 1978-2014 period (the same period for which we have PAC contribution data), the correlation between our measure of relative newspaper coverage and the CPG measure is 0.82. Again, like the PAC contributions measure, this outcome is measured in relative terms. Thus, newspapers are devoting substantially *more* of their coverage to party leaders and substantially *less* to committee leaders.

While neither outcome measure is without flaws, both newspapers and PACs are sophisticated observers of Congress with constrained resources who respond to power. When using either of these two new measures of political power, we arrive at the same finding as when we use the other. That both sets of actors – two entirely separate groups – markedly shift their resources toward party leaders when intra-party preferences converge and inter-party preferences diverge is highly suggestive of an actual shift in power from committees to party leaders.

2 Results for PAC Contributions

2.1 Data, Measures, and Methods

We study campaign contributions to representatives serving in the 95th to 113th Congresses (elections held during the period 1978-2014), using data from the Federal Elections Commission.[15] For each U.S. House incumbent i serving in Congress t and running for reelection, let $PAC\ Contributions_{it}$ be the total amount of campaign contributions i receives from all PACs during the two-year election cycle coinciding with Congress t.[16] We measure the relative value of

[15] See http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftp_download.shtml for details.

[16] We must restrict our sample to incumbents seeking reelection, as we need to observe their status as party and committee leaders and the contributions they receive from PACs.

representative i as his or her share of total PAC contributions to all representatives running for reelection (the set I_t):

$$Percentage\ of\ PAC\ Contributions_{it} = \frac{PAC\ Contributions_{it}}{\sum_{j \in I_t} PAC\ Contributions_{jt}} \times 100\%$$

We consider two versions of this variable, one that includes only the main reelection campaign committee of each representative, and one that also includes the PAC contributions made to representatives' "leadership" committees (leadership PACs).[17]

We define the set of party leaders as the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader, the Majority Whip, the Minority Leader, and the Minority Whip. Committee leaders are chairs and ranking members. We use data from Charles Stewart, Garrison Nelson, and Jonathan Woon to determine which incumbents are party leaders, committee chairs, and ranking members (Stewart and Woon, 2015; Nelson, 2015).[18] We use this data to construct four indicator variables: $Majority\ Party\ Leader_{it}$, $Minority\ Party\ Leader_{it}$, $Committee\ Chair_{it}$ and $Committee\ Ranking\ Member_{it}$. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the number of observations in our sample in each of these categories for the 95th to 113th Congress.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for $Percentage\ of\ PAC\ Contributions_{it}$. The top panel includes only donations to representatives' main campaign committees, while the bottom panel also includes donations to members' leadership committees. Consider the top panel. Across the 95th to 113th Congresses, a majority party leader on average received 0.72% of all PAC contributions to representatives running for reelection. This is much larger than the 0.31% received by the average committee chair, or the 0.24% received by the average rank and file member. While these individual mean percentages may at first glance seem small, this is because the "pie" is quite large. For example, the representatives running for reelection in the 113th Congress collectively received $291 million in PAC contributions, and 0.50% of this would have been almost $146,000.

[17] According to the FEC, "A leadership PAC is a non-connected committee that supports/opposes more than one federal candidate and that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a federal candidate or office holder which is neither an authorized committee nor affiliated with the candidate's authorized committee." In practice, members of Congress use their leadership committees to raise funds to donate to other candidates and to pay other expenses. Some groups argue that leadership committees are often used to evade campaign finance regulations and should be banned.

[18] Nelson and Stewart (2010) and Groseclose and Stewart (1998) are two examples of research that use this data.

Table 1 – Percentage of PAC Contributions, 95th–113th Congresses

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N
Without Leadership Committees				
Majority party leaders	0.72%	0.72%	0.26%	54
Minority party leaders	0.65%	0.64%	0.27%	36
Committee chairs	0.31%	0.27%	0.21%	360
Ranking members	0.26%	0.23%	0.16%	354
Rank-and-file	0.24%	0.21%	0.15%	6726
With Leadership Committees				
Majority party leaders	1.03%	1.01%	0.38%	51
Minority party leaders	0.83%	0.73%	0.38%	34
Committee chairs	0.33%	0.28%	0.23%	342
Ranking members	0.27%	0.23%	0.17%	335
Rank-and-file	0.24%	0.21%	0.15%	6384

We use a measure of conditional party government developed in Aldrich and Rohde (1998) and Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) and constructed using data from Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2007). They construct their measure as follows. First, they define M_t^1 as the difference between the party median DW-NOMINATE scores in Congress t; M_t^2 as the ratio of the standard deviation of DW-NOMINATE scores for the majority party to the standard deviation for the full chamber (subtracted from 1); M_t^3 as the R-squared from regressing DW-NOMINATE scores on party affiliation; and M_t^4 as the proportion of overlap of DW-NOMINATE scores between the two parties (subtracted from 1). Next, Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) run a linear factor analysis on (M^1, M^2, M^3, M^4), and extract the first principal factor. We use their measure and call it $CPG\ Score_t$.[19]

[19] Aldrich and Rohde (1998) and Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) study the four components separately and their relationship. Although the literature investigating the CPG theory is extensive (see the survey above), there is not a single, conventional measure of GPG. The Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) measure that we employ, and its components, are utilized quite widely. Also, as Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) note, the individual components are highly correlated with one another and the first principal factor (see Table A3 in the Appendix for the correlation matrix). For example, Aldrich and Battista (2002) utilize the four components separately, and Finocchiaro and Rohde (2008) and Aldrich (2011) use the two-dimensional analog of this measure developed in Aldrich, Rohde, and Tofias (2007). Other scholars use a variant of one of these four measures; for instance, Hetherington (2001) utilizes a Euclidean distance measure and correlates it with the measures from Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) to provide evidence for the validity of his measure. Finally, some researchers simply assert that certain time periods are strong-party or weak-party eras.

Figure 1 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions to Party Leaders, Committee Leaders, and Rank-and-File.



In some regressions we include additional control variables. Since previous work finds that incumbents who are electorally vulnerable raise and spend significantly more in their campaigns, the main set of controls attempts to capture electoral competition. The variables are *Quality Challenger*$_{it}$, *Uncontested Election*$_{it}$, *Safeness of District*$_{it}$, *Midterm*$_t$, *Same Party as President*$_{it}$, and *Midterm*$_t \times$ *Same Party as President*$_{it}$.[20] In some specifications we add two other variables. The first is *Seniority*$_{it}$, measured as the number of terms served. The second is a measure of progressive ambition, *Seeking Senate Seat*$_{it}$, defined as 1 for representatives who ran for the U.S. Senate in the subsequent election cycle.

[20] *Quality Challenger*$_{it}$ is coded = 1 if the candidate has previously held elective office. *Safeness of District*$_{it}$ is based on the mean-deviated presidential vote share in the concurrent (in presidential years) or most recent election (in midterm years). We re-scale this variable between 0 and 1 to measure the safeness of the district from the perspective of the incumbent.

2.2 Main Results

We begin with figures that illustrate the basic patterns. Figure 1 shows the relationship between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* and *CPG Score*.[21] The left panel includes all PAC donations to members' campaign committes; the right panel includes PAC donations to both members' campaign committees and members' leadership committees.

Looking first at the left panel of Figure 1, *Percentage of PAC Contributions* grows sharply for party leaders as *CPG Score* increases; the correlation is 0.36. This growth is substantively large. For example, for party leaders, *Percentage of PAC Contributions* increases from an observed average of 0.45% when CPG score is 0 to 0.80% when CPG score is 1 – an increase of 78%. For committee leaders the growth is positive but much smaller, while for rank-and-file members there is a slight decrease. The right panel of Figure 1 has the same set-up as the left panel, but the PAC contributions measure now also include donations to members' leadership committees in addition to their main campaign committees.[22] Overall, when accounting for contributions to leadership committees, the patterns are even starker. For party leaders, *Percentage of PAC Contributions* increases from an average of 0.45% when CPG is 0 to 1.1% when CPG is 1—an increase of 144%. Again, for committee leaders the growth is positive but much smaller, and for rank-and-file members there is a small decline.

Note that although there has been a steep growth in the number and size of leadership committees, the strong relationships shown in Figure 1 are not "mechanical," because party leaders are not the only House members with leadership committees. Many committee chairs and ranking members have them as well, as do a substantial number of rank-and-file members. Over the period 1980-2014, 526 different representatives had active leadership committees at some point, only 21 of whom were party leaders. What Figure 1 shows is that as CPG has risen, PACs have donated relatively more to the leadership committees run by party leaders compared to the leadership committees run by committee leaders (and rank-and-file members).

[21] Figure A6 in the Appendix separates the left panel of Figure 1 into panels for majority and minority party, and Figure A4 presents the left panel with year on the horizontal axis.

[22] Figure A7 in the Appendix separates the right panel of Figure 1 by majority and minority party, and Figure A5 presents the right panel with year along the horizontal axis.

Table 2 – Results for Baseline Specification

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.283*	0.314*	0.308*	0.605*	0.651*	0.648*
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.053*	0.053*	0.053*	0.092*	0.087*	0.087*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.011*	0.013*	-0.016*	0.009	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.226	0.229	0.210	0.299	0.302
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	None	Electoral	Full	None	Electoral	Full

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is rank-and-file.

Table 2 presents the results in regression form. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is constructed using only representatives' main campaign committees, while in columns 4-6 the dependent variable also includes representatives' leadership committees. We only show the coefficients of interest (the full set of estimates are in Appendix Table A5), and we vary the vector of additional control variables across the columns.[23] In every column of Table 2, the estimated coefficient on the key party leader variable *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is large, positive, and statistically significant. From this, we can infer that *Percentage of PAC Contributions* to party leaders are significantly higher when *CPG Score* is high rather than low. By contrast, the estimated coefficients on the committee leader variable are much smaller. Indeed, F-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Leader* all strongly reject the null hypothesis. Thus, from the evidence in Table 2, we can infer that the relationship between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* and *CPG Score* is stronger for party leaders than for committee leaders.

[23] Results where the standard errors are clustered by Congress are in Appendix Table A6 and do not change substantively.

Table 3 – Results Split by Majority Status

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.288*	0.358*	0.350*	0.583*	0.688*	0.684*
	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.070)
CPG Score x Min. Party Leader	0.268*	0.255*	0.249*	0.633*	0.622*	0.618*
	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.083)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.034	0.035	0.032	0.085*	0.083*	0.082*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.071*	0.067*	0.069*	0.101*	0.091*	0.091*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.021	0.010	0.005	0.033*	0.015	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
CPG Score	-0.020*	0.008	0.012	-0.032*	0.002	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.111	0.232	0.236	0.223	0.311	0.315
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.012	0.010	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	None	Electoral	Full	None	Electoral	Full

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is minority party rank-and-file.

2.3 Robustness Checks

2.3.1 Majority Party Status

Table 3 presents the results by majority party status. As in Table 2, we show only the coefficients of interest (the full set of estimates are in Table A7 in the Appendix) and vary the vector of control variables across the columns. The patterns when separating by majority and minority party are similar to those in Table 2. The estimated coefficients on the key party leader variables, *CPG Score* × *Majority Party Leader* and *CPG Score* × *Minority Party Leader*, are both large, positive, and statistically significant in all specifications. They imply that for both majority and minority parties, the *Percentage of PAC Contributions* to party leaders are significantly higher when *CPG Score* is high rather than low. By contrast, the estimated coefficients on the two committee leader variables are much smaller. They are all statistically insignificant for the majority party, and insignificant for both parties in the third column when we include the full set of controls. Also, F-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Majority Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Chair* (denoted $F_{Majority}$) always strongly reject the null hypothesis. The

same is true for the hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Minority Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Ranking Member* (denoted $F_{Minority}$). Evidently, the relationship between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* and *CPG Score* is stronger for party leaders than for committee leaders within both the majority and minority party.

2.3.2 Party Leaders vs. Committee Leaders

Many of the reforms in the 1970s were viewed as transferring power from committee chairs and ranking members to party leaders.[24] To examine the transfer of power between party leaders and committee leaders only, we can exclude the rank-and-file category and recompute *Percentage of PAC Contributions* using the population of party leaders and committee leaders only. Figure 2 illustrates the same pattern of party leaders gaining substantially more in their average percentage of PAC contributions as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied. When we restrict attention only to party leaders and committee leaders, it is clear that party leaders are gaining more power at the expense of committee leaders.

Table 4 – Results for Sample Restricted to Party and Committee Leaders

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	1.195*	1.712*	1.848*	1.824*	2.488*	2.616*
	(0.605)	(0.600)	(0.608)	(0.692)	(0.690)	(0.699)
CPG Score x Min. Party Leader	1.066	0.992	1.051	2.413*	2.403*	2.451*
	(0.725)	(0.696)	(0.698)	(0.830)	(0.799)	(0.801)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	-0.221	-0.220	-0.123	-0.092	-0.143	-0.052
	(0.316)	(0.314)	(0.322)	(0.359)	(0.361)	(0.369)
CPG Score	0.117	0.252	0.190	-0.014	0.131	0.076
	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.260)
Observations	804	775	775	762	734	734
Adjusted R^2	0.300	0.361	0.361	0.466	0.509	0.509
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.020	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.142	0.155	0.133	0.004	0.003	0.002
Controls	None	Electoral	Full	None	Electoral	Full

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is ranking members.

[24] As mentioned in the introduction, these reforms included the weakening of agenda control of committee chairs, the Speaker gaining the authority to choose the majority party's members of the Rules committee, the reduction of committee staff, the imposition of term limits on committee chairs, and the shifting of committee assignment power from the Ways and Means committee to a steering committee with a majority of Speaker-appointed members (for Democrats), among other reforms.

Figure 2 – Relative Percentage of PAC Contributions, Sample Restricted to Party Leaders and Committee Leaders.



Table 4 presents the regression estimates when we restrict attention only to party leaders vs. committee chairs, dropping rank-and-file members from the analysis. The denominator of the dependent variable in this table only includes party and committee leaders (not all representatives). The patterns are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3, especially for the majority party. The estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Majority Party Leader* is always large, positive, and statistically significant, while the estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Chair* is always negative (and insignificant). Also, the F-test always rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Majority Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Chair*. The results are somewhat weaker and sometimes statistically insignificant for the minority party, but they always point in the predicted direction.

2.3.3 Non-Election Year Contributions

In addition, we construct an alternative measure of the *Percentage of PAC Contributions* outcome by counting only those contributions made in the non-election year.[25] The advantage of using this

[25]For instance, we only count PAC contributions made in 2013 for the 113th Congress, which was in session during calendar years 2013-2014.

alternative measure is that contributions made in non-election years are less likely to be driven by fundraising and electoral pressures. Instead, in non-election years in particular, PACs are likely making contributions to attempt to gain access to and influence over the most powerful members.[26] While the fundraising responsibilities of party leaders may have increased over time, this measure is less susceptible to such concerns. Results based on this alternative outcome measure are displayed in the Appendix in Figures A8-A9 and Tables A9-A10. Using this non-election year measure, the estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is again larger than the estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Leader*, and an F-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal. The estimates from these specifications continue to provide support for the CPG hypothesis and are of a similar magnitude to our earlier estimates. If anything, these results provide even stronger support for the hypothesis.

2.3.4 Member Fixed Effects

While not the focus of the paper, we also estimate models in which we include member-specific fixed-effects. This specification might help to rule out a hypothesis such as the following: As campaign money has become increasingly important over time, each party has increasingly chosen party leaders who are good fundraisers. If fundraising ability is a fixed attribute—Nancy Pelosi was a good fundraiser even before she became Minority Leader or Speaker—then the member-specific fixed-effects will capture this attribute. The results are in the Appendix in Table A11. Overall, the pattern of estimates is similar to that in Table 3. Again, the relationship between *Percentage of PAC Contributions* and *CPG Score* appears to be stronger for party leaders than for committee leaders. Also, the relationships appear even clearer when we include donations to members' leadership committees.

2.3.5 District Ideology

While utilizing measures of party leadership power not based on roll call votes is a considerable improvement over the past literature, some critics may reasonably object to the use of roll call votes as a measure of legislators' preferences. The CPG theory is based on the idea that legislators

[26] Fouirnaies (2016) uses a similar measure for the same purpose.

are willing to transfer power to leaders when they have similar preferences to their co-partisans in the chamber and dissimilar preferences to legislators from the other party. Many roll call votes are likely subject to party pressures (e.g., Clinton, 2012; Snyder and Groseclose, 2000), which suggests that roll call based measures of preferences could be endogenous to the level of party influence.[27]

Table 5 – Results for District-Level Ideology Measure

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pres CPG x Party Leader	0.227*	0.285*	0.280*	0.510*	0.597*	0.595*
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Pres CPG x Committee Leader	0.068*	0.063*	0.062*	0.105*	0.099*	0.099*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Pres CPG	-0.013*	0.014*	0.015*	-0.020*	0.007	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.100	0.225	0.228	0.207	0.297	0.300
F p-value	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Controls	None	Electoral	Full	None	Electoral	Full

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is rank-and-file.

Unfortunately, few obvious measures of member ideology exist that are independent of party pressures. However, it is reasonable to assume that, among other things (e.g., personal preferences), a legislator's ideal point is a function of her district's preferences. Unlike the legislator's roll call voting behavior, which is clearly subject to potential party pressures, the district's preferences are plausibly exogenous to the power of party leaders. For example, Cooper and Brady (1981) characterize the level party polarization in Congress based on a measure of district-level preferences.[28] While far from perfect, we construct an analog measure to *CPG Score* derived from the presidential vote in the congressional district.[29] The presidential vote is a commonly used measure of congres-

[27] For instance, suppose that in a given congress party leaders are powerful for a reason unrelated to CPG, leaders could then exert influence on members' roll call votes. Due to this pressure from leaders to vote together, roll called based measures of ideology would likely produce a distribution of preferences that would appear as if the condition in CPG is satisfied even though this distribution of preferences is actually the result of party leaders' influence.

[28] Cooper and Brady (1981) measure district preferences between 1881 and 1920 based on the number of agricultural workers vs. the number of industrial workers in the district.

[29] For more details on the construction of the measure, see Section A.2.2 in the Appendix.

sional district-level preferences with strong evidence of validity (e.g., Erikson and Wright, 1980; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001; Burden, 2004).[30]

We present the results using the district-level presidential vote to measure the condition in CPG in Table 5. As in our other robustness checks, these results strongly accord with the CPG hypothesis. Across all specifications, the estimated coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is large, positive, and significant, and the F-test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Party Leader* is equal to the coefficient on *CPG Score* × *Committee Leader* in all specifications. It is worth emphasizing that in an important sense this is our most rigorous test, as we use an exogenous measure of preferences, and our results continue to tell the same story: as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied, PACs direct an increasing share of their resources to party leaders.

2.3.6 Other Robustness Checks

In addition to splitting our results by majority party status, restricting the sample to party and committee leaders, constructing an outcome measure based on non-election year PAC contributions, estimating a member fixed effects specification, and measuring the condition in CPG based on the presidential vote in the district rather than roll call data, we conduct further robustness checks in the Appendix. In Table A14, we report results restricting our sample to only senior members (those who had served at least 4 terms as of that Congress). This specification provides additional assurance that our results are not driven by seniority. Finally, in Table A13, we report results for a sample without the Speaker. The results for this sample omitting the Speaker indicate that PACs are directing relatively more resources to party leaders in general and not solely the Speaker.

[30] In recent years, scholars have developed more sophisticated measures of district-level preferences and partisanship (e.g., Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman, 2008; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013). Unfortunately for our purposes, because of how these measures are constructed, they are relatively static and not available for each two-year congressional election cycle. Nevertheless, these measures provide strong evidence for the validity of district-level measures based on the presidential vote. The correlation between the Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) measure and the 2008 presidential vote share for congressional districts is 0.92. Moreover, Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman (2008) conclude, "Our pattern of results should provide reassurance to researchers who have used district-level presidential vote shares as a proxy for district-level partisanship."

3 Results for Newspaper Coverage

3.1 Theory, Data, Measures, and Methods

Ban et al. (2017) argue that the relative amount of newspaper coverage devoted to political actors A and B should reflect the relative power of A vs. B, at least after controlling for the intrinsic entertainment value of the actors. They validate this idea by checking how accurately the newspaper coverage measure correlates with an existing measure of power in five cases where some existing measure of power was available. For instance, they estimate the change in the relative coverage of mayors in cities that switch from a strong mayor (mayor-council) form to a weak mayor (council-manager) form of government.[31] In all cases, newspaper coverage proves to be a meaningful indicator of political power that is broadly applicable to a variety of political offices and contexts. In this section, we adapt this idea and use newspaper coverage to measure the relative power of party leaders in Congress.

We count articles in eight newspapers in the ProQuest archive for each year during the period 1890-2014. These newspapers are the major newspapers available in the ProQuest database with full-text historical data going back to the late 19th century.[32] We construct two variables, *Party Leader Hits*$_t$ and *Committee Leader Hits*$_t$. For party leaders, we search for the string: "Congress" AND ("House Speaker" OR "Speaker of the House" OR "House Majority Leader" OR "House Minority Leader"). For committee leaders, we search for the string: "Congress" AND ("Chairman of the House" OR "Chairwoman of the House" OR "Chair of the House" OR "Ranking Member of the House") AND "Committee". We group odd and even-numbered years together by Congress (1947 with 1948, 1949 with 1950 etc.), and then make the variable:

$$\textit{Party Leader Percentage of Hits}_t = \frac{\textit{Party Leader Hits}_t}{\textit{Party Leader Hits}_t + \textit{Committee Leader Hits}_t} \times 100\%$$

[31] For more on the validation of using newspaper coverage as a measure of political power, see Section A.4.1 in the Appendix.

[32] The newspapers are *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Boston Globe*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, *Newsday* (Long Island), *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Washington Post*. These newspapers are the major newspapers that are available in the ProQuest database with full-text data from 1890 through 2014. By including all eight available newspapers, instead of just one or a few, we can limit the potential effect of specific editorial teams or regimes.

In other words, the variable *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* measures the amount of newspaper coverage of party leaders relative to the amount of newspaper coverage of party leaders and of committee leaders. Because this is a relative measure, even if newspapers adjusted how much attention they paid to Congress as a whole during different eras (Kernell and Jacobson, 1987), our measure still is able to capture the relative power of party leaders to committee leaders across time. Note, to smooth out random noise, in the analyses below we use a three-Congress moving average of *Party Leader Percentage of Hits*.[33]

One possible concern regarding the use of PAC contributions data in the previous section is that fundraising skills may have become an increasingly important prerequisite for party leaders. In other words, if the importance of fundraising has increased over time, members may choose to select top fundraisers as their party leaders. If this were true, the increasing share of contributions to party leaders might merely reflect fundraising skills rather than power. However, this concern almost certainly does not apply to the newspaper coverage measure, as it is highly unlikely that newspapers report more on party leaders because of their fundraising skills or activity. In fact, we can analyze the content of the newspaper coverage to confirm that our suspicion is correct. We do so by calculating the share mentions of party leaders and committee leaders that also refer to fundraising activity.[34] When we examine party leader mentions that are in articles that include words relating to fundraising, we find that only 1.23% of *Party Leader Hits* are potentially connected to fundraising activity across our time period 1890-2014. For committee leader mentions, only 1.01% of *Committee Leader Hits* are potentially connected to fundraising activity. While the newspaper measure perhaps has its own potential problems—e.g. inflated coverage due to entertainment value or scandals—it does not share the *same* concerns as the PAC contributions measure.

3.2 Results

We begin by examining the limited period of time that corresponds to our previous analyses related to PAC contributions. Figure 3 plots *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* against CPG for the time period 1978-2014. As in Figure 2, we see that the relative newspaper coverage of party leaders

[33]The results are substantively quite similar when we use the raw measure rather than the moving average.

[34]We find mentions of party leaders and committee leaders that also reference fundraising activity by adding the word stems for "fundraise," OR "donor," OR "raise money" as requirements in the string searches mentioned in the previous paragraph.

is positively related to *CPG Score*. Like the PAC contributions measure, the newspaper coverage measure is highly suggestive of a shift in power from committee chairs to party leaders. The correlation between the newspaper measure and the CPG score for this time period is 0.82. That the newspaper coverage shows the same shift in power to party leaders as the PAC contributions measure provides further evidence for the CPG hypothesis.

Figure 3 – Relative Newspaper Coverage of Party Leaders and Committee Chairs (1978-2014)



The benefit of using newspaper coverage data is that it allows us to extend the time period of study to nearly a full century before the start of our PAC contributions data. By expanding the sample further back in time, we are able to cover a period during which CPG was not merely increasing monotonically across time.[35] Figure 4 presents the newspaper coverage measure across time. Starting in 1890, we see that *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* decreases until around 1920. Within this 1890-1920 time period, a sharp decline is apparent around 1910, which coincides with the revolt against Speaker Joseph Gurney Cannon. Almost universally, scholars view the Reed-Cannon period from about 1890-1910 as the apex of "strong party rule" in the U.S. House. Brady and Phillip (1974), Cooper and Brady (1981), and Sinclair (1990) all characterize the period 1890-1910 as one with a centralized, speaker-led House.[36]

[35]Figure A1 shows *CPG Score* across time.

[36]Schickler (2001) partially dissents from the view that the entire 1890-1910 period was a strong-party era. He instead argues that during the years of Democratic control, 1891-1895, the leadership was "paralyzed" and that the

Figure 4 – Percentage Party Leader Hits Time Trend, 1890-2014



After the revolt against Cannon, the House became more institutionally decentralized (Collie and Brady, 1985). As Schickler (2001) notes, "By the 1920s, it was commonplace to argue that 'leadership in the House is in commission'... Party leaders, committee chairmen, the Rules Committee, and rank-and-file members competed for influence, so that no single officer or group was as powerful as the Speaker had been in the Reed-Cannon era." In particular, Schickler (2001) points to the Rules Committee as a key actor after the 1910 revolt: "The Norris resolution loosened the Speaker's influence over Rules without directly challenging the committee's powers." Consistent with these accounts of organizational decentralization in the chamber, Brady, Cooper, and Hurley (1979) show that there was a long-term decline in party voting on roll calls in the U.S. House after the revolt against Cannon through the 1960s. They describe 1890-1910 as a a high period of party voting, 1911-1940 as an intermediate period, and 1941-1968 as a low period. According to Rohde (1991), the reforms leading to the current strong-party era began in 1970.[37] Similarly, Hall and

Henderson speakership of 1899-1903 was weak. However, Schickler (2001) characterizes both the Reed and Cannon speakerships as strong and centralized.

[37]Rohde (1991) focuses on the reforms adopted during the period 1970-1977 (see, e.g, pages 16-17). On page 85 he highlights the expansion of the whip system, beginning in 1970 with the creation of the chief deputy whip post.

Figure 5 – Percentage Party Leader Hits vs. CPG Score, 1890-2014



Shepsle (2014) delineate 1977 as the start of a strong-party era after the committee reforms of the 1970s. An increase in *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* is especially apparent across the 1970s, in line with the committee reforms of that decade.

How does the relative newspaper coverage of party leaders vary as the condition in CPG is increasingly satisfied? Figure 5 plots the newspaper coverage measure against the CPG score. In general, as the CPG score increases, *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* also increases. This suggests that the pattern we observe for the 1978-2014 period also broadly applies when we extend further back in time to 1890; we see that party leaders gain more in relative newspaper coverage, at the expense of committee leaders, as CPG increases.

The grey triangles in Figure 5, however, represent observations during the time period just after the Cannon revolt through 1930, and represent a somewhat anomalous period that deviates from the broader trend seen in the graph. During this time period, the condition for CPG was strong (as measured by the CPG score), but the relative newspaper coverage of party leaders was low. Democrats took control of the House in 1911 and maintained control of the chamber through the 1918 election. Goodman and Nokken (2007) note, "Most studies seem to imply that even during periods of extreme party polarization, the Democrats were hopelessly divided." They point to "the strange, cross-regional coalition of urban, machine-oriented Democrats with those

representatives from the solidly Democratic South." In particular, the issues of tariffs and Civil War pensions deeply divided the party (Goodman and Nokken, 2007). After the revolt against Cannon, Democrats experimented with a party-caucus model of government. In the party-caucus model, power was not concentrated in the hands of a single party leader as in the czar-speaker model, but the procedures of the caucus attempted to restrict agenda access to items that enjoyed broad support within the party. Moreover, the caucus attempted to bind members to vote with the party on any items that advanced out of the caucus to the floor.[38] "Indeed, it is fair to say that the Insurgent Republicans were no happier in the new 'reformed' Democratic House than they had been in the old 'tyrannical' Republican one. They had no greater liking for 'King Caucus' than for 'Czar rule'" (Cooper and Brady, 1981). Republicans recaptured control of the House in 1919 and implemented a steering committee, which "was less of a control device than the caucus and more of a coordinating and planning mechanism" (Cooper and Brady, 1981).

On the whole, the anomalous 1911-1930 period seems to have been a transitional period—the parties were experimenting with new organizational strategies in the aftermath of the Cannon revolt. As Cooper and Brady (1981) note, "If it is true that factionalism in the party system led to the decline of party control mechanisms, it is also true that the decline of these mechanisms had the further effect of allowing party factionalism greater expression." This expression grew louder in the decades after the revolt. In the interim period, however, the party-caucus model likely artificially inflated the roll call based measure of the condition in CPG, as members of the majority restricted floor access to only those items with broad support from the party and bound members to vote with the party. Indeed, Cooper and Brady (1981) present evidence that suggests that party polarization in terms of the underlying characteristics of districts (as measured by the "degree to which each congressional party represented agricultural as opposed to industrial districts") had started to decline prior to the Cannon revolt.

[38] Haines (1915) describes the procedures of the Democratic caucus: "In deciding upon action in the house involving party policy or principle, a two-thirds vote of those present and voting at a caucus meeting shall bind all members of the caucus; provided, the said two-thirds vote is a majority of the full Democratic membership of the house, and provided further, that no member shall be bound upon questions involving a construction of the Constitution of the United States or upon which he made contrary pledges to his constituents prior to his election or received contrary instructions by resolutions or platform from his nominating authority." While Green (2002) argues that the effectiveness of the binding caucus is often overstated, "it does appear to have built voting discipline on certain legislation that was divisive within the party, using a variety of means to do so."

It is worth emphasizing that while the condition in CPG is necessary, it is not sufficient (Hall and Shepsle, 2014; Goodman and Nokken, 2007). Overall, despite this anomalous period, there is a clear, positive relationship between the CPG score and relative newspaper coverage throughout the 1890-2014 time period. The bottom line is that the newspaper coverage measure exhibits the same overall patterns as the PAC donations.

4 Conclusion

This is a straightforward paper with a simple bottom line. We study PAC donations to party leaders, committee leaders, and the rank-and-file during the period 1978-2014. Since PACs are strategic actors who target powerful members, we use PAC donations as a measure of relative power. We also examine a measure of relative power based on the share of newspaper coverage devoted to party leaders vs. committee leaders, which allows us to examine shifts in relative power within Congress for an even longer time period, from 1890-2014. To our knowledge, this is the first paper using non-roll call based measures to systematically study shifts in political power across a long period of time.

By measuring the distribution of preferences (the condition for CPG) using roll call votes and relative political power using our two new alternative approaches, we avoid the previous literature's problematic reliance on using roll call votes to measure both. During the period 1978-2014, we find that as intra-party and inter-party preferences satisfy the condition for CPG, party leaders receive an increasing share of donations at the expense of committee leaders and the rank-and-file. We find similar patterns in the newspaper coverage shares of party leaders, committee leaders, and the rank-and-file for the 1978-2014 period, as well as for the longer period 1890-2014. Most measurement concerns that would apply to using PAC donations do not apply to using newspaper coverage, and vice versa. Since both PACs and newspapers are strategic actors with distinct sets of incentives, our consistent results give us more confidence that as the condition for CPG is satisfied, there is indeed a shift in power from committees and the rank-and-file to party leaders.

We end by noting some of the possible limitations of our analysis, and pointing out some possible directions for future research. First, it might be that PACs do not have independent information about the actual distribution of power in Congress, but they give more money to party

leaders because they have read the research of political scientists (or other observers) and *believe* that party leaders have become more powerful. The same could be true of newspaper editors and reporters. While potentially flattering to the profession, this seems doubtful.

As noted above, another possibility is that the parties have increasingly turned to representatives with strong fundraising skills in choosing their leaders. The specifications that include member-specific fixed effects help address this alternative, but only partially. An alternative explanation that is more difficult to rule out is that rank-and-file members have come to expect party leaders to play a larger fundraising role, so that representatives change their behavior, and devote much more time and effort to fundraising, after moving into party leadership positions. It is not clear to us how these alternatives can account for the observed patterns in newspaper coverage, but that might simply reflect our lack of creativity.

Both of our measures could probably be improved, at least to some degree. For instance, we might try to drop "ideological" PACs, whose contribution behavior is geared more toward changing the composition of Congress than pragmatic concerns such as access to the most powerful legislators.[39] In a similar vein, the results from the newspaper coverage might be improved by further refining the construction of the measure. For example, the newspaper content could be cleaned to filter out scandals and sensational coverage, which may artificially inflate the measure and lead us to overestimate "power."[40] On the other hand, scandals are likely to happen in both weak party eras and strong party eras, so it is unlikely that further filtering of scandals and sensational coverage would substantively change the main patterns that we report.

Finally, another measure of CPG would strengthen not only our paper but the literature as a whole. Recall that the CPG hypothesis involves the distribution of *preferences* of representatives within and across parties. We adopt the measure of CPG developed by Aldrich and Rohde, but as many scholars have noted this may capture *outcomes* as much as the underlying preferences of members of Congress, since it is based on roll call voting decisions. Better measures might be developed using behavior that is potentially less subject to pressure from parties and interest groups, such as members' speeches or bill sponsorship, or perhaps using underlying characteristics

[39] See, for example, Romer and Snyder (1994).

[40] As long as scandals are not correlated with CPG, sensational coverage should add noise rather than confound the analysis.

of members' districts. Our alternative measure of the condition in CPG based on the district-level presidential vote that we utilize in the paper is one such attempt.

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Appendix: Supporting Information for *Leadership Power in Congress, 1890-2014*

Contents

A.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table A1 – Sample Size by Congress

Congress	Election Cycle	Majority Party Leaders	Minority Party Leaders	Committee Chairs	Ranking Members	Total (Includes Rank-and-File)
95	1978	3	2	18	19	384
96	1980	3	2	19	20	400
97	1982	3	2	21	19	393
98	1984	3	2	22	18	411
99	1986	2	2	20	20	392
100	1988	3	1	21	19	410
101	1990	3	2	21	22	407
102	1992	3	2	19	13	371
103	1994	3	1	22	21	388
104	1996	1	2	15	16	374
105	1998	3	2	18	19	400
106	2000	3	2	15	16	403
107	2002	2	2	17	18	399
108	2004	3	2	18	21	406
109	2006	3	2	16	21	408
110	2008	3	2	21	17	402
111	2010	3	2	21	18	398
112	2012	3	2	19	19	393
113	2014	4	2	17	18	391

Table A2 – Percentage with Leadership PAC

Congress	Election Cycle	Majority Party Leaders	Minority Party Leaders	Committee Chairs	Ranking Members	All (Includes Rank-and-File)
96	1980	66.7%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.2%
97	1982	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.6%
98	1984	66.7%	50.0%	9.1%	0.0%	3.6%
99	1986	100.0%	50.0%	5.0%	0.0%	3.3%
100	1988	100.0%	100.0%	9.5%	0.0%	3.2%
101	1990	100.0%	50.0%	4.8%	0.0%	2.0%
102	1992	66.7%	100.0%	5.3%	0.0%	3.0%
103	1994	66.7%	100.0%	9.1%	0.0%	4.4%
104	1996	100.0%	50.0%	20.0%	12.5%	7.0%
105	1998	100.0%	100.0%	33.3%	15.8%	12.5%
106	2000	100.0%	100.0%	40.0%	31.2%	21.3%
107	2002	100.0%	100.0%	58.8%	38.9%	28.6%
108	2004	100.0%	100.0%	61.1%	42.9%	37.4%
109	2006	100.0%	100.0%	81.2%	57.1%	47.1%
110	2008	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	82.4%	51.7%
111	2010	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	72.2%	59.0%
112	2012	100.0%	100.0%	89.5%	84.2%	66.4%
113	2014	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	77.8%	70.1%

A.2 Measuring the Condition in CPG

A.2.1 CPG Score

Table A3 – Correlation Matrix: Component Measures of CPG

	M^1	M^2	M^3	M^4	*CPG Score*
M^1	1.00				
M^2	0.93	1.00			
M^3	0.93	0.99	1.00		
M^4	0.72	0.85	0.87	1.00	
CPG Score	0.93	0.99	1.00	0.86	1.00

Figure A1 – CPG Score, 46th to 113th Congress.



A.2.2 Analog CPG Measure from Presidential Vote

Given the concern that a measure of preferences based on roll call votes could be endogenous to the level party influence in the chamber, we construct an analog measure to the Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002) measure (which we refer to in the paper as *CPG Score*) based on the presidential vote share in the district rather than DW-NOMINATE scores.

We define P_t^1 as the difference between the party median presidential vote shares for the election year corresponding to Congress t;[41] P_t^2 as the ratio of the standard deviation of presidential vote shares for the majority party to the standard deviation for the full chamber (subtracted from 1); P_t^3 as the R-squared from regressing the presidential vote share on party affiliation; and P_t^4 as the proportion of overlap of presidential vote shares between the two parties (subtracted from 1). We then run a linear factor analysis on (P^1, P^2, P^3, P^4), and extract the first principal factor and re-scale the variable to range from 0 to 1.

Table A4 contains the pairwise correlation between each of the four components along with the first principal factor. The correlation between each of the four components and *Pres CPG Score* is 0.88 or higher. Figure A2 plots the *Pres CPG Score* measure across time, and Figure A3 plots the relationship between *Pres CPG Score* and *CPG Score* (based on DW-NOMINATE). The correlation between the two measures is 0.84. Table A12 contains the full regression results using *Pres CPG Score*.

Table A4 – Correlation Matrix: Component Measures of Pres. Vote CPG

	P^1	P^2	P^3	P^4	*Pres CPG*
P^1	1.00				
P^2	0.78	1.00			
P^3	0.97	0.85	1.00		
P^4	0.85	0.80	0.86	1.00	
Pres CPG	0.97	0.88	1.00	0.89	1.00

[41] If the median Democratic district has a Democratic presidential vote share of 0.60, and the median Republican district has a Democratic presidential vote share of 0.45, then $P_t^1 = 0.15$.

Figure A2 – Presidential Vote CPG Score, 1978-2014



Figure A3 – Presidential Vote CPG Score vs. CPG Score (DW-NOMINATE)



A.3 PAC Contributions Results

A.3.1 Baseline Specification

Table A5 – Results for Baseline Specification

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.283*	0.314*	0.308*	0.605*	0.651*	0.648*
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.053*	0.053*	0.053*	0.092*	0.087*	0.087*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.011*	0.013*	-0.016*	0.009	0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party Leader	0.263*	0.256*	0.270*	0.293*	0.278*	0.284*
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Committee Leader	0.010	0.017	0.028*	-0.002	0.009	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Quality Challenger		0.072*	0.071*		0.067*	0.066*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.034*	-0.035*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.354*	-0.350*		-0.336*	-0.332*
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Midterm		-0.008	-0.007		-0.010*	-0.010*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Same Party as President		-0.017*	-0.018*		-0.017*	-0.017*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.024*	0.024*		0.025*	0.024*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.030*			0.030*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Seniority			-0.002*			-0.001
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Constant	0.250*	0.422*	0.425*	0.249*	0.410*	0.409*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.226	0.229	0.210	0.299	0.302
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is rank-and-file.

A.3.2 Baseline Specification with Clustered SEs

Table A6 – Results for Baseline Specification — Clustered SEs

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.283*	0.314*	0.308*	0.605*	0.651*	0.648*
	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.110)	(0.121)	(0.121)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.053*	0.053*	0.053*	0.092*	0.087*	0.087*
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CPG Score	-0.011*	0.011	0.013*	-0.016*	0.009*	0.010*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Party Leader	0.263*	0.256*	0.270*	0.293*	0.278*	0.284*
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.088)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Committee Leader	0.010	0.017	0.028*	-0.002	0.009	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Quality Challenger		0.072*	0.071*		0.067*	0.066*
		(0.007)	(0.006)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.034*	-0.035*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.008)	(0.007)
Safeness of District		-0.354*	-0.350*		-0.336*	-0.332*
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.019)	(0.019)
Midterm		-0.008	-0.007		-0.010	-0.010
		(0.008)	(0.009)		(0.010)	(0.010)
Same Party as President		-0.017	-0.018		-0.017	-0.017
		(0.009)	(0.010)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.024	0.024		0.025	0.024
		(0.016)	(0.017)		(0.020)	(0.020)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.030*			0.030*
			(0.013)			(0.013)
Seniority			-0.002			-0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Constant	0.250*	0.422*	0.425*	0.249*	0.410*	0.409*
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.226	0.229	0.210	0.299	0.302
F p-value	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors, clustered by Congress, in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is rank-and-file.

A.3.3 Trends Across Time

Figure A4 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions to Party Leaders, Committee Leaders, and Rank-and-File Across Time.



Figure A5 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions (Including Leadership Committee Contributions) to Party Leaders, Committee Leaders, and Rank-and-File Across Time.



A.3.4 Split by Majority Status

Figure A6 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions to Party Leaders vs. Committee Leaders, by Majority and Minority Party.



Figure A7 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions (Including Leadership Committee Contributions) to Party Leaders vs. Committee Leaders, by Majority and Minority Party. Panels A and B show the trends of the mean percentages of PAC contributions, taking into account any additional leadership PAC contributions, across Congressional sessions. Panels C and D relate the CPG score to the mean percentages of PAC contributions, also taking into account any additional leadership PAC contributions.



Table A7 – Results Split by Majority Status

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.288*	0.358*	0.350*	0.583*	0.688*	0.684*
	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.070)
CPG Score x Min. Party Leader	0.268*	0.255*	0.249*	0.633*	0.622*	0.618*
	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.083)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.034	0.035	0.032	0.085*	0.083*	0.082*
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.071*	0.067*	0.069*	0.101*	0.091*	0.091*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.021	0.010	0.005	0.033*	0.015	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
CPG Score	-0.020*	0.008	0.012	-0.032*	0.002	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Maj. Party Leader	0.276*	0.251*	0.267*	0.376*	0.334*	0.341*
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Min. Party Leader	0.245*	0.262*	0.276*	0.168*	0.183*	0.188*
	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Committee Chair	0.033	0.046*	0.061*	0.020	0.035	0.042
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Ranking Member	-0.010	-0.008	0.002	-0.023	-0.016	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Majority Status	0.015	0.017*	0.020*	0.009	0.019	0.021*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Quality Challenger		0.074*	0.072*		0.068*	0.068*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.034*	-0.035*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.346*	-0.342*		-0.326*	-0.323*
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Midterm		-0.003	-0.003		-0.006	-0.006
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Same Party as President		-0.002	-0.003		0.003	0.002
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.015*	0.015*		0.016*	0.016*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.032*			0.034*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Seniority			-0.002*			-0.001
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Constant	0.240*	0.399*	0.401*	0.242*	0.383*	0.381*
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.111	0.232	0.236	0.223	0.311	0.315
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.012	0.010	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is minority party rank-and-file.

A.3.5 Restricting to Party Leaders and Committee Leaders

Table A8 – Results for Sample Restricted to Party and Committee Leaders

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	1.195*	1.712*	1.848*	1.824*	2.488*	2.616*
	(0.605)	(0.600)	(0.608)	(0.692)	(0.690)	(0.699)
CPG Score x Min. Party Leader	1.066	0.992	1.051	2.413*	2.403*	2.451*
	(0.725)	(0.696)	(0.698)	(0.830)	(0.799)	(0.801)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	-0.221	-0.220	-0.123	-0.092	-0.143	-0.052
	(0.316)	(0.314)	(0.322)	(0.359)	(0.361)	(0.369)
CPG Score	0.117	0.252	0.190	-0.014	0.131	0.076
	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.260)
Maj. Party Leader	2.394*	2.207*	2.133*	3.479*	3.279*	3.209*
	(0.447)	(0.431)	(0.435)	(0.525)	(0.514)	(0.518)
Min. Party Leader	2.039*	2.147*	2.095*	1.810*	1.848*	1.802*
	(0.537)	(0.516)	(0.517)	(0.633)	(0.609)	(0.610)
Committee Chair	0.464*	0.559*	0.485*	0.445	0.630*	0.561*
	(0.230)	(0.224)	(0.231)	(0.268)	(0.271)	(0.278)
Quality Challenger		0.552*	0.558*		0.495*	0.502*
		(0.145)	(0.145)		(0.153)	(0.153)
Uncontested Election		-0.243	-0.242		-0.213	-0.211
		(0.139)	(0.139)		(0.143)	(0.143)
Safeness of District		-2.349*	-2.306*		-1.912*	-1.863*
		(0.413)	(0.414)		(0.425)	(0.427)
Midterm		-0.049	-0.044		-0.106	-0.103
		(0.135)	(0.135)		(0.141)	(0.142)
Same Party as President		0.110	0.120		0.201	0.211
		(0.155)	(0.155)		(0.157)	(0.157)
Midterm x Same Party as President		-0.008	-0.007		0.075	0.077
		(0.198)	(0.198)		(0.208)	(0.208)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.085			0.142
			(0.481)			(0.488)
Seniority			0.017			0.015
			(0.012)			(0.012)
Constant	1.807*	2.874*	2.703*	1.727*	2.492*	2.324*
	(0.163)	(0.278)	(0.305)	(0.192)	(0.300)	(0.328)
Observations	804	775	775	762	734	734
Adjusted R^2	0.300	0.361	0.361	0.466	0.509	0.509
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.020	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.142	0.155	0.133	0.004	0.003	0.002

Standard errors in parentheses. * p $<$ 0.05. The reference category is ranking members.

A.3.6 PAC Contributions in the Non-Election Year

Figure A8 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions to Party Leaders, Committee Leaders, and Rank-and-File – Non-Election Year Specification.



Figure A9 – Relative Percentages of PAC Contributions, Sample Restricted to Party Leaders and Committee Leaders – Non-Election Year Specification.



Table A9 – Results for Non-Election Year PAC Contributions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.369*	0.391*	0.376*
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.055*	0.050*	0.048
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.012	0.017*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Party Leader	0.326*	0.322*	0.354*
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Committee Leader	0.020	0.026	0.052*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Quality Challenger		0.035*	0.033*
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Uncontested Election		-0.001	-0.002
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Safeness of District		-0.282*	-0.276*
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Midterm		-0.009	-0.009
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Same Party as President		-0.033*	-0.034*
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.021*	0.020*
		(0.009)	(0.009)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.017
			(0.013)
Seniority			-0.003*
			(0.001)
Constant	0.247*	0.389*	0.398*
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	7140	6823	6799
Adjusted R^2	0.114	0.152	0.157
F p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

The reference category is rank-and-file.

Table A10 – Results for Non-Election Year PAC Contributions by Majority Status

	(1)	(2)	(3)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.335*	0.387*	0.365*
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)
CPG Score x Min. Party Leader	0.412*	0.412*	0.403*
	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.101)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.043	0.036	0.026
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.067	0.065	0.069*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.015	0.013	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
CPG Score	-0.015	0.007	0.016
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Maj. Party Leader	0.396*	0.378*	0.413*
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Min. Party Leader	0.221*	0.231*	0.261*
	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Committee Chair	0.052*	0.061*	0.094*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Ranking Member	-0.008	-0.007	0.013
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Majority Status	0.027*	0.018	0.022
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Quality Challenger		0.037*	0.034*
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Uncontested Election		-0.001	-0.002
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Safeness of District		-0.274*	-0.268*
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Midterm		-0.006	-0.006
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Same Party as President		-0.015*	-0.017*
		(0.007)	(0.007)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.013	0.013
		(0.009)	(0.009)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.019
			(0.013)
Seniority			-0.003*
			(0.001)
Constant	0.229*	0.364*	0.371*
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Observations	7140	6823	6799
Adjusted R^2	0.127	0.160	0.164
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.001	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.001	0.001	0.002

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

The reference category is minority party rank-and-file.

A.3.7 Member Fixed Effects

Table A11 – Member Fixed Effects Specification

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.241*	0.325*	0.320*	0.238*	0.377*	0.370*
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.094)
CPG Score x Min. Party Leader	0.214*	0.202*	0.195*	0.420*	0.398*	0.382*
	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.112)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	0.056*	0.067*	0.063*	0.075*	0.083*	0.074*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	-0.011	-0.009	-0.018	0.016	0.013	-0.003
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)
CPG Score x Majority Status	0.073*	0.060*	0.056*	0.069*	0.052*	0.042*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
CPG Score	-0.038*	-0.022	-0.046*	-0.023	-0.005	-0.051*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Maj. Party Leader	0.193*	0.132	0.133	0.486*	0.392*	0.393*
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.081)
Min. Party Leader	0.133	0.146	0.148	0.124	0.146	0.152
	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.103)	(0.100)	(0.099)
Committee Chair	0.045*	0.035	0.037	0.052*	0.044	0.047
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Ranking Member	0.074*	0.065*	0.070*	0.056	0.052	0.060*
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Majority Status	-0.038*	-0.028*	-0.025	-0.031*	-0.016	-0.009
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Quality Challenger		0.058*	0.058*		0.058*	0.057*
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Uncontested Election		-0.042*	-0.042*		-0.039*	-0.038*
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.196*	-0.196*		-0.166*	-0.176*
		(0.028)	(0.029)		(0.031)	(0.032)
Midterm		-0.001	-0.002		-0.002	-0.003
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Same Party as President		-0.002	-0.003		0.002	-0.000
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.009	0.009		0.009	0.010
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.006)	(0.005)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.008			0.008
			(0.009)			(0.010)
Seniority			0.002*			0.004*
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Constant	0.261*	0.351*	0.356*	0.245*	0.313*	0.331*
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Observations	7529	7196	7170	7145	6827	6803
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.033	0.002	0.002	0.097	0.002	0.002
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.027	0.032	0.030	0.001	0.001	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$.

The reference category is minority party rank-and-file.

A.3.8 District Ideology

Table A12 – Results for District-Level Ideology Measure

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pres CPG x Party Leader	0.227*	0.285*	0.280*	0.510*	0.597*	0.595*
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Pres CPG x Committee Leader	0.068*	0.063*	0.062*	0.105*	0.099*	0.099*
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Pres CPG	-0.013*	0.014*	0.015*	-0.020*	0.007	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party Leader	0.367*	0.361*	0.372*	0.518*	0.506*	0.511*
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Committee Leader	0.021*	0.030*	0.041*	0.023*	0.032*	0.038*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Quality Challenger		0.072*	0.070*		0.066*	0.066*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.034*	-0.035*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.357*	-0.353*		-0.337*	-0.333*
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Midterm		-0.007	-0.007		-0.009	-0.009
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Same Party as President		-0.018*	-0.018*		-0.017*	-0.017*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.024*	0.024*		0.026*	0.025*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.031*			0.031*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Seniority			-0.001*			-0.001
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Constant	0.248*	0.426*	0.429*	0.245*	0.413*	0.413*
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	7530	7196	7170	7146	6827	6803
Adjusted R^2	0.100	0.225	0.228	0.207	0.297	0.300
F p-value	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * p $<$ 0.05. The reference category is rank-and-file.

A.3.9 Additional Robustness Checks

Table A13 – Results for Sample Without Speakers

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Party Leader	0.193*	0.232*	0.227*	0.502*	0.557*	0.554*
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.060)
CPG Score x Committee Leader	0.053*	0.053*	0.053*	0.092*	0.087*	0.087*
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
CPG Score	-0.011	0.011*	0.013*	-0.016*	0.008	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Party Leader	0.324*	0.307*	0.320*	0.348*	0.323*	0.328*
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Committee Leader	0.010	0.017	0.028*	-0.002	0.009	0.014
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Quality Challenger		0.072*	0.071*		0.067*	0.066*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Uncontested Election		-0.040*	-0.041*		-0.033*	-0.035*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Safeness of District		-0.353*	-0.349*		-0.333*	-0.329*
		(0.016)	(0.016)		(0.017)	(0.017)
Midterm		-0.008	-0.008		-0.010*	-0.010*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Same Party as President		-0.017*	-0.018*		-0.017*	-0.017*
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.024*	0.024*		0.025*	0.024*
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.030*			0.031*
			(0.010)			(0.011)
Seniority			-0.001*			-0.001
			(0.000)			(0.001)
Constant	0.250*	0.421*	0.424*	0.249*	0.408*	0.407*
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	7512	7178	7152	7129	6810	6786
Adjusted R^2	0.083	0.210	0.213	0.170	0.262	0.265
F p-value	0.012	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * p $<$ 0.05. The reference category is rank-and-file.

Table A14 – Results for Sample Restricted to Senior Members (At Least 4 Terms)

	Without Leadership Committees			With Leadership Committees		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CPG Score x Maj. Party Leader	0.311*	0.422*	0.424*	0.644*	0.810*	0.812*
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.143)
CPG Score x Min. Party Leader	0.268	0.236	0.234	0.790*	0.762*	0.761*
	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.174)	(0.169)	(0.169)
CPG Score x Committee Chair	-0.013	0.005	0.006	0.052	0.065	0.066
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)
CPG Score x Ranking Member	0.043	0.026	0.026	0.070	0.041	0.041
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)
CPG Score x Majority Status	-0.020	-0.051	-0.050	-0.013	-0.054	-0.053
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)
CPG Score	-0.072*	-0.025	-0.025	-0.073*	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Maj. Party Leader	0.675*	0.622*	0.621*	0.935*	0.857*	0.856*
	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Min. Party Leader	0.644*	0.668*	0.664*	0.555*	0.576*	0.573*
	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Committee Chair	0.149*	0.152*	0.150*	0.130*	0.134*	0.132*
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Ranking Member	0.073	0.073	0.072	0.065	0.075	0.074
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Majority Status	0.057*	0.074*	0.074*	0.063*	0.094*	0.094*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Quality Challenger		0.129*	0.128*		0.115*	0.115*
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Uncontested Election		-0.054*	-0.054*		-0.038*	-0.037*
		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Safeness of District		-0.516*	-0.516*		-0.491*	-0.491*
		(0.041)	(0.041)		(0.043)	(0.043)
Midterm		0.011	0.012		0.003	0.003
		(0.013)	(0.013)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Same Party as President		0.020	0.020		0.033*	0.033*
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.015)	(0.015)
Midterm x Same Party as President		0.002	0.002		0.004	0.004
		(0.019)	(0.019)		(0.020)	(0.020)
Seeking Senate Seat			0.070*			0.068*
			(0.031)			(0.032)
Seniority			0.001			0.001
			(0.001)			(0.002)
Constant	0.439*	0.662*	0.656*	0.421*	0.616*	0.610*
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Observations	4190	3996	3996	4010	3822	3822
Adjusted R^2	0.166	0.236	0.236	0.284	0.335	0.336
$F_{Majority}$ p-value	0.014	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
$F_{Minority}$ p-value	0.149	0.163	0.165	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. The reference category is minority party rank-and-file.

A.4 Newspaper Coverage

A.4.1 More on Theory, Data, Measures and Methods

Ban et al. (2017) provide a systematic validation of using newspaper coverage to measure political power. Their complete set of cases is as follows: (i) comparing the relative coverage of congressional committees to the desirability of committees based on member transfer requests; (ii) examining coverage of members of Congress before, during, and after they are Speaker of the House; (iii) estimating the change in the relative coverage of mayors in cities that changed from a mayor-council to a council-manager form of government; (iv) investigating the effect of the passage of a reform that stripped the Massachusetts Governor's Council of most of its powers on the relative coverage of the Council; and (v) looking at the relative coverage of the President in the context of tariff policymaking authority before and after the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. For example, in the third validation test using mayors, the authors study the newspaper coverage of three local offices: mayor, city council, and city manager. Historically, many cities have switched from a mayor-council form of government (where there is a mayor endowed with strong executive authority) to a council-manager form of government (where the council appoints a city manager to oversee the operation of the executive branch and the mayor has little to no executive authority). Through a series of checks, the authors find that the relative amounts of newspaper coverage for the three local offices of interest do indeed capture the clear change in relative power associated with the changes in city government structure.

Figure A10 – Newspaper-Specific Trends



Figure A10 plots the trend in *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* across the 1890-2014 time period for each of the eight individual newspapers. The thick black line represents the overall average. As the figure demonstrates, while the level varies by newspaper, the trends largely move together

for all of the newspapers. In other words, there are gaps in *Party Leader Percentage of Hits* from newspaper to newspaper, but the trends largely move in parallel.

A.4.2 Results

In Figure A11, we plot the relationship between the relative newspaper coverage of party leaders and the CPG score calculated from the presidential vote in the district (see Section A.2.2) for the period 1978-2014. The correlation between relative newspaper coverage and *Pres CPG Score* is 0.84.

Figure A11 – Percentage Party Leader Hits vs. Presidential Vote CPG Score