DISCUSSION: WHEN GAMBLING FOR RESURRECTION IS TOO RISKY

BY: DIVYA KIRTI


Gabriel Chodorow-Reich Harvard University and NBER

IMF Annual Macro-Financial Research Conference April 11, 2018

OVERVIEW


- Great paper!
- Ontradicts much academic and practitioner wisdom around financial risk taking.
- Goes beyond earlier literature on financial risk to isolate decline in risk taking.
- My comments:
 - Review results.
 - Interpretation.
 - Implications.

KEY RESULT 1



- Underappreciated how much of insurance sector was nearly insolvent.
- CDS spreads give similar picture.

KEY RESULT 2




- "Hit hard" insurers start buying lower yield, safer bonds when the crisis starts.
- Regressions confirm result holds within rating category.

INTERPRETATION

- Two main sources of profits for life insurers:
 - Sales markup on policies.
 - Asset insulation: target asset portfolio to illiquid assets and time purchases.
- Both sources create franchise value.
- Franchise value depends on insurer remaining solvent:
 - Future sales require insurer to still be selling policies.
 - 2 Asset insulation disappears if insurer has to liquidate portfolio.
- Primacy of asset insulation view: if insurer cares most about maintaining solvency to take advantage of future sales, would invest portfolio in safe assets.

ASSET ALLOCATION



Source: Chodorow-Reich, Ghent and Haddad.

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 - ▶ \$0.15 higher equity out of financial crisis.
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- Distressed insurers buy safer bonds during a crisis because:
 - They do not benefit as much by holding a distressed bond because they value it at its market price.
 - They want to reduce overall portfolio risk to tilt valuation of other assets toward long-run values.

IMPLICATIONS

- Paper focuses on rejecting risk-shifting view. I agree.
- Asset insulation view: want insurers to hold risky assets.
- Post-crisis risk environment:
 - Policy makers concerned about "reach-for-yield". Some argued it should limit monetary stimulus.
 - ▶ These insurers took less risk, not more.
 - ► Maybe system overall needed more, not less risk-taking by financial institutions in crisis aftermath.

Appendix slides