

DISCUSSION:
SHOPPING FOR LOWER SALES TAX RATES
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OVERVIEW

- ① Review and comment on main findings.
- ② Discuss negative contribution.
- ③ Discuss positive contribution.

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- ⑤ Larger effects on more durable goods.
- ⑥ Little to no long-run spending response.

MODEL RESULTS

- Four prices facing consumer: $(1 + \tau_-) P_-^n, (1 + \tau_+) P_+^n, P_-^e, P_+^e$.
 - Anticipated shock: $\tau_+ > \tau_-$.
 - Full pass-through assumption: $P_-^e = P_+^e, P_-^n = P_+^n$.
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- Full pass-through assumption: $P_-^e = P_+^e, P_-^n = P_+^n$.
 - ▶ Crucial to equate long-run spending with consumption.
 - ▶ Theory and previous evidence consistent with $P_+^n \leq P_-^n$.
 - ▶ Testable using KNCP. Discuss and report it.
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
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 - ▶ Spending by agents far away?
 - ★ Maybe? Endogeneity of sales tax changes. Also an issue here...
 - ★ Unemployment rate control helpful but not perfect.
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
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
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
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
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- Broader data sets: Polk (auto spending, zipcode), CE (total spending, public state or confidential zipcode).

PRICING AND ADVERTISING

- Dorfman and Steiner (1954) model:

$$\max_{P_i, A_i} \{ P_i Y_i - C(Y_i) - \kappa A_i \}$$

s.t.

$$Y_i = \xi(A_i) \left(\frac{P_i}{P} \right)^{-\sigma} Y$$

and where:

$$Y = \left[\int_0^1 \xi_i^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} Y_i^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} di \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$

$$P = \left[\int_0^1 \xi_i P_i^{1-\sigma} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},$$

$$\xi_i = \xi(A_i) = A_i^\gamma.$$

IMPLICATIONS OF DORFMAN-STEINER

$$\text{FOC } (P_i): \quad P_i = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} C'(Y_i).$$

$$\text{FOC } (A_i): \quad A_i = \left(\frac{\gamma \sigma^{-1}}{\kappa} \right) P_i Y_i.$$

- Suppose Y up due to expenditure shifting before tax increase:
 - ▶ $\partial P_i / \partial Y_i > 0$ (if convex costs).
 - ▶ $\partial A_i / \partial (P_i Y_i) > 0$.
- Price response may undo part of tax jump.
- Advertising may amplify response of exempt items.
- Complications if sales used for advertising purpose.

ADVERTISING



NITPICKING/QUESTIONS

- Interpretation of Google Trends difficult. More search could mean less available information.
- Store advertising and newspaper articles could be complements or substitutes.
- Hard to interpret interaction with newspaper coverage. News articles could be about anticipatory spending responses (reverse causality).
- Allocating income effects to date of law passage possibly internally inconsistent. Ricardian equivalence implies no income effects.
Salience implies income effects emerge at implementation.
- Endogeneity: stack into event time and control for unemployment rate, consumption growth at passage.
- Description of data in paper incomplete:
 - ▶ Thomson OneSource reports exempt categories? What about hand-collected data?
 - ▶ KNCP item spending is net of tax. What about total trip amount?

CONCLUSION

- Interesting results.
- Negative and positive contribution.
- Policy? Depends on wealth effects at announcement. Large deficit-financed local government spending multipliers (Chodorow-Reich, 2017). Suggestive that temporary sales taxes are effective financing.

Appendix slides