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January/February 2019 Free LD Brief

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# Introduction

Friends of Premier Debate,

This is Premier’s third brief of the 2018-2019 season, and the topic is **“Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.”** This topic is an anomaly – we haven’t had a foreign policy topic that specifies the United States in ages! As coaches and judges, we are looking forward to seeing students hone their foreign policy skills on this rare topic with tangible, U.S. specific solvency and impacts.

**This brief includes 200 cards** to give you a running start on researching this topic. On the AFF, we’ve provided all of the cards necessary for two ACs (the Saudi Arabia plan and the Egypt plan), as well as evidence for numerous other potential plans and advantage areas. On the NEG, we’ve included multiple generic CPs, DAs, Ks and NCs, as well as complete strategies against some of the most popular AFFs on the topic. We’ve also covered a wide array of different philosophical arguments on both sides of the debate and have included multiple topicality interpretations to help you frame the debate.

We want to remind the readers about standard brief practice to get the most out of this file. Best practice for brief use is to **use this as a guide for further research**. Use the citations to find the articles and cut them for your own personal knowledge. You’ll find even better cards that way. If you want to use the evidence in here in a pinch, you should at least re-tag and highlight the evidence yourself so you know exactly what it says and how you’re going to use it. Remember, briefs can be a tremendous resource but you need to familiarize yourself with the underlying material first.

We’re always looking for ways to make the briefs better, so please, let us know what you think! And, if you use these briefs please help us direct other debaters to premierdebate.com/briefs where we will continue uploading .doc versions of the briefs.

If you like what we’re doing and these cards have been helpful to you, **consider signing up for online coaching through Premier Debate.** Our coaches were elite competitors in their own right and have coached students to elimination rounds, earning TOC bids, and qualifying to state and national championships. See premierdebate.com/coaching for more details!

Finally, we’d like to thank ­­­­­­­­Amy Santos, our lead organizer for this year’s briefs, and researchers Danny Li, Kevin Krotz, and Peter Zhang for their help on Jan/Feb. These are some of the best, round-ready cards you’ll see on the topic, and we couldn’t have done it without them! **Our briefs have always been free, and if you’d like to support our writers and this project, please consider donating at paypal.me/premierdebate**.

Good luck everyone. See you ‘round!

Bob Overing & John Scoggin

Directors | Premier Debate

# Affirmative

## Inherency

### General

#### The U.S. currently provides aid to over 73% of the world’s dictatorships.

Whitney 17 Rich Whitney [Truthout Contributor] "US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of World's Dictatorships." TruthOut - News Analysis. 09/23/2017. [Premier].

For decades, the American people have been repeatedly told by their government and corporate-run media that acts of war ordered by their president have been largely motivated by the need to counter acts of aggression or oppression by “evil dictators.” We were told we had to invade Iraq because Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator. We had to bomb Libya because Muammar Gaddafi was an evil dictator, bent on unleashing a “bloodbath” on his own people. Today, of course, we are told that we should support insurgents in Syria because Bashar al-Assad is an evil dictator, and we must repeatedly rattle our sabers at North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and Russia’s Vladimir Putin because they, too, are evil dictators. This is part of the larger, usually unquestioned mainstream corporate media narrative that the US leads the “Western democracies” in a global struggle to combat terrorism and totalitarianism and promote democracy. I set out to answer a simple question: Is it true? Does the US government actually oppose dictatorships and champion democracy around the world, as we are repeatedly told? The truth is not easy to find, but federal sources do provide an answer: No. According to Freedom House‘s rating system of political rights around the world, there were 49 nations in the world, as of 2015, that can be fairly categorized as “dictatorships.” As of fiscal year 2015, the last year for which we have publicly available data, the federal government of the United States had been providing military assistance to 36 of them, courtesy of your tax dollars. The United States currently supports over 73 percent of the world’s dictatorships!

#### Status quo restrictions are either flawed or unenforced.

Hill ’17 Hill, Evan (Writer and Researcher based in the Middle East). “The Dangers of Arming Autocrats.” *Forbes*. 13 June 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/saudi-arabia-weapons-deal/529689/>. [Premier]

In theory, U.S. law came down in favor of values more than half a century ago, when Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act in the first year of the Kennedy administration, banning security assistance to any government that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” U.S. security assistance, Congress wrote at the time, should be provided in a way that promotes human rights and avoids identifying the United States with abusive governments. Fifteen years later, the Arms Control Export Act set up elaborate procedures to regulate U.S. government and commercial arms sales and stated that the purpose of such sales should be limited to essentially three areas: supporting friendly nations’ internal security, legitimate self-defense, or participation in United Nations-sanctioned actions. The last major piece of legislation, passed 20 years ago by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, forbids the United States from training or equipping any unit of a foreign security force if there is “credible evidence” that the unit has committed “gross violations of human rights.”But this regime of rights-based restrictions has failed miserably to prevent U.S. weapons from flowing to abusive governments, especially in the lax environment of the seemingly never-ending conflict against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and whatever progeny will take their place. Michael Newton, a retired Army officer and professor at the Vanderbilt University School of Law, recently wrote a persuasive argument for the American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights that arms sales to Saudi Arabia, based on that country’s various abuses both domestic and international, violate the conditions of the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Control Export Act. “Saudi Arabia presents an apparent prima facie case for the immediate cessation of sales under the FAA,” Newton wrote. Even the Leahy Law, which theoretically enables the State Department to ban aid to abusive units based on even circumstantial evidence of violations, is riddled with holes. A 2016 report on military aid to Egypt by the Government Accountability Office found that the State Department was failing to record human-rights abuses committed by Egyptian security forces in its internal database, did not have the organizational charts necessary to identify problematic Egyptian units and, predictably, could not track some types of aid, like ammunition, to their final unit. In practice, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, which has lead responsibility for vetting under the Leahy Law, barely has the manpower to sift through the billions of dollars of arms purchases supported by U.S. subsidies in the form of foreign military financing, leaving foreign military sales—the exponentially larger purchases countries make with their own cash—almost unsupervised. While the Comey hearing may have rekindled Democrats’ dreams of a premature end to the Trump administration, the president’s arms dealing in Saudi Arabia highlighted a deeper strain of U.S. policy that seems destined to outlast him.

#### Reforms to military assistance aren’t coming now.

Powers ’08 Powers, Elizabeth (Law Clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay, holds B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Minnesota, and a J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law). “Greed, Guns, and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries.” *North Dakota Law Review*, Volume 84, pgs. 405. 2008. <https://law.und.edu/_files/docs/ndlr/pdf/issues/84/2/84ndlr383.pdf>. [Premier]

The deleterious effects of previous U.S. military assistance and arms sales to DR Congo and other corrupt and brutal governments are ubiquitous throughout the developing world. Yet the United States continues to allow arms sales and provides military assistance to questionable governments, often with egregious human rights violations on their rap-sheets.246 Such arms and military assistance are vital to the stability of the recipient government, affording it the ability to protect itself from internal and external enemies and entrench itself in power.247 A substantive change in U.S. military assistance policy seems unlikely. Congress recently enacted the American Service-Members Protection Act,248 which would cut military aid for any country that became party to the Rome Statute, which is the charter document for the International Criminal Court.249 With very limited exceptions under the Act, military aid is only available for countries party to the Rome Statute which enter into agreements with the United States pursuant to Article 98 (i.e., “Article 98 Agreements”).250 Article 98 Agreements prevent the International Criminal Court from proceeding against U.S. personnel within the country’s borders.251 An indicator of the significance of military aid to developing countries is reflected by the large number of Article 98 Agreements entered into with developing countries.252

### Saudi Arabia

#### Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian regime.

Wehrey 15 Frederic Wehrey. "The Authoritarian Resurgence: Saudi Arabia's Anxious Autocrats." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April, 2015. [Premier].

One of the world’s last remaining bastions of absolute monarchy, the oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursues throughout the broader Middle East and beyond an activist foreign policy that is largely nonideological, realist, and defensive in intent, but negative in its implications for democracy. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia has intervened in a number of transitioning states with the aim of countering the challenges posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafi jihadism as embodied by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. While the intent of such interference may not be explicitly antidemocratic, many of the recipients of Saudi support have been authoritarian and antiliberal.1 The ultimate effect has been damaging to the spread of democratization and political pluralism. When 90-year-old King Abdullah died in January 2015, the royal regime’s Allegiance Council, an appointed panel of 28 princes tasked with ensuring a smooth succession, swiftly named 79-year-old Crown Prince Salman as the new king. The Council then designated his 69-year-old half-brother Muqrin as his successor, with 55-year-old Muhammad bin Nayef as the next in line after Muqrin. The speedy process was a display of unity and political efficiency that must have seemed all the more crucial to Saudi Arabia’s rulers as they noted how rebels with ties to Iran had just overrun the capital of neighboring Yemen, forced out its president, and pushed that already turbulent country closer to full-blown state collapse. Increasingly, Saudi Arabia’s reach is global, with robust trade links to the powerhouse economies of Northeast Asia, burgeoning security and defense ties to South Asia, and longstanding bonds with Muslim communities across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although Saudi Arabia is not a revolutionary power bent on exporting its brand of authoritarian governance, its foreign policy is counterdemocratic in effect. Within the region, Saudi money and influence have been used to block the ascendance of groups that the royal family deems a threat to its security at home. The Saudi regional strategy is rooted in the monarchy’s view of the 2011 uprisings not as the Arab Spring but as the Arab Troubles—upheavals that brought sectarian strife, Iranian expansionism, newfound prominence for the Muslim Brothers, and fresh strains of jihadism such as the one that drives the Islamic State.

#### The US provides weapons, intelligence, and financial aid to Saudi Arabia to back its war effort.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

As public anger over America’s role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America’s longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking “demonstrable actions” to avoid harming civilians and making a “good faith” effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and billions of dollars worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force.

### Egypt

#### Egypt is the recipient of the second greatest amount of military aid from the US – 1.3 billion dollars.

Thompson 15 Nick Thompson [CNN reporter]. "Seventy-five percent of US foreign military financing goes to two countries." CNN politics. November 11, 2015. [Premier].

American taxpayers doled out $5.9 billion in foreign military financing in 2014, according to the government's Foreign Assistance report -- that's roughly the GDP of Somalia. But where did the money go? To the usual suspects, mostly -- Israel ($3.1B) and Egypt ($1.3B) received roughly 75% of all foreign military aid money handed out by the U.S. last year. This map from the cost-information website howmuch.net shows the relative size of countries based on how much U.S. military aid they receive.

#### Egypt is once again an authoritarian regime.

Hamzawy 17 Amr Hamzawy [Studies political science and developmental studies at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]. "Legislating Authoritarianism: Egypt's New Era of Repression." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 16, 2017. [Premier].

After a brief democratic opening, a new authoritarian regime has emerged in Egypt. The military establishment, security services, and intelligence agencies now rule the country and have managed to reintroduce fear as a daily constant in a nation still in dire straits. This stands in stark contrast to the period following the 2011 revolution, which fostered the activity of civil society and political parties and encouraged citizens to freely express their opinions and engage in the political process. Once again, power is held by a military officer who was pushed into the presidential palace after elections that lacked any measure of democratic competition.1 Images of peacefully protesting masses and citizens waiting in long lines to cast ballots have been replaced by scenes of police units rounding up young Egyptians after attempted peaceful demonstrations, confirmed reports of torture in places of custody, and forced disappearances.

#### Sisi has massacred and imprisoned thousands of political dissidents, and handed out record numbers of death sentences in mass trials. Trump has only increased military aid to Egypt.

Al-Arian 18 Lama Al-Arian. "U.S. Military Aid to Egypt Gives a 'Green Light' to Repression, Says Rights Advocates." NPR. August 8, 2018. [Premier].

The Trump administration's recent decision to release $195 million in military aid to Egypt has left rights experts stunned and deeply worried. A year ago, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suspended that sum because Egypt's human rights record didn't meet the standards imposed by Congress. Since that time, the space for civic freedoms in Egypt has shrunk, researchers say. Egypt's security forces have continued to lock up groups labeled dissidents or terrorists, and courts have handed down mass death sentences in cases widely criticized as politically motivated. The U.S. aid reversal comes in support of a regime that researchers say is even more authoritarian than ousted ruler Hosni Mubarak. "This sends all of the wrong signals to the Egyptian generals that the rhetoric about human rights is merely lip service," says Mohamed Soltan, a U.S. citizen who spent almost two years as a political prisoner in Egypt until he was released in 2015. "It is a green light to carry on with the repressive policies." On July 25, the State Department said it decided to release the money because the Middle Eastern country has taken steps in response to U.S. concerns, but didn't specify what progress has been made.

#### Egypt is a sham democracy

Binde 18 Seth Binde [Expert in security assistance and Middle East affairs at Strategic Research & Analysis] and William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy]. "Time to Rethink U.S. Military Aid to Egypt." LobeLog. March 28, 2018. [Premier].

At this point the government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is a democracy in name only. The only genuine candidates against al-Sisi in next week’s elections have withdrawn due to intimidation from the regime, including one who was jailed upon announcing his intention to run for president. And the remaining contender, who comes from a party that initially backed al-Sisi, has said that he’s not even interested in a pre-election debate because he’s “not here to challenge the president.”

## Solvency

### Free Development

#### Free development is empirically proven to better solve domestic problems in authoritarian regimes.

Easterly 14 William Easterly [co-director of NYU's Development Research Institute and author of The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor]. "Stop Sending Aid to Dictators." Time Magazine. March 13, 2014. [Premier].

But there is another model: free development, in which poor individuals, asserting their political and economic rights, motivate government and private actors to solve their problems or to give them the means to solve their own problems. Compare free development in Botswana with authoritarian development in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia in 2010, Human Rights Watch documented how the autocrat Meles Zenawi selectively withheld aid-financed famine relief from everyone except ruling-party members. Meanwhile democratic Botswana, although drought-prone like Ethiopia, has enjoyed decades of success in preventing famine. Government relief directed by local activists goes wherever drought strikes. In the postwar period, countries such as Chile, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have successfully followed the path of free development–often in spite of international aid, not because of it. While foreign policy concerns have often led America to prop up dictatorial regimes, we need a new rule: no democracy, no aid. If we truly want to help the poor, we can’t accept the dictators’ false bargain: ignore our rights abuses, and meet the material needs of those we oppress. Instead, we must advocate that the poor have the same rights as the rich everywhere, so they can aid themselves.

## Advantage Areas

### Authoritarianism

#### US military bases abroad prop up and legitimate authoritarian regimes.

Vine 17 Vine, David. [Contributor/Associate Professor of Anthropology, American University.] “How U.S. Military Bases Back Dictators, Autocrats, And Military Regimes.” The Huffington Post. 05/16/2017. [Premier]

Many of the 45 present-day undemocratic U.S. base hosts qualify as fully “authoritarian regimes,” according to the Economist Democracy Index. In such cases, American installations and the troops stationed on them are effectively helping block the spread of democracy in countries like Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kuwait, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This pattern of daily support for dictatorship and repression around the world should be a national scandal in a country supposedly committed to democracy. It should trouble Americans ranging from religious conservatives and libertarians to leftists ― anyone, in fact, who believes in the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. After all, one of the long-articulated justifications for maintaining military bases abroad has been that the U.S. military’s presence protects and spreads democracy. Far from bringing democracy to these lands, however, such bases tend to provide legitimacy for and prop up undemocratic regimes of all sorts, while often interfering with genuine efforts to encourage political and democratic reform. The silencing of the critics of human rights abuses in base hosts like Bahrain, which has violently cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators since 2011, has left the United States complicit in these states’ crimes. During the Cold War, bases in undemocratic countries were often justified as the unfortunate but necessary consequence of confronting the “communist menace” of the Soviet Union. But here’s the curious thing: in the quarter century, since the Cold War ended with that empire’s implosion, few of those bases have closed. Today, while a White House visit from an autocrat may generate indignation, the presence of such installations in countries run by repressive or military rulers receives little notice at all.

#### Authoritarian rulers take advantage of US reliance on base support to shore up support and crush opposition.

Vine 17 Vine, David. [Contributor/Associate Professor of Anthropology, American University.] “How U.S. Military Bases Back Dictators, Autocrats, And Military Regimes.” The Huffington Post. 05/16/2017. [Premier]

Authoritarian rulers tend to be well aware of the desire of U.S. officials to maintain the status quo when it comes to bases. As a result, they often capitalize on a base presence to extract benefits or help ensure their own political survival. The Philippines’ Marcos, former South Korean dictator Syngman Rhee, and more recently Djibouti’s Ismail Omar Guelleh have been typical in the way they used bases to extract economic assistance from Washington, which they then lavished on political allies to shore up their power. Others have relied on such bases to bolster their international prestige and legitimacy or to justify violence against domestic political opponents. After the 1980 Kwangju massacre in which the South Korean government killed hundreds, if not thousands, of pro-democracy demonstrators, strongman General Chun Doo-hwan explicitly cited the presence of U.S. bases and troops to suggest that his actions enjoyed Washington’s support. Whether or not that was true is still a matter of historical debate. What’s clear, however, is that American leaders have regularly muted their criticism of repressive regimes lest they imperil bases in these countries. In addition, such a presence tends to strengthen military, rather than civilian, institutions in countries because of the military-to-military ties, arms sales, and training missions that generally accompany basing agreements. Meanwhile, opponents of repressive regimes often use the bases as a tool to rally nationalist sentiment, anger, and protest against both ruling elites and the United States. That, in turn, tends to fuel fears in Washington that a transition to democracy might lead to base eviction, often leading to a doubling down on support for undemocratic rulers. The result can be an escalating cycle of opposition and U.S.-backed repression.

#### US base presence in authoritarian regimes causes radical militancy and terrorism.

Vine 17 Vine, David. [Contributor/Associate Professor of Anthropology, American University.] “How U.S. Military Bases Back Dictators, Autocrats, And Military Regimes.” The Huffington Post. 05/16/2017. [Premier]

While some defend the presence of bases in undemocratic countries as necessary to deter “bad actors” and support “U.S. interests” (primarily corporate ones), backing dictators and autocrats frequently leads to harm not just for the citizens of host nations but for U.S. citizens as well. The base build-up in the Middle East has proven the most prominent example of this. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, which both unfolded in 1979, the Pentagon has built up scores of bases across the Middle East at a cost of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. According to former West Point professor Bradley Bowman, such bases and the troops that go with them have been a “major catalyst for anti-Americanism and radicalization.” Research has similarly revealed a correlation between the bases and al-Qaeda recruitment. Most catastrophically, outposts in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan have helped generate and fuel the radical militancy that has spread throughout the Greater Middle East and led to terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States. The presence of such bases and troops in Muslim holy lands was, after all, a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s professed motivation for the 9/11 attacks. With the Trump administration seeking to entrench its renewed base presence in the Philippines and the president commending Duterte and similarly authoritarian leaders in Bahrain and Egypt, Turkey and Thailand, human rights violations are likely to escalate, fueling unknown brutality and baseworld blowback for years to come.

#### Without political rights for native citizens, benefits from US foreign aid are short-lived, with the long-term consequence being more powerful dictators.

Easterly 14 William Easterly [co-director of NYU's Development Research Institute and author of The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor]. "Stop Sending Aid to Dictators." Time Magazine. March 13, 2014. [Premier].

Too much of America’s foreign aid funds what I call authoritarian development. That’s when the international community–experts from the U.N. and other bodies–swoop into third-world countries and offer purely technical assistance to dictatorships like Uganda or Ethiopia on how to solve poverty. Unfortunately, dictators’ sole motivation is to stay in power. So the development experts may get some roads built, but they are not maintained. Experts may sink boreholes for clean water, but the wells break down. Individuals do not have the political rights to protest disastrous public services, so they never improve. Meanwhile, dictators are left with cash and services to prop themselves up–while punishing their enemies.

#### Middle Eastern military exploit US aid to strengthen their hold on domestic politics.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller [scholar in Carnegie's Middle Eastern Program] and Richard Sokolsky [senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program]. "What has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not much." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Feb 27, 2018. [Premier]

Meanwhile, Middle Eastern militaries have exploited arms sales to buttress their prestige and to support local patronage networks, both of which help to sustain their dominant position in domestic politics. Egypt’s procurement of over 1,000 M1A1 Abrams tanks, for instance, has less to do with their military value than with the Egyptian jobs supported by a co-production plant in country. The Egyptian Armed Forces have so far opted not to deploy M1A1s in combat in the restive Sinai Peninsula.

#### US foreign aid preserves corrupt authoritarian government; as long as a country can depend on foreign aid, they don’t need to be accountable to its own people. Swanson summarizes Deaton:

Swanson 15 Ana Swanson [A reporter for Wonkblog specializing in business, economics, data visualization and China]. "Does foreign aid always help the poor?" World Economic Forum. October 23, 2015. [Premier].

Why was this happening? The answer wasn’t immediately clear, but Deaton and other economists argued that it had to do with how foreign money changed the relationship between a government and its people. Think of it this way: In order to have the funding to run a country, a government needs to collect taxes from its people. Since the people ultimately hold the purse strings, they have a certain amount of control over their government. If leaders don’t deliver the basic services they promise, the people have the power to cut them off. Deaton argued that foreign aid can weaken this relationship, leaving a government less accountable to its people, the congress or parliament, and the courts. “My critique of aid has been more to do with countries where they get an enormous amount of aid relative to everything else that goes on in that country,” Deaton said in an interview with Wonkblog. “For instance, most governments depend on their people for taxes in order to run themselves and provide services to their people. Governments that get all their money from aid don’t have that at all, and I think of that as very corrosive.” It might seem odd that having more money would not help a poor country. Yet economists have long observed that countries that have an abundance of wealth from natural resources, like oil or diamonds, tend to be more unequal, less developed and more impoverished, as the chart below shows. Countries at the left-hand side of the chart have fewer fuels, ores and metals and higher growth, while those at the right-hand side have more natural resource wealth, yet slower growth. Economists postulate that this “natural resource curse” happens for a variety of reasons, but one is that such wealth can strengthen and corrupt a government.

### Militarism

#### The biggest profiteers of US aid are US military contractors.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller [scholar in Carnegie's Middle Eastern Program] and Richard Sokolsky [senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program]. "What has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not much." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Feb 27, 2018. [Premier]

Under existing conditions, U.S. interests and taxpayers are not the primary beneficiaries of military assistance and arms sales. Instead, it is U.S. defense contractors and regional militaries that often prioritize domestic political influence over operational capabilities. In recent years, the U.S. arms industry has registered record profits, a pattern likely to continue given President Trump’s initiative to expedite government approval of weapons sales. Indeed, the State Department cleared a record number of arms sales in Fiscal Year 2017 ($75.9 billion). While champions of the U.S. arms industry defend it as an engine of job growth, economists have found that investments in other industries are more efficient job generators.

### Accountability

#### America’s inability to hold clients accountable for their use of aid encourages moral hazard.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller [scholar in Carnegie's Middle Eastern Program] and Richard Sokolsky [senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program]. "What has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not much." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Feb 27, 2018. [Premier]

A second and related problem is that the U.S. government does a poor job of holding allies and clients to account for behavior that runs counter to American interests. There is no systematic review of what U.S. military assistance accomplishes. The key questions that rarely get asked, let alone answered, are what does the U.S. want and expect from the assistance we provide and how does this aid help or hurt America’s ability to achieve these goals? If the U.S. cannot identify actions that the recipient would not have otherwise taken as a result of this assistance, then it is nothing more than a welfare program, and has two pernicious effects. First, it encourages “moral hazard”—recipients to do whatever they want with the assistance without having to fear the consequences of their actions. Second, it creates “reverse leverage”— Washington bends over backwards to keep relations smooth and the assistance flowing, rather than leverage the recipient’s dependence on U.S. military support and political commitments.

### Terrorism

#### US support for repressive regimes has an augmentative effect on anti-American terrorism.

Gries et al 14 Thomas Gries, Daniel Meierrieks [Research Fellow at the Department of Economics at the University of Freiburg], and Margarete Redlin [Research Associate at the Department of Economics of the University of Paderborn]. "Providing aid to oppressive terrorist source countries does not make the U.S. any safer." London School of Economics US Centre. December 15, 2014. [Premier].

In recent years the U.S. government has increasingly tied its foreign assistance policy to national security concerns. Here, one goal of U.S. aid is to reduce U.S. vulnerability to transnational terrorism by delegating the fight against a common enemy (i.e., terrorist organizations) to the source countries of terrorism. However, there is little empirical support that this idea actually works. Rather, the evidence suggests that activist foreign policies are associated with more (anti-American) terrorism. Hence, an important question is: Why is the U.S. more vulnerable to terrorism originating from countries receiving the most development and military aid? The augmentative effect of U.S. aid on anti-American terrorism may be due to the idea that “the friend of my enemy is my enemy”. As argued by earlier studies, it may be attractive for terrorist groups to internationalize a domestic conflict by targeting foreign allies (i.e., the U.S.) that stabilize the government they oppose. Even though these terrorist groups ultimately have domestic ambitions, attacking the United States as a foreign sponsor may stir up domestic support for their cause and improve terrorist mobilization. Besides this strategic logic, the eventual effect of U.S. support on anti-American terrorism may, however, also be contingent upon local (economic, political, and cultural) conditions in the aid-receiving country. Still, the conditioning effect of local conditions on the emergence of anti-American terrorism has so far received little attention in academic research. Our empirical analysis aims at filling this research gap. Here, we focus on the (conditioning) role of local repression. In recent years the argument has been brought forward that anti-American resentment (which may also result in anti-American terrorism) is a consequence of U.S. support for repressive local regimes. Critical voices (e.g., Noam Chomsky) argue that U.S. aid all too often—and deliberately—falls into the hands of oppressive governments. Local repression coupled with U.S. aid may indeed explain why this aid is deemed unwelcome and thus results in additional anti-American grievances. Trends and patterns in terrorism since the end of the Cold War provide tentative support for this idea. Many terrorist attacks against U.S. interests (most notoriously, the 9/11 attacks) have been conducted by perpetrators from the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA). At the same time, many countries in this part of the world receive substantial U.S. aid and also feature repressive regimes, e.g., in Egypt and Iraq (see Figure 1).

#### US base presence in authoritarian regimes causes radical militancy and terrorism.

Vine 17 Vine, David. [Contributor/Associate Professor of Anthropology, American University.] “How U.S. Military Bases Back Dictators, Autocrats, And Military Regimes.” The Huffington Post. 05/16/2017. [Premier]

While some defend the presence of bases in undemocratic countries as necessary to deter “bad actors” and support “U.S. interests” (primarily corporate ones), backing dictators and autocrats frequently leads to harm not just for the citizens of host nations but for U.S. citizens as well. The base build-up in the Middle East has proven the most prominent example of this. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, which both unfolded in 1979, the Pentagon has built up scores of bases across the Middle East at a cost of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. According to former West Point professor Bradley Bowman, such bases and the troops that go with them have been a “major catalyst for anti-Americanism and radicalization.” Research has similarly revealed a correlation between the bases and al-Qaeda recruitment. Most catastrophically, outposts in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan have helped generate and fuel the radical militancy that has spread throughout the Greater Middle East and led to terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States. The presence of such bases and troops in Muslim holy lands was, after all, a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s professed motivation for the 9/11 attacks. With the Trump administration seeking to entrench its renewed base presence in the Philippines and the president commending Duterte and similarly authoritarian leaders in Bahrain and Egypt, Turkey and Thailand, human rights violations are likely to escalate, fueling unknown brutality and baseworld blowback for years to come.

#### US support for authoritarian regimes causes local association between the US and repression.

Gries et al 14 Thomas Gries, Daniel Meierrieks [Research Fellow at the Department of Economics at the University of Freiburg], and Margarete Redlin [Research Associate at the Department of Economics of the University of Paderborn]. "Providing aid to oppressive terrorist source countries does not make the U.S. any safer." London School of Economics US Centre. December 15, 2014. [Premier].

Here, the argument is that aid is purposely given by the U.S. to buy political support from recipient countries. For instance, it may be in the interest of the United States to deliberately use aid to foster economic change (e.g., an opening of local markets to U.S. products and capital) that benefits the United States. This may already cause anti-American resentment. However, the combination of U.S. aid and local repression creates additional grievances that are specifically directed against the United States. Here, due to its support for repressive local regimes, the United States becomes associated with— and tainted by—local repression, the argument (e.g., voiced by Osama bin Laden in his “Letter to America”) being that the United States deliberately uses aid to freeze local political developments (i.e., democratization), instead supporting local repression. In other words, it is argued that aid is purposely given by the U.S. and used by the (dependent) local government to uphold local repression, which serves both the interests of the U.S. and the local government. In consequence, support from the U.S. government for an unpopular—oppressive—local regime may correlate with rising discontent projected onto the United States, which may ultimately result in anti-American terrorism.

#### Empirics prove that US military aid in oppressive regimes are especially likely to result in 10x more anti-American terrorism.

Gries et al 14 Thomas Gries, Daniel Meierrieks [Research Fellow at the Department of Economics at the University of Freiburg], and Margarete Redlin [Research Associate at the Department of Economics of the University of Paderborn]. "Providing aid to oppressive terrorist source countries does not make the U.S. any safer." London School of Economics US Centre. December 15, 2014. [Premier].

To analyze the potentially interacting effects of dependence and repression we study the nexus between U.S. economic and military aid, human rights and anti-American terrorism using panel data from 126 countries for the period between 1984 and 2008. We show that the combination of local oppression and economic and particularly military aid indeed leads to more anti-American terrorism. The estimated effects are also (economically) substantive. For instance, a country with a substantial level of human rights violations (indicated by the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances and political imprisonments) that receives the mean amount of military aid from the U.S. (approx. 0.043% of local GDP) generates about 10 times more anti-American terrorism compared to a baseline country that receives the same level of aid but does not exert repression. Our findings support those voices that are critical of U.S. interventionism. The positive association between military-economic dependence on the United States and anti-American terrorism generated in the aid-receiving country only weakens (i.e., is no longer statistically significant) when U.S. aid becomes very large; this may be due to increased capacity of oppressive regimes—possibly further incentivized by the prospect of future American support—to adopt harsh counterterrorism measures. However, we find no evidence at all (even after accounting for endogeneity) that the U.S. is made any safer by providing assistance to the source countries of terrorism, even if this assistance is very large and/or channeled to particularly oppressive regimes. Our analysis thus provides little support for the official U.S. government notion that foreign aid may be part of an effective U.S. strategy to prevent anti-American terrorism. To the extent that U.S. foreign assistance creates benefits not related to security (e.g., access to foreign markets), the United States may therefore face a trade-off between securing these benefits and being vulnerable to terrorism.

#### US military aid is counterproductive – turns back any security net benefits by being incredibly costly as well as focal points for radicalization. Vine ’17:

Vine ’17 Vine, David. (Associate professor of anthropology at American University). “How US military bases back dictators, autocrats, and military regimes.” Huffington Post. 05/16/2017. [Premier]

While some defend the presence of bases in undemocratic countries as necessary to deter “bad actors” and support “U.S. interests” (primarily corporate ones), backing dictators and autocrats frequently leads to harm not just for the citizens of host nations but for U.S. citizens as well. The [base build-up](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176090/tomgram%3A_david_vine%2C_enduring_bases%2C_enduring_war_in_the_middle_east) in the Middle East has proven the most prominent example of this. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution, which both unfolded in 1979, the Pentagon has built up [scores of bases](http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176090/tomgram%3A_david_vine%2C_enduring_bases%2C_enduring_war_in_the_middle_east) across the Middle East at a cost of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars. According to former West Point professor Bradley Bowman, such bases and the troops that go with them have been a “[major catalyst](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcsis.org%2Ffiles%2Fpublication%2Ftwq08springbowman.pdf&ei=_DNdVNuFPLTLsATknYK4Cg&usg=AFQjCNGr1RKhn7_eim2InSMCN76uFqreZA&sig2=OvoQCtsdNUkjXLss-5dpvw&bvm=bv.79189006,d.cWc) for anti-Americanism and radicalization.” Research has similarly revealed a [correlation](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcsis.org%2Ffiles%2Fpublication%2Ftwq08springbowman.pdf&ei=_DNdVNuFPLTLsATknYK4Cg&usg=AFQjCNGr1RKhn7_eim2InSMCN76uFqreZA&sig2=OvoQCtsdNUkjXLss-5dpvw&bvm=bv.79189006,d.cWc) between the bases and al-Qaeda recruitment. Most catastrophically, outposts in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan have helped generate and fuel the radical militancy that has spread throughout the Greater Middle East and led to terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States. The presence of such bases and troops in Muslim holy lands was, after all, a major recruiting tool for al-Qaeda and part of Osama bin Laden’s [professed motivation](https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/stephen-glain/2011/05/03/what-actually-motivated-osama-bin-laden) for the 9/11 attacks. With the Trump administration seeking to entrench its renewed base presence in the Philippines and the president commending Duterte and similarly authoritarian leaders in Bahrain and Egypt, Turkey and Thailand, human rights violations are likely to escalate, fueling unknown brutality and baseworld [blowback](http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175578/best_of_tomdispatch%3A_chalmers_johnson%2C_the_cia_and_a_blowback_world/) for years to come.

### Xenophobia

#### The argument for foreign aid causes domestic xenophobia.

Easterly 17 William Easterly [Professor of Economics at NYU] "This common argument for U.S. Foreign Aid is actually quite Xenophobic." The Washington Post. March 31, 2017. [Premier].

Even worse, the argument that aid will “stabilize vulnerable parts of the world” unintentionally paves the way for today’s resurgence of xenophobia. If you had argued for aid to keep the United States safe, then aid failures cause your argument to go into reverse. The United States is left unsafe, exposed to all those people coming from un-stabilized, vulnerable (not “civilized”) parts of the world. Now Bush’s old hopeful list of “every African, every Asian, every Latin American, every Muslim” is only a list of threats. The false generalization that portrayed huge classes of people as prone to terrorism scared Americans into increasing aid. Now it scares Americans into increasing xenophobic travel bans

### Budget

#### Military aid spills over to clean-up costs.

Powers ’08 Powers, Elizabeth (Law Clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay, holds B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Minnesota, and a J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law). “Greed, Guns, and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries.” *North Dakota Law Review*, Volume 84, pgs. 411-12. 2008. <https://law.und.edu/_files/docs/ndlr/pdf/issues/84/2/84ndlr383.pdf>. [Premier]

300 D. MORE PROSPEROUS COUNTRIES FOOT THE CLEAN-UP BILL ANYWAY In the aftermath of the Congo Conflict, the United Nations deployed a peacekeeping force and an observer mission, the United Nations Mission to the DR Congo (MONUC).301 MONUC is charged with collecting weapons from civilians, scheduling and supervising the withdrawal of foreign forces, providing protection to displaced persons, and supervising the transition to democracy.302 For calendar year 2007 to 2008, MONUC had a budget of over $1.1 billion.303 The same countries that previously provided military assistance or allowed arms sales or transfers from domestic companies to DR Congo now finance MONUC (e.g., the United States, France, and Belgium).304 Furthermore, President Bush pledged $28 million to assist refugees from DR Congo.305 Not only are undemocratic militarized African governments dangerous to their populations and neighbors, they also present a high bill to the world community in terms of peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian assistance once they implode. Publicly funded international institutions (the United Nations), individual countries (the United States), and private entities (e.g., the Red Cross and Save the Children), pour billions of dollars into what appears to be an abyss.306 In light of budgetary considerations, it may prove more efficient to simply stop providing military assistance and allow U.S. arms dealers to sell to African countries with questionable human rights records and a tenuous hold on democracy.307

### Conflict

#### Military aid undermines regional stability – Congo, Liberia, and Ethiopia prove.

Powers ’08 Powers, Elizabeth (Law Clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay, holds B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Minnesota, and a J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law). “Greed, Guns, and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries.” *North Dakota Law Review*, Volume 84, pgs. 409-411. 2008. <https://law.und.edu/_files/docs/ndlr/pdf/issues/84/2/84ndlr383.pdf>. [Premier]

B. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UNSTABLE COUNTRIES UNDERMINES THEIR NEIGHBORS’ STABILITY There are numerous militias and rebel groups in DR Congo. The use of Eastern DR Congo as a rebel base threatens the security interests of neighboring countries. For example, Interahamwe attacks on Rwandan civilians and troops, which are launched out of Eastern DR Congo have provoked the government of Rwanda to respond by sending troops into DR Congo.281 Further, the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) regularly received military support from Uganda.282 Uganda has also been a longtime recipient of U.S. military aid.283 During the Congo Conflict, the MLC controlled Northeastern DR Congo.284 Similar dynamics to those between Rwanda, Uganda, and DR Congo are endemic to the developing world. In 2000, the United Nations was bombarded with claims that West African nations were systematically subverting arms sanctions by smuggling arms across borders in exchange for diamonds, timber, and other natural resources.285 The arms smuggling enabled the embattled Charles Taylor to stay in power in Liberia for a protracted period and to smuggle arms into Sierra Leone for a supporting faction.286 This highly militarized situation resulted in civil wars in both countries. The United States has also provided a substantial amount of weaponry to Ethiopia. From 2005 to 2006, U.S. arms transfers to Ethiopia were valued in excess of $19 million.287 For 2007, the stated value of arms transfers was $10 million.288 Ethiopia is now well-equipped for intervention in Somalia and Eritrea. Ethiopia has fought several wars with Eritrea in the past and border disputes continue.289 Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia are likewise acrimonious. In January 2007, Ethiopia invaded Somalia with the ostensible purpose of restoring the rightful government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is pro-Ethiopia.290 Despite the installation of the TFG, Ethiopian troops continue to occupy Somalia.291 C. UNSTABLE COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO IMPLODE, THEREBY GIVING SAFE HAVEN TO TERRORISTS The United States has recognized the inherent danger of failed states.292 Examples of failed states that have provided safe harbor to terrorists include Afghanistan and Somalia.293 Somalia is a largely militarized country that was taken over by warlords in 1990.294 This fractionalized state now houses al-Qaeda operatives.295 Incidents are on the rise of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups obtaining arms through illicit deals, posing a direct threat to U.S. forces abroad.296 Although Somalia is under an arms embargo,297 arms continue to pour in.298 From 2005 to 2006 the Central Intelligence Agency funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Somali warlords.299 The warlords then used the money to buy weapons and continue to wreak havoc throughout the country.

#### Aid causes entanglement by increasing adventurism and raising tensions – tons of empirics – that risks great power war.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

Entanglement. Arms sales raise the risk of entanglement in two ways. First, they can represent early steps down the slippery slope to unwise military intervention. Consider a case like the Syrian civil war or the many cases during the Cold War in which the United States wanted to support rebels and freedom fighters against oppressive governments.74 In the majority of those cases, American leaders were wary of intervening directly. Instead, the United States tended to rely on money, training, and arms sales. But by taking concrete steps like arms sales to support rebel groups, Washington’s psychological investment in the outcome tends to rise, as do the political stakes for the president, who will be judged on whether his efforts at support are successful or not. As we saw in the Syrian civil war, for example, Barack Obama’s early efforts to arm Syrian rebels were roundly criticized as feckless, increasing pressure on him to intervene more seriously.75 History does not provide much guidance about how serious the risk of this form of entanglement might be. During the Cold War, presidents from Nixon onward viewed arms sales as a substitute for sending American troops to do battle with communist forces around the world. The result was an astonishing amount of weaponry transferred or sold to Third World nations, many of which were engaged in active conflicts both external and internal. The risk of superpower conflict made it dangerous to intervene directly; accordingly, the Cold War-era risk of entanglement from arms sales was low.76 Today, however, the United States does not face nearly as many constraints on its behavior, as its track record of near-constant military intervention since the end of the Cold War indicates. As a result, the risk of arms sales helping trigger future military intervention is real, even if it cannot be measured precisely. The second way in which arms sales might entangle the United States is by creating new disputes or exacerbating existing tensions. U.S. arms sales to Kurdish units fighting in Syria against the Islamic State, for example, have ignited tensions between the United States and its NATO ally Turkey, which sees the Kurds as a serious threat to Turkish sovereignty and stability.77 Meanwhile, ongoing arms sales to NATO nations and to other allies like South Korea and Taiwan have exacerbated tensions with Russia, China, and North Korea, raising the risk of escalation and the possibility that the United States might wind up involved in a direct conflict.78

#### Best studies confirm – military aid increases the probability, duration, and intensity of wars.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

Instability, Violence, and Conflict. First, arms sales can make conflict more likely.79 This may occur because recipients of new weapons feel more confident about launching attacks or because changes in the local balance of power can fuel tensions and promote preventive strikes by others. A study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, for example, found that although arms sales appeared to have some restraining effect on major-power allies, they had the opposite effect in other cases, and concluded that “increased arms transfers from major powers make states significantly more likely to be militarized dispute initiators.”80 Another study focused on sub-Saharan Africa from 1967 to 1997 found that “arms transfers are significant and positive predictors of increased probability of war.”81 Recent history provides supporting evidence for these findings: since 2011, Saudi Arabia, the leading buyer of American weapons, has intervened to varying degrees in Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar. Second, arms sales can also prolong and intensify ongoing conflicts and erode rather than promote regional stability. Few governments, and fewer insurgencies, have large enough weapons stocks to fight for long without resupply.82 The tendency of external powers to arm the side they support, however understandable strategically, has the inevitable result of allowing the conflict to continue at a higher level of intensity than would otherwise be the case. As one study of arms sales to Africa notes, “Weapons imports are essential additives in this recipe for armed conflict and carnage.”83

#### Arms sales do not promote stability – unpredictability, offensive capabilities, arms races, and other suppliers – the best evidence and majority of scholars conclude aff.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

The hidden assumption underlying the balance of power strategy is that the United States will be able to predict accurately what the impact of its arms sales will be. If the goal is deterrence, for example, the assumption is that an arms sale will be sufficient to deter the adversary without spawning an arms race. If the goal is to promote stability, the assumption is that an arms sale will in fact reduce tensions and inhibit conflict rather than inflame tensions and help initiate conflict. These assumptions, in turn, depend on both the recipient nation and that nation’s neighbors and adversaries acting in ways that don’t make things worse. As it turns out, these are often poor assumptions. Although arms sales certainly enhance the military capability of the recipient nation, the fundamental problem is that arms sales often initiate a long chain of responses that the United States generally cannot control. The United States, after all, is not the only country with interests in regional balances, especially where the survival and security of local actors is at stake. The United States is neither the only major power with a keen interest in critical regions like Asia and the Middle East, nor the only source of weapons and other forms of assistance. Nor can it dictate the perceptions, interests, or actions of the other nations involved in a given region. For example, though a nation receiving arms from the United States may enjoy enhanced defensive capabilities, it is also likely to enjoy enhanced offensive capabilities. With these, a nation’s calculations about the potential benefits of war, intervention abroad, or even the use of force against its own population may shift decisively. Saudi Arabia’s recent behavior illustrates this dynamic. Though the Saudis explain their arms purchases as necessary for defense against Iranian pressure, Saudi Arabia has also spent the past two years embroiled in a military intervention in Yemen. Likewise, arms sales can heighten regional security dilemmas. Neighbors of nations buying major conventional weapons will also worry about what this enhanced military capability will mean. This raises the chances that they too will seek to arm themselves further, or take other steps to shift the balance of power back in their favor, or, in the extreme case, to launch a preventive war before they are attacked. Given these dynamics, the consequences of arms sales to manage regional balances of power are far less predictable and often much less positive than advocates assume.54 This unpredictability characterizes even straightforward-seeming efforts to manage the balance of power. The most basic claim of arms sales advocates is that U.S. arms sales to friendly governments and allies should make them better able to deter adversaries. The best available evidence, however, suggests a more complicated reality. In a study of arms sales from 1950 to 1995, major-power arms sales to existing allies had no effect on the chance that the recipient would be the target of a military attack. Worse, recipients of U.S. arms that were not treaty allies were significantly more likely to become targets.55 Nor is there much evidence that arms sales can help the United States promote peace and regional stability by calibrating the local balance of power. On this score, in fact, the evidence suggests that the default assumption should be the opposite. Most scholarly work concludes that arms sales exacerbate instability and increase the likelihood of conflict.56 One study, for example, found that during the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet arms sales to hostile dyads (e.g., India/Pakistan, Iran/Iraq, Ethiopia/Somalia) “contributed to hostile political relations and imbalanced military relationships” and were “profoundly destabilizing.”57 There is also good reason to believe that several factors are making the promotion of regional stability through arms sales more difficult. The shrinking U.S. military advantage over other powers such as China and the increasingly competitive global arms market both make it less likely that U.S. arms sales can make a decisive difference. As William Hartung argued as early as 1990, “the notion of using arms transfers to maintain a carefully calibrated regional balance of power seems increasingly archaic in today’s arms market, in which a potential U.S. adversary is as likely to be receiving weapons from U.S. allies like Italy or France as it is from former or current adversaries.”58 In sum, the academic and historical evidence indicates that although the United States can use arms sales to enhance the military capabilities of other nations and thereby shift the local and regional balance of power, its ability to dictate specific outcomes through such efforts is severely limited.

### Proliferation

#### US military aid violates the NDT which signals hypocrisy on non-proliferation.

Forthofer ’18 Forthofer, Ron (Researcher at the Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center). “Peace Train: U.S. hypocrisy on nuclear weapons.” *Colorado Daily*. 6 September 2018. <http://www.coloradodaily.com/your-take/ci_32120262/peace-train-u-s-hypocrisy-nuclear-weapons>. [Premier]

Shortly after the development of the atomic bomb, humans began living under the threat of a major nuclear conflict with its potentially catastrophic effects. Leaders have long recognized the immense danger of this situation and have crafted treaties in an attempt to reduce or to eliminate this threat. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was a major attempt to rein in nuclear weapons. Specifically, this treaty attempted to stop the proliferation of these weapons to non-nuclear states and to pursue the disarmament of the nuclear states (the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France) with the goal of totally eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear states were to also share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology with the non-nuclear states. This treaty went into force in 1970 with 191 nations now adhering to the treaty. However, there has been a lack of compliance by the original nuclear states with the nuclear disarmament requirement. Moreover, Israel, India, Pakistan and South Sudan didn't accept the treaty, and North Korea didn't comply with it. South Sudan is the only one of these nations that doesn't possess nuclear weapons. In 2017, efforts by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons led to the U.N. General Assembly's passing of the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. This treaty reflected the worldwide concern that nuclear weapons were still a major threat to humanity and must be eliminated. The vote was 122 for (including Iran) and 1 against (the Netherlands) with 1 abstention and 69 nations not voting (including the nuclear states and all of NATO except the Netherlands). Domestically, the 1976 U.S. Arms Export Control Act essentially requires that the U.S. president, upon learning a non-NPT member was involved in nuclear proliferation activities, cut off U.S. foreign aid. Unfortunately, U.S. presidents have not followed this law regarding Israel and its nuclear weapons program, and Israel still receives billion of dollars in aid every year. In fact, a recent New Yorker article by Adam Entous revealed that four sitting U.S. presidents, beginning with Bill Clinton, signed secret letters agreeing never to discuss Israel's nuclear weapons. This hypocritical behavior makes a mockery of U.S. law and harms U.S. credibility. The U.S. claims to be concerned about nuclear proliferation. However, consider the U.S. treatment of Israel and Iran. Israel, an alleged U.S. ally with a history of attacks on its neighbors, has nuclear weapons and the U.S. lavishes large amounts of military aid on it. Iran, not an ally, doesn't have a nuclear weapons program, but the U.S. still imposes incredibly harsh sanctions and threatens a military attack against it. Clearly, the U.S. position is not based on principle, but on politics, and perhaps the real U.S. goal for Iran is regime change.

#### US military aid is perceived as hypocrisy and prevents non-proliferation efforts.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

The second major benefit of reducing arms sales is that it would imbue the United States with greater moral authority. Today, as the leading arms-dealing nation in the world, the United States lacks credibility in discussions of arms control and nonproliferation, especially in light of its military interventionism since 2001. By showing the world that it is ready to choose diplomacy over the arms trade, the United States would provide a huge boost to international efforts to curtail proliferation and its negative consequences. This is important because the United States has pursued and will continue to pursue a wide range of arms control and nonproliferation objectives. The United States is a signatory of treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, land mines, and cluster munitions, not to mention the flow of conventional weapons of all kinds. The effectiveness of these treaties, and the ability to create more effective and enduring arms control and nonproliferation frameworks, however, depends on how the United States behaves. This is not to say that unilateral American action will put an end to the problems of the global arms trade. States would still seek to ensure their security and survival through deterrence and military strength. Other weapons suppliers would, in the short run, certainly race to meet the demand. But history shows that global nonproliferation treaties and weapons bans typically require great-power support. In 1969, for example, Richard Nixon decided to shutter the American offensive-biological-weapons program and seek an international ban on such weapons. By 1972 the Biological Weapons Convention passed and has since been signed by 178 nations.98 In 1991 President George H. W. Bush unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons. By 1993 the United States had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which now has 192 signatories.99 Both of these efforts succeeded in part because the United States took decisive early action in the absence of any promises about how others would respond.100 Without U.S. leadership, any effort to limit proliferation of major conventional weapons and dangerous emerging technologies is likely to fail.

### Human Rights

#### The U.S. provides aid to human rights violators across the globe – it legitimizes and fuels the violations.

Powers ’08 Powers, Elizabeth (Law Clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay, holds B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Minnesota, and a J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law). “Greed, Guns, and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries.” *North Dakota Law Review*, Volume 84, pgs. 409-411. 2008. <https://law.und.edu/_files/docs/ndlr/pdf/issues/84/2/84ndlr383.pdf>. [Premier]

Laurent Kabila was known not only for his brief tenure as head of government for DR Congo, but also for his use of child soldiers.256 The FNI, FRPI, and MRC, a few of the numerous rebel groups in DR Congo, consistently recruit and use children within their ranks.257 A number of the leaders of the various rebel groups, which knowingly recruited and retained child soldiers, are now incorporated into DR Congo’s armed forces (FARDC).258 There are still an estimated 30,000 child soldiers serving in militias throughout DR Congo.259 A UN Group of Experts on DR Congo found the violation of international laws concerning children in armed conflict to be endemic.260 Use of child soldiers in militias and rebel groups within unstable developing countries is hardly an anomaly. Where AK47s, M16s, grenades, handguns, and pistols are readily available, the only concern is finding someone to use them. During the Liberian civil war, the Liberian government was estimated to have recruited 21,000 child soldiers.261 The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) based in Northern Uganda has also been cited for using child soldiers, who are abducted from their villages and foisted into a life of crime.262 There are an estimated 300,000 child soldiers worldwide.263 Use of child soldiers directly contravenes the Convention on the Rights of the Child.264 In light of the basic human rights tenets concerning the prohibition of the use of child soldiers, which the United States promulgated and continues to support,265 aiding regimes that use child soldiers violates U.S. principles. Human rights violations in African countries are almost too numerous for review. The United States provided military assistance and U.S. companies sold arms to the vast majority of these countries.266 Many SubSaharan African countries violate their citizens’ fundamental political rights. For example, Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential election was set against widespread, politically motivated violence instigated by Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front.267 Predictably, Mugabe was reelected.268 Mugabe went on to oust white farmers, demolish informal housing developments, and restrict the availability of goods.269 Such actions lead to shortages in basic needs amongst the population and served as the impetus for refugee crises.270 Military assistance and arms transfers to human rights violators are not just confined to Africa. Central American end users of arms transfers are notorious for their poor human rights records.271 Southeast Asian countries known for human rights violations have also had influxes of M16 rifles.272 Lebanon, home to Hezbollah and other Islamic fundamentalists, received 38,000 U.S. supplied M16s from 1980 to 1983 alone.273 U.S. arms transfers also reached the Balkans.274 The FAA is not silent as to arms transfers to human rights abusers. In the U.S. arms transfer schema, Section 2304 of the FAA provides that military assistance may not be provided to any government “which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”275 However, to determine whether a government consistently violates human rights, Congress requires the President to consider whether the government engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom.276 Other internationally recognized human rights, such as freedom from torture, genocide, and slavery did not warrant this special consideration.277 Congress reserved the right to request information regarding countries’ human rights practices and the reason why military assistance is continuing to be provided,278 which the State Department has thirty days to produce.279 Section 2304 is rarely invoked to prohibit military assistance or arms sales to human rights abusers.2

### Fem

#### The US military has a history of patriarchal domination in occupied nations.

Trafford 13. Trafford, Zara. “Prostitution, Patriarchy and Power in the Military” War Resisters International, 27 Nov 2013, <https://www.wri-irg.org/en/story/2013/prostitution-patriarchy-and-power-military> [Premier]

Embrace Dignity is a South African human rights organization advocating for legal and social reform. We campaign for reforms recognising prostitution as violence and aim to reduce demand for commercial sex. Recognising the harms of prostitution, we offer support to women seeking exit through a self-led system. We look forward to welcoming and collaborating with international and local nonviolent activists embodying the conference’s theme: “small actions can contribute to building big movements for change”. In our country [South Africa], it is more likely that a girl will be raped than go to secondary school. If girls do manage to attend school, it is unlikely they will find a job. Violence against women stops them getting an education, limits economic activity, and undermines their ability to choose the timing and number of children they have. It is also damaging to their physical, social, emotional and psychological wellbeing – for many, it is a direct cause of death or disability. It also has huge economic costs, including costs to health and policing. Every year, thousands of rural South African women migrate to urban centres in the hope of economic opportunity, often joining the ranks of the unemployed. Domestic and gender based violence worsen the situation, and under these conditions, prostitution flourishes. Prostitution is a deeply rooted form of sexual exploitation that feeds off poverty, inequality and entrenched social constructs. The sex industry is unequivocally dangerous. Different degrees of abuse, coercion and violence are experienced but all prostituted people are physically and psychologically harmed in the process. Prostituted women’s level of post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been proven to be equivalent to that of combat veterans. Once in the sex industry, women often resort to alcohol and drug abuse to endure daily mental distress, resulting in dissociation from oneself and the rest of the world. Prostitution also has negative impacts on the rest of society. If some women can be bought and sold it gives the message that all women are potentially for sale, a concept which permeates social sensibilities. South Africa is a deeply patriarchal society, in which masculinity often entails conquering or controlling women. The perception that masculinity and violence are intimately entwined is still dominant. Young boys fear that demonstrating sensitivity or gentleness will emasculate them and make them appear weak. War feeds into the image of masculinity as unemotional, dominant and hyper-violent. In fact, the militarisation of societies and war play an enormous role in fuelling prostitution. A breakdown of social structures, economic crisis, and an influx of occupying soldiers (and even peacekeeping forces) result in a drastic increase in demand for prostitution – a burden often carried by women from poorer nations. Some argue that the act of war creates individual feelings of powerlessness, which must be regained through the domination of vulnerable women. This is not new information. During World War II the Japanese Empire forced thousands of “comfort women” from Japanese-occupied territories into a prostitution corps to serve soldiers. The United States armed forces have a particularly damning history of misuse of the women of occupied countries, as well as the practise of “R & R” (rest and recuperation). Prostitution sites around military were encouraged by military leadership, with condoms and security escorts often being provided. In the past, arguments have been made to explain the blind eyes and enabling hands of governments and military leadership – rampant sexual activity would occur anyway so it might as well result in some financial “reward” for the bought individual rather than manifesting as rape. This creates a fallacious distinction between rape and prostitution, when in fact the two are intimately linked and complementary. Both acts conform to the concept of a right to pleasure, encouraged by military leadership and hegemonic masculinity. Government-sanctioned prostitution has also been rationalised as useful for creating a necessary sense of brotherhood and camaraderie between soldiers – what about the women’s rights to equality, happiness, and human dignity? This is also an injustice to men, portrayed as incapable of controlling their rampant sexual urges. One of the results of organised military prostitution for soldiers’ “rest and recuperation” is the creation of a “prostitution economy”. Even after the military moves away, sex trade entrepreneurs maintain the industry through sex tourism. This has an economic and generational legacy in which it becomes a dominant option for employment for impoverished women. Children (destined to be fatherless) are also born, bearing the stigma of illegitimacy and often entering the trade later in life. The recurring occupation of parts of South East Asia by United States forces is perhaps where this is most evident.

### Imperialism

#### Military aid props up US imperialism.

Richards 77. Richards, Lynn. “The Context of Foreign Aid: Modern Imperialism,” Review of Radical Political Economics, SAGEJournals, 1 December 1977, [https://doi.org/10.1177%2F048661347700900404](https://doi.org/10.1177/048661347700900404) [Premier]

All that is left is “militarism and imperialism.” But although militarism could conceivably be manifested in stockpiles of weapons “just in case” imperialism is integrally related for monopoly capital. Although it is possible, in the present context, for capitalists to trade with socialist nations and to trade advantageously with truly developing countries, mere trade is not the goal: The spread of socialism “does necessarily reduce ... opportunities to profits from doing business ... 1187 Monopolies are really after “monopolistic control over foreign sources of supply and foreign markets ... to do business on their own terms and wherever they choose ... (requiring) ... not trading partners but ’allies’ and clients ...”In this construction, the profit motive returns to prominence and the economic subjugation of dependent economies is an integral aspect of capitalist imperialism. This imperialism, thus, serves a dual role. It protects overseas profitmaking and at the same time provides a justification for the gigantic use of surplus in maintaining and “improving” the U.S. military establishment to keep the “free world” capitalist and the socialist” contained if at all possible. Baran and Sweezy do not, however, see a permanent solution in the imperialism they describe. Although providing an important use of the accumulated surplus, the overseas operations thus protected continue to accumulate, on an annual basis, more than is sent abroad, thereby increasing the surplus to be absorbed.89

## AC - Amend FMAA

#### Plan – The United States ought to amend the FMA to require that recipient countries are democratic.

#### The plan solves – prevents countries that are undemocratic or with human rights violations from receiving military aid.

Powers ’08 Powers, Elizabeth (Law Clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay, holds B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Minnesota, and a J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law). “Greed, Guns, and Grist: U.S. Military Assistance and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries.” *North Dakota Law Review*, Volume 84, pgs. 413-414. 2008. <https://law.und.edu/_files/docs/ndlr/pdf/issues/84/2/84ndlr383.pdf>. [Premier]

The Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1961 should be amended to require that the President find, in his or her Presidential Justifications, that the recipient countries are democratic.311 Democratic countries are less likely to go to war, largely due to the need for leaders to convince their constituencies that war is in their best interests.312 Democratic countries also are unlikely to routinely commit grave human rights violations.313 For these reasons and others, promoting the democratization of developing countries has been a consistent U.S. policy goal.314 Congress may guide this determination by setting statutory factors for the President to consider. For a country to qualify as democratic it should have at least five years of experience with democratic government or at least one election cycle, whichever is the later. Although five years is not a substantial period of time, it generally is enough time for democratic institution building to begin. The present FAA requirement that recipient countries do not violate or condone serious human rights abuses should be extended to a look-back period of five years. By amending the FAA, the State Department could no longer request military aid funding for human rights violators or countries with poor democratic track records. If such changes are implemented, neighbors of countries engaged in open conflicts in developing countries will most likely not qualify for military assistance.315

## AC – Saudi Arabia

#### Plan – The United States ought not provide military aid to Saudi Arabia.

#### The plan signals human rights support and stops funding for terrorism and the Yemen war.

Paul ’18 Paul, Rand (Kentucky Senator). “Stop Military Aid to Saudi Arabia.” *The Atlantic*. 10 October 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/stop-funding-saudi-arabia-until-jamal-khashoggi-returns/572692/>. [Premier]

For years, I have decried our country’s involvement in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are a state sponsor of radical Islam, and their war on Yemen, a poor Arab country, has led to many thousands of civilian deaths. The Saudis have provided at least 2,500 fighters to the Islamic State in Syria, making them the second-largest source of foreign fighters for the group on a per capita basis, after Tunisia. News reports from 2013 stated that the Saudis offered more than 1,200 death-row inmates a pardon and a monthly stipend for their families to go fight the Syrian government. In 2009, U.S. officials said Saudi Arabia was the “most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.” And in 2014, those same officials wrote that Qatar and Saudi Arabia were “providing clandestine financial and logistic support to [the Islamic State] and other radical Sunni groups.” So why is America selling arms to a country that has supported terror, has a poor human-rights record, and has waged a reckless war in Yemen? As they say, follow the money. But no amount of oil business or arms deals justifies our collusion with a regime that sponsors jihadism around the world. Furthermore, if America is not at war with Yemen—which, technically, we are not—why are we enabling Saudi Arabia to prosecute a war that has killed tens of thousands and left 8 million more “on the brink of famine,” according to The Washington Post? I’m not just talking about bombs being dropped on innocent civilians that bear the words “Made in the U.S.A.” Without American intelligence, logistics, training, and equipment, the Saudi war effort would have fallen apart long ago. I have spoken out loudly on this for some time, and I’ve also introduced legislation to halt U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. I have been deeply disappointed with those of my colleagues in Congress who don’t seem to care that Yemenis are being massacred by U.S.-backed-and-armed Saudis. But I’m giving them another chance. A chance to stand up to Saudi Arabia and say, “America will not tolerate these heinous acts.” This week, I intend to introduce another measure to cut all funding, training, advising, and any other coordination to and with the military of Saudi Arabia until the journalist Jamal Khashoggi is returned alive.

#### Plan spills over to arms deals by eliminating subsidies – this stops a slippery slope.

Hill ’17 Hill, Evan (Writer and Researcher based in the Middle East). “The Dangers of Arming Autocrats.” *Forbes*. 13 June 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/saudi-arabia-weapons-deal/529689/>. [Premier]

Never mind that the Obama administration had been quite good to the Saudis, reportedly boosting the intelligence support they got from the National Security Agency and offering them $115 billion worth of weapons in 42 separate deals over eight years, more than any previous administration. For the Saudis, nothing made up for the Obama-led deal to lift sanctions on Iran, their preeminent foe, in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear program. Legitimizing Iran was anathema not only to Saudi Arabia but to much of the Washington foreign-policy establishment, the “blob” so disparaged by Obama’s deputy national-security adviser Ben Rhodes. Trump’s performance in Riyadh—complete with ardah—was a belly flop into the blob, which has long supported the seemingly hereditary U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia, handed down like an inheritance to generation after generation of Saudi kings and American presidents. A central tenet of this durable pro-Saudi dogma, indeed of nearly all U.S. alliances in the Middle East, is the sale of U.S. arms. In 2015, the top three purchasers among all developing nations worldwide were Qatar ($17.5 billion), Egypt ($11.9 billion), and Saudi Arabia ($8.6 billion). From 2008 to 2015, Saudi Arabia bought more U.S. weapons than any other developing nation, agreeing to $93.5 billion worth of purchases. (Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution has argued that Trump’s Riyadh bonanza was “fake news,” a misleading mix of Obama-era efforts, but while Trump may have been taking credit for past deals, the weapons have, nevertheless, been offered.) These sales, often buoyed by U.S. subsidies known as foreign military financing, have continued despite many of the recipients’ dark records of serious human-rights abuses—such as the torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings carried out by the Egyptian military in its campaign against the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula, or the many possible war crimes committed by the Saudi-led coalition in its ongoing bombing of Houthi-Saleh forces in Yemen. Supporters of these sales argue that while these governments may be ugly, if they don’t buy from us, they will buy from the Russians or the Chinese (or the French), and selling them our weapons gives us greater say in how those weapons are used, and greater insight into how their militaries operate. If war breaks out, we’ll be able to work closely with our clients because they’ll be using our technology. Andrew Exum, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy in the Obama administration, recently argued in this magazine that progressive politicians should take more credit, not less, for these sales, given the hundreds of thousands of workers employed in the U.S. defense industry and the “millions of American mouths” fed by their salaries. “This might be another area in which progressive elites … are simply out of touch with the voters they need to win back control of the Congress and state assemblies, never mind the presidency,” Exum wrote. But arms sales don’t bring home the jobs that supposedly make these deals worth the angst. The Costs of War project at Brown University’s Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs has found that “clean energy and health care spending create 50 percent more jobs than the equivalent amount of spending on the military,” while education spending creates more than twice as many jobs. Boeing’s deal to sell 30 passenger jets to Iran will reportedly support 18,000 U.S. jobs, the same number Lockheed Martin touted for the air and missile defense systems, combat ships, and tactical aircraft it may sell to Saudi Arabia. But passenger jets won’t be bombing civilians in Yemen. Nor were Boeing, Raytheon, or Lockheed Martin even willing to hazard a guess as to the number of jobs Trump’s Riyadh proposals might actually create, when asked by The Washington Post. In Egypt’s case, the provision of U.S. arms has also not provided the more cynical benefits put forward by the proponents of such sales. U.S. officials don’t always know how the Egyptian military uses U.S. weapons in the Sinai. In a leaked video that appeared in April, Egyptian army and militia forces appeared to have used U.S. Humvees to transport several Sinai men to their summary executions. More importantly, treating values as negotiable based on whether they are effective is a slippery slope. (The argument against torture as both reprehensible and ineffective, for instance, raises the question of how we would view torture if it worked.) Weapons sales to abusive governments tweak our conscience, supporters argue, but they offer benefits. Thou shall not kill, except for votes in swing states.

#### The Yemen War is killing, displacing, and starving millions.

Sommerlad ’18 Somerlad, Joe. “Yemen civil war: The facts about the world's 'forgotten war'.” *The Independent*. 15 October 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-explained-facts-saudi-arabia-bombing-uk-forgotten-war-deaths-refugees-a8584356.html>. [Premier]

As many as 13 million people in Yemen are facing starvation in what could be the “worst famine seen anywhere in the world for 100 years”, according to the UN. The Middle Eastern nation has been embroiled in violent conflict for more than three years, its people suffering desperate privation and living under the constant threat of air strikes. Here’s how the “forgotten war” started. Who are the two sides? The battle is being fought between Houthi rebels, members of the Zaidi Shia Muslim minority said to be backed by Iran, and Yemeni government forces supported by a 10-nation coalition of mostly Sunni Muslim majority nations led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The foreign powers involved have been accused of exploiting the crisis to expand their respective spheres of interest within the region. The Houthis – disillusioned with the reign of President Abbrabbuh Mansur Hadi since he replaced Ali Abdullah Saleh following the Arab Spring uprising of 2011 – marched on the capital city of Sanaa from the north in September 2014 and forced him out office. President Hadi fled to Riyadh via the Port of Aden and appealed for help. Saudi Arabia duly retaliated against the rebels in March 2015, raining down brutal air strikes as part of operation “Decisive Storm” at the instigation of Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s defence minister prior to his accession to position of crown prince. While the Saudi-led coalition began by targeting Houthi military strongholds, its bombing campaign quickly shifted to civilian targets, according to Professor Martha Mundy of the World Peace Foundation (WPF). These included “water and transport infrastructure, food production and distribution, roads and transport, schools, cultural monuments, clinics and hospitals, and houses, fields and flocks,” the academic states in her recent report on the crisis, The Strategies of the Coalition in the Yemen War: Aerial Bombardment and Food War. The countryside has meanwhile been littered with landmines and other explosive devices as a result of the fighting, posing a further threat to human life on terra firma and making the ploughing of fields impossible. The Saudis allege a million have been laid by the Houthis as a trap for them over the course of the last three years, with an estimated 500,000 left over by al-Qaeda in addition – a terror group with whom the state is still battling in the east of Yemen, further complicating the picture. “This is one of Yemen’s toughest problems now. It will take a lifetime to sort,” officer Ali Salah told The Independent. Planned peace talks collapsed last month after the Houthi delegation failed to attend, prompting accusations from the Yemeni foreign minister Khaled al-Yamani they were “trying to sabotage the negotiations.” But Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi insisted his side had been deliberately prevented from being able to attend by strategic road blocks. Why are the US and UK supporting Saudi Arabia? While the UK, the US and France have called on the two sides to negotiate a peace settlement, all three have been roundly criticised for failing to stand up to Saudi Arabia to protect their commercial interests. The UK has sold more than £4.6bn worth of arms to the Saudis since the beginning of the Yemeni conflict in March 2015, according to the Campaign Against the Arms Trade, including aircraft, drones, grenades, missiles and tanks. A poll published in September by YouGov for Save the Children and Avaaz meanwhile found that 63 per cent of the British public oppose the British government allowing sales to continue, with just 13 per cent supporting the trade. The US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, previously CIA director, recently elected to continue US support for the Saudi air strikes rather than risk $2bn (£1.5bn) of weapon sales to the Gulf. According to The Wall Street Journal, reporting on a leaked memo, Mr Pompeo “overruled concerns from most of the state department specialists involved in the debate who were worried about the rising civilian death toll in Yemen”. While the UK and US do not participate in the Saudi-led bombings, the US provides aerial refuelling and logistical support while UK military personnel are stationed in command and control centres. For its part, Spain cancelled its arms deal with Riyadh over concerns about the war, paying back the £7.8m it had already received in payment for laser-guided bombs. How many people have died or been forced to flee as refugees? At least 7,641 people have been killed in the conflict and millions displaced, although the total is thought to be closer to 10,000. In August 2018, the bloodiest month of fighting so far this year, 981 civilians were killed, 300 of whom were children, according to the UN’s Human Rights Office. Prior to that, 6,660 civilians were killed and 10,563 injured between March 2015 and August this year, according to conservative estimates from the UN. Why is Yemen on the brink of a famine? Strict Saudi blockades and travel restrictions have prevented food and aid reaching Yemen, causing the price of food within the country to skyrocket and leaving desperate families unable to afford basic supplies from markets. The WPF report, accusing the Saudi coalition of using starvation as a weapon of war to create untenable conditions for the Houthis, states that no fewer than 220 fishing boats have been destroyed by bombs along the country’s Red Sea coast. This has meant the local fish catch is down by 50 per cent.Air strikes on the Port of Hodeida in June likewise appear a deliberate attempt to disable a facility from which 70 per cent of imports enter Yemen. Coalition forces cut a crucial supply route between Sanaa and Hodeida in September. The prevailing hardships as a result of bomb-damage have hit supplies of electricity and fuel, making basic arable farming difficult, while ranchers have been forced to sell their cattle to make ends meet. As a result of all this, almost three-quarters of Yemen’s 27.58 million population are currently reliant on aid. Of that total of approximately 22.2 million, 8.4 million are starving, 1.8 million of those being children, according to Unicef.

#### Saudi arms deals kill thousands and force millions in starvation. They also fuel terrorism, force entanglement, and displace diplomacy.

Thrall ’17 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government). “Trump’s No Good Very Bad Arms Deal.” *Cato at Liberty*. 7 June 2017. <https://www.cato.org/blog/trumps-no-good-very-bad-arms-deal>. [Premier]

Trump’s arms deal with the Saudis is in fact a terrible deal for the United States. It might generate or sustain some jobs in the U.S. It will certainly help the bottom line of a handful of defense companies. But from a foreign policy and national security perspective, the case against selling weapons to Saudi Arabia is a powerful one for many reasons. 1. The deal will deepen U.S. complicity in Saudi Arabia’s inhumane war in Yemen. In an almost three-year long intervention into the Yemeni civil war to defeat the Houthi rebels and to destroy the local Al Qaeda franchise (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—AQAP), the Saudis have demolished much of Yemen with little concern about the consequences. NGOs have documented case after case of the Saudis attacking civilian targets—the United Nations estimates over 10,000 civilians have died to date—and millions of Yemenis now suffer at the brink of starvation under increasingly desperate and unhealthy conditions. Tragically, the Saudis now seek American firepower to help them break the stalemate that has emerged on the ground in Yemen. 2. The deal will not help the United States “defeat” AQAP. As the United States should have learned by now, military intervention is a blunt tool ill-suited to counterterrorism. Airstrikes are wonderful for destroying buildings and military equipment, but of much less value for killing terrorists. And they are less than worthless for confronting the political motivations that actually drive groups to conduct terrorism in the first place. America’s track record in the Middle East since 2001 shows that despite having killed thousands of terrorists, U.S. military intervention has actually caused chaos, resentment, and terrorism to spread. Instead of defeating Al Qaeda, sixteen years of constant military pressure has helped spawn dozens of new terrorist groups and tens of thousands of new jihadist fighters. And in Yemen, where AQAP thrives despite years of U.S. drone strikes and special forces missions, there are signs that the Saudis are partnering with AQAP in the fight against the Houthis. In short, American-fueled escalation by the Saudis is only likely to help AQAP further enhance its position, while adding to the anti-U.S. sentiment in Yemen brought about by the devastation U.S. munitions have wrought. 3. The deal pushes the United States down the slippery slope in the Middle East. Picking sides in the broader struggles between Saudi Arabia and Iran, between Sunni and Shia, and among the array of other groups seeking power and dominance in the Middle East can only cause trouble. The idea that through arms sales the United States can “project stability” or dictate geopolitical outcomes in the Middle East is dangerous folly. The more likely outcomes of the Saudi arms deal are increased tensions with Israel and a costly and dangerous arms race with Iran. Even worse, picking sides increases the risk that the U.S. will wind up getting dragged deeper into future conflicts as it seeks to make sure “its side” maintains the advantage. Given that Saudi Arabia lobbied for Western intervention in Libya and Syria, and has intervened itself to varying degrees in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and Bahrain since 2011, this risk is non-trivial. The reality is that this self-imposed entanglement does nothing to advance American security or other national interests. Neither vague concerns about regional stability nor the modest risk posed by terrorism warrant such large-scale arms deals. Though the Trump administration worries about Iran’s influence, it makes no sense to worry more about Iran—who opposes Al Qaeda and ISIS—than about the other autocratic states in the region. Why, for example, does it make sense for the United States to double down on a partnership with Saudi Arabia, the very country most responsible for the spread of Wahhabism—the hard line version of Islam embraced by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State? Why does it make sense to continue pouring weapons into a region already fragile, already tense, already in conflict? As civil wars across the region should illustrate, external intervention, whether in the form of troops or weapons, simply amplifies existing conflicts. 4. The Saudi arms deal will privilege military solutions at the expense of diplomacy. When countries believe they have the ability to impose their will by military force, their desire to negotiate dwindles. By selling the Saudis weapons, the United States will embolden Saudi hawks to continue pressing for a military approach, not only in the short run in Yemen, but in other conflict areas as well. Likewise, when Israel or Iran’s national security team meets, the U.S. weapons sale to the Saudis will give those hawks the upper hand in their discussions. This problem will be further multiplied by every other instance where the United States is selling weapons in the Middle East. The dynamic will, in turn, encourage arms racing, inflame tensions, will very likely amplify existing violence, and in short will make it much more difficult for leaders of all nations in the region to work toward diplomatic solutions. Beyond their impact on the recipients’ interest in diplomacy, U.S. reliance on arms sales also destroys America’s moral authority and reduces its diplomatic flexibility. By arming oppressive governments throughout the Middle East without regard for the consequences, not only does the United States risk the resentment of Arab populations and the wrath of terrorist groups, it also loses the ability to call out autocratic behavior, to inspire political change, and to speak credibly to democratic movements. By using weapons sales to take sides in various sectarian and regional disputes, the United States loses the ability to serve as a convener of stakeholders and a mediator of peace agreements. This, in turn, leaves the United States even more reliant on military tools.

#### Saudi Arabia is an authoritarian regime.

Wehrey 15 Frederic Wehrey. "The Authoritarian Resurgence: Saudi Arabia's Anxious Autocrats." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April, 2015. [Premier].

One of the world’s last remaining bastions of absolute monarchy, the oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursues throughout the broader Middle East and beyond an activist foreign policy that is largely nonideological, realist, and defensive in intent, but negative in its implications for democracy. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia has intervened in a number of transitioning states with the aim of countering the challenges posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafi jihadism as embodied by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. While the intent of such interference may not be explicitly antidemocratic, many of the recipients of Saudi support have been authoritarian and antiliberal.1 The ultimate effect has been damaging to the spread of democratization and political pluralism. When 90-year-old King Abdullah died in January 2015, the royal regime’s Allegiance Council, an appointed panel of 28 princes tasked with ensuring a smooth succession, swiftly named 79-year-old Crown Prince Salman as the new king. The Council then designated his 69-year-old half-brother Muqrin as his successor, with 55-year-old Muhammad bin Nayef as the next in line after Muqrin. The speedy process was a display of unity and political efficiency that must have seemed all the more crucial to Saudi Arabia’s rulers as they noted how rebels with ties to Iran had just overrun the capital of neighboring Yemen, forced out its president, and pushed that already turbulent country closer to full-blown state collapse. Increasingly, Saudi Arabia’s reach is global, with robust trade links to the powerhouse economies of Northeast Asia, burgeoning security and defense ties to South Asia, and longstanding bonds with Muslim communities across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Although Saudi Arabia is not a revolutionary power bent on exporting its brand of authoritarian governance, its foreign policy is counterdemocratic in effect. Within the region, Saudi money and influence have been used to block the ascendance of groups that the royal family deems a threat to its security at home. The Saudi regional strategy is rooted in the monarchy’s view of the 2011 uprisings not as the Arab Spring but as the Arab Troubles—upheavals that brought sectarian strife, Iranian expansionism, newfound prominence for the Muslim Brothers, and fresh strains of jihadism such as the one that drives the Islamic State.

#### The US provides weapons, intelligence, and financial aid to Saudi Arabia to back its war effort.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

As public anger over America’s role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America’s longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking “demonstrable actions” to avoid harming civilians and making a “good faith” effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and billions of dollars worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force.

#### Millions in Yemen are on the brink of starvation, and thousands of children have died as a result of the US-backed Saudi war in Yemen.

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof [Columnist at The Times since 2001, winner of two Pulitzer Prices for coverage of China and of the genocide in Darfur. Also a debate parent]. "Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children." The New York Times. Opinions Section. December 9, 2018. [Premier].

Some 85,000 children may have already died here in Yemen, and 12 million more people may be on the brink of starvation, casualties in part of the three-year-old American-backed Saudi war in Yemen. United Nations officials and aid experts warn that this could become the worst famine the world has seen in a generation. “The risk of a major catastrophe is very high,” Mark Lowcock, the United Nations humanitarian chief, told me. “In the worst case, what we have in Yemen now has the potential to be worse than anything any professional in this field has seen during their working lives.” Both the Obama and Trump administrations have supported the Saudi war in Yemen with a military partnership, arms sales, intelligence sharing and until recently air-to-air refueling. The United States is thus complicit in what some human rights experts believe are war crimes. The bottom line: Our tax dollars are going to starve children.

#### The starvation of Yemenese children is not a consequence of natural disaster, but an intentional weapon.

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof [Columnist at The Times since 2001, winner of two Pulitzer Prices for coverage of China and of the genocide in Darfur. Also a debate parent]. "Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children." The New York Times. Opinions Section. December 9, 2018. [Premier].

What is most infuriating is that the hunger is caused not by drought or extreme weather, but by cynical and failed policies in Riyadh and Washington. The starvation does not seem to be an accidental byproduct of war, but rather a weapon in it. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, backed by the United States, are trying to inflict pain to gain leverage over and destabilize the Houthi rebels. The reason: The Houthis are allied with Iran. The governments of Saudi Arabia and the United States don’t want you to see pictures like Yaqoob’s or reflect on the suffering in Yemen. The Saudis impose a partial blockade on Houthi areas, banning commercial flights and barring journalists from special United Nations planes there. I’ve been trying for more than two years to get through the Saudi blockade, and I finally was able to by tagging onto Lowcock’s United Nations delegation.

#### Besides starvation, malnutrition and lack of health services has left thousands of children permanently disabled and diseased.

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof [Columnist at The Times since 2001, winner of two Pulitzer Prices for coverage of China and of the genocide in Darfur. Also a debate parent]. "Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children." The New York Times. Opinions Section. December 9, 2018. [Premier].

We think of war casualties as men with their legs blown off. But in Yemen the most common war casualties are children like Fawaz who suffer malnutrition. Some will die. Even the survivors may suffer lifelong brain damage. A majority of Yemen children are now believed to be physically stunted from malnutrition (46 percent were stunted even before the war), and physical stunting is frequently accompanied by diminished brain development. “These children are the future of Yemen,” Dr. Aida Hussein, a nutrition specialist, told me, looking at Fawaz. “He will be stunted. How will he do in school?” The war and lack of health care facilities have also led to outbreaks of deadly diseases like diphtheria and cholera. Half of the country’s clinics and hospitals are closed.

#### Civilian death has been caused overwhelmingly by the Saudis, UEA, and the US.

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof [Columnist at The Times since 2001, winner of two Pulitzer Prices for coverage of China and of the genocide in Darfur. Also a debate parent]. "Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children." The New York Times. Opinions Section. December 9, 2018. [Premier].

Still, the civilian loss of life has overwhelmingly been caused not by the Houthis but by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and America, through both bombings and starvation. It’s ridiculous for the Trump administration to be exploring naming the Houthis a terrorist organization. And while the Houthis are allies of Iran, I think the Saudis exaggerate when they suggest that the Houthis are Iranian pawns.

#### Without cutting off military aid to Saudi Arabia, short-term aid to Yemen is useless.

Kristof 18 Nicholas Kristof [Columnist at The Times since 2001, winner of two Pulitzer Prices for coverage of China and of the genocide in Darfur. Also a debate parent]. "Your Tax Dollars Help Starve Children." The New York Times. Opinions Section. December 9, 2018. [Premier].

Saudi and U.A.E. officials note that they provide an enormous amount of humanitarian aid to Yemen. This is true, and it mitigates the suffering there. But it’s difficult to give the Saudis much credit for relieving the suffering of a country that they are bombing and starving. To avert a catastrophe in Yemen, the world needs to provide more humanitarian aid. But above all, the war has to end. “You’re not going to solve this long-term until the war is ended,” said David Beasley, the executive director of the World Food Program. “It’s a man-made problem, and it needs a man-made solution.” That solution will entail strong American backing for a difficult United Nations-backed peace process involving Yemeni factions and outsiders, aiming for a measure of power sharing. This diplomatic process requires engaging the Houthis, not just bombing them. It also means a cease-fire and pressure on all sides to ensure humanitarian access and the passage of food and fuel. The best leverage America has to make the Saudis part of the solution is to suspend arms sales to Riyadh so long as the Saudis continue the war.

#### In addition to 50,000 causalities between 2016 and 18, the war in Yemen has left 22 million in need of aid.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

That war has long since devolved into a humanitarian catastrophe. The United Nations stopped counting its civilian death toll two years ago, when it hit 10,000. An independent estimate by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, which tracks conflicts worldwide, found that nearly 50,000 people, including combatants, died between January 2016 and July 2018. The war has also left more than 22 million people—75 percent of the population of Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the world—in need of humanitarian aid.

#### US commitment to the Saudis means the war will go on indefinitely.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

By accepting the coalition’s cosmetic attempts to minimize civilian casualties, the Trump administration is signaling to Saudi and Emirati leaders its apparent belief that a clear military victory in Yemen remains possible. And as long as the coalition believes it can crush the Houthis, there’s little incentive for it to negotiate. Trump, then, has bought into Saudi Arabia’s zero-sum calculation: that a military win in Yemen for the kingdom and its allies would be a defeat for Iran, while a negotiated settlement with the Houthis would be a victory for Tehran. Blinded by its obsession with Iran, the Trump administration is perpetuating an unwinnable war and undermining the likelihood of a political settlement.

#### The Trump administration has only been escalating US involvement in the war.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

The Trump administration has shown little interest in using arms deals as leverage for a political settlement, or to force the Saudis to take concerns about civilian deaths more seriously. In March 2017, Trump reversed a decision by the Obama administration to suspend the sale of more than $500 million in laser-guided bombs and other munitions to the Saudi military. As more members of Congress expressed criticism of Saudi actions in Yemen, the Senate narrowly approved that sale. After the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at several Saudi cities in late 2017, the Trump administration again escalated U.S. involvement in the war. The New York Times broke the news that the Pentagon had secretly dispatched U.S. special forces to the Saudi-Yemen border to help the Saudi military locate and destroy Houthi missile sites. Frustrated by the deepening U.S. role, two dozen members of the House introduced a resolution this week invoking the 1973 War Powers Act, arguing that Congress never authorized American support for the Saudi coalition and instructing Trump to withdraw U.S. forces.

#### The Trump admin’s endorsement of the Saudi coalition has dis-incentivized efforts to avoid civilian causalities and war crimes.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

Saudi and Emirati leaders want a clear-cut victory in their regional rivalry with Iran, and they have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s unconditional support to stall negotiations. A recent UN effort to hold peace talks between the Houthis, Hadi’s government, and the Saudi-led coalition collapsed in early September, after the Houthi delegation did not show up in Geneva. Houthi leaders said the Saudis, who control Yemen’s airspace, would not guarantee their safe travel. Days later, Yemeni forces loyal to the Saudi-UAE alliance launched a new offensive aimed at forcing the Houthis out of Hodeidah port, which is the major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen. UN officials warn that a prolonged battle for the port and its surroundings could lead to the death of 250,000 people, mainly from mass starvation. After the Trump administration’s endorsement this month, the Saudi-UAE alliance has even less incentive to prevent civilian casualties and new humanitarian disasters. Saudi Arabia and its allies are more likely to accept a peace process if it is clear that the United States won’t support an open-ended war in Yemen and won’t provide the military assistance required to keep the war apparatus going. But Trump has shown little sign of pressuring his Saudi and Emirati allies, least of all over Yemen. The only realistic check left is in Congress, where more voices are asking why the world’s most powerful country is helping to perpetuate the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

#### The Saudi-led coalition has been blocking international aid.

Goodman 18 Jack Goodman [BBC reporter]. "Yemen war: Billions in aid, but where's it going?" BBC News. Dec 12, 2018. [Premier].

The current conditions on the ground are seriously hindering the delivery and distribution of aid - far too little is reaching those desperately in need. On the one hand, the Saudi-led coalition is enforcing a commercial blockade on sea and air routes into the country, and placing restrictions on relief supplies. A total of 90% of imports are food, fuel, and drugs, and the blockade is effectively choking a country heavily reliant on these goods. Aid is also subject to long inspection delays as well as in some cases being rejected altogether. Coalition forces have also bombed bridges linking Yemen's main port at Hudaydah with Sanaa, the capital city, which has meant trucks loaded with vital supplies are having to take other routes, adding many hours to journey times, increasing the price of delivery and, in some cases, making it impossible to deliver supplies at all to areas in desperate need.

#### Even aid from the Saudis and US is ineffective; local groups and warlords prevent delivery of aid to those in need.

Goodman 18 Jack Goodman [BBC reporter]. "Yemen war: Billions in aid, but where's it going?" BBC News. Dec 12, 2018. [Premier].

On the other hand, local groups and warlords are also hindering the delivery of aid, and at times there is outright looting and selling on the black market. Houthi rebels have blocked access to besieged cities such as Taiz and set up checkpoints into the capital, charging extra fees to aid agencies, who in turn have less available to spend on humanitarian aid. Profiteers on both sides of the conflict are also intentionally creating shortages and spiking prices of certain items such as fuel and gas. The UN says humanitarian organisations are now able to reach eight million people a month but the warnings of a catastrophic famine have grown stronger.

#### The ongoing war makes humanitarian work in Yemen too dangerous.

Goodman 18 Jack Goodman [BBC reporter]. "Yemen war: Billions in aid, but where's it going?" BBC News. Dec 12, 2018. [Premier].

Delivering aid in an active conflict is challenging - continued fighting and air strikes make it dangerous for humanitarian workers to gain access to people in need. In the months of June and July this year, 86% of incidents where UN staff were delayed or denied access were due to administrative restrictions on movement - activities that require permissions from the authorities. Most of the rest were delayed by military operations and hostilities impeding humanitarian operations. Suze van Meegen, a spokeswoman for the Norwegian Refugee Council, highlighted some of the difficulties faced by its staff operating in Yemen. "Restrictions on the movement of humanitarian goods and personnel span challenges with security and logistics, as well as complex, changing bureaucratic impediments, delayed visa processes for international staff, and threats to the safety of Yemeni humanitarian staff - the ones working at greatest personal risk to help people in need."

#### Even with food imports, soaring food prices make access for the poor impossible.

Goodman 18 Jack Goodman [BBC reporter]. "Yemen war: Billions in aid, but where's it going?" BBC News. Dec 12, 2018. [Premier].

As a result of the blockade and a collapsing currency, food prices have soared, leaving a desperately poor population unable to buy food even though it is available in shops and on market stalls. A pro-Yemeni-government assault on Hudaydah port, which supplies food and goods for just under two-thirds of Yemen's population and serves shipments of aid, threatened food supplies even further. "If food imports dry up there's no way for the aid community to offset a famine," says Mr Konyndyk.

#### Increased military support in Yemen is part of Trump’s broader policy shift to ally the US closer with Saudi Arabia.

Bazzi 18 Mohamad Bazzi. "The war in Yemen is disastrous. America is only making things worse." The Guardian. June 11, 2018. [Premier].

The increased US military support for Saudi actions in Yemen is part of a larger policy shift by Trump and his top advisers since he took office, in which Trump voices constant support for Saudi Arabia and perpetual criticism of its regional rival, Iran. The transformation was solidified during Trump’s visit to the kingdom in May 2017, which he chose as the first stop on his maiden foreign trip as president. Saudi leaders gave Trump a grandiose welcome: they filled the streets of Riyadh with billboards of Trump and the Saudi King Salman; organized extravagant receptions and sword dances; and awarded Trump the kingdom’s highest honor, a gold medallion named after the founding monarch.

#### Trump has over exaggerated the benefits of US-Saudi arms sales to the US economy.

Borger 18 Julian Borger [World affairs editor at The Guardian]. "Trump inflated importance of Saudi arms sales to US job market, report says." The Guardian. November 20, 2018. [Premier].

US arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Washington extensive leverage on Riyadh, while accounting for fewer than 20,000 US jobs a year – less than a twentieth of the employment boost Donald Trump has claimed – according to a new report. Trump has repeatedly cited the importance of Saudi arms sales to the US economy as a reason not to cut the supply of weapons in response to the murder of the Saudi writer and Washington Post columnist, Jamal Khashoggi. The president has frequently estimated the total extent of defence sales to the Saudi regime at $110bn, and variously said they would generate 450,000, 500,000 or 600,000 jobs. According to a report by the Centre for International Policy thinktank in Washington, those figures are hugely inflated. The report, US Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen, argues that Saudi Arabia needs the US far more than the other way round, and the administration is underplaying its hand, if it wants to rein in Riyadh in Yemen – or punish the monarchy for Khashoggi’s murder at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

#### Plan is key to human rights credibility – it’s perceived as a response to human rights abuses.

Morin ’18 Morin, Rebecca. “Rubio: U.S. risks ‘credibility on human rights’ with weak response to Khashoggi disappearance.” *Politico*. 16 October 2018. <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/16/rubio-khashoggi-saudi-arabia-credibility-903828>. [Premier]

Saudi Arabia is a longstanding U.S. partner on key Middle East issues, including national and regional security, as well as a top purchaser of American-made defense equipment. But Rubio (R-Fla.) told CNN's "New Day" that the U.S. ought to prioritize human rights over a $110 billion arms deal with the Saudi government. "I can tell you that human rights is worth blowing that up and luring someone into a consulate where they're murdered, dismembered and disposed of is a big deal," Rubio, who sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said. "It's a human being whose life was taken by a direct act of a foreign government by luring him into a diplomatic facility in a third country." Khashoggi is a Saudi journalist who had been living in exile in the United States and has been critical of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other members of the Saudi royal family. He was last seen entering the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2 to obtain an official document required for his planned marriage. President Donald Trump last week said he does not want to cancel an arms deal with Saudi Arabia over concerns that such a move could negatively impact the U.S. economy. Trump signed a memorandum in May, 2017, outlining intent from the Saudi government to buy nearly $110 billion in arms over the next 10 years. In an interview with CBS's "60 Minutes" that aired Sunday, the president did say that there will be "severe punishment" over Khashoggi's disappearance. But in a brief exchange with reporters on Monday, Trump said he had spoken to Saudi Arabia's King Salman, who Trump said "firmly denied any knowledge of" Khashoggi's disappearance. "I don't want to get into his mind, but it sounded to me like maybe these could have been rogue killers, who knows?" the president said. "We'll try getting to the bottom of it very soon. His was a flat denial." Rubio said that he realizes that selling weapons to another country also gives us leverage, as buyers have to rely on the U.S. to maintain the weapons. Still, he said, the benefits of prioritizing defense sales do not outweigh the human rights costs. "There isn't enough money in the world to purchase back our credibility on human rights and the way nations should conduct themselves," Rubio said. "We lose our credibility and our moral standing to criticize [Russian President Vladimir] Putin for murdering people, [Syrian President Bashar] Assad for murdering people, [Nicolás] Maduro in Venezuela for murdering people, we can't say anything about that if we allow Saudi Arabia to do it and all we do is a diplomatic slap on the wrist."

#### Saudi Arabia is extremely authoritarian.

Fields ’18 [Fields, Jeremy (Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, University of Southern California). “Saudi Arabia is a repressive regime – and so are a lot of US allies.” *The Conversation*. 22 October 2018. <https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabia-is-a-repressive-regime-and-so-are-a-lot-of-us-allies-105106>. [Premier]

The alleged assassination of Khashoggi by Saudi operatives may seem surprising because of the 31-year-old crown prince’s reputation as a moderate reformer. Salman has made newsworthy changes in the conservative Arab kingdom, allowing women to drive, combating corruption and curtailing some powers of the religious police. Still, Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes. Women must have the consent of a male guardian to enroll in college, look for a job or travel. They cannot swim in public or try on clothes when shopping. The Saudi government also routinely arrests people without judicial review, according to Human Rights Watch. Citizens can be executed for nonviolent drug crimes, often in public. Forty-eight people were beheaded in the first four months of 2018 alone. Saudi Arabia ranks just above North Korea on political rights, civil liberties and other measures of freedom, according to the democracy watchdog Freedom House.

## AC - Egypt

#### Plan – The United States ought not provide military aid to Egypt.

#### The plan shifts U.S. strategy away from supporting dictators and failed attempts at “leverage.”

Hartung ’13 Hartung, William D. (Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy and a senior adviser to the Center’s Security Assistance Monitor). “Stop Dithering Over Military Aid to Egypt.” *Huffington Post*. 15 August 2013. <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/egypt-military-aid_b_3762184.html>. [Premier]

The Obama administration’s effort to pretend that the military takeover in Egypt wasn’t a “coup” was never credible. Now that hundreds of regime opponents have been murdered in the streets of Cairo — in many cases with U.S.-supplied weaponry — it is unconscionable. President Obama’s announcement this morning that he will cancel scheduled military exercises with Egypt while leaving aid untouched is unacceptable. U.S military aid must end — now. Stopping aid won’t bring back the dead, or have any impact on the Egyptian military’s behavior in the short-term. But it is the right thing to do, and it could have a longer-term impact if it brings an end to the decades-long, misguided U.S. policy of arming dictatorships in the name of “stability.” Since the end of World War II, the twisted rationale for U.S. assistance and weapons sales to dozens of repressive regimes has been grounded in two related myths. The first is that the alleged alternative — whether a communist, or nationalist, or Islamist government — would be worse than what Reagan administration official Jeane Kirkpatrick famously described as rule by “authoritarian,” pro-Western regimes that she claimed were easier to reform. Her assertion has since been disproven by developments like the largely peaceful transition from communism to democracy in East and Central Europe and the persistence of repressive governments in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and for the moment at least, in Egypt. The truth is that every undemocratic regime has its own vulnerabilities, and each opposition movement has its own dynamics. There is no “acceptable” form of dictatorship. The second myth that has undergirded a policy of arming dictators has been the notion that a military relationship provides the United States with leverage it would not otherwise have — leverage to moderate repressive behavior and gradually nudge the recipient state towards democracy and respect for human rights. This has always been a questionable proposition, and the killings in Cairo have left it in tatters. According to Gordon Lubold of Foreign Policy magazine’s “Situation Report,” Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has spoken to Egyptian General Abel Fattah Al-Sisi fifteen times in the past few weeks with no discernible effect on his regime’s behavior. Marc Lynch elaborates on the futility of these efforts and the need to cut ties with the military regime in Egypt in his piece today on the Foreign Policy web site. Egypt is not the only place where the “arms to dictators” approach has been employed. Bahrain — with help from Saudi Arabia — has violently repressed the democracy movement there. This behavior has prompted criticism from Washington as well as some debate over what types of weaponry to ship to the Bahraini regime, but the overriding point is that U.S. arms and training continue to flow. This too must stop. And the examples don’t end there. A June 2012 report by the Center for Public Integrity documented U.S. arms transfers to ten countries that its own State Department had cited for major human rights abuses. A full cross check between the State Department’s annual human rights document with reports on U.S. arms transfers would reveal many other examples. Stopping military aid to Egypt should be a first step in undermining the myth that supplying arms to repressive regimes is a road to stability and reform. And the Obama administration should act accordingly.

#### Egypt is the recipient of the second greatest amount of military aid from the US – 1.3 billion dollars.

Thompson 15 Nick Thompson [CNN reporter]. "Seventy-five percent of US foreign military financing goes to two countries." CNN politics. November 11, 2015. [Premier].

American taxpayers doled out $5.9 billion in foreign military financing in 2014, according to the government's Foreign Assistance report -- that's roughly the GDP of Somalia. But where did the money go? To the usual suspects, mostly -- Israel ($3.1B) and Egypt ($1.3B) received roughly 75% of all foreign military aid money handed out by the U.S. last year. This map from the cost-information website howmuch.net shows the relative size of countries based on how much U.S. military aid they receive.

#### Trump’s decision to release aid to Egypt has green-lighted decades of human rights abuses – causes massive structural violence and crushes human rights credibility.

Hurley ’18 Hurley, Daniel (Student of Political Science at The College of New Jersey). “U.S Provides Aid to Egypt, Human Rights Abused.” *Journal of International Relations*. 4 August 2018. <http://www.sirjournal.org/op-ed/2018/8/4/us-provides-aid-to-egypt-human-rights-abused>. [Premier]

The U.S. Department of State this week lifted restrictions on $195 million in military aid that was previously frozen by former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in 2017 (1). Originally imposed to protest Cairo’s facilitation of North Korean illicit arms sales and Egypt’s abysmal human rights record, the financial restrictions, according to current Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, needed to be lifted now due to Egypt’s response to specific U.S. concerns—concerns that have not been specified by the administration. Providing Egypt with military aid and other sources of financial assistance is routine for the U.S. Between 1946 and 2016, Egypt received $78.3 billion in bilateral foreign assistance from American taxpayers (2). Specifically since the ratification of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the U.S. has provided vast amounts of military aid to Egypt in an effort to support regional stability. With this aid, Egypt has mostly purchased large-scale conventional military equipment, including fighter jets and battle tanks. For fiscal year 2019, President Trump has requested $1.381 billion in foreign assistance to Egypt. What makes this transfer of funds unusual, however, is that aid is being provided despite the fact that one of the main goal’s for restricting the funds in the first place—to pressure Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to improve his record of human rights—has yet to be realized according to some experts. While past administrations, including those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, have made improvements in Egypt’s domestic human rights conditions a precondition for the allocation of military and economic foreign assistance, the Trump administration is providing aid while the Egyptian government has not met the original “human rights” precondition. Although the Egyptian government has apparently addressed some of the human rights concerns advanced by the State Department, the extent to which these concerns have been meet does not warrant the release of these funds. The Trump administration’s call for Sisi to overturn the conviction of 43 employees (including 17 American citizens) of international groups that promote democracy, for instance, has been addressed with Sisi’s minimalist decision to schedule a retrial rather than dismiss the charges altogether. Frankly, over the last year, Sisi’s government has cracked down more heavily on nongovernmental organizations, journalists, and political opponents operating inside Egypt. In the period preceding the March 2018 presidential election, for example, critics of Sisi were arrested without a credible, legal-based justification (3). Under the guise of a counterterrorism strategy, Egyptian security services also blocked 64 news websites in June 2017, alleging that they did not align with the state media’s narrative of events. Adding to this track record, 47,000 nongovernmental organizations have been subjected to strict operational guidelines due to the enactment of a controversial 2017 law. The law restricts NGO activity to “developmental and social work” and threatens up to five years of incarceration for non-compliance (4). Effectively, NGOs in Egypt are virtually inoperable under this law. Context & Consequences Given President Trump’s record of complimenting autocrats in an effort to build bilateral strategic partnerships, the fact that the funds were released is not surprising. During his first meeting with Sisi as president, Trump praised Sisi for doing a “tremendous job under trying circumstance” (5). The “trying circumstance” that Trump referred to is the ongoing, disruptive, and ineffective “brute force” strategy that Sisi has been undertaking in an effort to root out armed rebel groups occupying the Sinai Peninsula. According to residents of the Sinai, this strategy is causing more danger to their lives than proving to secure their safety. With regards to the U.S. administration’s approach to dealing with the threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile program, Trump again used praise to achieve national security interests. In a June 2018 interview with Fox News, Trump expressed admiration for Chairman Kim Jong-un’s intelligence, strategic way of thinking, and personality (6). Based on reports generated by international human rights watchdogs including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the North Korean government has imprisoned thousands of political dissenters, forced women to have abortions repeatedly, condoned rape, and turned a blind eye to acts of gender-based abuses. Yet, despite the well-documented track record of the North Korean regime abusing human rights, Trump has chosen to laud the regime in an effort to attain strategic ends. By choosing to sideline human rights concerns in an effort to address national security interests, the Trump administration has effectively given Egypt’s government a green light to continue to abuse human rights in the same way they have for years, since the U.S. apparently is comfortable with a policy of minimal (if tangible at all) improvements in domestic human rights conditions in exchange for strengthening bilateral military and economic partnerships. This is a dangerous policy, for two reasons. Primarily, such a disregard for human rights in a national security strategy weakens the leverage, and standing, that the U.S. has in international negotiations. By condoning the actions of human rights violators, allies of the U.S. may be reluctant to pursue joint international efforts for fear of domestic backlash as a result of their nation’s leaders cooperating with a country that underestimates the value of human rights diplomacy. Such polarization among allies poses a threat to the longevity of Western alliances and the value of common strategic partnerships. On the other hand, repeated displays of U.S. disregard for international human rights feeds into the narrative of American adversaries that the U.S. is a hypocritical state on the international stage. While the U.S. expresses a deep commitment to securing and advancing human rights in speeches and decrees, it does not so in its national policies and global initiatives—so adversaries say. While this argument is true and false to an extent, that fact that the U.S. is supporting Egypt’s repressive regime fuels the “true” narrative. For a country that prides itself on promoting respect for human rights at home and abroad, the State Department’s decision is not conducive to the cause.

#### Egypt is once again an authoritarian regime.

Hamzawy 17 Amr Hamzawy [Studies political science and developmental studies at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]. "Legislating Authoritarianism: Egypt's New Era of Repression." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 16, 2017. [Premier].

After a brief democratic opening, a new authoritarian regime has emerged in Egypt. The military establishment, security services, and intelligence agencies now rule the country and have managed to reintroduce fear as a daily constant in a nation still in dire straits. This stands in stark contrast to the period following the 2011 revolution, which fostered the activity of civil society and political parties and encouraged citizens to freely express their opinions and engage in the political process. Once again, power is held by a military officer who was pushed into the presidential palace after elections that lacked any measure of democratic competition.1 Images of peacefully protesting masses and citizens waiting in long lines to cast ballots have been replaced by scenes of police units rounding up young Egyptians after attempted peaceful demonstrations, confirmed reports of torture in places of custody, and forced disappearances.

#### Sisi has massacred and imprisoned thousands of political dissidents, and handed out record numbers of death sentences in mass trials. Trump has only increased military aid to Egypt.

Al-Arian 18 Lama Al-Arian. "U.S. Military Aid to Egypt Gives a 'Green Light' to Repression, Says Rights Advocates." NPR. August 8, 2018. [Premier].

The Trump administration's recent decision to release $195 million in military aid to Egypt has left rights experts stunned and deeply worried. A year ago, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suspended that sum because Egypt's human rights record didn't meet the standards imposed by Congress. Since that time, the space for civic freedoms in Egypt has shrunk, researchers say. Egypt's security forces have continued to lock up groups labeled dissidents or terrorists, and courts have handed down mass death sentences in cases widely criticized as politically motivated. The U.S. aid reversal comes in support of a regime that researchers say is even more authoritarian than ousted ruler Hosni Mubarak. "This sends all of the wrong signals to the Egyptian generals that the rhetoric about human rights is merely lip service," says Mohamed Soltan, a U.S. citizen who spent almost two years as a political prisoner in Egypt until he was released in 2015. "It is a green light to carry on with the repressive policies." On July 25, the State Department said it decided to release the money because the Middle Eastern country has taken steps in response to U.S. concerns, but didn't specify what progress has been made.

#### Aid to Egypt undermines US leverage and encourages Egyptian repression.

Al-Arian 18 Lama Al-Arian. "U.S. Military Aid to Egypt Gives a 'Green Light' to Repression, Says Rights Advocates." NPR. August 8, 2018. [Premier].

Soltan says, by resuming military aid, the U.S. is relinquishing leverage it once had to influence policy and possibly the fate of prisoners in Egypt. Enlarge this image In this March 2015, photo, Mohamed Soltan is pushed by his father Salah during a court appearance in Cairo. Egyptian officials freed Soltan May 30, 2015. He had been sentenced to life in prison on charges of financing an anti-government sit-in and spreading "false news." Soltan himself was shot, arrested and sentenced to life in prison for tweeting at a demonstration in Cairo in 2013. His imprisonment was condemned by human rights groups and eventually — after a 489-day hunger strike — the Obama administration intervened to demand his release. Egypt ultimately succumbed to U.S. pressure: Soltan was freed in May 2015 after 22 months in prison and deported to the United States. "My release, among a few others, is proof the U.S. has leverage over Egypt with regards to human rights policies. The recent decision to release the withheld aid is a devastating blow to that influence," Soltan says, speaking to NPR from Washington, D.C. President Sissi has expanded the government crackdown beyond so-called Islamist opponents. In April, he won re-election in a landslide, but had no real opponent. Most candidates had been either arrested or pressured to drop out of the race. The situation in Egypt is "dreadful, far worse than it has ever been," says Andrew Miller, who researches Egypt for the Washington-based Project on Middle East Democracy. Civil society and the media are also gasping for air, according to Dooley of Human Rights First, who visited Cairo last week. Dooley met with activists there who have been targeted by the Egyptian government. He says Sissi has passed laws criminalizing any form of free media and advocacy for human rights. Egypt has maintained that these laws are necessary to maintain stability and security. The Egyptian military has been fighting an insurgency in the Sinai region for the past few years, where groups allied to al-Qaida and ISIS have entrenched themselves. But as NPR has reported, extremist groups have used Egypt's prisons to recruit members. Former political prisoners have recounted how ISIS recruiters roam around the prison freely. "This level of repression expedites the process of radicalization," Miller says. The U.S. government has long faced criticism, including from Congress members, for providing aid to Egypt even at times when it clearly failed to make progress on human rights and democracy. Since 1946, the U.S. has provided Egypt with more than $78 billion in foreign aid. But the current era of financial support goes back to a 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that came out of the Camp David Accords. These days, the U.S. government says it is assisting Egypt in part to help fight radicalization. But Miller says the Egyptian government's strategy is problematic. "They are using conventional military tactics and blowing up entire areas without engaging the local population, and this is making a lot of people angry," he says. Activists in Egypt have implored the U.S. to use its influence in positive ways and condition its military aid to Egypt on better human rights for Egyptians, according to Dooley. "Withholding aid was starting to have impact," Dooley says, "but now the U.S. administration has shown Egypt it just doesn't really care."

#### Egypt’s problem is military strategy, not a lack of resources.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller. "Five myths about US aid to Egypt." Reuters. August 13, 2018. [Premier].

The Egyptian military has been struggling to defeat some 1,000 members of a Sinai Peninsula-based affiliate of the Islamic State (IS) for the past five years. Periodic military campaigns have failed to deal a decisive blow to the militants, and 2017 was the bloodiest year in modern Egyptian history, as measured by the death toll from terrorist attacks. Egypt requires U.S. assistance to address this challenge, but it needs training and advice, not more weapons. When I served in the U.S. government, there was general recognition that Egypt already had enough weapons to win against IS. The real problem was how the Egyptian military used those weapons. Instead of adopting modern, effective counterinsurgency tactics that ousted IS from Iraq and Syria, Egypt’s armed forces continued to rely on the conventional approach of directing overwhelming force against militants embedded in residential communities. This heavy-handed strategy has alienated the local Sinai population, without whose support a lasting victory against IS is nearly impossible.

#### Sisi has done little to combat extremism, and has led to IS recruiting in Egypt.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller. "Five myths about US aid to Egypt." Reuters. August 13, 2018. [Premier].

The West has praised Sisi’s calls for a “religious revolution” in Islam, but in reality he has done little to combat extremist views. Blasphemy convictions against those perceived to have offended Islam have increased since Sisi became president, and pervasive discrimination against Coptic Christians continues. Moreover, Sisi has presided over an unprecedented level of political repression that is fueling radicalization amongst Egyptian youth. Several prominent former Egyptian prisoners have reported that IS is finding new recruits among those jailed with hardened militants in over-crowded prisons. Indeed, it appears that the suicide bomber in a December 2016 church attack that killed 26 people was radicalized in an Egyptian prison.

#### Egypt uses the US-Russia conflict for leverage, but wouldn’t replace the US.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller. "Five myths about US aid to Egypt." Reuters. August 13, 2018. [Premier].

Egypt is seeking to play off the United States and Russia against each other to maximize its leverage, not to replace the United States with Russia. Egypt will continue to work with Washington to get what it cannot from Moscow — such as free weapons and military equipment and access to international markets — while maintaining ties to the Kremlin to strengthen its bargaining position. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty is no longer dependent on U.S. mediation or intervention. Egypt has no interest in conflict with Israel, which has become one of Cairo’s most important regional partners. In fact, Egypt has allowed Israel to conduct airstrikes on Egyptian territory against mutual enemies, something that was unthinkable 40 years ago.

#### There is no reason to think that Egypt would turn to Russia.

DePetris 18 Daniel DePetris [Fellow at Defense Priorities]. "Time To Reassess the US-Egypt Relationship." Opinions. The Hill. September 17, 2018. [Premier].

Advocates of continued U.S. aid to Egypt use another argument that, while persuasive at first, is a red-herring. The logic plays on the foreign policy establishment’s fear for all things Russian; if Washington downgrades or reforms its relationship with Egypt in any way, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will have no choice but to retaliate by reaching out to the Kremlin and replace the U.S. with Russia as the foreign ally of first resort. The signing of a preliminary deal in November 2017, which permits Russian aircraft to use Egyptian airfields, only solidified this concern about Cairo’s drifting into Russia’s orbit. But this, too, is an argument based more in innuendo than evidence. Egypt is no more likely to become a Russian vassal state in the Middle East as it was to be an American one. Although Egypt may be willing to take free money from foreign powers with no strings attached, Cairo is fiercely independent of its prerogatives and has its own set of national interests guiding its actions. What Moscow views as important, Cairo may dismiss as marginal. Nor are the Russians likely to be as generous as the Americans have been over the past 40 years. Unlike Washington, which has upheld an aid relationship that is lopsided to Cairo’s benefit to the misfortunate of the American taxpayer, the Kremlin is far more transactional in its dealmaking. The worry that Egypt would totally jettison the United States in favor of Russia is both misguided and specious. Even worse, such a belief will only provide fuel for those who believe that the U.S.-Egypt aid relationship should continue as is, perpetuating an unacceptable status-quo in which the American people continue to be swindled with few tangible deliverables to show for it.

#### Use of Egyptian resources is not contingent on military aid.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller. "Five myths about US aid to Egypt." Reuters. August 13, 2018. [Premier].

The passage of U.S. naval vessels through the Suez Canal is not funded by U.S. military aid. Indeed, the U.S. Navy, like all other navies, pays the Egyptian government a fee for each ship that transits the canal. These fees are an important source of foreign currency, making it very unlikely Cairo would block U.S. ships from using the canal. Egypt does not charge the U.S. for allowing its airplanes to cross Egyptian airspace, but this access is declining in importance as Trump seeks to withdraw U.S. forces from the Middle East and the U.S. military increasingly relies on Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

#### Withholding aid from Egypt is empirically proven to succeed.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller. "Five myths about US aid to Egypt." Reuters. August 13, 2018. [Premier].

This is wrong on two counts. First, U.S. pressure on Egypt has delivered results in cases like the release of Americans wrongly imprisoned by the Egyptian regime, including Mohamed Soltan and Aya Hijazi, and in deterring the government from following through on Sisi’s 2014 threat to close down unregistered NGOs. Most recently, Tillerson’s aid suspension was beginning to pay off, prompting the Egyptian government to finally allow a retrial in the 2013 NGO case and to scale back Egypt’s relations with North Korea. Second, perceived failures, such as the Obama administration’s hold on military equipment, may have more to do with unrealistic time horizons and giving up too soon. Aid suspensions are, in effect, sanctions, and we know from both practice and academic scholarship that such pressure takes time to change behavior.

#### Egypt is a sham democracy.

Binde 18 Seth Binde [Expert in security assistance and Middle East affairs at Strategic Research & Analysis] and William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy]. "Time to Rethink U.S. Military Aid to Egypt." LobeLog. March 28, 2018. [Premier].

At this point the government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is a democracy in name only. The only genuine candidates against al-Sisi in next week’s elections have withdrawn due to intimidation from the regime, including one who was jailed upon announcing his intention to run for president. And the remaining contender, who comes from a party that initially backed al-Sisi, has said that he’s not even interested in a pre-election debate because he’s “not here to challenge the president.”

#### It’s not worth it – Egypt restricts access to US officials and continues to spread anti-American conspiracy theories.

Binde 18 Seth Binde [Expert in security assistance and Middle East affairs at Strategic Research & Analysis] and William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy]. "Time to Rethink U.S. Military Aid to Egypt." LobeLog. March 28, 2018. [Premier].

Washington expects Cairo to return the favor for U.S. aid by providing fly-over rights for U.S. aircraft, expedited access through the Suez canal for the U.S. Navy, counterterrorism cooperation, and maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. Putting these purported security benefits aside, the underlying issue is that Egypt is not playing the role of staunch ally worthy of over a billion dollars per year in military equipment and training. The Egyptians have restricted access to the Sinai, not just for journalists, but for U.S. officials, making it nearly impossible for the United States to ensure that U.S. law and policy are upheld. And as the Government Accountability Office has discovered, Egypt has even restricted access for U.S. officials trying to carry out standard end-use monitoring checks to ensure U.S.-supplied weaponry is used for its intended purposes. The Egyptian government has also helped perpetuate anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories despite receiving 20 percent of its defense budget from U.S. military aid.

#### Egyptian foreign policy runs contrary to US interests.

Binde 18 Seth Binde [Expert in security assistance and Middle East affairs at Strategic Research & Analysis] and William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy]. "Time to Rethink U.S. Military Aid to Egypt." LobeLog. March 28, 2018. [Premier].

In addition, Egypt’s foreign policy has increasingly acted counter to U.S. interests. In Libya, in partnership with the United Arab Emirates, Egypt has actively supported anti-Islamist strongman General Khalifa Hiftar in opposition to U.S. policy of neutrality and a United Nations arms embargo. President al-Sisi has all but come out in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad through a thinly veiled call to respect national sovereignty. Al-Sisi has also come to a preliminary agreement to allow the Russians to use Egypt’s airspace and military bases. For this access, the Russians have sold nearly $10 billion in military equipment to Egypt since 2008, including a recent deal for 50 Russian MiG-29 fighter jets. The Egyptians have also skirted sanctions, providing economic and military support to North Korea including, according to a New York Times report, the purchase of 30,000 North Korean rocket-propelled grenades by the Arab Organization for Industrialization, one of Egypt’s main military-run businesses.

#### US military aid has strengthened military control of politics in Egypt.

Binde 18 Seth Binde [Expert in security assistance and Middle East affairs at Strategic Research & Analysis] and William Hartung [Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy]. "Time to Rethink U.S. Military Aid to Egypt." LobeLog. March 28, 2018. [Premier].

Ultimately, the lasting impact of decades of providing over $1 billion in military aid to Egypt per year is not just the massive number of tanks and missiles, but the military’s influence over the Egyptian state. For example, the military’s role in the economy is thought to be somewhere between 40 and 60 percent and includes businesses involved in nearly every sector, from foodstuffs and real estate to construction and electronics. U.S. military aid is not cash that can be diverted for personal benefit. But agreements that allow for U.S. aid to be spent on economic activities within Egypt, like co-production of the M-1 Abrams tank, have helped perpetuate military-run businesses that lack transparency and oversight.

#### US influence has failed – Egypt has squandered aid and refuses to cooperate.

Miller ’18 Miller, Andrew (Nonresident Scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program). “Security, Human Rights, and Reform in Egypt.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. 24 July 2018. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/24/security-human-rights-and-reform-in-egypt-pub-76943>. [Premier]

The first key characteristic of today’s Egypt is that the country is no longer as important to U.S. interests as it once was. President al-Sisi has been unable to reverse years of internal state decay and, with the increasing assertiveness of wealthy Gulf states, Egypt has ceased to be a regional power in the Middle East. The Egyptian government currently possesses neither the wealth, the military power, nor the administrative efficiency to shape events and outcomes elsewhere in the region, with the exceptions of Libya and Gaza. Even the country’s soft power across the region has dissipated. The days when the United States could rely upon Egypt to serve as an anchor for U.S. interests in the region are long gone. Egypt is not the key to resolving the crisis in Syria, is not at the forefront of efforts to roll back Iranian influence in the Middle East, and lacks the expeditionary capability to deploy outside of its borders in support of the United States.1 While Egypt has influence over the economic situation in Gaza due to its control of the border, it has scant influence in the West Bank, and is in no position to deliver the Palestinians to a peace agreement with Israel.2 However, Egypt still matters to the United States, albeit for different reasons than before. Despite its diminished regional importance, Egypt’s ongoing internal deterioration could have serious implications for U.S. interests. While outright state failure does not appear imminent, prolonged instability in Egypt could lead to both new refugee flows from this country of 100 million people or facilitate the rise of terrorist groups with transnational reach. Egypt’s stability, defined not as a ruling regime imposing control through repression but as a society that does not create security risks beyond its borders, is thus of paramount concern to the United States. Unfortunately, and this is the second key characteristic of today’s Egypt, al-Sisi’s military-backed government is doing poorly at managing the country’s internal challenges. Repression is reaching alarming levels as al-Sisi takes steps that are more characteristic of totalitarian than authoritarian regimes. Since March’s presidential election, al-Sisi has escalated his campaign of arrests against his political opponents in an apparent attempt to consolidate and extend his rule. Just in the past several weeks, there has been a new spate of arrests targeting people like Amal Fathy, a democracy activist who was detained after publicly speaking out against sexual harassment.3 With as many as 60,000 political prisoners already in Egyptian jails, the detention of peaceful political activists shows no signs of abating.4 In contrast to previous authoritarian regimes in Egypt, which allowed some space for civil society to operate, al-Sisi seems determined to snuff out all room for activity independent of the state. And, while some authoritarian regimes have proven durable, totalitarian ones are seldom stable, tending to collapse in ways that are deeply dangerous for their neighbors. The security situation in Egypt also remains worrisome. Over four years after his first election, and despite extraordinarily repressive measures, President al-Sisi is still yet to neutralize the threat posed by terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s Sinai-based affiliate, which is believed to be responsible for the downing of a Russian airliner and the bombing of churches, among many other attacks. New groups, such as the U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) HASM, have also emerged to conduct lower-level attacks in the Egyptian mainland.5 Attesting to the Egyptian government’s lack of progress on counterterrorism, 2017 set the record for the most deaths in terrorist attacks (756) in modern Egyptian history.6 Furthermore, we have seen no concrete evidence that the Egyptian military’s much-hyped “Sinai 2018” campaign has extinguished the ISIS threat in the Sinai. To the contrary, Human Rights Watch reports that an additional 3,000 homes were destroyed during the operation, fueling resentment toward the government and impairing the type of cooperation between the state and the public that is the hallmark of successful counterterrorism campaigns.7 President al-Sisi’s government has received kudos for its economic performance, but even here the picture below the surface is deeply troubling. In return for a $12 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), al-Sisi undertook a number of structural adjustments that have helped to stabilize Egypt’s macroeconomic situation. Foreign currency reserves have recovered after reaching dangerously low levels and the economy is expected to grow by 5.2 percent in 2018.8 But just as Mubarak’s once-vaunted economic reforms masked deeper problems and public discontent that ultimately led to the 2011 uprising, conditions in the real economy in which Egyptians live are getting harder. Indeed, al-Sisi’s government has neglected the impact of economic reforms on the Egyptian people, whose living standards have declined sharply. The poverty rate in Egypt has jumped from 27.8 percent in 2016 to an estimated 35 percent in 2017, partly due to IMF-mandated subsidy cuts on which the poorest Egyptians depended.9 The government, moreover, has no clear plan to create the 700,000 to 1,000,000 jobs per year necessary to prevent the unemployment rate from increasing further.10 Even middle class Egyptians are struggling badly, as the combined effects of inflation—14.4 percent as of June—and devaluation have gutted their spending power.11 The growing role of the military in the economy has made it even more difficult for the average Egyptian to reap the benefits of al-Sisi’s reforms, and al-Sisi’s financing of wasteful “megaprojects” through massive borrowing has turned public debt, which is currently 107 percent of GDP, into a ticking time bomb. It is thus not surprising that Egypt has averaged more than one protest per day—252 in total—in the first half of 2018, most of them over economic discontent.12 Another looming threat on the horizon is Egypt’s water supply, a problem that successive Egyptian governments have badly mismanaged. Simply put, Egypt already does not have enough water for its population, and experts have estimated that, once operational, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam could temporarily reduce Egypt’s water supply by as much as a further 25 percent.13 Given Egypt’s dependence on water for agriculture and electricity generation, and its growing population, such a development could prove crippling for a weak economy. While it may be too late to reach an agreement with Ethiopia that would mitigate the dam’s impact on Egypt, al-Sisi’s government has largely failed to regulate highly water-intensive agricultural and construction practices that could insulate Egypt from the worst effects of the dam. The third characteristic of today’s Egypt is that it is an extremely difficult partner for the United States. The Cold War consensus that held together the U.S.-Egyptian relationship no longer holds, and Egyptian interests often diverge from those of the United States. For example, Egypt has continued its political, economic, and military cooperation with North Korea, helping Pyongyang to acquire badly needed foreign currency, at the precise time the Trump administration has sought to apply maximum pressure on King Jong Un’s regime.14 Egypt is also determined to build a closer relationship with Russia, regardless of how the United States treats Egypt. And, at the United Nations Security Council, Egypt has opposed U.S. positions on Syria and Israel. Even where the United States and Egypt share common interests, Egypt has often rejected U.S. cooperation and assistance. Counterterrorism (CT) is a case in point. While Egypt has gladly accepted U.S. military equipment funded by American taxpayer money, it has largely spurned other forms of support that are arguably more important to its CT success, including training and advice.15 This is particularly detrimental to CT in Egypt, as the Egyptian military’s struggles against the ISIS affiliate in the Sinai appear to be a function of poor doctrine and tactics rather than equipment shortfalls. Moreover, al-Sisi’s government has ignored U.S. concerns that its political repression and mass incarceration of peaceful actors is fueling radicalization trends in the country, in effect creating new terrorists.16 As one former prisoner noted, “In the beginning [2013], no one had even heard of Daesh, but by the time I left, maybe 20 percent were openly supporting their ideas... after all those years of being in jail with no explanation, many wanted revenge.”17 Yet, repeated U.S. warnings that Egypt needs to take prison radicalization seriously have fallen on deaf ears. Egypt’s declining utility to the United States as a partner is all the more striking given how much money the United States has invested in Egypt. In recent years, the U.S. government has continued to provide Egypt with an annual $1.3 billion in military assistance, which in Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 accounted for 21 percent of all U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds globally, making the country the second largest recipient of FMF worldwide.18 And this is on top of the $47 billion in military assistance and $24 billion in economic aid that the United States has given to Egypt over the last forty years. As a whole, it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that the United States is getting a good return on its investment in Egypt. Egypt has lost regional influence, but the United States continues to provide al-Sisi’s government with the second largest FMF package in the world. Egypt is moving in the wrong direction, endangering key U.S. interests in human rights and counterterrorism, while rejecting U.S. advice on how to turn around this negative trajectory. What can the United States do to break out of this unsatisfactory cycle?

#### Aid to Egypt is a green light for further abuses.

Al-Arian ’18. Al-Arian, Lama. “US military aid to Egypt gives a green light to repression, say rights advocates.” NPR. 08/08/2018. <https://www.npr.org/2018/08/08/635381440/u-s-military-aid-to-egypt-gives-a-green-light-to-repression-say-rights-advocates> [Premier]

The Trump administration's recent decision to release $195 million in military aid to Egypt has left rights experts stunned and deeply worried. A year ago, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suspended that sum because Egypt's human rights record didn't meet the standards imposed by Congress. Since that time, the space for civic freedoms in Egypt has shrunk, researchers say. Egypt's security forces have continued to lock up groups labeled dissidents or terrorists, and courts have handed down mass death sentences in cases widely criticized as politically motivated. The U.S. aid reversal comes in support of a regime that researchers say is even more authoritarian than ousted ruler Hosni Mubarak. "This sends all of the wrong signals to the Egyptian generals that the rhetoric about human rights is merely lip service," says Mohamed Soltan, a U.S. citizen who spent almost two years as a political prisoner in Egypt until he was released in 2015. "It is a green light to carry on with the repressive policies." On July 25, the State Department said it decided to release the money because the Middle Eastern country has taken steps in response to U.S. concerns, but didn't specify what progress has been made. The funds are a fraction of the [annual $1.4 billion](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf) U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt, one of the largest recipients, according to the Congressional Research Service. The military aid is for Egypt to procure defense equipment and training from the United States. Visiting Washington this week, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry said on Wednesday that "Egypt is at the forefront in the fight against terrorism" and it welcomes the renewed aid. "The military assistance is appreciated and is fundamental and crucial to enable us to continue to eradicate terrorism and radical ideologies from the region as a whole," Shoukry told reporters after meeting Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other senior administration officials. But the Egyptian government casts a sprawling net as part of its purge. "The Egyptian government has civil society by the throat, choking all criticism; we're close to the death of dissent," says Brian Dooley, a senior researcher at the Washington, D.C.-based advocacy group Human Rights First. Government repression in Egypt has grown since the military overthrew the country's first elected leader in 2013 and Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi later became president. "Under Sissi's reign, thousands of political dissidents have been killed, tens of thousands imprisoned and hundreds of thousands exiled," Soltan says. "Lately, we have seen a spike in death sentences being handed down in internationally condemned mass trials." The latest mass trial, at the end of July, included 739 defendants. The court handed 75 people death sentences for their involvement in a 2013 sit-in. The more than 600 remaining defendants reportedly will be sentenced in September. They include U.S. citizen Mustafa Kassem and Egyptian photographer Mahmoud Abou Zeid. Both deny the charges against them, which include Muslim Brotherhood membership, illegal assembly at a political protest in 2013, possession of weapons and murder. Soltan says, by resuming military aid, the U.S. is relinquishing leverage it once had to influence policy and possibly the fate of prisoners in Egypt. Soltan himself was shot, arrested and sentenced to life in prison for tweeting at a demonstration in Cairo in 2013. His imprisonment was condemned by human rights groups and eventually — after a 489-day hunger strike — the Obama administration intervened to demand his release. Egypt ultimately succumbed to U.S. pressure: [Soltan was freed](https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/30/410758751/egypt-agrees-to-deport-u-s-citizen-sentenced-for-protests) in May 2015 after 22 months in prison and deported to the United States. "My release, among a few others, is proof the U.S. has leverage over Egypt with regards to human rights policies. The recent decision to release the withheld aid is a devastating blow to that influence," Soltan says, speaking to NPR from Washington, D.C.

#### It’s T – Egypt is an authoritarian regime.

Hamzawy ’17 Hamzawy, Amr (studied political science and developmental studies in Cairo, The Hague, and Berlin.). “Legislating Authoritarianism: Egypt’s New Era of Repression.” *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. 16 March 2017. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/16/legislating-authoritarianism-egypt-s-new-era-of-repression-pub-68285>. [Premier]

After a brief democratic opening, a new authoritarian regime has emerged in Egypt. The military establishment, security services, and intelligence agencies now rule the country and have managed to reintroduce fear as a daily constant in a nation still in dire straits. This stands in stark contrast to the period following the 2011 revolution, which fostered the activity of civil society and political parties and encouraged citizens to freely express their opinions and engage in the political process. Once again, power is held by a military officer who was pushed into the presidential palace after elections that lacked any measure of democratic competition.1 Images of peacefully protesting masses and citizens waiting in long lines to cast ballots have been replaced by scenes of police units rounding up young Egyptians after attempted peaceful demonstrations, confirmed reports of torture in places of custody, and forced disappearances.2 Using undemocratic legal and judicial tools with a zeal unmatched even during the long authoritarian rule of former president Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), Egypt’s generals are closing the public space by cracking down on autonomous civil society and independent political parties, asphyxiating the practice of pluralist politics, and pushing citizens away from peaceful and active engagement in public affairs. Scare tactics and police brutality are being used for wide-scale repression. Key opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a small number of political parties, human rights defenders, and young activists are under immense pressure and struggling against the yoke of the government. The military, as well as the security and intelligence services, are institutionalizing this new authoritarianism as part of the state apparatus. The generals are denying Egyptians the right to a representative and accountable government. Further, according to popular opinion, the generals are ridiculing any serious search for democratic alternatives. Against a background of growing economic and social crises, rising political tensions, and failed policies, the new authoritarian regime is propagating conspiracy theories and populist narratives as a prime strategy for maintaining its control of society. This is Egypt’s current reality. And while this is not the country’s first contemporary encounter with undemocratic rule, what is new is the tenacity with which the generals are eliminating human rights and freedoms, threatening Egypt’s fragile social fabric, and monopolizing the state apparatus. They are resorting to repression in direct response to a brief democratic opening and a period of citizen activism that challenged the pillars of authoritarianism. Also notable is the central tool in their efforts—a new series of repressive laws and amendments that have largely gone undiscussed in international discourse. Egypt’s new government is essentially using lawmaking to legalize its behavior and guarantee impunity for its generals. Civil society, opposition parties, and pro-democracy groups will need to continually adapt their strategies to fight against this normalization of repressive action through laws and amendments. To do so, however, first requires an awareness and understanding of both the regime’s tools and the evolving legal landscape.

## AC – Bahrain

#### Plan: The United States will withdraw military aid from Bahrain.

#### The US shamelessly continues to support Bahrain under the guise of counter terrorism.

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Fact Sheet ‘18. “US Relations with Bahrain”. US department of state website. 07/23/2018. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414.htm [Premier]

The Government of Bahrain plays a key role in the Gulf’s security architecture and is an important member of the U.S.-led anti-ISIL coalition. **U.S. assistance enables Bahrain to continue to obtain the equipment and training it needs to provide for its own defense and to operate alongside U.S. air and naval forces. U.S. assistance also strengthens Bahrain’s interoperability for regional security and counterterrorism cooperation; boosts Bahrain’s maritime defenses against smuggling and terrorism; and improves Bahrain’s ability to deny terrorist sponsorship, support, and sanctuary in a manner that respects the human rights of its residents.**

#### Trump has removed what little restraint prior administrations had towards Bahrain – and the damage shows.

Hasan ’18. Hasan, Mehdi. (Columnist and senior contributor at the intercept. Author of two books on UK labor party and financial crisis/austerity economics. Based in DC.) “Donald trump’s words are a green light to dictators and torturers around the world.” The Intercept. 05/22/2018. [Premier]

Consider the case of Bahrain, home not just to the [U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet](https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18fleet.html), but also to what has been [dubbed](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bahrain-un-voices-concern-over-use-tear-316872) the “[forgotten revolution](https://www.sbs.com.au/news/q-a-bahrain-s-forgotten-revolution)” of the Arab Spring. For more than seven years now, security forces in the tiny Gulf island kingdom have been [shooting](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/14/teenager-dies-protest-bahrain), [maiming](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19078659), [blinding](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-unrest-teargas-idUSBRE8700QC20120801), and [detaining](https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/15/bahrain-security-forces-detaining-children) pro-democracy protesters in their hundreds and thousands. An [independent inquiry](http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf) commissioned by the Bahraini government at the start of the uprising confirmed the use of “excessive” and “indiscriminate” use of force, not to mention the systematic use of torture. To be clear, the Obama administration did [shamefully little](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jul/11/west-averts-eyes-brutes-bahrain) to stop the violence in Bahrain. Nevertheless, as president, Barack Obama at least went through the motions of condemning “[mass arrests and brute force](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa)” and even imposed a [handful of restrictions](http://www.industryweek.com/global-economy/lockheeds-jet-sale-bahrain-blocked-human-rights-violations) on U.S. arms sales to the kingdom. Under Trump, however, even those few restrictions have been [lifted](http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-trump-administration-drops-human-rights-in-bahrain-f-16-deal-2017-3) — and the rhetoric transformed. “Our countries have a wonderful relationship together, but there has been a little strain. But there won’t be strain with this administration,” the new U.S. president [proclaimed](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-saudi-bahrain/trump-says-ties-with-bahrain-wont-be-strained-anymore-idUSKCN18H05Y) a year ago, during a meeting with Bahrain’s king, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, at a summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Less than 48 hours later, on May 23, 2017, Bahraini security forces [raided the village of Diraz](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40026813) and opened fire at a sit-in by supporters of the Sunni-ruled kingdom’s [most high-profile Shia cleric](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/world/middleeast/bahrain-sheikh-isa-qassim.html). Five people were [killed](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-24/bahrain-raid-on-shiite-cleric-s-town-5-killed-286-arrested), including a [respected environmental activist](http://birdbh.org/2017/05/bahrain-police-raid-duraz-sit-in-killing-5-and-injuring-dozens/), more than 100 were [wounded](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=407041&mode=print), and 286 were [arrested](https://www.yahoo.com/news/bahrain-police-targets-town-where-sit-ongoing-cleric-062856051.html). It was the deadliest attack on Bahraini protesters since the start of the revolt in 2011 — and it was done with the [blessing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/after-assurances-by-trump-bahrain-mounts-deadliest-raid-in-years-on-pro-opposition-shiite-neighborhood/2017/05/24/6995e954-4067-11e7-9851-b95c40075207_story.html?utm_term=.867dded75b0e) of the president of the United States. “The timing of this operation – two days after King Hamad’s convivial meeting with President Donald Trump – can hardly be a coincidence,” [observed](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-24/bahrain-raid-on-shiite-clerics-town-5-killed-286-arrested) Nicholas McGeehan, then a senior Bahrain researcher at Human Rights Watch, last May.

#### The plan solves – removing assistance and cancelling agreements with Bahrain not only reduces the tools they can use to repress, but also encourages and legitimizes protestors.

Husayn ’15 Husayn, Neil. (Assistant professor in Department of Religious studies at the University of Miami, BA in Middle Eastern studies from UVA, MA in Arabic and Islamic studies from Harvard, and PhD from Princeton in 2016) “Mechanisms of authoritarian rule in Bahrain.” Arab Studies Quarterly 37.1 (2015). Pp. 33-52. 4/12/2015. [Premier]

Bahrain's Shi'i citizens have been demanding economic and political reforms for decades (al-Mdaires, 2002: 32). However, hardliners in control of the CSA and influencing the ISA have succeeded in obstructing major reforms. Concerted efforts for reform must recognize the role of both the ideological and coercive apparatuses in the alienation of many Bahraini citizens. Even if legal barriers were removed to empower Shi'is financially or politically, narratives expressed in the media, schools, and non-governmental associations would remain deep and ingrained sources of tension. Substantive reform would require discourses which champion Arab superiority and domination over Persians be replaced with those that admire both cultures. Bahrain's Persian history would need to be studied rather than ignored. State media has portrayed Sunnism as orthodoxy, while Shi'ism has not enjoyed equal representation. During the crackdown, the ISA encouraged Sunnis to negatively portray Shi'is as dangerous and loyal only to Iran. The ISA has effectively alienated Shi'is and caused them to primarily fear persecution, radicalize, or disengage from participation in peaceful dialogue. The media and public education would need to revise narratives, so that Sunnism and Shi'ism are presented as two historic orthodoxies in Islam. Public patronage of pluralism would provide an alternative to absolutist rhetoric of hardliners or extremist groups. Evidence indicates that Bahraini government reformers, opposition figures, and foreign players have challenged, if not discredited, some state ideologies. The report of the BICI has forced the government to admit its heavy use of violence and imprisonment against peaceful protestors. Furthermore, the USA, Formula One, and Moody's have succeeded in incentivizing reform in the country by acknowledging news of violent repression of protestors as grounds for canceling agreements with Bahrain or downgrading government bond ratings. Saudi Arabia has offered economic incentives and military aid to ensure the status quo in Bahrain. As a country that upholds authoritarianism, discrimination, and human rights violations of religious minorities, migrant workers, and women, Saudi Arabia opposes democratization in the Gulf. As a response to Saudi pressures, it is important that the USA incentivizes reform by denying rulers of countries with egregious human rights violations access to US visas or banking systems (The Washington Post, 2012). Continued American support for the regime during this period may increase anti-American sentiment, radicalization, and [terrorism](http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId=GALE%7CA413581472&docType=Article&sort=RELEVANCE&contentSegment=&prodId=AONE&contentSet=GALE%7CA413581472&searchId=R1&userGroupName=uarizona_main&inPS=true). (13) Continued repression will encourage disenfranchised and persecuted protestors to begin attacking Bahraini, Saudi, and American installations or accept extremist or Islamist ideologies as alternatives to democracy. This investigation essentially recognizes social, political, and economic factors as contributing to the resilience of authoritarianism, but does not claim each of them to be necessary or sufficient conditions. Rather the ISA, CSA, and strategic alliances have reinforced one another and mutually enabled hardliners to promote authoritarian rule and sectarian tensions. Government, non-government, and foreign players have all made concerted efforts to challenge hardliners and have achieved modest successes. Reformers are already convinced that the financial well-being of Bahrain depends on the successes of its own citizens and that continued repression will only hurt the country's international standing and lead to greater instability. Empowering reformers, marginalizing hardliners, or convincing the latter of this framework will be an important component in encouraging democratization. (14)

#### US presence in the Gulf incentivizes increasing militarism and radicalism.

Jones ’11. Jones, Toby. (assistant professor of history at Rutgers). “Don’t stop at Iraq: why the us should withdraw from the entire Persian gulf”. The Atlantic. 12/22/2011. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/> [Premier]

Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existentia**l**. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism. The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control. Less obvious, the United States' military posture has also emboldened its allies, sometimes to act in counterproductive ways. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain justify their brutal crackdown of Bahrain's pro-democracy movement by falsely claiming Iranian meddling. While American policymakers support democratic transitions in the Middle East rhetorically, their unwillingness to confront long-time allies in the Gulf during the Arab Spring is partly the product of the continued belief that the U.S. needs to keep its military in the Gulf, something that requires staying on good terms with Gulf monarchies. The result is that Saudi Arabia and its allies have considerable political cover to behave badly, both at home and abroad. If the Arab Spring has demonstrated anything, it is that the old political order is vulnerable to domestic political pressure. The Middle East is moving to an era of mass politics, in which mobilized publics demand greater rights and greater influence. While many observers [believe](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/why-middle-east-monarchies-might-hold-on/72170/) that the oil states are less susceptible to such pressures, this seems far from certain. In fact, Saudi Arabia, the world's most important oil producer, shares many of social and political-economic characteristics of its beleaguered neighbors, including high unemployment, widespread poverty, popular disillusion with corruption, and an increasingly sophisticated network of grassroots organizations committed to political change. Even flush with considerable oil revenue and the capacity to throw money at its many internal problems, Saudi Arabia has still been forced to unleash its police and security forces to quell unrest. The United States, because of its relationship with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and its apparent preference for preserving the political status quo in the Gulf, is increasingly seen by the region's citizens as conflated with the violent forces of counterrevolution. Should revolutionaries and would-be revolutionaries in the Gulf force political transitions in the future, the United States could pay a political price for its long-standing military entanglements.

## AC - Africa

#### Military assistance to authoritarian regimes in Africa are rising and causing human rights violations.

Allen ’16 Allen, Nathaniel (Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow at the United States of Institute of Peace and Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University). “U.S. Military Assistance to Africa Is Growing. But Is It Succeeding?.” *World Politics Review*. 23 September 2016. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19995/u-s-military-assistance-to-africa-is-growing-but-is-it-succeeding>. [Premier]

In July, Marine Corps Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser officially took over command of the United States Africa Command, known as AFRICOM, from retiring Army Gen. David Rodriguez. Waldhauser inherits an organization that has overcome initial growing pains and turned into an integral player in responding to African security challenges. Although the U.S. maintains only one official base on the continent, as many as 60 smaller facilities sprawl across 34 African nations. These facilities serve as staging areas for a steadily growing array of joint special force operations, military exercises and other security cooperation activities. Under Rodriguez’s three-year tenure, AFRICOM took its response to the spread of Islamist extremism across the continent to another level, conducting massive airstrikes on al-Shabab training camps in Somalia and building a drone base in Cameroon to aid in the fight against Boko Haram. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that AFRICOM is succeeding in meeting its longer-term objectives of deterring transnational threats and promoting regional security and stability. In its efforts to combat extremism, the U.S. has fostered close partnerships with some of the continent’s most repressive authoritarian regimes. Likewise, U.S. attempts to support democratization and aid fragile democracies have at times contributed to further upheaval and abetted extremist groups. AFRICOM’s expanding mandate is dogged by the reality that the relationship between combating terrorism, safeguarding national interests and fostering political stability is not always clear. A central priority for AFRICOM going forward should be to consider better ways to balance these competing interests. To start, AFRICOM should be more active in supporting armed forces that refrain from political interference and respect human rights; rethink its approach to assisting Africa’s most fragile states; and invest in the analytical capacity needed to better weigh the costs of engagement against the political risks. Although AFRICOM has succeeded in helping to enhance the military capabilities of many countries, U.S. military partnerships have also fostered numerous uncomfortable alliances. Three of the top 10 recipients of U.S. government Foreign Military Financing over the past five years were autocratic regimes in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda. The U.S. also relies heavily on Chad, Cameroon and Mauritania—all notorious for their repression—to fight Islamist terrorist and insurgent groups across the Sahel. Such regimes have often used U.S. support as an opportunity to run roughshod over domestic opposition and abuse human rights. The current government in Ethiopia and the previous one in Mauritania both passed anti-terrorism laws to cozy up to Western security partners, and then cracked down at home against protesters, political parties and members of the media that dared to criticize their policies. Units in both the militaries of Chad and Cameroon that have received U.S. training have reportedly been involved in the torture and killing of civilians.

## AC - Honduras

#### U.S. military aid props up Honduran security.

Belleza-Smull ’18 Belleza-Smull, Isabella. “Why We Stand In Solidarity With Honduras.” *Global Exchange*. 31 January 2018. <https://globalexchange.org/2018/01/31/why-we-stand-in-solidarity-with-honduras>. [Premier]

Not only did the State Department legitimize Honduras’ fraudulent election by recognizing Juan Orlando at the same time that the Organization of American States (OAS) reported the process to be “characterized by irregularities and deficiencies, with very low technical quality and lacking integrity.” It also supports the Honduran security apparatus with millions of dollars worth of equipment, training, and technical assistance despite continuous reporting that the institution is plagued by endemic corruption and impunity. The long-standing overlap between high-level officials, police, and drug traffickers was once again corroborated by recent reports that Honduras’ newly appointed police chief is implicated in illicit cocaine transit. Assistance to Honduran military and police doesn’t end with State Department funds. The Pentagon has its own channels through which it can provide security assistance to the country. These channels authorize several hundred U.S. troops— including elite military units like Green Berets and Navy SEALs— to train their Honduran counterparts. In 2015, over a thousand Honduran military police received training from the U.S. military, up from 191 Hondurans in 2010. These trainings have been on the increase in recent years as the Department of Defense has outmuscled State for control over U.S. foreign military aid. Special Operation force deployments, alone, nearly tripled in Central America from 2007 to 2014.

#### Continued aid signals support for Honduras’ authoritarian regime.

Noriega ’18 Noriega, David. “The U.S. is propping up a dictatorship in Honduras.” *Vice News*. 9 February 2018. <https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/kzpabe/the-us-is-propping-up-a-dictatorship-in-honduras>. [Premier]

The inauguration ceremony for Juan Orlando Hernández's second term as president of Honduras was held in a sparsely attended stadium guarded by hundreds of soldiers and police officers decked out in riot gear. Outside, in the streets of Tegucigalpa, protesters did what they've been doing since November, when Hernández went against the country’s constitution to run for a second term: They blocked roads, burned tires, and chanted, using the president's initials, "Out with JOH!" Hernández's re-election represents a political and social crisis for the already-fragile nation, and casts new light on the U.S.’s complicated relationship with its most important ally in Central America — namely, its history of supporting Honduras’s armed forces while turning a blind eye to the corruption, power grabs, and violence that critics say have put the country on the path to authoritarianism. Honduras's constitution explicitly forbids a president from running for a second term, but Hernández ran anyway. Then, after international observers found multiple signs of fraud in the election, the electoral tribunal controlled by Hernández's party declared him the victor. The country erupted in protest, and the government responded with force, at times firing live rounds into crowds of demonstrators. Some 30 people have died in the violence thus far. Today's crisis has roots going back almost a decade, and has been consistently enabled by the United States. In 2009, President José Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a military coup engineered by the National Party, which remains in power today. The justification for the coup was that Zelaya was setting himself up for re-election — which is precisely what Hernández went on to do last year, except successfully. After initially condemning the coup in 2009, the United States then reversed course: Hillary Clinton's State Department endorsed the coup regime by allowing it to hold new elections without restoring Zelaya to power. Since then, the U.S. has given more than $111 million in security assistance to Honduras's military and police, even after the Honduran government was implicated in massive corruption scandals and high-profile political assassinations. That pattern is now repeating itself: Even after most of Latin America and the international community condemned last year's elections as suspect, the U.S. endorsed Hernández's victory, cementing his and the National Party's increasingly comprehensive grip on power. "All of this is a continuation of the weakening of institutions, the concentration of power, and what we might call the construction of a dictatorship," said Hugo Noe Pino, a liberal economist and leading critic of the current administration. "And the sad thing is seeing the United States support a situation like that."

## AC - Israel

#### Military aid causes violence against Palestinians.

Morris ’17 Morris, Brett. “It’s Time for the United States to Stop Supporting Israel.” *Medium*. 5 March 2017. <https://medium.com/s/just-world-order/its-time-for-the-united-states-to-stop-supporting-israel-1fc88a41492b>. [Premier]

Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory has now gone on for more than 50 years. Israel has systematically deprived Palestinians of their lives, land, and rights. The United States has largely abetted this process — and Israel could not continue what it is doing without U.S. support. It’s time for the United States to stop supporting Israel. If all one does is casually watch any of the news networks regarding this issue, one will probably have significant misunderstandings of the causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One may believe that Israel is being picked on by Islamic radicals bent on its destruction or that “both sides” are to blame in some kind of thousand-year-old religious conflict. It’s true some Palestinians have committed crimes against Israel. However, such incidents are usually a reaction to the greater crimes Israel commits against Palestinians on a regular basis. They should be viewed in context of the larger conflict, which is over land and territory. Since the conclusion of the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel has occupied the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza. (Although Israel disbanded its settlements in Gaza in 2005, it maintains control over virtually all aspects of life in Gaza and is recognized as the occupying power by most international bodies and human rights organizations.) Israel’s acquisition of these territories is illegal, and its occupation is the root cause of the conflict. The United Nations Security Council passed its first resolution against Israel’s occupation in 1967 by 15–0, in which it recognized “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and called for “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” Most recently, the Security Council passed another resolution in 2016 by 14–0 (with the United States issuing a rare abstention) reaffirming that “the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law.” Israel ignores international law and has chosen expansion over security. Obviously, Palestinians don’t enjoy being occupied, and some resort to violence as a way of resisting the occupation. If Israel were serious about establishing a lasting peace, it would cease building settlements and end its illegal occupation. Instead, Israel continues to build more settlements in Palestinian territory. The whole point is to slowly chip away at the prospect of any future Palestinian state until such an entity becomes impossible to establish. Israel’s ultimate goal is the annexation of Palestinian territory. “We are here to stay, forever,” as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told West Bank settlers last year. Israel could not do what it does to Palestinians without U.S. support. The United States provides diplomatic cover for Israel at the United Nations, and the United States also supplies Israel with most of its weapons and military hardware. Since 1972, the United States has vetoed more than 40 resolutions critical of Israel at the UN Security Council — usually being the only one of the body’s 15 members to vote against the resolution. Most recently, the United States vetoed a resolution in December 2017 condemning the Trump administration’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The vote was 14–1. In the UN General Assembly, the United States is routinely only one of a few countries in the world to vote against resolutions regarding Israel and the Palestinians. In 2012, the General Assembly voted 138–9 to admit Palestine to the United Nations as a non-member observer state. The countries opposed were the United States, Israel, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Panama, and Palau. The United States heavily arms Israel through foreign aid. In fact, “Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II,” according to a report from the Congressional Research Service, to the tune of $127 billion. In 2016, the Obama administration concluded a new $38 billion military aid package for Israel. Washington’s military aid to Israel includes everything from fighter jets, helicopters, bombs, and missiles to tear gas canisters and white phosphorus munitions (which can burn skin to the bone). Israel then uses these weapons to kill Palestinian civilians. During the 2014 conflict, Amnesty International called on the United States to “immediately end its ongoing deliveries of large quantities of arms to Israel, which are providing the tools to commit further serious violations of international law in Gaza.” The United States ignored this. (Actually, during the middle of the conflict, Congress voted to supply more aid to Israel.) Even if we were to put aside the moral issue, the longstanding support for Israel makes the United States less safe. The oppression of Palestinians by Israel and the United States has long been one of the grievances driving recruitment to jihadist groups. Osama bin Laden cited U.S. support for Israel as one of Al Qaeda’s primary reasons for “fighting and opposing” the United States. Beyond this basic self-interest, however, the main reason the United States should stop supporting Israel is because Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is a moral disgrace. It’s time for the United States to cease sending aid and weapons to Israel, and for the United States to join the rest of the world in supporting a two-state settlement.

#### U.S. military aid enables and endorses war crimes.

Yun ’16 Yun, Justin. “US military aid to Israel fosters war crimes.” *The Chimes*. 20 September 2016. <https://chimesnewspaper.com/24986/opinions/us-military-aid-israel-fosters-war-crimes/>. [Premier]

When Washington provides military aid to Israel, the United States is complicit in war crimes and the systematic destruction of the Palestinian people. The United States officially signed the “single largest pledge of bilateral military assistance in U.S. history,” according to the State department. The U.S. will provide Israel with an unprecedented $38 billion military aid package over a 10-year period, which includes $5 billion in missile defense. The strengthening of the American and Israeli war industries and the maintenance of the current balance of power of the Middle East is expected, but it is still morally reprehensible. A Seven Billion Dollar Shortfall The $38 billion military aid is a shortfall from the $45 billion package Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu originally asked for. The current military aid also establishes certain limitations — including the agreement that Israel cannot ask the U.S. for more money during the 10-year period. According to Haaretz, Israel “will have to spend all its American aid money on purchases from U.S. military industries” — a change from when Israel previously allowed to use its American aid money on its own military industries. According to Stephen R. Shalom, a professor at William Paterson University, the new military aid will support Israel’s war crimes — including the systematic destruction of the Gaza Strip and the settler-colonization of the West Bank. Israel’s conduct is morally unacceptable and a violation of international law. The American military support of Israel is also a breach of the Leahy Law which states, “No assistance shall be furnished… to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” Reporter Ryan McNamara wrote in Jacobin Magazine on how “in just one 24-hour period during negotiations over the new aid package, Israel bombed Gaza and announced new settlements in the West Bank city of Hebron. How can the Palestinians — who have no air force, command and control, missile defense and tanks — defend themselves from one of the world’s most advanced military? Over 2,000 Dead As investigative journalist Max Blumenthal reported two years ago during Operation Protective Edge, Israel’s 51-day bombing campaign in the Gaza Strip left over 2,000 Palestinians dead — including over 500 children. Like all wars, women and children tend to be the victims who suffer the most. When Israel deliberately turns off its electricity to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the middle of winter “as punishment for joining the [International Criminal Court]” and restricts access to drinking water, they are harming women and children. When Israel calculates a “calorie count” to starve Palestinians during a blockade, this has little to do with Hamas. As Shalom points out, “After all, you don’t need fifth-generation stealth technology to blow up civilian houses in the Gaza Strip” — the most densely populated area in the world. It is time for the United States to drop its military support for Israel now. This is a relationship strictly defined by American hegemonic and geopolitical interests — and it is literally killing people. The only way this will become possible is if the American people stands in solidarity with Palestinians by pressuring the government to stop its endorsement of Israel’s actions. Israel has already received $125 billion in aid from the United States since World War II. As Christians, we say no more to war and violence.

## AC - Philippines

#### Cuts in military aid punish Duterte for his drug war.

Hubert ’17 Hubert, Murray. “Involving Phillipine Military in Duterte Drug War Could Force Cuts in U.S. Aid.” *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*. 28 February 2018. <https://amti.csis.org/philippine-drug-war-force-cuts-aid/>. [Premier]

Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte announced in early February that he planned to remove the police from his war on illicit drugs and put the anti-drug agency in charge with support from the military. So far, the military appears to be staying out of the bloody campaign, although some officers have said that they would comply if asked. If the military were to join the drug war and participate in extra-judicial killings, congressional regulations could force the United States to suspend military aid and training to the units involved. This could potentially have a devastating impact on the bilateral military relationship, introducing major complications to long-standing training and military education programs that could take decades to resolve. While the Trump administration is still cobbling together its Asia teams in the State and Defense departments, members of U.S. Congress have in recent weeks been discussing whether and how the Hill should respond to Duterte’s deadly drug war in which over 7,000 have been killed since late June. In September, Senator Patrick Leahy warned in a colloquy with Senator Ben Cardin that Congress may need to consider imposing conditions on general assistance to Manila until the government demonstrates a commitment to the rule of law. Leahy’s voice on this issue matters. He is the author of the so-called Leahy amendment, a 1997 provision to the foreign aid bill that bars the U.S. departments of Defense and State from providing equipment or training to foreign military units that commit “gross human rights violations” such as murder, torture, or rape

## AC - War On Drugs

#### The US spends billions in military aid on the deadly and ineffective War on Drugs in Latin America.

Isacson and Kinisan ’17 Isacson, Adam and Kinosian, Sarah. “U.S. Military Assistance and Latin America.” *WOLA*. 27 April 2017. https://www.wola.org/analysis/u-s-military-assistance-latin-america/. [Premier]

Since 2000, the United States has spent roughly $268 billion on security assistance worldwide. Of that total, Latin America has received about 8 percent, or just over $20.5 billion. Out of that, over $17 billion come through programs established for the “War on Drugs”. The top recipients over the past 17 years, by a large margin, have been Colombia ($9.5 billion) and Mexico ($2.9 billion), which both received big-ticket antidrug packages in the 2000s. Starting in 2016, Central America’s Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) collectively overtook both of these countries, as funding levels increased to respond to high levels of crime, violence, and drug trafficking. WOLA first began to follow Defense Department programs in Latin America in the 1990s, when the War on Drugs replaced the Cold War as the driving threat framework. This marked the first time that the Pentagon took the helm of a big foreign aid program without explicit State Department management. The United States has a checkered past with respect to human rights and program effectiveness in Latin America, which warrants continued citizen oversight. A few examples include: In the 1970s, we learned about U.S. collusion with regional armed forces participating in coups in Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, and elsewhere. We learned about police aid programs that ended up teaching torture techniques. In the 1990s, the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas had trained dozens of military officers with notorious human rights records, and that cold-war era training manuals included torture techniques. In the 2000s, U.S.-aided Colombian Army units were among those whose members were killing thousands of civilians to falsely pad combat “body counts.” Over an eight-year period, Guatemala had to disband two U.S.-backed police counternarcotics units due to rampant corruption. The United States greatly increased assistance to Mexico’s security forces in 2007. A decade later, there is a great need to evaluate why the strategy has achieved almost no improvement in the country’s organized crime-related violence and drug trafficking challenges. In 2009, despite years of cultivating relationships, Honduran military leaders participating in a coup d’etat stopped taking calls from their U.S. military counterparts, who were urging them not to do so. In 2012, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) team was involved in a confusing incident in rural eastern Honduras that killed four civilians. This is not to say that the United States is solely to blame for the region’s problems—but it is easy to make the case that a different set of policies, using the same level of resources, could have helped the region develop more solid institutions and made the United States more secure. To improve security and effectiveness, transparency and oversight are key. For instance, the United States’ main military goal in both Mexico and Colombia for over 20 years has been to cut drug trafficking into the United States. Yet with the possible exception of cannabis, no drug produced in the region—cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine—experienced a sustained decline in production over those years. This calls into question if the United States’ massive investment in Latin American security forces’ eradication, interdiction, and incarceration efforts—which has far outstripped investment in strengthening states and fighting impunity—is the best way forward for tackling narcotics trafficking.

## AC - Ukraine

#### U.S. military aid to Ukraine legitimates a undemocratic regime and threatens US-Russia war.

Carpenter ’18 Carpenter, Ted (Senior Fellow in Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute). “Washington Quietly Increases Lethal Weapons to Ukraine.” *The American Conservative*. 10 September 2018. <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/washington-quietly-increases-lethal-weapons-to-ukraine/>. [Premier]

For all of the loose (frequently hysterical) talk in Congress, the foreign policy community, and the news media about President Donald Trump’s alleged eagerness to appease Vladimir Putin, U.S. policy remains as confrontational as ever toward Russia. Among other actions, the Trump administration has involved U.S. forces in NATO military exercises (war games) in Poland and other East European countries on Russia’s border, as well as in naval maneuvers in the Black Sea near Russia’s sensitive naval base at Sevastopol. Washington has even sent U.S. troops as participants in joint military exercises with Ukrainian forces—an act that Moscow considers especially provocative, given its tense relations with Kiev. On no issue is the administration’s risky course more evident than its military policy toward Ukraine. Recent measures are certain to provoke Moscow further, and entangle the United States to an unwise extent with an extremely murky, ideologically troubling Ukrainian regime. Secretary of Defense James Mattis acknowledges that U.S. instructors are training Ukrainian military units at a base in western Ukraine. Washington also has approved two important arms sales to Kiev’s ground forces in just the past nine months. The first transaction in December 2017 was limited to small arms that at least could be portrayed as purely defensive weapons. That agreement included the export of Model M107A1 Sniper Systems, ammunition, and associated parts and accessories, a sale valued at $41.5 million. A transaction in April 2018 was more serious. Not only was it larger ($47 million), it included far more lethal weaponry, particularly 210 Javelin anti-tank missiles—the kind of weapons that Barack Obama’s administration had declined to give Kiev. Needless to say, the Kremlin was not pleased about either sale. Moreover, Congress soon passed legislation in May that authorized $250 million in military assistance, including lethal weaponry, to Ukraine in 2019. Congress had twice voted for military support on a similar scale during the last years of Obama’s administration, but the White House blocked implementation. The Trump administration cleared that obstacle out of the way in December 2017 at the same time that it approved the initial small-weapons sale. The passage of the May 2018 legislation means that the path is now open for a dramatic escalation of U.S. military backing for Kiev. On September 1, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker disclosed during an interview with The Guardian that Washington’s future military aid to Kiev would likely involve weapons sales to Ukraine’s air force and navy as well as the army. “The Javelins are mainly symbolic and it’s not clear if they would ever be used,” Aric Toler, a research scholar at the Atlantic Council, asserted. One could well dispute his sanguine conclusion, but even Toler conceded: “Support for the Ukrainian navy and air defence would be a big deal. That would be far more significant.” Volker’s cavalier attitude about U.S. arms sales to a government locked in a crisis with Russia epitomizes the arrogance and tone-deaf nature of the views that too many U.S. foreign policy officials exhibit regarding the sensitive Ukraine issue. “We can have a conversation with Ukraine like we would with any other country about what do they need. I think that there’s going to be some discussion about naval capability because as you know their navy was basically taken by Russia [when the Soviet Union dissolved]. And so they need to rebuild a navy and they have very limited air capability as well. I think we’ll have to look at air defence.” One suspects that Americans would be incensed at comparable actions by Moscow if the geo-strategic situations were reversed. Imagine if Russia (even a democratic Russia) had emerged from the wreckage of the Cold War as the undisputed global superpower, and a weakened United States had to watch as the Kremlin expanded a powerful, Russian-led military alliance to America’s borders, conducted alliance war games within sight of U.S. territory, interfered in Canada’s internal political affairs to oust a democratically elected pro-American government, and then pursued growing military ties with the new, anti-U.S. government in Ottawa. Yet that would be disturbingly similar to what Washington has done regarding NATO policy and U.S. relations with Ukraine. Moreover, although Kiev’s cheerleaders in the Western (especially U.S.) media like to portray Ukraine as a beleaguered democracy that plays the role of David to Russia’s evil Goliath, the reality is far murkier. Putin’s government overstates matters when it alleges that Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan revolution was a U.S.-orchestrated coup that brought outright fascists to power in Kiev. Nevertheless, that version contains more than a little truth. Prominent, powerful U.S. figures, most notably the late Senator John McCain and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, openly sided with demonstrators seeking to unseat Ukraine’s elected government. Indeed, Nuland was caught on tape with U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt scheming about the desired composition of a new government in Kiev. It is unfair to portray Ukraine’s current administration led by President Petro Poroshenko as a neo-fascist regime. Post-revolution elections appear to have been reasonably free and fair, and there are major factions that are committed to genuine democratic values. But Ukraine also is hardly a model of Western-style democracy. Not only is it afflicted with extensive graft and corruption, but some extreme nationalist and even neo-Nazi groups play a significant role in the “new” Ukraine. The notoriously fascist Azov Battalion, for example, continues to occupy a prominent position in Kiev’s efforts to defeat separatists in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region. Alexander Zakharchenko, prime minister of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic in the pro-Russia rebel-occupied city of Donetsk, was assassinated on September 1 and officials there and in Russia are blaming Kiev. The Ukrainian government has denied involvement. Other ultranationalist factions act as domestic militias that attempt to intimidate more moderate Ukrainians. Even the Poroshenko government itself has adopted troubling censorship measures and other autocratic policies. Officials in both the Obama and Trump administration have taken a much too casual attitude toward U.S. cooperation with extremist elements and a deeply flawed Ukrainian government. Both the danger of stoking tensions with Moscow and becoming too close to a regime in Kiev that exhibits disturbing features should caution the Trump administration against boosting military aid to Ukraine. It is an unwise policy on strategic as well as moral grounds. Trump administration officials should refuse to be intimidated or stampeded into forging a risky and unsavory alliance with Kiev out of fear of being portrayed as excessively “soft” toward Russia. Instead, the president and his advisers need to spurn efforts to increase U.S. support for Ukraine. A good place to start would be to restore the Obama administration’s refusal to approve arms sales to Kiev. Washington must not pour gasoline on a geo-strategic fire that could lead to a full-blown crisis between the United States and Russia.

## AC – Gift K

#### US military aid in Yemen only exists to further US interests.

Sanger 11. David E. Sanger, The New York Times, “Envoy Meets With Leader of Yemen on Accord,” July 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/world/middleeast/11yemen.html?\_r=1&scp=2&sq=US%20interest%20in%20Yemen&st=cse, 7-29-11. [Premier]

WASHINGTON — President Obama sent his counterterrorism chief to Saudi Arabia over the weekend to meet with Yemen’s badly injured president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, with the envoy telling him that the only way to get American aid flowing again was to sign an accord that would effectively remove Mr. Saleh from power. The envoy, John O. Brennan, a former C.I.A. station chief in Saudi Arabia who has been the administration’s middleman to the embattled Yemeni leader, is presumed to have urged Mr. Saleh not to return to Sana, the Yemeni capital, following weeks of statements from administration officials that they believe his return would incite more violence. Mr. Saleh was rushed to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, after he was severely burned in a bombing of his presidential compound on June 3. He appeared on television last week for the first time since the attack, and much of his skin was covered during the appearance. In a written statement on Sunday, the White House said Mr. Brennan “called on President Saleh to fulfill expeditiously his pledge to sign” an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which would lead to a transition ending his 33 years in office and grant the president immunity. The statement said that “much needed assistance will flow to Yemen as soon as the G.C.C. proposal is signed and implemented.” The Yemeni economy is on the brink of collapse, in part because of the months of unrest. The United States had long been a supporter of Mr. Saleh’s authoritarian rule, viewing it as the best way to combat Qaeda affiliates in Yemen. But the Obama administration withdrew its support four months ago, after concluding that Mr. Saleh’s government could not survive the uprisings sweeping the country, and that American interests were better served in getting a new government in place that might allow continued American attacks on Al Qaeda. That issue is becoming more urgent. Militants linked to Al Qaeda have been able to exploit the turmoil that has resulted from Mr. Saleh’s resistance to leave office, becoming bolder in the country’s lawless southern region. The militants now control two cities and are close to Aden, the strategically important port on the Arabian Sea. Mr. Saleh has not been clear about when, or if, he might seek to return to Sana. Mr. Saleh and Mr. Brennan have such a long history together that he was the natural choice for a presidential envoy. He has talked to the Yemeni president numerous times since street protests broke out in February, following uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. At times Mr. Brennan has broken into Arabic to make an emphatic point to Mr. Saleh. In the State Department cables released by WikiLeaks, the nature of the American dance with Mr. Saleh before the uprisings was made particularly vivid. In some cables, Mr. Saleh insisted on maintaining the fiction that attacks on Al Qaeda were orchestrated by the Yemen government, not the United States, and American officials went along with the creation of that mythology. It fooled no one: Mr. Saleh’s forces did not have that kind of reach and power. But the cables also revealed Mr. Saleh’s long-running suspicions of American intentions. The Americans, he told one visitor, Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s counterterrorism chief, are “hot-blooded and hasty when you need us,” but “cold-blooded and British when we need you.

#### Military aid is a gift intended to secure US hegemony by ensuring countries are perpetually indebted to us in a vicious cycle of reciprocity.

Arrigo and Williams 00. Bruce A Arrigo., Christopher R. Williams, professor of @ the University of North Carolina, associate professor of criminology @ the University of West Georgia, “Possibility of Democratic Justice and the "Gift" of the Majority: On Derrida, Deconstruction, and the Search for Equality Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice” [Premier]

Derrida's explication of the gift provides an insightful metaphor with which to analyze the current state of sociopolitical affairs regarding tradition­ally subjugated populations. The advances made by the state regarding minority citizen groups, particularly within the context of employment (eco­nomic) and education (social), are gifts.13 Legislative enactments designed to foster the growth of equality and thereby democratic justice (i.e., standards of what is "right and fair") produce hegemonic effects constitutive only of nar­cissistic power.14 These effects are eclipsed by counterfeit, although impactful, offerings. The omnipotence of majority sensibilities in Western cultures, particularly in the United States, has produced an exploitative and nongiving existence for under- and nonrepresented citizen groups. Despite the many rights-based movements during the past several decades that have ostensibly conferred to minorities such abstract gifts as liberty, equality, and freedom, there remains an enduring wall dividing the masses from those on whom such awards are bestowed. This fortified separation is most prominent in the (silent) reverber­ations of state and federal legislative reforms.15 Relying on Derrida's (1991,1992,1997) critique, **we can regard such stat­utory reform initiatives as gifts; that is, they are something given to non-majority citizens by those in power; they are tokens and emblems of empow­erment in the process of equality and in the name of democratic justice**. The majority is presenting something to marginalized groups, something that the giver holds in its entirety: power.16 The giver or presenter of such power will never, out of capitalistic conceit and greed, completely surrender that which it owns. It is preposterous to believe that the narcissistic majority would give up so much as to threaten what they own; that is, to surrender their hospice and community while authentically welcoming in the other as stranger. **This form of open-ended generosity has yet to occur in Western democratic societ­ies and**, perhaps, **it never will.** Thus, it is logical to assume that, although unconscious in some respects, the efforts of the majority are parsimonious and intended to secure (or accessorize) their own power.17 The following two means by which a gift enables self-empowerment were already alluded to by Derrida (1997): (a) the giver (i.e., the sender or majority) either bestows to show off his or her power or (b) gives to mobilize a cycle of reciprocation in which the receiver (i.e., the minority) will be indebted. It is for these reasons that the majority gives. This explanation is not the same as authentically supporting the cause of equality in furtherance of a cultural politics of difference and recognition.

#### US military aid destroys democracy while simultaneously using logic of humanitarian intervention to portray its actions as a gift to the world to protect peace.

Maus 06. Ingeborg Mause, “From Nation Sate to Global State, or the Decline of Democracy,” Constellations – An international Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, Volume 13, No 4, 2006 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2006.00414.x . [Premier]

In contrast, today’s practice of establishing a global monopoly of violence de facto through worldwide military interventions and a willful reinterpretation of the UN Charter is set to destroy all the achievements of democracy and right. The legal document of the UN Charter still contains all the essential principles of the theory of democratic sovereignty and Kant’s philosophy of peace in positive form. The UN Charter, proposed after the Second World War as a peace organization, was a reaction to the hegemonial border-crossing of the Nazi system – which, along with their national integrity, destroyed the political autonomy of the affected peoples – by making the “sovereign equality of all its Members” a fundamental principle, treating the “territorial integrity or political independence of any state” as a good worthy of protection through military measures against threats to or breaches of world peace and international security, while, conversely, expressly denying the UN the authority to intervene “within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” It corresponds to the logic of this construction that “respect for human rights” within the framework of these democratic principles of peace is only to be “encouraged,” not compelled. However, in the span of a few short decades this has not protected the Charter from being turned into its opposite: a global order of intervention and war. The mere fact that Security Council resolutions increasingly redefine internal human rights violations as threats to world peace and international security is sufficient for contemporary theorists of international law to deduce a norm from existing practice: the “right” of humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, current proposals for reforming the UN are aimed at resolving the alleged contradiction between the Declaration of Human Rights and the principle of state sovereignty by eliminating the latter and restructuring the UN’s decision-making structure to make it able to intervene more efficiently. Without going into the complex relation between human rights, popular sovereignty, and peace, we should note that the right to self-determination of citizens overrun by military intervention can also be violated when they share the human rights interpretations of the intervening powers. If there is in concrete cases another understanding of human rights, then the “humanitarian intervention” is nothing other than temporary hegemonial border-crossing. In both cases, civilians again find themselves as – somewhat troublesome – appendages of territories designated for bombing.

#### Foreign aid is an economy of exchange where the giver will expect something in its interests.

Arrigo and Williams 00. Bruce A Arrigo., Christopher R. Williams, professor of @ the University of North Carolina, associate professor of criminology @ the University of West Georgia, “Possibility of Democratic Justice and the "Gift" of the Majority: On Derrida, Deconstruction, and the Search for Equality Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice” [Premier]

The gift has no idiosyncratic or artful definition that needs to be addressed. Derrida's concept of the gift is simply as it sounds: Something that is given to someone by someone else. Gift, however, is a misleading term. Once an award is given to someone, that someone assumes a debt (of gratitude or a reciprocation of the gift). The giver of the gift, in return, is "consciously and explicitly" pleased with him- or herself for the show of generosity (Caputo, 1997, p. 141). This narcissistic, self-eudemonical exchange is in fact in­creased if the receiver is ungrateful or is unable, through the anonymity of the gift, to show gratitude. Thus, the offering that is made without expectation of explicit gratitude simply nourishes the narcissism of the giver. This is the par­adoxical dimension of the gift. The sender of the gift, instead of giving, receives; and the receiver of the gift, instead of receiving something, is in debt (Caputo, 1997). To avoid mobilizing the circular economy of the gift (the circle of ex­change, of reciprocation, and of reappropriation), the gift must not appear as such. Thus, the giver must not be aware that he or she is giving, and the receiver must not be aware that he or she is receiving. Only under those cir­cumstances would the giver not fuel the fire of narcissistic generosity, and the receiver not assume a debt. As Caputo (1997) notes, the pure gift "could take place only if everything happened below the level of conscious intentionality, where no one intends to give anything to anyone and no one is intentionally conscious of receiving anything" (p. 147). Phenomenologists remind us, following Aristotle's (1925) notion of act and intentionality, that the agent always acts for its own good. The agent always intends to act for its own good; otherwise, it will not act at all (e.g., Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1983). Thus, there are always degrees of intentionality—expectation, reciprocation, and reappropriation—on the part of the giver. The giving of the gift serves a purpose. It can be traced to narcis­sism masked by a facade of generosity, or it can be linked to anticipation of something that will come back at some point some time in the future (Derrida, 1997). This is where the notion of economy arises. What fuels the economy are "entities determined and exchanged, of calculation and bal­anced equations, of equity and sound reason, of laws and regularities" (Caputo, 1997, p. 146). It is the gift that the community has an affinity for in the name of democratic justice. The justice that the gift does, however, authenticates the reality of a pseudo-democracy. An imitation (i.e., illusion) of justice that, as an artifact of simulation, is more real that reality itself; one that is (im)possible in the community that we refer to as democratic society.A

#### Turns case – foreign aid in the name of democracy and equality is inherently undemocratic and inequitable due to ulterior motives by the gift-giver.

Arrigo and Williams 00. Bruce A Arrigo., Christopher R. Williams, professor of @ the University of North Carolina, associate professor of criminology @ the University of West Georgia, “Possibility of Democratic Justice and the "Gift" of the Majority: On Derrida, Deconstruction, and the Search for Equality Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice” [Premier]

This is the relationship between the gift and justice. Justice cannot appear as such; it cannot be calculated as in the law or other tangible commodities (Derrida, 1997). Although Derrida acknowledges that we must attempt to calculate, there is a point beyond which calculation must fail and we must recognize that no amount of estimation can adequately assign justice (Derrida, 1997). **For equality** (like the "gift beyond exchange and distribution"; Der­rida, 1992, p. 7) **to be possible,** **we must go beyond any imaginable, knowable notion. This is why the gift and justice are conceptually (im)possible** (Desilva Wijeyeratne, 1998). They serve a necessary purpose in society; however, **they represent something to always strive for, something that mobilizes our desire. If the impossible was possible, we would stop trying and desire would die. Justice, and thus democracy, is an appeal for the gift**. As Derrida (1992) notes, "this 'idea of justice' seems to be irreducible in its affirmative charac­ter, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, without rec­ognition of gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason and without rationality" (p. 25). **The gift (of equality), like justice and democracy, is an aporia, an (im)possibility. Thus**, **the use of the gift as a transaction in the name of equality, and equality in the name of justice and democracy, is truly** (un)just, **(un)democratic, and (in)equitable**. **The gift is a calculated, majoritarian endeavor toward illusive equality**. Equality beyond such a conscious effort (i.e., where the illusion is displaced) is open-ended and absent of any obligatory reciprocation. As Caputo (1997) notes, "justice is the welcome given to the other in which I do not... have anything up my sleeve" (p. 149). With this formula of equality and justice in mind, one may still speculate on the law's relationship to the gift. But again, the law as a commodity, as a thing to be transacted, eliminates its prospects as something to be given.

## Morals / Framework

### God

#### God affirms – military aid endorses wrong ideologies and represents a lack of faith in God.

Hooser ’11 Hooser, Dan. “Will America's Billions in Military Aid to Egypt Backfire?.” *United Church of God*. 10 February 2011. <https://www.ucg.org/beyond-today/blogs/will-americas-billions-in-military-aid-to-egypt-backfire>. [Premier]

Most of America’s founders had great faith in God and relied on Him much more than do the present leaders and citizens of the United States. For a nation to be persistently blessed with God’s provision and protection, the people must be faithful to God, and they must trust in and rely on Him. We are to be at least as faithful to God as a person should be to his or her spouse. Our Creator is rightfully jealous. He regards any unfaithfulness to Him as spiritual adultery. This requires more than lip service. Actions speak louder than words. The problems of foreign aid and political alliances One example of spiritual infidelity is when our country’s leaders have more trust in political and military alliances than they have in God. And the obvious evidence of this is when we unnecessarily send hard-earned tax dollars to other countries as political and military foreign aid (as opposed to disaster relief and humanitarian aid). Tragically, much foreign aid is siphoned off to enrich the leaders rather than to benefit the common citizen. In fact, the aid often props up corrupt leaders, enabling them to retain their power over the people. Most of America’s foreign aid and military aid to other countries is an effort to buy cooperation and friendship. In doing so, the United States has “hired lovers” (Hosea 8:9). But “friends” who are purchased are not real friends. The “aid” is like a bribe. They know you don’t have real love for them. They know you have the selfish motive of buying their favors. In fact, the United States often sends more money to unreliable “friends” than to its reliable friends! We reward nations for being unreliable! We choose strange bedfellows. But the most serious aspect of this mess is failing to rely on God’s guidance, provision and protection. Egypt a dangerous example Peace treaties and other negotiations with dictators usually come to an end when the dictator dies or is ousted. That shows how futile it is to rely on countries that are ruled by dictators. Egypt has been one of the top recipients of American assistance, receiving about $1.5 billion in aid each year. But the violent demonstrations against the Mubarak regime show that no amount of aid can guarantee stability, prosperity or even a reliably pro-American foreign policy. Much of the aid to Egypt has been military aid. Egypt has an incredibly strong military. It is larger than Israel’s, although some of Israel’s military is more advanced and sophisticated. If control of Egypt falls into the wrong hands, that military power could easily be used against us. With the recent enormous uprising in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to get its foot in the door hoping to gain control of the government. It was the Muslim Brotherhood that murdered Hosni Mubarak’s predecessor, Anwar Sadat. A government that involves the Muslim Brotherhood will be hostile to personal liberties, repudiate Egypt’s treaty with Israel and threaten the United States. It could refuse traffic through the Suez Canal to anyone at any time. And although a majority of Egypt’s people say they want democracy, 84 percent of them also say you should be killed if you leave Islam. With that belief, Egypt won’t be a land of freedom—a land that guarantees the right to life, the rule of law, property rights, the protection of minorities, respect for human dignity and the right to worship God according to one’s conscience. Through His prophets, God frequently reprimanded Israel and Judah for committing spiritual adultery and “playing the harlot” with neighboring nations. Instead of being loyal to God and putting their full trust in Him to provide and protect, they relied instead on alliances with various nations (see Jeremiah 3:1-15 and Ezekiel 16:15-63). God warned Israel that their alliances would backfire. He said, “I will stir up your lovers against you” (Ezekiel 23:22). After the fall of Judah to the Babylonians, God’s prophet wrote, “Among all her lovers she has none to comfort her. All her friends have dealt treacherously with her; they have become her enemies” (Lamentations 1:2). Would that America would rededicate herself to a committed covenant relationship with God! But it is not going to happen soon enough to prevent calamity. Our nation’s increasing infidelity toward our Creator will be our undoing. Bible prophecies tell us that America and her Western allies will eventually suffer terribly because of their unfaithfulness to God. However, God promises that He will provide for and protect every individual who faithfully obeys, serves and trusts in Him! For more understanding of these prophecies and of the volatile Middle East, see our free booklets The United States and Britain in Bible Prophecy and The Middle East in Bible Prophecy .

### International Law

#### International law decisively affirms – arms transfers to authoritarian regimes are prohibited.

Lederer ’14 Lederer, Edith. “Treaty regulating global arms trade takes effect Wednesday.” *San Diego Union Tribute*. 23 September 2014. <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-treaty-regulating-global-arms-trade-takes-effect-2014dec23-story.html>. [Premier]

A landmark treaty regulating the multibillion-dollar global arms trade comes into force on Wednesday, a milestone hailed by the United Nations and campaigners seeking to stop weapons sales to dictators, terrorists and human rights abusers. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Tuesday the treaty's speedy entry into force — less than two years after its historic adoption by the U.N. General Assembly — reflects the commitment of states, international organizations and civil society "to stop irresponsible arms transfers." The treaty requires countries that ratify it to establish national regulations to control the transfer of conventional arms and components, and to regulate arms brokers. It prohibits the transfer of conventional weapons if they violate arms embargoes or if they promote acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, and if they could be used in attacks on civilians or civilian buildings such as schools and hospitals. So far, 60 countries have ratified the treaty including five of the world's top 10 arms exporters — France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Britain. Another 129 countries have signed but not ratified the treaty including the United States, the largest arms producer and exporter. Ban called on all countries that haven't ratified the treaty to do so "without delay."

### Kant

#### A state is only entitled to defend an ally if the defense is essential the state’s survival.

Ripstein ’09 Ripstein, Arthur (Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto) “Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.” *Harvard University Press*, pgs. 226-227. 2009. [Premier]

The second difference is that a state is a public rightful condition. The public nature of the state limits the purposes for which it can act to those that are properly public, that is, sustaining its own character as a rightful condition. Because it is not en ti tled to set and pursue its own private purposes, but only public ones, it could never have grounds for going to war except to defend itself or to defend an ally whose defense was important75 to its own self- defense, or to unite against a state that poses a general threat to the condition of peace among nations.77 The public nature of a rightful condition is most fully re flected in a republican system of government. Kant’s famous claim in Perpetual Peace that republican states do not go to war against each other has been read as an empirical conjecture about how likely people who need to pay for wars are to vote in favor of them, and the ability of such states to engage in more productive forms of interaction.78 It also has an a priori basis in concepts of public right, as a simple re flection of the fact that republican governments do not act for private purposes, and so have an internal limit on the ends they will pursue, and the means they will use in pursuit of them.79 If the only source of con flict in a state of nature between states is generated by the indeterminacy of the right to self- defense, then the solution is a partial analogue of a civil condition, but not a civil condition as such. Instead, the ideal is “a permanent Congress of states” which realizes the idea of “a public right of nations” through which nations establish a procedure “for deciding their disputes in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way (the way of savages), namely by war.”80 Because each nation has neither private purposes nor external objects of choice, the analogue of a rightful condition among states has a court but neither legislature nor executive. Such a court can resolve disputes about boundaries peacefully, but its resolution of disputes is only “as if before a court,” because states can resolve their disputes peacefully by accepting the decision of a court as binding.

#### The intention to coopt the ends of other states is illegitimate – five warrants.

Van der Linden ’95 summarizes van der Linden, Harry (Professor of Philosophy at Butler University). “Kant, the Duty to Promote International Peace, and Political Intervention.” Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Volume 2, pgs. 73-4. 1995. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/62434886.pdf>. \*the author does not agree with the conclusion [Premier]

Preliminary Article 5 of To Perpetual Peace prohibits intervention: "No nation shall forcibly (gewalttdtig) interfere with the constitution and government of another." In his explication of the Article, Kant suggests that just as one may not coercively interfere with the immoral conduct of a person who only sets a bad example, so it is wrong to coercively interfere with a foreign state that does not harm other states but oppresses its own people. Rather, the example of the oppressive government should be seen as a warning to other nations not to commit the same injustices. Kant adds that foreign assistance to one of the parties in an internal discord is justified only in the case of civil war; for since the parties are in a "condition of anarchy," the assistance "to one of the parties could not be regarded as interference by the other in its constitution.,,9 He concludes that, short of civil war, "a foreign power's interference 'would violate the rights of an independent people struggling with its internal ills. Doing this would be an obvious offense and would render the autonomy of every nation insecure." This argument (a), that political intervention is wrong because states are like moral persons with autonomy should be distinguished from Kant's immediately following and final argument (b), under Preliminary Article 5, that adopting a policy of intervention for the sake of eliminating injustice is wrong because it would lead to the bad consequence of making the "autonomy of every nation insecure" (and, hence, lasting peace would become an illusion). Kant does not address intervention in any detail elsewhere in his work, and so additional arguments that he might have held against political intervention must be inferred from various aspects of his practical philosophy. The following three arguments seem to be the most significant: (c) A central theme of Kant's ethics is that we must mirror the ideal of the realm of ends in our moral actions. We may infer that it is also his view that in working toward peace we must mirror the ideal of the federation of states as the political foundation of the realm of ends. In this federation, nonintervention is the rule, and so Kant's ethics seems to imply that this rule must always guide our political conduct, irrespective of whether intervention might at times lead to political improvements. (d) In To Perpetual Peace, Kant warns that political change should not be pushed too quickly. "Despotic moralists" make this mistake out of political inexperience and enthusiasm for the ideal, and, typically, the overall result is repression for the sake of the good and a worse political constitution. Moral politicians, to the contrary, realize that change must come gradually. Proponents of political intervention are like despotic moralists, seeking premature political change. They fail to realize that when people in a foreign nation are ready for change they can realize it by themselves, and that intervention will ultimately only worsen the situation. (e) Kant rejects revolution and resistance for various reasons, and, since political intervention commonly involves assistance to popular resistance, it is also unjustified.

#### This outweighs – the duty to help others is only an imperfect duty.

Stohr ’10 summarizes Stohr, Karen (Associate Professor of Metaphysics at Georgetown University). “Kantian Beneficence and the Problem of Obligatory Aid.” *Journal of Moral Philosophy*. 2010. <http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kes39/Stohr_Kantian_Beneficence_and_the_Problem_of_Obligatory_Aid.pdf>. [Premier]

The usual interpretation of the perfect/imperfect duty distinction is as follows: perfect duties prescribe or prohibit specific actions whereas imperfect duties are duties to adopt a maxim. Generally speaking, we establish the existence of a perfect duty by applying some formulation of the categorical imperative—very often the first formulation—in order to see whether the proposed maxim is rationally defensible. If the maxim fails the universalizability test, the action is forbidden. An action is required if the negation of its maxim fails the test. Maxims that otherwise pass the test are permissible. Imperfect duties, however, are not duties to perform or refrain from particular actions, but rather duties to adopt maxims, where adopting the maxim implies committing oneself to certain ends. For Kant, there are two morally obligatory ends: one‟s own perfection and the happiness of others. The commitment to my own perfection generates duties to cultivate both my good will and my natural capacities. The commitment to the happiness of others generates the duty of beneficence. On Kant‟s view, if I am truly committed to the happiness of others, I will have it as my maxim to make the permissible ends of others my own.16 Broadly speaking, this means that I will view those ends as worthy of promotion, insofar as they are the ends of rational beings, and moreover, I will commit myself to aiding in their promotion appropriately. Kant is clear in his insistence that the general duty of beneficence is a wide imperfect duty: But I ought to sacrifice a part of my welfare to others without hope of return because this is a duty, and it is impossible to assign specific limits to the extent of this sacrifice. How far it should extend depends, in large part, on what each person‟s true needs are in view of his sensibilities, and it must be left to each to decide this for himself….Hence, this duty is only a wide one; the duty has in it a latitude for doing more or less, and no specific limits can be assigned to what should be done.17 The duty is imperfect because it is a duty to adopt a maxim of making the ends of others my own, rather than a duty to perform specific actions.18 It is a wide imperfect duty because I am permitted to make judgments about which sacrifices are required, based on my estimation of my “true needs” in view of my “sensibilities.” In this passage, it seems evident enough that Kant intends that individuals should exercise reflective judgment about how the obligatory end of beneficence is to be carried out.

### Libertarianism

#### Military aid illegitimately infringes on the property rights of citizens – no circumstance justifies coercion.

Vance ’17 Vance, Laurence (Policy Adviser for the Future of Freedom Foundation and Associated Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute). “When Right Is Wrong.” *Lew Rockwell*. 5 September 2017, <https://www.lewrockwell.com/2017/09/laurence-m-vance/when-right-is-wrong/>. [Premier]

The Obama administration slashed hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic assistance to Egypt in 2013 after the ouster of Egypt’s president Mohamed Morsi. This was a great thing, although Obama did promise future support that will depend on “Egypt’s progress in pursuing a democratic path.” As expected, $575 million in military aid to Egypt that had been frozen since the ousting of Egypt’s president was released in 2014. The Trump administration has now done the same thing. It has “decided to deny Egypt almost $100 million in aid and hold back another $195 million until it sees improvements in Cairo’s track record on human rights and democracy.” “We have serious concerns regarding human rights and governance in Egypt,” said an administration official. Egypt said it “regrets the decision” and termed it a “misjudgment.” Back in May, Egypt passed a draconian law that restricts the operations of human rights and aid groups. This was after members of the delegation that accompanies Egypt’s president to the White House in April insisted that the law would not be passed. Amnesty International and other watchdog groups “have documented widespread repression and human rights abuses, including torture, by the Egyptian security forces and an effort by the government to quell dissent.” The decision to deny Egypt some foreign aid is viewed as the administration’s response. The aid includes $195 million in Foreign Military Financing. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has directed that that funding will now be held in reserve “until we see progress from Egypt on key priorities.” The United States will also “redirect another $65.7 million in Foreign Military Financing and $30 million in Economic Support Funds that had been meant for Egypt and give them, instead, to ‘other key security partners.’” Again, cutting foreign aid to Egypt is a great thing. Especially since the United States has given Egypt “nearly $80 billion in military and economic assistance over the past 30 years.” Too bad the Trump administration is making the cuts for the wrong reason. Total U.S. spending on foreign aid for fiscal year 2017 comes to $42.4 billion. Only Afghanistan ($4.7 billion) and Israel ($3.1 billion) receive more aid than Egypt ($1.46 billion). The problem is that not one penny of this money should be spent regardless of any country’s human rights record, poverty, natural disasters, epidemics, or “need.” The libertarian position on foreign aid is straightforward: Foreign aid is unconstitutional. Foreign aid is an illegitimate purpose of government. Foreign aid is simply the looting of American taxpayers. The government has no right to take money from Americans against their will and give it to foreigners or their governments—regardless of the need, crisis, or circumstances, and regardless of where the money goes, how much is spent, what the terms are, or what the supposed benefits are. Foreign aid is foreign welfare. If it is illegitimate for the U.S. government to dispense welfare to its own citizens, then it is certainly inappropriate to bestow welfare on foreigners. All foreign aid should be individual, private, and voluntary. Any American who wants to help the poor, the hungry, the downtrodden, the oppressed, the disadvantaged, or the underprivileged in any county is welcome to do so on his own or through any number of private organizations—as long as spends his own money. Foreign aid spending is wrong even if it is small percentage of the federal budget, is a small percentage of GDP, has bipartisan support, feeds the hungry, clothes the naked, shelters the homeless, treats the sick, educates children, drills wells, curbs drug production, or rebuilds infrastructure. All foreign aid supplied by the government should be eliminated immediately.

### Polls

#### Americans disapprove of military aid, especially to authoritarian regimes.

Carden ’18 Carden, James. “A New Poll Shows the Public Is Overwhelmingly Opposed to Endless US Military Interventions.” *The Nation*. 9 January 2018. <https://www.thenation.com/article/new-poll-shows-public-overwhelmingly-opposed-to-endless-us-military-interventions/>. [Premier]

Last week, the bipartisan Committee for a Responsible Foreign Policy—a bipartisan advocacy group calling for congressional oversight of America’s lengthy list of military interventions abroad—released the results of a survey that show broad public support for Congress to reclaim its constitutional prerogatives in the exercise of foreign policy (see Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution) and for fewer US military interventions generally. Undertaken last November by J. Wallin Opinion Research, the new survey revealed “a national voter population that is largely skeptical of the practicality or benefits of military intervention overseas, including both the physical involvement of the US military and also extending to military aid in the form of funds or equipment as well.” Bill Dolbow, the spokesman for the Committee for a Responsible Foreign Policy, said, “We started this initiative to give a voice to the people and the people have spoken—Congress needs to enact more oversight before intervening in conflict abroad.” The headline findings show, among other things, that 86.4 percent of those surveyed feel the American military should be used only as a last resort, while 57 percent feel that US military aid to foreign countries is counterproductive. The latter sentiment “increases significantly” when involving countries like Saudi Arabia, with 63.9 percent saying military aid—including money and weapons—should not be provided to such countries

#### Americans want to cut off aid for Saudi Arabia.

Daragahi ’18 Daragahi, Borzou. “Majority of Americans want congress to cut arms sales to Saudi Arabia over Yemen war, survey finds.” *The Independent*. 26 November 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-arms-sales-embargo-us-yemen-civil-war-famine-trump-congress-a8651931.html>. [Premier]

A majority of Americans oppose the US government’s support for the ongoing Saudi-led war in Yemen, a survey has shown. Some 58 per cent of respondents wanted lawmakers to curtail or halt the supply of arms for a conflict considered the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian disaster. Only 13 per cent of Americans said they want lawmakers to maintain or increase arms sales to the US allies in the conflict – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

### Hobbes

#### Uncertainty would lead the sovereign to adopt passive foreign policy.

Williams ’96 Williams, Michael C. (Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa). “Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration.” *International Organization*, Volume 50, Number 2, pg. 231. Spring 1996. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704077>. [Premier]

Skepticism about the limits of human knowledge leads Hobbes to great caution in human affairs, especially regarding the relationship of theory to practice. He warns that to act as if we can know (predict) and control the future is to court disaster. In this light, then, it is an interesting (if anachronistic) question to ask what he might have thought about, for example, the intimate relationship between the science of strategic studies and American involve- ment in the Vietnam War.50 It is probably equally fair to say that he would have had little sympathy for continuing efforts toward the creation of "policy sciences" in the discipline as a whole.51 Hobbes's skepticism also plays a role in his positing of an international system populated by sovereigns operating upon Hobbesian principles. Knowing the limitations of human knowledge, and the inability to know God's will or other visions of ultimate human fulfillment, Hobbes believes that rational sovereigns will not act in an unnecessarily aggressive manner. His vision of foreign policy is cautious and essentially pacific, a position that, as Flathman has illustrated drawing upon a passage from the Elements of Law, is condi- tioned by-or perhaps founded in-his skepticism: "Hobbes is far from a supporter of bellicose or expansionist policies. Because no preparation can assure victory, 'such commonwealths, or such monarchs, as affect war for itself ... out of ambition, or of vain-glory, or that make account to avenge every little injury, or disgrace done by their neighbours, if they not ruin themselves, their fortune must be better than they have reason to expect.' "52

## Blocks

### A2 Stability DA

#### Aid exacerbates political violence – studies.

Dube and Naidu ’15 Dube, Oeindrila (Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at New York University) and Naidu, Suresh (Assistant Professor of Economics & Public Affairs at Columbia University). “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia.” *The Journal of Politics*, Volume 77, Number 1. January 2015. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w20213.pdf>. [Premier]

Although substantial amounts of military assistance have been disbursed to countries facing internal conflict, little work has evaluated the impact of military aid on political violence. This paper has examined the effect of U.S. military assistance on conflict in Colombia, a country embroiled in civil war over the past four decades. We found evidence that increases in U.S. military aid lead to higher levels of paramilitary attacks, even after controlling for government attacks. There are also no corresponding reductions in guerrilla violence. As such, neither tactical complementarities with government forces nor indirect repression of the insurgency can account for this effect. Instead, our results are consistent with the diversion of foreign military aid from the Colombian military to illicit paramilitary groups, which accords with extensive qualitative documentation of collusive resource sharing between these entities. Turning to the implications for Colombian politics, we found that there are differential paramilitary killings in election periods, with largest effects emerging in competitive municipalities. These results point to a political cycle of paramilitary violence that is exacerbated by U.S. military aid. Finally, we found no evidence of aid increasing counter-narcotics activities, which is one of the stated goals of U.S. assistance to Colombia. Though we focus on Colombia, our results speak to broad questions in political development and international assistance. Military aid is sometimes proposed as a cure for weak states, as it is presumed to enhance the government’s repressive capacity, and facilitate its ability to secure a "monopoly on the legitimate use of violence." Yet our results suggest that, in environments such as Colombia, international military assistance can strengthen armed non-state actors, who rival the government over the use of violence. As such, our findings hold obvious relevance for several other major recipients of U.S. military aid, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Mexico, and Indonesia. In these nations, links between the military and informal armed militias have led to the use of foreign military resources by illegitimate armed groups, and sometimes been accompanied by severe human rights abuses. Massacres in East Timor preceding the 1999 referendum on independence from Indonesia were led by militias tightly connected to the Indonesian military, which has been a large recipient of U.S. military assistance. In recently occupied Iraq, informal Shiite militias conducted joint operations with the U.S. backed Iraqi army against suspected insurgents, despite accusations of torture and other human rights violations.39 Over 2008- 2012, the United States disbursed nearly $2 billion to Mexico as a part of the Merida Initiative to assist in combating the well-armed private armies of drug cartels. However, a 2001 Global Exchange report notes that "the Mexican army has been infilltrated by narcotics traffickers at the highest ranks, and is increasingly dependent on U.S. weapons, training, and ideology" (p. 46). The results in this paper suggest that informal links between a state’s armed forces and armed non-state actors need to be taken into account for the effective deployment of military aid to conflict-torn societies.

#### No threat to the US – geography, buffer states, economy, and nukes.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

At the strategic level, the United States inhabits such an extremely favorable security environment in the post-Cold War world that most arms sales do little or nothing to improve its security. Thanks to its geography, friendly (and weak) neighbors, large and dynamic economy, and secure nuclear arsenal, the United States faces very few significant threats. There is no Soviet Union bent upon dominating Europe and destroying the United States. China, despite its rapid rise, cannot (and has no reason to) challenge the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the United States. Arms sales — to allies or others — are unnecessary to deter major, direct threats to U.S. national security in the current era.47 Nor are arms sales necessary to protect the United States from “falling dominoes,” or the consequences of conflicts elsewhere. The United States enjoys what Eric Nordlinger called “strategic immunity.”48 Simply put, most of what happens in the rest of the world is irrelevant to U.S. national security. The United States has spent decades helping South Korea keep North Korea in check, for example, but division of territory on the Korean peninsula does not affect America’s security. Likewise, civil wars in the Middle East and Russia’s annexation of Crimea might be significant for many reasons, but those events do not threaten the ability of the United States to defend itself. As a result, a decision to sell weapons to Ukraine, Taiwan, or South Korea could significantly affect those nations’ security; doing so is not an act of ensuring U.S. national security.

#### Aid causes blowback – allies turn on us, neutrals turn hostile, and arms leak.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

Blowback can occur in at least three ways. First, a previously friendly regime becomes unfriendly. For example, the United States sold billions of dollars in weapons to the Shah of Iran during the 1970s in the hopes that Iran would provide a stabilizing influence on the Middle East. The sales included everything from fighter jets for air campaigns to surface-to-air missiles to shoot down enemy fighters.70 After the 1979 revolution, however, Iran used those weapons in its war with Iraq and enabled the new Iranian regime to exert its influence in the region. Panama, the recipient of decades of American military assistance, as well as host to a major military base and 9,000 U.S. troops, was a similar case. In 1989, Gen. Manuel Noriega — himself a CIA asset for more than 20 years — took power and threatened U.S. citizens, prompting a U.S. invasion that featured American troops facing American weapons.71 Blowback also occurs when the United States sells weapons to nations (or transfers them to nonstate actors) that, though not allies, simply did not register as potential adversaries at the time of the sale. The United States, for example, sold surface-to-air missiles, towed guns, tanks, and armored personnel carriers to Somalia during the 1980s. Few officials would have imagined that the United States would find itself intervening in Somalia in 1992, or that the United States and its allies would provide billions in weapons and dual-use equipment to Iraq in an effort to balance against Iran, only to wind up confronting Iraq on the battlefield to reverse its annexation of Kuwait.72 And finally, blowback can occur when U.S. weapons are sold or stolen from the government that bought them and wind up on the battlefield in the hands of the adversary. For example, the Reagan administration covertly provided Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen, who were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s; they in turn sold them off eventually to Iran and North Korea, among others. More recently, the Islamic State managed to capture from the Iraqi government a stunning number of Humvees and tanks the United States had sold to Iraq to rebuild its military capabilities after the 2003 invasion, as well as enough small arms and ammunition to supply three divisions of a conventional army.73 These examples of blowback demonstrate how difficult it can be to forecast the long-term outcomes of arms sales and how obvious it is that selling weapons carries a number of risks. Predicting what exactly will happen is hard, but predicting that arms sales to clients with red flags are likely to end badly is quite easy. Iraq was a fragile state ravaged by a decade’s worth of American intervention and rife with terrorism and civil conflict; to transfer such large quantities of weapons to its military and police force under such conditions was to invite disaster.

#### Military aid fails – ISIS, Yemen war, and oil flow prove.

Miller and Sokolsky ’18 Miller, Andrew (Scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program) and Sokolsky, Richard (Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program). “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 27 February 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/27/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much-pub-75657. [Premier]

In reality, U.S. military assistance promises more than it delivers. There is scant evidence outside of a few isolated cases that U.S. material support to Middle Eastern countries has fulfilled any of these purposes. Recipients of U.S. funding and weapons have largely failed to make major strides in their capabilities and, in some instances, may have even regressed. Despite $47 billion in U.S. military assistance over 40 years, the Egyptian military has struggled mightily to contain an ISIS-affiliate numbering no more than 1,200 militants. The Saudis barely used their American-made advanced combat aircraft in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS operation in Syria, and $89 billion in arms sales to the kingdom over the last 10 years has not prevented Riyadh from getting bogged down in an increasingly costly quagmire in Yemen with U.S.-supplied weapons. The U.S. has sold hundreds of billions of dollars in military hardware to Persian Gulf countries and yet collectively they are not capable of defending the free flow of oil from the Gulf against a militarily weaker Iran without U.S. assistance.

### A2 Influence / Leverage DA

#### The government rubber stamps military aid – it fails to get influence.

Norris ’13 Norris, John (Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at the Center for American Progress). “Is America Training Too Many Foreign Armies?.” *Foreign Policy*. 28 January 2013. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/28/is-america-training-too-many-foreign-armies>. [Premier]

At a time when not a day goes by without Beltway handwringing about the impact of a potential sequester, there has been almost zero discussion of how to better focus U.S. military assistance around clear objectives and direct it to countries where it can make a lasting difference. And these aren’t insignificant sums when taken together. The administration requested $9.8 billion in security assistance funding for fiscal year 2013. Much of this military assistance — through programs like Foreign Military Financing; International Military Education and Training; Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Peacekeeping Operations; and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund — is supposed to be overseen by the State Department with the Defense Department doing the heavy lifting of actually delivering aid and training. The rationale on paper for such assistance is straightforward and usually receives uncritical congressional support. U.S. military aid helps train security forces, finance the purchase of military equipment, bolster the ability of law enforcement to tackle the illegal narcotics trade, and shape cooperation on nonproliferation issues. But more than anything, the Pentagon has always insisted that spreading military assistance so broadly is all about building relationships with fellow militaries — a cost effective way of establishing contacts who will pick up the phone in a ministry of defense when needed. For those who say U.S. dollars propped up an autocratic military in Egypt, other argue that it was the senior flag relationships between the Pentagon and Cairo that kept the military from opening fire on democratic protesters during the Arab Spring. But U.S. military aid looks much better on paper than in practice, in large part because it is often delivered as if on autopilot without a reasoned discussion of its merits. The State Department largely offers rubber-stamp approvals, and the Foreign Service currently lacks personnel with the expertise needed to engage in a rigorous debate with the Pentagon about who deserves aid and why. As Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center has argued, the State Department’s "internal capacity to plan, budget, and manage these programs needs to be seriously strengthened." This, combined with the general tendency of Congress to treat military spending requests as something just short of a papal writ, has meant that U.S. security assistance programs receive very little oversight. Equally troubling, military and economic assistance are treated as quite different creatures. For economic assistance, the United States has increasingly insisted that aid recipients at least demonstrate some marginal commitment to democracy and open markets. Not so on the military side, where concerns about corruption, the rule of law, and human rights are treated as something we are too polite to ask about. Indeed, we probably would offer military training to everyone if it were not for the minor restrictions imposed by Senate Democrats like the Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. military assistance to known thugs and war criminals that violate human rights with impunity. Yes, having military-to-military contacts through U.S. military training and aid is often useful and can build important relations and lasting trust. But it is equally true that the list of U.S.-trained officers that have led coups against their sitting governments is a lengthy one in countries ranging from Honduras to Haiti to the Gambia. Contrary to what Ham’s remark suggested, a few months spent studying tactics and logistics in Kansas or Georgia rarely seems to slow down a power-hungry colonel when he is hell bent on toppling the elected government that just threatened to cut his budget. Underwriting security assistance to countries with autocratic leadership or nations that are of little strategic significance doesn’t make much sense. U.S. military aid and training should be concentrated in a far fewer countries rather than being sprinkled all around the globe like fairy dust in hopes that good relations result. Nations should be chosen to receive such military aid and training based on their commitment to reform — both within the military and within the broader structures of democratic governance, free markets, and respect for human rights. Such aid should be a reward for high-performing countries, not a party favor dispensed at the door.

#### Stats flow aff – military aid decreases cooperation.

Sullivan ’12 Sullivan, Patricia (Associate Professor of Public Policy, Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense, University of North Carolina). “Is Military Aid an Effective Tool for U.S. Foreign Policy?” *Scholars Strategy Network*. 1 May 2012. <https://scholars.org/brief/military-aid-effective-tool-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

The Reverse Leverage model suggests that, paradoxically, a powerful nation can become dependent on countries it aids. In this way of thinking, the amount of military aid granted to a foreign government reflects the extent to which the U.S. is reliant on that nation – for things like oil exports, intelligence, bases for troops, and military cooperation. In this perspective, it could be easier for a nation receiving assistance to obtain military aid elsewhere than for a superpower like the United States to find an equally valuable strategic partner. Rather than inducing compliance, generous U.S. military funding runs the risk of creating strong clients who are able to ignore U.S. interests and play us off against other powers. What the Evidence Shows The world is much more complicated than any one model can capture. Each nation receiving major military aid has a unique relationship with the United States that changes over time. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the connections between U.S. military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the governments that received aid between 1990 and 2004 reveals a pattern largely consistent with the Reverse Leverage model. In general, U.S. military aid proved to be negatively correlated with cooperation by the nations receiving the aid. In fact, national governments that received aid exhibited less cooperative behavior toward the United States than governments given no military aid. Some countries that received U.S. military aid became more cooperative with increased levels of assistance. But aid was less likely to induce cooperation from formal U.S. allies. In practice, the United States did not punish defiance with reductions in aid; nor did it reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. The opposite pattern prevailed, because higher levels of cooperation from nations we assisted were correlated with decreased military aid in subsequent years, while reductions in cooperative behavior were often followed by increased aid.

#### No influence – narrow range of applicable cases and countries don’t respond to sanctions – empirics prove.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

Arms for (Not That Much) Influence. Successful foreign policy involves encouraging other nations to behave in ways that benefit the United States. As noted, the United States has often attempted to use arms sales to generate the sort of leverage or influence necessary to do this. History reveals, however, that the benefits of the arms for influence strategy are limited for two main reasons. First, the range of cases in which arms sales can produce useful leverage is much narrower than is often imagined. Most obviously, arms sales are unnecessary in situations where the other country already agrees or complies with the American position or can be encouraged to do so without such incentives. This category includes most U.S. allies and close partners under many, though not all, circumstances. Just as clearly, the arms for influence strategy is a nonstarter when the other state will never agree to comply with American demands. This category includes a small group of obvious cases such as Russia, China, Iran, and other potential adversaries (to which the United States does not sell weapons anyway), but it also includes a much larger group of cases in which the other state opposes what the United States wants, or in which complying with U.S. wishes would be politically too dangerous for that state’s leadership.59 In addition, there are some cases in which the United States itself would view arms sales as an inappropriate tool. The Leahy Law, for example, bars the United States from providing security assistance to any specific foreign military unit deemed responsible for past human rights abuses.60 More broadly, arms sales are clearly a risky choice when the recipient state is a failed state or when it is engaged in a civil conflict or interstate war. Indeed, in such cases it is often unclear whether there is anyone to negotiate with in the first place, and governments are at best on shaky ground. At present the United States bars 17 such nations from purchasing American arms. As long as these nations are embargoed, arms sales will remain an irrelevant option for exerting influence.61 Apart from these cases, there is a large group of nations with tiny defense budgets that simply don’t buy enough major conventional weaponry to provide much incentive for arms sales. On this list are as many as 112 countries that purchased less than $100 million in arms from the United States between 2002 and 2016, including Venezuela, Jamaica, and Sudan. Lest this category be dismissed because it includes mostly smaller and less strategically significant countries from the American perspective, it should be noted that each of these countries has a vote in the United Nations (and other international organizations) and that many of them suffer from civil conflicts and terrorism, making them potential targets of interest for American policymakers looking for international influence. By definition, then, the arms-for-influence strategy is limited to cases in which a currently noncompliant country might be willing to change its policies (at least for the right price or to avoid punishment). The second problem with the arms for influence strategy is that international pressure in general, whether in the form of economic sanctions, arms sales and embargoes, or military and foreign aid promises and threats, typically has a very limited impact on state behavior. Though again, on paper, the logic of both coercion and buying compliance looks straightforward, research shows that leaders make decisions on the basis of factors other than just the national balance sheet. In particular, leaders tend to respond far more to concerns about national security and their own regime security than they do to external pressure. Arms sales, whether used as carrots or sticks, are in effect a fairly weak version of economic sanctions, which research has shown have limited effects, even when approved by the United Nations, and tend to spawn a host of unintended consequences. As such, the expectations for their utility should be even more limited.62 A recent study regarding the impact of economic sanctions came to a similar conclusion, noting that, “The economic impact of sanctions may be pronounced … but other factors in the situational context almost always overshadow the impact of sanctions in determining the political outcome.”63 The authors of another study evaluating the impact of military aid concur, arguing that, “In general we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of the recipient state. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of U.S. aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior.”64 Perhaps the most explicit evidence of the difficulty the United States has had exerting this kind of leverage came during the Reagan administration. Sen. Robert Kasten Jr. (R-WI) signaled the concern of many when he said, “Many countries to whom we dispense aid continue to thumb their noses at us” at the United Nations, and Congress passed legislation authorizing the president to limit aid to any state that repeatedly voted in opposition to the United States at the UN.65 In 1986, the Reagan administration began to monitor voting patterns and issue threats, and, in roughly 20 cases in 1987 and 1988, it lowered the amount of aid sent to nations the administration felt were not deferential enough. An analysis of the results, however, found no linkage between changes in American support and UN voting patterns by recipient states. The authors’ conclusion fits neatly within the broader literature about the limited impact of sanctions: “The resilience of aid recipients clearly demonstrates that their policies were driven more powerfully by interests other than the economic threat of a hegemon.”66 The U.S. track record of generating influence through arms sales specifically is quite mixed. U.S. arms sales may have improved Israeli security over the years, for example, but American attempts to pressure Israel into negotiating a durable peace settlement with the Palestinians have had little impact. Nor have arms sales provided the United States with enough leverage over the years to prevent client states such as Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco from invading their neighbors. Nor have arms sales helped restrain the human rights abuses of clients like Chile or Libya, or various Middle Eastern client states. Although the United States has used the promise of arms sales or the threat of denying arms successfully from time to time, the failures outnumber the victories. The most rigorous study conducted to tease out the conditions under which arms for influence efforts are successful is a 1994 study by John Sislin.67 Collating 191 attempts between 1950 and 1992, Sislin codes 80 of those attempts (42 percent) successful. Sislin’s analysis is incomplete, however, since he looks only at the immediate benefits of arms sales and does not consider the long-term consequences. Furthermore, a close look at the supposedly successful attempts reveals that many of them are cases in which the United States is in fact simply buying something rather than actually “influencing” another nation. Thirty of the cases Sislin coded as successful were instances of the United States using arms to buy access to military bases (20 cases) or to raw materials (5 cases) or to encourage countries to buy more American weapons (5 cases).68 Without those in the dataset, the U.S. success rate drops to 31 percent. Finally, the conditions for successful leverage seeking appear to be deteriorating. First, Sislin’s study found that American influence was at its height during the Cold War when American power overshadowed the rest of the world. With the leveling out of the global distribution of power, both economic and military, the ability of the United States to exert influence has waned, regardless of the specific tool being used. Second, as noted above, the U.S. share of the global arms market has declined as the industry has become more competitive and, as a result, American promises and threats carry less weight than before. As William Hartung noted, “The odds [of] buying political loyalty via arms transfers are incalculably higher [worse] in a world in which there are dozens of nations to turn to in shopping for major combat equipment.”69

#### Perception of honesty and neutrality would allow better diplomacy – the turn outweighs.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

The first benefit from reducing arms sales would be greater diplomatic flexibility and leverage. Critics might argue that even if arms sales are an imperfect tool, forgoing arms sales will eliminate a potential source of leverage. We argue that, on the contrary, the diplomatic gains from forgoing arms sales will outweigh the potential leverage or other benefits from arms sales. Most importantly, by refraining from arming nations engaged in conflict, the United States will have the diplomatic flexibility to engage with all parties as an honest broker. The inherent difficulty of negotiating while arming one side is obvious today with respect to North and South Korea. After decades of U.S. support for South Korea, North Korea clearly does not trust the United States. Similarly, U.S. attempts to help negotiate a peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians have long been complicated by American support for Israel. To stop arming one side of a contentious relationship is not to suggest that the United States does not have a preferred outcome in such cases. Rather, by staying out of the military domain the United States can more readily encourage dialogue and diplomacy. Forgoing arms sales is likely to be a superior strategy even in cases where the United States has an entrenched interest. In the case of Taiwan, for example, though it is clear that Taiwan needs to purchase weapons from other countries to provide for its defense, those weapons do not have to be made in the United States. Having Taiwan buy from other suppliers would help defuse U.S.-China tensions. Even if Taiwan’s defenses remained robust, China would clearly prefer a situation in which American arms no longer signal an implicit promise to fight on Taiwan’s behalf. This could also promote more productive U.S.-China diplomacy in general, as well as greater stability in the Pacific region. Most important, breaking off arms sales would also reduce the likelihood of the United States becoming entangled in a future conflict between Taiwan and China.

#### There’s no accountability – leads to reckless spending and perception of weakness.

Miller and Sokolsky ’18 Miller, Andrew (Scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program) and Sokolsky, Richard (Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program). “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 27 February 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/27/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much-pub-75657. [Premier]

A second and related problem is that the U.S. government does a poor job of holding allies and clients to account for behavior that runs counter to American interests. There is no systematic review of what U.S. military assistance accomplishes. The key questions that rarely get asked, let alone answered, are what does the U.S. want and expect from the assistance we provide and how does this aid help or hurt America’s ability to achieve these goals? If the U.S. cannot identify actions that the recipient would not have otherwise taken as a result of this assistance, then it is nothing more than a welfare program, and has two pernicious effects. First, it encourages “moral hazard”—recipients to do whatever they want with the assistance without having to fear the consequences of their actions. Second, it creates “reverse leverage”— Washington bends over backwards to keep relations smooth and the assistance flowing, rather than leverage the recipient’s dependence on U.S. military support and political commitments.

#### Egypt proves – no democracy, human rights, or access – success is attributable to other factors.

Miller and Sokolsky ’18 Miller, Andrew (Scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program) and Sokolsky, Richard (Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program). “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 27 February 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/27/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much-pub-75657. [Premier]

Likewise, U.S. attempts to explicitly link military assistance and arms sales to a recipient country’s domestic political behavior have not borne much fruit. For instance, the Obama administration’s suspension of some types of military assistance to Egypt in 2013 did not lead to “credible progress” toward democratic reforms. Nor did putting a $4 billion arms package for Bahrain on hold yield an improvement in that country’s human rights environment. Importantly, these failures have more to do with a lack of political will in Washington, in which the U.S. capitulated before its coercive measures could have the desired effect, than any inherent limitation in what withholding weapons shipments can accomplish. But the frequency with which the United States folds in these standoffs suggests a structural problem in U.S. assistance mechanisms that undermines its efficacy as a tool of influence. U.S. officials have excellent access in Middle Eastern capitals, but it is hard to attribute this to military assistance and arms sales. The United States remains a predominant international player and most countries do not have the luxury of ignoring Washington for long. Pentagon officials argue that the provision of material support increases their contacts with foreign militaries, creating opportunities to learn more about partner armed forces. In practice, however, recipient countries take great precautions to limit and regulate U.S. access to their troops. As an example, most Egyptian military personnel are prohibited from interacting with U.S. officials, while a small core of vetted senior officers are entrusted with managing Egypt’s military relationship with the United States.

### A2 Counterterror DA

#### Counterterror funding is misused.

Page ’18 Page, Andrea. “Counterterrorism Efforts Proving Counterproductive.” *Homeland Security Digital Library*. 14 December 2018. <https://www.hsdl.org/c/counterterrorism/>. [Premier]

The Center for International Policy formed the Security Assistance Monitor (SAM) program to provide oversight to U.S. foreign security aid and counterterrorism efforts. SAM conducts independent research and provides data regarding the uses and risks of U.S. security aid oversees. In a report released this month, Corruption in the Defense Sector: Identifying Key Risks to U.S. Counterterrorism Aid, SAM found that corruption is rampant among recipients of U.S foreign security aid. The most common misuses of aid include nepotism, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, theft, and the misappropriation of arms and supplies. According to the report, corruption is the predominant reason why U.S. counterterrorism efforts are often critically ineffective and even counterproductive: In FY 2017-2019 the U.S. will provide $24 billion in aid to foreign security forces in 36 countries. The largest recipients of aid are Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. The majority of aid goes toward providing combat and tactical support to military groups, intelligence and surveillance support, military aircraft, logistics, and security. Arms and supplies are frequently diverted to the black market, leaving soldiers under-equipped while weapons end up in the hands of terrorist organizations. Diversion and misappropriation of funds, embezzlement and outright theft is widespread, as in the case of aid to Somalia in which it was found that only 30% of aid was being utilized appropriately.

#### Military aid only fuels terrorism – weapons mismatch, breeds resentment, lone wolf attackers, and fuels conflicts. Case outweighs on probability.

Thrall and Dorminey ’18 Thrall, Trevor (Senior Fellow for the Cato’s Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Department and Associate Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government) and Dominey, Caroline (Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and Emerging Expert with the Forum on the Arms Trade). “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy.” *Cato Institute*. 13 March 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>. [Premier]

Nor does the threat of transnational terrorism justify most arms sales. Most fundamentally, the actual threat from Islamist-inspired terrorism to Americans is extraordinarily low. Since 9/11, neither al Qaeda nor the Islamic State has managed an attack on the American homeland. Lone wolf terrorists inspired by those groups have done so, but since 9/11 those attacks have killed fewer than 100 Americans, an average of about 6 people per year. There is simply very little risk reduction to be gained from any strategy. The idea that the United States should be willing to accept the significant negative effects of arms sales for minimal counterterrorism gains is seriously misguided.49 Moreover, even if one believed that the benefits would outweigh the potential costs, arms sales still have almost no value as a tool in the war on terror for several reasons. First, the bulk of arms sales (and those we considered in our risk assessment) involve major conventional weapons, which are ill suited to combatting terrorism. Many U.S. arms deals since 9/11 have involved major conventional weapons systems such as fighter jets, missiles, and artillery, useful for traditional military operations, but of little use in fighting terrorists. Insurgencies that hold territory, like the Islamic State, are one thing, but most terrorist groups do not advertise their location, nor do they assemble in large groups. Second, there is little evidence from the past 16 years that direct military intervention is the right way to combat terrorism. Research reveals that military force alone “seldom ends terrorism.”50 This comports with the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terror to date. Despite regime change, thousands of air strikes, and efforts to upgrade the military capabilities of friendly governments, the United States has not only failed to destroy the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism, it has also spawned chaos, greater resentment, and a sharp increase in the level of terrorism afflicting the nations involved.51 Given the experience of the United States since 2001, there is little reason to expect that additional arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates will reduce terrorism, much less anti-American terrorism specifically. Relatedly, many arms deals since 9/11, made in the name of counterterrorism, were irrelevant to U.S. goals in the global war on terror because they provided weapons to governments fighting terrorist groups only vaguely (if at all) linked to al Qaeda or ISIS. Although selling weapons to the governments of Nigeria or Morocco or Tunisia might help them combat violent resistance in their countries, terrorist groups in those countries have never targeted the United States. As a result, such arms deals cannot be justified by arguing that they advance the goals of the United States in its own war on terror in any serious way. Finally, arms sales are completely useless to combat the largest terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland — lone wolf attackers already living in the United States. As noted, none of the successful attacks in the United States since 9/11 resulted from operations directed by al Qaeda or ISIS. And in fact only two foiled attempts since then — the underwear bomber and the printer-bomb plot — can be ascribed to al Qaeda.52 Instead, in almost all cases, persons already living in the United States, inspired by Islamist groups, decided to carry out attacks on their own. Clearly, arms sales to foreign nations won’t help with that problem; rather, as many analysts have suggested, amplifying conflicts abroad may well make the problem worse.53

#### Studies flow aff – aid increases terrorism.

Dimant et al. ’17 Dimant, Eugen (University of Pennsylvania), Krieger, Tim (University of Freiburg), and Meierrieks, Daniel (University of Freiburg). “Negative Returns: U.S. Military Policy and Anti-American Terrorism.” *Hoover Institutions Economic Working Paper*, No. 17106. September 2017. <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/17106-diman-krieger-meierrieks.pdf>. [Premier]

We study the effect of U.S. military policy on anti-American terrorism for a sample of 106 countries from 1986 to 2011. We find that more active U.S. military policy translates into more anti-American terrorism produced in the target country of these very policies, corroborating previous evidence on the determinants of anti-American terrorism. We show that this effect is not due to U.S. policies strengthening local state capacity and thus creating a strategic incentive for local terrorist groups to engage in anti-American terrorism. Rather, we find that more U.S. military aid (but not U.S. troop deployments) is associated with poorer political-institutional conditions, which gives rise to grievances and anti-American terrorism in aid-receiving countries. That is not to say that all foreign aid will always yield such negative returns. In light of our empirical findings, military measures (especially military aid), however, do not appear to be an appropriate policy tool to better protect the United States from transnational terrorism.

#### Billions spent have failed to curb terror – multiple empirics.

Saab ’18 Saab, Bilal (Executive Director and Head of Research & Public Affairs of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis North America). “What Does America Get for Its Military Aid?” *National Interest*. 22 February 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-america-get-its-military-aid-24605>. [Premier]

Then there are the less positive cases. Egypt probably tops them all. Although it has been receiving $1.3 billion per year in military assistance from Washington since the late 1970s, Egypt still struggles mightily in fighting terrorism at home, countering Islamic insurgents in the Sinai Peninsula, and securing its borders with Libya and Gaza. And while Baghdad should be proud of what its counterterrorism service has accomplished in the past couple of years, one must not forget that the Iraqi army did collapse in a humiliating fashion in 2014, failing miserably to stop ISIS’s initial onslaught, despite substantial U.S. treasure and training spanning more than a decade. Although Tunisia has received an exponential increase in U.S. security assistance since 2011 (tripling it to roughly $100 million in 2016) and has been designated by Washington as a major non-NATO ally, the country is a hotbed for Islamic militancy. It is estimated that some seven thousand Tunisians have traveled to fight in Iraq and Syria, making them the largest contingent of foreign fighters joining ISIS. Jordan’s internal-security apparatus has done well to contain the Syrian spillover and block ISIS infiltration with the help of U.S. money and equipment. However, terrorist attacks by ISIS-inspired extremists have spiked in Jordan in recent years, and youth radicalization has become a serious problem. Like Tunisia, Jordan has seen many of its young men, anywhere from two thousand to four thousand, leave the country to fight with ISIS, making the Hashemite kingdom one of the world’s highest per capita contributors of foreign fighters.

#### The aid-as-counterterrorism argument lacks empirical support.

Easterly 17 William Easterly [Professor of Economics at NYU] "This common argument for U.S. Foreign Aid is actually quite Xenophobic." The Washington Post. March 31, 2017. [Premier].

Unfortunately for these politically convenient arguments, the evidence for a link from poverty to terrorism never showed up. Though annual U.S. aid indeed increased from $8 billion before 9/11 to $18 billion afterward, studies since 9/11 have consistently shown that terrorists tend to have above-average income and education. Even if there had been a link from poverty to terrorism, the “aid as counter-terrorism” argument also required the assumption that aid has a dramatic effect on the poverty of entire aid-receiving nations. Today’s proponents of aid no longer make the grandiose claims of aid lifting whole societies out of poverty. They are more likely to cite the successes of more narrow programs with more limited numbers of beneficiaries, as Gates does with his (correct) celebration of efforts against Ebola and AIDS. As time passed, the aid-fighting-terrorism story became ever less plausible. Indeed, there has been a lot of aid effort in some crucial nations with little noticeable effect on poverty — or on violence and terrorism. Four of the nations on Trump’s original travel ban list — Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Syria — saw official foreign aid surge after 9/11. These four nations together received an annual flow of $1 billion in foreign aid from 1996 to 2000. After 9/11, they received an annual flow of $9 billion in foreign aid from 2002 to 2013. And whole books have been written about the disastrous record of the huge foreign aid program to still-violent Afghanistan. If that aid-as-security argument now fails, then it is not surprising that the support for aid collapses.

### A2 Econ DA - General

#### Military aid is inefficient – offsets and subsidies.

Caverly ’18 Caverly, Jonathan (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). “America's Arms Sales Policy: Security Abroad, Not Jobs at Home.” *War on the Rocks*. 6 April 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/>. [Premier]

Even if the Trump administration boosts sales against such headwinds, this will not create many additional jobs. Arms exports are a surprisingly inefficient means of employing people at home. Using census data, the Commerce Department estimates that a billion dollars of defense exports would “create or sustain” 3,918 jobs, considerably fewer than the 5,700 jobs per billion created by increased US exports more broadly. Doubling the United States’ annual arms exports to $40 billion, a highly unrealistic goal, would thus create fewer than 80,000 new jobs. There are other industries the United States can promote that will have larger effects on jobs. One reason defense exports appear to be inefficient employment generators is that states that spend their own money on buying American weapons also care about “jobs, jobs, jobs” for their own people, as well as supporting their own aspirational defense industries. Most countries require “offsets,” mandating that a percentage of any arms deal (often 50 to 100 percent) must be re-invested in the importing state’s economy. Between 2013 and 2015, these offsets, had the work been performed in the United States, would have created or sustained over 46,000 jobs. In publicizing a recent Saudi deal for 150 S-70 Black Hawk utility helicopters at roughly $6 billion, Lockheed Martin predicted that it would “support” 900 jobs. But half those jobs would be in Saudi Arabia. Yet another reason that arms exports are an inefficient employment mechanism: Any additional U.S. market share is likely to be heavily subsidized. In 2016, the United States spent $10 billion buying weapons for other countries, roughly 10 percent of the entire global arms export market, equivalent to Singapore’s or Algeria’s defense budget. Moreover, over the past six years, the Defense Department waived another $16 billion in normally mandatory fees for Foreign Military Sales — including $3.5 billion for a $15 billion Saudi agreement — largely to close deals that may have gone to other suppliers. In short, when it comes to boosting the domestic economy, arms sales contain relatively little juice. And, as we shall see, it may not be worth the squeeze.

#### Military aid is the least effective investment to create jobs.

Hartung ’18 Hartung, William D. (Director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy and a senior adviser to the Center’s Security Assistance Monitor). “Arms Sales Decisions Shouldn’t Be About Jobs.” *Defense One*. 26 March 2018. <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/03/arms-sales-decisions-shouldnt-be-about-jobs/146939/>. [Premier]

A secondary reason not to use the “jobs card” as a reason to sell U.S. weapons abroad is that the claims of jobs linked to foreign arms sales are greatly exaggerated. As a study from the University of Massachusetts has documented, weapons spending is virtually the least effective way to create jobs. Almost any other U.S. export could create more domestic employment. In addition, most major U.S. sales now involve offsets or licensed production – processes in which recipients of U.S. arms and technology produce all or part of U.S.-supplied weapons in their own countries. The above-mentioned arrangements diminish the U.S. job benefits of major foreign arms deals. And as research by my colleagues at the Security Assistance Monitor has revealed, licenses to produce U.S. weapons overseas have been a regular practice during Donald Trump’s time in office. One of the more embarrassing examples of this phenomenon was when President Trump bragged about the jobs impact of F-35 sales during last year’s trip to Japan, apparently unaware that F-35s sold to Japan and other regional players would be produced at a U.S.-licensed facility in Japan.

#### Trump has over exaggerated the benefits of US-Saudi arms sales to the US economy.

Borger 18 Julian Borger [World affairs editor at The Guardian]. "Trump inflated importance of Saudi arms sales to US job market, report says." The Guardian. November 20, 2018. [Premier].

US arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Washington extensive leverage on Riyadh, while accounting for fewer than 20,000 US jobs a year – less than a twentieth of the employment boost Donald Trump has claimed – according to a new report. Trump has repeatedly cited the importance of Saudi arms sales to the US economy as a reason not to cut the supply of weapons in response to the murder of the Saudi writer and Washington Post columnist, Jamal Khashoggi. The president has frequently estimated the total extent of defence sales to the Saudi regime at $110bn, and variously said they would generate 450,000, 500,000 or 600,000 jobs. According to a report by the Centre for International Policy thinktank in Washington, those figures are hugely inflated. The report, US Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen, argues that Saudi Arabia needs the US far more than the other way round, and the administration is underplaying its hand, if it wants to rein in Riyadh in Yemen – or punish the monarchy for Khashoggi’s murder at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

### A2 Econ DA – Saudi Arabia

#### No DAs – the plan doesn’t harm the economy, security, or partnerships.

Caverly ’18 Caverly, Jonathan (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). “Want to Punish Saudi Arabia? Cut Off Its Weapons Supply.” *The New York Times*, 12 October 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>. [Premier]

More than a week after Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi Arabian journalist, commentator and intellectual disappeared inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the United States is starting to realize it may be time to hold the government in Riyadh accountable for its reckless behavior and its violations of human rights. On Oct. 10, Bob Corker and Bob Menendez, the top Republican and Democrat in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, triggered the Global Magnitsky Act, a bipartisan bill to punish human rights violators, to force the Trump administration to investigate and consider sanctions against Saudi Arabia. The crisis over Mr. Khashoggi’s disappearance piles on to growing — if belated — concern over Saudi Arabia’s disastrous war in Yemen, which has produced little geopolitical gain and much human suffering. If American officials really want to encourage a change in Saudi policy, they should begin by looking at Saudi Arabia’s largest imports from the United States: weaponry. Cutting off the flow of American arms to Saudi Arabia would be an effective way to put pressure on Riyadh with little cost to the American economy or national security. President Trump, however, is skeptical. “I don’t like stopping massive amounts of money that’s being poured into our country,” he said on Thursday. “They are spending $110 billion on military equipment and on things that create jobs for this country.” This figure is vastly inflated, but there’s a reason Mr. Trump is inclined to believe it. While the amount of new deals approved under President Trump is closer to $20 billion, the Saudi government has visibly linked itself as the foremost client of the administration’s export push. Peter Navarro, the White House’s director of trade and industrial policy, has argued that increased arms sales “will be an important catalyst for strengthening American industry; the stewardship of our national security; and the strengthening of our international partnerships.” But the truth is that in the case of Saudi Arabia, the benefits on all three fronts are slight. Despite recent increases, Saudi arms orders remain a manageably small part of the United States’ exports. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in 2017, a near-record year for annual purchases, the United States delivered $5.5 billion worth of arms, 20 percent of all foreign military sales. That may sound like a lot, but the United States exports only 25 to 30 percent of its defense industry production, so exports to Saudi Arabia clearly remain a relatively small slice of the enormous defense industrial pie. And contrary to President Trump’s statement, exports to Saudi Arabia create relatively few American jobs. Based on Commerce Department figures, releasing the billion dollars of munitions currently on hold in the Senate would “create or sustain” fewer than 4,000 jobs. Here’s a more specific example: Publicizing a recent $6 billion helicopter deal with Saudi Arabia, Lockheed Martin predicted that it would “support” 450 American jobs. To date these sales have not “stewarded our national security.” Beyond its tragic war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has blockaded Qatar, an ally that hosts the Middle East’s largest American military base. And Saudi Arabia provides little help when it comes to Washington’s real regional priorities, such as fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing Iraq. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy specifically de-emphasizes the war on terror to focus on competition with China and Russia. Perhaps selling weapons “strengthens international partnerships,” as Mr. Navarro put it, or at least discourages Saudi Arabia from finding different ones. Mr. Trump on Thursday cited “four or five alternatives” to American weapons, and the need to avoid “letting Russia have that money and letting China have that money.” This, however, is unlikely even in the long term. Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia’s remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants. Last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that Saudi Arabia was minimizing civilian casualties in the Yemen air campaign apparently to avoid jeopardizing $2 billion in weapons sales. That small number does not show how powerful the Saudis are so much as how cheaply the United States can be bought. Given these sales’ low domestic economic impact and the enormous costs of going elsewhere for Saudi Arabia, the United States has the preponderance of influence in this arms trade relationship. It should act accordingly.

#### No internal link – job losses would be a drop in the ocean.

O’Conner ’18 O’Conner, Tim. “U.S. Does not Need Saudi Arabia Military Sales as Much as Donald Trump Says, Reports Show.” *Newsweek*. 26 November 2018. <https://www.newsweek.com/us-not-need-saudi-military-sales-trump-says-1232147>. [Premier]

Cowen Research's findings detailed how canceling certain deals with Saudi Arabia would actually affect some of the biggest U.S. defense firms. Lockheed Martin—which has the biggest exposure to the kingdom with potential sales of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system as well as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles, Black Hawk helicopters, munitions, C-130 aircraft and littoral combat ships on the line—would only see a loss of about 1.5 percent in its projected revenue in 2019. Raytheon, which primarily sells defensive equipment that was said to be unlikely opposed by potential congressional restrictions, faced about $500 million, or less than 2 percent, of its revenue in at-risk items, which were mostly munitions and missiles. Boeing, which was set to sell some $1.7 billion worth in equipment—including F-15 jets, Chinook and Apache helicopters—would only see a loss of about 1.5 percent of its total sales. As for Trump's figures on U.S.-Saudi deals, they have been disputed by a number of experts. On the same day that Trump released his statement justifying his ongoing support for Saudi Arabia, the Washington-based Centre for International Policy published a report challenging Trump's $110 billion deal claim as "wildly exaggerated." "The White House has issued a list of deals adding up to $110 billion, but most of them were either notified to Congress during the Obama administration, or are projections far into the future of potential sales that are unlikely to ever occur," the report, authored by expert William Hartung, found. "In hard numbers, the State Department estimates that the Saudi regime has signed $14.5 billion in letters of offer and acceptance (LOA’s) for new weaponry and support equipment since President Trump took office." Such letters were not signed contracts, the report noted. While Hartung conceded that mapping out the exact number of jobs such arrangements would create was a difficult endeavor, he came up with a figure also drastically lower than the one provided by the president. "If we take a generous approach and include all jobs created in direct assembly and production of components, along with the jobs induced by the spending of wages by workers employed in assembly or component production, the $2.5bn in annual arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia would create 17,500 jobs in any given year," the report found, adding that even 40,000 jobs "would equal less than three one-hundredths of one percent of the total U.S. labor force of over 160 million people."

### A2 Econ DA - Egypt

#### Debt crisis will only grow – three warrants. External funds won’t cut it.

Springborg ’18 Springborg, Robert (Kuwait Foundation Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Middle East Initiative, Belfer Center, Visiting Professor in the Department of War Studies, King's College, London, and non-resident Research Fellow of the Italian Institute of International Affairs). “Egypt: The debt crisis that no one is talking about.” *The New Arab*. 3 September 2018. <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/9/3/egypt-the-debt-crisis-no-one-is-talking-about>. [Premier]

Curiously, Egypt has remained below the horizon in most media reports on countries confronting debt and currency crises. This is due primarily to global financial institutions - led by the IMF, which in 2016 extended a $12 billion loan to the country, accompanied by the US, European countries, Russia and even China all seeking to portray the Egyptian economy in rosier terms than it deserves. The primary concern of these institutions and countries is Egypt's political stability, not its economic performance, other than its ability to repay foreign debt. In reality, Egypt's debt crisis is substantially worse than Turkey's. The headline figure is foreign debt as a proportion of GDP, which in Turkey's case is now 23 percent, causing Canada's National Bank Financial to note that "Turkey is especially exposed... as its $195 billion in debt is "a stunning 23 percent of GDP." Egypt's government debt alone stood at 36.8 percent of GDP at the end of June, having increased over the year by 11.6 percent. Egypt's domestic debt is also proportionately larger than Turkey's, reaching 86.8 percent of GDP. On world rankings of debt/gdp ratio, Egypt is 13th, whereas Turkey is not even in the top 50 most proportionately indebted countries. Of the 12 countries more indebted than Egypt, all but three are OECD members, hence far less threatened by inability to repay their debt. Egypt's crushing debt burden is reflected by the high cost of servicing it. In 2017 interest payments absorbed some 31 percent of the budget. They are on track in 2018 to consume over 35 percent, at which time debt servicing will be eating up "almost 55 percent of all government revenues". Three factors will continue to drive debt servicing costs upward into the foreseeable future. The first is globally rising interest rates combined with increasing distrust in the value of the Egyptian pound, so causing domestic interest rates to remain extraordinarily high and probably to rise further. At present, Egypt is paying about 6 percent interest on its 12-year Eurobonds and between 18 and 20 percent on its Egyptian pound denominated Treasury bills, with the proportion of foreign investors in the latter having dropped so sharply during 2018 that the Central Bank has stopped reporting their relative purchases. Second, Egypt's external debts are set to continue to mount. The country is scheduled to float another seven billion worth of Eurobonds in 2018 and, according to the Ministry of Finance, just under $23 billion in additional euro and dollar bonds by 2021. The third factor that will continue to drive up the cost of debt servicing is that the borrowed funds are not being wisely invested, so are not generating adequate returns, especially in foreign currencies. Indeed, they are hardly being invested at all. The key ratio is the nation's gross fixed capital investment as a proportion of GDP. It has sunk to one of the world's lowest, from 24 percent in 2014 to 15 percent two years later, and now about 12 percent. In Turkey, by contrast, gross fixed capital investment as a proportion of GDP was over 29 percent in 2016, almost double Egypt's. Egypt, in other words, is now borrowing mainly to cover the costs of previous loans and current consumption. White elephant projects - such as the new "Administrative Capital," the widening of the Suez Canal, the abysmal efforts to reclaim "one million acres of desert", the 2018 contract signed with Russia for a $25 billion nuclear power plant, of which Egypt will pay 15 percent with the balance taking the form of an interest bearing loan, along with the associated burden of Egypt having to invest $18 billion over five years to upgrade the electricity transmission network - all attest to Sisi's profligacy and the crushing financial burden it is imposing on his country. Sisi can only hope that he and Egypt will remain below the world's financial radar. The chances of this, however, will recede as emerging market financial problems intensify and heavily indebted countries come under investors' microscopes. Their reluctance will propel interest rates further upward on Egypt's foreign and even domestic debt, putting renewed downward pressure on the currency's value, thereby re-igniting inflationary pressures that had slowly abated since 2017. Egypt's people are ill-equipped to face another round of high inflation, it recently having dropped to 13.5 percent after having exceeded 35 percent in the wake of the IMF mandated devaluation in 2016. Wages and salaries have not kept pace with inflation. Reductions in energy and food subsidies have driven up household expenditures. About 40 percent of the population now lives on less than $2 daily. Their margins of subsistence are so narrow that a new bout of inflation would have dire economic and potentially explosive political consequences. Egypt's economic squeeze resulting from Sisi's profligacy, coupled with political pressure caused by the austerity he has imposed on his people, are bound to intensify in lock step with mounting debt. The Egyptian economy is considerably more fragile and exposed than the Turkish one, currently the focus of global media attention. Sisi's hope is that he and his country will be bailed out because they will be deemed too big - meaning too politically important - to fail. But intermittent commitments of external financial support, most notably from Gulf countries, important as they are, do not address the structural deficiencies of the economy nor its incompetent leadership. These subventions would be insufficient to hold back an economic tide that has turned, as suggested by the precedent of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. When and if panic over Egypt does strike global financial markets, the country's economy will suddenly be seen as too risky and expensive to save, whatever politicians in the US, the EU and elsewhere are saying about its strategic value and the merits of its president.

### A2 Iran DA (Saudi Arabia/Yemen)

#### The Houthis have shown little regional ambition; in fact, the war in Yemen drives them closer to Iran.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assured Congress that the coalition was trying to minimize civilian casualties and enable deliveries of humanitarian aid to Yemen. Yet his claim contradicted virtually every other independent assessment of the war, including a recent report by a group of United Nations experts and several Human Rights Watch investigations that alleged the coalition had committed war crimes. Meanwhile, in a memo Pompeo sent to Congress, he noted another reason for continued U.S. support for the coalition: containing Iran and its influence on the Houthis. Like the Saudis and Emiratis, the Trump administration sees in the Houthis the same sort of threat as other Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah, which has sent thousands of fighters to help Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. In late August, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations tweeted a photo that had circulated in the Arab press of a meeting in Beirut between the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Houthi officials. U.S. officials claimed it showed “the nature of the regional terrorist threat,” and added: “Iranian proxies in Lebanon & Yemen pose major dangers to peace & stability in the entire Middle East.” But beyond recent missile attacks on Saudi Arabia—in retaliation for Saudi air strikes—the Houthis have displayed little regional ambition. Ironically, as the war drags on, the Houthis will grow more dependent on support from Iran and its allies.

#### The Saudis intervened before Iran even got involved with the Houthis.

Bazzi 18Mohamad Bazzi [associate professor of journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday] "The United States Could End the War in Yemen if it Wanted to." The Atlantic. Sep 30, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>. [Premier]

While the Saudis are quick to blame Iran for the war, several researchers, including Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa and a former analyst at Canada’s Department of National Defense, have shown that the Houthis did not receive significant support from Tehran before the Saudi intervention in 2015. Iran has stepped up military assistance to the Houthis since the war, and Hezbollah has begun sending military advisers to train the Yemeni rebels. But the costs of this assistance fall far short of those incurred by Saudi Arabia and its allies. For Iran, the Yemen conflict is a low-cost way to bleed its regional rival.

### A2 Negotiations CP (Saudi Arabia)

#### Plan is prerequisite – only stopping arms deals can force Saudi to negotiate.

Bazzi ’18 Bazzi, Mohamad (Associate Professor of Journalism at New York University and the former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday). “The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To.” *The Atlantic*. 30 September 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465>. [Premier]

The Trump administration has shown little interest in using arms deals as leverage for a political settlement, or to force the Saudis to take concerns about civilian deaths more seriously. In March 2017, Trump reversed a decision by the Obama administration to suspend the sale of more than $500 million in laser-guided bombs and other munitions to the Saudi military. As more members of Congress expressed criticism of Saudi actions in Yemen, the Senate narrowly approved that sale. After the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at several Saudi cities in late 2017, the Trump administration again escalated U.S. involvement in the war. The New York Times broke the news that the Pentagon had secretly dispatched U.S. special forces to the Saudi-Yemen border to help the Saudi military locate and destroy Houthi missile sites. Frustrated by the deepening U.S. role, two dozen members of the House introduced a resolution this week invoking the 1973 War Powers Act, arguing that Congress never authorized American support for the Saudi coalition and instructing Trump to withdraw U.S. forces. Saudi and Emirati leaders want a clear-cut victory in their regional rivalry with Iran, and they have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s unconditional support to stall negotiations. A recent UN effort to hold peace talks between the Houthis, Hadi’s government, and the Saudi-led coalition collapsed in early September, after the Houthi delegation did not show up in Geneva. Houthi leaders said the Saudis, who control Yemen’s airspace, would not guarantee their safe travel. Days later, Yemeni forces loyal to the Saudi-UAE alliance launched a new offensive aimed at forcing the Houthis out of Hodeidah port, which is the major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen. UN officials warn that a prolonged battle for the port and its surroundings could lead to the death of 250,000 people, mainly from mass starvation. After the Trump administration’s endorsement this month, the Saudi-UAE alliance has even less incentive to prevent civilian casualties and new humanitarian disasters. Saudi Arabia and its allies are more likely to accept a peace process if it is clear that the United States won’t support an open-ended war in Yemen and won’t provide the military assistance required to keep the war apparatus going. But Trump has shown little sign of pressuring his Saudi and Emirati allies, least of all over Yemen. The only realistic check left is in Congress, where more voices are asking why the world’s most powerful country is helping to perpetuate the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

### A2 Relations DA (Saudi Arabia)

#### No backlash – they’d be shooting themselves in the foot.

Noueihed et al. ’18 Noueihed, Lin, Fattah, Zainab, Dipaola, Anthony, and Niquette, Mark. “Oil, Debt and Iran: Weapons in Any U.S.-Saudi Fight Over Khashoggi.” *Bloomberg*. 11 October 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/oil-debt-and-iran-weapons-in-any-u-s-saudi-row-over-khashoggi> [Premier]

Saudi Arabia could divest its Treasury holdings, and threatened to do just that when it faced pressure over the involvement of its citizens in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. But it is far from the biggest direct investor, limiting the impact. China and Japan hold over $1 trillion each of U.S. Treasuries, which are classed among the safest investments on Earth. “The most powerful weapon Saudi has is oil and its investments,” said Fawaz Gerges, a professor of international relations at the London School of Economics. “I doubt Saudi will decrease the production of oil to the world economy because it will hurt itself, and I doubt that Saudi will withdraw its investments.”

#### No risk of oil cuts – no dependence and financial crisis.

Schapiro and Soloksky ’16 Schapiro, Jeremy (Research Director at the European Council on Foreign Relations) and Soloksky, Richard (Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). “What a Real Review of U.S. Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia Would Say.” *War on the Rocks*. 26 October 2016. <https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/what-a-real-review-of-u-s-military-assistance-to-saudi-arabia-would-say/>. [Premier]

For years, the U.S.-Saudi relationship was underpinned by the deal of U.S. security in exchange for Saudi oil. But the United States currently buys very little oil from Saudi Arabia and is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The increase in U.S. oil and gas production means that Saudi Arabia is no longer even the key swing producer able to stabilize prices. Flexible U.S. producers now fulfill that function, without any government action. While Saudi Arabia is still one of the most important oil producers and continues exert its influence on the price of oil, changes in the energy market combined with Saudi Arabia’s own financial situation mean the Saudi government is no longer able to use the oil price as a strategic weapon to either support or oppose U.S. policy.

#### Current relations are one-sided and will comprise interests in the long run – plan stops that. And, cooperation on oil is in MSB’s interest.

Miller and Sokolsky ’18 Miller, Aaron (vice president and director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson Center) and Sokolsky, Richard (Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). “The U.S.-Saudi relationship is worth preserving — but not under the current terms.” *Washington Post*. 25 October 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/25/the-u-s-saudi-relationship-is-worth-preserving-but-not-under-the-current-terms/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.991c6e9215fe>. [Premier]

McCain would also have conceded that the United States has important interests in Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has compromised these interests by enabling and placating a reckless Saudi leader. If Khashoggi’s killing is to have any lasting meaning and impact, it should offer up both a moment of clarity and a warning to the Trump administration to restore reciprocity and balance to a relationship that’s now out of control. The U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia is therefore worth preserving — but not under current circumstances or at any price. In the past two years, the Trump administration has allowed the dynamic to slip out of our control into the hands of the inexperienced, overly ambitious and reckless Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, who has not only taken U.S. support for granted but also exploited it to pursue policies that fundamentally undermine American interests and values. The de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia has left a trail of failed and feckless policies abroad with which the Trump administration is now linked: the kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister, the prosecution of a disastrous war in Yemen that has become the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster, and an ill-conceived boycott of Qatar that has made it more difficult to form a united Gulf state front against Iran and, like the war in Yemen, has only enhanced Iranian influence. At home, under the cover of several important social and economic reforms (including the decision to allow women to drive and a crackdown on the religious police) MBS has shown a darker and ruthless side — brooking no dissent; arresting journalists, civil society bloggers and women activists from the driving campaign; and imprisoning and bilking wealthy Saudis in the “shaikhdown” at the Ritz-Carlton. The killing of Khashoggi reflects the culmination of a pattern of destructive MBS policies that the Trump administration has either ignored, enabled or supported through acquiescence or silence. Worse still, the president and his son-in-law Jared Kushner’s approach to Saudi Arabia has been based on magical thinking. Far from being a catalyst in containing Iran or taking a lead role in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, MBS’s policies in Qatar and Yemen have enlarged Tehran’s room to maneuver. King Salman had to walk back his son’s enthusiastic support for the president’s peace plan. The administration might very well get some Saudi help to dampen upward pressure on oil prices when new U.S. sanctions on Iran remove oil from the market, but this will surely benefit Saudi Arabia and is anchored in Saudi Arabia’s own national interest. The challenge isn’t just punishing Saudi Arabia for killing a journalist. The Saudis have been undermining U.S. interests, too. We need to take steps to rebalance what has become a one-sided, dysfunctional relationship. The administration should start by freezing senior-level contacts with the kingdom, beginning with MBS, for a period of time to send an unmistakable signal that it is losing confidence in the crown prince. Washington should also suspend support for the Saudi air campaign in Yemen — a misadventure that is seen as MBS’s war — and press Riyadh to show greater flexibility toward a U.N.-brokered political solution. There is also no reason that the United States should not speak out against MBS’s repressive policies at home, which over time could accelerate instability in Saudi Arabia. And if it’s proved that MBS was involved in Khashoggi’s murder, additional steps such as freezing assets, travel bans and suspension of arms sales should be considered. This is a critical inflection point in U.S.-Saudi relations. MBS could conceivably rule Saudi Arabia for 50 years. The United States has a strong stake in supporting a wise, prudent and reform-minded leader; it most certainly doesn’t have an interest in being used and abused by a reckless authoritarian who seems bent on repressing his own citizens, killing his opponents, destabilizing the region and undermining American interests and values in the process.

#### No threat from bonds – investors fill in, other holdings solve, it’s against Saudi interests, and alt causes overwhelm the link.

La Monica ’18 La Monica, Paul R. “Saudi Arabia owns (at least) $166.8 billion in US debt.” *CNN*. 15 October 2018. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/investing/saudi-arabia-us-debt-jamal-khashoggi/index.html/>. [Premier]

A spike in bond yields could make it more expensive for consumers to take out mortgages and other loans and also increase the interest costs that companies have to pay on their existing debt. But this assumes that there wouldn't be other investors lining up to buy the bonds that the Saudis would be selling. That seems unlikely, experts said. What's more, while $166.8 billion may sound like a large amount of bonds, it actually isn't. Saudi Arabia's holdings pale in comparison to China's and Japan's. Both of those Asian nations hold more than $1 trillion in US Treasuries. Lisa Hornby, US fixed income portfolio manager with Schroders, said it's possible that Saudi Arabia may hold more in Treasuries than is reported. That's because several smaller countries like Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Cayman Islands have fairly large Treasury holdings, according to the US government data. Some nations, including China and Saudi Arabia may hold more Treasury bonds in custodial accounts in these tax-friendly nations. "That $166.8 billion number, if anything, is probably not lower," Hornby said, suggesting that it's either the same or higher. But Hornby doubts that Saudi Arabia would want to shoot itself in the foot by dumping bonds since a fire sale would depress the value of its remaining holdings. It would be foolish for the Saudis to sell US assets like bonds since oil is priced in US dollars, Hornby said. Higher oil prices might result in higher Treasury yields and this would impact the value of their portfolio. "It is not in Saudi Arabia's best interest to do a large scale Treasury selling program," Hornby said. "Most oil is still denominated in US dollars so it makes more sense for [Saudi Arabia] to continue to have investments in the US." Bigger global factors moving bonds than Saudi Arabia Bruce Monrad, chairman of Northeast Investors Trust, added that there are so many geopolitical factors influencing the bond market right now that any major Saudi sales might not even get noticed. Monrad said bond investors are far more focused on the US-China trade war, Italian budget concerns and Brexit. "I'm not too worried that any Saudi bond sales would move the needle on interest rates," Monrad said. If Saudi Arabia were to sell its Treasuries, it "begs the question of where they'd go," he said. The United States has the most attractive economy in the world right now, which is why both China and Japan are still big backers of US debt.

### A2 Suez Canal DA (Egypt)

#### Pacific routes solve – extra costs would be offset by savings from cutting aid.

O’Hanlon ’13 O’Hanlon, Michael (Senior Fellow and Director of Research at Foreign Policy). “The U.S. Can Afford to Rethink Aid to Egypt.” *Brookings*. 23 August 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-u-s-can-afford-to-rethink-aid-to-egypt/>. [Premier]

The U.S. military benefits from being able to send ships through the Suez Canal and fly straight from Mediterranean airspace over Egypt to the Red Sea and then the Persian Gulf. But it does not need these conveniences in any absolute sense. There are alternatives, and we should bear this in mind as policy options toward Egypt are sized up. Consider first the Navy. The United States divides its major warships between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Historically, the division has been relatively even. Since roughly 2012, and President Obama’s rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, the Pentagon has announced plans to base 60 percent of Navy vessels in Pacific ports. Most of these are in the mainland United States, though some ships are based in Hawaii, Guam, Japan and, soon, Singapore. To be sure, one can reach the Persian Gulf faster from Norfolk or Jacksonville, Fla., than from California or Washington state — if the Suez is available. The distance via the Atlantic route is about 6,000 miles; the distance via the Pacific route is about twice that. At a comfortable cruising speed, the sailing time is roughly 10 to 12 days vs. 20 to 24. But there is nothing prohibitive about reaching the Persian Gulf region via a westward path — and there would be nothing prohibitive about basing up to, say, 70 percent of the Navy in the Pacific region. Our military planners should bear this in mind, and we should remind Egypt’s military strongmen of our options, should their recent reprehensible behavior continue. These changes would come at a cost. The Navy does not like to keep carriers at sea longer than six months straight for the well-being of the crews, and a Pacific route to the Gulf would deprive a carrier battle group of about 10 percent more of its deployment time than would an Atlantic path — largely wasted in added transit. But this transit need not be a complete waste, as the ship can perform exercises with foreign militaries along the way and provide a presence in places such as the Strait of Malacca, a waterway crucial to global trade. Moreover, the Navy can further mitigate the loss of station time, at least for ships smaller than carriers, by making greater use of “crew swaps” — leaving ships at sea for one to two years while rotating sailors by airplane every six months. The calculus is similar for the Air Force, though on balance the trade-offs may be slightly easier because Air Force assets can more easily and quickly be repositioned from the eastern United States to the West Coast and vice versa. Much of the issue for the Air Force is refueling. For aircraft not capable of making a 6,000-mile voyage nonstop, and not able to refuel conveniently in flight (which can depend on tanker availability), the eastern route may include refueling and rest stops in Ireland, Germany or Italy, then perhaps a flight over Egypt into the Gulf region. A western route is likely to include Alaska or Hawaii, Japan or Guam, then Singapore or Thailand or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. All of these routes are eminently practicable; indeed, all are routinely used by the U.S. military today. There is a cost to the longer route, which for airplanes is measured more in fuel and dollars than time. But while the cost can be many tens of thousands of dollars per flight, that $1.5 billion in annual aid to Egypt could go a long way toward offsetting it. The bottom line is that, as a superpower blessed by easy access to open oceans both east and west, the United States has options. The last thing we want to signal to Cairo at this crucial moment is anything to the contrary.

### A2 Rights Discourse K

#### “Human rights” and “democracy” are not *western* concepts; they are normative tools universal across society and necessary for liberation.

Amine ’16 Amine, Loubna. “Are ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ Western colonial exports? No. Here’s why.” *The Washington Post*. 2 April 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/02/are-democracy-andhuman-rights-western-colonial-exports-no-heres-why/?utm_term=.c77594d06aa8>. [Premier]

If Western categories ought to be rejected in favor of non-Western ones, as these academics tell us, what should we make of the fact that protesters on the ground continue to cling to the former in a very familiar way, explicitly demanding rights, including women’s rights, equality, elections and the rule of law? The familiarity of the protesters’ slogans is important and telling. The slogans are familiar not because of superficial resemblances between modes of activism across the world that somehow mask deep intellectual disagreements. Rather, they are familiar because the situation to which they are a response is familiar: a state using extensive and arbitrary power. It would have been odd for protesters in Hong Kong to advocate for the Chinese government’s return to Confucian rituals, or for crowds in Cairo’s the streets to demand a return to the Islamic dhimmi system, which left minorities free to pursue private religious practices while being otherwise excluded from political life. These scenarios are implausible, if not impossible, not because Confucian rituals and the dhimmi system are ineffective in themselves but because they don’t match modern realities. To fight a modern state, to constrain rulers and protect minorities, one needs more appropriate tools. In a new article, I argue that these tools are precisely the so-called Western ideals of which some academics are skeptical: democracy, rights and the rule of law. These should be understood not as Western, but as modern: normative tools particularly suited to the realities of political life under the sovereign state, the central institution of modern politics. Sovereign states centralize politics and impose a monopoly on the use of force in a way that pre-modern empires could not, and did not. The only protection against the risk that states will abuse their power is to make the government accountable to its people and protect the inviolability of human life. In other words, demand democracy and rights. Non-Western states now have the same essential features of sovereignty as Western ones. And so their citizens can protect themselves only by fighting for these ideals, and their intellectuals can support these citizens’ efforts only by advocating for these ideals. This is not to deny that many critics around the world denounce human rights and democracy as Western impositions. Their proposals, whether building on Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, Asian or various Western traditions, typically contend that the state should intervene more, rather than less, in society. They argue that the state should provide for social welfare, defend a particular view of the good life or act on religious maxims. However, to justify themselves to the public, these arguments also inevitably build in guarantees against abuse, legally limiting the use of state power and requiring states to consult with the people, usually through elections. These guarantees dominate the debate between advocates and opponents of these proposals. Even when there is a desire to get away from democracy and human rights, the conversation ends up centering on them and whether to accept them, to what extent and in what form. Efforts to provide Islamic variants on democracy or Confucian variants on rights thus should be understood not as alternatives to modern ideals, but as variants on them. This is just as it should be. Just as there are differences between the democratic systems of Germany and the United States, so too would a democratic China and a democratic Yemen be different, both from each other and from the U.S. and German models. Crucially, these differences are not between East and West but among different countries with different material realities. For a non-Western conception of government to completely avoid generating appeals to democracy and rights, it would need to reject these without simply calling for the extension of the power of the sovereign state. The Islamic State, by rejecting state borders and harking back to a pre-modern caliphate system, is trying to do precisely this. But as the group conquers territory and rules people, it will have to start acting like a state. In fact, it already is. And once the Islamic State does act like a state, we can expect its subjects to start demanding rights, laws and other limits on state action. Their demands might be couched in religious language, but the debate will become more and more recognizable as a debate about the limits of state power, rather than as a debate internal to Islam. In short, when citizens in non-Western countries clamor for democracy, there is no reason to suspect elitism or Western manipulation or false consciousness. Not everything familiar is a sign of cultural imperialism. This is not to deny that power differentials continue to structure the relationship between the West and the East, but rather to suggest that overcoming the discourse of “us” and “them” will open up more promising avenues for responding to domination.

## Frontlines

### A2 Military

#### US foreign aid in the Middle East has largely failed to produce military success.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller [scholar in Carnegie's Middle Eastern Program] and Richard Sokolsky [senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program]. "What has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not much." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Feb 27, 2018. [Premier]

In reality, U.S. military assistance promises more than it delivers. There is scant evidence outside of a few isolated cases that U.S. material support to Middle Eastern countries has fulfilled any of these purposes. Recipients of U.S. funding and weapons have largely failed to make major strides in their capabilities and, in some instances, may have even regressed. Despite $47 billion in U.S. military assistance over 40 years, the Egyptian military has struggled mightily to contain an ISIS-affiliate numbering no more than 1,200 militants. The Saudis barely used their American-made advanced combat aircraft in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS operation in Syria, and $89 billion in arms sales to the kingdom over the last 10 years has not prevented Riyadh from getting bogged down in an increasingly costly quagmire in Yemen with U.S.-supplied weapons. The U.S. has sold hundreds of billions of dollars in military hardware to Persian Gulf countries and yet collectively they are not capable of defending the free flow of oil from the Gulf against a militarily weaker Iran without U.S. assistance.

### A2 Democracy

#### US aid in the Middle East has failed to increase democratic influence in the region.

Miller 18 Andrew Miller [scholar in Carnegie's Middle Eastern Program] and Richard Sokolsky [senior fellow in Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program]. "What has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not much." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Feb 27, 2018. [Premier]

Likewise, the track record of using security assistance to increase U.S. influence in the region is no more encouraging. While recipient countries are happy to utter platitudes about increased cooperation, they generally—and successfully—resist Washington’s requests to modify their policies in exchange for assistance. Ongoing U.S. assistance to Egypt did not leave Cairo open to American pleas to desist from forcibly dispersing two largely non-violent sit-ins in the capital, in which over 800 people were massacred. Likewise, U.S. attempts to explicitly link military assistance and arms sales to a recipient country’s domestic political behavior have not borne much fruit. For instance, the Obama administration’s suspension of some types of military assistance to Egypt in 2013 did not lead to “credible progress” toward democratic reforms. Nor did putting a $4 billion arms package for Bahrain on hold yield an improvement in that country’s human rights environment. Importantly, these failures have more to do with a lack of political will in Washington, in which the U.S. capitulated before its coercive measures could have the desired effect, than any inherent limitation in what withholding weapons shipments can accomplish. But the frequency with which the United States folds in these standoffs suggests a structural problem in U.S. assistance mechanisms that undermines its efficacy as a tool of influence.

# Negative

## CPs

### CP – Conditions

#### CP: The United States ought to provide military aid to authoritarian regimes conditioned on \_\_\_\_.

#### The CP preserves US influence and solves downsides – other countries can’t fill in.

Miller and Sokolsky ’18 Miller, Andrew (Scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program) and Sokolsky, Richard (Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program). “What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 27 February 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/27/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much-pub-75657. [Premier]

Before allocating security assistance, recipients should first have to demonstrate their commitment to a set of norms, standards, and rules of good security-sector governance. The State Department and Congress should create new mechanisms to rigorously assess, monitor, and evaluate security assistance against performance benchmarks that are linked to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The sale of weapons should be linked to new training commitments that the host country would have to fulfill in advance before taking delivery of the weapons and equipment. To demonstrate its commitment to performance and results, all contracts for the supply of weapons and training should include “sunset” provisions based on mutually agreed upon performance milestones. Most in the American defense establishment would agree in principle that introducing more accountability for U.S. military assistance and arms sales is a worthy goal. But they would also express concern that the measures we recommend would prompt Middle Eastern countries to turn to Russia or China for easier terms. However, for many of our security partners, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, integrating Russian and Chinese weapons into their force structure would create serious operational and logistical problems. Moreover, neither Moscow nor Beijing offers grant assistance, which means they are not viable substitutes for countries that depend on U.S. financial help to buy equipment. Even for countries that use their own money, their strong preference for U.S. equipment, which they view as both superior to the alternatives and a sign of American support, suggests they would be willing to submit to more rigorous oversight if that is the price of obtaining American weapons. U.S. military assistance in the Middle East could magnify our influence and help build local military forces that reduce the burden on U.S. forces. Unfortunately, billions in American taxpayer money have been spent for unclear purposes without sufficient oversight. By learning from past mistakes and implementing our recommended reforms, the U.S. government can begin to break this cycle of waste and missed opportunities.

#### The US should use our ties to authoritarian regimes to place pressures on them. We shouldn’t withdraw military aid – we should just be firmer with the conditions attached to it.

Calingaert ’12. Calingaert, Daniel. “Rethinking US relations with dictators.” Huffington post. 10/09/2012. Updated 12/09/2012. <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-calingaert/rethinking-us-relations-w_b_1952077.html> [Premier]

The current strain in U.S. relations with Russia sums up the challenges of dealing with authoritarian rulers. They vigorously object to any criticism of their human rights record, yet even when such criticism is muted, they may still resist cooperation with the United States on major security issues. The Obama administration has resisted moves by Congress to sanction human rights abusers in Russia, but President Vladimir Putin continues to intensify his crackdown on civil society and block international efforts to stop mass atrocities in Syria. The time has come for the United States to take a fresh look at its relations with Russia and with other dictatorships around the world. U.S. relations with authoritarian regimes often focus on a trade-off between security and economic interests on the one hand and human rights and democracy on the other. By accepting this bargain, which dictators often proffer, U.S. policymakers tend to miss opportunities to raise human rights issues and thereby contribute to both the expansion of democracy and U.S. interests in the long term. A group of 22 leading human rights organizations and experts, including Freedom House, have urged the next U.S. president to look past the false choice between values and interests and review U.S. relationships with governments that violate human rights. We believe that the United States should stop underestimating, or refusing to use, its power and moral capital to keep human rights on the agenda. Recent history amply demonstrates how the United States can raise human rights concerns while pursuing security interests at the same time. In the 1980s, U.S. pressure at critical moments on allied governments in the Philippines, Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea assisted their transitions from dictatorship to democracy. The United States also kept human rights on the agenda in its negotiations with the Soviet Union and still made progress in nuclear arms reductions. U.S. opposition to totalitarian ideology and support for dissidents contributed to the fall of communism. These lessons of history seem to have been lost in the Middle East and elsewhere. Decades of cozy relations with Arab dictators blinded U.S. policymakers to the groundswell of disaffection that eventually launched the 2011 Arab uprisings, and did lasting damage to U.S. credibility in the eyes of Arab revolutionaries. By clinging to the mistaken belief that soft-peddling on human rights was the price to pay for influence and stability in the region, the United States ultimately obtained neither. Similarly short-sighted U.S. policy is still evident in various places around the world. The current administration resumed arms sales to Bahrain even as the Bahraini government carried on with its brutal crackdown on protests and dragged its feet on promised reform. Aid to the repressive government of Uzbekistan was resumed in return for supply routes to Afghanistan. And the United States has stayed largely silent about human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia while collaborating with their regimes on counterterrorism, even though this collaboration serves the interests of all parties. U.S. reluctance to criticize China’s human rights abuses is equally misguided. It is motivated by a fear that China will retaliate by harming what are in fact shared U.S.-Chinese interests, for instance in stability on the Korean Peninsula and a mutually beneficial economic relationship. When the United States downplays human rights concerns, it is at best buying short-term advantages at the expense of long-term interests and influence. There is often no need to make this sacrifice. Dictatorships are inherently unstable, because they lack the renewal mechanisms of an electoral democracy, and U.S. support for autocratic leaders invariably causes resentment among those who ultimately replace them. For example, suspicions of U.S. motives in Latin America have lingered for decades after the United States stopped trying to prop up anticommunist caudillos and military juntas. U.S. interests are best served by pushing for reform and building ties with the political opposition and civil society, including possible future leaders. These ties can lay the groundwork for continued influence and facilitate smooth transitions to democracy.

### CP – Laundry List

#### CP – The United States ought to clarify the strategic purpose of military aid, coordinate inter-agency efforts, and consider the views of recipient countries.

#### The CP preserves foreign policy goals, cuts costs, and avoids the Econ DA.

Saab ’18 Saab, Bilal (Executive Director and Head of Research & Public Affairs of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis North America). “What Does America Get for Its Military Aid?” *National Interest*. 22 February 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-america-get-its-military-aid-24605>. [Premier]

Trump believes that the United States spends too much on foreign aid and that it should sell more arms to boost the U.S. economy. That’s why his idea of fixing security assistance is based on making cuts in some foreign-aid programs and making more megaweapons deals. There certainly is no harm in looking more closely at the numbers of FMF programs to Arab partners to check if waste can be eliminated or reduced. But economic savings is not what should drive American policy, as those can be made via multiple other avenues in the U.S. budget. The ultimate metric of success for U.S. security assistance should be its direct contributions to America’s policy objectives in the region. U.S. security assistance has to be, first and foremost, integrated into a broader U.S. Middle East strategy and linked more directly to clearly defined U.S. policy goals in the region, which currently center on, but are not limited to, deterring Iranian aggression, countering Iranian asymmetric warfare and combating violent extremism, all of which require working with Arab partners and helping them enhance their military capabilities (and reform their politics and economics). Such a strategic reconfiguration of U.S. security assistance must be implemented through the interagency process, given the involvement of various federal agencies in this system. The National Security Council (NSC) should take the lead, and start by abandoning the current bottom-up security-assistance approach, which is primarily engineered by the defense offices of U.S. embassies in the region, along with CENTCOM and the U.S. military-service chiefs, in favor of a strategy that is formulated at the top and communicated to the various bureaucracies and offices. As experienced as CENTCOM is in the military and security requirements of its Arab partners, and as irreplaceable as its role in the region is, the process of security assistance requires first the strategizing, prioritizing and policymaking of the NSC (ideally, DOS should be the one prioritizing and policymaking, and the NSC should be coordinating and helping get DOD on board). That is because even the strictest military affairs of the region have first-, second- and third-order political effects that must be accounted for, which can only be done through proper interagency coordination. However, strategy at the NSC level is not enough. There also has to be concrete planning guidance to identify which Arab partner capabilities we care about in relation to stated strategic aims. One way to do that is by returning to the original legislative intent of security assistance as a tool of foreign policy, which would require much closer DOS-DOD coordination. While new legislation like Section 333 of the FY17 NDAA is a helpful step in that regard, it maintains the responsibility for wwamany security assistance programs, and a vast majority of unearmarked security-assistance funding, with DOD. Approaches that place foreign policy back in the heart of security-assistance strategy, planning and implementation, such as the creation of a transfer of authority to enable DOD to funnel its assistance dollars through the DOS policymaking apparatus, might assist in this goal. Second, we need to craft clearer policies toward Arab partners to allow for more effective arming, funding and training of their militaries, should there be a need for such activities. Security assistance simply will not succeed in the absence of a convincing reason why we are committing more U.S. treasure and political capital, and sometimes even blood, to this endeavor. It is no longer sufficient for the Defense and Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which takes the lead in implementing DOS’s authorities and the security-assistance process, to state vaguely that a certain arms sale to the region contributes to “regional stability” and U.S. interests. It has to explain to Congress more clearly why specific types of Arab military capabilities should be developed, and how exactly they are expected to contribute to U.S. goals. Third, there might be a benefit to establishing a new joint congressional committee (or subcommittee) on security assistance, to which DOS and DOD report—although this runs the risk of creating more barriers and perhaps stovepipes than the ones that already exist. Currently, DOS and DOD report to separate congressional committees and use different language and metrics for security-assistance evaluation. That needs to stop, given the obvious linkages and synergies between political and military affairs when it comes to security assistance. We can talk all we want about joint planning and interagency coordination, but if oversight systems are not harmonized and reporting channels are not unified, it might make no difference (mind you, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to convince the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and others to give up their jurisdictions on security assistance). Fourth, the executive branch needs to more meaningfully involve Congress in this process, not just because the latter has the power of the purse, but because security assistance must be a national conversation, especially as we might provide more of it in the future to our Arab partners to reduce our military involvement in the Middle East. This will require not just “dropping off” loads of documents and hoping for lawmakers to read them (which more often than not they won’t), but also personally and more regularly engaging with senior staffers on the Hill, who generally tend to know more about the issues than their bosses. In return, members of Congress need to more effectively engage their DOS and DOD colleagues by educating themselves more about security assistance (some, like Sen. John McCain, are more knowledgeable and experienced than others, of course), asking the right questions and, as impossible as this sounds, depoliticizing the issue. There’s no excuse for ignorance when DOS notifies and briefs members of Congress in advance on all major arms sales and security-assistance grants and submits multiple reports on FMF. Fifth, it is vitally important for Washington to try to understand its Arab partners’ perspectives on their own national security and U.S. security assistance, rather than dismiss them offhand as bizarre or irrational. There is an unhealthy dose of waste and ineptitude in some aspects of the Arab partners’ approaches to defense and security policy, but not everything they do, by any stretch of the imagination, is misguided. A greater appreciation of the differing security calculations and concerns of Arab partners might help U.S. officials in their efforts to (1) encourage these partners to do joint threat assessments, strategic analyses and capability planning with U.S. counterparts, and (2) offer them more pointed advice on their core security requirements, both of which could positively affect U.S. security assistance. It is not as though U.S. political and military leaders have not pursued these consultative processes with Arab counterparts before. They have—many times. For example, Daniel Chiu, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development, led discussions with various global U.S. partners about their own military requirements and national-security concerns. The goal was to entice the allies to compare threat assessments and pursue joint acquisition projects with the United States. It worked to a large extent with Jordan, for example, but failed with Egypt. The United States now leads annual Defense Resourcing Conferences (DRCs) with Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan, and anticipates expanding these to other partners around the world. The purpose of these DRCs is to help partners match their procurement decisions to their strategy and resources. But unless this process is, first and foremost, directly tied to U.S. policy and strategy—which it doesn’t seem currently to be—all it would do is create more problems. TOO OFTEN the United States has sold or transferred weapons to friends and allies—not just Arab—with little regard to their military utility and the recipients’ capacity to use them. This wasn’t much of a U.S. concern in the past, because Washington had policy objectives that seemed more important or pressing than building or enhancing the military capabilities of friends and allies. However, U.S. priorities in the Middle East have changed. Today, the United States is facing a more complex network of adversaries, some of whom do battle in the shadows, resort to irregular war tactics and are eager to sacrifice everything for their apocalyptic cause. The support of Arab partners is vital for addressing these threats effectively. There is immense value in continuing to pursue arms deals that benefit the U.S. economy and preserve enduring U.S. goals in the region, including the upholding of U.S. military basing on and access to Arab territory and airspace, as well as the Camp David peace treaty. But the status quo is no longer acceptable, and it is becoming increasingly costly. Despite its humongous size, security assistance is not and cannot be an island. It must be reintegrated into the U.S. foreign-policy process.

#### Solves the case – the problems of military aid aren’t intrinsic, it’s the product of bad policy.

Saab ’18 Saab, Bilal (Executive Director and Head of Research & Public Affairs of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis North America). “What Does America Get for Its Military Aid?” *National Interest*. 22 February 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-america-get-its-military-aid-24605>. [Premier]

On the American side, the problems of U.S. security assistance to Arab partners are equally basic, and have little to do with security assistance per se. The source of all security-assistance ills is not the amount of funding, the quality of training, the speed of U.S. weapons delivery, or the type or quantity of arms that Washington provides. It is the often-broken U.S. policy toward the recipient country that profoundly undermines the entire enterprise. U.S. security assistance has become an end in itself rather than a means, often driving U.S. policy as opposed to the other way around. Every time a training program breaks down, or an arms transfer leads to unintended consequences, U.S. officials and military officers with security-assistance responsibilities are drilled by members of Congress and blamed for the failures . Of course, these administrators of security assistance are too courteous and loyal to their supervisors to state the obvious: things fell apart not because a U.S. general did something wrong or there wasn’t enough money, but because, more often than not, the policy toward the Arab partner was incoherent. Consider Egypt. We finance a good bit of the country’s military requirements and support its economy, yet we tolerate its government’s political repression, which contributes to Islamist radicalization. In Syria, we said that Assad must go, but did the absolute bare minimum to make that happen. We armed and trained a handful of rebels so they could fight terrorism, which Assad helped create, yet we ceded the terrain to Iran and Russia, whose heavy-handed interventions ensured Assad’s survival. In Iraq, we helped build the country’s law-enforcement agencies after Saddam, in an attempt to help the Iraqis figure out their politics in relative peace and security. Yet we did nothing to limit Iran’s growing influence over Baghdad. Worse still, we tolerated the proliferation of IRGC-controlled Iraqi militias that recently used U.S. equipment to recapture Kirkuk. In Yemen, we politically and militarily enabled Saudi Arabia’s war against the Houthis, even though we knew it would be a major distraction from the fight against ISIS and Al Qaeda, and offer Iran influence in Yemen that didn’t exist before. Instead of fixing the policy, which should be the author of security assistance, we either have thrown more money at these problems, added more layers of bureaucracy, or overlitigated and politicized the process. One immediate consequence of an unclear policy toward the recipient country is confusion in the U.S. government over who does what and when in the security-assistance process. The most obvious example of this tension is between the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD). Bureaucratic infighting is commonplace in any government, and often attributed to rivalry or competition over power and resources. But that is not always the reason. The root cause can also be, especially in the context of security assistance, the lack of a viable policy toward the recipient country. The main reason why the United States defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, for example, is not because the mujahideen of the past were braver or better warriors than today’s Arab rebels, or because we armed the Afghans with Stinger missiles (okay, that helped a lot). It’s because U.S. policy at the time—rollback of communism—and the strategy—containment—were clear and consistent, which made for effective security assistance. Numerous congressional hearings have been held, and even more reforms enacted since 9/11, to try to improve DOD-DOS coordination on security assistance. But all the debates and tactical fixes have essentially missed the mark. There is no doubt that some improvement in interagency coordination has been made in recent years, and especially since the 2012 Benghazi incident, when terrorists attacked and burned the U.S. mission in Libya, killing Amb. Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. nationals. Unlike in the past, there is now legislation —Section 333 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, or FY17 NDAA, is the latest example—calling for synchronization and joint planning between DOS and DOD. A new steering committee has been established to oversee such joint planning. Further, the secretary of defense now must seek the concurrence of the secretary of state before launching some, but not all, security-assistance programs with partner nations (exceptions include Ukraine and counter-ISIS assistance). However, optimal interagency coordination won’t happen absent a workable policy toward the country receiving such assistance. It also won’t happen if DOS continues to exhibit leadership deficiencies and organizational weaknesses. Today, a major opportunity for DOS to get more involved seems to present itself: both the Congress and DOD affirm that they have provided DOS with the necessary resources and authorities to lead this process (although DOS still assesses that section 333 of the FY17 NDAA consolidates DOD’s security-assistance “fiefdom” and that Foggy Bottom still lacks the necessary resources and authorities to take the lead as it did in the past). One would also be hard pressed to find a secretary of defense who values and champions interagency coordination more than James Mattis. Yet despite its absolutely crucial role in security assistance, many in the Pentagon and Congress believe that DOS does not appear to be ready yet to assume larger responsibilities in the process. That’s especially damaging for the future of the security-assistance enterprise. The absence of a viable policy toward the recipient country also explains why we’re less articulate in explaining why we provide security assistance to our Arab partners. Although we do enjoy, as stated previously, a number of political and economic benefits from security assistance, on military matters, however, it is far less clear. Merely inserting the term “building the local capacity” of Arab partners in high-level documents does not answer the question of precisely why we pursue these onerous, expensive and often controversial activities. For example, should we be engaged in developing our Arab partners’ overall military capabilities, or should we help build specific capabilities to achieve well-defined U.S. objectives? The two goals might sound the same, but practically and strategically they are considerably different. The first assumes that such a process would by default contribute to U.S. interests, or it might be indifferent toward that outcome. The second is much more deliberate toward such end results. So far, we have sporadically pursued the second approach and relied much more on the first.

### CP – State Department

#### CP – The United States State Department ought to veto military aid to authoritarian regimes.

#### Normal means is DoD.

McBride ’18 McBride, James. “How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?” *Council of Foreign Relations*. 1 October 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid>. [Premier]

The Department of Defense plays a major role as the agency primarily responsible for implementing traditional military aid, though the State Department also funds and influences many security assistance programs. The Department of Health and Human Services implements many health-related programs, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Treasury Department helps manage funding of global financial institutions, as well as programs for debt relief and economic reforms in poor countries. There is also a plethora of other agencies and autonomous organizations, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Peace Corps, and the African Development Foundation, involved in aid work.

#### The CP affirms State Department jurisdiction over Pentagon control – that solves diplomacy, human rights, and tensions.

Ryan ’16 Ryan, Missy. “State Department and Pentagon tussle over control of foreign military aid.” *Washington Post*. 10 July 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/state-department-and-pentagon-tussle-over-control-of-foreign-military-aid/2016/07/10/ddc98f3e-42b0-11e6-88d0-6adee48be8bc_story.html?utm_term=.59a3ef753f11>. [Premier]

President Obama’s most senior advisers convened last month to consider changes to the way the United States provides security aid to foreign nations, as a long-running struggle for control between the State and Defense departments intensifies. At the heart of the controversy is whether the State Department will retain its historic jurisdiction over security aid, or whether the Pentagon, which Congress has bestowed with increasing autonomy and resources over the past decade, will eclipse Foggy Bottom in taking greater responsibility for engagement with allied nations overseas. The June 30 meeting of Cabinet officials centered on execution of Obama’s 2013 directive on security assistance, which sought to ensure that the billions of aid dollars the United States provides to allied nations each year are used more effectively. Adding to concerns at the State Department is a series of proposals in this year’s defense authorization bill, which would give the Pentagon permanent control over certain aid programs and greater flexibility in supporting counterterrorism activities overseas. The discussions are part of an effort to reform the United States’ unwieldy system for providing assistance to foreign security forces, which includes more than 100 different legislative authorities and accounted for at least $20 billion in U.S. spending in 2015. State Department officials fear that an expansion in Pentagon control over security assistance would impair diplomatic efforts and move the United States further from the Obama administration’s goal of getting the military out of foreign aid. Diplomats also say that military-led programs, without adequate input from the State Department, can overlook key human rights or governance concerns and heighten tensions with nations such as China and Russia, because foreign governments see assistance delivered by the U.S. military, rather than civilian agencies, as a potential threat. “We’ve got to balance the various components of our foreign policy,” said a senior State Department official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.”

#### Pentagon is normal means – Congress has shifted to the Pentagon – CP is key to transparency and relations.

Stohl ’16 Stohl, Richard (Senior Associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center and Consultant to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty process). “The Pitfalls of the Pentagon Taking the Lead on U.S. Security Assistance.” *World Politics Review*. 20 September 2016. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19963/the-pitfalls-of-the-pentagon-taking-the-lead-on-u-s-security-assistance. [Premier]

Burkina Faso is not the only country receiving U.S. security assistance despite a questionable human rights record. Every year, the United States spends billions of dollars on military and security assistance to foreign governments through programs run by both the State Department and the Department of Defense. But in the past 15 years, the scope and magnitude of the Pentagon’s programs have expanded dramatically. Experts now estimate the Pentagon alone spends $8 billion to $10 billion a year on assistance to more than 180 countries—compared to approximately $8 billion a year by the State Department to 147 countries—which has led many to question the apparent militarization of U.S. security assistance and the impact that has on short- and long-term security and foreign policy objectives. Oversight and transparency over these myriad programs are often extremely difficult. Numerous government accounts provide this money, and depending on the program, different congressional committees maintain oversight. The stove-piped nature of U.S. military assistance and the steadfast secrecy that surrounds decisions made for reasons of “national security” often create an artificial division between national security interests and foreign policy ideals. They also make it nearly impossible to identify the exact amount of spending, to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of various programs, and to avoid duplicating resources and efforts across different offices and agencies. This tension between the State Department and the Pentagon is not new. For decades, there have been contradictions between advancing U.S. security interest and foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights. Traditionally, the State Department was the primary decision-maker that determined who received security assistance and for what purpose. Yet all of that began to change after Sept. 11. Before 9/11, Congress had already begun authorizing the Pentagon to support foreign militaries in roles that had long been filled by the State Department. Starting with anti-drug training in the Western Hemisphere, the number and size of these programs has steadily grown since. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the purpose of “train and equip” programs was altered to fill an expanding list of priorities to “build partner capacity,” known as BPC. A RAND Corporation study in 2013 found that of 184 unique authorities that underwrite 165 BPC programs, at least 70 are managed and can be utilized by the Pentagon to provide security cooperation. The mandates of these programs are vast, ranging from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. After 9/11, the Defense Department created military assistance programs to supplement traditional State Department ones. But from the outset, the appropriated funds that support these programs were subject to fewer restrictions than their State Department counterparts. For example, the Pentagon’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program was originally created in 2002 with a mandate that critics claimed served the same purpose as the State Department’s International Military Education and Training program. The Pentagon program provided nonlethal counterterrorism training, but lethal training was made available two years later. Similarly, in 2006, the Pentagon was authorized to use $200 million of its Operation and Maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations. In creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the defense budget, the Pentagon is, in effect, able to implement its security assistance without applying Foreign Assistance Act restrictions, which are intended to ensure that human rights and other foreign policy concerns are taken into consideration when determining the provision of security assistance. Experts have counted a tripling of military assistance out of the Pentagon budget from 2008 to 2015. That money comes with greater influence. And although the State Department can veto some programs, others are outside its authority, and program planning is not always shared with State Department personnel. After 9/11, the Pentagon gained a larger role, not just because it had the money, but because it was believed that it had the experience and means to react more quickly to changing situations and needs in an expansive and fast growing war on terror. While many of the countries receiving Pentagon military assistance are seen as national security priorities, their behavior often raises foreign policy concerns that make diplomatic engagement difficult. Providing arms to these countries also increases the risk that U.S.-origin weapons could be used against the United States, its soldiers, its allies and/or its interests. In many cases, military and security assistance is provided to achieve short-term security gains, which may undermine long-term U.S foreign policy interests. These issues are compounded by the fact that the Pentagon simply has more money and resources to address these concerns, and it has become easier for it to simply foot the bill. Pentagon spending on military assistance has totaled at least $122 billion since 2001, compared to approximately $119 billion for the State Department. The Security Assistance Monitor, a program of the Center for International Policy that tracks U.S. security assistance to countries around the world, has documented a tenfold increase in Pentagon security aid programs since 2001—from $1 billion in 2001 to $10.8 billion in 2015. State Department spending nearly doubled in that time from $4.6 billion to $8.3 billion. However, it is not the dollar figure that is worth comparing, but rather the meteoric rise of Pentagon spending, as opposed to a more gradual increase from the State Department. This increased spending has made some observers apprehensive. A Congressional Research Service report last May raised serious concerns about the roles of the State Department and the Pentagon with regard to security assistance and reconciling foreign policy objectives with security goals. It highlighted the lack of reporting requirements for Pentagon programs compared to the State Department and the resulting lack of oversight and accounting. In addition, Pentagon programs are not subject to country-by-country public reporting, making understanding a recipient country’s priorities, activities and funding impossible. At least 66 Pentagon programs do not allow any specific country information to be made available at all. Beyond this lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Recipient countries and communities have the impression that help only comes from the U.S. military, which changes the context of assistance and the relationship with those receiving it. The mission and its perception differ depending on whether the help comes from the U.S. military, or instead from the U.S. Embassy, the United States Agency for International Development or other civil servants from various U.S. government agencies. Today, American security assistance has become unnecessarily military in nature, simply because there are additional Pentagon funds and programs that can quickly move money. At a fundamental level, when speaking with members of the U.S. military involved in these types of missions, such as building schools or bridges in African countries, they have recognized that they are simply there to complete their work and to strengthen military-to-military relationships. They often don’t worry about diplomatic aspects or the types of relationships they are establishing. To be sure, developing any relationship, particularly in countries with questionable and at times poor records of democracy and human rights, is important, and military relationships may buy the security that is desired in the short term. But in the long term, without deeper diplomatic relationships and nonmilitary engagement, it will be impossible to achieve larger strategic objectives and foster an environment of trust.

### PIC – Demining

#### CP – The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes except for demining assistance.

#### NADR funding for demining has empirically saved thousands in authoritarian regimes.

Patierno 2K Patierno, Pat. “The Why and What of the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program.” 15 May 2000. <https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/why-and-what-us-humanitarian-demining-program>. [Premier]

Since 1993, the United States has provided approximately $320 million to more than 35 mine-affected nations around the world. In addition, we have spent another $80 million-plus supporting research and development efforts to find better and more cost-effective mine detection technologies. This combined figure of nearly $400 million has positioned us as a world leader in humanitarian mine action. I would be remiss if I did not mention the significant contributions of other nations as well to this noble endeavor. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and other like-minded donor nations are equally engaged. International organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization of American States contribute their fair share as well. But the aggregate contributions of these generous mine-action benefactors fall far short of what is required to clear the more than estimated 60 million landmines that pollute the earth in more than 70 nations. The United States, like other donors, focuses its humanitarian mine action assistance to address one or more of the following requirements: Mine Awareness -- educating the people of mine-affected nations as to the dangers of landmine and unexploded ordnance and what to do should they encounter such devices. Mine Detection -- using a variety of technologies, including manual probes, to locate mines and unexploded ordnance. Mine Clearance -- lifting and removing, or destroying in place, mines and unexploded ordnance. Mine Victims' Assistance -- providing long-term care, including prosthetic support, and rehabilitative services, including societal reintegration to the victim and his/her family. The U.S. has provided, or is currently providing assistance to the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Peru, Rwanda, Swaziland, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, Kosovo, and NW Somalia. Within a few months, we will begin programs in Armenia, Oman, and Zambia. The U.S. program is an interagency one, with various elements of the Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development joining with the Department of State in providing assistance in a number of ways. U.S. Special Forces train indigenous personnel on mine awareness, mine detection, mapping and marking techniques, mine clearance, and trauma care in case of an accident involving mine clearance personnel. When they train, they provide some essential equipment that they then leave behind. The Department of State provides equipment such as detectors, protection gear, explosives, tents and other comfort requirements, foodstuffs, and vehicles, including ambulances, to support mine- detection and -clearance field operations. We also provide office equipment and data base capabilities to help the host nation establish a mine action center that coordinates and monitors mine action operations within its boundaries. And we fund mine clearance operations provided both by non-governmental and commercial demining organizations. The nature of our assistance to a specific mine-affected nation depends entirely upon what that nation has determined its requirements to be. U.S. efforts in this current fiscal year will exceed $100 million. The State Department's principal demining appropriation is the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs Appropriation, which has an fiscal year 2000 budget of $40 million. In addition, the State Department manages a special appropriation that supports the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Victims' Assistance. The Fund is a unique initiative that allows the Department to match, dollar for dollar, contributions made by other donors to support mine action in mine-affected Balkan states. Over the last year, we have provided $14 million in matching contributions; we have another $14 million available. The Department of Defense administers the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid Appropriation, which funds the train-and-equip program executed by U.S. Special Forces. This year, OHDACA has been budgeted at $25.4 million. DoD also will provide $18.7 million this year to support research and development into new and promising mine detection technologies. Resident within the U.S. Agency for International Development is the Leahy War Victims Fund, which will provide approximately $11 million this year to support programs that seek the rehabilitation of landmine victims and their reintegration into society. So, has our assistance and that of other countries paid off? Are we seeing indications of progress? I believe the answer is yes. In Cambodia, the casualty rate has declined by more than 90%. In February, the number of landmine casualties was 42, compared to 550 per month just three years ago. Namibia and Rwanda have built highly successful and sustainable programs. Namibia is close to being able to declare itself mine-safe. So, too, are the countries of Central America. Although suffering a bit of a setback when Hurricane Mitch roared through in 1998, Honduras and Costa Rica should be mine-safe by next summer. Nicaragua should reach that plateau by 2003. In Bosnia, more than 2,000 deminers have been trained and certified and are helping to return land to productive use. In Croatia, a highly capable and focused mine action center, created with and sustained by international funding, enjoys enormous support from the Government as it coordinates all mine action activity. In Kosovo, the casualties last summer were far less than feared, due in large part to a focused international effort to educate Kosovar refugees while they still were housed in camps in Albania and Macedonia. Humanitarian mine action is an ambitious undertaking, but one that has enormous personal satisfaction for those involved. I, for one, am pleased and proud to play a small part in this truly global, humanitarian mission.

### CP – Negotiations (Saudi Arabia)

#### CP – The United States ought to advocate for inclusive UN negotiations and support local Yemen governance.

#### CP solves – includes all actors and enables transition to peace.

Al-Dawsari ’17 Al-Dawsari, Nadwa (Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Project on Middle East Democracy). “Breaking the Cycle of Failed Negotiations in Yemen.” *Project on Middle East Democracy*. May 2017. <https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PolicyBrief_Nadwa_170505b-1.pdf>. [Premier]

The United States and its allies must use their political capital to strengthen and broaden the United Nations-led negotiations to include other key actors beyond the main warring parties currently represented in the talks. It was recently announced that the United Nations envoy will initiate a new round of talks scheduled to resume in May 2017. To end the conflict, the UN-led negotiations must include all of the main aggrieved parties and negotiate a peace deal beyond the two warring sides; it is important to remember that most of Yemen is currently outside of their control. Representatives from Hirak as well as from Taiz, Mareb, and Baydha must be included. Any peace agreement that does not address their regional grievances will not be accepted and will ultimately fail. The United Nations should reach out to include Aidaroos al-Zubaidi, a prominent Hirak leader recently selected to form a political body representing Hirak,41 as well as include a representative from the Hadramout Inclusive Council.42 Hirak may push for secession during the negotiations or may be willing to remain a part of Yemen at least for an interim period, if they feel that the political arrangement will give them genuine governing autonomy. Hadi’s government must also work to include the voice of local leaders in Mareb, Taiz, and Baydha in his delegation. Leaders like the Nasserite party figure Abdullah Numan in Taiz are well respected by different armed factions in the governorate and would help to secure a more durable buy-in and support of any peace negotiation and interim power-sharing government. Support further negotiations in which all sides participate regarding the division of Yemen into federal regions. In the meanwhile, an interim federal government should be formed through a power-sharing arrangement among all key political parties, including Hadi’s government and its allies, the General People’s Congress, the Houthis, and Hirak. Forces currently allied with Hadi in Mareb, Baydha, Taiz and the South are not fighting on his behalf, but rather against the Houthis and Saleh. These forces will reject a return of Hadi rule without reforms. Hadramout’s local authority and political leaders have already declared it as a separate region. Tension between Hadi and Hirak in the South has also resulted in the rejection of Hadi’s leadership and the expulsion of Hadi and his entire cabinet from Aden. Any central government formed out of an agreement among only the northern elite will not be viewed as legitimate by the majority of the population. Each governorate can be treated as a federal state until agreement on the number of federal regions and their borders is reached.43 Don’t wait for the formation of a national government to stabilize Yemen. While peace negotiations and political agreements remain ongoing, local governance must be supported. Reaching political agreement will take time. It is critical to help local populations in the interim period create a functioning level of governance and stability. Under the current circumstances, working with local governments is the only viable option to prevent further deterioration and build sustainable peace. Strengthening local government will help defuse some tension, build trust in national political negotiation processes, give local actors a sense of ownership and responsibility, and restore faith in nonviolent political processes.

### CP – Conditions (Egypt)

#### CP – United States Congress ought to:

#### enforce human rights conditions on Egypt’s military aid packages and

#### reduce Egypt’s military aid to $1 billion.

#### The CP retains U.S. interests and solves HR cred.

Miller ’18 Miller, Andrew (Nonresident Scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program). “Security, Human Rights, and Reform in Egypt.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. 24 July 2018. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/24/security-human-rights-and-reform-in-egypt-pub-76943>. [Premier]

There are two steps that Congress could take that would both advance vital U.S. interests and ensure that the U.S. investment in Egypt is proportional to its return. Both concern U.S. military assistance to Egypt, which is no coincidence. The Egyptian government values U.S. military assistance above all else. If the U.S. government is to get through to al-Sisi’s government, U.S. aid will have to be put on (or off) the table. First, Congress should retain human rights conditions on Egypt’s military assistance package in the FY19 State and Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The Trump administration made use of this conditionality last August when it suspended $195 million in FMF funding for Egypt.19 As a result of this pressure, the Egyptian government finally arranged for a retrial in the infamous foreign funding case, in which 43 employees of U.S. and German-based NGOs, including 17 Americans, received prison sentences on politicized charges in 2013.20 Egypt also reportedly forced North Korea to reduce the staff level of its embassy in Cairo, Pyongyang’s largest mission in the region.21 While neither step is sufficient to justify the release of the $195 million, they indicate that U.S. pressure is having some effect. In FY19, Congress should condition a portion of military assistance to Egypt on progress in several important areas, including a cessation of the investigation and arrest of activists and democracy promotion organizations, the release of political prisoners, and granting U.S. military officials access to the Sinai to perform end-use monitoring of U.S.-made military equipment. Second, Congress should reduce military assistance to Egypt from $1.3 billion to $1 billion in the FY19 appropriations bill, as proposed in the Senate Appropriations Committee’s markup. As things currently stand, Egypt both views U.S. military support as an entitlement and believes itself to be more important to the United States than vice versa. Based on these perceptions, the Egyptian government expects the United States will ultimately back down from any threat or sanction, which undermines U.S. influence in Egypt. Reducing Egypt’s annual military assistance appropriation would send the unmistakable message that the United States expects more in return for its support to Egypt. In addition, by disabusing Egypt of the notion that it can take its existing level of funding for granted, Congress can restore U.S. leverage over the Egyptian government.22 The risks of cutting Egypt’s military assistance and retaining human rights conditionality are often exaggerated. Contrary to popular belief, the United States did not undertake an indefinite commitment to provide Egypt with any specific level of military support at Camp David; reducing military assistance to Egypt would thus not put the United States in breach of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. Moreover, the Peace Treaty is no longer dependent on U.S. mediation; Israel and Egypt have become solid, if quiet, allies. Nor will Egypt abandon the United States in favor of Russia or China in response to a reduction in assistance. Russia and China, in contrast to the United States, do not provide Egypt with military equipment as grant assistance, and the Egyptian government has no desire to be wholly dependent on any external patron, whether it is the United States or Russia. And, finally, a reduction in U.S. military assistance will not degrade the Egyptian military’s ability or interest in combating terrorist groups. Egypt needs better training, which is relatively inexpensive, not new tools. Egypt is on a dangerous course, one with grave implications for the United States. It will be difficult to reverse this trajectory, but Congress has an important opportunity to help the Trump administration tackle this thorny challenge by restoring U.S. credibility and influence with Egypt. If military assistance to Egypt is reduced and conditioned, the Trump administration will be in a stronger position to persuade al-Sisi’s government to open up political space, reform its military doctrine, and address the country’s growing radicalization problem. At the very least, cutting Egypt’s military aid will be a service to the American taxpayer, who has seen little return on their investment in the current Egyptian government. The U.S.-Egyptian military assistance relationship no longer makes sense in its current form; I hope Congress will take this chance to recalibrate U.S. aid for a new era.

### CP – Counterterror (Egypt)

#### CP – The United States ought to provide counterterror aid to Egypt.

#### The CP resolves current deficiencies in Egyptian counterterror – checks back against IS expansion into Egypt.

Soliman ’18 Soliman, Mohamed (Huffington Fellow at the Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy). “How America Can Help Egypt in its War On Terror.” *The Washington Institute*. 27 April 2018. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/how-america-can-help-egypt-in-its-war-on-terror>. [Premier]

Faced with a stubborn common terrorist enemy, the United States should expand its military support for the Egyptian army’s capabilities, focusing more on training and equipping it to counter the Islamic State (IS) in Sinai. Without increased U.S. military aid, Egypt will be ill-equipped to counter the threat of IS, which will gain a crucial foothold that can expand into other parts of the Middle East. For its part, Egypt must integrate modern counter-terrorism techniques into its military doctrine. In the past year, IS has lost most of its territories in Iraq and Syria. But having established a powerful base in Egypt since 2013, IS shifted its attention from Iraq and Syria to Egypt. There has been a continuous Islamist insurgency in Northern Sinai led by more than 1,000 IS fighters. The Sinai insurgency has had drastic consequences: the take-down of a Russian passenger plane in 2015 that killed all 224 people on board; the attacks on the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO), including American personnel Task Force of Sinai; the killing of more than 250 people in the al-Rawda mosque bombing of November 2017, and the targeting of Egypt’s Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior during their visit to al-Arish airport in December 2017. In February 2018, Egypt’s military started Operation Sinai, involving land, naval and air forces, plus police and border guards, to target terrorist organizations in northern and southern Sinai. After two weeks of military operations, Mohamed Farid, chief of staff of the armed forces, asked President Sisi to extend the campaign by at least three months. Farid justified his request by noting the terrorist organizations’ extensive possession of explosives and the hardships that Egypt’s forces face in residential areas. In fact, the Egyptian Army has been incapable of countering IS expansion because it lacks advanced relevant training for its aircrews and enhanced ground forces training in urban combat. Current American aid to Egypt has strengthened Egypt’s ability for conventional warfare, but has not enhanced the capabilities necessary to defeat IS in Sinai. The Egyptian army’s failure underscores the need to re-evaluate the effectiveness of the $1.3 billion in annual U.S. military support. This aid started as compensation for Egypt’s peace deal with Israel, by providing an alternative arms supplier to Cairo, and establishing a semi-military deterrence between Egypt and Israel. Today, however, the United States cannot and should not shoulder this responsibility alone. European nations, NATO, and Israel also have a vested interest in countering IS threats in this region, and should play an active role in increasing Egyptian counter-terrorism capability. To be sure, the United States finds it challenging to convince the Egyptian government to accept counter-terrorism training and its integration into its military doctrine. Nevertheless, the U.S. should reorient its military relations with Egypt and build more international support to counter the growing Islamist insurgency in Sinai. The U.S. should also persuade the European counterparts to conduct counter-insurgency training for the Egyptian ground and air forces. Egyptian-European military exercises are still limited to naval operations, which have historically played a role in Egypt’s patrol of the southern Mediterranean Sea and the prevention of illegal immigration to Europe. In light of IS expansion into Northern Sinai, such naval cooperation is insufficient and broader cooperation is needed immediately. The Egyptian army has been skeptical of any pressure from the U.S. regarding Egypt’s military operations. Egypt has always perceived U.S. military aid in its current form as compensation for the peace treaty with Israel, and would perceive any revision of U.S. military aid as an unfriendly act. But the current landscape offers the most opportune moment to restructure the Egyptian army for fighting the IS insurgency in Sinai, due to the Sisi regime’s need for a quick win to reinvigorate its legitimacy among Egyptians. The U.S. can still pressure the Egyptian leadership to change its arm deals priorities to include the needed counter-terrorism tools.(Instead, to cite but two examples, Egypt has recently bought German submarines and two French amphibious helicopter landing vehicles last year, from national funds.) Finally, on the non-military side, the Egyptian priorities towards Sinai should include a development plan providing basic infrastructure and creating job opportunities for the local Sinai Bedouin, who were marginalized for decades.

#### Human rights concerns are overstated and would be far worse with IS resurgence or Russian aid – the CP is the best of both worlds.

Rubin ’18 Rubin, Micheal. “Washington’s misplaced human rights advocacy on Egypt will backfire.” *Washington Examiner*. 13 September 2018. <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/washingtons-misplaced-human-rights-advocacy-on-egypt-will-backfire>. [Premier]

There is an unfortunate tendency within American foreign policy circles to develop irrational hatreds. Part of this is the product of partisanship: Within the halls of Congress, too often countries cease being partners and instead become political footballs. And part of it is tunnel vision. Human rights are important, but those who define themselves as activists are frequently unwilling to understand either the complexities of other societies or accept that the potential for instability is real, and the results of that instability could lead to far worse human rights situations. Consider Iran under the Shah: Iran was an important Cold War ally for the U.S. and, in the words of Jimmy Carter, “an island of stability in a sea of turmoil.” Iran’s lynchpin status led successive American administrations to paper over differences with the Shah. As Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained in his memoirs, Carter was unwilling to turn a blind eye to the Shah’s human rights abuses. The Shah had long been unpopular among diplomats and, as Iranians took to the streets to protest his dictatorial ways, many in the State Department counseled in favor of abandoning the pro-American leader. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski explained that “the lower echelons at State, notably the head of the Iran Desk … were motivated by doctrinal dislike of the Shah and simply wanted him out of power altogether.” They got their wish. Human rights activists swore until they were blue in the face that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was, as Senate aide William Miller described him, “a progressive force for human rights.” Richard Falk, a Princeton political scientist who was influential in the Carter administration and later enjoyed senior U.N. appointments, urged the White House to embrace Khomeini. “The depiction of him [Khomeini] as fanatical, reactionary, and the bearer of crude prejudices seems certainly and happily false,” he explained, adding, “His close advisers are uniformly composed of moderate, progressive individuals … who share a notable record of concern with human rights.” Of course, what followed, was an all-out assault on human rights that has led Iranians to pine for the days of the Shah. Now, consider Egypt. Like Iran, it is a pivotal country. After all, 1-in-5 Arabs call themselves Egyptians. Egypt controls the Suez Canal. Former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s decision to try peace instead of war with Israel has led to 40 years of peace, in contrast to the turmoil of the preceding three decades. Simply put, Sadat’s gamble provided a model to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict which persists to the present. Traditionally, while the U.S. appreciated the role Egypt plays in the security of the region, there has been a broad bipartisan concern about the over-securitization of bilateral relations. This has led to a number of haphazard efforts to promote democratization and liberalism. Admittedly, it was as often the U.S. ambassador as the Egyptian government that killed such efforts. The Arab Spring, along with the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, brought the debate to the forefront. Young Egyptians sought democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood which had spent decades underground and in opposition jumped at the chance. They had developed a reputation for efficiency in their social service network and had long cultivated supporters among Egypt’s youth, diplomats, and analysts abroad who accepted their rhetoric of democracy at face value. After Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated candidate, squeaked by in the 2012 elections with just 51 percent of the vote, however, the Muslim Brotherhood proved its rhetoric empty. Morsi cast aside previous democratic commitments. Rather than consult the public and political opposition, he sought to dominate Egypt. Even more explicitly than Turkish strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan would later, Morsi argued his power should trump the judiciary. He offered the Egyptian people a Faustian bargain: Accept the constitution the Muslim Brotherhood opposed absent a parliamentary quorum, or suffer his dictatorship. That constitution imposed the Brotherhood’s religious agenda on a population that wanted jobs, not Islamic law. One article, for example, charged the state with protecting public morality, which Morsi interpreted in the most conservative, religious manner. Against this backdrop, the uprising against Morsi is understandable. In many ways, its story is even more important than the Arab Spring itself: In the space of a year, Morsi alienated and antagonized Egyptians in a way that took Mubarak three decades to accomplish. Within Washington, those who staked their career promoting or downplaying the Brotherhood, however, could not accept the manner in which Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi came to power. Fairer critics of Morsi thought it would have been wiser to allow Morsi to serve until electoral defeat. The problem with that, of course, is the assumption Morsi would have allowed free and fair elections. Abuses occurred in the months that followed Morsi’s fall, and neither el-Sissi nor the Muslim Brotherhood were blameless. El-Sissi cracked down hard, and Egyptian forces ran roughshod over critics and opponents. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, also turned to violence to avenge its loss of power. Things came to a head in the clashes on Aug. 14, 2013, when police tried to clear a sit-in camp near the Rabaa al-Adaweya mosque. Estimates vary, but in subsequent clashes, several hundred protesters died, as did several dozen police. That violence outraged critics who already harbored irrational hatred toward el-Sissi. Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth, for example, seemed to make up casualty figures out of thin air when he felt personally aggrieved. Within Congress, several representatives sought to withhold security assistance due to human rights concerns. For example, I used to visit Fort Hood, Texas, where helicopters bound for Egypt remained on tarmacs outside hangers, their transfer held up by a single senator. The Senate mandated Leahy vetting, in which aid to and training for foreign militaries is tied to their willingness to address accusations of human rights abuses. There are two problems with this, however. The first is that not every human rights accusation is legitimate. Both HRW and Amnesty International often corrupt their process with politics. The second is that withholding training because of human rights abuses likely guarantees those abuses remain unaddressed. Many senators and representatives are sincere in their human rights concerns, but their actions are callous and detrimental to human rights. Egypt is facing an Islamist insurgency in the Sinai that predates the ousters of both Mubarak and Morsi and is rooted more in ideology than grievance. To withhold the tools necessary to fight that insurgency risks empowering radicals that emulate the Islamic State or encouraging an Egyptian turn toward Russia which, likewise, would setback human rights. While the U.S. government should not abandon human rights advocacy, security blackmail is neither effective nor wise. It is true that el-Sissi has cracked down too hard on the press and opposition, but it is also true that he has forced through economic reforms that were a half-century delayed. Had he not constrained some political space, then populism both among secularists and Islamists would have pushed an already teetering Egypt off the fiscal precipice. Recently, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo authorized the release of $1.2 billion in aid withheld to Egypt because of human rights concerns. He is right to do so. Egypt fights al Qaeda, and it has done more than any other state to stabilize Libya. But there is more to do. U.S. officials continue to hold up spare parts for F-16s, unmanned aerial vehicles, and M1A1 tanks. These are all platforms used to battle insurgents, not journalists or the non-violent opposition. Defeating Islamist terrorism and securing human rights need not be mutually exclusive endeavors. How unfortunate, then, that even after Pompeo’s recent moves, Washington's myopia seems increasingly determined to pursue policies that promise to do neither.

### CP – Cooperation (Pakistan)

#### CP – The United States ought to cooperate with Pakistan to negotiate with the Taliban.

#### CP saves relations and solves terror.

Khan ’18 Khan, Sahar. “Double Game: Why Pakistan Supports Militants and Resists U.S. Pressure to Stop.” *Cato Institute*. 20 September 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/double-game-why-pakistan-supports-militants-resists-us-pressure-stop>. [Premier]

The United States and Pakistan may never have an ideal relationship, but they do agree on one fundamental thing: U.S. involvement in Afghanistan needs to end. To achieve this shared objective, the United States must adopt a more pragmatic approach toward Pakistan. The Trump administration should adjust its expectations with respect to Pakistan and its support for militant groups, especially the Taliban. Although the United States has been fighting the Taliban for almost two decades, no enduring resolution to the war in Afghanistan is possible without their cooperation. The Trump administration should pursue an Afghan-led peace process that directly involves the Taliban.133 While the Taliban have so far refused to participate in Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for this fall, they have expressed an interest in negotiating with the United States. Instead of rejecting that offer, the Trump administration should try to leverage talks with the Taliban to mediate the U.S. relationship with the Afghan government, while also planning for a military withdrawal. Pakistan can be a useful partner in such an effort. The Trump administration should seek common ground with Pakistan while acknowledging areas of disagreement. For example, protecting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal from militant groups is a priority for both countries. According to Gina Haspel’s testimony during her confirmation hearing to become CIA director, the CIA remains focused on monitoring any activities between extremist groups and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which may provide a good opportunity for American and Pakistani intelligence communities to cooperate.134 Finding a feasible and lasting end to the war in Afghanistan is also mutually beneficial for the United States and Pakistan. The United States wants to ensure that Afghanistan has a stable government and that the country does not become a launching pad for another terrorist attack on the United States. However, Washington has ruled out any role for the Taliban in the Afghan government. Pakistan’s objective is to ensure a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul, one that will assist it in deterring India, and maintains that the Taliban would be the most reliable actor. Yet the Taliban’s pro-Pakistan tendencies are questionable at best. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Afghanistan can even have a stable government in the next few years. Ongoing U.S. and Pakistani support for an Afghan-led peace process is a step in the right direction. The United States must come to grips with its inability to get Pakistan to stop sponsoring militants and pursue direct talks with the Taliban while the opportunity still exists. For years, the United States has supported Pakistan’s military establishment over its civilian institutions. While Pakistan’s civil-military imbalance is a result of numerous domestic factors, U.S. support for the Pakistan Army has aggravated it. The United States has also overlooked the ways in which Pakistan’s civilian institutions have evolved to facilitate militant sponsorship, directly or indirectly. The only way the Trump administration can have a positive relationship with Pakistan is recognize the futility of pressuring Pakistan to stop funding militants and partner with Islamabad on terms it can accommodate. A strategic reevaluation of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in order. Conclusion Pakistan has a long history of militant sponsorship. The military establishment has played a central role in Pakistan’s use of militant groups as proxies, but contrary to longstanding presumptions in Washington, Pakistan’s civilian establishment by no means serves as a check against these policies. Militant sponsorship has become a kind of whole-of-government principle of Pakistan’s security policy and national identity. Punitive U.S. actions to discourage it, therefore, have little chance of success. Washington should incorporate this reality into its policy and look for alternative solutions to securing a durable peace in Afghanistan that can set the stage for a U.S. withdrawal and establish a new and constructive relationship with Pakistan.

### CP – Reforms (Africa)

#### The United States ought to:

#### establish a reward program for human rights,

#### eliminate aid to fragile states, and

#### invest in AFRICOM’s analytical capacities.

#### Solves human rights *and* stability.

Allen ’16 Allen, Nathaniel (Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow at the United States of Institute of Peace and Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University). “U.S. Military Assistance to Africa Is Growing. But Is It Succeeding?.” World Politics Review. 23 September 2016. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19995/u-s-military-assistance-to-africa-is-growing-but-is-it-succeeding>. [Premier]

A more viable approach for AFRICOM would be to focus less on crisis response and more on its longer-term mission of preventing conflict and fostering political stability. Washington clearly considers the countries that currently receive the most U.S. military aid to be strategic priorities. But little is done to systematically recognize or reward countries whose armed forces respect the principles of civilian control and human rights. The U.S. might consider establishing a program or series of funds for that purpose, with explicit and transparent guidelines for steps that the armed forces of a partner country would need to take to qualify, akin to the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s approach to selecting candidates for U.S. poverty-alleviation assistance. AFRICOM also needs to rethink its approach to providing military equipment and weapons to Africa’s most fragile states. There is little evidence to suggest that such assistance is effective, and the defections of U.S.-trained units and an abundance of ill-secured arms have abetted many of the continent’s worst conflicts. What good are weapons systems if, as if often the case, they are not well maintained or don’t reach the front lines because of corruption or mismanagement? U.S. engagement should try to introduce more autonomy and transparency into the security sector and focus more on law enforcement and counternarcotics, which appear to be more effective than traditional security assistance. Finally, AFRICOM needs to invest more in improving its own analytical capabilities. Rigorous monitoring and evaluation practices now common across other forms of foreign aid are the exception in the security sector. Most programs lack even basic theories of change that directly link the inputs provided to African partners to basic outcomes and long-term impacts the U.S. expects to achieve. Much more could be done to identify, monitor and mitigate political risks inherent in providing security assistance. Rewarding specialization, hiring more regional experts and embedding U.S. personnel by expanding the U.S. Ministry of Defense Advisors program in Africa would help AFRICOM gain much-needed local knowledge and expertise. Ultimately, AFRICOM cannot defend itself or its partners against every conceivable contingency. But it can, and should, be doing much more to understand, plan for and mitigate the political risks of its expanding mandate.

## DAs

### DA – Counterterror

#### US counterterror has been effective – a vast array of empirics.

Saab ’18 Saab, Bilal (Executive Director and Head of Research & Public Affairs of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis North America). “What Does America Get for Its Military Aid?” *National Interest*. 22 February 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-america-get-its-military-aid-24605>. [Premier]

The tale of U.S. counterterrorism support to Arab partners is more promising, though still vastly lacking. Thanks in large part to various forms of U.S. help, Iraq’s counterterrorism service, a crowning achievement of the United States in Iraq, has performed ably in the fight against ISIS; Jordan’s elite military units, one of the most proficient “rapid reaction forces” in the region and highly regarded in the world’s special-operations community, have trained Arab irregular forces in partnership with the U.S. military to fight terrorism; Lebanon’s army has succeeded in protecting the country’s northern borders and evicting violent Sunni extremists; the Palestinian Authority has ensured security and coordinated with the Israel Defense Forces and Shin Bet much more effectively over the past decade; the UAE’s special-operations forces have pursued military missions jointly with U.S. special-operations commandos against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; and finally, Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism apparatus crushed Al Qaeda’s insurgency across the kingdom in the mid-2000s and, more recently, denied ISIS a foothold in the country.

### DA – Econ

#### Military aid is vital to the US economy.

Saab ’18 Saab, Bilal (Executive Director and Head of Research & Public Affairs of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis North America). “What Does America Get for Its Military Aid?” *National Interest*. 22 February 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-america-get-its-military-aid-24605>. [Premier]

THE UNITED States has used various forms of security assistance over the past half century to achieve numerous policy goals in the Middle East, including (1) guaranteeing Israel’s survival throughout its wars with Arab states, and preserving its qualitative edge over its neighbors; (2) prying Egypt away from the Soviets and restricting Moscow’s political access to the shah of Iran; (3) upholding Cairo’s commitment to the 1978 Camp David peace treaty, and maintaining U.S. access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace; (4) containing the Islamic Republic of Iran during the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War by secretly providing intelligence and transferring weapons to the Iraqis; and (5) checking Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein following the Second Gulf War by, among other things, arming GCC countries. Massive U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) to Arab partners throughout these years have also done wonders for the U.S. economy. They have generated trillions of dollars’ worth of revenue, created hundreds of thousands of jobs in the American defense industry and boosted efficiency in U.S. military budgets by reducing unit costs.

#### Foreign Military Assistance programs are key to the defense industry.

Gould ’17 Gould, Joe (Writer for Defense News). “White House plan to gut foreign military financing would cost defense jobs, senators warn.” *Defense News*. 13 March 2017. <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/13/white-house-plan-to-gut-foreign-military-financing-would-cost-defense-jobs-senators-warn/>. [Premier]

The Trump administration is mulling plans to kill U.S. subsidies for foreign allies to buy American-made weapons outright and replace them with a loans program. The proposal is a bullet point in White House budget director Mick Mulvaney's controversial plans to slash funding for diplomacy and development, first reported by The Washington Post and confirmed to Defense News by multiple sources. The idea is to replace all foreign military financing, or FMF, grants with loans, save for the security aid committed to Israel — which makes up more than half of the $5.7 billion program. While it has uncertain prospects in Congress, it has frustrated key U.S. lawmakers, who say such a move would trash both a critical national security tool and a buttress for the domestic defense industry — just as President Donald Trump says U.S. jobs are his top priority. Sen. Lindsey Graham, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, earlier this month said deep State Department cuts are "dead on arrival" in Congress. On Thursday, he defended FMF. "Sometimes we have to subsidize the allies' purchases, but they buy American equipment and they do pay," Graham, R-S.C., said of the FMF program. "You have to show me where a loan is better for our national security. … This part of the [federal] budget is a percent of a percent." A key argument for FMF is that if America ends arms subsidies, it lets strategic allies get weaker and cedes business and influence to Russia and China — its largest rivals strategically and for global defense markets. "The last thing I want allies to do is go to the Russians and the Chinese because we are penny-wise and pound-foolish," Graham said. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's ranking member, Sen. Ben Cardin, D-Md., said he would strongly oppose the change, which "would have serious consequences for U.S. foreign and defense policy" and "potentially kill the program." Because subsidies further U.S. relationships and leverage with recipient countries, "if anything [the program] should be expanded, not undermined," Cardin said in a statement. Cardin drew a link between the FMF proposal and Trump's past suggestions that foreign military aid is a bad deal for the U.S., saying the president "does not appear to appreciate that these sales and the FMF program are in America's foreign policy and national security interest, not as a favor to these countries." "Given this proposal and the rumored huge cuts to the U.S. foreign assistance budget, the president seems determined to empty America's national security toolbox, leaving only the hammer of military force," Cardin said. "I'm particularly concerned that this move would result in lost U.S. jobs, particularly in Maryland." Of the $5.7 billion request for FMF for 2017, $3.1 billion was for Israel, $1.3 billion for Egypt, $350 million for Jordan, $265 million for Pakistan and $150 million for Iraq, those five countries being the top funded. With the exception of certain assistance allocated to Israel, the money was used exclusively to procure U.S. military equipment and associated training. One key recipient, Jordan, has received U.S. military aid for 60 years — about $774.6 million since 2014. Because it's wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Jordan is vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful neighbors, but it's also a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another. Today, it is a key U.S. ally on the front lines of the fight against the Islamic State group. FMF alone has enabled the Royal Jordanian Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter jets and purchase Raytheon-made Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles and Sikorsky-made Black Hawk helicopters for border monitoring and counterterror missions, according to the Congressional Research Service. When top Central and Eastern European diplomats came to Capitol Hill on March 7, they urged lawmakers to support U.S. soft power efforts — and FMF — as a counterweight to the alleged Russian influence campaigns targeting their citizens. Georgia's ambassador to the U.S., David Bakradze, said U.S. aid, in place since his country declared its independence from the Soviet Union, has been essential to its survival. FMF is "supporting Georgia's resilience when it comes to the defense and security cooperation," he said. Andrew Shapiro, an Obama administration chief of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which has policy authority over FMF, called the broader State Department cuts "ill-advised" and argued for preserving FMF. If the U.S. were to pull the grants, not only would relationships with recipient countries suffer, but defense business might go to U.S. rivals, who offer less expensive alternatives. In Asia, where the U.S. uses FMF to promote maritime security for allies, China may step in, and Russia and others "may try to fill the gap" in the Middle East, Shapiro said. "In effect, we are cutting money that would go to U.S. defense companies," Shapiro said of the proposed FMF change. "It helps maintain the U.S. defense-industrial base, it helps lower the cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and communities." Foreign policy experts familiar with the FMF program say its beneficiaries are economically underdeveloped — and would neither be eligible for nor interested in loans.

### DA – Heg

#### Middle Eastern autocracies would turn to Russia.

Leone ’17 Leone, Daniel. “The Dangers of Slashing Foreign Aid to the Middle East.” *Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative*. 20 July 2017. <https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1990-the-dangers-of-slashing-foreign-aid-to-the-middle>. [Premier]

Aid to the Middle East is not spared in the budget proposal, with the Trump administration requesting cuts of around 850 million USD to the region. The proposal includes severe cuts to military, humanitarian, and development assistance to increasingly unstable countries like Tunisia and Lebanon, and also to devastating crisis areas like Yemen. The proposed budget cuts have the potential to exacerbate conditions in the region, while simultaneously ceding influence to Russia and other actors. Since the series of uprisings in the region in 2011 and 2012, the Middle East has been plagued by the worst regional turmoil in decades. Major conflicts involving an array of international actors are raging in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, leading to humanitarian crises of historic scale. Most other countries in the region are fighting powerful and evolving insurgencies and terrorist groups, many of them affiliated with the Islamic State. Repressive authoritarian rulers are in control of almost every country in the region, many of them possessing tenuous but brutal grips on power. The situation in the region has continued to deteriorate over the last year, fueled by a quickly intensifying regional proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Middle East is in dire straits – and cutting American foreign aid to unstable countries could be disastrous. Tunisia has often been hailed as the success story of the Arab Spring: the only Arab country in the region that has legitimately moved towards a democratic transition. However, the situation in Tunisia is still fragile at best, as the country’s economic malaise and lack of employment opportunities have led to widespread discontent among the populace, and the Islamic State remains a dangerous threat to the country [3][4]. Despite the precarious nature of the promising democratic transition in Tunisia, the fiscal year 2018 budget proposal requests a cut of around 87 million USD (almost 62 percent) to bilateral aid to the North African nation from 2016 levels. The cuts include zeroing out foreign military financing to Tunisia, which was USD 65 million in 2016, meaning that Tunisia will likely be unable to buy American weapons to deal with the tumultuous internal security situation. If the proposed cuts pass Congress, Tunisia may be forced to turn to other options for military aid – specifically Russia, who has been trying to assert their influence in Tunisia and throughout the region [5]. Budget cuts to other vulnerable countries in dire need of military support like Lebanon would also give Russia an opportunity to continue to expand its influence in the region past Syria. Allowing space for Russia will allow the Kremlin to gain ground in the proxy fight against the United States in the Middle East. Divesting from the region, both in terms of military and developmental aid, will not only increase suffering but will also likely prove to hurt American interests and overall grand strategy.

#### Triggers their impacts but worse – Russian arms are effective and cheap.

Borshchevskaya ’17 Borshchevskaya, Anna. “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East.” *The Jamestown Foundation*. 20 December 2017. <https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/>. [Premier]

Russia is the world’s top arms exporter, second only to the United States. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has emerged in recent years as Moscow’s second most important arms market after Asia. Moscow has made great strides in this region since Vladimir Putin came to power, and especially in recent years, after it embarked on major military reform following August 2008. Arms sales matter to the Kremlin because they are a major source of financial gain, but these arms sales are also a tactical foreign policy instrument for wielding influence. Russia’s arms—generally speaking—are well made, sometimes on par with the US, and well suited for the region’s needs. These platforms and armaments are also more affordable than Western weaponry. The US simply will not sell weapons to certain countries, which, therefore, turn to Moscow. Politically, Russian arms come with few strings attached and thus are a great choice when a country wants to diversify away from the West, or at least signal such an intent. Moscow has made inroads with traditional clients such as Iran, Syria and Egypt, but also diversified toward countries closer to the West, such as the Arab Gulf states, Morocco and Turkey. Russia’s overall influence in the region is growing in the context of Western retreat. The Russian defense sector has problems, but also demonstrated improvements, learning and flexibility. Undoubtedly, Russia’s arms sales to the MENA region will continue to present a challenge for American interests in this region in the coming years.

### DA – Relations – Oil (Saudi Arabia)

#### Cutting arms sales signals a hardline stance and would drive up oil prices.

Krane ’18 Krane, Jim (Wallace S. Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at Rice University’s Baker Institute). “Trump Climbdown Shows That Saudis Hold The Cards - And The Oil.” *Forbes*. 16 October 2018. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2018/10/16/trump-climbdown-shows-that-saudis-hold-the-cards-and-the-oil/#f992df815502>. [Premier]

Why would Trump back away from confronting Saudi Arabia? Arms sales is Trump’s answer. A stronger possibility is evident in numerous presidential Tweets: Trump needs Saudi Arabia to get moving on crude oil production, far beyond Saudi Aramco’s modest increases to date. And why might Trump need more Saudi oil? Because of his decision in May to pull America out of the Iranian nuclear pact and re-impose US sanctions. US sanctions are attempting to remove 1.5 million barrels per day – or more – of Iranian oil from global markets by the deadline of Nov. 4, just two days before Americans head to the polls on Election Day. The increase in Saudi production since June must strike the Trump administration as frustratingly small: from 10.4 million barrels per day in June, Saudi production actually fell to 10.3 million barrels per day in July, before rising to almost 10.5 in September, according to MEES. The Saudi oil minister says the kingdom will hit 10.7 m b/d by the end of October, and plans another increase in November. Meanwhile, Iran’s exports have fallen at least 1m b/dyear-on-year. The 300,000 b/d Saudi increase is nowhere near to covering the sanctions shortfall. Normally, sucker-punching Iran carries few political risks for American politicians, as long as Saudi Arabia swings into action and insulates the US motorist from the costs. And why shouldn’t the Saudis go along, if they can? After all, the kingdom welcomed Trump’s re-imposition of the Iran sanctions, which align with Saudi aims in the region. Handing Iran’s oil market share to Saudi Arabia is another gift, since Iran’s lost revenues could reach $160 million per day at current prices. But if the Saudis balk – even for a few weeks – Trump’s get-tough-on-Iran posture could backfire by forcing up global oil prices and, shortly thereafter, American gasoline prices. Despite being embattled over the Khashoggi affair, Saudi Arabia still has a strong hand, since the kingdom reaps an increase in oil revenues whether Trump gets tough or goes soft. Until now, the Saudis could be counted on to play along with US Mideast policy. The US sanctions playbook has always ensured Riyadh was on board ahead of American intervention against any oil-exporting country. Over the years, the Saudis have stepped in to replace exports from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and others. In effect, the Saudis helped protect the American motorist—and global markets—from American foreign policy. In return, Washington provided hard security and weapons sales. This time Saudis have made clear that if Trump chooses the path of confrontation, the kingdom’s commitment to covering lost Iranian oil exports could falter. “If President Trump was angered by $80 oil, nobody should rule out the price jumping to $100 and $200 a barrel or maybe double that figure,” wrote Turki al-Dakhil, an ally of the Royal Court and director of the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya news network. The Saudi oil minister and embassy in Washington played down al-Dakhil’s comments, no doubt understanding how devastating a politicized Saudi production cut would be to the kingdom’s international stature. Still, the outburst served its purpose. The grim specter of the 1973 embargo’s quadrupling of oil prices was not lost on the Trump administration. Regardless, the decision to soft-pedal the Saudis plays well with the Trump administration’s worldview, where international norms mean little; even less when cheap Election Day gasoline is on the line. And anyway Trump’s refusal to appoint US ambassadors to posts around the world, including Saudi Arabia, leaves him without the option to withdraw an ambassador as a symbol of displeasure. Much of this comes back to Trump’s unilateral decision to walk away from America’s allies and the Iran deal. The US president simply has no maneuvering room. Being tough on Iran is easy. Not so easy to get tough on Saudi Arabia.

#### US-Saudi relations improve now and is key to international oil stability. Plan prompts retaliation which causes price hikes.

Noueihed et al. ’18 Noueihed, Lin, Fattah, Zainab, Dipaola, Anthony, and Niquette, Mark. “Oil, Debt and Iran: Weapons in Any U.S.-Saudi Fight Over Khashoggi.” *Bloomberg*. 11 October 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/oil-debt-and-iran-weapons-in-any-u-s-saudi-row-over-khashoggi> [Premier]

President Donald Trump threatened his most important Arab ally with “severe punishment” if it was shown to have killed a top regime critic. Saudi Arabia hit back with a not-so-veiled threat of its own to weaponize its vast oil exports. The disappearance of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi after he stepped inside the Saudi consulate on Oct. 2 began as a tussle between regional heavyweights Turkey and Saudi Arabia. But it spread rapidly to threaten Trump’s Middle East policy that’s built around ever closer ties with the kingdom’s autocratic rulers. With Saudi Arabia shifting away from its flat-out denials of involvement to announce an internal investigation, and Trump floating the theory of “rogue killers,” efforts to lower tensions appear to be underway. If they fail, what actions could the two sides take and what factors may hold them back? SAUDI ARABIA 1. The Oil Weapon The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are two of the world’s top oil producers. Saudi Arabia’s more than 7 million barrels a day of crude exports -- the most in the world -- give the kingdom a key role in balancing global energy markets. Trump has urged Saudi Arabia to put more crude on the market to pull prices back from near four-year highs above $80 a barrel. He is also leaning on Saudi Arabia, a key ally in his stand-off with Iran, to replace barrels that will come off the market when sanctions on the Islamic Republic take effect next month. Were the Saudis to back away from signals they are willing to meet global demand, prices could spike to $100 a barrel, just as Trump wants lower gas prices going into midterm elections that could help determine the rest of his presidency. It might also make it harder for U.S. sanctions to take as much Iranian oil off the market as he seeks. The Saudis, meanwhile, would collect the profits. If they cut output, oil prices could rise more sharply, but that would risk angering customers and harming the global economy. Saudi Arabia last used its petroleum wealth as a political weapon in 1973-74, when it led an Arab oil embargo during a war between Israel and a coalition of Arab states.

#### Leads to U.S. recession.

Denning ’18 Denning, Liam. “The Last Temptation of Saudi Arabia.” *Bloomberg*. 19 April 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-19/-100-oil-price-the-last-temptation-of-saudi-arabia>. [Premier]

The 2008 spike put the seal on the U.S. recession and accelerated a decline in domestic gasoline consumption that began the year before. Meanwhile, the second bout of triple-digit prices, resulting partly from the turmoil of the Arab Spring, fed the U.S. shale boom that helped spark the subsequent crash. Think of what it has taken to get to today's level of roughly $70. Saudi Arabia has had to cozy up to Russia (currently allied with Riyadh's arch-enemy Iran in Syria); the Iran nuclear deal appears to be on death row; and economic collapse has led to Venezuela "involuntarily" cutting way more supply than it agreed to cut. Meanwhile, $70 oil has sparked a revival in non-OPEC supply, especially U.S. shale production. Triple-digit oil would supercharge the latter, especially, raising the longer-term cost for petro-states in terms of market share (see this). The other side of the equation is demand. This is strong today, helped by economic growth and the low energy prices of recent years. Now consider what $100 oil might mean for this. U.S. gasoline demand finally regained its 2007 peak only in late 2016 2 -- helped in large part by the price crash. Having bottomed out at less than $1.90 a gallon in February 2016, the national average pump price is now around $2.86. Of that, 47 cents goes to your friendly state and federal tax collectors, according to the Energy Information Administration. Another 74 cents goes to refiners, shippers and marketers, using average data for the 12 months through February. The residual, $1.65, is the cost of crude oil: an implied $69.50 a barrel, around where oil trades today. Plug in $100 a barrel and, all else equal, it equates to about $3.60 a gallon at the pump (and probably north of $4.50 in California). That would be almost a dollar higher than today and the highest level since that unsuspecting summer of 2014: The recovery in U.S. gasoline demand has mostly flattened out since the fall of 2016, which coincides with when pump prices began rising again. While U.S. economic growth is strong, we are late in the cycle of one of the longest economic expansions on record, at more than 100 months. The unemployment rate is low already, and the Federal Reserve is raising interest rates, albeit cautiously. Hiking oil and gasoline prices in that environment would provide a short-term windfall but ultimately curb demand (not just in the U.S., either). And unlike a decade ago, internal combustion engines face a credible and expanding competitive threat from electric and hybrid vehicles, whose manufacturers would relish $3-plus gasoline. Tempting as it is for Saudi Arabia to push for further gains, it risks repeating the mistakes of the past, undermining demand and ceding market share to rivals. It is perhaps the curse of petro-states that, even as they talk the language of stability and long-term planning, immediate appetites are ever the priority.

### DA – Relations – Bonds (Saudi Arabia)

#### Saudi investment in US bonds is contingent on military aid – pullout would harm Treasury holdings.

Noueihed et al. ’18 Noueihed, Lin, Fattah, Zainab, Dipaola, Anthony, and Niquette, Mark. “Oil, Debt and Iran: Weapons in Any U.S.-Saudi Fight Over Khashoggi.” *Bloomberg*. 11 October 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/oil-debt-and-iran-weapons-in-any-u-s-saudi-row-over-khashoggi> [Premier]

2. U.S. Bond Holdings In 2016, the U.S. released details of Saudi holdings of American debt for the first time. The numbers had been secret for four decades, part of a deal whereby the U.S. would buy Saudi oil and provide it with military aid and the kingdom would plow petrodollars into Treasuries to finance U.S. spending. The grand total of Saudi holdings in 2016? $117 billion, ranking Saudi Arabia among the top 12 foreign holders of U.S. bonds. Some analysts have speculated that it might hold even more indirectly. Saudi Arabia could divest its Treasury holdings, and threatened to do just that when it faced pressure over the involvement of its citizens in the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

#### That hikes interest rates.

La Monica ’18 La Monica, Paul R. “Saudi Arabia owns (at least) $166.8 billion in US debt.” *CNN*. 15 October 2018. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/investing/saudi-arabia-us-debt-jamal-khashoggi/index.html/>. [Premier]

Saudi Arabia held $166.8 billion in Treasury securities as of July, According to the US Treasury Department. That made it the 10th largest foreign holder of government bonds -- ahead of larger economies such as India, France, Canada and Germany. So if Saudi Arabia wanted to inflict pain on the United States, it could -- in theory -- weaponize those bonds by selling them off en masse. Adding a bigger chunk of bonds to the market could push yields, which move in the opposite direction of prices -- sharply higher. A spike in bond yields could make it more expensive for consumers to take out mortgages and other loans and also increase the interest costs that companies have to pay on their existing debt.

### DA – Trump (Saudi Arabia)

#### Plan is perceived as Republicans fighting back against Trump.

Shepard ’18 Shepard, Alex. “Don’t Count on Republicans to Punish Saudi Arabia.” *The New Republican*. 23 October 2018. <https://newrepublic.com/article/151840/dont-count-republicans-punish-saudi-arabia>. [Premier]

Ever since Trump took office, Senate Republicans have made a big show of pushing back against Trump whenever his foreign policy deviated from the party establishment. But true action has been rare. After Trump accepted Vladimir Putin’s promise that Russia didn’t interfere in the 2016 election, the “outcry, including from Republicans, was instant,” The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos noted. “More remarkable, though, was what didn’t happen. No one resigned from the Cabinet. No Republican senators took concrete steps to restrain or contain or censure the President.” And even when the Republican-led Senate has taken concrete steps, they have often been symbolic. In response to Trump’s repeated criticism of NATO, the Senate “passed a non-binding measure, 97-2, that expresses support for NATO, its mutual self-defense clause and calls on the administration to rush its whole-of-government strategy to counter Russia’s meddling in the U.S. and other democracies,” DefenseNews reported in July. The Senate passed another non-binding resolution after Trump briefly flirted with the idea of handing over U.S. officials to Russia for questioning. Senate Republicans have also tried strongly worded committee reports and letters to the president. As long as Trump is the most popular Republican politician in America, and he’s taking the arms deal off the table, it’s unclear what Senate Republicans could do to send a meaningful message to Bin Salman and Saudi Arabia. It’s also unclear that they even want to. From senators Graham and Rubio, there’s the sense that Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses are better left ignored—that what matters is that they are allies in the fight against Iran. Surely others agree with Trump that one man’s murder does not warrant reneging on a $100 billion arms deal, which might explain why talk of blocking the deal appears not to have nearly the necessary support in the Senate. The New York Times reported on Saturday that Trump is “betting he can stand by his Saudi allies and not suffer any significant damage with voters.” He’s probably right, and some Senate Republicans probably are making the same wager. The midterms have revolved almost entirely around health care and immigration for weeks now, and that’s not likely to change. Some on the right, notably evangelical leader Pat Robertson, are shrugging off Khashoggi’s murder, which only gives them further cover. If the Republican Senate ultimately does nothing meaningful to punish Saudi Arabia, it will represent the party establishment’s final capitulation to Trump. This was perhaps inevitable after Senator John McCain’s death in August. Though his own foreign policy views were deeply flawed, there’s little doubt that McCain would have been the most morally righteous Republican voice in this moment, chastising Trump and calling on the Senate to punish Saudi Arabia. “We are not the president’s subordinates,” McCain said upon his triumphant return to the Senate last year, after being diagnosed with brain cancer. “We are his equals.” It’s not clear that any of his surviving Republican colleagues feel the same way.

#### Trump uses military aid to promote jobs – it’s a core part of his appeal to voters.

Exum ’17 Exum, Andrew (Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy). “What Progressives Miss About Arms Sales.” *The Atlantic*. 23 May 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/americas-right-to-sell-arms/527805/>. [Premier]

Celebrating their success in retaining blue-collar jobs is one way Republicans are winning the votes of working-class Americans. Whew! For once, one of my predictions was correct: Donald Trump had a great visit to Saudi Arabia. It was a great visit for him, it was a great visit for the Saudis and the other Arab Gulf states, and—last but not least—it was a great visit for magical, glowing orbs. I want to spend a little time talking about one of the reasons why the trip went so well. I’ll warn you: This is a somewhat taboo subject for progressive foreign-policy types. The subject, friends, is arms sales. Progressives don’t like arms sales very much, but they need to pay attention to them, because they’re one big way Republicans are fighting for—and winning—the votes of working-class Americans who have traditionally voted for Democrats. While the president was in Saudi Arabia, the Trump administration announced $110 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia—with an additional $240 billion committed over a 10-year period. If you’ve ever worked in government, you know this is what is called a “deliverable,” the clunky management-consultantese term for a tangible outcome of a visit or meeting. When Donald Trump is asked to justify his trip to Saudi Arabia, he’ll cite that $110 billion in arms sales. There are a few interesting things about these sales. The first is that many of these sales were already in the works. The Obama administration spent eight years quietly selling a lot of arms to Saudi Arabia: When President Obama left office, for example, the United States still had $100 billion in the foreign military sales pipeline with Saudi Arabia and, in 2011, had inked what was previously the largest arms sale in U.S. history with the Kingdom—a $29 billion deal to sell F-15s to the Saudis. Obama-era sales to Saudi Arabia were in keeping with sales to other Gulf states: Both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates bought a tremendous amount of U.S. arms between 2009 and 2017. Qatar bought more U.S. arms than any other state in 2014 and, in the waning days of the Obama administration, announced that it would buy nearly $4 billion in Boeing-made F-15s in addition to $19 billion in commercial aircraft, also from Boeing. Overall, the Arab Gulf states went on a spending spree during the Obama years, and most of the money was spent on American arms. So why didn’t you hear a lot about this from Democratic politicians during the 2016 election season? There are two main reasons—one strategic and one moral. Strategically, not everyone is convinced that arming the Arab Gulf states to the teeth is a wise idea. Some worry that these arms might someday endanger Israel’s security, while others worry the Arab Gulf states might be encouraged to use their new toys on disastrous military interventions against Iran or Iranian proxies in, say, Yemen. The quick and unsatisfying answer to these concerns is the global market. The Arab Gulf states have money, and that money will buy the weapons that are available. If U.S. arms are not for sale, fine: French, Chinese, or Russian arms will be. (And if you don’t believe me, look at the way in which Gulf states—frustrated by U.S. export controls on drone technology—are turning to the Chinese.) Selling U.S. arms to the Gulf states, by contrast, further ties them to U.S. interests by deepening cooperation and interoperability between the U.S. military and its Gulf partners. One of the reasons Qatar wanted to buy U.S. fighters to partially replace its French-made fleet, for example, was because they discovered how difficult it was for their existing fighter aircraft to fly with the U.S. air force as part of coalitions over Libya and Syria. Arms sales also drive down the cost of our own weapons and thus the amount of money U.S. tax-payers have to spend on defense instead of other priorities like, say, the State Department, school lunches, or housing subsidies. Here’s one example: Because the United States is buying fewer F-35s than originally planned and using more of its “fourth generation” fighters (F-15s, F-16s, etc.) in the skies over Iraq and Syria than previously anticipated, the Department of Defense will likely need to buy more of those fourth generation fighters in the coming years. The recent sales of F-15s to Qatar, F-18s to Kuwait, and F-16s to Bahrain will drive down the cost per plane for the Pentagon. That’s a good thing—at least financially. Morally, though, many progressives just grow ill at the idea of selling weapons abroad. Senator Chris Murphy, for example—one of the more eloquent and consistent critics of U.S. arms sales in the Senate, even though his own state has a very robust defense industrial base—sees nothing admirable about the idea of selling weapons to the Saudis that might be used in Yemen. Other progressives agree: Yes, they argue, we understand the demand of the market will be met by someone, but do we have to be complicit in providing the supply? In other countries, progressives have even taken to the courts in an effort to halt sales. I have a lot of respect for these progressives and their values. I spent too much time in Sunday School as a kid to not feel a little uneasy about the business of selling weapons. And the angst many progressives feel about U.S. arms sales has been enough to keep many Democrats from talking up their successes in helping U.S. industry abroad. I wonder, though, if there isn’t a real political cost to not doing so. Boeing employs 157,000 people—almost all of them in the United States. 14,500 people work in Boeing’s facilities in Missouri, where the F-15 and F-18 are made, where Senator Claire McCaskill is up for reelection next year, and where Donald Trump trounced Hillary Clinton 56 to 38 percent in 2016. (Those 14,500 people do not include the many thousands of other Americans who make parts for the F-15 and F-18 elsewhere in America.) Lockheed Martin, meanwhile, a huge winner in the recent arms deal with Saudi Arabia (despite ace businessman Jared Kushner negotiating the price down on behalf of the Saudis), employs an additional 97,000 workers—again, most of them in the United States. And Raytheon, another big winner last week, employs another 60,000 or so Americans. Donald Trump obviously has no moral qualms about selling weapons to our partners and allies abroad. And so while Democrats leave points on the board with working-class voters by not talking about how much Democrats do to support U.S. industry, Republicans swoop in to take credit with assembly line workers for even those things that Obama approved and set in motion. The way in which Trump brags about U.S. arms sales, of course, is in keeping with the strain of economic mercantilism that ran through his populist campaign message. That message worked with voters throughout the Midwest, helping to cost Clinton the election. So while progressives might have moral qualms about companies that sell weapons, the roughly 1.2 million American voters who work in the aerospace and defense sector—together with the roughly 3.2 million Americans who support the sector indirectly—see little wrong with the sales that help ensure their livelihoods and provide a future for their children. This might be another area in which progressive elites—who have the kinds of education and skills that don’t require them to seek work on the assembly line—are simply out of touch with the voters they need to win back control of the Congress and state assemblies, never mind the presidency. And politics aside, surely even the moral calculus of arms sales gets more complicated when you think about the millions of American mouths that are fed by mothers and fathers who work in the aerospace and defense sector. Donald Trump, for his part, is speaking to those voters. And even as progressives fret about U.S. arms sales, they should also fret about what it will mean for the rest of their agenda when Republicans claim credit for protecting some of the last good assembly-line jobs in America.

### DA – Econ (Saudi Arabia)

#### Plan crushes the defense industry.

Davies ’18 Davies, Rob. “How much damage can Saudi Arabia do to the global economy?.” *The Guardian*. 15 October 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/15/how-much-damage-can-saudi-arabia-do-to-the-global-economy>. [Premier]

Saudi Arabia also supports thousands of US jobs via its arms purchases. It is the world’s second-largest arms importer after India and 61% of those imports come from the US. It was the US’s biggest arms customer last year, signing $17.5bn worth of deals, a trend that looks set to continue after Donald Trump signed a $110bn defence agreement in Riyadh last year. The alliance stands to benefit US employers such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil. Some of the firms are reported to have expressed concern to Trump already about the impact that a freeze in Saudi-US relations might have. Riyadh could, for example, simply switch its purchases to other major arms exporters such as Russia and China.

### DA – War Powers (Saudi Arabia)

#### The senate is poised to end military aid for the Yemen War, but it won’t pass now. The plan would be the first ever exercise of the War Powers Act.

Detrow ’18 Detrow, Scott. “Senate Poised To Vote To End U.S. Military Support For War In Yemen.” *NPR*. 12 December 2018. <https://www.npr.org/2018/12/12/676152310/senate-poised-to-vote-to-end-u-s-military-support-for-war-in-yemen>. [Premier]

The U.S. Senate is poised to deliver a historic rebuke to both Saudi Arabia and the Trump administration Thursday, passing a resolution demanding an end to U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia's ongoing war in Yemen. The resolution draws on congressional authority spelled out in the 1973 War Powers Act – authority that, until now, Congress has never actually used. The effort to stop American involvement in Yemen is still a long way from a done deal. The House would have to pass the resolution by years' end and President Trump would have to sign it — two steps that likely will not happen. Still, Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., calls the vote "a profound message." "It says to the country, it says to the world, the United States Senate — hopefully in good numbers today — says we will not be part of this brutal, horrific war in Yemen led by an undemocratic, despotic regime," Sanders told NPR. "That's a profound statement that will reverberate all over the world." The years-long conflict, viewed as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, has spiraled into a growing humanitarian disaster. The U.S. military has provided refueling for Saudi aircraft carrying out strikes — assistance the Trump administration ended amid growing criticism — and helped Saudi Arabia with other strategic assistance, as well. Sanders and a handful of other senators, including Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., and Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah, have been working for more than a year to round up support for the resolution. Only 44 senators voted for it in March. But two weeks ago, more than 60 lawmakers voted to advance debate the same bill. Roughly the same amount of senators are expected to support the resolution tonight, sending it to the House. Sanders and Murphy say two key moments contributed to the push's growing momentum: Saudi bombing of a school bus filled with Yemeni children in August, and what the C.I.A. believes to be the Saudi government-sanctioned killing in August of Washington Post writer Jamal Khashoggi. "I think that exposed to the world what this regime is about," Sanders said of the Khashoggi killing. "And people began to ask, why are we allied with a Saudi war in Yemen which is killing children? Maybe it's time to rethink that." The late-November procedural vote came hours after Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stonewalled senators in a closed-door bipartisan briefing about the administration's response to the Khashoggi killing, which also likely contributed to the bipartisan support for the Yemen bill. "There is no direct reporting connecting [Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman] to the order to murder Jamal Khashoggi," Pompeo told reporters after the briefing. "I don't think there's anybody in that room that doesn't believe he was responsible for it," Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said minutes later. Corker voted to advance the Yemen resolution that day, but says he'll vote against the measure this evening. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., opposes the measure, even though it's expected to pass with bipartisan support. "If the Senate wants to pick a constitutional fight with the executive branch over war powers, I would advise my colleagues to pick a better case," he said on the Senate floor Wednesday.

### DA – Suez Canal (Egypt)

#### Plan strips access to the Suez Canal which is key to regional stability and economic growth.

Clingan ’18 Clingan, Bruce. “Commentary: The U.S. is right to restore aid to Egypt.” *Rueters*. 30 July 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE>. [Premier]

Last week the United States restored the $195 million in military aid that it had withheld from Egypt because of the country’s human rights record and its ties to North Korea. This was the right move. Egypt has long been one of the world’s largest recipients of U.S. aid, accepting $71.6 billion in bilateral military and economic aid between 1948 and 2011 – the largest amount of any country in that time period, other than Israel. The United States has given Egypt about $1.3 billion per year in military aid since 1987. Last August, the United States decided to deny Egypt $95.7 million in aid and to delay an additional $195 million because of concerns about human rights under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Sisi was elected president after he led the army in ousting Mohammad Mursi. His government then enacted a law restricting the activities of nongovernmental organizations – part of a wider crackdown on dissent. Under Sisi scores of websites have been taken down and journalists and opponents have been arrested. In a 2017 State Department memo to Congress, U.S. officials wrote that the “overall human rights climate in Egypt continues to deteriorate, with the government enacting legislation that conflicts with its human rights obligations, including the right of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and due process guarantees.” In March voters elected Sisi to a second term, in an election that saw all major opposition candidates cut short their campaigns, citing intimidation. Yet despite Sisi’s record on human rights, it is still in the United States’ interests to support Egypt. Doing so will help hold the line against IS and prevent Egypt from turning to a country like Russia for security and economic cooperation. Washington should adopt a two-track approach with Egypt, as it has historically done with Turkey, advancing security issues at the same time it pushes for improvements in human rights and democracy. Egypt has long been a critical U.S. security partner because of its control of the Suez Canal and its border with Israel. When U.S. forces are engaged in the region, Egypt provides expedited access for U.S. naval vessels transiting the Suez Canal and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft, both of which are crucial for the United States’ ability to project power across the Middle East. Its role as a linchpin of regional stability has grown with multiple forces roiling the Middle East in recent years. Amid Iranian and Russian entrenchment in the Levant, and the recent rise in IS and Hamas operations, Egypt has remained squarely in the camp of secular and reformist Middle Eastern countries trying to stop the spread of Islamist extremism. Cairo is working with Israel to contain IS in the Sinai and Hamas in Gaza, and the countries’ navies coordinate regularly on Mediterranean security issues. I met with Sisi in May, when I visited Egypt as part of a delegation sponsored by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, and he was keen to emphasize the common security interests Cairo shares with Washington and Jerusalem, and his desire to advance both partnerships. Egypt’s internal security is threatened by a relentless IS-affiliated insurgency in Sinai. In November the group attacked a Sinai mosque, killing more than 300 people. Egypt also faces the ever-present challenge of preventing the conflict in Libya from spilling over its western border. (While Cairo and Washington both want a stable Libya, the Sisi government is backing Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a military strongman who was once a CIA asset; the United States is supporting his rival and UN-backed Libyan government.) Further instability in Egypt would be disastrous for its nearly 100 million citizens, the region and the United States. Regardless of which might come first – the collapse of Egypt’s economy or the spread of Islamist insurgency – the other would surely follow. The result would be new extremist safe havens, millions of desperate Egyptians seeking to flee to Europe, an existential threat to Israel, the disruption of the Suez Canal upon which global economic stability depends and the potential for the United States to get involved in yet another Middle East quagmire.

#### Specifically, the Suez Canal is key to military operations – cutting aid strips access and would be filled in by regional partners.

Michaels ’13 Michaels, Jim. “U.S. military needs Egypt for access to critical area.” *USA Today*. 17 August 2013. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/08/17/egypt-morsi-obama-hagel-gulf-heritage-brookings/2665903/>. [Premier]

The U.S. military is heavily dependent on Egypt to move personnel and equipment to Afghanistan and around volatile parts of the Middle East, complicating U.S. efforts to place pressure on the Egyptian military in the wake of its violent crackdown on protesters. "Egypt has been a cornerstone for the U.S. military presence in the Middle East," said James Phillips, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation. During the past year, more than 2,000 U.S. military aircraft flew through Egyptian airspace, supporting missions in Afghanistan and throughout the Middle East, according to U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for the region. About 35 to 45 U.S. 5th Fleet naval ships pass through the Suez Canal annually, including carrier strike groups, according to the Bahrain-based fleet. Egypt has allowed U.S. warships to be expedited, which often means getting to the head of a very long line of ships waiting for access to the canal. "The Egyptian military has always been good to us," said Kenneth Pollack, an analyst at the Brookings Institution. Egyptian cooperation is particularly critical at a time when the Pentagon is facing budget pressures and tensions with Iran remain high. In response to the Egyptian military's bloody crackdown on protesters, President Obama announced this week that the United States would cancel Bright Star, a training exercise with Egypt that had been scheduled for next month. Washington has also suspended the delivery of a shipment of F-16 fighter aircraft. Obama stopped short of cutting off the $1.3 billion in annual military aid it supplies to Egypt, though some in Congress, including Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., have called for cutting the aid. In canceling the exercise, the president said he was balancing the need to advance U.S. interests with "the principles that we believe in." If Egypt cut off its airspace and canal access, the U.S. military would face heavier costs and much longer transit times as it positions troops and equipment in the Middle East. For example, without access to the canal, which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, warships would generally have to sail around Africa in order to get to the Persian Gulf. Analysts say Egypt's ruling military would probably not cut off air and sea access immediately if U.S. aid were cut, but the relationship might deteriorate rapidly, particularly if Egypt's generals feel they don't need the aid. Persian Gulf states may take up some of the slack if the United States cuts its aid. Relieved that Egypt's military removed a Muslim Brotherhood government, Gulf nations, including Saudi Arabia, have already pledged billions of dollars to Egypt. Historically, Egypt's leaders have been sensitive to the appearance that outside powers are pushing them around. Egypt closed the 120-mile-long Suez Canal after the Six Day Arab-Israeli war in 1967. "Egyptian nationalism is a critical factor," said Anthony Cordesman, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. U.S. military leaders have remained in touch with their Egyptian counterparts throughout the crisis in an effort to maintain the close relationship and communicate Washington's concerns.

### DA –Econ (Egypt)

#### Egypt’s economy will stay afloat now. Foreign investment – like the IMF – is key.

Rosenberg ’18 Rosenberg, David. “Egypt, Economic Miracle or Basket Case on the Nile?.” *Hareetz*. 3 October 2018. <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/egypt/.premium-egypt-economic-miracle-or-basket-case-on-the-nile-1.6517031>. [Premier]

Actually, both sides have a case. The fact is that the Egyptian economy has made remarkable progress in the last three years – at least by the measures that most concern the IMF and international investors. GDP growth exceeded 5% in the fiscal year ended in June, its strongest in a decade. Meanwhile, the government has cut its debt from 103.5% of GDP in fiscal 2017 to 86%, which is one reason why Moody’s (another grown-up or evil sock puppet) is optimistic about the country’s outlook. Egypt’s budget deficit fell below 10% for the first time since Hosni Mubarak was toppled in 2011 and the economy went into a tailspin. This was achieved with the help of a $12 billion loan the IMF granted Egypt in 2016, which moved Sissi to undertake a series of badly needed reforms. He cut energy subsidies, raised taxes, let the pound float freely and is introducing a raft of laws to make it easier to do business -- all things designed to please global investors, who have at least until recently been ready to buy Egyptian debt. Alas, Egypt had no choice about addressing their interests, because it so desperately needs their capital.

#### Cutting aid will crush Egypt’s economy by deterring other funds and forcing investment into revamping the military – the link is as significant as an IMF loan.

Zamzam ’13 Zamzam, Roqaya. “U.S. Military Aid Cut Might Not Just Affect Egypt.” *Caravan*. 19 November 2013. <http://www.auccaravan.com/?p=1396>. [Premier]

The decision to partially cut U.S. military aid to Egypt for the first time stirred controversy over the effects on both countries on the political and economic levels. The US decided last month to partially suspend military equipment and economic aid given to Egypt. The Foreign Assistance Act mandates that the US cuts aid to any country that isn’t practicing democracy or that has encountered a military coup. “If they suspend the aid, they lose the last bargaining chip they have in the region,” said Samer Atalla, economics Professor at AUC. Holger Albrecht, assistant Professor in the AUC department of political science, does not believe support for Egypt is politically crucial for the US. “There is always talk about strategic interest that America has in the Middle East, but I can’t find any strategic interests found in the Middle East that don’t allow for any alternative thinking,” said Albrecht. Albrecht also believes that even if the aid is provided to maintain peaceful relations with Israel, it’s time for change. “[The US] might rethink and reformulate their entire foreign policy [towards] a [relatively] big region [because of] relations to one particular country,” he said, explaining that Israelis should be able to “look after themselves” without the US tailoring its foreign policy towards many countries in the Middle East just to support Israel. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF US MILITARY AID Atalla said that the U.S. military aid does not benefit the Egyptian economy; however, Albrecht argues that it boosts it by generating more aid from other countries. “The [military] aid goes to the U.S. military for supplying weapons for Egypt, so it is not a great booster for [Egypt’s] economy,” said Atalla, adding that the money goes back to U.S. suppliers who deliver their military products to Egypt. Mohamed Waked, a political activist who holds a Ph.D. in mediating aid in Egypt, told the Caravan that the military aid does not allow Egypt to buy any equipment from countries other than the US and some of its allies, and that the US provides Egypt with a list of weapons they can buy using the aid. Atalla said that on one hand, Egypt benefits from the aid in terms of the received weapons. But on the other hand, it is rather the U.S. economy that is “enriched” because American businessmen find a flow of money when they produce weapons. However, Albrecht said that good relations with the US benefit Egypt economically because they allow the country to get funds elsewhere and thus reform the Egyptian economy. “These funds are [as] significant as a deal with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] would be,” said Albrecht, adding, “They resemble a possible deal with the IMF or other governments in the European Union and single member states.” CONSEQUENCES OF CUTTING MILITARY AID Due to the fact that it will be left with overdue bills to U.S. defense contractors, the U.S. government might lose money if the aid is, in fact, cut. According to U.S. officials, stopping the military aid would result in breaking the contracts regarding weapons delivery to Egypt. As a result, the U.S. government would be responsible for paying overdue bills for the weapons that were produced but not delivered. According to The Jerusalem Post, analysts have estimated that the U.S. government may endure up to $3 billion bills when aid stops. However, Albrecht said that the US is capable of enduring the penalties, because it is a stronger player and would easily be able to reformulate its interests. “The U.S. government will find a way to get rid of the materials. They were meant to be delivered as [goods] to some friendly countries and Egypt from their perspective wasn’t that friendly,” said Albrecht. “They have the right to reconsider supporting it,” he added. Albrecht believes that Egypt’s economy might suffer if it turns to another country for support to the Egyptian military. “Most of the material the military is using is western in origin, so searching for an alternative would hurt a little bit,” said Albrecht, referring to the maintenance of the spare parts of the equipment that already exists in Egypt. Albrecht added that if Egypt changes its military supporter, the training for the use of already existent equipment will “all go to waste” and 30 years of agreements will have to be changed.

### DA – Backlash (Pakistan)

#### Pressure will spark backlash – threatens prolif, war, and terror – also turns case.

Felbab-Brown ’18 Felbab-Brown, Vanda (Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence). “Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US finds it so hard to induce change.” *Brookings*. 5 January 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change>. [Premier]

But there are limits to U.S. coercive power vis-à-vis Pakistan. The United States has many interests in Pakistan, beyond the Afghan conflict: ensuring the stable control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, getting Pakistan to dispense with the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (which could fall into terrorists’ hands), dissuading Pakistan from resurrecting its past nuclear proliferation activities, and preventing a major Pakistan-India war, as well as Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks in India. Moreover, the United States wants to encourage democratization, pluralization, and stronger civilian and technocratic governance in Pakistan. Just as there is a young, educated, well-meaning technocratic segment of the population battling it out against the warlords and parochial powerbrokers in Afghanistan, there are such reformist elements in Pakistan. Thus, in response to U.S. pressure, Pakistan could threaten any of these interests. For example, it can discontinue cooperation on nuclear safety issues or suspend Pakistan-India nuclear confidence-building measures. It could also consider provoking border instability in the Punjab. Most immediately, Pakistan can again shut down the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for U.S. military logistics—not just the ground lines of transportation, as in 2011, but also air routes—as well as for Afghan trade—as it has done before. That would significantly hamper U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Despite President Ashraf Ghani’s goals to the contrary, Pakistan will remain a crucial market for Afghan goods and logistical access.

### DA – Stability (Africa)

#### Aid is effective and necessary to maintain stability.

Allen ’16 Allen, Nathaniel (Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow at the United States of Institute of Peace and Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University). “U.S. Military Assistance to Africa Is Growing. But Is It Succeeding?.” World Politics Review. 23 September 2016. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19995/u-s-military-assistance-to-africa-is-growing-but-is-it-succeeding>. [Premier]

Despite these setbacks, a policy of U.S. retrenchment isn’t desirable from a strategic standpoint, and it wouldn’t likely make citizens across Africa any more safe. First, not all of AFRICOM’s engagements have ended in failure. Although there is plenty of skepticism over U.S. military involvement, many African governments are taking advantage of U.S. training, equipment, intelligence and special operations forces capabilities to respond to crises and fight conflicts. U.S. efforts to support the African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, have been an unqualified success, pushing al-Shabab militants out of most of their formerly held territory, including the capital, Mogadishu. So have anti-piracy task forces in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea. Amid the Ebola crisis, AFRICOM sent some 3,000 troops to Liberia to assist with efforts to combat the disease at the explicit request of Liberia’s president, as local resources were being overwhelmed. Second, the U.S. cannot back out of its current commitments so easily. Just about every authoritarian regime the U.S. works with plays a critical role in regional security. Djibouti hosts the largest and only official American base on the continent. Ethiopia hosts the headquarters of the African Union. Uganda plays a leading role in providing peacekeeping troops to fight al-Shabab in Somalia. The armies of Chad and Cameroon have been instrumental in containing Boko Haram. And despite these regime’s ugly human rights records, the truth is armies of other fragile states and nascent democracies across Africa fare little better. From the 319th Commando Battalion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit, the involvement of U.S.-trained units in the rape, torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings of noncombatants is unfortunately all too common.

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### Cap

#### Arms sales to authoritarian regimes are just a symptom of capitalism in crisis. The aff represents a reactionary politics that retains the influence of the military-industrial complex over the state. The alternative is a mass political mobilization towards socialism – solves the aff.

Van Auken ’13 Van Auken, Bill. “The tripling of US arms sales.” *World Socialist Web Site*. 30 August 2012. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/08/pers-a30.html>. [Premier]

The tripling of US arms sales abroad to a record $66.3 billion is an accurate barometer of the accelerating drive to war in the Persian Gulf and on a world scale. This one violently surging sector of American exports reflects a diseased capitalist economy and society, whose financial-corporate elite resorts to militarism as a means of offsetting the overall economic decline of the United States. The annual survey of global arms sales released this week by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the policy research arm of the US Congress, places the United States number one in the provision of advanced weaponry to the world by an overwhelming margin. “In 2011, the US led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at $66.3 billion (77.7 percent of all such agreements), an extraordinary increase from $21.4 billion in 2010. The US worldwide agreements total in 2011 is the largest for a single year in the history of the US arms export program,” according to the report prepared for Congress. In an earlier period, Washington justified such weapons deals as part of its Cold War strategy of countering the influence of the Soviet Union and propping up regimes aligned with the West against Moscow and its allies. This was under conditions where Soviet arms sales to the so-called Third World rivaled and even surpassed those of the United States. Today, however, as the CRS report makes clear, the US accounts for more than three quarters of global arms deals, with the share of its closest competitor, Russia, amounting to just 5.6 percent. The massive rise in US arms sales is driven by the accelerating turn toward aggressive war as a means of achieving the strategic global objectives of US imperialism, combined with the insatiable drive for profit and power by America’s bloated military-industrial complex. The lion’s share of the rise in arms exports is directed to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which together account for $38.2 billion of the $66.3 billion total. The other major sales were $2 billion worth of antimissile batteries to Taiwan—a provocative move aimed against China—and $6.9 billion in arms to India, ratcheting up tensions with its regional antagonist, Pakistan. The Saudi monarchy’s purchase of 84 advanced F-15 fighter planes together with dozens of military helicopters and other weapons yielded super profits for Boeing and United Technologies. The regime in the UAE obtained a $3.5 billion sophisticated missile defense system, providing rich returns for Lockheed Martin. The CRS report includes the observation: “Whereas the principal motivation for arms sales by key foreign suppliers in earlier years might have been to support a foreign policy objective, today that motivation may be based as much, if not more, on economic considerations as those of foreign or national security policy.” In reality, these foreign policy objectives and economic interests feed each other. The military-industrial complex that the former general Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against at the end of his presidency a half-century ago has grown to gargantuan proportions, dominating the US government and both major parties and playing a grossly disproportionate role in the American economy. It provides a powerful impetus to both militarism abroad and the assault on democratic rights at home. The purchases by the monarchical regimes in the Arab world stem, on the one hand, from their reaction to the popular upheavals that were dubbed the “Arab Spring” and, on the other, from the buildup by the US and its allies for another war, this time against Iran. The House of Saud, which runs Saudi Arabia as a family fiefdom, saw in the events in Tunisia, Egypt and particularly Bahrain, where its troops were used to suppress mass protests, a mortal threat to its absolutist rule. An essential part of its response is the dramatic expansion of its military apparatus. The buildup to war against Iran, just as the one that preceded the war of aggression against Iraq a decade ago, has been publicly justified as a response to the supposed threat posed by “weapons of mass destruction.” The US and its allies have claimed that Iran’s nuclear program is directed at producing nuclear weapons, a charge repeatedly denied by the government in Iran, which insists the program is for peaceful purposes. The hypocrisy of these charges against Iran, which have provided the pretext for crippling sanctions, the deployment of a US air and sea armada in the Persian Gulf, and threats by Israel and the US of an unprovoked military assault, is evident in the figures provided by the US arms sales report. The amount of weaponry Washington sold to the Saudi and UAE regimes alone last year amounted to nearly six times Iran’s entire military budget. The US geo-strategic objective in sponsoring these weapons sales is to create potently armed regional proxies for a war for regime-change in Iran. This process is already playing out in Syria, where Washington’s major arms customers—Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are openly sponsoring the so-called rebels seeking the overthrow of Iran’s principal Arab ally, the government of Bashar al-Assad. This sponsorship has extended to the creation of a $100 million fund to pay the salaries of the militias challenging the Syrian government, as well as the provision of weapons, which is being coordinated by the CIA in Turkey and undoubtedly on the ground in Syria itself. The preparations for war against Iran are directed at tightening US hegemony over the energy-rich regions of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, which the landmass of Iran spans. In that sense, the aggression being prepared against Iran and its people under Obama is in pursuit of the same aims that underlay the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq launched under Bush. The arms industry is massively subsidized by the American taxpayer. While the political establishment and media insist “there is no money” when it comes to jobs, decent wages, education and vital public services, endless billions are lavished on America’s merchants of death. American working people neither share in this industry’s state-subsidized profits nor have any say over its sale of powerful weapons systems to reactionary regimes. Just as mass opposition emerged to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is similar popular hostility to arming the Saudi and UAE monarchs to the teeth, not to mention being dragged into yet another war, this time against Iran. The disappearance of any mass protest against war is a reflection not of popular sentiment, but rather of the reactionary politics of a privileged middle class layer of pseudo-lefts that deliberately worked to channel anti-war sentiment behind Obama and the Democratic Party. A new mass movement against war can be built only through an irreconcilable break with the Democratic Party and the US two-party system. What is required is the independent political mobilization of the working class on the basis of a socialist program, including the conversion of the arms industry into publicly owned facilities dedicated to production for human needs rather than mass slaughter.

#### War is *not* a function of politics – war is first and foremost an extension of capitalism. Arms sales are just *one* manifestation of the military-industrial complex that drives war.

Astore ’13 Astore, William. “The Business of America Is War: Disaster Capitalism on the Battlefield and in the Boardroom.” *Truthout*. 21 October 2018. <https://truthout.org/articles/the-business-of-america-is-war-disaster-capitalism-on-the-battlefield-and-in-the-boardroom/>. [Premier]

There is a new normal in America: our government may shut down, but our wars continue. Congress may not be able to pass a budget, but the U.S. military can still launch commando raids in Libya and Somalia, the Afghan War can still be prosecuted, Italy can be garrisoned by American troops (putting the “empire” back in Rome), Africa can be used as an imperial playground (as in the late nineteenth century “scramble for Africa,” but with the U.S. and China doing the scrambling this time around), and the military-industrial complex can still dominate the world’s arms trade. In the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, it’s business as usual, if your definition of “business” is the power and profits you get from constantly preparing for and prosecuting wars around the world. “War is a racket,” General Smedley Butler famously declared in 1935, and even now it’s hard to disagree with a man who had two Congressional Medals of Honor to his credit and was intimately familiar with American imperialism. War Is Politics, Right? Once upon a time, as a serving officer in the U.S. Air Force, I was taught that Carl von Clausewitz had defined war as a continuation of politics by other means. This definition is, in fact, a simplification of his classic and complex book, On War, written after his experiences fighting Napoleon in the early nineteenth century. The idea of war as a continuation of politics is both moderately interesting and dangerously misleading: interesting because it connects war to political processes and suggests that they should be fought for political goals; misleading because it suggests that war is essentially rational and so controllable. The fault here is not Clausewitz’s, but the American military’s for misreading and oversimplifying him. Perhaps another “Carl” might lend a hand when it comes to helping Americans understand what war is really all about. I’m referring to Karl Marx, who admired Clausewitz, notably for his idea that combat is to war what a cash payment is to commerce. However seldom combat (or such payments) may happen, they are the culmination and so the ultimate arbiters of the process. War, in other words, is settled by killing, a bloody transaction that echoes the exploitative exchanges of capitalism. Marx found this idea to be both suggestive and pregnant with meaning. So should we all. Following Marx, Americans ought to think about war not just as an extreme exercise of politics, but also as a continuation of exploitative commerce by other means. Combat as commerce: there’s more in that than simple alliteration. In the history of war, such commercial transactions took many forms, whether as territory conquered, spoils carted away, raw materials appropriated, or market share gained. Consider American wars. The War of 1812 is sometimes portrayed as a minor dust-up with Britain, involving the temporary occupation and burning of our capital, but it really was about crushing Indians on the frontier and grabbing their land. The Mexican-American War was another land grab, this time for the benefit of slaveholders. The Spanish-American War was a land grab for those seeking an American empire overseas, while World War I was for making the world “safe for democracy” — and for American business interests globally. Even World War II, a war necessary to stop Hitler and Imperial Japan, witnessed the emergence of the U.S. as the arsenal of democracy, the world’s dominant power, and the new imperial stand-in for a bankrupt British Empire. Korea? Vietnam? Lots of profit for the military-industrial complex and plenty of power for the Pentagon establishment. Iraq, the Middle East, current adventures in Africa? Oil, markets, natural resources, global dominance. In societal calamities like war, there will always be winners and losers. But the clearest winners are often companies like Boeing and Dow Chemical, which provided B-52 bombers and Agent Orange, respectively, to the U.S. military in Vietnam. Such “arms merchants” — an older, more honest term than today’s “defense contractor” — don’t have to pursue the hard sell, not when war and preparations for it have become so permanently, inseparably intertwined with the American economy, foreign policy, and our nation’s identity as a rugged land of “warriors” and “heroes” (more on that in a moment). War as Disaster Capitalism Consider one more definition of war: not as politics or even as commerce, but as societal catastrophe. Thinking this way, we can apply Naomi Klein’s concepts of the “shock doctrine” and “disaster capitalism” to it. When such disasters occur, there are always those who seek to turn a profit. Most Americans are, however, discouraged from thinking about war this way thanks to the power of what we call “patriotism” or, at an extreme, “superpatriotism” when it applies to us, and the significantly more negative “nationalism” or “ultra-nationalism” when it appears in other countries. During wars, we’re told to “support our troops,” to wave the flag, to put country first, to respect the patriotic ideal of selfless service and redemptive sacrifice (even if all but 1% of us are never expected to serve or sacrifice). We’re discouraged from reflecting on the uncomfortable fact that, as “our” troops sacrifice and suffer, others in society are profiting big time. Such thoughts are considered unseemly and unpatriotic. Pay no attention to the war profiteers, who pass as perfectly respectable companies. After all, any price is worth paying (or profits worth offering up) to contain the enemy — not so long ago, the red menace, but in the twenty-first century, the murderous terrorist. Forever war is forever profitable. Think of the Lockheed Martinsof the world. In their commerce with the Pentagon, as well as the militaries of other nations, they ultimately seek cash payment for their weapons and a world in which such weaponry will be eternally needed. In the pursuit of security or victory, political leaders willingly pay their price. Call it a Clausewitzian/Marxian feedback loop or the dialectic of Carl and Karl. It also represents the eternal marriage of combat and commerce. If it doesn’t catch all of what war is about, it should at least remind us of the degree to which war as disaster capitalism is driven by profit and power. For a synthesis, we need only turn from Carl or Karl to Cal — President Calvin Coolidge, that is. “The business of America is business,” he declared in the Roaring Twenties. Almost a century later, the business of America is war, even if today’s presidents are too polite to mention that the business is booming. America’s War Heroes as Commodities Many young people today are, in fact, looking for a release from consumerism. In seeking new identities, quite a few turn to the military. And it provides. Recruits are hailed as warriors and warfighters, as heroes, and not just within the military either, but by society at large. Yet in joining the military and being celebrated for that act, our troops paradoxically become yet another commodity, another consumable of the state. Indeed, they become consumed by war and its violence. Their compensation? To be packaged and marketed as the heroes of our militarized moment. Steven Gardiner, a cultural anthropologist and U.S. Army veteran, has written eloquently about what he calls the “heroic masochism” of militarized settings and their allure for America’s youth. Put succinctly, in seeking to escape a consumerism that has lost its meaning and find a release from dead-end jobs, many volunteers are transformed into celebrants of violence, seekers and givers of pain, a harsh reality Americans ignore as long as that violence is acted out overseas against our enemies and local populations. Such “heroic” identities, tied so closely to violence in war, often prove poorly suited to peacetime settings. Frustration and demoralization devolve into domestic violence and suicide. In an American society with ever fewer meaningful peacetime jobs, exhibiting greater and greater polarization of wealth and opportunity, the decisions of some veterans to turn to or return to mind-numbing drugs of various sorts and soul-stirring violence is tragically predictable. That it stems from their exploitative commodification as so many heroic inflictors of violence in our name is a reality most Americans are content to forget. You May Not Be Interested in War, but War Is Interested in You As Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky pithily observed, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” If war is combat and commerce, calamity and commodity, it cannot be left to our political leaders alone — and certainly not to our generals. When it comes to war, however far from it we may seem to be, we’re all in our own ways customers and consumers. Some pay a high price. Many pay a little. A few gain a lot. Keep an eye on those few and you’ll end up with a keener appreciation of what war is actually all about. No wonder our leaders tell us not to worry our little heads about our wars — just support those troops, go shopping, and keep waving that flag. If patriotism is famously the last refuge of the scoundrel, it’s also the first recourse of those seeking to mobilize customers for the latest bloodletting exercise in combat as commerce. Just remember: in the grand bargain that is war, it’s their product and their profit. And that’s no bargain for America, or for that matter for the world.

### Rights Discourse

#### Human rights discourse is a modern manifestation of imperialism. Military aid should not be conditioned on “behaving” like Western democracies. Instead, prefer a bottom-up approach to resolves particular scenarios for the sole end of helping others.

Posner ’14 Posner, Eric (Professor at the University of Chicago Law School). “The Case Against Human Rights.” *The Guardian*. 4 December 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights>. [Premier]

In his influential book The White Man’s Burden, William Easterly argues that much of the foreign-aid establishment is in the grip of an ideology that is a softer-edge version of the civilising mission of 19th-century imperialists. Westerners no longer believe that white people are superior to other people on racial grounds, but they do believe that regulated markets, the rule of law and liberal democracy are superior to the systems that prevail in non-western countries, and they have tried to implement those systems in the developing world. Easterly himself does not oppose regulated markets and liberal democracy, nor does he oppose foreign aid. He instead attacks the ideology of the “planners” – people who believe that the west can impose a political and economic blueprint that will advance wellbeing in other countries. Since the second world war, western countries contributed trillions of dollars of aid to developing countries. The aid has taken many different forms: unrestricted cash, loans at below-market interest rates, cash that must be used to buy western products, in-kind projects such as dams and plants, technical assistance, education and “rule-of-law” projects designed to improve the quality of legal institutions. For a while, the “Washington consensus” imposed cookie-cutter market-based prescriptions on countries that needed to borrow money. The consensus among economists is that these efforts have failed. The reasons are varied. Giving cash and loans to a government to build projects such as power plants will not help the country if government officials skim off a large share and give contracts to cronies incapable of implementing those projects. Providing experts to improve the legal infrastructure of the country will not help if local judges refuse to enforce the new laws because of corruption or tradition or incompetence. Pressuring governments to combat corruption will not help if payoffs to mob bosses, clan chiefs, or warlords are needed to maintain social order. Demanding that aid recipients use money in ways that they believe unnecessary can encourage governments to evade the conditions of the donations. The Washington consensus failed because economic reform requires the consent of the public, and populations resented the imposition by foreigners of harsh policies that were not always wise on their own terms. International human rights law reflects the same top-down mode of implementation, pursued in the same crude manner. But human rights law has its distinctive features as well. Because it is law, it requires the consent of states, creating an illusion of symmetry and even-handedness that is missing from foreign aid. Hence the insistence, wholly absent from discussions about foreign aid, that western countries are subject to international human rights law as other countries are. However, in practice, international human rights law does not require western countries to change their behaviour, while (in principle) it requires massive changes in the behaviour of most non-western countries. Both foreign aid and human rights enforcement can be corrupted or undermined because western countries have strategic interests that are not always aligned with the missions of those institutions. But the major problem, in both cases, is that the systems reflect a vision of good governance rooted in the common historical experiences of western countries and that prevails (albeit only approximately) in countries that enjoy wealth, security and order. There is no reason that this vision – the vision of institutionally enforced human rights – is appropriate for poor countries, with different traditions, and facing a range of challenges that belong, in the view of western countries, to the distant past. Development economics has gone some distance to curing itself of this error. The best development scholars today, such as Esther Duflo, have been experimenting furiously with different ways of improving lives of people living in foreign countries. Rigorous statistical methods are increasingly used, and in recent years economists have implemented a range of randomised controlled trials. Much greater attention is paid to the minutiae of social context, as it has become clear that a vaccination programme that works well in one location may fail in another, for reasons relating to social order that outsiders do not understand. Expectations have been lowered; the goal is no longer to convert poor societies into rich societies, or even to create market institutions and eliminate corruption; it is to help a school encourage children to read in one village, or to simplify lending markets in another. It is time to start over with an approach to promoting wellbeing in foreign countries that is empirical rather than ideological. Human rights advocates can learn a lot from the experiences of development economists – not only about the flaws of top-down, coercive styles of forcing people living in other countries to be free, but about how one can actually help those people if one really wants to. Wealthy countries can and should provide foreign aid to developing countries, but with the understanding that helping other countries is not the same as forcing them to adopt western institutions, modes of governance, dispute-resolution systems and rights. Helping other countries means giving them cash, technical assistance and credit where there is reason to believe that these forms of aid will raise the living standards of the poorest people. Resources currently used in fruitless efforts to compel foreign countries to comply with the byzantine, amorphous treaty regime would be better used in this way. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the human rights treaties were not so much an act of idealism as an act of hubris, with more than a passing resemblance to the civilising efforts undertaken by western governments and missionary groups in the 19th century, which did little good for native populations while entangling European powers in the affairs of countries they did not understand. A humbler approach is long overdue.

## NCs

### Hobbes

#### The constitutive function of the state is to define truth – it exists outside the realm of moral obligation.

Williams ’96 Williams, Michael C. (Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa). “Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration.” *International Organization*, Volume 50, Number 2, pgs. 218-220. Spring 1996. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704077>. [Premier]

By themselves, the laws of nature are not enough, not because rational actors cannot trust each other enough to enter into a social contract but because in the condition of epistemological indeterminacy that Hobbes portrays as natural, this universality is at best a partial step. For even if all were to agree on the right to self-preservation, all need not necessarily agree on what comprised threats to that preservation, how to react to them, or how best to secure themselves against them. Conflict is not simply intrinsic to humanity's potential for aggression; nor can it be resolved directly through the utilitarian calcula- tions of competing and conflicting interests. On the contrary, Hobbes believes that the answer lies in recognizing the problem: namely, the inability to resolve objectively the problem of knowing facts and morals in any straightforward manner. Once this is recognized, the stage is set for Hobbes's solution, a solution that lies not-as Donald Hanson has argued-in a flight from politics but rather in an appeal to politics.19 Or, put another way, Hobbes tries to show how rational certainty and skepticism can be paradoxically combined into a solution for politics and a solution by politics. To escape the state of nature, individuals do not simply alienate their "right to everything" to a political authority.20 More fundamentally, what is granted to that authority is the right to decide among irresolvably contested truths: to provide the authoritative criteria for what is and thus to remove people from the state of epistemic and ethical anarchy that form the basis of the state of nature. Hobbes uses his skepticism both to show the necessity of his solution and to destroy (what he views as dogmatic) counterclaims to political authority based upon unsupportable (individual) claims to truth. In arguing against what he views as seditious individual claims against the authority of the sovereign in De Cive, Hobbes puts it in the following way: "the knowledge of good and evil belongs to each single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by equal right, and has not by any mutual pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true; nay, [proved it] ... [But in the civil state it is false. For it was shown. . .] that the civil laws were the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil. "21 Earlier in the same work, he phrased the argument even more unequivocally, noting that since "the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like; which every man esteems according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evel; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life." It follows that for Hobbes: "All judgment therefore, in a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority."22 These are the fundamental reasons why the sovereign must be unchallenge- able; to rebel is to return to the subjectively relative claim to know and the conflict that this inevitably entails. They also explain why the sovereign ultimately must control language (which defines what is) and clarify Hobbes's repeated stress on the importance of education rather than coercion as the essential element in a successful sovereign's rule.23 Interpretive dissent leads to political dissension and to conflict. In the words of Hobbes's patron, the Earl of Newcastle, "controversy Is a Civil Warr with the Pen which pulls out the sorde soon afterwards. "24

#### This means that the sovereign cannot be held accountable to international standards or norms – this would destroy the power of the sovereign to define meaning.

Williams ’96 Williams, Michael C. (Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa). “Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration.” *International Organization*, Volume 50, Number 2, pgs. 228-229. Spring 1996. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704077>. [Premier]

Again, Hobbes's problematic is not simply one of rational coordination and self-interest. It is also (indeed fundamentally) one of epistemic agreement. Without such agreement, he holds, social concord cannot come about. Hobbes rejects the extension of the social contract to the international level, not only because international relations do not constitute a true (and therefore less intolerable) state of nature, or because the laws of nature are not universal. Rather, his view seems to be that the necessarily authoritative role of sovereigns domestically precludes the extension of agreement internationally. The sovereign must remain absolutely authoritative or it cannot perform its necessary role. To hold it susceptible to international standards (or those of other sovereigns) would be the same as holding it accountable to individual judgments (and thus challenges) from its citizens domestically. And this is just what Hobbes feels it is imperative to avoid. The appeal to the laws of nature that underlies the rationalist view is inadequate as an understanding of Hobbes's international theory for the same reasons as a focus solely on the laws of nature provides an incomplete understanding of his theory of sovereignty; namely, it overlooks the importance of Hobbes's skepticism and the role of this skepticism in both making necessary and justifying Hobbes's belief in the need for absolute sovereignty. It is important to stress that a recognition of this shortcoming in the rationalist interpretation rests upon issues far removed from those invoked by neorealism and should in no way be seen as supporting neorealist claims. But it does pose a series of important and complex questions for the rationalist perspective on international society. For Hobbes, the link between the rational and the epistemological realms is crucial. He claims that the problems of political order can only be resolved by a shared understanding of the relationship between knowledge and politics (the rational principles of the laws of nature, the limits of human knowledge, and the necessary legitimacy of absolute sovereign authority that follows in their wake) together with the existence of a political authority that can overcome the limits of a purely rational solution.

## On Case

### US Credibility

#### Withdrawing aid undermines US credibility and leverage necessary to implement anti-corruption programs abroad.

Swedlund 18 Haley Swedlund [Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management at Radboud University Nijmegen] "There's another big reason US foreign aid is important: It helps the US get what it wants." The Washington Post. July 19. 2018. [Premier]

Politicians in donor countries determine how much foreign aid a particular country gets. But donor agencies like USAID are responsible for delivering that aid. In exchange for aid dollars, donor officials ask recipients to make changes like implementing anti-corruption programs, establishing an independent electoral commission or overhauling the country’s primary education system. This requires donor officials to negotiate with recipient governments over how and under what conditions aid will be delivered. In Ghana, for example, the United States promised up to $498.2 million to support the country’s power sector over a five-year period. In return, the government of Ghana committed to invest at least $37.4 million of its own money. The government also promised to implement a series of changes seen as necessary to improve the country’s power sector and encourage private sector investment. Aid dollars stimulated these promises. My research tells us that credible promises give donor officials a stronger bargaining position with recipient governments. If a donor agency is not able to keep its side of the bargain, why should the recipient?

#### US aid credibility is key to future negotiations.

Swedlund 18 Haley Swedlund [Assistant Professor at the Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management at Radboud University Nijmegen] "There's another big reason US foreign aid is important: It helps the US get what it wants." The Washington Post. July 19. 2018. [Premier]

That’s why drastic cuts in aid will hurt the U.S.’s ability to keep its promises to countries like Ghana. Retracting aid promises will discourage recipients from upholding their side of the bargain. It will also undermine the U.S.’s credibility in future negotiations. African governments like Ghana increasingly have access to financing from “nontraditional” donors like China. Just last month, Ghana signed a $10 billion memorandum of understanding with the Chinese to develop the country’s bauxite industry. Chinese financial assistance should not yet be seen as a replacement to traditional aid. Chinese aid is concentrated in the productive sectors (infrastructure, agriculture and mining) and mainly goes to Chinese companies. In contrast, traditional aid is more likely to go directly to recipient governments and supports social sectors like health and education. My conversations with government officials, however, suggest that some African governments see Chinese aid as more credible than assistance from traditional Western donors. This puts even more pressure on traditional donors to offer credible promises of aid to recipient governments. My research tells us that uncertainty in foreign aid negotiations undermines the ability of USAID to lobby for things including democratic overhauls, increased transparency and economic policy that are in the U.S. national interest. This should matter to a president interested in making deals that benefit the American people. To get the best possible deal for our aid dollars, the assistance needs to be given in a predictable way.

### A2 Saudi Arabia AC

#### Ending support for the Saudi-coalition ignores the threat that the Iran-based Houthi rebels pose to US security interests.

Phillips and Posey 18 James Phillips [Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation] and Madyson Hutchinson Posey [Research assistant], "Ending US Military Support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences.” The Heritage Foundation Blog. December 6, 2018. [Premier].

The killing of Khashoggi was certainly abhorrent, but ending U.S. support for the multinational coalition in Yemen is not the proper solution. It risks dangerously conflating two separate issues and would inevitably trigger unintended consequences that would undermine U.S. national security interests in the region. Senators must remember that Saudi Arabia is not the only belligerent in Yemen. A cutoff of U.S. support would also hurt the elected and internationally recognized government of Yemen, which was ousted by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015 in a bloody coup that violated a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. Withdrawing U.S. support would also harm the interests of other U.S. allies fighting in Yemen, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. The war in Yemen is complex. Those who rush to blame Saudi Arabia entirely for the suffering of the Yemeni people ignore the war crimes and heavy-handed treatment meted out by the Houthis to their opponents and the ruthless role that Iran plays in supporting the Houthi Ansar Allah (“Supporters of Allah”) movement, a Shia Islamist extremist group. The Saudis are rightly criticized for not doing more to prevent civilian casualties as they target Ansar Allah positions. But the Houthis should not be given a free pass for deliberately targeting civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with increasingly sophisticated Iranian ballistic missiles. Ansar Allah also deserves criticism for its violent role in destabilizing Yemen and creating the conditions that led to the current humanitarian disaster. Ansar Allah regularly attacks the Saudi border, launches missiles strikes into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and diverts international medical and food aid to favor its own supporters and sell on the black market. Ansar Allah also has targeted U.S. Navy vessels, those of allied nations, and civilian shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian-supplied missiles, gunboat attacks, and boat bombs. Undermining the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen risks exacerbating this threat to international shipping and giving Iran the opportunity to threaten oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, just as it has threatened to do in the Strait of Hormuz. Those who advocate withdrawing support for Saudi Arabia apparently believe that they can somehow end the current conflict in Yemen through a one-sided strategy that penalizes allies and boosts Ansar Allah, a group that chants “Death to America” and looks more like Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy group, every day. Never mind that Saudi Arabia is supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen in this effort. Never mind that leaving Ansar Allah to run amuck will not bring an end to the humanitarian suffering, but only prolong it.

#### Withdrawing US support prevents settlement by emboldening the Iran-backed rebels.

Phillips and Posey 18 James Phillips [Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation] and Madyson Hutchinson Posey [Research assistant], "Ending US Military Support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences.” The Heritage Foundation Blog. December 6, 2018. [Premier].

The U.S. currently extends only limited support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen centered on intelligence and information sharing. There are no U.S. troops involved in combat operations, except for occasional commando raids and air strikes against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Sunni terrorist group that continues to target the U.S. homeland, as well as Saudi Arabia, France, and other countries. The Trump administration already has stopped the aerial refueling of Saudi warplanes involved in the Yemen conflict and called for a negotiated settlement. But the United States cannot afford to abandon its allies and hope for the best. Undermining the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition would make an acceptable political settlement impossible. The Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia will continue to fight this war with or without U.S. support. Those who would connect two unrelated issues, condemn Saudi involvement, and ignore Iran’s hostile role inside Yemen will only do more harm to innocent Yemeni civilians and empower Iran and its Yemeni proxies.

#### Turn: ending US aid prevents an end to the war in Yemen by encouraging the Houthis to avoid peace-talks.

Phillips and Posey 18 James Phillips [Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation] and Madyson Hutchinson Posey [Research assistant], "Ending US Military Support to Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences.” The Heritage Foundation Blog. December 6, 2018. [Premier].

Advocates of the arms cutoff apparently believe that they can somehow “end” the war through a one-sided strategy of depriving America’s allies of U.S.-provided weapons. But this is not a one-sided war. Iran and its Yemeni allies have a vote, and clearly intend to keep fighting against Yemen’s government. It is delusional to think that the Yemenis, who have been fighting for years, will end the bloodletting because Bahrain, a minor member of the Saudi-led coalition, has been singled out for a humiliating arms cutoff. The war will go on, with or without U.S. weapons. But depriving Bahrain of arms that it requires for its own defense will undermine U.S. national interests by weakening ties to a major non-NATO ally, giving a psychological boost to Iran, and encouraging the Houthis to continue to drag their feet on peace talks.

#### Military aid will be cut now.

Ferrechio ’17 Ferrechio, Susan. “Senate heading for historic vote to pull US military aid to Saudi Arabia.” *Washington Examiner*. 6 September 2017. <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/congress/senate-heading-for-historic-vote-to-pull-us-military-aid-to-saudi-arabia>. [Premier]

The Senate could begin debating a measure as early as Monday that would override the Trump administration and force the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. The effort is fueled in large part by a strong sense among lawmakers in both parties that the United States needs to rebuke Saudi Arabia over the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi. The Senate has never considered a measure to withdraw U.S. military forces from an overseas conflict, and the resolution would compel them to take such a vote. Many think the Senate will take it up. The vote hasn’t been scheduled yet, but Senate lawmakers anticipate Monday’s agenda will include passage of a motion to proceed to the joint resolution. “My guess is it’s got more than 51,” said Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker, R-Tenn., referring to a majority vote in the Senate that would be needed to proceed to the measure. “My sense is the motion to proceed will be successful.” The tri-partisan measure is sponsored by Sens. Mike Lee, R-Utah, Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., and Chris Murphy, D-Conn. and calls for ending U.S. military involvement in the war between a Saudi-led coalition and Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. Sanders, Lee, and Murphy believe the United States should not be aiding the Saudis in a war that has created a humanitarian crisis in Yemen. According to lawmakers, 10,000 civilians have been killed in the war and 40,000 have been wounded. The majority of the population is struggling to avoid starvation. A large faction of Republican lawmakers is eager to avoid a vote on the War Powers Act because they believe it would set a dangerous precedent that could be applied to any United States ally. At the same time, they are determined to rebuke the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who the CIA determined is responsible for the October murder and dismemberment of Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

#### Saudi Arabia can’t afford to purchase more arms anyways.

Reidel ’17 Reider, Bruce (Senior Fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy). “The $110 billion arms deal to Saudi Arabia is fake news.” *Brookings Institute*. 5 June 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-110-billion-arms-deal-to-saudi-arabia-is-fake-news/>. [Premier]

Moreover, it’s unlikely that the Saudis could pay for a $110 billion deal any longer, due to low oil prices and the two-plus years old war in Yemen. President Obama sold the kingdom $112 billion in weapons over eight years, most of which was a single, huge deal in 2012 negotiated by then-Secretary of Defense Bob Gates. To get that deal through Congressional approval, Gates also negotiated a deal with Israel to compensate the Israelis and preserve their qualitative edge over their Arab neighbors. With the fall in oil prices, the Saudis have struggled to meet their payments since.

#### Arms deal will be repealed now – four corners and Democrat control.

Gould ’18 Gould, Joe. “Will Congress really cancel US-Saudi arms deals? It’s complicated, but let us explain.” *Defense One*. 18 October 2018. <https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/10/18/will-congress-really-cancel-us-saudi-arms-deals-its-complicated-but-let-us-explain>. [Premier]

The answer is eventually, maybe, but it’s complicated. Pressure to punish Saudi Arabia is growing as more damning details become public, such as the alleged links between one of the suspects and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and that Khashoggi was tortured to death. First, some wonkery. To advance a proposed arms sale, the U.S. State Department, by decades-old tradition, grants the “four corners” — the top Democrat and Republican on the House and Senate Foreign Relations committees — an informal review period. During that time, those four lawmakers can pause a sale while the administration answers their questions and concerns. These holds are not typically made public, but in this case Menendez has been openly frustrated with civilian casualties caused by Saudi airstrikes and skeptical that the administration is sufficiently leveraging the sales to end the war through diplomacy. Such holds can be elastic, but they’re not meant to be indefinite or a congressional veto. And after the review period, the State Department can advance a sale to the Senate. There, lawmakers have 30 days to seek answers from the executive branch. Could the president blow through the hold? Technically, yes, but not only would it be extraordinary — it would risk the optics of conducting business as usual with a regime accused of killing a journalist, and it risks angering Menendez, who can use his position to slow State Department nominees or otherwise bedevil the administration. (An administration official said it’s not a step to be taken lightly, but it hasn’t been ruled out.) If the sale is advanced to the full Senate, it could be subject to a joint resolution of disapproval under the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. Such a measure would be privileged in the Senate, which means it could be quickly brought to a floor vote. Whether Congress then rejects a U.S.-Saudi arms deal may also depend on what’s being dealt. For instance, Reed said Wednesday he opposes precision-guided munition sales to the kingdom but added it has “legitimate defensive needs” like Patriot anti-missile batteries — a line of thinking that could extend to a pending $15 billion sale of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. Supposing Trump wants to muscle a sale past Congress, it’s unlikely that in this session either chamber could muster the two-thirds majorities needed to override a presidential veto, congressional observers say. Both chambers are under the control of the GOP, which has shown reluctance to challenge the president on a range of issues. While it appears steam is building to halt arms sales, Congress is also discussing sanctions under the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act, a tough move in its own right that could quench lawmakers' thirst for punitive action against Riyadh. Twenty lawmakers, including Corker and Menendez, requested the Trump administration make a determination on whether Saudi officials violated the Global Magnitsky Act, which started a 120-day review clock. If the administration finds human rights violations occurred, it may apply sanctions prescribed by Global Magnistky or issue a waiver. In the House, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce, R-Calif., and ranking member Eliot Engel, D-N.Y., favored that track in an Oct. 12 letter to Trump. Arms sales weren’t mentioned. The duo also asked Trump to take the intermediate steps of canceling Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s visit to an investment conference in Saudi Arabia next week, and of reviewing Saudi diplomatic and consular personnel and activities within the U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wis., hinted Wednesday to CBS News that he favors the Global Magnitsky Act process, calling Khashoggi’s disappearance “really disturbing” and potentially problematic for the U.S.-Saudi relationship. But Ryan defended that relationship as "very important, and there is a lot to this relationship that that will persist no matter what.” Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, when asked whether the U.S. should halt arms sales to Riyadh, told Bloomberg he’s not ready to say which form of action he would take and called the allegations “extremely disturbing.” “Clearly we need to find out what happened before deciding what action should be taken," McConnell, R-Ky., said Tuesday. “I can’t imagine if what we think happened, that we would take no action." To what end? The Obama administration used arms-sale holds in an attempt to improve a customer nations' behavior on human rights, but to limited effect, said Becca Wasser, a researcher with the think tank Rand. "You have to ask the question: What end is the hold supposed to achieve? Is it intended to condition a partner’s behavior or punish them?” Wasser said. “I have a healthy amount of skepticism on both counts.” Wasser predicted that holding up arms sales is not going to massively impact the U.S. defense industry or bin Salman’s signature economic agenda, Vision 2030. As for Magnitsky sanctions, Wasser argued they’re more effective in Russia, targeting businessmen in the oligarch class who have reach with the Kremlin. “It is less likely to be effective in Saudi, where the royal family and upper echelons of government that may be implicated are insulated,” she said. What about midterms? When the new Congress is seated in January, there likely will be a different status quo, and that could force a new calculus for lawmakers and the White House. CNN projected last week that Democrats will take control of the House while the GOP will retain the Senate, but the margins will matter. Of the key players, Menendez is in a tight re-election battle, and both Corker and Ryan are leaving Congress at the end of the year either way.

### A2 Egypt AC

#### Cuts in aid to Egypt are misguided and breed anti-US resentment.

James ’13 James, Phillip (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation). “Why US aid cuts will backfire in Egypt.” *The Heritage Foundation*. 23 October 2013, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/why-us-aid-cuts-will-backfire-egypt>. [Premier]

Earlier this month the Obama administration announced it was cutting military aid to Egypt by hundreds of millions of dollars. The move had nothing to do with the budget battle in D.C. Rather, it was a belated reaction to last July’s military coup against President Mohamed Morsi’s increasingly autocratic Islamist government. Unfortunately, the administration has taken three months to come up with the wrong reaction. The cutback in military aid is likely to trigger an anti-American backlash in Egypt, undermine our reputation as a reliable ally and accelerate the decline of U.S. influence in the Middle East. Ostensibly the cuts are meant to encourage a democratic evolution in Egypt. The intent is to pressure the military-backed transitional government to negotiate with Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood and include it in future elections. But the anti-Western Muslim Brotherhood is not a genuine democratic movement. It amply demonstrated that by ramming its Islamist agenda down the throats of Egyptians during its one year in power. Morsi’s rigid authoritarian rule provoked massive popular protests. The army stepped in to avert a civil war and now sees itself engaged in a life and death struggle with the Brotherhood. It knows that if it allows the Brotherhood to make a comeback, it will be targeted for purges, show trials and executions. Given that reality and Morsi’s track record as a budding dictator, it is extremely naïve to believe that forcing the army to accept a renewed bid for power by Morsi’s Islamist supporters would help Egypt make the very difficult transition to become a stable democracy. Instead, the likely result would be more political instability and rising violence. President Obama should have used aid as leverage before the coup, to brush back Morsi’s aggressive and unconstitutional efforts to consolidate power. Instead, the U.S. voiced uncritical support for Morsi, alienating Egyptian liberals and secularists, as well as the army. After the July coup, the administration announced it was suspending $585 million in U.S. military assistance to Egypt (about half of Cairo’s annual $1.3 billion allotment), pending a policy review. After several months of handwringing, the administration has decided to withhold most of that aid, with the exception of funds slated for counter-terrorism and border security programs. Those initiatives focus on containing Islamist extremist threats, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula near the Israeli border. The decision tries to split the difference between the Pentagon, which argued that aid to Egypt furthers U.S. security interests, and human rights activists who contend that Egypt’s new government must be punished for its crackdown against the brotherhood. But splitting the baby is likely to satisfy nobody in Washington or Cairo. Instead, a partial aid cutoff is likely to further erode American influence in Egypt, which has declined rapidly under President Obama. It risks rupturing ties to Egypt’s military, which shares American concerns about Islamist extremism and offers the best hope of eventually salvaging a stable democratic system in Egypt. The New York Times reported that President Obama felt compelled to act after street clashes erupted in several Egyptian cities recently, killing more than 50 people. But the U.S. should not abandon long term allies in response to political violence provoked by the Muslim Brotherhood or other groups hostile to U.S. foreign policy. This will only encourage the brotherhood to escalate its campaign against the new government. Moreover, publicly humiliating Egypt’s military-backed government could provoke a backlash against the U.S. and undermine Egyptian compliance with the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. Washington would do much better to press Cairo privately to remain committed to its roadmap for restoring democracy. Unfortunately, the administration’s decision to cut military aid to rescue the Muslim Brotherhood will only make a bad situation worse. That clearly runs against the expressed interests of most Egyptians, U.S. allies such as Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and long-term U.S. interests as well.

### A2 Pakistan AC

#### Pakistan turns to Russia, China, or Saudi Arabia.

Felbab-Brown ’18 Felbab-Brown, Vanda (Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy's Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence). “Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US finds it so hard to induce change.” *Brookings*. 5 January 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change>. [Premier]

Suspending military aid to Pakistan—and perhaps even permanently discontinuing it in the future, if Pakistan does not change its behavior—was the most directly available coercive tool for the United States. But quite apart from the political outrage it has generated in Pakistan, the pain it delivers is quite limited. Parts of the Coalition Support Fund—designed to enable Pakistan to go after counterterrorism targets and militant groups— have been suspended for a long time because of Pakistan’s continued support for the Haqqanis. Overall, U.S. military aid to Pakistan decreased by 60 percent between 2010 and August 2017, without a significant impact on Pakistan’s behavior. Moreover, Pakistan can seek aid from others: Russia is always looking for opportunities to undercut the United States, and although direct military cooperation with Pakistan risks alienating India—a significant cost for Russia—Russia no longer considers the Afghan Taliban a prime enemy in Afghanistan. (The Islamic State is, so much so that Russia has courted the Afghan Taliban with intelligence and military aid to secure its cooperation against the Islamic State.) Pakistan can also seek military assistance from China, long its steadfast ally. Although China does not want to see a further destabilization of Afghanistan and an outward leakage of terrorism, it has not been willing to take punitive action against Pakistan’s support for the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban. Finally, Pakistan can court Saudi aid, which Saudi Arabia may grant, including as an anti-Iran hedge. Thus, Pakistan can easily believe that it can ride out tensions with the United States.

#### Hardline stances won’t solve – Pakistan is resistant to pressure.

Khan ’18 Khan, Sahar. “Double Game: Why Pakistan Supports Militants and Resists U.S. Pressure to Stop.” *Cato Institute*. 20 September 2018. <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/double-game-why-pakistan-supports-militants-resists-us-pressure-stop>. [Premier]

The United States and the international community have accused Pakistan of sponsoring militant groups in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir for decades—a charge Pakistan vehemently denies. Pakistan does, in fact, support three prominent jihadi militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir: the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad, even though these groups are officially banned by the Pakistani government. The United States has also routinely criticized Pakistan for supporting the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network (a U.S.-designated terrorist group), both of which frequently attack U.S. troops and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Why does Pakistan continue to sponsor militant groups in the face of considerable U.S. pressure to stop? This question has plagued U.S.-Pakistan relations for decades. President Trump has rebuked Pakistan, inflaming an already tense relationship when he tweeted about decades of U.S. aid to Pakistan with “nothing but lies & deceit” in return. The Trump administration subsequently reduced security and military aid to Pakistan, campaigned to add Pakistan to an intergovernmental watchlist for terrorism financing, and imposed sanctions on seven Pakistani firms involved in prohibited nuclear activities. Unfortunately, these policies are unlikely to be effective in changing Pakistan’s behavior. Pakistan’s military establishment and intelligence agencies consider militant sponsorship an important mechanism for maintaining Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity. Pakistan’s civilian institutions, too, have evolved to facilitate militant sponsorship by routinely legitimizing expansive executive powers, limiting judicial oversight, and violating civil liberties in the name of the national interest. Pakistan’s civilian and military institutions, therefore, are much more closely aligned on matters of state sponsorship of militant groups than most U.S. policymakers and academics think, and therefore less susceptible to outside pressure. However, the pervasiveness of militant sponsorship should not deter the United States from pursuing a productive relationship with Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in ending the war in Afghanistan. This objective will continue to elude Washington unless policymakers better understand the motivations behind Islamabad’s support for militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Therefore, policymakers should focus less on trying to change Pakistan’s security policies and instead find ways to leverage its existing strategic perspective in pursuit of U.S. interests.

#### Not T – Pakistan is a hybrid regime, not a full authoritarian regime.

Shahzad ’16 Shahzad, Faisal. “Pakistan, currently, is a competitive authoritarian regime and not a democratic one.” *The Nation*. 9 March 2016. <https://nation.com.pk/09-Mar-2016/pakistan-currently-is-a-competitive-authoritarian-regime-and-not-a-democratic-one>. [Premier]

Steven Levitski, a well-known comparative political scientist, argues that many contemporary regimes are hybrid regimes. They are neither democracies nor full time authoritarian regimes. These regimes are combined with democratic rules and authoritarian governments. Levitski (2002) believes that a modern democratic regime has these four following traits: (1) Selection of executive and legislature through election. (2) Virtually all adults posses the right to vote. (3) Political rights and civil liberties including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected. (4) Political representatives has real authority to govern. He believes that those regimes which do not full fill aforementioned criteria are not democracies. They are hybrid regimes and one such hybrid regime is “Competitive Authoritarianism”, in which formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy. In a Competitive Authoritarian regime, elections are held regularly but not free and fair. Media is controlled by the state. Opposition parties are given less coverage as compare to government parties. Opposition members are harassed through legal measures and often forced to change their loyalty in favor of government party. Although governments are changed through peaceful means, the state lacks aforementioned traits of a modern democratic regime. Journalists, opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, threatened, harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or less frequently even assaulted or murdered. Regimes characterized by such abuses cannot be called democratic. In this article, I’ll look to consider Pakistan’s case after the exit of General Musharraf and whether it is a full-time democratic regime or a competitive authoritarian one. General Musharraf resigned from the office on August 18, 2008. After his resignation, it was widely believed that Pakistan had entered into the phase of democratic regime. Though it is true that 13th National Assembly completed its term of five years and transition came through elections held in May 2013. The president has also completed his full tenure of five years. Civil-military relations are not as tense as it used to be in the decade of 90s. IIf we look into the aforementioned criteria of modern democratic regime, we see that even though elections were held in 2013, but they were not free and fair. Almost all the political parties raised their voices against inconsistencies, rigging and manipulation of electoral results. An opposition party started a strong social movement to put pressure on government to initiate judicial inquiry of the 2013 election. Later, a Judicial Commission was made to probe the matter which gave its verdict in favor of status quo. During this period after General Musharraf, Pakistan made fine progress regarding preparation of electoral lists. For the first time in history, electoral lists were prepared with the help of National Database and Regulatory Authority (NADRA). More than 20 million new voters were registered in the voters’ lists. Pictures of all the voters were also made compulsory on electoral lists. In modern democratic countries citizens have constitutional right to assemble, demonstrate and criticize the government. As far as civil liberties and political rights are concerned in Pakistan, during this era few incidents showed that we are still far behind modern democratic regimes. One such incident is the July 17, 2014 massacre on the headquarter of Tehrik-e-Minhaaj Ul Quran (TMQ) when Punjab Police stormed into the headquarter and killed more than dozen TMQs activists and wounded many. TMQ was going to plan anti-government movement and this act was done to harass the party workers. This brutal action showed that state itself violated constitutional rights of the people. The fourth and last trait of modern democracy is that political representatives have the real authority to govern. Throughout Pakistan’s political history, civil military relations have remained problematic. Military planned three successful coups to dislodge civilian governments. In “democratic” periods, military and bureaucracy hold the real power while civilian leadership has been helpless to restrain them. Still, after the exit of General Musharraf, the situation remained the same. The civilian leadership is under constant check of the military establishment. Civilian leaders have to satisfy military generals on important matters before taking the decisions. Army’s input is given more weightage now after the start of National Action Plan to uproot militancy and terrorism. Keeping in view Levitsky’s four traits of modern democracy, Pakistan does not qualify to be a modern democratic regime. Instead, Pakistan fits into the category of “Competitive Authoritarian Regime”. Throughout this era, massive use of state authority is seen in both general and local bodies’ elections. Electoral results were manipulated and often claimed as engineered. Civil liberties and political rights were not ensured and many complaints were seen in this era regarding killing and harassment of political workers. Civil military relations are still not settled and political representatives doesn’t have real power to govern. So, keeping in view Levitsky’s scholarship, I conclude that currently Pakistan is a competitive authoritarian regime instead of a democracy.

### A2 Africa AC

#### African countries will turn to China and Russia – historical precedence.

Allen ’16 Allen, Nathaniel (Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow at the United States of Institute of Peace and Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University). “U.S. Military Assistance to Africa Is Growing. But Is It Succeeding?.” World Politics Review. 23 September 2016. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/19995/u-s-military-assistance-to-africa-is-growing-but-is-it-succeeding>. [Premier]

Finally, despite concerns that AFRICOM’s presence will “militarize” the continent, the U.S. does have legitimate strategic interests in being engaged. Military spending in sub-Saharan Africa has nearly doubled since 2007, a fact that has more to do with the region’s growing economies than the U.S. presence. If African countries do not receive their military equipment and training from the U.S. or other Western sources, they can go elsewhere, including to rivals such as China and Russia, and have done so in the past.

### A2 Bahrain AC

#### The US should remain neutral in the Bahrain conflict. Placing pressure may backfire.

Hadar ’11. Hadar, Leon. (former research fellow in foreign policy studies, specializing in foreign policy ,international trade, the middle east, and south and east asia.) “US should stay neutral in the sunni-shiite conflict.” Cato institute. 03/24/2011. <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-should-stay-neutral-sunnishiite-conflict> [Premier]

Riyadh signaled its intention to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf with the deployment of more than 1,000 Saudi Arabian and 500 United Arab Emirates (UAE) troops to neighboring Bahrain on March 14, under the auspices of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). This intervention is comparable to the numerous deployments of U.S. troops under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS) — Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and Haiti (1994). Moreover, protecting Bahrain, which provides the U.S. Fifth Fleet with a base and has the freest economy in the Middle East (according to the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom), seems to be compatible with U.S. interests. Some Americans, who view the uprising in Bahrain as a conflict between the majority Shiite population and the ruling Sunnis, are urging Washington to condemn the Saudi move aimed at silencing the Shiites. The United States should not oppose the Saudi and GCC military intervention in Bahrain. But Washington should also make it clear that it will not take sides in the conflict between Shiites and Sunnis in Bahrain. The tensions between the Sunnis and the Shiites have long been a fundamental part of the political realities of the Middle East. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the rise of the Shiite-led Hizbollah in Lebanon, and the collapse of Sunni rule in Iraq exacerbated that factor. So it’s not surprising that Saudi Arabia, with its small Shiite minority, is concerned that the growing influence of Iran, including its allies in Lebanon and Iraq, is energizing Shiites elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. The strong U.S. ties with Riyadh could create the impression that Washington is encouraging the Saudi-backed efforts to suppress the Shiite insurgency in Bahrain. Those ties could even tempt the United States to intervene directly in the conflict if Iran decides to respond to the Saudi actions. It is not clear whether it is in America’s interest to join the Saudis and its regional allies in trying to check this Shiite ascendancy. Saudi Arabia has never been a full-fledged strategic ally of the U.S., but a client-state that Washington was committed to protect during the Cold War. The post-Cold War U.S. partnership with the Saudis has been portrayed as part of a “war on terrorism.” But much of the anti-American terrorism has been driven by Washington’s continuing support for Saudi Arabia and the presence of U.S. troops in the region. Now the Saudis may drag the United States into a new Middle East front in which the Sunni-led regimes are pitted against Iran and its Shiite allies. The irony is that the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the ensuing Freedom Agenda have helped strengthen Iran while empowering the Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon. It is a double standard for the United States to oppose the Shiites in Bahrain obtaining the same political rights enjoyed by Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon, and reflective of the major inconsistencies that seem to dominate U.S. policy in the Middle East. The notion that the United States needs to ride the “wave of history” sweeping the Arab World and ally with crusaders for democracy reflects wishful thinking and cannot serve as a basis for coherent policy. Sectarian strife will make peaceful political reform especially difficult in economically free Bahrain. There is no compelling policy reason why Washington should place democratization — a process that could lead to the emergence of a Shiite Iran-style regime — at the center of its relationship with the kingdom. Washington should, however, take steps to “normalize” its relationship with Saudi Arabia by creating a new set of strategic parameters. It must be made clear that American and Saudi interests are not always compatible. It is neither wise nor prudent for the United States to support Saudi regional policies that don’t directly benefit U.S. interests. The United States has no valid interest in encouraging a Shiite ascendancy. But it should also not be seen as impeding that process by trying to preserve Sunni primacy. Further, Washington should not preclude taking steps to pursue a diplomatic dialogue with Tehran and to establish ties with Hizbollah and other Shiite groups — similar to U.S. ties with the Iraqi government that includes members of Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement. While it’s too early to predict which political forces will emerge victorious from the Middle East upheaval, the U.S. should do its best to diversify its portfolio of friends in the region and leave its diplomatic options open. Taking sides in Bahrain and the region’s other many ethnic and sectarian conflicts runs contrary to America’s best interests.

### A2 Kant AC

#### Authoritarian regimes are not legitimate governments – they have no right to autonomy.

Van der Linden ’95 van der Linden, Harry (Professor of Philosophy at Butler University). “Kant, the Duty to Promote International Peace, and Political Intervention.” Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Volume 2. Pg. 74. 1995. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/62434886.pdf>. [Premier]

Argument (a) is mistaken on Kant's own terms. Granted that it is wrong to coercively try to change the immoral conduct of a person who does not inflict harm on you, it does not follow in analogy that all political intervention is wrong. The crucial point is that not all states should be viewed as moral persons with autonomy. Kant claims that the state as moral person is constituted by the social contract. In other words, the state as moral person emerges when the people give up their lawless freedom in the state of nature and install the rule of law, expressing their united will, i.e., the will of the state as moral person. This means that the state is justified, and should be viewed as a moral person with autonomy, only if the state accords with the united will. 12 Thus, the more a government adopts laws and policies that cannot be seen as an expression of the united will-and, typically, this involves the more a government is undemocratic-the less reason there is to treat the state with this government as a moral person. Kant failed to draw this conclusion, perhaps because he could not accept its implication that most governments of his time were not legitimate. At any rate, the logic of his view is that political intervention is only wrong with respect to republican states, or approximations thereof, and may be justified with regard to unjust states if it accords with the will of their people struggling for democracy. 13

#### Intervention is justified when it is in accordance of the will of a foreign countries’ citizens.

Van der Linden ’95 van der Linden, Harry (Professor of Philosophy at Butler University). “Kant, the Duty to Promote International Peace, and Political Intervention.” Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Volume 2. Pg. 74. 1995. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/62434886.pdf>. [Premier]

The upshot is that it is similarly wrong to act as if all existing nations are like republican states in the federation of nations and thus arrive at an absolute prohibition of intervention. Just as we may need to lie in order to prevent great harm to an individual, so political intervention may be justified in order to counteract political oppression in a foreign nation. This does not mean, however, that we should not mirror the ideal in our conduct. Rather, in this context, this moral demand should be interpreted to mean that we should continue to strive for the ideal and not deny its moral validity through our actions. Kant's view in The Metaphysics oj Morals on the rules of war is instructive here. He does not claim that we must be unconditional pacifists, apparently rejecting the reasoning that led up to his rigorism concerning truth-telling.17 A defensive war may be waged, but it should be waged "in accordance with principles that always leave open the possibility of leaving the state of nature among states ... and entering a rightful condition" (VI, 347/153). Wars, then, must not undermine the possibility of future peace. Accordingly, Kant continues to argue that wars may not aim at the extermination or subjugation of other people. Plunder is also wrong, and in support of this claim Kant makes the important observation that the people' do not wage war, but rather the state "through the people" (VI, 348/154). Last, Kant emphasizes that assassins, poisoners, snipers, and the like, should not be used; for "such underhanded means ... would destroy the trust requisite to establish a lasting peace in the future.,,18 In my view, political intervention should likewise aim at peace and not undermine trust as the very basis of the future federation of states. This underlines the significance of the restrictions on justified inte~ention mentioned earlier. Intervention must be based on the will of the people needing outside assistance; it should ideally be supported by many republican nations in the world com-' munity; and it should be a last resort measure, especially when violence is involved. More generally, intervention directed against an oppressive government should incorporate Kant's guideline concerning war that the target should not be individuals but the state as it acts through them. 19 Argument (d) points to an additional restriction on justified political intervention. It should be acknowledged that intervention may lead to premature change because, as the gradualist rightly claims, emancipation is a slow process even in revolutionary periods. So it is important that intervention in general aims at increased moral and political self-determination of the people on whose behalf it takes place. Kant, however, is often too conservative in his gradualism. In the anti-revolution/resistance passages in his work, Kant assumes that the people are only ready for change when it is initiated and gradually pursued by their governments, and that any successful attempt on the side of the people to force change temporarily involves a state of anarchy that is worse than any government whatsoever. 20 Once this bleak vision of the capacity of selfdetermination of the people is adopted, political intervention must always appear to be politically unwise. Kant's historical location may have prevented him , from seeing that popular struggles may be well-organized and disciplined. Cer-· tainly, external support of such struggles does not necessarily iead to premature change; for the people may be ready for political change and, yet, their political success may require intervention to counteract an otherwise too powerful oppressive government. In response to argument (e), it may first of all be noted that Kant's rejection of resistance and revolution does not commit him to prohibit all political intervention. After all, intervention might involve support for an aspiring demo-:- cratic government against its internal opposition. Further, although it is not my purpose here to examine all Kant's arguments against revolution and resistance in any detail, it may be noted that most of these arguments are similar to his objections to political intervention and involve similar weaknesses. My discussion of argument (d) illustrates the point. A second example concerns Kant's claim that revolution and resistance are unjustified because their acceptance '''would render all just constitutions insecure. ,,21 This argument can be refuted along the same lines in which I have refuted argument (b): A defense of civil, 'disobedience, revolution under exceptional circumstances, and so on, does neither in theory nor in practice imply the consequences foreseen by Kant. A final. example is Kant' sargument that revolution and resistance are self-contradictory practices in that they entail that the people wish to act as judges of their own cause and, yet, :Q.ave given up the right to do so in the social contract. Kant here makes the same mistake as in argument (a), namely, that any government" no matter how oppressive, must be seen as an expression of the united will and; hence, as a moral person. 22

# Topicality

## “Military Aid”

### Programs List

#### Military aid entails these nine programs.

ICIJ ’14 The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. “A Citizen’s Guide to Understanding U.S. Foreign Military Aid.” *The Center for Public Integrity*. 19 May 2014. <https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/a-citizens-guide-to-understanding-u-s-foreign-military-aid/>. [Premier]

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.” Funds appropriated to the State Department and Defense Department represent the vast majority of unclassified military aid and assistance. This report does not attempt to track smaller overseas programs where funding is appropriated to the Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Department of Homeland Security. The public does not have any way of tracking classified programs administered by the U.S. intelligence community. These classified programs likely command large amounts of funding, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence committees. Programs included in the Center’s database: Coalition Support Funds (CSF): created after 9/11 to reimburse key allied countries for providing assistance to the U.S. in the global war on terror. Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP): created after 9/11 to give the Defense Department its own funding to train and educate foreign military officers in counterterrorism techniques. In practice, CTFP has evolved into a program very similar to IMET (see definition below). Department of Defense Counterdrug Funding: assists foreign militaries and security forces to combat drug trafficking around the world; also known as Section 1004 appropriations. Economic Support Fund (ESF): provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. ESF is often used for non-military purposes, but the grants are commonly viewed as a way to help offset military expenditures. They have historically been earmarked for key security allies of the United States. Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of ESF. Foreign Military Financing (FMF): finances foreign governments’ acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training. International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems. International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI): the primary State Department funding effort for countering drugs, including the large Colombian initiatives. Military Assistance Program (MAP): provides military material and services to foreign countries; the U.S. government is not reimbursed. MAP includes “emergency drawdowns,” which are emergency transfers authorized by the president for weapons, ammunition, parts and military equipment to foreign governments. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Activities (NADR): supports de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assistance. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): supports programs that improve foreign militaries’ peacekeeping capabilities.

#### Military aid includes FMF, Peacekeeping, and IMET.

Wikpedia Wikipedia. “United States military aid.” <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_military_aid>. [Premier]

There are three main programs where military funding is allocated: 1. Foreign military financing provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. These grants enable friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities. The goals of FMF are: • Promoting national security by contributing to regional and global stability • Strengthening military support for democratically elected governments and containing transnational threats, including terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons • Fostering closer military relationships between the U.S. and recipient nations 2. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) provide voluntary support for international peacekeeping activities. These funds support non-U.N. operations and training in response to a nation’s crisis. The goals of PKO are: • Promoting increased involvement of regional organizations in conflict resolution • Helping leverage support for multinational efforts in the event of a nation's crisis 3. The International Military Education and Training program (IMET) offers military training on a grant basis to foreign military officials. The goals of IMET are: • Encouraging effective defense relationships • Promoting interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces • Exposing foreign civilian and military officials to democratic values, military professionalism, and international norms of human rights

### Not “Security Assistance”

#### Security assistance includes anti-narcotics and trafficking units – military aid is distinct.

Bearak and Gamio ’16 Bearak, Max and Gamio, Lazaro. “The U.S. foreign aid budget, visualized.” *The Washington Post*. 18 October 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/which-countries-get-the-most-foreign-aid/>. [Premier]

In the breakdown above, we have laid out where the $42.4 billion will go in 2017. The money comes from the State and Defense departments and a slew of other agencies. But it would be wrong to think that “security assistance” comes entirely from the DoD. Security assistance is a broader term than so-called military aid because this financial support is often extended to other types of security forces such as anti-narcotic or trafficking units. Actually, only about half the security assistance budget is provided by the DoD. That mostly derives from programs directly tied to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as the Afghan Security Forces Fund and the Iraq Train and Equip Fund. Deals like last month’s with Israel, on the other hand, come from the State Department. In that case, the U.S. government is essentially financing Israel’s military purchases. Under the current agreement, Israel can spend 26 percent of that money on military equipment produced in Israel, but the new deal, which starts in 2019, gradually phases out that stipulation. Then, like every other country, Israel will have to spend all the assistance money on American defense contractors. In other words, U.S. foreign military financing is essentially a way of subsidizing its domestic defense industry while strengthening the military capabilities of its strategic allies.

### No Arms Sales

#### Arms sales are not military aid.

Bearak and Gamio ’16 Bearak, Max and Gamio, Lazaro. “The U.S. foreign aid budget, visualized.” *The Washington Post*. 18 October 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/which-countries-get-the-most-foreign-aid/>. [Premier]

As opposed to the broad dispersal of economic development funds, the security assistance cartogram demonstrates the targeted nature of the American national military strategy. A swath of countries from Egypt to Pakistan — excluding Iran, of course — receive the vast majority of U.S. security assistance. The biggest individual, non-bilateral program in the security assistance budget is the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). The DoD describes the program thusly: “For DoD to provide assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan to include the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation and construction, and funding.” Security Assistance Monitor, the nonprofit organization that provided much of the data on which this article is based, says on its website that the ASFF’s ultimate goal “is to produce an independent, self-sufficient armed forces for Afghanistan.” The security assistance budget also includes “train and equip funds” for allied forces in Iraq and Syria. Those funds go toward the Iraqi army, as well as Kurdish peshmerga troops and other militias the U.S. cooperates with in both countries in its push against the Islamic State. Israel and Egypt are the biggest recipients of U.S. military financing. Israel receives about $3.1 billion in annual financing currently, and that number will increase to $3.8 billion after 2017. Egypt has received major financing ever since it agreed to an American-brokered peace with Israel in the Camp David Accords of 1978. Put all together, the top-10 list of U.S. foreign assistance recipients are as follows: But if the U.S. assistance budget demonstrates where the American government has strategic interest, then where are some of our biggest allies on the cartograms above? Saudi Arabia, NATO members, Japan, South Korea and India are all conspicuously absent. The answer is that those countries simply buy arms from the United States rather than receive large-scale assistance. Many have their own established defense programs. The cartogram below shows U.S. arms deliveries worldwide for 2015, which amounted to $21.9 billion. The U.S. sells arms to nations that surround its main adversaries, China and Russia, as well as to countries playing active roles in the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, which includes most of the Gulf states.

### No Foreign Aid

#### Military aid is distinct from foreign aid.

TP Take Part. “What is foreign aid?.” <http://www.takepart.com/flashcards/what-is-foreign-aid/index.html>. [Premier]

The most basic definition of the term is "resources given from one country to another." But it’s usually understood to mean money, materials, and manpower given or loaned by governments, organizations, and individuals in rich countries to help people in poor countries. Also referred to as international aid, economic aid, or development aid/assistance, foreign aid is a category distinct from military aid.

### No Humanitarian Aid

#### Military aid excludes humanitarian and non-military programs.

USAID USAID. “What Is Foreign Aid?” <https://explorer.usaid.gov/about.html#tab-methodology>. [Premier]

Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. Military assistance excludes humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of Defense; these programs are categorized as 'Economic Assistance'.

### Spec Good

#### Whole res debates are impossible – there’s too many programs and inconsistencies – specifying a type of military aid is key.

ICIJ ’14 The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. “A Citizen’s Guide to Understanding U.S. Foreign Military Aid.” *The Center for Public Integrity*. 19 May 2014. <https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/a-citizens-guide-to-understanding-u-s-foreign-military-aid/>. [Premier]

There is no single, accepted definition of the terms “foreign aid” or even “foreign military aid” or “military assistance.” For a government as large as that of the United States, it’s virtually impossible to track all of the various federal agencies’ programs across countries and sectors to arrive at a single number that captures the true amount of U.S. taxpayer dollars going to foreign governments, or even just their militaries.

### Unconditional

#### Aid is unconditional.

Richards 77. Richards, Lynn. “The Context of Foreign Aid: Modern Imperialism,” Review of Radical Political Economics, SAGEJournals, 1 December 1977, [https://doi.org/10.1177%2F048661347700900404](https://doi.org/10.1177/048661347700900404) [Premier]

Economists often complicate the problem of aid by attempting to define it. Understandably, a “scientific” approach requires a precise concept, and aid is perhaps one of the less precise concepts of our time. The bewildering array of programs, terms and conditions seems to defy rational analysis; and certainly the aims and results are muddled by non-economic considerations. Obviously, a gift of resources with no conditions attached would be aid. Even this straightforward pronouncement hides the question of what the donor may be receiving - other than psychic satisfaction - if the gifts contribute to, e.g., the “defense of the free world.” And once the realm of loans is entered, the complexity increases.

### Must be publicly funded

#### Military aid must be publicly funded and contribute to offensive military capabilities.

Public Integrity, 2007, A Citizen’s Guide to Understanding US Foreign Military Aid, <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid> [Premier]

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.”

### Training/Weapons Credits

#### Military aid is training or credits for foreign militaries to purchase weapons from the donor country.

Global Issues, May 3, 2010, Military Aid, http://www.globalissues.org/article/785/military-ai [Premier]

Military aid can be controversial. Its stated aim is usually to help allies or poor countries fight terrorism, counter-insurgencies or to help fight drug wars. The aid may be in the form of training, or even giving credits for foreign militaries to purchase weapons and equipment from the donor country.

### Purpose = terrorism, counter-insurgency, drug wars

#### The purpose of military aid is to assist allies and/or poor countries in fighting terrorism, counterinsurgencies or drug wars.

Global Issues, May 3, 2010, Military Aid, http://www.globalissues.org/article/785/military-ai [Premier]

Military aid can be controversial. Its stated aim is usually to help allies or poor countries fight terrorism, counter-insurgencies or to help fight drug wars. The aid may be in the form of training, or even giving credits for foreign militaries to purchase weapons and equipment from the donor country.

##  “Authoritarian Regimes”

### Countries List

#### There are forty-nine authoritarian regimes.

Whitney ’17 Whitney, Rick. “US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of World’s Dictatorships.” *Truthout*. 23 September 2017. <https://truthout.org/articles/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-world-s-dictatorships/>. [Premier]

For purposes of deciding whether a nation could be categorized as a “dictatorship,” however, I focused only on the “political rights” scores, classifying nations with a political rights score of 6 or 7 as a dictatorship. This does not mean that civil liberties are unimportant, of course, but the objective here is to assess the degree of absolutism of the political leadership, not freedom of expression, press, etc. Of course, in the overwhelming majority of cases, nations with low political rights scores also have low civil liberties scores. However, a political rights score of 6 or 7 corresponds most closely with our definition of dictatorship, based on Freedom House’s characterization: 6 — Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted political rights. They are ruled by one-party or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. They may allow a few political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups, and a few are traditional monarchies that tolerate political discussion and accept public petitions. 7 — Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no political rights because of severe government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. They may also lack an authoritative and functioning central government and suffer from extreme violence or rule by regional warlords. While it may be debatable whether it is appropriate to consider a country with no “functioning central government” as a dictatorship, I would submit that the label is appropriate if that nation is ruled de facto by warlords or rival armies or militias. In effect, that simply means that it is ruled by two or more dictators instead of one. By Freedom House’s measure, then, there were 49 nation-states that could be fairly characterized as dictatorships in 2015, as follows: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Brunei, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa), Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Libya, Mauritania, Myanmar, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen.

### No Hybrid Regimes

#### Limits – hybrid regimes add 39 potential affs.

EIU ’17 Economist Intelligence Unit. “Democracy Index 2017 Free speech under attack.” 2017. *The Economist*. <https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf>. [Premier]

According to the 2017 Democracy Index, 76 of the 167 countries covered by the model, or 45.5% of all countries, can be considered to be democracies. The number of “full democracies” has remained at 19 in 2017, the same as in 2016, when the total declined from 20 in 2015 as the US fell into the “flawed democracy” category. The score for the US fell to 7.98 in 2016, reflecting a sharp fall in popular confidence in the functioning of public institutions, a trend that predated—and aided—the election of Donald Trump. Of the remaining 91 countries in our index, 52 are “authoritarian” and 39 are classified as “hybrid regimes” (for a full explanation of our methodology, see page 63).

### No Totalitarian Regimes

#### Authoritarian regimes are distinct from totalitarian regimes.

Lauth ’12 Lauth, Hans-Joachim. “Authoritharian Regimes.” *InterAmerican Wiki*. 2012. <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/a_Authoritarian%20Regimes.html>. [Premier]

The term 'authoritarian regimes' ('a.r.') in its broadest sense encompasses all forms of undemocratic rule. Compared to democracies, an a.r. does not maintain the institutions and procedures of participation and political competition, fundamental rights and control of power (separation of powers, parliaments, elections, plurality of parties, etc.) characteristic of a democracy, and thus does not possess democratic legitimacy. In a more narrow view of the term, a.r. represents a specific form of autocratic rule which has been especially distinguished from totalitarian regimes ('t.r.', also totalitarian states) (Arendt 1951, Friedrich/ Brzezinski 1956). Juan Linz's frequently applied definition (1975: 264) of a.r. names three characteristics through which a.r. can be differentiated both from democratic systems and from t.r.: (1) limited pluralism contrasted with the principally unlimited pluralism of democracies and monism of t.r.; (2) limited political participation (de-politicization) and (except for in limited phases) neither an extensive nor an intensive mobilization; (3) in contrast to totalitarianism there is no legitimation of the system through a common and dominating ideology, but rather through mentalities, psychological predispositions and values in general (patriotism, nationalism, modernization, order, etc.). Polity IV defines a.r. (without differentiating it from t.r.) through stronger restrictions on political participation, a completely exclusive restriction in the selection of the heads of the executive and very sparse limitations on the executive. A precise distinction of a.r. from t.r. is often made more difficult by the fact that the individual definitions take different characteristics or levels of characteristics into account. These days it has become broadly accepted that in order to differentiate between a.r., t.r. and democratic regimes, the same categories or dimensions should be used; e.g. degree of freedoms, political equality and control (Lauth 2004). When distinguishing, the different forms within this category should be noted, which in turn serve in the identification of the individual regimes (basic types), where t.r. and democratic regimes mark opposite ends of a polar scale. A.r. lies in between and forms an area with a much more clearly distinctive functional logic. A.r.s should not be confused with hybrid regimes, which display characteristics of different basic types.

### Spec Good / Plan Flaw

#### Legislation conditioning foreign aid needs to clearly define the condition. It’s historically proven that when the condition is too broad or imprecise, the State Department refuses to follow the bill. Only focus on a subset was able to create binding policy.

Keys ’10 Keys, Barbara (Associate Professor of History at the University of Melbourne and Vice President of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations). “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy.” *Diplomatic History*, Volume 34, Number 5. November 2010. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916461>. [Premier]

Watergate shifted the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government. As revelations of White House dirty deeds mounted, one Senate staffer recalled, "the attitude of the whole damn Congress changed."54 Foreign aid was one focal point of congressional assertiveness. As the Nixon and then the Ford administrations increased military aid to brutal and repressive regimes in Indonesia, Iran, Chile, and the Congo, critics in Congress grew increasingly irate. Congressional advocates of linking aid to human rights believed that providing military or economic assistance to regimes that violated human rights made the United States partly responsible for abuses.55 Noting that the most repressive allies often received the largest amounts of aid, critics charged that U.S. military assistance served to increase repression. (Academic studies have since shown that aid went disproportionately to the worst human rights violators.56) In Latin America in particular, the military was deeply involved in maintaining internal security, suggesting to critics that U.S. military aid was being used to augment internal repression. As Fraser put it, "military aid to a regime which practices torture was simply wrong on its face, [because] it enhanced the power of that government to remain in control and repress its own citizens."57 Liberals noted as well that associating with brutal regimes violated U.S. ideals. Even if cutbacks in aid would be ineffec tive in moderating abuses, they argued, it was in America's interest to uphold its values by dissociating itself from regimes that tortured and murdered political opponents. The result of the congressional revolt against Kissinger's Realpolitik was a string of legislative initiatives tying foreign aid to human rights criteria. This precedent-setting series of laws made human rights a legally required compo nent of bilateral diplomacy involving aid. Allying with conservatives interested in cutting the foreign aid budget, liberals in Congress succeeded in passing a series of measures, each more stringent than the last.59 Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 requested that the executive branch deny eco nomic or military assistance to governments that held political prisoners. Although the State Department collected information to comply with the pro vision, an official admitted in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the information had led to no action. Department officials argued that it was too difficult to define "political prisoner," that cutting aid was inappropriate as a tool of diplomacy, and that quiet diplomacy on behalf of human rights was preferable.60 Fraser and his staff then drafted and pushed through Congress a second effort to link human rights and aid. Section 502B of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, in nonbinding "sense of Congress" language, stated that "except in extraordi nary circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or terminate secu rity assistance to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations or internationally recognized human rights. Responding to State Department complaints that Section 32's reference to "political prisoner" had lacked precise definition, Section 502B explicitly defined "gross violations" as abuses such as torture and prolonged detention without charges, emphasizing "gross violations" on a reading of international law that said such abuses could not be regarded as merely domestic issues and that intervention to prevent them did not constitute a violation of sovereignty.6' Fraser intended to focus on protecting rights widely recognized internationally, to avoid charges of U.S. imperialism. That meant a focus on what he described as "the most fundamental of all human rights, the right to the integrity of one's person.

### Spec Bad

#### Limits – speccing a country justify 36 affs.

Whitney ’17 Whitney, Rick. “US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of World’s Dictatorships.” *Truthout*. 23 September 2017. <https://truthout.org/articles/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-world-s-dictatorships/>. [Premier]

The truth is not easy to find, but federal sources do provide an answer: No. According to Freedom House‘s rating system of political rights around the world, there were 49 nations in the world, as of 2015, that can be fairly categorized as “dictatorships.” As of fiscal year 2015, the last year for which we have publicly available data, the federal government of the United States had been providing military assistance to 36 of them, courtesy of your tax dollars. The United States currently supports over 73 percent of the world’s dictatorships!