

HCSS StratMon 2015

PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES

TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN TODAY'S
WORLD



HCSS helps governments, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to understand the fast-changing environment and seeks to anticipate the challenges of the future with practical policy solutions and advice.



PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES
TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN TODAY'S WORLD
HCSS StratMon 2015

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

ISBN/EAN: 978-94-92102-21-8

Authors Willem Oosterveld, Stephan De Spiegeleire, Tim Sweijts

Contributions by Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal González, Kelsey Shantz, Jasper Ginn, Cameron Reed

© 2015 *The Hague* Centre for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced and/or published in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from HCSS. All images are subject to the licenses of their respective owners.

Graphic Design Joshua Polchar & Studio Maartje de Sonnaville

Print de Swart

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Lange Voorhout 16
2514 EE The Hague
The Netherlands

info@hcss.nl
HCSS.NL

PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES

TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN TODAY'S
WORLD

HCSS StratMon 2015

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KEY FINDINGS	7
1 INTRODUCTION	11
2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND MILITARY CONFLICT	13
2.1 THE ARGUMENT	13
2.2 THE RECORD	14
2.3 STRATEGIC RATIONALES	21
2.4 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES	22
2.5 ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MOTIVATIONS	23
3 OVERVIEW OF CURRENT UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS	25
4 ODDS OF ESCALATION: WHEN DO UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES TURN HOT?	33
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS	41
ANNEX	46
BIBLIOGRAPHY	49

KEY FINDINGS

Prevalence of Territorial Disputes in Today's World

- 51 out of 89 ongoing interstate conflicts involve territorial disputes. These territorial disputes are found all over the world but not in equal measure. Europe, the continent with the greatest density of countries, has the fewest territorial disputes, which are only found around its fringes. In Africa and Asia, about 2 out of 5 countries are embroiled in a territorial dispute. In the Americas, every second country has an ongoing territorial dispute, albeit that few – if any – of these ever see serious levels of violence. The most troublesome region, however, is the Middle East, where about 70% of the countries are involved in territorial disputes, whether of a colonial or more recent origin, further fanning the flames that have engulfed the region since 2003.

Dangers of Territorial Conflict

- Territorial disputes are the source for most interstate conflicts – in the past and at present. The probability that a conflict erupts into violence increases eightfold when territory is involved. Territorial conflicts tend to last longer than non-territorial ones: between 1901 and 2008, territorial conflicts lasted on average for 20.6 years, while non-territorial conflicts lasted around 13.7 years. Territorial conflicts are more difficult to settle than non-territorial conflicts. Militarized conflicts over territory have also been found to produce more fatalities. Territorial disputes are more apt to be reciprocated and tend to recur.

Some Territorial Conflicts are More Dangerous than Others

- In the period since World War II, territorial disputes involving ethnic claims proved to be the most war-prone, increasing the odds of escalation from mere dispute to armed conflict by 30%. When strategic considerations played a role in territorial disputes, it led to a 15 percent

increase in probability of conflict. Economic incentives in relation to territorial disputes had an overall small effect of reducing the chance of conflict by 7%. Where immediate triggers for conflict are concerned, the most dangerous trigger is the coming into office of a hardline political leader.

Some Aspects of Territorial Conflict Seem to Be Changing

- The total number of interstate wars – including territorial ones – has decreased over the past 200 years even as the number of states has increased, resulting in “a reverse correlation” between the number of states and the risk of international war. After the Second World War, far fewer wars have led to the annexation of territory by the winning party.

How can Western defense and security organizations (WDSO) deal with old and new challenges posed by territorial disputes?

- **Boost anticipation and prevention monitoring and early warning mechanisms.**
 - Develop special (near) **real-time datasets** for (at least) the main triggers behind territorial conflict and **monitor trends and developments** across these triggers.
 - Develop and deploy better **international (micro-) sensing capabilities** in a broader (i.e. not exclusively military) context. Track both the **negative sparks and the positive elements of resilience**. The proliferation of mobile devices in many conflict-prone parts of the world offers unprecedented opportunities for such a balanced security monitoring effort.
 - Monitor **unauthorized violations of territorial integrity**. WDSOs could play an important role in developing, sustaining, and – where necessary – deploying such monitoring capabilities both along their own national or alliance borders, but possibly also along the increasingly contested borders in potential or actual conflict zones.
- Find (cost) effective ways to **‘battle’ against self-serving parochial/territorial narratives**. The creation of effective mechanisms to puncture their intangible aura may prove of great value in the **prevention and mitigation** of territorial conflict.

- Continue to support **international judicial institutions** that can **arbitrate** between conflict parties and help **solve territorial disputes**. International law is one of the key ‘weapons’ that the world as a community has to ‘arm’ itself against the destabilizing effects of territorial appetites and narratives.
- **Improve and expand our portfolio of conflict prevention options**, including ones in the field of **confidence-building measures**. Deploy new-style security personnel to those parts of the world where territorial ghosts seem to be (re-) appearing in order to design ‘small-scale’ prototype initiatives, which can later be scaled up or down based on their relative success in defusing territorial tensions.
- Put **greater emphasis** on **A2AD** (anti-access/areal denial) strategies to impede **possible territorial** competitors with varying degree of technological sophistication.
- In a more traditional vein, **deploy international armed forces** along **disputed borders** to **create buffer zones** that **separate conflict actors, and deny and deter** them from militarily contesting the control over disputed territories. **Deterrent strategies contain** both **military** and **political** elements and should be formulated and executed as part of a **comprehensive security and defense policy**.

1 INTRODUCTION

After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed his indignation by stating that: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pre-text,” This statement reflected a widely held view in the West that territorial conflict belongs to the past. The reality, unfortunately, is that territory is still seen by some to be at a premium for strategic, economic and other reasons. Territorial disputes continue to fuel contemporary militarized conflicts,¹ and can be found in all parts of the world. Territory and war have been inextricably linked throughout the history of the Westphalian world system. Four out of every five wars fought between the end of the Thirty Years War (1648) and the Cold War (1989) involved territorial disputes. From the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the attacks of 9/11 (2001), almost one third of all interstate conflicts involved territorial conflict.² In 2013, 51 out of 89 ongoing interstate conflicts involved territorial disputes.³ Indeed, in modern times, territorial ambitions do not cease to stir the hearts and minds of combatants from Latin America to East Asia. They have even been eating away at the fringes of Europe itself, seen by some as an island of ‘post-Westphalian’ tranquility. As the previous EU Commission president put it:

“Recent events from Afghanistan to Africa and even more recently Ukraine have shown that for the sake of its own stability and security, Europe has to pay attention to old “frozen conflicts” and other potential new flashpoints.”⁴

1 As Johnson and Toft put it, “[i]f territoriality is dying out in its literal form, we are seeing it reappear in others.” See Dominic D.P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” *International Security* 38, no. 3 (January 2014): p. 34.

2 According to another measurement over half of all interstate wars from 1816 to 1997 were prompted by territorial issues. Dominic D.P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” *International Security* 38, no. 3 (January 2014): pp. 11-12.

3 See also John A. Vasquez and Brandon Valeriano, “Classification of Interstate Wars,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 292–309.

4 José Manuel Durão Barroso, “Strengthening Europe security and defence sector”, March 4, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-177_en.htm.

The apparent return of these ghosts of times past is forcing Europe to re-assess its international security and defense posture. The key question: is Europe's approach to international security still in sync with the challenges posed by the evolving security environment? Territorial disputes are increasingly identified as risks to international peace and security in various security strategies. The 2013 Dutch International Security Strategy identified the potential emergence of conflict emanating from (frozen) territorial disputes between states.⁵ Its November 2014 update added that non-state actors such as ISIS and Boko Haram are also interested in carving out their own territory.⁶ In France, the 2013 *Livre Noir* on Defense and Security underlined the danger of territorial conflict in Europe and its neighborhood.⁷ The analogous Spanish strategy (2013) is not alone in mentioning the South China Sea issue in this regard.⁸

In light of these developments, HCSS decided to take a closer look at of the nature of territorial disputes in the international system. Which types of disputes are more likely to lead to conflict? Where are these located? What kind of policy responses does all of this require?

Section 2 discusses the relationship between territorial disputes and military conflict and reviews the scholarly evidence. Section 3 turns to ongoing territorial disputes in today's world. Section 4 examines the odds of these disputes further escalating into violent conflict. Section 5, finally, concludes and reflects on implications for defense and security policies.

5 See "A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World", p. 6.

6 See "Policy Brief International Security – Turbulent Times in an Unstable Environment" ("Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving"), p. 4.

7 See "Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité nationale 2013 », p. 53-54.

8 See "Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional", p. 18.

2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND MILITARY CONFLICT

Throughout history, maintaining or gaining control over territory has featured as a key motivating factor for conflict.⁹

2.1 THE ARGUMENT

Anthropologists, psychologists and biologists consider the desire for territorial control to be a primordial biological instinct. In its most basic formulation, the argument is that the close link between living beings and the physical habitat in which they live and evolve has tended to give those actors that control more territory an evolutionary advantage. It guarantees them more living space, mates, better access to food and other basic resources, and it enables larger group sizes – all of which enhances their evolutionary ‘fitness’.¹⁰ Some argue that territoriality is ‘soft-wired’ into many animals, including humans; they assert that it is “a component of human nature but one that is responsive to prevailing conditions.”¹¹

Scholars of international conflict have long been aware of the importance of territory to their field of inquiry. Thinkers in classical times had already explored the many linkages that tie human behavior to the territory on which he lives.¹² In the 19th century, however, a peculiarly potent blend of romantic nationalism

9 Dominic D.P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” *International Security* 38, no. 3 (January 2014): p. 11.

10 Johnson and Toft, “Grounds for War,” 7; Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, 46–47.

11 Johnson and Toft, “Grounds for War,” 11. For a counter-argument, see Kuo, Johnson, and Toft, “Correspondence.”

12 These include the Greek philosophers Aristotle, Thucydides, and Strabo. For overviews, see Deudney, “Geography and Change”; Ugarte, “Geopolitical Thinking throughout History.” Also in the Renaissance, thinkers like Bodin, Montesquieu, Kant and Hegel made frequent reference to these issues.

with various ‘scientific’ cross-overs¹³ led to conceptions of ‘nation-states’ as living organisms with life cycles in which they get born, grow, contract, and eventually die.¹⁴ Throughout this life cycle, their territorial confines could – just like in the animal kingdom – be expected to wax and wane. The early 20th century gave birth to the idea of ‘geopolitics’ that focused on the relationship between geography and international relations.¹⁵ The association of geopolitics with ‘Lebensraum’ tainted its adherents in the post World War II era, but the ideas continued to enjoy significant popularity in various communities, especially among Anglo-Saxon security strategists.¹⁶ The rise of new challengers to the current international status-quo has in recent years also triggered a renewed ascendancy of international relations scholars and analysts who argue that ‘geopolitics’ is back.¹⁷

2.2 THE RECORD

What do we actually know about the link between territory and conflict? Research has shown that territorial disputes have a higher likelihood to lead to militarized conflict than disputes over other issues. The probability that a conflict erupts into violence increases eightfold when it involves territory.¹⁸ Territorial conflicts tend to last longer too: between 1901–2008, territorial conflicts last on average for 20.6 years, while non-territorial conflicts last around 13.7 years.¹⁹ On top of that, they also prove “more (...) difficult to settle.”²⁰ Militarized conflicts over territory have also been found to produce more

13 Between biology (Darwinism), geography (many geopolitical thinkers were geographers with an interest in politics), anthropology and even economics (there are many analogies between neo-classical economics – e.g. the thinking about marginal utility).

14 A seminal person in this development was the German geographer and ethnographer Friedrich Ratzel.

15 Notable examples include Mackinder, *The Geographical Pivot of History*; Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*; Sprout and Sprout, *Foundations of National Power. Readings on World Politics and American Security*.

16 Including with influential scholars that played key roles in different U.S. Administrations such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger.

17 Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography*.

18 John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 345.

19 Based on data analysis from the Conias Research Institute (University of Heidelberg) taking into account ongoing and elapsed conflicts. See also Krista Wiegand, *Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), p. 81.

20 Miles Kahler, “Territoriality and Conflict in an era of Globalization”, in Miles Kahler et.al, (eds.), *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 10.

fatalities.²¹ Furthermore, the figure below shows how the percentage of high-intensity territorial militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) has consistently been higher than non-territorial disputes since 1850.²²




FIGURE 1. COMPARISON OF THE PERCENTAGE OF TERRITORIAL VS NON-TERRITORIAL MIDS INVOLVING ACTUAL USE OF ARMED FORCE PER EPOCH.

Notwithstanding the relative intractability of territorial militarized conflict overall, there is also good news. Looking at the overall picture of conflict over the past 200 years, while the number of states has increased, the total number

21 See Paul Hensel, “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict”, in John A. Vasquez, ed., *What Do We Know about War?* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012), pp. 3-27; John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 347.

22 We have distinguished territorial disputes from non-territorial MIDs by rev. type, where 1=territory (see Jones, Bremer, and Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992,” 178. and the accompanying codebooks of the MID 4.1). We have compared percentage of territorial versus non-territorial conflicts with 1-3 (green) compared to 4-5 (brown) of conflict intensities. We take inference of intensity from the MID ‘Hostility Level of Dispute’, where 1 indicates no militarized action, 2 and 3 the threat of or display of force, respectively, 4 the use of force, and 5 war. For the purposes of this research, we have generalized disputes coded as 1-3 as non-violent, and those coded as 4-5 as showing incidents of violence or war. For access to the datasets and the codebook, see <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs>.

of interstate wars has in fact decreased,²³ resulting in “a reverse correlation between the number of states and the risk of international war.”²⁴ After the Second World War, fewer wars have led to the annexation of territory by the winning party: “while approximately 80 percent of territorial wars led to re-distributions of territory for all periods prior to 1945, this figure dropped to 30 percent after 1945.”²⁵




FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF TERRITORIAL AND NON-TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS MIDS OVER TIME.²⁶

In sum, territorial disputes are more prevalent than is sometimes thought. In many instances, they can be identified once the surface is scratched of disputes that otherwise exhibit themselves as ethnic rivalries or fights over resources. Additionally, when territory is a contributing factor to conflict, it is more likely

23 Mark Harrison and Nikolaus Wolf, “The Frequency of Wars,” *The Economic History Review* 65, no. 3 (2012), p. 1058.

24 Bruno Tertrais, “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?,” *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (August 2012): 7–22, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2012.703521, p. 11.

25 Mark Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force”: *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring, 2001), p. 223.

26 “MIDs – Cow.”

that a conflict becomes more violent. While relatively few current territorial conflicts today involve resources, this may change in the future and provide additional sources for conflict.²⁷

The following overview synthesizes the main findings on the link between territory and conflict based on the most recent academic literature.²⁸ Readers primarily interested in the overview of current unresolved territorial disputes in the international system are advised to jump ahead to section 3 on page 25.

1. Territory can and does lead to disputes that also tend to escalate more often into militarized conflict:
 - Territorial disputes are the source of most interstate rivalries,²⁹ particularly between two minor powers and between neighbors.³⁰
 - The presence of a territorial claim between two states increases the probability of a militarized interstate dispute (MID).³¹
 - Territorial disputes have a higher probability of leading to war than other types of disputes.³² The probability that a conflict erupts into violence increases eightfold when territory is involved.³³ This holds for major-major, major-minor, and minor-minor dyads (with few exceptions) and for the 1816–1945, 1946–89, and 1990–2001 periods.
 - Controlling for the effect of territorial claims at the MID onset stage does not eliminate the effect of territorial disputes (MIDs) at the escalation to war stage, i.e. territorial MIDs increase the probability of

27 Dominic Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for Hope: The Evolutionary Science behind Territorial Conflict”, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford March 2014), p. 2. Available at <http://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/blavatnik/files/documents/2014-GroundsForHope-PolicyMemo.pdf>.

28 Tir and Vasquez, “Territory and Geography”; Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited*, 423–426.

29 Vasquez and Leskiw, “The Origins and War Proneness of Interstate Rivalries”; Tir and Diehl, “Geographic Dimensions of Enduring Rivalries.”

30 Vasquez and Leskiw, “The Origins and War Proneness of Interstate Rivalries.”

31 Senese and Vasquez, “A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict”; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics*, 253.

32 Hensel, “Charting A Course To Conflict”; Vasquez and Henehan, “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992”; Vasquez, “Mapping the Probability of War and Analyzing the Possibility of Peace”; Vasquez, “The Probability of War, 1816–1992 Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, March 25, 2002, New Orleans”; Senese and Vasquez, “A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict”; Senese and Vasquez, “Alliances, Territorial Disputes, and the Probability of War.”

33 John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 345.

- war, even while controlling for the effect of territorial claims on dispute onset.³⁴
- Controlling for the effect of contiguity at the MID onset stage does not eliminate the effect of territory at the escalation to war stage.³⁵ Dyads that have territorial disputes are more likely to have a war regardless of whether or not they are contiguous. Controlling for the presence of territorial disputes wipes out the significance between contiguity and war onset.³⁶ The same is true of fatal MIDs.³⁷ These findings indicate that the territorial explanation of war is superior to the contiguity explanation of war.
 - Territorial claims and contiguity increase the likelihood of a MID, but the presence of a territorial dispute is the primary determinant of whether a MID is likely to escalate to war.³⁸
 - Dyads that are neighbors (i.e. contiguous) are more apt to have a MID than non-contiguous dyads.³⁹

2. Different types of territorial issues lead to different outcomes:

- Intangible territorial claims are more apt to have a MID than tangible territorial claims.⁴⁰ Not all territorial issues are equally likely to escalate to the threat or use of force (as in a MID). Territorial issues (claims) involving ethnic questions have proved the most conflict-prone,⁴¹ strategic territory the next, and territorial claims involving economic resources the least conflict-prone.⁴²

34 Senese and Vasquez, "A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict."

35 Senese, "Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict."

36 Vasquez, "Mapping the Probability of War and Analyzing the Possibility of Peace"; Senese, "Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict."

37 Hensel, "Territory."

38 Senese and Vasquez, "A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict"; Senese, "Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict."

39 Senese, "Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict."

40 Hensel and Mitchell, "Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims."

41 Huth, *Standing Your Ground*; Hensel and Mitchell, "Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims"; Hensel et al., "Bones of Contention Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues."

42 Huth, *Standing Your Ground*; Huth and Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, chap. 9.

- Salient territorial issues (i.e. involving homeland territory, ethnicity, or a long history of sovereign rule) are more likely to lead to a militarized interstate dispute.⁴³
- Territorial disputes that are handled through power politics are more apt to go to war than those that are not.
- Dyads that have outside alliances, a pattern of rivalry (recurring disputes), and an ongoing arms race are subject to a step-wise increase in the probability that the territorial MID will escalate to war. This pattern holds for the entire post-Napoleonic period for rivalry, for 1816–1945 and 1990–2000 for alliances, and for the arms races from 1816–1945.
- Dyads that have legally accepted their borders are considerably less likely to go to war⁴⁴ or raise a territorial claim.⁴⁵ Likewise, dyads that have stable borders are unlikely to have MIDs.⁴⁶
- Alliances that settle territorial disputes are less likely to be followed by war than other alliances.⁴⁷
- Once states settle their territorial claims, the probability of having any future MID considerably declines.⁴⁸ Enduring rivals that settle their territorial disputes experience a significant reduction in future MIDs.⁴⁹
- Leaders will resort to legal settlement procedures to deal with territorial disputes, rather than make concessions during negotiations, if they face political opposition or anticipate adverse domestic costs.⁵⁰
- Peaceful historical eras have few territorial disputes on the agenda.⁵¹
- Joint democratic dyads tend not to have many territorial disputes.⁵² Even when they have territorial claims against each other, they rarely threaten or use force over these claims.⁵³

43 Hensel et al., “Bones of Contention Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues.”

44 Kocs, “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945-1987.”

45 182 Huth, *Standing Your Ground*.

46 Gibler, “Bordering on Peace.”

47 Gibler, “Alliances That Never Balance.”

48 Hensel, “Territorial Claims and Armed Conflict between Neighbors.”

49 Gibler, “Control the Issues, Control the Conflict.”

50 Allee and Huth, “The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes”; Allee and Huth, “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement”; Simmons, “See You In’court?”

51 Henehan and Vasquez, “The Changing Probability of Interstate War, 1816-1992.”

52 Mitchell and Prins, “Beyond Territorial Contiguity.”

53 Huth and Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, 267.

- States with stable borders are more apt to become democracies.⁵⁴ The absence of external territorial MIDs is related to a higher level of domestic political tolerance.⁵⁵

3. Territorial conflict tends to endure:

- Territorial disputes are more apt to be reciprocated⁵⁶ and tend to recur.⁵⁷
- A sense of rivalry and contesting territory produce militarized disputes.⁵⁸
- States that have territorial disputes with each other are more apt to have fatal MIDs.⁵⁹
- Enduring rivalries that are territory-based have more severe MIDs.⁶⁰
- Dyads that have recurring territorial MIDs (four or more) have an increased probability of having a war.⁶¹
- Dyads that have a history of territorial MIDs will go to war sooner than dyads that have a history of non-territorial MIDs.⁶²

4. Some aspects of territorial conflict seem to be changing:

- The total number of interstate wars – including territorial ones – has decreased over the past 200 years even as the number of states has increased, resulting in 'a reverse correlation between the number of states and the risk of international war.'⁶³
- Since the end of the Second World War, fewer wars have led to the annexation of territory by the winning party: 'while approximately 80

54 Gibler, "Bordering on Peace."

55 Hutchison and Gibler, "Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat."

56 Hensel and Diehl, "It Takes Two to Tango Nonmilitarized Response in Interstate Disputes"; Hensel, "Charting A Course To Conflict."

57 Hensel, "One Thing Leads to Another"; Hensel, "Charting A Course To Conflict"; Hensel, "Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conflict."

58 Rasler and Thompson, "Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation"; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson, *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics*, chap. 9.

59 Senese, "Geographical Proximity and Issue Saliency"; Hensel, "Territory."

60 Tir and Diehl, "Geographic Dimensions of Enduring Rivalries."

61 Senese and Vasquez, *The Steps to War*, chap. 5.

62 Petersen, "History Matters: An Analysis of the Effect of Territorial Disputes on Dyadic Interstate Relations."

63 Tertrais, "The Demise of Ares," 11; Holsti, *Peace and War*, 136.

percent of territorial wars led to re-distributions of territory for all periods prior to 1945, this figure dropped to 30 percent after 1945.⁶⁴

To better understand why territorial conflicts are so prevalent, are likelier to escalate and generally last longer, the underlying factors of such conflicts need to be probed. We distinguish three basic reasons that account for the escalation of territorial disputes into militarized conflict: 1) strategic or political rationales, 2) economic incentives, and 3) ethnic, cultural or religious motivations.

2.3 STRATEGIC RATIONALES

The historical record confirms the inflammatory nature of territorial disputes where strategic issues are at stake. With strategic issues, we mean that territory has a certain security value, i.e. that whoever holds that piece of land is better able to defend their territory as a whole, and has a regional if not international advantage in terms of power projection over their neighbors.⁶⁵ This can apply to terrestrial or maritime areas. Between 1950 and 1990, no less than two-thirds of disputes where strategically located territory was at stake witnessed “high levels of diplomatic or military pressure.”⁶⁶ In that same period, when strategic considerations played a role in territorial disputes it led to a 15 percent increase in probability of conflict.⁶⁷ First and foremost, territorial disputes are more likely to escalate into militarized conflict if a country feels itself under threat of military invasion and perceives the need to acquire territory to defend its homeland.⁶⁸ Examples are Germany in 1914, Pakistan and India after 1947, Israel and Lebanon in 1982 and, arguably, Russia and Ukraine in 2014. Second, territorial disputes stem from a state’s attempt to protect its interests and its

64 Mark Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force”: *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring, 2001), p. 223.

65 In this paper, we use the “international power” category of the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer as a proxy for the strategic importance of territory. The Barometer describes this (p. 30) as “conflicts over changes in the power structure of the international system or in one of its regional systems”, underlining the geopolitical importance of territory.

66 Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 108.

67 John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 423; Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 108-113.

68 See e.g. Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 72-73.

ability to project force beyond its own borders. In the past, disputes over locations such as Fashoda in 1898 and the Suez Canal in 1956 all gave rise to militarized conflict. Recently, we've seen similar ventures undertaken by the U.S. in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2008); by China in the South China Sea; and by Russia in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). Third, states might seek to gain access to international waters. Examples include Bolivia (War of the Pacific, 1879-1883), Bulgaria (World War I), and today also Russia, wanting to consolidate access to the Mediterranean.

2.4 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

Access to and control over economic resources can also be a bone of contention in territorial disputes.⁶⁹ There is an economic incentive associated with territorial conflicts regarding the need to secure control or access to key resources, which are vital to national economic security interests.⁷⁰ Historical evidence, however, shows that such disputes have a low propensity to escalate, with only about a quarter rising above low-level conflict,⁷¹ examples being the Iraq-Kuwait war (1990-91) and the current conflict between Sudan and South-Sudan. In fact, economic incentives had an overall small effect of *reducing* the chance of conflict by 7%. According to Huth, this “suggests that leaders were generally not willing to sacrifice salient domestic political or security concerns for the opportunity to secure economic gains.”⁷² It also suggests that when it comes to attachment to territory, it is strategic or ancestral value that makes it worthwhile to contest.

Occasionally disputes over the exploitation rights of resources escalate into full-fledged conflict: for instance, among country pairs with oil near the common

69 Christopher Macaulay and Paul Hensel, “Natural Resources and Territorial Conflict”, available at <http://www.paulhensel.org/Research/isa14.pdf>. In the remainder of this paper, we use the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer description of “resources” as a proxy for economic incentives. This is described as “natural resources, raw materials, or the profit generated thereof.” (p. 19).

70 In the remainder of this paper, we use the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer description of “resources” as a proxy for economic incentives. This is described as “natural resources, raw materials, or the profit generated thereof.” (p. 19).

71 Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 113.

72 Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 108-113, 113; John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 423.

border, the chances of conflict are three to four times higher than when oil is absent.⁷³ At present, the number of actual conflicts as a result of this trigger has been relatively low: out of 17 existing territorial disputes involving resources (according to the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2013), only six have experienced serious levels of violence at some point. The likelihood of new resources coming online can also kick-start or re-ignite territorial disputes, as illustrated by the scramble for the maritime resources in the South China Sea.⁷⁴ But while the impact of economic motivations underlying territorial disputes is negative in relation to the chances of escalation, this does not permit complacency on the part of the international community.

2.5 ETHNIC AND CULTURAL MOTIVATIONS

Finally, ethnic and cultural motivations can push people to dispute borders and territories.⁷⁵ For a dispute to be an ‘ethnic interstate territorial dispute’, there has to be 1) territory inhabited by a large plurality or majority belonging to a specific ethnic group, 2) that is claimed by two different states, and 3) whereby the territory is claimed by both parties for the purpose of bringing their own kinsmen within their own borders.⁷⁶ In some cases, a minority living in a particular piece of territory can be sufficient if the land on which they live holds special significance to one of the claimants. Examples are Kosovo to Serbia, the West Bank to Israel and possibly bits of Ukraine to Russia.

73 See Francesco Caselli et al., “The Geography of Intern-State Resource Wars”, (July 23, 2014), p. 41, available at personal.lse.ac.uk/casellif/papers/oil%20wars.pdf.

74 Such disputes typically revolve around rights of passage, or of exploration/exploitation of available resources, and now expand into the Indian Ocean towards the Arabic Sea and the Persian Gulf.

75 Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 78; Paul Hensel and Christopher Macaulay, “Ethnic/Identity Issues and Interstate Territorial Conflict”, available at <http://www.paulhensel.org/Research/isa15.pdf>.

76 Clear definitions of ethnic interstate territorial conflict are hard to come by, also for ethnic conflict as such. One useful description that has been drawn on is Huibregtse, who speaks of “A conflict occurring between (...) two independent states is considered to have an ethnic dimension when the conflict is fought over ethnic secessionist and/or irredentist movements, mistreatment of ethnic groups, or ethnic political, economic and cultural rights.” See Ada Huibregtse, “Interstate Conflict and Ethnicity” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 13, no 1, p. 41. This description is a little broader than Huth’s description, who regards “appeals to ethnic solidarity” as including “emphasizing the common linguistic and cultural ties” or claim “mistreatment the minority population” in another country. See Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 51. In absence of a specific indication in the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, disputes have been classified for ethnic dimensions on the basis of a historical examination of each dispute.

In the period since World War II, territorial disputes involving ethnic claims have proved to be the most war-prone, increasing the odds of escalation from mere dispute to armed conflict by 30%.⁷⁷ According to Johnson and Toft, “[f]rom 1940 to 2000, no fewer than 73 percent of all ethnic wars centered on the control of territory.”⁷⁸ Very recent – and provisional – research has concluded that territorial claims are likely to occur if the cross-border ethnic group at issue makes up the majority in the challenging state. Under the same conditions, armed conflict is also more likely to occur.⁷⁹ In some respects, this set of motivations provides the most incendiary cocktail for creating conflict because it relates to identities and speaks to people’s thymos, or pride, for which people are prepared to fight.⁸⁰

To summarize, territorial conflicts have been found to be more intractable on average than other kinds of conflicts and they also tend to be very violent. Vasquez concludes here that:

“[i]n and of themselves, [territorial issues] increase the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and of crises. Second, once a territorial MID occurs between two states, it tends to recur. Third, territorial disputes are among the most serious of MIDs and are more likely to be severe and to result in fatalities than non-territorial disputes.”⁸¹

77 John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 423; Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 108-113.

78 Dominic D.P. Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, “Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict,” *International Security* 38, no. 3 (January 2014): p. 15.

79 Paul Hensel and Christopher Macaulay, “Ethnic/Identity Issues and Interstate Territorial Conflict” (July 24, 2014), available at www.paulhensel.org/Research/isa15.pdf.

80 See for thymos as a driving force for disputes Richard Ned Lebow, *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motivations for War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and also Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, Free Press, 2006), in particular chs. 17 and 27-31.

81 John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 351.

3 OVERVIEW OF CURRENT UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS

Of all ongoing interstate conflicts (89) listed in the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2013, almost 60% (51) are territorial in nature.⁸² Of these, about 40% have witnessed serious levels of violence at some point in the past. A big premium is put on territory when disputes involve political-strategic considerations, or when access to key resources or ethnic factors are involved. This is the case in Ukraine, but similar conditions prevail in central and east African countries. In disputes where only economic interests are at stake – say around the African west coast – or where there are no strategic interests at play – say in Latin America – the odds of outright conflict may be considered low.

Territorial disputes are not limited to particular geographic regions – they occur all over the world.⁸³ A number of these disputes are no more than disagreements about border delimitations that do not seem to carry critical political, security or economic implications. For instance, the dispute between Croatia and Slovenia over the Gulf of Piran is highly unlikely to lead to armed conflict. The same applies to the long-term (and previously very bloody) historical competition over Alsace-Lorraine, over which France and Germany fought for almost a hundred years, but where people now freely cross borders or speak their dialects without this being instrumentalized by political entrepreneurs.

82 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, “Conflict Barometer 2013.” See also the list of conflicts in the Annex.

83 In examining this map, it is important to keep in mind that 1) territorial/border disputes do not necessarily need to concern immediate neighbours, but could also involve countries with far-flung dependencies. Good examples are the U.K. and Argentina disputing ownership of the Falklands, or Denmark and Canada disputing control over the island of Hans. The current standoff in the South China Sea arguably also fits this category, with PR China claiming ownership over islands that are no way near the mainland coast.

In different parts of the world, however, disputes over land that has great strategic or economic value may still lead to armed incidents. The border disputes between China and Vietnam or Nigeria and Cameroon are good examples of this.




FIGURE 3. MAP OF CURRENT TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS.⁸⁴

Territorial disputes are fairly evenly spread around the world and also appear in some less likely places. Latin America has no fewer than nine outstanding territorial disputes, none of which have led to any serious levels of violence. These include longstanding disputes between Nicaragua and Colombia and Nicaragua and Costa Rica going back to the days of Latin American independence. The dispute between Peru and Chile regarding maritime delimitation is a good example of a dispute that was peacefully resolved,⁸⁵ and stands in a tradition of other cases that have been submitted to international tribunals.⁸⁶ The chances of armed violence occurring as a result of territorial disputes in Latin America look remote; even the almost 150 years old dispute

84 See Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, “Conflict Barometer 2013.”

85 “A Line in the Sea.” *The Economist*, February 1st, 2014.

86 See e.g. El Salvador v. Honduras, Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and Nicaragua v. Colombia.

between Colombia and Venezuela – ideological adversaries for over a decade – has not given rise to military engagements at any time.

In Africa, the effects of the race for resources may be starting to show, given that 5 out of 11 territorial disputes relate to resources. Most notably, three of these started in recent years, being Uganda v. DR Congo, Angola v. DR Congo⁸⁷ and Sudan-South Sudan. With new resources being discovered almost monthly off the coasts of Africa, and more resources coming online on the continent itself – partly due to Chinese involvement – more resources-related territorial disputes might very well emerge, in particular since many borders in Africa remain porous and continue to be contested. For instance, one dispute appears imminent between Somalia and Kenya over oil discoveries in the Indian Ocean.⁸⁸ Tanzania and Malawi could also be locked in a dispute soon.⁸⁹ Fortunately however, only the Sudan-South Sudan and Nigeria-Cameroon disputes have witnessed elevated levels of violence to date, suggesting that there is a prospect that other border disputes could be resolved peacefully. For instance, Somalia and Kenya have involved the UNCLOS tribunal in Hamburg as well as the International Court of Justice in seeking a resolution.⁹⁰ Not to be discounted in some of these disputes is the ethnic factor, which often mixes with issues over resources – examples being Sudan-Uganda, Nigeria-Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea-Gabon and Sudan-South Sudan – suggesting that there is a potentially explosive cocktail when these two factors converge.

In the Middle East, many of the current territorial conflicts find their origins in unresolved demarcation issues dating from the time of the demise of the Ottoman Empire. While the rise of ISIS is the clearest symptom of the fact that

87 See e.g. “Black Gold in the Congo.” at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/188-black-gold-in-the-congo-threat-to-stability-or-development-opportunity.aspx>.

88 See “Simmering Border Disputes in Battle to Control Oil, Gas.” At <http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/Oil-boom-and-border-tiffs-/979182/1487446/-/sg7ldx/-/index.html> This dispute is also likely to draw in Tanzania.

89 See “East Africa.” at <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/east-africa-oil-discoveries-fuel-fresh-border-disputes>.

90 See “Somalia Asks UN to Shelve Kenya Bid in Oil Border Dispute.” <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-asks-UN-to-shelve-Kenya-bid-in-oil-border-dispute-/2558/2464670/-/ymjsco/-/index.html>.

the Sykes-Picot system is on its way out,⁹¹ enduring disputes also exist between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Syria and Lebanon. Worryingly, five out of six current disputes have gone through phases of limited war or worse, the only exception being the Syria-Turkey dispute concerning the Hatay region. All of these considerations make this region the one with the highest average incidence of military conflicts of all regions between 1950-1990.⁹² The motivations for conflict exhibit no clear pattern, but suggest that national prestige and first-mover disadvantage mean that many disputes remain unresolved.

Asia is the most worrisome continent, being home to no fewer than 14 territorial disputes and one major rising power that seems bent on pursuing them. Significantly, all of the major powers in the region are involved in such disputes, many of which in multiple ones. For instance, China is embroiled with India, with countries in Southeast Asia (maritime delimitation) and with Japan (Senkaku/Diaoyu islands). Indonesia still has not resolved its territorial dispute with Timor Leste concerning the exclave of Oecusse, in spite of accepting the country's independence in 2002. The lack of legitimate borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan (the colonial-era Durand line) is also a factor in explaining the instability that continues to dog relations between these countries. In Southeast Asia, Thailand is enmeshed in two disputes, one with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple (adjudicated by the International Court of Justice in 2013, but continuing nonetheless) and with Myanmar over their 1948 border. The South China Sea issue is arguably emblematic for what might be to come on this continent, including disputes over access to and exploration rights of economic resources. This does not necessarily need to lead to territorial conflicts, but given the rise and strength of nationalist sentiments on the continent, as well as some serious skirmishes we have seen in recent years involving the Koreans, China, Japan and Vietnam, vigilance is needed to identify and mitigate potential triggers for territorial conflict.

91 See Itamar Rabinovich, "The End of Sykes-Picot? Reflections on the Prospects of the Arab State System", Middle East memo, *Brookings Institution*, February 2014, but see also Steven Simon, "The Middle East's Durable Map" *Foreign Affairs*, August 26, 2014, available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141934/steven-simon/the-middle-east-s-durable-map>.

92 Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 31.

Europe, the continent with the highest density of countries, is free of territorial disputes except at its fringes.⁹³ These disputes include Slovenia-Croatia and Turkey-Greece. This latter dispute concerns maritime delimitation in the Aegean, but could extend to areas in the eastern Mediterranean where potential oil and gas deposits beckon.⁹⁴ The dispute between Russia and Estonia was formally resolved in February 2014, but continues to simmer due to the Ukraine war.⁹⁵ Denmark and Norway are engaged in disputes in the Arctic zone, while the outstanding disputes the U.K. is involved in concern Spain (Gibraltar) and Argentina (Falklands). In all, this means that the picture for Europe looks relatively positive, with the major exception of course being Russia's (arguably) revanchist and irredentist agenda that we see playing out in Ukraine, which has the potential to upset the territorial order in the former Soviet space as a whole.

Around 60% of all current disputes involving territorial claims do not lead to any violence—at least not on a frequent basis. That is to say that for most of their existence, they remain largely dormant (“frozen”) and experience few if any serious flare-ups, examples being Japan-South Korea, Denmark-Canada, Turkey-Greece (Aegean islands) and South Africa-Swaziland. Many of these also do not include one of the three salient issues listed above, and are limited to delimitation questions. They include territorial disputes such as between Canada-Denmark, Nicaragua-Costa Rica, Singapore-Malaysia but also Japan-Russia (over the Kuriles), none of which have seen any serious levels of violence throughout their existence. Rather than seeking to resolve these issues, an ‘agreement to disagree’ could also be a ticket to geopolitical stability; i.e. disputes can sometimes die a peaceful death.

93 Indeed, one researcher found that “of the twenty-one wars in the international system since 1946, all but two (...) were fought outside Europe.” Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 5.

94 See Schleifer, “Turkey.” <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66680>.

95 See “After 20 Years, Russia and Estonia Sign Border Treaty.” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/18/us-russia-estonia-idUSBREA1HoQN20140218>.




FIGURE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF INTENSITIES OF ONGOING TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS⁹⁶.

Of all of these outstanding territorial disputes (2013) that have witnessed some form of armed violence at some point in time,⁹⁷ it turns out that almost all originated in unresolved border demarcations, the majority of which relate to post-colonial or secessionist issues.⁹⁸ Only the Israel-Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, North and South Korea and the South China Sea disputes do not immediately relate to colonial or secessionist disputes. This suggests that in order to avoid future disputes, it is very important to achieve unequivocal agreements on delimitations

96 See Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, “Conflict Barometer 2013.”

97 This list contains all territorial disputes according to the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer that are currently ongoing and which at one point in time experienced violence at level 3 (“violent crisis”). Many of these conflicts alternated between peace and war, and thus provide insight into conflict dynamics of current territorial disputes.

98 Essentially, this matches research done by John Vasquez, who concluded that “[t]he most important pattern is that neighbors who have accepted their boundaries as legitimate have a much lower probability of having a war than states that do not mutually recognize the legitimacy of their borders.” John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle Revisited* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 363.

in case of secessions or other settlements (say in post-1990 Eastern Europe), lest disputes erupt years or decades down the line.

Territorial disputes are more or less prone to escalate into armed violence based on whether they involve military-strategic, economic or ethnic, cultural or religious issues. Hence, even in an age of unprecedented globalization, territorial disputes continue to warrant serious attention.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ See e.g. David Newman, “The Resilience of Territorial Conflict in an Era of Globalization”, in Miles Kahler et.al, (eds.), *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

4 ODDS OF ESCALATION: WHEN DO UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES TURN HOT?

Like dormant volcanoes, plenty of interstate territorial disputes simmer beneath the surface, sometimes erupting with apparently little warning. Others are more visible but may still be hard to contain. For the policy-maker, the key questions then are 1) what set of factors makes territorial conflicts more prone for escalation, and 2), related to this, what are some common triggers in this process?

We saw in the second section of this paper that, historically speaking, particular characteristics of territorial disputes have rendered them more prone to violent escalation, most notably when they involve strategic, economic and/or ethnic & cultural factors. The previous section allowed us to update those historical findings based on the empirical record of the more recent past. In this section, we turn our attention to the present and the future and try to identify territorial disputes that, based on the analysis provided in the previous two sections, may be particularly vulnerable to escalation into conflict. We continue to focus on the three aforementioned ‘issues’ by taking them as early warning indicators for whether a particular dispute may be at greater risk of escalation. Schematically, the territorial disputes can be distinguished as follows.





FIGURE 5. CURRENT TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS THAT WITNESSED SERIOUS LEVELS OF VIOLENCE AND SOURCE OF ESCALATION.

Among all 51 existing interstate territorial conflicts today, some 27 include strategic, economic and ethno cultural factors, and sometimes a combination of those. (see Figure 5) These sets of factors also account for most of the territorial disputes that have witnessed a degree of violence at the level of violent crisis or above, being 13 out of a total of 20. Those cases where no specific strategic, economic or ethnic motives lie at the basis are usually the result of unsettled post-conflict or post-colonial borders (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Egypt-Sudan), or cases where one-time conflicts for regional hegemony or national pride were fought over (Israel-Lebanon, Iran-Iraq). Some of these disputes involve rather minute demarcation issues, such as between Eritrea and Djibouti, or Slovenia and Croatia. Others are leftovers from colonial times, examples being Spain and the U.K. concerning Gibraltar and the U.S. and Cuba over Guantánamo and Turkey and Greece following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In many of these cases, there can be a political motivation for not resolving the dispute at issue, but this is not the same as saying that the dispute remains unresolved because the territory at issue carries any significant strategic, economic or ethnic-cultural weight.



PRESTIGE & TERRITORIAL ADVANTAGE

- | | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Peru – Chile | Cambodia – Vietnam | USA – Cuba | Egypt – Sudan |
| Swaziland – S. Africa | Iran – UAE | Fiji – Tonga | Burundi – Rwanda |
| Japan – Russia | Denmark – Canada | Honduras – El Salvador | Eritrea – Djibouti |
| Thailand – Myanmar | Turkey – Greece | Nicaragua – Costa Rica | Ethiopia – Eritrea |
| Israel – Lebanon | Guatemala – Belize | Indonesia – Timor Leste | Singapore – Malaysia |
| Spain – UK | Slovenia – Croatia | Chile – UK | Iran – Iraq |

FIGURE 6. CURRENT TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS THAT WITNESSED SERIOUS LEVELS OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT ISSUE.¹⁰⁰

100 R&E= resources and economic; S&P= strategic and political; E&C= ethnic and cultural; P & TA=prestige and territorial advantage. The list of selected countries was compiled on the basis of data from the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2013. First, all disputes were selected that included “territory” so as to have a list of all territorial conflicts today. For “political and strategic rationales”, “international power” is used as a proxy. As a proxy for “resources and economic incentives”, Heidelberg’s “resources” category is used. To differentiate “ethnic and cultural motivations”, expert judgment was used in the absence of a reliable single indicator in the principal datasets on international conflict, but based on explicit sources that attest to the presence of ethnic factors in the selected disputes. Prestige and territorial advantage is the category of territorial conflicts in which none of the previously mentioned salient issues are present. See also the full list of conflicts in the annex.

Analyzing the various kinds of conflicts, one striking feature is the rise of territorial disputes over resources, of which fewer than seven (out of a total of 17) were added since 1990. Also remarkable is that two of the most notable recent geopolitical issues combine all three characteristics that increase the chances for escalation: the South China Sea and the Russia-Ukraine disputes, thus illustrating that, on average, the more characteristics a dispute contains, the higher the current intensity and onetime intensity of a conflict.

The sets of characteristics described above are not in themselves reasons why territorial disputes could escalate into militarized conflict. For this to happen, particular triggers or direct causes are required. We describe four of these triggers: regime change; discovery of economic resources; economic downturns; and ethnic tensions in disputed territory. These triggers can help us better understand why and when unresolved territorial disputes become unfrozen – and even how they can be pacified or resolved.¹⁰¹

Regime change brings a government in power that implements a more assertive foreign policy and then sparks a crisis. Of the 79 interstate conflicts between 1816 and 1997, no fewer than 75 (94.4%) were precipitated when a hardliner entered office in the agitating country.¹⁰² Regime change can be important both in terms of changes among the challenging or the incumbent side. Examples are the Turkish invasion of Cyprus following the imminent collapse of the Greek junta. The 1980 war between Iraq and Iran was significantly influenced by the revolution in Iran a year earlier. Today, regime change in Ukraine triggered Russia to capture Crimea and foment war in eastern Ukraine.

The discovery and availability and need for access to natural resources increases the value of a particular territory and incentivizes conflict actors to back up any claims they have with armed force. In a world with bulging demographic growth and continuing increases in living standards, the demand for the control of natural resources and secure access will continue to be critical

101 Huth list no fewer than twelve pathways to conflict, a number of which relate to unresolved border disputes. Here, the number of pathways has been limited to six for reasons of parsimony. This is not to say that a combination of pathways cannot occur for any given conflict. See Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 70.

102 See Brandon Valeriano, and Victor Marin, “Pathways to Interstate War: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the Steps to War Theory” *Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies*, Vol. 2 (2010), p. 11.

to a country's security. Indeed, the discovery of resources puts countries at greater risk of conflict, in particular in low-income countries, where the risk of a war having a secessionist character rises from 68% to 100%.¹⁰³ The South China Sea dispute is only the best known among recently (re-) emerged conflicts regarding the discovery of resources. Others examples are found in different corners of the world: from the coasts of Africa (Nigeria-Cameroon and DR Congo and Angola) to the Caribbean Sea (Colombia and Nicaragua) to the Mediterranean (Lebanon and Israel), albeit that very few of these have led to armed conflict so far.

An economic downturn pushes state leaders to pursue so-called diversionary policies or 'wag the dog', whereby a foreign quarrel is sought to deflect attention from problems at home. In recent history, we have seen the best-known examples of such, including Argentina seizing the Falklands at a time of economic trouble. Today North Korea can be said to have initiated armed force against its southern neighbor in the face of increasing impact of sanctions on the North's economy. While the full implications of this trigger remain under-researched,¹⁰⁴ it is nevertheless an important one to track, given how rapidly the domestic economic fortunes of countries can wax and wane.

Finally, **ethnic tensions in disputed territory** are used as a pretext by one of the conflict parties to foment possible secession and/or gain control over such territory. Already the most escalatory factor in relation to territorial conflicts, the stoking of ethnic tensions is therefore something to be closely watched.¹⁰⁵ In the past, we saw this occur when Germany claimed land inhabited by people of German descent before WWII; in the 1980s, such claims were rife in the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute; and of course in the run-up to the Bosnia and Kosovo wars. Today, we see such claims turn up between Sudan and South Sudan and in the conflict in Ukraine.

103 Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds.), *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions* (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2003), p. 5.

104 But see M. Taylor Fravel, "The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict", *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2010); Jaroslav Tir, "Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict" *Journal of Politics*, Vol 72, no 2 (2010), p. 413-25.

105 Among political scientists, this is called the 'elite-manipulation' thesis. Although criticized by some, here it is not conceived of as a cause of conflict, but rather as a trigger. See Bojana Blagojevic, "Causes of Ethnic Conflict, A Conceptual Framework" *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, Vol. 3, no. 1 (2009), p. 9-11.

In summary, particular characteristics of unresolved territorial disputes indicate general risk propensities based on historical evidence. Conflict escalation then results from particular triggers or proximate causes. These triggers can serve as late warning indicators to assess odds of conflict escalation. Underlying factors regarding political/strategic issues as well as ethnic/cultural issues make territorial disputes more dangerous, also because they are often associated with elements of national pride. This is less-so the case for economic issues. In terms of triggers, regime change and stoking of ethnic tensions are the most dangerous. Hence, wherever a combination of these factors and triggers occurs, vigilance is required. Interestingly, changes in the military balance between two countries have not had a significant impact on conflict escalation. In fact, only in about one in four cases where territorial claims were at stake and the challenger was four times as powerful as the challenged state did the former exploit an opportunity to press its claim.¹⁰⁶ Likewise, arms races prior to a conflict have been shown to have little if no effect on the outbreak of conflict overall.¹⁰⁷

In light of the potential triggers, some of the most important disputes to watch are:

- The South China Sea, where multiple players are involved in brinkmanship and hardline positions can lead to large-scale conflagrations. The upcoming elections in Japan could be an important test in this regard, while the economic slowdown in China could provide them with an incentive to increase their control over the area within the famous nine-dash-line.
- Russia-Ukraine, and its potential fallout, also due to the chance that hardliners, whether in Kiev, Tbilisi, the Baltics or Moscow, who may further escalate the current war. Further incendiary factors include political leaders who may play up ethnic differences. This is already an issue where Russia's Karaganov doctrine is concerned. But the fact that many countries in Eastern Europe have kinsmen living in neighboring countries adds to the chances of sustained or new conflict. The same issue

106 Paul Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 85-86.

107 Brandon Valeriano, and Victor Marin, "Pathways to Interstate War: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the Steps to War Theory" *Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies*, Vol. 2 (2010), p. 13.

could also lead to an escalation in the Russia-Kazakhstan dispute, since the latter hosts a sizeable Russian minority along the border with Russia.

- Pakistan-Afghanistan, a conflict that is likely to escalate should the Taliban manage to seize power in the coming years; and the territorial disputes in the African interior, because they represent a dangerous mixture of economic and ethnic factors that have proved to be able to escalate towards violence quickly.
- India-Pakistan, a conflict that last saw large scale conventional clashes in 1999, remains unstable mostly for political reasons - the danger being a hardliner coming to power. This is a real risk on both sides, and principally fueled by the instability in both countries: in Pakistan, a tenuous balance between the civilian and military leadership; in India, the rise of Hindu nationalism, which in particular differentiates itself from the (sizeable) Muslim minority. However, declining economic growth figures over the past years could also become a trigger towards escalation.
- Sudan-South Sudan is another dispute that is likely to continue to flare up in the coming years, because of a dangerous mix of hardline leaders on both sides, the unresolved border dispute, and the involvement of oil resources as well as ethnic issues.
- Armenia-Azerbaijan have an outstanding dispute that has continued since the two countries emerged independent from the Soviet Union. They last saw fighting in 1994, and intermittent skirmishes continue - the last flare-up dating from August 2014.¹⁰⁸ Even if it is impossible to assess the likelihood of a hardliner coming to power in either country, manipulation of popular resentment over ethnicity issues remains a clear and present danger.¹⁰⁹

Fortunately, there are also some situations that are much less likely to escalate, in spite of the apparent potential. This applies, for instance, to the disputes between Angola and DR Congo and Venezuela-Colombia. Both disputes concern access to resources, but in neither instance does this look to be a sufficient factor leading to armed conflict between the parties. What is more, there is a host of territorial conflict, which, in spite of the strength of the adversaries, continues to be unlikely to lead to serious levels of violence, at least in the short term. This

¹⁰⁸ EurasiaNet and network, "Bloody Clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Disputed Territory."

¹⁰⁹ Mansfield, *Electing to Fight*. p. 262.

includes the disputes between China and India, Japan and South Korea, Japan and Russia, and Turkey and Greece. In none of these disputes are interests such that armed altercations look likely.

In the 21st century, territorial conflicts will not be the only jurisdictional kind of contests between states. Cyber will become ever more important, and so will sea and space. But in all of these, physical territory will continue to play a role, and perhaps make it even more important, as these other jurisdictional dimensions are usually linked to territory in one way or another.

5 IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS

For the first time since the end of World War II, Europe has once again experienced the territorial expansion of one European country at the expense of another. Analogous threats exist, as we have seen in this paper, in many other parts of the world. How can Western defense and security organizations (WDSO) deal with these old and ‘new’ challenges? The final part of this paper sketches a number of policy options.

Guided by a more open-minded quest for robust policy options, our first concrete recommendation is to **boost our anticipation and prevention monitoring and early warning mechanisms**. This is in line with the findings of the 2010 Dutch Future Policy Survey that prompted the Dutch government to start the ‘Strategic Monitor’ to which this paper is a contribution. Given the observation that territorial conflict remains of particular concern amongst all drivers of militarized conflict, we see three concrete lines of development behind this recommendation.

- The first one is the necessity to develop special **(near) real-time datasets** for (at least) the main triggers behind territorial conflict and **monitor trends and developments** across these triggers. We indicated in the previous section that we do not have reliable and up-to-date data on some of these triggers and suggest here that we should.
- Secondly, we submit that also in the collection of evidence, balance is of the essence and that we should track both the negative sparks *and* the positive elements resilience. We recommend that special attention be devoted to the **development and deployment** of better international **(micro-) sensing capabilities** in a broader (i.e. not mainly military) context. When certain communities – especially at the sub-national level

– start developing or boosting new (exclusive) territory-based narratives, the international (security) community should be able to detect that as soon as possible. At the same time, our monitoring efforts should also look for and **track the evidence of individual or societal resilience** against such inflammatory territory-based invective. The proliferation of mobile devices in many conflict-prone parts of the world offers unprecedented opportunities for such a balanced security monitoring effort.

- A third line of development in our ‘monitoring’ recommendation is the actual **physical monitoring of unauthorized violations of territorial integrity** remains a key issue. Developed countries typically spend significant amounts of money on the physical monitoring of their borders. The world’s most fragile states that are also most conflict-prone typically do not. This suggests a large range of concrete options to make sure any such transgressions can globally and reliably be monitored. Here too, the proliferation of new sensor and data processing technologies offers great promise to help tame these old ghosts. It would be vastly preferable if such physical monitoring could be achieved with an international mandate from a global or regional security organization – maybe on the basis of early warning systems along the lines described in the previous paragraph. But since such a mandate remains implausible in the current international context, **WDSOs** could play an **important role in developing, sustaining** and – where necessary – **deploying such monitoring capabilities** both along their own **national or alliance borders**, but possibly also along the **increasingly contested borders** in possible or **actual conflict zones**. In this context, the case of Ukraine springs to mind, where one could wonder why it proved (and is proving) impossible to publicly and verifiably ascertain the presumed transgressions by Russian forces across the official Ukrainian-Russian border.¹¹⁰
- Once detected, the next imperative becomes to find **(cost) effective ways to ‘battle’** against such **self-serving parochial/territorial narratives** and in favor of more evidence-based and balanced analyses that put them in a broader perspective. As we have seen in this paper, one of the most incendiary ‘territorial’ cocktails blend territory with

110 It may be worthwhile to consider that such monitoring efforts could be perimeter-based (controlling borders) but also vector-based (whereby certain types of weapon systems, for instance, would be systematically tracked).

(intangible) ethnic rhetoric. This cocktail is usually stirred and served by local political entrepreneurs who may very well be guided by more venal or demonstrably material motives that are only thinly disguised by their rhetoric. **Effective mechanisms to puncture** their intangible aura by producing tangible evidence of possible venality may prove one of great value in the **prevention and mitigation** of territorial conflict.

- Another contribution that countries like the Netherlands could make and further invest in is to offer its good offices as the host of international judicial institutions that can **arbitrate** between conflict parties and **help solve territorial disputes**. International law is one of the key ‘weapons’ that the world as a community has to ‘arm’ itself against the destabilizing effects of territorial appetites and narratives. The potential effectiveness of this ‘weapon’ in deterrent, preventive and responsive ways is greatly hampered by the current inefficient global governance structure¹¹¹ and the often contradictory principles with respect to territory that undergird international law. As a community, we therefore have a shared incentive to uphold and – where possible – strengthen the rules-based global legal governance system. We derive some solace from the observation that a number of disputes involving resources have been resolved peacefully by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).¹¹² A case such as Israel v. Lebanon concerning potential reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean has, in spite of many other tensions, not led to an exacerbation of conflict between the two parties. The fact that most territorial disputes result from unsettled border demarcation issues and experience relatively low levels of violence on an annual basis – i.e. they are effectively “frozen” – creates an opportunity to promote arbitration or judgments by international bodies such as the ICJ as an effective means for settling age-old territorial quarrels. Today there are many cases in front of the ICJ dealing with territorial delimitation,¹¹³ and the recent conclusion of many can only be seen as encouraging and as a positive contribution of The Hague to

111 The veto power still enjoyed by the five permanent members of the Security Council has rendered the United Nations powerless in the face of many instances of territorial aggression. We have to bear in mind, however, that the Security Council’s powers are exercised in response to a breach of the peace, threat to the peace or act of aggression and they are not specifically intended to meet the non-fulfilment of general legal obligations. Dixon, *Textbook on International Law*.

112 See e.g. Cameroon-Nigeria (2002) and Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012).

113 See <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3>.

international stability. The smaller Western countries tend to be staunch proponents of international law. We therefore suggest a more focused investigation of what they might actually be able to do to strengthen international law – including on issues involving territory.

- We still see much scope for **improving our portfolio of conflict prevention options**, including ones in the field of **confidence-building measures**. We have argued elsewhere¹¹⁴ that an argument could be made in favor of deploying – openly – new-style security personnel to those parts of the world where territorial ghosts seem to be (re-) appearing in order to design ‘small-scale’ prototype initiatives that could then be scaled up or down based on their relative success in defusing territorial tensions.

Given the disappointingly weak ability of the international community to monitor and physically enforce international norms against territorial aggression, Western individual countries and alliances have no alternative but to start taking territorial defense more seriously again. For the Netherlands, this remains the first main task of the Dutch Armed forces and an international legal obligation under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Since many of the non-kinetic capabilities we have described here remain essentially untested, this inevitably implies that more traditional kinetic capabilities have to remain an important part of a balanced capability option portfolio.

- Western WDSOs may have to start putting **more emphasis** on what has come to be known as **A2AD** (anti-access/areal denial) strategies. The anti-A2AD concept became popular in the U.S. defense strategic literature in the past decade in the context of trying to disrupt, destroy and defeat ‘smart’ (relatively cheap and effective¹¹⁵) Chinese military investments that threatened to impede U.S. military access to the (South) East Asian theater in defense of its Allies.¹¹⁶ The defense planning challenge to defeat

114 De Spiegeleire et al., *Report*, 19–20.

115 Like various relatively cheap anti-ship and anti-land base missiles as well as (again cheap) quiet submarines and surface vessels (all – presumably – tied together with advanced ISR capabilities that piggy-back on Chinese global competitiveness in civilian technologies) that make the very expensive aircraft carrier groups but also US regional bases quite vulnerable. See also Gompert, *Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific*.

116 Cliff et al., *Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States*; Kelly et al., “Developing a U.S. Strategy for Dealing with China – Now and into the Future.” This ‘anti-access’ problem became the heart of the U.S. AirSea Battle doctrine, see Van Tol et al., *AirSea Battle*.

this Chinese strategy became known as the ‘anti-A2AD’ challenge. It may be worth pondering, however, whether a Western A2AD strategy along the lines of the Chinese example, whereby **Western technologies** might impede **possible territorial** competitors with varying degree of technological sophistication to deny would-be aggressors access to other countries territories, might not be a much better value for money proposition than the anti-A2AD. This may require investments in what the scholarly literature calls – not without controversy¹¹⁷ – ‘defensive’ military capabilities.

- In a more traditional vein, it also means there may be a need for the **deployment of international armed forces** along **disputed borders**, which **create buffer zones** that **separate conflict actors**. These can be peacekeeping missions under United Nations mandate but can also be a bilateral contribution to the security of an allied nation. Such deployments either aim **to deny** or **to deter** conflict actors from militarily contesting the control over disputed territories. While denial strategies will simply target their ability to do so, deterrent strategies seek to target their willingness. Successful deterrent strategies signal to the conflict actors that it will be prohibitively costly to infringe upon contested territory. **Deterrent strategies contain** both **military** and **political** elements and include a (substantial) military presence on the ground, joint training exercises and maneuvers along the borders, official (alliance) agreements, visits of high ranking leaders and statements underscoring the importance of the territory in question. As such, they illustrate the need for a **comprehensive security and defense policy** in which the actions of different departments converge and contribute to achieving an overall political objective.

In sum, also in the 21st century, paying attention to territorial conflicts remains critical for our security, for the reports about the declining significance of territory are rather exaggerated.

¹¹⁷ Seminal pieces on the offense-defense balance are Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma”; Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*; Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.”. See also Adams, “Attack and Conquer?,” -; Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” -; Glaser and Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?,” -; Glaser and Kaufmann, “What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?”

ANNEX ¹¹⁸

START	CONFLICT PARTIES	RESOURCE	POLITICAL	ETHNIC	CURRENT*	HIGHEST**	PEAK***
1825	Nicaragua – Colombia	1	0	0	2		
1833	Argentina – UK	1	0	0	2	5	1982
1858	Nicaragua – Costa Rica	0	0	0	1		
1871	Venezuela – Colombia	1	0	0	1		
1883	Bolivia – Chile	1	0	0	1		
1883	Peru – Chile	0	0	0	1		
1902	Swaziland – S. Africa	0	0	0	1		
1945	Japan – Russia	0	0	0	1		
1946	Syria – Turkey	0	1	1	3		
1947	Afghanistan – Pakistan	0	0	1	3		
1947	India – Pakistan	0	1	0	3	5	1998
1948	Israel – Lebanon	0	0	0	3	4	2006
1948	N. Korea – S. Korea	0	1	0	2		
1948	Syria – Israel	1	1	0	3	5	1973
1948	Thailand – Myanmar	0	0	0	1		
1949	China – Vietnam et al.	1	1	0	3	4	1986
1951	Japan – South K	0	0	0	2		
1954	China – India	1	1	0	2	4	1962
1954	Spain – UK	0	0	0	2		
1954	Thailand – Cambodia	0	1	1	1	5	1985
1958	Egypt – Sudan	0	0	0	1	3	1995
1959	USA – Cuba	0	0	0	1	3	1997
1960	Burundi – Rwanda	0	0	0	1		
1961	Iraq – Kuwait	1	0	0	1	5	1991
1961	Nigeria – Cameroon	1	0	1	3	4	1994
1963	Singapore – Malaysia	0	0	0	1		
1969	Cambodia – Vietnam	0	0	0	1	5	1978
1969	Iran – Iraq	0	0	0	1	5	1988
1970	Equatorial G. – Gabon	1	0	1	1		
1970	Iran – UAE	0	0	0	1	4	1971
1971	Japan – China	0	1	0	2		
1973	Denmark – Canada	0	0	0	1		

118 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, “Conflict Barometer 2013.”

START	CONFLICT PARTIES	RESOURCE	POLITICAL	ETHNIC	CURRENT*	HIGHEST**	PEAK***
1973	Turkey – Greece	0	0	0	2		
1981	Guatemala – Belize	0	0	0	1		
1987	Armenia – Azerbaijan	0	0	1	3	5	1994
1991	Slovenia – Croatia	0	0	0	1		
1993	Russia – Kazakhstan et al.	1	1	0	3		
1994	Eritrea – Djibouti	0	0	0	1	3	2008
1998	Ethiopia – Eritrea	0	0	0	1	5	2000
1994	Russia – Estonia	0	1	1	1		
1994	Sudan – Uganda	0	0	1	1	4	1997
2001	Russia – Norway/US/Canada/Denmark	1	0	0	1		
2002	Indonesia – Timor Leste	0	0	0	1		
2003	Russia – Ukraine	1	1	1	2		
2005	Cyprus – Turkey	1	1	0	2		
2005	Fiji – Tonga (Minerva Reefs)	0	0	0	1		
2007	Chile – UK	0	0	0	1		
2007	Uganda – DR Congo	1	0	0	1		
2009	Angola – DR Congo	1	0	0	1		
2011	Sudan – South Sudan	1	0	1	3		
2013	Honduras – El Salvador	0	0	0	2		

* CURRENT INTENSITY BY LEVEL (1-5); LEVELS OF INTENSITY: 1 = ETC.

** HIGHEST INTENSITY LEVEL OBSERVED (1-5); RECORDED IF AT LEVEL 3 OR ABOVE

*** YEAR OF HIGHEST INTENSITY LEVEL

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “After 20 Years, Russia and Estonia Sign Border Treaty.” *Reuters*. February 18, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/18/us-russia-estonia-idUSBREA1HoQN20140218>.
- “A Line in the Sea.” *The Economist*, February 1, 2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21595481-heres-grown-up-way-settle-long-standing-border-dispute-line-sea>.
- Allee, Todd L., and Paul K. Huth. “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover.” *The American Political Science Review* 100, no. 2 (May 1, 2006): 219–34.
- . “The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23, no. 4 (September 1, 2006): 285–307. doi:10.1080/07388940600972644.
- “An Exemplary Partnership.” *Beijing Review*, July 17, 2014.
- Balas, Alexandru, Andrew P. Owsiak, and Paul F. Diehl. “Demanding Peace: The Impact of Prevailing Conflict on the Shift from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding.” *Peace & Change* 37, no. 2 (2012): 195–226.
- Bannon, Ian, and Paul Collier, eds. *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2003.
- Battaglino, Jorge Mario. “The Coexistence of Peace and Conflict in South America: Toward a New Conceptualization of Types of Peace.” *A Coexistência Entre Paz E Conflito Na América Do Sul: Em Direção a Uma Nova Conceituação Dos Tipos de Paz*. 55, no. 2 (December 2012): 131–51.
- Belt, Stuart. “An Approach That Works.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 140, no. 4 (April 2014): 44–48.
- “Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity? - International Crisis Group,” March 20, 2015. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/188-black-gold-in-the-congo-threat-to-stability-or-development-opportunity.aspx>.

- Blagojevic, Bojana. "Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework." *Journal of Global Change and Governance* 3, no. 1 (2009): 1–25.
- Blank, Andreas. "Johannes von Felden on Usucaption, Justice, and the Society of States." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 74, no. 3 (July 2013): 403–23.
- Brunnschweiler, C. N., and E. H. Bulte. "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence, and the Onset of Civil Wars." *Oxford Economic Papers* 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 651–74. doi:10.1093/oep/gpp024.
- Burrett, Tina. "Reaffirming Russia's Remote Control: Exploring Kremlin Influence on Television Coverage of Russian-Japanese Relations and the Southern Kuril Islands Territorial Dispute." *Demokratizatsiya* 22, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 359–81.
- Caselli, Francesco, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner. *The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars*. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18978>.
- Cheng, Joseph Y. S. "China's Regional Strategy and Challenges in East Asia." *China Perspectives* 2013, no. 2 (June 2013): 53–65.
- Clancy, Mary Alice C., and John Nagle. "Frozen Conflicts, Minority Self-Governance, Asymmetrical Autonomies—In Search of a Framework for Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution." *6th Asia-Europe Roundtable, University of Ulster-United Nations University-International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE). Republic of Ireland*, 2009. http://osdnlkq.asef.org/images/docs/1276-6th_AER_Background_Paper_-_Dr._Clancy_and_Dr._Nagle.pdf.
- Colaresi, Michael. "A Boom with Review: How Retrospective Oversight Increases the Foreign Policy Ability of Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 56, no. 3 (July 2012): 671–89. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00567.x.
- Colaresi, Michael P., Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space and Conflict Escalation*. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Colaresi, Michael P., and William R. Thompson. "Alliances, Arms Buildups and Recurrent Conflict: Testing a Steps-to-War Model." *Journal of Politics* 67, no. 2 (May 2005): 345–64. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00320.x.
- "Contentious Cases | International Court of Justice," March 20, 2015. <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3>.

- Coyne, Christopher J., and Rachel L. Mathers. *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.
- Deudney, Daniel. "Geography and Change." In *New Thinking In International Relations Theory*, by Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 91–123. Westview Press, 1997.
- Diehl, Paul F. "Geography and War: A Review and Assessment of the Empirical Literature." *International Interactions* 17, no. 1 (1991): 11–27.
- . "What Are They Fighting for? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 3 (August 1992): 333.
- Diehl, Paul F., Derrick V. Frazier, Todd L. Allee, and Shannon O’Lear. "Introduction to CMPS Special Issue on Territorial Conflict Management1." *Conflict Management & Peace Science (Routledge)* 23, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 263–65. doi:10.1080/07388940600972610.
- Diehl, Paul F., and Gary Goertz. "Territorial Changes and Militarized Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 32, no. 1 (1988): 103–22.
- Diehl, Paul Francis. *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*. Vanderbilt University Press, 1999.
- Diehl, Paul, and Gary Goertz. *Territorial Changes and International Conflict*. Routledge, 2002. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YNSIAG-AAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=diehl+territory+conflict&ots=Wy7EL2Hryu&sig=IgOIeywSbJdhxHobmc_1lTnbCHc.
- . *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
- Dreyer, David R. "Issue Conflict Accumulation and the Dynamics of Strategic Rivalry." *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 3 (September 2010): 779–95. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00609.x.
- . "Issue Intractability and the Persistence of International Rivalry." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 5 (November 1, 2012): 471–89. doi:10.1177/0738894212449090.
- Dudden, Alexis. "Japan’s Island Problem." *Dissent (00123846)*, Fall 2014.
- "East Africa: Oil Discoveries Fuel Fresh Border Disputes," March 19, 2015. <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/east-africa-oil-discoveries-fuel-fresh-border-disputes>.
- "Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2013," March 19, 2015. http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/documents/seguridad_1406connavegacionfinalaccesiblepdf.pdf.

- EurasiaNet, Joshua Kucera for, and part of the New East network. “Bloody Clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Disputed Territory.” *The Guardian*, March 20, 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/04/nagorno-karabakh-clashes-azerbaijan-armenia>.
- “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Speech: Strengthening Europe Security and Defence Sector,” March 19, 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-177_en.htm.
- Forsberg, Erika. “Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 2 (June 2013): 329–40. doi:10.1111/isqu.12006.
- Fravel, M. Taylor. “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential for Territorial Expansion.” *International Studies Review* 12, no. 4 (December 2010): 505–32. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00958.x.
- . “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict.” *Security Studies* 19, no. 2 (May 21, 2010): 307–41. doi:10.1080/09636411003795731.
- Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Jaroslav Tir. “Territorial Dimensions of Enduring Internal Rivalries.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 4 (September 1, 2009): 307–29. doi:10.1177/0738894209106478.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. 1st Free Press trade pbk. ed. New York: Free Press, 2006.
- Fu Ying. “Answers to Four Key Questions about China’s Rise.” *China Today*, January 2015.
- Gartzke, Erik, and J. Joseph Hewitt. “International Crises and the Capitalist Peace.” *International Interactions* 36, no. 2 (April 2010): 115–45. doi:10.1080/03050621003784846.
- Gartzke, Erik, and Alex Weisiger. “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 171–85. doi:10.1111/isqu.12046.
- Gibler, Douglas M. “Alliances That Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no. 1 (February 1, 1996): 75–97. doi:10.1177/073889429601500104.
- . “Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 3 (September 2007): 509–32. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00462.x.

- . “Contiguous States, Stable Borders, and the Peace between Democracies.” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 1 (March 2014): 126–29. doi:10.1111/isqu.12105.
- . “Control the Issues, Control the Conflict: The Effects of Alliances That Settle Territorial Issues on Interstate Rivalries.” *International Interactions* 22, no. 4 (1997): 341–68.
- . “East or Further East?” *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 7 (November 1999): 627.
- . “Outside-In: The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 4 (August 2010): 519–42. doi:10.1177/0022002710370135.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Alex Braithwaite. “Dangerous Neighbours, Regional Territorial Conflict and the Democratic Peace.” *British Journal of Political Science* 43, no. 4 (October 2013): 877–87. doi:10.1017/S000712341200052X.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Marc L. Hutchison. “Territorial Issues, Audience Costs, and the Democratic Peace: The Importance of Issue Salience.” *Journal of Politics* 75, no. 4 (October 2013): 879–93. doi:10.1017/S0022381613000923.
- Gibler, Douglas M., Marc L. Hutchison, and Steven V. Miller. “Individual Identity Attachments and International Conflict: The Importance of Territorial Threat.” *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 12 (December 2012): 1655–83. doi:10.1177/0010414012463899.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Steven V. Miller. “Comparing the Foreign Aid Policies of Presidents Bush and Obama.” *Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell)* 93, no. 5 (December 10, 2012): 1202–17. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00909.x.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Steven V. Miller. “External Territorial Threat, State Capacity, and Civil War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 5 (September 2014): 634–46. doi:10.1177/0022343314531003.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Steven V. Miller. “Quick Victories?: Territory, Democracies, and Their Disputes.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 2 (April 2013): 258–84. doi:10.1177/0022002712446126.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Kirk A. Randazzo. “Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 3 (July 2011): 696–709. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x.

- Gibler, Douglas M., and Jamil A. Sewell. "External Threat and Democracy: The Role of NATO Revisited." *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 4 (July 2006): 413–31. doi:10.1177/0022343306065115.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Jaroslav Tir. "Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers." *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 4 (October 2010): 951–68. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00473.x.
- . "Territorial Peace and Democratic Clustering." *Journal of Politics* 76, no. 1 (January 2014): 27–40. doi:10.1017/S0022381613001059.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and John A. Vasquez. "Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980." *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (December 1998): 785.
- Gibler, Douglas M., and Scoyf Wolford. "Alliances, Then Democracy: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGIME TYPE AND ALLIANCE FORMATION." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 1 (February 2006): 129–53. doi:10.1177/0022002705281360.
- Harrison, Mark, and Nikolaus Wolf. "The Frequency of Wars." *The Economic History Review* 65, no. 3 (2012): 1055–76.
- Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. "Conflict Barometer 2013," March 20, 2015. http://hiik.de/de/downloads/data/downloads_2013/ConflictBarometer2013.pdf.
- Henehan, Marie T., and John A. Vasquez. "The Changing Probability of Interstate War, 1816-1992." In *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*, by Raimo Vayrynen, 289–99, 2006.
- Hensel, Paul R. "Charting A Course To Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816-1992." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no. 1 (February 1, 1996): 43–73. doi:10.1177/073889429601500103.
- . "ICOW Territorial Claims Data," March 7, 2015. <http://www.paulhensel.org/icowterr.html>.
- . "Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conflict." *New Directions in the Study of International Conflict, Crises, and War*, 1998, 162–204.
- . "One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816-1986." *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no. 3 (August 1, 1994): 281–97. doi:10.1177/0022343394031003004.

- . “Territorial Claims and Armed Conflict between Neighbors.” In *Article Presented to the Lineae Terrarum International Borders Conference, El Paso, TX*, 2006. <http://www.paulhensel.org/Research/lineae.pdf>.
- . “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict.” In *What Do We Know about War*, by John A. Vasquez, 57–84, 2000.
- Hensel, Paul R., Michael E. Allison, and Ahmed Khanani. “Territorial Integrity Treaties and Armed Conflict over Territory.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 120–43. doi:10.1177/0738894208101126.
- Hensel, Paul R., and Paul F. Diehl. “It Takes Two to Tango Nonmilitarized Response in Interstate Disputes.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 3 (September 1, 1994): 479–506. doi:10.1177/0022002794038003006.
- Hensel, Paul R., and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. “Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims.” *GeoJournal* 64, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 275–85. doi:10.1007/s10708-005-5803-3.
- Hensel, Paul R., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E. Sowers, and Clayton L. Thyne. “Bones of Contention Comparing Territorial, Maritime, and River Issues.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 1 (2008): 117–43.
- Horowitz, Shale, and Min Ye. “Targeting Civilians in Ethno-Territorial Wars: Power- and Preference-Based Sources of Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Killing Strategies.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36, no. 5 (May 2013): 372–93. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2013.775455.
- Huibregtse, Ada. “Interstate Conflict and Ethnicity.” *Civil Wars* 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 40–60. doi:10.1080/13698249.2011.555691.
- Hutchison, Marc L. “Territorial Threat, Mobilization, and Political Participation in Africa.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 183–208. doi:10.1177/0738894211404790.
- Hutchison, Marc L., and Douglas M. Gibling. “Political Tolerance and Territorial Threat: A Cross-National Study.” *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 1 (February 2007): 128–42. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00499.x.
- . “Why Territory Matters: The Effects of External Threat on Domestic Political Tolerance.” In *Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association*, 1–33, 2005. <http://proxy.library.umkc.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=18608873&site=e=ehost-live&scope=site>.
- Huth, Paul. *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.

- Huth, Paul, Sarah Croco, and Benjamin Appel. "Law and the Use of Force in World Politics: The Varied Effects of Law on the Exercise of Military Power in Territorial Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March 2012): 17–31. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00695.x.
- Huth, Paul K., and Todd L. Allee. *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Huth, Paul K., Sarah E. Croco, and Benjamin J. Appel. "Bringing Law to the Table: Legal Claims, Focal Points, and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes Since 1945." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 1 (January 2013): 90–103. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00607.x.
- Johnson, Dominic DP, and Monica Duffy Toft. "Bringing 'Geo' Back into Politics: Evolution, Territoriality and the Contest over Ukraine." *Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution* 5, no. 1 (2014). <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/59536683.pdf>.
- Johnson, Dominic D.P., and Monica Duffy Toft. "Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict." *International Security* 38, no. 3 (January 1, 2014): 7–38. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00149.
- Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no. 2 (September 1, 1996): 163–213. doi:10.1177/073889429601500203.
- Jun Xiang. "Relevance as a Latent Variable in Dyadic Analysis of Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 2 (April 2010): 484–98.
- Kahler, Miles, and Barbara F. Walter, eds. *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Klein, James P., Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl. "The Peace Scale: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Non-Rivalry and Peace." *Conflict Management & Peace Science (Routledge)* 25, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 67–80. doi:10.1080/07388940701860466.
- Kocs, Stephen A. "Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945-1987." *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 1 (February 1995): 159.
- Küntay, Burak. "Peace through Institutions: Woodrow Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference." *Kurumlar Yoluyla Barış: Woodrow Wilson ve Paris Barış Konferansı*. 8, no. 15 (December 2014): 73–89.

- Kuo, Raymond, Dominic D.P. Johnson, and Monica Duffy Toft. "Correspondence: Evolution and Territorial Conflict." *International Security* 39, no. 3 (January 1, 2015): 190–201. doi:10.1162/ISEC_c_00180.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Lektzian, David, Brandon C. Prins, and Mark Souva. "Territory, River, and Maritime Claims in the Western Hemisphere: Regime Type, Rivalry, and MIDs from 1901 to 2000." *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 4 (December 2010): 1073–98. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00627.x.
- Levin, Dov H., and Benjamin Miller. "Why Great Powers Expand in Their Own Neighborhood: Explaining the Territorial Expansion of the United States 1819-1848." *International Interactions* 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 229–62. doi:10.1080/03050629.2011.594746.
- "Livre Blanc Sur La Défense et La Sécurité Nationale 2013." *Calameo.com*, March 19, 2015. <http://www.calameo.com/read/000331627d6fo4ea4fe0e>.
- Macaulay, Christopher, and Paul R. Hensel. "Natural Resources and Territorial Conflict," March 19, 2015. <http://www.paulhensel.org/Research/isa14.pdf>.
- Mackinder, Halford John. *The Geographical Pivot of History*. Royal geographical Society, 1904.
- Malik, Mohan. "Energy Remapped." *World Affairs* 177, no. 5 (February 1, 2015): 85–92.
- Mansfield. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. MIT Press, n.d.
- Markowitz, Jonathan N., and Christopher J. Fariss. "Going the Distance: The Price of Projecting Power." *International Interactions* 39, no. 2 (April 2013): 119–43. doi:10.1080/03050629.2013.768458.
- Mattes, Michaela, and Greg Vonnahme. "Contracting for Peace: Do Nonaggression Pacts Reduce Conflict?" *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 4 (October 2010): 925–38. doi:10.1017/S0022381610000447.
- Mazarr, Michael J. "The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 1 (February 1, 2014): 113–21.
- McKibben, Heather Elko. "The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (April 2013): 411–27. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00628.x.
- "MIDs — Cow," March 20, 2015. <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs/mids>.

- Miller, Steven V. "Territorial Disputes and the Politics of Individual Well-Being." *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 6 (November 2013): 677–90. doi:10.1177/0022343313484954.
- Miller, Steven V., and Douglas M. Gibling. "Democracies, Territory, and Negotiated Compromises." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 261–79. doi:10.1177/0738894211404797.
- Ministerie van Algemene Zaken. "Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving - Kamerstuk - Rijksoverheid.nl." Kamerstuk, November 14, 2014. <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheid-turbulente-tijden-in-een-instabiele-omgeving.html>.
- Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. "A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World - News Item - Government.nl," June 21, 2013. <http://www.government.nl/news/2013/06/21/a-secure-netherlands-in-a-secure-world.html>.
- Mitani, John C., David P. Watts, and Sylvia J. Amsler. "Lethal Intergroup Aggression Leads to Territorial Expansion in Wild Chimpanzees." *Current Biology* 20, no. 12 (June 22, 2010): R507–8. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2010.04.021.
- Mitchell, Sara MacLaughlin, and Brandon C. Prins. "Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes." *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (1999): 169–83.
- Mitchell, Sara MacLaughlin, and Paul F. Diehl. "Caution in What You Wish for: The Consequences of a Right to Democracy." *Stanford Journal of International Law* 48, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 289–317.
- Montiel, Cristina Jayme, Judith M. de Guzman, and Ma. Elizabeth J. Macapagal. "Fragmented Ethnopolitical Social Representations of a Territorial Peace Agreement: The Mindanao Peace Talks." *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology* 6, no. 2 (December 2012): 37–47. doi:10.1017/prp.2012.4.
- Otte, Neil, Brian Donohue, and Barry Smith. "An Ontological Approach to Territorial Disputes," 2014. <http://philpapers.org/rec/OTTAOA>.
- "Paul Huth Dataverse - Harvard Dataverse Network," March 7, 2015. <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/phuth>.
- Petersen, Karen. "History Matters: An Analysis of the Effect of Territorial Disputes on Dyadic Interstate Relations," 2008.
- Petrovsky, Vladimir. "Origins of the Cold War in Northeast Asia: Did Gromyko Always Say 'Nyet'?" *Far Eastern Affairs* 42, no. 2 (April 2014): 68–82.

- Powell, Emilia Justyna. "Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation." *International Interactions* 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 28–59. doi:10.1080/03050620903553855.
- Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. "The International Court of Justice and the World's Three Legal Systems." *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (May 2007): 397–415. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00539.x.
- Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Krista E. Wiegand. "Legal Systems and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 129–51. doi:10.1177/0738894209343979.
- Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Krista E. Wiegand. "Strategic Selection: Political and Legal Mechanisms of Territorial Dispute Resolution." *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 3 (May 2014): 361–74. doi:10.1177/0022343313508969.
- Prorok, Alyssa K., and Paul K. Huth. "International Law and the Consolidation of Peace Following Territorial Changes." *Journal of Politics* 77, no. 1 (January 2015): 161–74. doi:10.1086/678529.
- Quackenbush, Stephen L. "Territorial Issues and Recurrent Conflict." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 27, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 239–52. doi:10.1177/0738894210366511.
- Rabinovich, Itamar. "The End of Sykes-Picot? Reflections on the Prospects of the Arab State System." *The Brookings Institution*, March 20, 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/02/sykes-picot-rabinovich>.
- Raleigh, Clionadh. "Scales of Conflict Research." *International Interactions* 37, no. 4 (October 2011): 469–81. doi:10.1080/03050629.2011.622663.
- . "Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Does Physical Geography Affect a State's Conflict Risk?" *International Interactions* 36, no. 4 (October 2010): 384–410. doi:10.1080/03050629.2010.524524.
- Rasler, Karen A., and William R. Thompson. "Contested Territory, Strategic Rivalries, and Conflict Escalation." *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 1 (March 2006): 145–68. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00396.x.
- Ratzel, Friedrich. *Politische Geographie: oder, die Geographie der Staaten, des Verkehrs und des Krieges*. R. Oldenbourg, 1903.
- Regan, Patrick M. "Civil War and Territory? Drawing Linkages Between Interstate and Intrastate War." *International Interactions* 35, no. 3 (July 2009): 321–29. doi:10.1080/03050620903084844.
- Rider, Toby J. "Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races." *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (September 2013): 580–91. doi:10.1111/isqu.12058.

- . “Understanding Arms Race Onset: Rivalry, Threat, and Territorial Competition.” *Journal of Politics* 71, no. 2 (April 2009): 693–703.
- Ritter, Carl. *Die Erdkunde im Verhältniss zur Natur und zur Geschichte des Menschen: oder allgemeine vergleichende Geographie, als sichere Grundlage des Studiums und Unterrichts in physikalischen und historischen Wissenschaften*. G. Reimer, 1838.
- Sample, Susan G. “From Territorial Claim to War: Timing, Causation, and the Steps-to-War.” *International Interactions* 40, no. 2 (April 2014): 270–85. doi:10.1080/03050629.2014.880698.
- Saul, Ben. “China, Natural Resources, Sovereignty and International Law.” *Asian Studies Review* 37, no. 2 (June 2013): 196–214. doi:10.1080/10357823.2013.769497.
- Schleifer, Yigal. “Turkey: Trouble Brewing With Greece Over Maritime Territorial Claims?” *EurasiaNet*, March 12, 2013. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66680>.
- Schneider, Christina J., and Johannes Urpelainen. “Distributional Conflict Between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification¹ Distributional Conflict Between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 13–27. doi:10.1111/isqu.12024.
- Senese, Paul D. “Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation of Militarized Interstate Conflict.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no. 2 (September 1, 1996): 133–61. doi:10.1177/073889429601500202.
- . “Territory, Contiguity, and International Conflict: Assessing a New Joint Explanation.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 4 (October 2005): 769–79. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00154.x.
- Senese, Paul D., and John A. Vasquez. “Alliances, Territorial Disputes, and the Probability of War.” *The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem*, 2004, 189.
- . “A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919–1992.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 2 (2003): 275–98.
- . *The Steps to War: An Empirical Study*. Princeton University Press, 2008.

- “Simmering Border Disputes in Battle to Control Oil, Gas,” March 20, 2015. <http://www.africareview.com/Special-Reports/Oil-boom-and-border-tiffs-/-/979182/1487446/-/sg7ldx/-/index.html>.
- Simmons, Beth A. “See You In ‘Court’? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes.” In *A Roadmap to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*, by Paul F. Diehl, 1999. <http://scholar.harvard.edu/bsimmons/publications/see-you-court-appeal-quasi-judicial-legal-processes-settlement-territorial-dis>.
- Simon, Steven. “The Middle East’s Durable Map.” *Foreign Affairs*, August 26, 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141934/steven-simon/the-middle-east-s-durable-map>.
- Slobodchikoff, Michael O. “How Effective Are International Organizations at Resolving Territorial Disputes Among Member States: A Look at the European Union.” *Studies of Changing Societies: Comparative & Interdisciplinary Focus* 1, no. 2 (February 2012): 29–59.
- “Somalia Asks UN to Shelve Kenya Bid in Oil Border Dispute,” March 19, 2015. <http://www.www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-asks-UN-to-shelve-Kenya-bid-in-oil-border-dispute/-/2558/2464670/-/ymjsco/-/index.html>.
- Șoșea, Cristina. “A Conceptual Viewpoint on the Urban Periphery. Craiova, Romania as a Case Study.” *Considerații Privind Conceptul de Periferie Urbană. Craiova, România - Studiu de Caz*. 12, no. 2 (December 2013): 187–93. doi:10.5775/fg.2067-4635.2013.222.d.
- Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *Foundations of National Power. Readings on World Politics and American Security*. New York, 1951.
- Spykman, Nicholas John. *America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*. Transaction Publishers, 1942.
- Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Paul E. Diehl, Philip Schafer, and Charles Gochman. “The Correlates of War (cow) Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3.0.” *Conflict Management & Peace Science (Routledge)* 19, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 59–67.
- Taylor, Brendan. “The South China Sea Is Not a Flashpoint.” *Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 99–111. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.893176.
- Tertrais, Bruno. “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?” *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (August 2012): 7–22. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2012.703521.

- “The Cameroon-Nigerian Border Conflict in the Lake Chad Region,” October 15, 2014. <http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/21-40/panel-28/Metz-Warner-Brzoska-Full-paper.pdf>.
- Tir, Jaroslav. “Domestic-Level Territorial Disputes: Conflict Management via Secession.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23, no. 4 (September 1, 2006): 309–28. doi:10.1080/07388940600972651.
- . “Never-Ending Conflicts? Territorial Changes as Potential Solutions for Territorial Disputes.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 20, no. 2 (September 1, 2003): 59–83. doi:10.1177/073889420302000203.
- . “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict.” *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 413–25. doi:10.1017/S0022381609990879.
- Tir, Jaroslav, and Paul F. Diehl. “Geographic Dimensions of Enduring Rivalries.” *Political Geography* 21, no. 2 (February 2002): 263–86. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00059-2.
- Tir, Jaroslav, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz. “Territorial Changes, 1816–1996: Procedures and Data.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 16, no. 1 (1998): 89–97.
- Tyner, James A., Stian Rice, and Andrew Shears. “State Capacity, Scalar Politics, and the Geographic Study of Civil Wars.” *International Interactions* 37, no. 4 (October 2011): 481–89. doi:10.1080/03050629.2011.622660.
- Ugarte, Augusto Pinochet. “Geopolitical Thinking throughout History.” In *Introduction to Geopolitics*, 43–58. Editorial Andres Bello, 1981.
- Usanov, Artur, Marjolein de Ridder, Willem Auping, Stephanie Lingemann, Luis Tercero Espinoza, Magnus Ericsson, Masuma Farooki, Henrike Sievers, and Maren Liedtke. *Coltan, Congo and Conflict*. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2013. <http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=en5eBAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA4&dq=%22US%24+per+kg+of+tantalum%22+%22the+early+2000s,+tantalum+%E2%80%93+a+rare+metal+with+some+unique+properties%22+%22strong+public+attention+on+tantalum+and+coltan+is+somewhat%22+&ots=yfS5Jnn1zJ&sig=q3pGXcxXf1j7uPCPX9OZgtRp8>.
- Valentino, Benjamin A., Paul K. Huth, and Sarah E. Croco. “Bear Any Burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War.” *Journal of Politics* 72, no. 2 (April 2010): 528–44.

- Valeriano, Brandon. "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Testing Aggressive Power Politics Models." *International Interactions* 35, no. 2 (April 2009): 179–206. doi:10.1080/03050620902864493.
- Valeriano, Brandon, and John Van Benthuisen. "When States Die: Geographic and Territorial Pathways to State Death." *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 7 (August 2012): 1165–89. doi:10.1080/01436597.2012.691826.
- Valeriano, Brandon, and Douglas M. Gibling. "The Steps to Interstate War in Africa." *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association, Annual Meeting 2006*, 1–35.
- VALERIANO, BRANDON, and VICTOR MARIN. "Pathways to Interstate War." *Josef Korbel Journal of*, March 20, 2015, 1.
- Vasquez, John A. "Mapping the Probability of War and Analyzing the Possibility of Peace: The Role of Territorial Disputes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18, no. 2 (February 1, 2001): 145–73. doi:10.1177/073889420101800201.
- . "The Probability of War, 1816–1992 Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, March 25, 2002, New Orleans." *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–28. doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00289.x.
- . *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- . *The War Puzzle Revisited*. 1 edition. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- , ed. *What Do We Know about War ?*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.
- Vasquez, John A., and Brandon Valeriano. "Classification of Interstate Wars." *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 02 (April 2010): 292. doi:10.1017/S0022381609990740.
- Vasquez, John, and Marie T. Henehan. "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992." *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 2 (March 1, 2001): 123–38.
- Vasquez, John, and Christopher S. Leskiw. "The Origins and War Proneness of Interstate Rivalries." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (June 2001): 295.
- Vayrynen, Raimo. *The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates*. Routledge, 2013.

- Wang, Taehee, Elena V. McLean, and Douglas W. Kuberski. "Coercion, Information, and the Success of Sanction Threats." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 1 (January 2013): 65–81. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00629.x.
- Wiegand, Krista Eileen. *Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement*. Studies in Security and International Affairs. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011.
- Wiegand, Krista E., and Emilia Justynia Powell. "Unexpected Companions Bilateral Cooperation Between States Involved in Territorial Disputes." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 209–29. doi:10.1177/0738894211404792.
- Wolff, Stefan. "Conflict Management in Divided Societies: The Many Uses of Territorial Self-Governance." *International Journal on Minority & Group Rights* 20, no. 1 (January 2013): 27–50. doi:10.1163/15718115-02001003.
- Wright, Thorin M., and Toby J. Rider. "Disputed Territory, Defensive Alliances and Conflict Initiation." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 119–44. doi:10.1177/0738894213503440.
- Yubing Sheng. "Preventing Balancing: China's Territorial Concessions and Threat Reduction." *Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association*, 1/1/2014 2014, 1–61.
- Yu Lintao. "Lasting Peace. (cover Story)." *Beijing Review*, July 10, 2014.
- Zacher, Mark W. "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force." *International Organization* 55, no. 02 (2001): 215–50.
- Zhao, Suisheng. "Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn." *Journal of Contemporary China* 22, no. 82 (July 2013): 535–53. doi:10.1080/10670564.2013.766379.
- Zitelmann, Thomas. "Introduction to the Special issue 'Horn of Africa'." *Africa Spectrum*, 2008, 5–18.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Lange Voorhout 16
2514 EE The Hague
The Netherlands

info@hcass.nl
HCSS.NL